(Online Appendix) Presidential Particularism and Mayoral Elections?

November 2024

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
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A   Online Appendix: Figures

Figure A.1: Cities, Population over 50,000

*Note*: The legend represents circle sizes. However, it does not denote a range but rather indicates specific population sizes. Consequently, many cities have circle sizes smaller than those representing a population of 500 (in thousands), while a few cities have circle sizes larger than those representing 5,000 (in thousands). Although Anchorage, Alaska, is included in the analysis, it is not depicted on this map.

Figure A.2: Federal Grants to Cities by Election Years (FY2006-2021)

(a) Education

(b) Community Development

(c) Housing

(d) Transportation

Note: Among federal grants, transportation grants are particularly noteworthy, serving as a significant credit-claiming source for subnational politicians (Lee 2004, Gerber and Gibson 2009, Nicholson-Crotty and Theobald 2011, Brollo and Nannicini 2012). Community development, housing, and education grants also represent pivotal policy concerns (Kettl 1979, Handley 2008, Hays 2012), as well as significant spending domains for the local government. (See, for example, U.S. Census Bureau, *2021 Annual Surveys of State and Local Government Finances.*) This wider perspective also takes into account the significant lobbying expenditures by local governments (Goldstein and You 2017).

B   Online Appendix: Tables

Table B.1: Summary Statistics, During Mayoral Election Years

Variable	N	Min	Max	Mean	SD
Federal Block and Project Grants (Per Capita)	1956	-47.18482	576.9568	17.62431	37.87925
Swing City (Prev Election)	2012	0	1	0.2171968	0.4124402
Close City (Prev Election)	2012	0	1	0.1093439	0.3121478
President - Mayor Party Alignment	2012	0	1	0.4498012	0.4975974
President - Governor - Mayor Party Alignment	2012	0	1	0.2256461	0.418111
Total Population	1956	39978	8560072	228849.7	517260.8
Income (Per Capita)	1956	11967	81074	27926.17	9139.7
Poverty Rate	1892	0.0120788	0.2467959	0.0788024	0.0388461

Note: The FAADS dataset documents that negative amounts often arise from refunds, reversals, corrections, and adjustments related to previous expenditures (Lecy and Thornton 2016).

Table B.2: Federal Grants to Swing Cities during Mayoral Election Years, including Secure Elections

	(1) Federal Grants PC (con $)	(2) Federal Grants PC (con $)
Swing City	-0.621	-0.348
	(3.219)	(2.639)
Pres-Mayor Party	0.405	
	(1.863)	
Swing City #Pres-Mayor Party	8.015*	
	(4.418)	
Pres-Gov-Mayor Party		4.353**
		(2.124)
Swing City #Pres-Gov-Mayor Party		13.07**
		(5.761)
Total Pop (Logged)	39.22*	35.15
	(21.61)	(21.46)
Income PC (Logged)	55.16	56.04
	(35.85)	(35.58)
Poverty Rate	199.1**	215.7**
	(95.65)	(96.38)
Constant	-1,024**	-986.5**
	(475.2)	(470.4)
Observations	1,892	1,892
R-squared	0.108	0.116
Number of Cities	465	465
City FE	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: clustered standard errors at city level.

Table B.3: Federal Grants to Close Election Cities during Mayoral Election Years

	(1) Federal Grants PC (con $)	(2) Federal Grants PC (con $)
Close election cities	3.187	3.348
	(4.691)	(3.802)
Pres-Mayor Party	-1.916	
	(2.453)	
Close election cities	10.28	
#Pres-Mayor Party	(8.438)	
Pres-Gov-Mayor Party		2.698
		(2.718)
Close election cities		20.37
#Pres-Gov-Mayor Party		(12.87)
Total Pop (Logged)	40.26	37.92
	(38.01)	(38.13)
Income PC (Logged)	58.40	60.39
	(46.77)	(46.71)
Poverty Rate	167.5	162.2
	(143.4)	(142.4)
Constant	-1,066	-1,060
	(832.2)	(835.2)
Observations	1,124	1,124
R-squared	0.099	0.106
Number of Cities	399	399
City FE	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: clustered standard errors at city level.

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