

**The democratic ideal under stress:
Citizen commitment to democratic rights and procedures
in challenging times**

Online Appendix

accompanying the article published in the *European Journal of Political Research* (EJPR)

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A.1: Preregistration and handling of deviations

This study is part of the larger project ‘Regime and cultural determinants of the acceptance of political decisions in times of crisis (DAPEK)’ ([GESIS DOI link](#)) which was preregistered and time-stamped at OSF ([OSF DOI link](#)), preregistration doc provided as supplementary material for review] prior to receiving any data from the survey provider. Given the larger project focus, some of the preregistered expectations – a.o. on individual affectedness, cultural value orientations, and probabilities to vote for specific parties – are not covered by the present study but are to be addressed in separate publications. Here we focus on the preregistered main expectations regarding citizen’s sensitivity to democratic rights restrictions (Study 1) and preferences for democratic decision-making procedures (Study 2). For convenience, Table 1 below lists the expectations relevant for this study, states the criteria we have registered for assessing the respective expectations, and briefly sketches the respective findings presented and discussed in the main text. The first column gives the numbering of the respective expectation as provided in the preregistration. Furthermore, the two expectations in bold are at the heart of the paper. The remaining expectations have been added to test alternative explanations of our findings as well as to enable some robustness checks.

While our basic expectation on the *overall restrictiveness* of pandemic policy packages (Expectation R1 in Table A1) is presented and confirmed, our main focus in Study 1 has been on the average effect of *democratic rights* restrictions in pandemic policies (Expectation R2 in Table A1). This expectation is rejected in Section 4 of the manuscript. While they are not central to the present paper, we test (and largely reject) the interaction effects implied by preregistered Expectations R4 & R7 in the context of our discussion of alternative readings—also in Section 4 as well as in Section 6.

In Study 2, we test Expectations P2. The revealed preference order is inconsistent with the expectation and we treat it as rejected in Section 5 (see also P1). While they are not the at the heart of the present paper, we test (and largely reject) the interaction effects implied preregistered Expectations P4 & P5 in with the context of our discussion of alternative readings in Section 5 and 6 of the main paper. We also see, based on descriptive evidence, that citizens tend to prefer output-over input-oriented procedures if threats are more immediate (Expectation P3).

	Prereg expectation	Prereg survey items	Prereg specification on planned inference	Implementation in present article
R1	Citizen support for governmental policies will be lower the more restrictive governmental policies are.	Exp1	Negative effect of sum of attributes at the more restrictive level 2	Tested as planned, confirmed
R2	Citizen support for governmental policies will be lower if the policies limit core democratic rights such as the freedom of expression, the conduct of elections, or the right of political assembly.	Exp1	Negative effect of the more restrictive level 2 on attributes 9, 10, 11	Tested as planned, rejected
R4	The negative effect of democratic right restrictions on citizen support (R2) is weaker or even reversed for citizens in higher age groups or with lower levels of self-rated health.	Exp1; Q04/Q05; Q30	Interaction effect	Partially tested, rejected,
R7	The negative effect of policy restrictiveness on citizen support (R1) is stronger for citizens who support opposition parties (with an even stronger effect for supporters of outsider or populist parties), who feel disenchanted with the political system, or who hold low levels of trust in governing institutions.	Exp1; Q15; Q27; Q28	Interaction effect	Partially tested (party preferences not covered here), mainly rejected
R19	The negative effect of democratic right restrictions on citizen support (R2) is stronger among citizens living in more liberal political systems.	Exp1 + country selection	Tentative, negative effects of restrictions should be stronger in more liberal systems	Tested, mainly rejected
P1	Citizens favour decision-making procedures that focus on the consultation of experts, international coordination, or swift executive decisions.	Exp2	Attributes 1, 4, and 6 consistently preferred over 2, 3, 5, and 7	Tested, mainly confirmed
P2	Citizens favour decision-making procedures that include participatory elements, broad political consensus, or legislative control by elected representatives.	Exp2	Attributes 2, 3, 5, and 7 consistently preferred over 1, 4, and 6	Tested, mainly rejected
P5	Citizens who support fringe parties, who feel disenchanted with the political system, or who hold low levels of trust in governing institutions prefer participatory mechanisms, consensus seeking, and legislative control of decision-making over expert consultation, international coordination, and swift executive choices.	Exp2; Q15 (+ external party classifications); Q27; Q28	Subgroup differences	Partially tested (party preferences not covered here), mainly rejected
P4	Citizens in higher age groups or with prior health conditions will prefer expert consultation, international coordination, and swift executive choices over participatory mechanisms, consensus seeking, and legislative control of decision-making.	Exp2; Q04/Q05; Q30	Subgroup differences	Partially tested (party preferences not covered here), mainly rejected
P3	The more immediate a societal threat is, the more citizens prefer output-oriented over input-oriented decision-making procedures.	Exp2, intro [16], Q14	Mean differences across treatment subgroups (Covid-19 > generic societal challenge > climate change) and across perceived individual threat	Not formally tested, confirmed based on descriptive evidence

Table A1: Summary of preregistered expectations

Source: authors' elaboration.

Beyond individual hypotheses our preregistered arguments generally predicted a high sensitivity to democratic rights restrictions and strong preferences for democratic decision-making procedures (as also indicated in Section 2 of the main text). However, this general expectation is clearly not borne out by the data we have collected and this contrast to our initial expectations is emphasized throughout the paper. While we do discuss possible reasons for this lacking inviolability of the democratic ideal related to the complexity of contemporary societal challenges in the main article, we do not present them as original expectations that would be conclusively tested by the present study.

Finally, we also run several and additional tests for Study 1 and 2 to identify any relevant country differences concerning our main findings. This is not limited to specific features of countries—e.g., a country’s democratic quality as mentioned above as well as the severity of COVID-19 in a respective country—but also includes tests of country differences in general. While there are some county differences, they do not alter the main interpretation of our results.

Regarding the more technical aspects of the preregistered analysis plan—survey and experiment design, treatment of missing data, model specifications, and exclusion of speeders/inattentive respondents—we have closely followed the protocol with one exception: the number of conjoint tasks per respondent has been reduced from the preregistered 10 to 5 after pre-tests of our instruments suggested fatigue effects. However, the ex-ante power analysis suggests that this is still sufficiently powered (see A.4.3 below), in particular as the main findings of the present manuscript do not involve interaction effects.

Lastly, the robustness check reported in A.4.8 has not been re-registered but mainly serves to reject our initial Expectation R2 in Table A1 (in that it makes sure that the unexpected rejection of this expectation is not driven by policy packages with “implausible” combinations of measures; see Section 4.8 below for further details).

A.2: Selection and characteristics of country contexts

The overarching question of our study—to what extent do citizens value democratic rights and procedures in challenging times?—suggests that the relevant universe of country contexts are all democracies in the world. Applying a minimalist definition of democracy—national leader selection occurs through free multiparty elections (Przeworski 1999)—and relying on the respective indicators ($v2elfrfair_osp > 2$ and $v2elmulpar_osp > 2$) from the V-Dem data set (Lührmann *et al.* 2020), this universe comprises 115 countries in the year our fieldwork took place (2021). As we cannot cover all of these countries, we had to make choices on which specific national contexts to pick from this universe. Our preregistration highlighted two broad sets of country-level characteristics

that might decisively shape individual citizens' views on democracy and specific democratic rights and procedures.

Our focus in the main article is on the identification of general patterns related to citizens' sensitivity to restrictions on democratic rights and to their support for democratic decision-making procedures. Our primary research interests are thus *not* comparative, and our interpretation and discussion of the results in the main article emphasizes the relatively high degree of similarity across countries, a point that we address empirically in A.4.4 and A.5.4 below. This relative similarity becomes all the more striking when one realizes that we selected our country sample so as to maximize variation on institutional and cultural dimensions that might plausibly lead to variation in citizens' attitudes towards democratic rights and procedures and that the six countries also show considerable variation in their 'pandemic trajectories' up to the time of data collection, both in terms of the severity of the pandemic (infection and mortality rates) and in terms of the strictness of governmental countermeasures.

Concerning possible institutional and cultural influences, our case selection strategy was, firstly, motivated by the possibility that citizen support for democracy might vary according to the *quality of democracy* due to various socialization, routinization, and habitualization arguments discussed in the preregistration document. The second type of factor we considered in selecting country cases was the *dominant societal culture*, more specifically the relative value ascribed to the individual over the collective (captured by the individualism-collectivism dimension in cross-cultural psychology; Minkov *et al.* 2017) and cultural emphasis on self-control and flexible adaptation to changing circumstances (captured by the flexibility-monumentalism dimension; Minkov *et al.* 2018), two cultural facets that have received considerable attention in public and academic debates about national trajectories during Covid-19, for example, when it comes to explaining the adoption of precautionary behaviors and compliance with public health recommendations (e.g., Li *et al.* 2022).

Following these considerations, we therefore aimed to select a country sample with substantial variation on a) the quality of democracy dimension, as captured by V-Dem indices that tap into whether the ideal of electoral and especially liberal democracy is fulfilled (Lührmann *et al.* 2020), as well as b) the 'individualism vs. collectivism' and 'monumentalism vs. flexibility' dimensions of national culture, drawing on the aggregation of World Values Survey data that is commonly used in this literature (Minkov *et al.* 2017; Minkov *et al.* 2018).

Our country selection was furthermore constrained by *pragmatic considerations*. Besides budgetary limitations, the availability of high-quality online access panels in each country was a necessary condition for conducting our research. We thus collected initial offerings by different established survey providers and then selected the final set of countries— *Germany (DEU)*, *Hungary (HUN)*,

Japan (JPN), Poland (POL), South Korea (KOR), and Spain (ESP)—to maximize variation on the above dimensions.

Figure A1 shows where our country sample falls within the broader universe of minimally defined democracies regarding national political system and dominant societal culture.¹ Along the expert assessments provided by V-Dem, our sample includes four high-quality democracies (Germany, Spain, South Korea, and Japan) but also two partially defective democracies (Poland and especially Hungary). Regarding the standard approaches in research on dominant societal culture, the aggregated World Values Survey data show that our country sample cover two more collectivist societies (South Korea and Poland) but also four societies with higher emphasis on the individual (Japan, Spain, Hungary, and especially Germany). Finally, the distributions show that the two East-Asian democracies, South Korea and especially Japan, cover societies that are very ‘flexible’, setting them apart from the more ‘monumentalist’ societal cultures in Germany, and especially in Spain, Poland and Hungary.




Figure A1: Locating the country sample in the broader universe of minimally defined democracies (quality of democracy and dominant societal culture)

Note: Figure shows location of the six countries included in the study (Germany, DEU; Hungary, HUN; Japan, JPN; Poland, POL; South Korea, KOR; Spain, ESP) on the electoral/liberal democracy indexes from the V-Dem Dataset 2021 and on the individualism-collectivism and flexibility-monumentalism dimensions of societal culture, as calculated from the 2018 World Values Survey. Box-and-whisker plots have been added to indicate the first, second (median), and third quartile of each variable's distribution. Maximum length of whiskers is 1.5 times the interquartile range, capped at the empirical minimum, Outliers falling

¹ Note that the World Value Survey data used for the cultural dimensions unfortunately only cover 42 of the 115 minimally defined democracies derived from the V-Dem data set.

outside the range of the whiskers are represented as dots. Source: authors' calculations based on V-Dem Dataset 2021 (Lührmann et al., 2020) and World Values Survey (Haerpfer *et al.* 2020)

While we explicitly asked respondents to abstract from the ongoing pandemic (see A.4 below), it is conceivable that their attitudes towards democracy and especially towards the pandemic countermeasures considered in Study 1 might nevertheless depend on their country's trajectory during Covid-19. In this regard, we note that our country sample offers considerable variation in Covid-19 case incidences and death rates (Figure A2) as well as the strictness of governmental restrictions (Figure A3). It thus seems very unlikely that the rather similar patterns identified in the main article are an accidental byproduct of similar pandemic experiences in all six countries.




Figure A2: Locating the country sample in the broader universe of minimally defined democracies (Covid-19)

Note: Figure shows location of the six countries included in the study (Germany, DEU; Hungary, HUN; Japan, JPN; Poland, POL; South Korea, KOR; Spain, ESP) with respect to cumulative Covid-19 infections and deaths until November 2021, the month of data collection. Box-and-whisker plots have been added to indicate the first, second (median), and third quartile of each variable's distribution. Maximum length of whiskers is 1.5 times the interquartile range, capped at the empirical minimum, Outliers falling outside the range of the whiskers are represented as dots. Source: authors' calculations based on data from ourworldindata.org (see figure for details).




Figure A3: Stringency of governmental responses to Covid-19 in the country sample

Source: authors' calculations based on data from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (Hale *et al.* 2021; see figure for details).

A.3: Individual-level data collection and research ethics

We collected our individual-level data through *standing online access panels* provided by IPSOS Interactive Services (hereafter IPSOS). The survey was offered in each country's main language, with an additional Catalan option in the case of Spain. We provided IPSOS with a Master Questionnaire in English which was then translated by two professional translators for each language—except for the German translations which were done by us. Question wordings were taken from established cross-country surveys such as the World Values Survey whenever possible. IPSOS conducted the survey between November 3 and 30, 2021, targeting a sample of 1,500 respondents from the voting population between ages 18 and 75 and relied on quota sampling with respect to country-specific regional, gender, age, and education distributions.

Quotas for gender, age groups and region of residence could mostly be met very well. However, as is common with online access panels, respondents with low levels of education are underrepresented in some countries, especially in Hungary and South Korea. All analyses reported in the main article and in this appendix apply post-stratification weights to correct for deviations from the country-specific reference distributions, particularly with respect to education. Given

length restrictions for appendices we can only supply the quota fulfilment tables in the replication material.

Given that this primary data collection involves human subjects via an online survey with experimental modules, we were alert to questions of *research ethics* early on and submitted the research design as well as the full master questionnaire for full review by the institutional ethics committee at the first author's primary institution. After review and deliberation, the ethics committee approved our study without reservations but recommended considering varying legal standards and fair payment across countries.²

While the rigorous evaluation procedure by the ethics committee covers all main areas of research ethics, we understand it only serves as a 'control agency' for the design, at best. Responsibility for an ethically sensitive design and implementation of our research lies with us and building on our experience from similar earlier projects we put a lot of energy and thought into living up to the highest ethical standards.

In that context, we particularly acknowledge the 'Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research' (PGHSR) approved by the APSA Council and, in the following, discuss our study in light of these principles (as far as applicable here). Concerning possible *power differentials* between the researchers and the research subjects, our study did not focus on or single out any specific low-power or vulnerable group but the general population in each country. All subjects are part of standing online-access panels and have been pre-recruited. Subjects are not only able to leave these panels at any time, but they were also able to ignore or decline the invitation to participate in our specific study as well as to cancel their participation while filling out the questionnaire.

In standing online-access panels like the one we used, *informed consent* is gathered and contractually guaranteed by survey companies, in our case IPSOS, and it plays a central role in recruitment to the panels as well as in taking part in each individual survey administered to the panel, including ours. As contractually agreed, all procedures at IPSOS follow, among other things, [ESOMAR rules and guidelines](#) as well as ISO-norms (9001, 20252 and 27001). In our case, this means, among other things, that participants were informed about the nature of the survey and the planned data usage before the start of our questionnaire, and they were able to withdraw their consent at any time. The research institutions responsible for the content of the survey were disclosed to participants before the start of the questionnaire. Respondents were also provided with an email address to contact

² To ensure anonymity during the review process, we do not name the institution here for now. However, we have already submitted the official ethics approval to the journal editors and will make it part of the supplementary materials in case of acceptance.

the project team for questions or feedback at any time. We did not receive any messages through this address, however.

The PGHSR furthermore discusses various kinds of *deception* that may pose ethical challenges. Our data collection effort and study did not involve deception of any kind (see also the introduction screens for our experiments in Sections A4 and A5 below).

The possibility that participation in our study could *bring harm or cause trauma* to our subjects appears very low. All questionnaire items outside the experiments represent standard items from established cross-national surveys. More importantly, none of them cover sensitive topics such as criminal behavior or sexual orientations. In addition, data was collected by self-administration (i.e., there was no risk of respondents feeling pressured to provide information by the presence and behavior of an interviewer), and respondents could generally choose not to answer a given question. The two survey experiments did refer to issues of a potentially distressful nature (in particular, a hypothetical pandemic roughly as dangerous as Covid-19 and major societal challenges, including Covid-19 and climate change). While these and other societal challenges certainly have the potential to trigger psychological distress, they featured prominently on the public agenda in all countries studied here at the time of the survey, thus rendering it highly unlikely that respondents first learned about these challenges or were reminded of them in a way that would have caused them significant additional distress.

Data was *securely stored* at all times and at no time did we have access to information which might allow the *identification of subjects*. It is also important to note that respondents were assured of confidentiality and anonymity in the context of providing informed consent prior to the survey itself. In line with good scientific practice, the dataset will be made available and is already stored at a dedicated repository with a permanent DOI. However, and in accordance with the information provided to participants before the start of the survey, use of the data will be restricted to research purposes, and the dataset was carefully checked for potentially identifying information by the data protection officer at the first author's primary institution.

Turning to a *potential impact on political or social processes*, our study poses only minimal risk. Our study did not involve any direct intervention into social or political phenomena and was confined to a survey, and respondents were fully aware of their participation as well as the general aims of the project. Any potential political or social impacts of the research should therefore be confined to the effect that voluntary engagement with survey content had on participants and their subsequent behavior (which, for reasons outlined above, i.e., the public prominence the topics covered in the survey should be minimal), or the (arguably desirable) impacts of the novel information generated by the data gathered.

The cooperation with IPSOS and their legal team ensures that our research *complied with relevant national laws and regulations*. In fact, such compliance was explicitly mandated by the project contract between the first author's primary institution and IPSOS. In general, online survey research based on fully informed consent of participants is common and legally unproblematic in all six countries we studied.

Finally, subjects received *financial (or equivalent) compensation* for their participation in the survey. As it is common practice, this is organized via the standing operating system of the survey company – IPSOS – and relates to acquiring participation points which can be exchanged for prices or money. While this compensation is by law not bound to the minimum wage or related legislation, the procurement office of the institution the contract with IPSOS was developed at considers and demands certain standards of fairness and compensation. In fact, a contract can only be signed with companies fulfilling these standards.

Taken together, the approval by a dedicated ethics committee as well as our investment in carefully checking our design and its implementation against the PGHSR guidelines should ensure that ethical standards have been met.

A.4: Additional information and analyses on Study 1 (conjoint experiment)

A.4.1. Intro screen for experiment 1

The following box provides the text shown to each respondent on a separate intro screen prior to the five consecutive conjoint tasks.

On the following pages, we are interested to know how people like you think **about possible government policies for controlling a pandemic threat**. We will therefore ask you to assess **different policy packages** that a government might consider when facing such a threat.

The policies will remind you of current discussions around the Coronavirus, but we ask you to assess them only based on the information provided. You may want to think of them as imaginary scenarios that might happen sometime in the future.

Please think of a pandemic that is as dangerous as the Coronavirus and where the virus is transmitted in similar ways. This means that approximately **1 in 100 people would die if no countermeasures were taken**.

You will see a total of five scenarios. In each scenario, there are two sets of policies that the government considers to implement. **Please read these policy packages carefully and let us know which of the two you would personally prefer in each case.**

A.4.2. Conjoint tasks

The table below sketches the layout of one (random) conjoint task (of which each respondent saw five). While the survey provider offered a visually more appealing layout, table structure and text are identical to the final version. Here we show an example of an actual conjoint task, where government measures in some domains would differ across the two packages and measures in other domains would happen to be the same (Table 1 in the main article shows the two possible levels for all attributes). As noted in the main article, the order of attributes was randomized across respondents (to average out potential ordering effects), but constant within (to reduce cognitive burden). Attribute levels were fully randomized except for the restriction that Option A and B differ in at least one dimension, that is, the (highly unlikely) cases of two identical policy packages were ruled out by design.

In developing the number of attributes (11) and levels (2 each) as well as the precise wordings we built on the advice and analyses in Bansak et al. (2021) and tested consecutive versions via a dedicated Shiny App among convenience samples drawn from Prolific.

	Policy option A	Policy option B
Political rallies or demonstrations	prohibited	prohibited
Leisure facilities (cinemas, restaurants, fitness clubs, ...)	avoid if possible	avoid if possible
Private gatherings beyond the own household	avoid if possible	prohibited
Conduct political elections	as scheduled	as scheduled
Leaving home without special reasons	avoid if possible	prohibited
Obligatory contact tracing	no	yes
Employers must enable home office or alternating presence	no	no
Shops & services beyond basic supply	avoid if possible	avoid if possible

	Policy option A	Policy option B
Fact-checking by news media	encouraged	encouraged
Schools & childcare	closed	open
International travel without special reasons	prohibited	prohibited
<i>Which policy would you personally prefer?</i>	☐	☐

A.4.3. Ex ante power considerations

The sample size of 1,500 respondents per country was chosen by balancing budget constraints with insights from a power analysis for the conjoint experiment following Schuessler and Freitag (2020, and using their `cjpowR` package in R). The most demanding (in terms of sample size) effects we are interested in are the interactions between profile attributes and respondent characteristics for the robustness check discussed below (e.g., Figure A9) and in Section 6 of the main text. As noted above, for robustness checks we are also interested in potential country differences in the effects of profile attributes, which can be conceptualized as an interaction between profile attributes and country memberships. In this latter case, we are effectively dealing with a balanced 2x2 design because profile attributes have two levels that are selected with equal probability and because the envisaged final sample size is the same for all countries. The effective sample size for pairwise comparisons of country differences in attribute effects is 30,000 (1,500 respondents times 2 countries times 5 tasks time 2 profiles per task).




Figure A4: Power as a function of the effective sample size for different sizes of interaction effects (δ_3), assuming balanced distribution of profile attributes and respondent characteristics

Note: Figure shows statistical power (= probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis) for the interaction between two factors as a function of the size of the interaction (δ_3), effective sample size, and the number of levels of the interacted factors, assuming an alpha level of 0.05. Exact values for selected sample sizes are provided in Table A6 below (figure is based on a much larger number of effective sample sizes to generate smooth curves). Source: authors simulations based on the *sjp* R package by Schuessler and Freitag (2020).

As shown in the upper left subgraph in Figure A4, this effective sample size is slightly lower than the sample size of approx. 34,000-35,000 that is required to achieve 80% power for detecting a relatively small interaction (country difference) of .03 in an attribute effect (under conservative assumptions, cf. Schuessler and Freitag 2020: p. 9). Thus, our study is well-powered for detecting country differences in attribute effects.

A.4.4. Average marginal component effects by country

Figure A5 shows that there is some country-level variation in the effects of individual policy attributes on citizen policy support but also demonstrates that the effect direction and ranking is roughly comparable across countries. Figure A6 reports two-tailed p-values for the pairwise cross-country comparisons (Bonferroni-corrected for the 15 pairwise comparisons per policy attribute).

P-values below .05 are colored to indicate cases in which a given AMCE differs statistically significantly between countries. The strongest differences are related to mandatory contact tracing, which is seen rather positively by the South Korean and Spanish respondents but viewed very negatively by citizens in the more defective democracies of Poland and Hungary.




Figure A5: Country-specific AMCEs for individual policy attributes

Note: Figure shows Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of a policy attribute being set to the strong/strict rather than weak level (see Table 1 in main article for details), separately by country (see Figure 2 in the main article for pooled results). Exact values are reported in Table A7 below. Positive (negative) AMCEs indicate that a policy package is more (less) likely to be selected when the respective policy attribute is set to the strict level. Horizontal lines depict two-sided confidence intervals (thick: 95%; thin: 99%). In total, 90,000 policy packages (45,000 conjoint tasks) were shown to 9,000 respondents (1,500 from each country, 5 tasks per respondent). For 118 packages (59 tasks), respondents did not indicate their preference, and 3 respondents did not complete any of the conjoint tasks. Estimates are based on 89,892 policy packages from 49,491 pairwise conjoint tasks from 8,997 respondents in Germany (14,986/7,493/1,500), Hungary (14,984/7,492/1,500), Japan (14,964/7,482/1,500), Poland (14,986/7,493/1,499), South Korea (14,968/7,484/1,498), and Spain (14,994/7,497/1,500). Source: authors' calculations from data collected by the authors.




Figure A6: Country-specific AMCEs for individual policy attributes: p-values for pairwise country comparisons

Note: Figure shows two-tailed p-values for all pairwise comparisons of the country-specific effects of policy attributes displayed in Figure A5. P-Values are Bonferroni-corrected for the 15 pairwise comparisons per attribute. For further details, see note to Figure A5.

We also see some variation with regard to the three attributes that are of greatest interest here and for completeness we should zoom in, particularly with a view to the question whether citizens in more established democracies are more sensitive to restrictions on their political rights compared to contested democracies. Figure A7 therefore plots the effects of the three relevant policy attributes separately for each country, ordered by the country's 2020 value on the V-Dem liberal democracy index.

We do not see a pattern that clearly distinguishes between mature and contested democracies. Citizens in Hungary were wary of election postponement, but citizens in Poland slightly prefer policy packages that prescribe such a restriction. When it comes to the prohibition of manifestations and rallies, Polish and Hungarian citizens are more hesitant to accept the policy, but their counterparts in the much more liberal Japanese political system are so, too. And whether a policy package prescribes more enhanced governmental media control does not really matter for the citizens in the more defective countries in our sample. Yet and still country-level differences in the inviolability of core political rights seem to exist. While they are small in substantial terms (with the exception of postponed elections in Hungary) and do not reach the effect sizes we observe for leave home or shopping restrictions in any of our country samples (cf. main text), these

heterogeneous effects merit a more in-depth look in future research potentially featuring larger country samples.




Figure A7: AMCEs of restrictions on political rights and quality of democracy (V-Dem Liberal Democracy Score)

Note: Figure shows Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of policy attributes referring to core democratic rights being set to the strong/strict rather than weak level (see Table 1 in main article for details), separately by country, with countries ordered according to the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Score. Exact values are reported in Table A8 below. Positive (negative) AMCEs indicate that a policy package is more (less) likely to be selected when the respective policy attribute is set to the strict level. Vertical lines depict two-sided confidence intervals (thick: 95%; thin: 99%). In total, 90,000 policy packages (45,000 conjoint tasks) were shown to 9,000 respondents (1,500 from each country, 5 tasks per respondent). For 118 packages (59 tasks), respondents did not indicate their preference, and 3 respondents did not complete any of the conjoint tasks. Estimates are based on 89,892 policy packages from 49,491 pairwise conjoint tasks from 8,997 respondents in Germany (14,986/7,493/1,500), Hungary (14,984/7,492/1,500), Japan (14,964/7,482/1,500), Poland (14,986/7,493/1,499), South Korea (14,968/7,484/1,498), and Spain (14,994/7,497/1,500). Source: authors' calculations from data collected by the authors and V-Dem Dataset 2021 (Lührmann et al., 2020).

Figure A8 relates cross-country differences in the effects of restrictions on democratic rights to the severity of the Covid-19 pandemic in each country, as measured by cumulative Covid-19-related deaths per million inhabitants by November 2021, when fieldwork for our study began. As noted in the main article and shown in the introductory screen reproduced in Section A.4.1 above, we instructed respondents to abstract from the ongoing pandemic, because we were interested in obtaining more general insights into citizens' commitment to democratic rights and procedures, as well as more stable country differences in such commitments, irrespective of the potentially idiosyncratic trajectory the pandemic had taken in their country. However, it remains possible that

this framing did not fully succeed and that respondents' evaluations of the various restrictions were partly shaped by national-level pandemic severity. If that were the case, one would expect respondents in countries with higher death rates to view the restrictions in Study 1 more favorably, including restrictions on democratic rights. Such a pattern would be consistent with the idea that restrictions of this sort are considered justified only in relatively extreme situations—such as a pandemic resulting in a large number of deaths.




Figure A8: AMCEs of restrictions on political rights and Covid-19 deaths

Note: Figure shows Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of policy attributes referring to core democratic rights being set to the strong/strict rather than weak level (see Table 1 in main article for details), separately by country, with countries ordered according to the cumulative number of Covid-19-related deaths per million people by November 2021. Positive (negative) AMCEs indicate that a policy package is more (less) likely to be selected when the respective policy attribute is set to the strict level. Vertical lines depict two-sided confidence intervals (thick: 95%; thin: 99%). In total, 90,000 policy packages (45,000 conjoint tasks) were shown to 9,000 respondents (1,500 from each country, 5 tasks per respondent). For 118 packages (59 tasks), respondents did not indicate their preference, and 3 respondents did not complete any of the conjoint tasks. Estimates are based on 89,892 policy packages from 49,491 pairwise conjoint tasks from 8,997 respondents in Germany (14,986/7,493/1,500), Hungary (14,984/7,492/1,500), Japan (14,964/7,482/1,500), Poland (14,986/7,493/1,499), South Korea (14,968/7,484/1,498), and Spain (14,994/7,497/1,500). Source: authors' calculations from data collected by the authors and V-Dem Dataset 2021 (Lührmann et al., 2020).

Yet the results displayed in Figure A8 do not clearly support this interpretation. For the postponement of elections, for example, we do find relatively strong opposition in South Korea, the country with the lowest Covid-19 mortality, but the strongest negative effect is observed in Hungary, the country with the highest Covid-19 mortality in our sample. Respondents in the four countries with intermediate mortality levels tend to be somewhat more favorable toward

postponing elections, with Germany as a partial exception, but the magnitude of these effects is generally small and does not stand in a clear relationship to pandemic severity. The remaining subgraphs in Figure A8 likewise show that bans on rallies and demonstrations, as well as restrictions on media freedom, do not track Covid-19 mortality in any systematic way. Overall, these results may indicate that respondents did abstract from their country's pandemic trajectory; if not, they suggest that country differences in pandemic severity were not a major driver of cross-country differences in the willingness to accept restrictions on democratic rights.

A.4.5. Interactions with trust in government and political system satisfaction

One possible interpretation of the low overall sensitivity to democratic right restrictions reported in the main text is that they reflect a high level of overall trust in the democratic system and its long-term stability. If this interpretation were correct, we would expect to see a strong positive interaction between satisfaction and trust in the political system and the willingness to accept democratic rights restrictions as well as marked negative effects of such restrictions on policy acceptance among “political outsiders” with low levels of satisfaction and trust. Figure A9 explores this possibility, drawing on the following items from our survey:

All in all, how satisfied are you with how the political system works in [RESPONDENT COUNTRY]?

*How much do you personally trust the following institutions and actors?:
The [RESPONDENT NATIONALITY] government*

Both items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (grouped here as 1-2, 3-5, 6-7). The top two categories in particular are less populated than the middle and lower ones, indicating that high levels of political system satisfaction and trust in government are relatively uncommon. This leads to noticeably wider confidence intervals for the high trust/satisfaction group (see replication data and codebook in replication package for detail) but generally also speaks against the alternative interpretation that our results on indifference towards democratic rights restrictions are driven by high levels of trust in government or political system satisfaction.

Further along that line, Figure A9 provides only limited support for a major moderating role of trust and satisfaction with the political system. We find the positive relationship between trust/satisfaction and the effects of democratic right restrictions expected by the alternative reading only for the prohibition of manifestations and rallies but not for the postponement of elections or enhanced control of public media.




Figure A9: AMCEs of restrictions across respondents' political views

Note: Figure shows Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of policy attributes referring to core democratic rights being set to the strong/strict rather than weak level (see Table 1 in main article for details) by respondents' level of trust in the national government (left column) and satisfaction with the political system (right column). Both items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (grouped here as 1-2 = low, 3-5 = mid, 6-7 = high). Positive (negative) AMCEs indicate that a policy package is more (less) likely to be selected when the respective policy attribute is set to the strict level. Vertical lines depict two-sided 95% confidence intervals. Exact values are reported in Table A9 below. In total, 90,000 policy packages (45,000 conjoint tasks) were shown to 9,000 respondents (1,500 from each country, 5 tasks per respondent). For 118 packages (59 tasks), respondents did not indicate their preference, and 3 respondents did not complete any of the conjoint tasks. 303 respondents did not provide an answer regarding trust in government, 327 did not provide an answer regarding political system satisfaction. Estimates shown are thus based on 86,862 policy packages from 43,431 pairwise conjoint tasks from 8,694 respondents for the left-hand panels of the figure (trust in government) and on 86,612 policy packages from 43,306 pairwise conjoint tasks from 8,670 respondents for the right-hand panels of the figure (satisfaction with political system). Source: authors' calculations from data collected by the authors.

On the one hand, this makes sense as rallies and demonstrations are a key channel for airing demands of citizens how do not see themselves well represented in the political system. On the other hand, the importance of this interaction should not be overstated in substantial terms: the difference in effects between political outsiders and political insiders, the latter prefer policies that contain prohibitions of rallies and manifestations—amounts to around four to five percentage points on average. Perhaps more importantly, even among outsiders the (conditional) AMCE of

restrictions on rallies and demonstrations is on the order of approximately minus 2 percentage points, much smaller (in absolute size) than, for example, the average effects for shopping restrictions reported in the main article. As demonstrated in the replication material, all of these patterns continue to hold in a marginal means perspective (Leeper *et al.* 2020).

A.4.6. Interactions with self-rated health

Another alternative interpretation of our main findings is that the people's relative indifference towards democratic rights restrictions was driven by the unique circumstances at the time of our survey, that is, the major public and individual health threat that Covid-19 was (still) posing (see also the discussion in Section 6 of the main article). If this were the case, we would expect to see a strong relationship between individual health risks and the willingness to accept democratic rights restrictions. In particular, we might expect to see a greater readiness to accept such restrictions among those with (pre-existing) health problems, but at least those who reported good health and therefore presumably had little to fear from Covid-19 should have been reluctant to accept democratic rights restrictions.




Figure A10: AMCEs of restrictions across respondents' self-rated health

Note: Figure shows Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of policy attributes referring to core democratic rights being set to the strong/strict rather than weak level (see Table 1 in main article for details) by respondents' level of self-rated health. Answers were provided on a 7-point Likert scale, grouped here as 1-2 = "very poor", 3-5 = "average", 6-7 = "Very good" (110 of the 9,000 respondents did not provide an answer on this item). Positive (negative) AMCEs indicate that a policy package is more (less) likely to be selected when the respective policy attribute is set to the strict level. Vertical lines depict two-sided 95% confidence intervals. Exact values are reported in Table A10 below. In total, 90,000 policy packages (45,000 conjoint tasks) were shown to 9,000 respondents (1,500 from each country, 5 tasks per respondent). For 118 packages (59 tasks), respondents did not indicate their preference, and 3 respondents did not complete any of the conjoint tasks. 110 respondents did not answer the self-rated health question. Estimates presented here are thus based on 88,872 policy packages from 44,391 pairwise conjoint tasks from 8,887 respondents in Germany, Hungary, Japan, Poland, South Korea, and Spain. Source: authors' calculations from data collected by the authors.

We explore this intuition by using the following item from our survey:

How would you describe your current health?

Answers on a 7-point Likert scale from “very poor” to very good”, grouped here as 1-2, 3-5, 6-7. Figure A10 shows that we do not find support for this intuition in our data—if at all, the tendency regarding election postponement is in the opposite direction (i.e., respondents reporting better health are more reluctant to accept democratic rights restrictions).

A.4.7. Robustness to inattentiveness and speeding behavior

We preregistered robustness checks regarding response duration and attentiveness. Our survey took time stamps for each experimental block (i.e., Study 1 and Study 2) and included two attentiveness checks hidden in survey items (one asked respondents to select a specific answer option, the other asked to place their birth year in the correct year range, see codebook in the replication material for details).

As preregistered, we then repeat our main analyses after a) excluding the fastest and slowest five percent of respondents for each experiment and country, b) after excluding respondents who failed one of the two attentiveness checks, and c) after excluding only those who failed both checks. Figure A11 shows the respective results for the conjoint experiment. Apart from the fact-checking attribute discussed in the main text, all AMCE estimates are very similar to those the full sample.

A.4.8. Robustness to exclusion of potentially implausible policy packages

A potential threat to the validity of our conjoint experiment is that some of the policy packages presented to respondents may be implausible. A related concern is that the set of policy packages, which is based on a uniform profile distribution that treats each treatment level as equally likely and imposes no restrictions on their covariation, may be unrepresentative of the ‘population’ of (actual or plausible) policy proposals. De la Cuesta et al. (2022) argue that the ‘uniform AMCEs’ that we are effectively estimating above can be different from what they refer to as the ‘*population* AMCE [...], which averages over the distribution of profile attributes in a target population of interest’ (de la Cuesta 2022, 20; emphasis in original).

In our case, determining the population AMCE is difficult because the population of pandemic policy packages that we would be interested in is not well-defined. As an alternative approach, we therefore conducted a supplementary analysis that explores the robustness of our results to the exclusion of implausible policy packages.

The specific design of this robustness test is motivated by the result that restrictions on leaving one’s home elicit the strongest negative reaction on the part of respondents. In light of this result, one might argue that policy proposals are implausible when they include restrictions on leaving

home but no or very few restrictions in other domains: A policy that would not permit citizens to leave their homes without special reasons but allowed all shops, restaurants, and schools to stay open would presumably not only generate major public opposition but outright consternation.




Figure A11: AMCEs of individual restrictions in full sample and excluding speeders and inattentive respondents

Note: Figure shows Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of a policy attribute being set to the strong/strict rather than weak level (see Table 1 in main article for details) for the full sample used in the main analysis and after excluding potentially inattentive respondents, identified according to several preregistered criteria (see figure legend for details). Positive (negative) AMCEs indicate that a policy package is more (less) likely to be selected when the respective policy attribute is set to the strict level. Horizontal lines depict two-sided confidence intervals (thick: 95%; thin: 99%). Full sample estimates are based on 89,892 policy packages from 49,491 pairwise conjoint tasks from 8,997 respondents in Germany, Hungary, Japan, Poland, South Korea, and Spain. Exact values are reported in Table A11 below. In total, 90,000 policy packages (45,000 conjoint tasks) were shown to 9,000 respondents (1,500 from each country, 5 tasks per respondent). For 118 packages (59 tasks), respondents did not indicate their preference, and 3 respondents did not complete any of the conjoint tasks. The number of respondents/profiles in the figure are 8,997/89,822 for the full sample, 8,070/80,614 for excluding the fastest and slowest 5% of respondents, 8,781/87,772 when excluding respondents having failed one attentiveness check, and 7,246/72,408 when excluding respondents having failed both attentiveness checks. Source: authors' calculations from data collected by the authors.

Our supplementary analysis here builds on this intuition and explores how the estimated AMCEs change when all profile pairs that contain at least one implausible proposal according to the above criterion are removed from the analysis. As it is difficult to draw a clear line between plausible and implausible proposals, we actually conduct a series of analyses that employ increasingly weaker definitions of ‘implausibility’ (and therefore exclude an increasing number of proposal pairs). That is, we start with removing only pairs that include the most implausible proposals – those that only

impose restrictions on leaving home but no restrictions in other domains. In the second step, we additionally exclude the next most implausible proposal pairs: those containing at least one proposal with restrictions on leaving home and only one additional restriction (in any other domain). In the third step, we additionally exclude pairs that include at least one proposal with restrictions on leaving home and restrictions in only two additional domains, and so forth, until we eventually exclude all policy pairs that include at least one proposal imposing restrictions on leaving one's home.




Figure A12: AMCEs of individual restrictions if increasingly implausible policy packages along the ‘leave home’ restriction are excluded from the analysis

Note: Figure shows Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of a policy attribute being set to the strong/strict rather than weak level (see Table 1 in main article for details) for the full sample used in the main analysis and after excluding potentially ‘implausible’ policy packages as well as their comparison packages, where implausibility is defined as a package including a restriction on leaving home but no additional restrictions than given on the x-axis (see text for further details). Positive (negative) AMCEs indicate that a policy package is more (less) likely to be selected when the respective policy attribute is set to the strict level. Vertical lines depict two-sided 95% N (profiles), after excluding profile pairs including a profile with a restriction on leaving home and X additional restrictions: 0: 89,904; 1: 89,022; 2: 85,060; 3: 75,352; 4: 59,302; 5: 42,494; 6: 30,664; 7: 24,846; 8: 22,868; 9: 22,460; 10: 22,418. Exact values are reported in Table A12 below. Source: authors’ calculations from data collected by the authors.

The key result of this series of tests, documented in Figure A12, is that most AMCEs change very little as we exclude increasing numbers of potentially implausible proposals (while the sample size and therefore also statistical precision decline substantially). Overall, there seems to be a certain tendency for the AMCEs of attributes other than ‘leaving home’ to increase in (absolute) strength as more and more implausible proposals are excluded. This might indicate that respondents’ strong reactions to restrictions on leaving home may partly ‘trump’ the effects of restrictions in other domains. Even this pattern does not hold for all types of restrictions, however, and – more

importantly – does not apply to the postponement of elections and fact-checking as key political liberties. Bans of rallies and demonstrations do show a certain tendency to have stronger negative effects when implausible profile pairs are excluded, but at barely more than 1 percentage point the estimated effects remain small throughout and fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

A.5: Additional information/analyses on study 2 (BWS/framing experiment)

A.5.1. Intro screen for experiment 2

“Thank you for your participation so far. We would now like to turn to a different topic.

Future [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] governments may have to make far-reaching decisions to address [MAJOR SOCIETAL CHALLENGES/MAJOR SOCIETAL CHALLENGES LIKE THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC/MAJOR SOCIETAL CHALLENGES LIKE CLIMATE CHANGE]. These decisions will affect practically everyone, and they may also have negative consequences.

What do you think: How should the government make up its mind in making these decisions? Which approaches should be followed? Who should be involved in the decision-making process?

On the following pages, we will show you a total of seven lists of approaches that the government might take. Each of these lists will include four options. For each list, please select what you think is the most important approach and what is the least important approach for making good decisions on [MAJOR SOCIETAL CHALLENGES/MAJOR SOCIETAL CHALLENGES LIKE THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC/MAJOR SOCIETAL CHALLENGES LIKE CLIMATE CHANGE].

The options can reappear in different combinations. In making your choice, please consider only the options in the list you are currently looking at.

There are no right or wrong answers. We are really interested in learning about your personal opinion on what is important for good decisions of governments, so please read everything carefully and take all the time you need.”

A.5.2. BWS task example

“Please consider the following four approaches future [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] governments might take in order to tackle [MAJOR SOCIETAL CHALLENGES/MAJOR SOCIETAL CHALLENGES LIKE THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC/MAJOR SOCIETAL CHALLENGES LIKE CLIMATE CHANGE].

Please indicate which one you think is **most important** and which one you think is **least important** for coming up with a good decision.“

Most important (pick only one)		Least important (pick only one)
☐	Evidence-based decisions by consulting relevant experts.	☐
☐	Decisions in accordance with public opinion by seeking citizen input (e.g., referenda, opinion polls, fora)	☐
☐	A resolute and swift response by taking decisions as quickly as possible.	☐
☐	An international or even global strategy by coordinating with other governments.	☐

A.5.3. Balanced in complete block design for the BWS tasks

We ensure that all respondents evaluate all options by following a balanced incomplete block design specified in Table A2 below (numbers refer to the items presented in Table 2 of the main text). In our design, respondents completed seven tasks, each time choosing the best (most important) and worst (least important) option from a set of four. The specified design includes each pairwise comparison twice to improve reliability. The order of the blocks and the order of decision-making procedures within each block was randomized across respondents.

Block ID	Procedure 1	Procedure 2	Procedure 3	Procedure 4
Block 1	4	5	6	7
Block 2	1	3	6	7
Block 3	2	3	5	6
Block 4	1	3	4	5
Block 5	2	3	4	7
Block 6	1	2	5	7
Block 7	1	2	4	6

Table A2: Balanced incomplete block design for BWS

Source: authors' elaboration.

A.5.4. BWS scores by country

Figure A13 displays country-specific results for Study 2 on citizen preferences for decision-making procedures. Figure A14 reports two-tailed p-values for the pairwise cross-country comparisons (Bonferroni-corrected for the 15 pairwise comparisons per policy attribute). P-values below .05 are colored to indicate cases in which a given BWS score differs statistically significantly between countries. In line with the pooled results in Figure 3 in the main article, expert input emerges as the most strongly favored option for all but one country-treatment combination, the only exception

being that Japanese respondents deem "quick action" slightly more important in the Coronavirus condition.

At the other end of the spectrum, parliamentary vote as a key mechanism of representative democracy uniformly ranks at the bottom of respondents' preference order, with one exception: German respondents value parliamentary votes more highly than their counterparts in the other five countries, irrespective of the societal challenge at stake. With some variation, parliamentary votes are about as (un)popular as business input, party consensus, and (with the exception of climate change) international German respondents, while they uniformly rank lowest (often by a substantial margin) in Hungary, Japan, Poland, South Korea, and Spain. That said, parliamentary votes do remain one of the least favored options even in Germany, with a negative BWS score (indicating that as least rather than as most important) in the two conditions naming specific societal challenges (Coronavirus, climate change).

Country-specific results for partisan consensus are also broadly consistent with the pooled analysis, where it ranked second lowest. In this case, Poland is something of an exception in that respondents here assign somewhat greater importance to it, especially in the priming condition that does not specify the nature of the societal challenges.

Overall, country-specific results concerning the decision-making procedures are therefore broadly in line with the main analysis, with some limited deviations for individual countries, most importantly somewhat stronger support for parliamentary involvement in Germany and partisan consensus in Poland.

When it comes to the effects of the priming treatments, the key patterns from the main analysis hold true in each country individually: a stronger emphasis on quick action when facing the Coronavirus, on international coordination when facing climate change, and on citizen input when facing unspecified 'societal challenges'.

As with the effects of democratic-rights restrictions in Study 1 (see Figures A7 and A8 above), we explored whether cross-country differences in respondents' preferences for the three decision-making procedures most closely related to the democratic ideal—parliamentary votes, party consensus, and citizen input—are associated with the quality of democracy (Figure A15) and Covid-19 mortality (Figure A16). Results for democratic quality are pooled across all three priming treatments, whereas those for Covid-19 mortality are restricted to respondents primed with the Coronavirus pandemic and are therefore subject to greater statistical uncertainty.




Figure A13: Best-worst scores of decision-making procedures by country

Note: Figure shows average standardized best-worst scores for seven decision-making procedures (see Table 2 and accompanying text in the main article for details on the procedures), separately by country (see Figure 3 in the main article for pooled results). Symbols and colors indicate the level of the priming treatment received by the respondent. Best-worst scores are calculated as the number of times a procedure was selected as ‘most important’ minus the number of times it was selected as ‘least important’, divided by the number of choice tasks that included the procedure. Scores range between -1 and +1, with positive values indicating that the procedure is more (less) likely to be selected as most important than as least important (and *vice versa* for negative values). Horizontal lines depict two-sided 95% confidence intervals. See Table A13 below for exact values. Estimates are based on 61,509 choice tasks (7 per respondent) from 8,787 respondents who completed the full best-worst scaling module. 213 of the 9,000 respondents who participated in the survey were excluded from this analysis because they failed to complete at least one of the choice tasks (Germany: 10,95 tasks by 1,485 respondents; Hungary 10,108/1,444; Japan: 10,360/1,480; Poland: 10,360/1,480; South Korea: 10,017/1,431; Spain: 10,269/1,467). Choice tasks followed a balanced incomplete block design ensuring that every respondent saw each option four times and each pair of options twice (for details, see main text and Section A.5 above).

Source: authors’ calculations from data collected by the authors.




Figure A14: Country-specific best-worst scores of decision-making procedures: p-values for pairwise country comparisons

Note: Figure shows two-tailed p-values for all pairwise comparisons of the country-specific best-worst scores for alternative decision-making procedures displayed in Figure A12. P-Values are Bonferroni-corrected for the 15 pairwise comparisons per attribute. For further details, see note to Figure A12.

Overall, we do not find clear and consistent associations between citizens' expressed preferences for democratic procedures and either factor. The cross-national patterns for party consensus and citizen input appear largely unordered with respect to both democratic quality (Figure A15) and pandemic severity (Figure A16). For parliamentary votes, respondents in Germany and Spain—the countries with the highest quality of democracy according to the V-Dem index—express the strongest preference for this procedure, but differences among the four remaining countries do not track democratic quality. Preferences for parliamentary votes also show some association with pandemic severity, insofar as this procedure is seen as least important in Japan and South Korea, the two countries with the lowest mortality rates. While interesting, this pattern is clearly inconsistent with the notion that tolerance for deviations from democratic procedures increases with pandemic severity.




Figure A15: Best-worst scores of democratic decision-making procedures and quality of democracy (V-Dem Liberal Democracy Score)

Note: Figure shows average standardized best-worst scores for the three democratic decision-making procedures (see Table 2 and accompanying text in the main article for details on the procedures), separately by country, with countries ordered according to the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Score. Results are pooled across the three priming treatments. Symbols and colors indicate the level of the priming treatment received by the respondent. Best-worst scores are calculated as the number of times a procedure was selected as ‘most important’ minus the number of times it was selected as ‘least important’, divided by the number of choice tasks that included the procedure. Scores range between -1 and +1, with positive values indicating that the procedure is more (less) likely to be selected as most important than as least important (and *vice versa* for negative values). Vertical lines depict two-sided 95% confidence intervals. (Estimates are based on 61,509 choice tasks (7 per respondent) from 8,787 respondents who completed the full best-worst scaling module. 213 of the 9,000 respondents who participated in the survey were excluded from this analysis because they failed to complete at least one of the choice tasks (Germany: 10,95 tasks by 1,485 respondents; Hungary 10,108/1,444; Japan: 10,360/1,480; Poland: 10,360/1,480; South Korea: 10,017/1,431; Spain: 10,269/1,467). Choice tasks followed a balanced incomplete block design ensuring that every respondent saw each option four times and each pair of options twice (for details, see main text and Section A.5 above).




Figure A16: Best-worst scores of democratic decision-making procedures and Covid-19 deaths

Note: Figure shows average standardized best-worst scores for the three democratic decision-making procedures (see Table 2 and accompanying text in the main article for details on the procedures), separately by country, with countries ordered according to the cumulative number of Covid-19-related deaths per million people by November 2021. Results are restricted to respondents who were primed with ‘major societal challenges like the Coronavirus pandemic’. Symbols and colors indicate the level of the priming treatment received by the respondent. Best-worst scores are calculated as the number of times a procedure was selected as ‘most important’ minus the number of times it was selected as ‘least important’, divided by the number of choice tasks that included the procedure. Scores range between -1 and +1, with positive values indicating that the procedure is more (less) likely to be selected as most important than as least important (and *vice versa* for negative values). Vertical lines depict two-sided 95% confidence intervals. (Estimates are based on 61,509 choice tasks (7 per respondent) from 8,787 respondents who completed the full best-worst scaling module. 213 of the 9,000 respondents who participated in the survey were excluded from this analysis because they failed to complete at least one of the choice tasks (Germany: 10,95 tasks by 1,485 respondents; Hungary 10,108/1,444; Japan: 10,360/1,480; Poland: 10,360/1,480; South Korea: 10,017/1,431; Spain: 10,269/1,467). Choice tasks followed a balanced incomplete block design ensuring that every respondent saw each option four times and each pair of options twice (for details, see main text and Section A.5 above).

A.5.5. BWS anchoring (important decision-making procedures)

Following the individual choice tasks, our questionnaire contained a so-called anchoring question that asked respondents to indicate all decision-making procedures they consider ‘very important’ (allowing for multiple choices). Figures A17 (pooled results) and A18 (country-specific results) present the percentage of respondents selecting each procedure (as well as the “don’t know” and “none important”). The ranking emerging from this analysis is very similar to the BWS-based results reported in the main article.

Below we have listed all of the seven approaches you saw on the previous pages. We would now like to know which of these you consider **very important** for making good decisions concerning [MAJOR SOCIETAL CHALLENGES/MAJOR SOCIETAL CHALLENGES LIKE THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC/MAJOR SOCIETAL CHALLENGES LIKE CLIMATE CHANGE].

Please select all options which you consider to be **very important**. Approaches that you do not find very important should be left unchecked. If you think that none of the options are very important, you can also indicate this below.

Select all approaches which you think are **very important**.




Figure A17: Anchoring question on decision-making procedures (pooled sample)

Note: Figure shows the percentage of respondents selecting the respective decision-making procedure as ‘very important’ (see Table 2 and accompanying text in the main article for details on the procedures). Colors indicate the level of the priming treatment received by the respondent. See Table A14 below for exact values. N = 9,000 respondents (1,500 for each of the six countries). Treatment was fully randomized across respondents (3,031 “major societal challenge”; 2,953 “Coronavirus”, 3,016 “Climate change”). Source: authors’ calculations from data collected by the authors.




Figure A18: Anchoring question on decision-making procedures by country sample

Note: Figure shows the percentage of respondents selecting the respective decision-making procedure as ‘very important’ (see Table 2 and accompanying text in the main article for details on the procedures), separately by country. Colors indicate the level of the priming treatment received by the respondent. See Table A15 below for exact values. N = 9,000 respondents (1,500 for each of the six countries). Treatment was fully randomized across respondents (3,031 “major societal challenge”; 2,953 “Coronavirus”, 3,016 “Climate change”). Source: authors’ calculations from data collected by the authors. Source: authors’ calculations from data collected by the authors.

A.5.6 Robustness to inattentiveness and speeding behavior

See A.4.7. above for details on the checks for inattentiveness and speeding behavior. Figure A19 shows that our results in Study 2 are robust to excluding respective respondents.

A.5.7. BWS scores of citizen and expert input by trust in government and political system satisfaction

To assess the plausible intuition that political outsiders have stronger preferences for democratic decision-making procedures, we zoom in on citizen participation and expert consultation as the arguably most and least democratic decision-making logics and compare their average best-worst scores across different levels of trust in and/or satisfaction with the political system of their country (Figure A20).




Figure A19: Best-worst scores in pooled sample excluding speeders and inattentive respondents

Note: Figure shows average standardized best-worst scores for seven decision-making procedures (see Table 2 and accompanying text in the main article for details on the procedures) for the full sample used in the main analysis and after excluding potentially inattentive respondents, identified according to several preregistered criteria (see figure legend for details). Best-worst scores are calculated as the number of times a procedure was selected as ‘most important’ minus the number of times it was selected as ‘least important’, divided by the number of choice tasks that included the procedure. Scores range between -1 and +1, with positive values indicating that the procedure is more (less) likely to be selected as most important than as least important (and *vice versa* for negative values). Horizontal lines depict two-sided confidence intervals (thick: 95%; thin: 99%). Exact values are reported in Table A16 below. Choice tasks followed a balanced incomplete block design ensuring that every respondent saw each option four times and each pair of options twice (for details, see main text and Section A.5 above). Full sample estimates are based on 61,509 choice tasks (7 per respondent) from 8,787 respondents who completed the full best-worst scaling module. As above, 213 of the 9,000 respondents who participated in the survey were excluded from this analysis because they failed to complete at least one of the choice tasks. Respondent/choice task N is reduced to 7,880/55,160 after excluding fastest/slowest 5%, 8,562/60,074 after excluding respondents who failed at least one attentiveness check, and 7,121/49,847 after excluding respondents who failed both attentiveness checks. Source: authors’ calculations from data collected by the authors.

The upper panel clearly conforms to the expectation. Political outsiders—respondents expressing low levels of trust in the government or satisfaction with the political system—rank decision-making procedures emphasizing citizen input more highly and on the positive side of the scale, meaning that this group more often selected this option as the most important than as the least important in the BWS tasks (more specifically, the standardized score, which ranges between -1 and +1, is calculated as the number of times an option such as citizen input was selected as the most important minus the number of times it was selected as the least important, divided by the number of tasks that included the option among the alternatives). In contrast, political insiders who trust the government and/or are satisfied with the political system—tend to dislike procedures building on citizen input. The group differences between the low and high trust/satisfaction groups are not only statistically robust but also substantively large, amounting to a difference of about 15 to 20 percentage points in the net choice propensity.




Figure A20: Best-worst scores of citizen and expert input across different views on the political system

Note: Figure shows average standardized best-worst scores for seven decision-making procedures (see Table 2 and accompanying text in the main article for details on the procedures) by respondents' level of trust in the national government (left column) and satisfaction with the political system (right column). Both items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (grouped here as 1-2 = low, 3-5 = mid, 6-7 = high). Best-worst scores are calculated as the number of times a procedure was selected as 'most important' minus the number of times it was selected as 'least important', divided by the number of choice tasks that included the procedure. Scores range between -1 and +1, with positive values indicating that the procedure is more (less) likely to be selected as most important than as least important (and *vice versa* for negative values). Vertical lines depict two-sided 95% confidence intervals. Exact values are reported in Table A17 below. Choice tasks followed a balanced incomplete block design ensuring that every respondent saw each option four times and each pair of options twice (for details, see main text and Section A.5 above). 213 of the 9,000 respondents who participated in the survey (1,500 each in Germany, Hungary, Japan, Poland, South Korea, and Spain) were excluded from this analysis because they failed to complete at least one of the choice tasks. 303 respondents did not answer the question for their trust in governments, while 327 did not answer regarding political system satisfaction. Estimates shown in the left-hand panel of the figure (trust in government) are accordingly based on 59,500 choice tasks (~7 per respondent) from 8,500 respondents. Estimates shown in the right-hand panel of the figure (political system satisfaction) are accordingly based on 59,290 choice tasks (~7 per respondent) from 8,470 respondents. Source: authors' calculations from data collected by the authors.

Group differences are not nearly as pronounced when we look at preferences for reliance on expert input in the lower panel of Figure A20. While the results confirm the strong support for expert input found in the main analysis, the strength of this support is only weakly related to respondents' views on the political system or the national government. If anything, and contrary to the intuition that political outsiders should be skeptical of procedures that remove political decision-making from indirect and direct forms of control by the people, the support for expert involvement is *stronger* among those expressing low levels of trust and/or satisfaction. The difference between those with low or high levels of governmental trust and between those with low or high levels of political satisfaction amounts to five percentage points on average.

A.5.8. BWS scores of citizen and expert input by self-rated health




Figure A21: BWS scores of selected decision-making procedures across different levels of self-rated health (pooled sample)

Note: Figure shows average standardized best-worst scores for seven decision-making procedures (see Table 2 and accompanying text in the main article for details on the procedures) by respondents' level of self-reported health. Answers were provided on a 7-point Likert scale, grouped here as 1-2 = "very poor", 3-5 = "average", 6-7 = Very good". Best-worst scores are calculated as the number of times a procedure was selected as 'most important' minus the number of times it was selected as 'least important', divided by the number of choice tasks that included the procedure. Scores range between -1 and +1, with positive values indicating that the procedure is more (less) likely to be selected as most important than as least important (and *vice versa* for negative values). Vertical lines depict two-sided 95% confidence intervals. Exact values are reported in Table A18 below. Choice tasks followed a balanced incomplete block design ensuring that every respondent saw each option four times and each pair of options twice (for details, see main text and Section A.5 above). 213 of the 9,000 respondents who participated in the survey were excluded from this analysis because they failed to complete at least one of the choice tasks. 110 respondents did not answer the question for self-rated health. Estimates shown here are accordingly based on 60,781 choice tasks (~7 per respondent) from 8,683 respondents who completed the full best-worst scaling module. Source: authors' calculations from data collected by the authors.

A.6 Exact values depicted in Figures 1 to 3 in the main article

Number of attributes at 'strong' level	Proportion selected	95% confidence interval (two-tailed)		Observations (# of profiles)
		Lower limit	Upper limit	
0	0.585	0.453	0.717	53
1	0.551	0.508	0.593	473
2	0.557	0.538	0.576	2450
3	0.544	0.534	0.556	7381
4	0.524	0.516	0.532	14360
5	0.505	0.498	0.512	20357
6	0.493	0.486	0.500	20296
7	0.476	0.467	0.484	14507
8	0.463	0.451	0.475	7286
9	0.444	0.422	0.465	2300
10	0.408	0.363	0.450	493
11	0.455	0.295	0.591	44

Table A3: Results depicted in Figure 1 in the main article

Note: See Figure 1 in the main article for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

Type of restriction	AMCE	95% CI (two-sided)		99% CI (two-sided)	
		Lower limit	Upper limit	Lower limit	Upper limit
Home office	0.064	0.055	0.074	0.052	0.077
Internat. travel	0.016	0.008	0.024	0.005	0.027
Fact checking	0.009	-0.002	0.019	-0.006	0.023
Rallies	-0.004	-0.012	0.004	-0.014	0.006
Elections	-0.005	-0.015	0.004	-0.018	0.007
Leisure facilities	-0.016	-0.024	-0.007	-0.026	-0.005
Contact tracing	-0.017	-0.025	-0.008	-0.028	-0.005
School closings	-0.023	-0.032	-0.014	-0.035	-0.011
Private gatherings	-0.044	-0.053	-0.036	-0.056	-0.033
Shops	-0.079	-0.088	-0.070	-0.091	-0.068
Leaving home	-0.085	-0.093	-0.077	-0.095	-0.074

Table A4: Results depicted in Figure 2 in the main article

Note: See Figure 2 in the main article for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

Decision-making procedure	Treatment: type of challenge	Standardized best-worst score	95% CI (two-sided)		99% CI (two-sided)	
			Lower limit	Upper limit	Lower limit	Upper limit
Expert input	Across all treatments	0.312	0.299	0.324	0.295	0.328
	Coronavirus	0.349	0.324	0.374	0.315	0.384
	Climate change	0.309	0.288	0.329	0.281	0.336
	Major societal challenges	0.277	0.257	0.298	0.250	0.304
Business input	Across all treatments	0.061	0.048	0.074	0.043	0.079
	Coronavirus	0.071	0.039	0.102	0.027	0.114
	Climate change	0.038	0.020	0.056	0.014	0.063
	Major societal challenges	0.074	0.053	0.095	0.046	0.102
Citizen input	Across all treatments	0.057	0.042	0.071	0.037	0.076
	Coronavirus	-0.011	-0.036	0.015	-0.046	0.025
	Climate change	0.037	0.012	0.062	0.003	0.071
	Major societal challenges	0.142	0.115	0.169	0.106	0.178
Quick action	Across all treatments	0.047	0.032	0.061	0.027	0.066
	Coronavirus	0.164	0.135	0.193	0.123	0.204
	Climate change	-0.006	-0.031	0.019	-0.040	0.028
	Major societal challenges	-0.016	-0.039	0.008	-0.047	0.016
International coordination	Across all treatments	-0.015	-0.028	-0.001	-0.033	0.003
	Coronavirus	-0.038	-0.070	-0.007	-0.082	0.005
	Climate change	0.110	0.090	0.130	0.083	0.137
	Major societal challenges	-0.116	-0.135	-0.096	-0.141	-0.090
Party consensus	Across all treatments	-0.132	-0.145	-0.119	-0.149	-0.115
	Coronavirus	-0.168	-0.190	-0.147	-0.198	-0.139
	Climate change	-0.140	-0.165	-0.116	-0.173	-0.107
	Major societal challenges	-0.088	-0.111	-0.065	-0.118	-0.057
Parliamentary vote	Across all treatments	-0.329	-0.341	-0.317	-0.345	-0.314
	Coronavirus	-0.366	-0.385	-0.347	-0.393	-0.339
	Climate change	-0.348	-0.368	-0.329	-0.374	-0.322
	Major societal challenges	-0.274	-0.298	-0.250	-0.307	-0.242

Table A5: Results depicted in Figure 3 in the main article

Note: See Figure 3 in the main article for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

A.7 Exact values depicted in Figures A4-A16 in the Online Appendix

Factor 1	Factor 2	E f f e c t i v e s a m p l e s i z e									
		10,000	30,000	90,000	150,000	200,000	10,000	30,000	90,000	150,000	200,000
2 levels	2 levels	<i>delta3 = 0.01</i>					<i>delta3 = 0.02</i>				
		0.08	0.14	0.32	0.49	0.61	0.17	0.41	0.85	0.97	0.99
		0.07	0.11	0.23	0.35	0.45	0.13	0.29	0.69	0.89	0.95
	3 levels	0.06	0.09	0.16	0.23	0.29	0.10	0.19	0.48	0.69	0.81
		0.07	0.11	0.23	0.35	0.45	0.13	0.29	0.69	0.89	0.95
		0.06	0.09	0.17	0.25	0.32	0.10	0.21	0.52	0.73	0.85
	5 levels	0.06	0.07	0.12	0.17	0.21	0.08	0.15	0.34	0.52	0.64
		0.06	0.09	0.16	0.23	0.29	0.10	0.19	0.48	0.69	0.81
		0.06	0.07	0.12	0.17	0.21	0.08	0.15	0.34	0.52	0.64
3 levels	2 levels	<i>delta3 = 0.03</i>					<i>delta3 = 0.05</i>				
		0.32	0.74	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.71	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00
		0.23	0.57	0.96	1.00	1.00	0.53	0.94	1.00	1.00	1.00
	3 levels	0.16	0.38	0.81	0.96	0.99	0.35	0.78	1.00	1.00	1.00
		0.23	0.57	0.96	1.00	1.00	0.53	0.94	1.00	1.00	1.00
		0.17	0.41	0.85	0.97	0.99	0.39	0.83	1.00	1.00	1.00
	5 levels	0.12	0.27	0.64	0.85	0.93	0.25	0.61	0.97	1.00	1.00
		0.16	0.38	0.81	0.96	0.99	0.35	0.78	1.00	1.00	1.00
		0.12	0.27	0.64	0.85	0.93	0.25	0.61	0.97	1.00	1.00
5 levels	5 levels	0.09	0.18	0.44	0.64	0.77	0.17	0.41	0.85	0.97	0.99

Table A6: Results depicted in Figure A4 in the online appendix

Note: Entries show statistical power (= probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis) for the interaction between two factors as a function of the size of the interaction (delta3), effective sample size, and the number of levels of the interacted factors, assuming an alpha level of 0.05. Note that the curves in Figure A4 are based on a much larger number of effective sample sizes to generate smooth curves, here only selected values can be shown due to space constraints. See Figure A4 above for further information.

Type of restriction	Country	AMCE	95% CI (two-sided)		99% CI (two-sided)	
			Lower limit	Upper limit	Lower limit	Upper limit
Home office/ alternating presence mandate	Germany	0.068	0.051	0.084	0.046	0.089
	Hungary	0.097	0.077	0.118	0.070	0.124
	Japan	0.035	0.018	0.053	0.012	0.058
	Poland	0.042	0.024	0.059	0.019	0.064
	South Korea	0.032	-0.010	0.074	-0.027	0.091
	Spain	0.114	0.096	0.131	0.091	0.137
International travel restricted	Germany	0.005	-0.011	0.021	-0.016	0.026
	Hungary	0.004	-0.018	0.026	-0.025	0.033
	Japan	0.080	0.062	0.098	0.057	0.103
	Poland	-0.022	-0.039	-0.006	-0.044	0.000
	South Korea	0.025	-0.004	0.054	-0.015	0.065
	Spain	0.006	-0.011	0.023	-0.017	0.028
Fines for false information	Germany	0.020	0.003	0.037	-0.003	0.043
	Hungary	0.008	-0.017	0.034	-0.025	0.042
	Japan	0.024	0.005	0.043	-0.001	0.049
	Poland	-0.011	-0.029	0.008	-0.035	0.013
	South Korea	-0.018	-0.069	0.033	-0.089	0.053
	Spain	0.028	0.010	0.046	0.004	0.052
Rallies/ demonstrations prohibited	Germany	-0.003	-0.019	0.014	-0.024	0.019
	Hungary	-0.024	-0.043	-0.006	-0.048	0.000
	Japan	-0.019	-0.037	-0.002	-0.042	0.003
	Poland	-0.027	-0.044	-0.009	-0.050	-0.004
	South Korea	0.033	0.006	0.061	-0.005	0.071
	Spain	0.015	-0.002	0.032	-0.007	0.038
Elections postponed	Germany	-0.002	-0.019	0.015	-0.025	0.020
	Hungary	-0.071	-0.093	-0.049	-0.100	-0.042
	Japan	0.022	0.005	0.039	0.000	0.045
	Poland	0.032	0.013	0.050	0.007	0.056
	South Korea	-0.047	-0.085	-0.009	-0.100	0.006
	Spain	0.034	0.016	0.051	0.010	0.057
Leisure facilities closed	Germany	-0.007	-0.023	0.010	-0.028	0.015
	Hungary	-0.021	-0.041	-0.001	-0.047	0.005
	Japan	0.003	-0.014	0.020	-0.020	0.025
	Poland	-0.043	-0.059	-0.026	-0.064	-0.021
	South Korea	-0.009	-0.040	0.021	-0.052	0.033
	Spain	-0.017	-0.034	0.001	-0.040	0.006
Mandatory app- based contact tracing	Germany	-0.005	-0.023	0.012	-0.029	0.018
	Hungary	-0.064	-0.086	-0.043	-0.093	-0.036
	Japan	-0.009	-0.025	0.008	-0.031	0.013
	Poland	-0.093	-0.111	-0.075	-0.117	-0.069
	South Korea	0.048	0.015	0.080	0.002	0.093
	Spain	0.023	0.005	0.040	0.000	0.046

Table continues on next page

Table A7 continued

Schools closed	Germany	-0.042	-0.060	-0.023	-0.066	-0.017
	Hungary	0.000	-0.024	0.023	-0.032	0.031
	Japan	-0.041	-0.059	-0.023	-0.065	-0.017
	Poland	-0.026	-0.043	-0.009	-0.048	-0.003
	South Korea	-0.017	-0.051	0.018	-0.065	0.031
	Spain	-0.013	-0.031	0.005	-0.037	0.011
No private gatherings	Germany	-0.053	-0.070	-0.036	-0.075	-0.031
	Hungary	-0.067	-0.089	-0.046	-0.096	-0.039
	Japan	-0.019	-0.036	-0.002	-0.041	0.004
	Poland	-0.079	-0.095	-0.062	-0.100	-0.057
	South Korea	-0.026	-0.062	0.009	-0.076	0.023
	Spain	-0.021	-0.038	-0.004	-0.044	0.001
Non-essential shops & services closed	Germany	-0.065	-0.082	-0.048	-0.087	-0.043
	Hungary	-0.069	-0.089	-0.049	-0.095	-0.043
	Japan	-0.091	-0.108	-0.073	-0.114	-0.068
	Poland	-0.103	-0.120	-0.086	-0.126	-0.081
	South Korea	-0.086	-0.121	-0.051	-0.135	-0.037
	Spain	-0.063	-0.080	-0.046	-0.086	-0.041
Leave home only with special reasons	Germany	-0.144	-0.161	-0.126	-0.167	-0.121
	Hungary	-0.096	-0.116	-0.076	-0.122	-0.069
	Japan	-0.040	-0.057	-0.024	-0.063	-0.018
	Poland	-0.115	-0.133	-0.098	-0.138	-0.093
	South Korea	-0.073	-0.101	-0.046	-0.111	-0.036
	Spain	-0.038	-0.054	-0.021	-0.059	-0.016

Table A7: Results depicted in Figure A5 in the online appendix

Note: AMCE = Average Marginal Component Effect; CI = Confidence Interval. See Figure A5 above for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

Type of restriction	Country	V-Dem score	AMCE	95% CI (two-sided)		99% CI (two-sided)	
				Lower limit	Upper limit	Lower limit	Upper limit
Elections postponed	Hungary	0.368	-0.071	-0.093	-0.049	-0.100	-0.042
	Poland	0.487	0.032	0.013	0.050	0.007	0.056
	Japan	0.731	0.022	0.005	0.039	0.000	0.045
	South Korea	0.792	-0.047	-0.085	-0.009	-0.100	0.006
	Spain	0.800	0.034	0.016	0.051	0.010	0.057
	Germany	0.833	-0.002	-0.019	0.015	-0.025	0.020
Rallies/ Demonstrations prohibited	Hungary	0.368	0.008	-0.017	0.034	-0.025	0.042
	Poland	0.487	-0.011	-0.029	0.008	-0.035	0.013
	Japan	0.731	0.024	0.005	0.043	-0.001	0.049
	South Korea	0.792	-0.018	-0.069	0.033	-0.089	0.053
	Spain	0.800	0.028	0.010	0.046	0.004	0.052
	Germany	0.833	0.020	0.003	0.037	-0.003	0.043
Fines for false information	Hungary	0.368	-0.024	-0.043	-0.006	-0.048	0.000
	Poland	0.487	-0.027	-0.044	-0.009	-0.050	-0.004
	Japan	0.731	-0.019	-0.037	-0.002	-0.042	0.003
	South Korea	0.792	0.033	0.006	0.061	-0.005	0.071
	Spain	0.800	0.015	-0.002	0.032	-0.007	0.038
	Germany	0.833	-0.003	-0.019	0.014	-0.024	0.019

Table A8: Results depicted in Figure A6 in the online appendix

Note: AMCE = Average Marginal Component Effect; CI = Confidence Interval. See Figure A6 above for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

Type of restriction	Level of trust/satisfaction	AMCE	95% CI (two-sided)	
			Lower limit	Upper limit
Elections postponed	Trust in national government			
	Low	-0.005	-0.017	0.008
	Mid	-0.001	-0.017	0.015
	High	-0.031	-0.056	-0.006
	Satisfaction with national political system			
	Low	-0.007	-0.019	0.006
	Mid	-0.002	-0.016	0.013
	High	-0.032	-0.061	-0.003
	Rallies/ Demonstrations prohibited	Trust in national government		
Low		-0.019	-0.031	-0.006
Mid		0.000	-0.013	0.013
High		0.018	-0.003	0.040
Satisfaction with national political system				
Low		-0.017	-0.029	-0.005
Mid		-0.003	-0.015	0.009
High		0.026	0.001	0.051
Fines for false information		Trust in national government		
	Low	0.010	-0.005	0.025
	Mid	0.008	-0.011	0.026
	High	0.012	-0.022	0.045
	Satisfaction with national political system			
	Low	0.014	-0.003	0.030
	Mid	0.010	-0.007	0.027
	High	-0.011	-0.054	0.033

Table A9: Results depicted in Figure A7 in the online appendix

Note: AMCE = Average Marginal Component Effect; CI = Confidence Interval. See Figure A7 above for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

Type of restriction	Self-rated health	AMCE	95% CI (two-sided)	
			Lower limit	Upper limit
Elections postponed	Very poor	0.009	-0.031	0.049
	Average	-0.002	-0.013	0.009
	Very good	-0.017	-0.035	0.002
Rallies/ demonstrations prohibited	Very poor	0.022	-0.020	0.065
	Average	-0.005	-0.015	0.006
	Very good	-0.007	-0.022	0.007
Fines for false information	Very poor	0.029	-0.018	0.076
	Average	0.010	-0.004	0.023
	Very good	0.004	-0.018	0.026

Table A10: Results depicted in Figure A8 in the online appendix

Note: AMCE = Average Marginal Component Effect; CI = Confidence Interval. See Figure A8 above for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

Type of restriction	Country	AMCE	95% CI (two-sided)		99% CI (two-sided)	
			Lower limit	Upper limit	Lower limit	Upper limit
Home office/ alternating presence mandate	Full sample	0.064	0.055	0.074	0.052	0.077
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	0.066	0.056	0.076	0.052	0.080
	W/o at least one failed check	0.068	0.058	0.077	0.055	0.080
	W/o two failed checks	0.073	0.063	0.084	0.060	0.087
Internal travel restricted	Full sample	0.016	0.008	0.024	0.005	0.027
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	0.020	0.011	0.028	0.008	0.031
	W/o at least one failed check	0.015	0.008	0.023	0.005	0.026
	W/o two failed checks	0.022	0.014	0.031	0.011	0.033
Fines for false informa- tion	Full sample	0.009	-0.002	0.019	-0.006	0.023
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	0.009	-0.002	0.021	-0.006	0.025
	W/o at least one failed check	0.012	0.001	0.022	-0.002	0.026
	W/o two failed checks	0.024	0.013	0.035	0.009	0.039
Rallies/ demon- strations prohibited	Full sample	-0.004	-0.012	0.004	-0.014	0.006
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.002	-0.010	0.006	-0.013	0.009
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.004	-0.012	0.003	-0.015	0.006
	W/o two failed checks	-0.001	-0.010	0.007	-0.013	0.010
Elections postponed	Full sample	-0.005	-0.015	0.004	-0.018	0.007
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.003	-0.013	0.006	-0.016	0.010
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.003	-0.011	0.006	-0.014	0.008
	W/o two failed checks	0.005	-0.004	0.014	-0.007	0.017
Leisure facilities closed	Full sample	-0.016	-0.024	-0.007	-0.026	-0.005
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.017	-0.026	-0.008	-0.028	-0.005
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.016	-0.024	-0.008	-0.027	-0.006
	W/o two failed checks	-0.014	-0.023	-0.005	-0.026	-0.002
Mandatory app-based contact tracing	Full sample	-0.017	-0.025	-0.008	-0.028	-0.005
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.019	-0.028	-0.010	-0.031	-0.007
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.018	-0.027	-0.010	-0.030	-0.007
	W/o two failed checks	-0.021	-0.030	-0.011	-0.033	-0.008
Schools closed	Full sample	-0.023	-0.032	-0.014	-0.035	-0.011
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.022	-0.032	-0.013	-0.035	-0.010
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.024	-0.033	-0.015	-0.036	-0.012
	W/o two failed checks	-0.022	-0.033	-0.012	-0.036	-0.009
No private gatherings	Full sample	-0.044	-0.053	-0.036	-0.056	-0.033
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.045	-0.054	-0.036	-0.057	-0.033
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.045	-0.054	-0.037	-0.057	-0.034
	W/o two failed checks	-0.047	-0.057	-0.038	-0.060	-0.035
Non- essential shops & services closed	Full sample	-0.079	-0.088	-0.070	-0.091	-0.068
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.081	-0.090	-0.071	-0.093	-0.068
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.081	-0.090	-0.072	-0.092	-0.070
	W/o two failed checks	-0.085	-0.095	-0.076	-0.098	-0.072
Leave home only with special reasons	Full sample	-0.085	-0.093	-0.077	-0.095	-0.074
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.087	-0.096	-0.079	-0.099	-0.076
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.089	-0.096	-0.081	-0.099	-0.079
	W/o two failed checks	-0.093	-0.101	-0.085	-0.104	-0.082

Table A11: Results depicted in Figure A9 in the online appendix

Note: AMCE = Average Marginal Component Effect; CI = Confidence Interval. See Figure A9 above for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

Type of restriction	Profile pairs excluded if one of the profiles includes restrictions on leaving and no more than ... additional restrictions	AMCE	95% CI (two-sided)	
			Lower limit	Upper limit
Leave home only with special reasons	0	-0.085	-0.093	-0.077
	1	-0.085	-0.093	-0.077
	2	-0.086	-0.095	-0.078
	3	-0.085	-0.094	-0.076
	4	-0.079	-0.090	-0.068
	5	-0.077	-0.093	-0.061
	6	-0.084	-0.106	-0.062
	7	-0.109	-0.161	-0.056
	8	-0.076	-0.154	0.003
	9	-0.069	-0.312	0.174
	10	---	---	---
International travel restricted	0	0.016	0.008	0.024
	1	0.016	0.008	0.024
	2	0.017	0.009	0.025
	3	0.018	0.009	0.026
	4	0.016	0.006	0.026
	5	0.017	0.004	0.029
	6	0.019	0.002	0.036
	7	0.026	0.007	0.046
	8	0.023	0.006	0.040
	9	0.023	0.006	0.040
	10	0.023	0.006	0.040
Leisure facilities closed	0	-0.016	-0.024	-0.007
	1	-0.015	-0.023	-0.007
	2	-0.016	-0.024	-0.007
	3	-0.016	-0.025	-0.007
	4	-0.020	-0.030	-0.009
	5	-0.020	-0.033	-0.007
	6	-0.024	-0.038	-0.009
	7	-0.027	-0.043	-0.011
	8	-0.028	-0.044	-0.011
	9	-0.028	-0.044	-0.011
	10	-0.028	-0.044	-0.011
Non-essential shops & services closed	0	-0.079	-0.088	-0.071
	1	-0.079	-0.088	-0.070
	2	-0.079	-0.088	-0.070
	3	-0.081	-0.090	-0.071
	4	-0.079	-0.089	-0.069
	5	-0.080	-0.092	-0.067
	6	-0.085	-0.100	-0.070
	7	-0.088	-0.106	-0.071
	8	-0.094	-0.112	-0.076
	9	-0.095	-0.113	-0.077
	10	-0.095	-0.113	-0.078

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Table A12 continued

Schools closed	0	-0.023	-0.032	-0.014
	1	-0.023	-0.032	-0.014
	2	-0.022	-0.031	-0.013
	3	-0.023	-0.033	-0.013
	4	-0.022	-0.034	-0.011
	5	-0.021	-0.033	-0.008
	6	-0.020	-0.035	-0.006
	7	-0.019	-0.035	-0.002
	8	-0.020	-0.037	-0.003
	9	-0.021	-0.037	-0.004
	10	-0.020	-0.037	-0.004
Home office/ alternating presence mandate	0	0.064	0.055	0.074
	1	0.064	0.055	0.074
	2	0.065	0.055	0.075
	3	0.065	0.055	0.076
	4	0.063	0.052	0.075
	5	0.062	0.047	0.077
	6	0.057	0.037	0.077
	7	0.051	0.028	0.074
	8	0.054	0.031	0.076
	9	0.054	0.032	0.077
	10	0.054	0.032	0.077
No private gatherings	0	-0.044	-0.053	-0.036
	1	-0.044	-0.053	-0.036
	2	-0.043	-0.052	-0.034
	3	-0.045	-0.054	-0.036
	4	-0.046	-0.056	-0.036
	5	-0.052	-0.064	-0.040
	6	-0.052	-0.068	-0.037
	7	-0.056	-0.073	-0.038
	8	-0.058	-0.076	-0.040
	9	-0.058	-0.076	-0.040
	10	-0.058	-0.076	-0.040
Mandatory app-based contact tracing	0	-0.017	-0.025	-0.008
	1	-0.017	-0.026	-0.009
	2	-0.017	-0.026	-0.008
	3	-0.017	-0.027	-0.008
	4	-0.019	-0.030	-0.008
	5	-0.019	-0.033	-0.005
	6	-0.019	-0.036	-0.001
	7	-0.020	-0.039	0.000
	8	-0.020	-0.040	0.000
	9	-0.020	-0.040	0.001
	10	-0.020	-0.040	0.001

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Table A12 continued

Rallies/demonstrations prohibited	0	-0.004	-0.012	0.004
	1	-0.004	-0.012	0.004
	2	-0.004	-0.012	0.004
	3	-0.005	-0.014	0.004
	4	-0.009	-0.019	0.001
	5	-0.012	-0.024	0.001
	6	-0.011	-0.027	0.005
	7	-0.009	-0.027	0.009
	8	-0.009	-0.027	0.010
	9	-0.011	-0.029	0.008
	10	-0.011	-0.029	0.008
Elections postponed	0	-0.006	-0.015	0.004
	1	-0.006	-0.015	0.003
	2	-0.006	-0.015	0.004
	3	-0.005	-0.015	0.005
	4	-0.008	-0.020	0.004
	5	-0.005	-0.021	0.011
	6	-0.005	-0.023	0.013
	7	-0.003	-0.024	0.017
	8	-0.005	-0.028	0.018
	9	-0.007	-0.030	0.016
	10	-0.007	-0.030	0.016
Fines for false information	0	0.009	-0.002	0.019
	1	0.009	-0.002	0.020
	2	0.008	-0.003	0.019
	3	0.008	-0.004	0.019
	4	0.003	-0.010	0.017
	5	0.001	-0.016	0.017
	6	0.006	-0.010	0.023
	7	0.006	-0.013	0.025
	8	0.004	-0.016	0.024
	9	0.005	-0.016	0.025
	10	0.004	-0.016	0.024

Table A12: Results depicted in Figure A10 in the online appendix

Note: AMCE = Average Marginal Component Effect; CI = Confidence Interval. See Figure A5 above for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

Decision-making procedure	Treatment: type of challenge	Germany			Hungary			Japan			Poland			South Korea			Spain		
		95% CI			95% CI			95% CI			95% CI			95% CI			95% CI		
		Score	LL	UL	Score	LL	UL	Score	LL	UL	Score	LL	UL	Score	LL	UL	Score	LL	UL
Expert input	Coronavirus	0.335	0.291	0.379	0.541	0.475	0.606	0.335	0.291	0.379	0.223	0.179	0.267	0.334	0.217	0.451	0.345	0.297	0.394
	Climate change	0.238	0.197	0.279	0.468	0.400	0.536	0.277	0.237	0.316	0.285	0.244	0.327	0.306	0.225	0.387	0.295	0.249	0.340
	Major societal challenges	0.297	0.250	0.344	0.444	0.398	0.491	0.255	0.212	0.297	0.196	0.149	0.243	0.238	0.167	0.310	0.218	0.173	0.263
Business input	Coronavirus	-0.087	-0.129	-0.045	0.142	0.093	0.191	0.067	0.026	0.108	0.121	0.080	0.162	0.168	-0.019	0.356	0.027	-0.018	0.072
	Climate change	-0.126	-0.171	-0.081	0.096	0.051	0.140	0.083	0.044	0.123	0.062	0.021	0.102	0.106	0.043	0.169	0.019	-0.024	0.062
	Major societal challenges	-0.141	-0.185	-0.096	0.232	0.182	0.283	0.055	0.016	0.093	0.077	0.035	0.120	0.108	0.016	0.201	0.083	0.037	0.128
Citizen input	Coronavirus	-0.041	-0.094	0.011	0.027	-0.040	0.094	0.073	0.017	0.128	-0.098	-0.148	-0.048	0.091	-0.011	0.193	-0.111	-0.163	-0.059
	Climate change	0.063	0.012	0.114	0.005	-0.057	0.068	0.087	0.034	0.141	-0.045	-0.092	0.002	0.180	0.063	0.296	-0.060	-0.111	-0.009
	Major societal challenges	0.071	0.016	0.126	0.110	0.052	0.167	0.219	0.168	0.270	0.072	0.018	0.125	0.295	0.181	0.409	0.083	0.032	0.134
Quick action	Coronavirus	0.205	0.160	0.251	0.099	0.047	0.152	0.391	0.346	0.436	0.001	-0.048	0.050	0.202	0.033	0.371	0.081	0.033	0.130
	Climate change	0.030	-0.019	0.079	-0.010	-0.064	0.044	0.180	0.133	0.228	-0.127	-0.174	-0.081	-0.091	-0.216	0.035	-0.017	-0.067	0.033
	Major societal challenges	0.052	0.003	0.100	-0.134	-0.190	-0.079	0.252	0.204	0.300	-0.171	-0.223	-0.120	0.017	-0.075	0.109	-0.111	-0.157	-0.066
International coordination	Coronavirus	-0.113	-0.156	-0.070	-0.139	-0.194	-0.084	-0.056	-0.098	-0.014	0.073	0.025	0.121	-0.047	-0.246	0.153	0.048	0.001	0.095
	Climate change	0.074	0.027	0.121	0.050	-0.005	0.106	0.093	0.047	0.140	0.172	0.129	0.215	0.087	0.022	0.153	0.176	0.130	0.223
	Major societal challenges	-0.160	-0.206	-0.113	-0.219	-0.267	-0.170	-0.107	-0.147	-0.067	-0.015	-0.063	0.034	-0.119	-0.170	-0.069	-0.065	-0.111	-0.019
Party consensus	Coronavirus	-0.169	-0.204	-0.134	-0.258	-0.315	-0.202	-0.292	-0.329	-0.254	0.023	-0.022	0.067	-0.231	-0.325	-0.138	-0.093	-0.134	-0.052
	Climate change	-0.161	-0.198	-0.124	-0.240	-0.287	-0.194	-0.224	-0.261	-0.187	-0.003	-0.045	0.040	-0.114	-0.270	0.041	-0.112	-0.153	-0.070
	Major societal challenges	-0.116	-0.157	-0.076	-0.117	-0.167	-0.066	-0.254	-0.290	-0.217	0.106	0.059	0.154	-0.116	-0.230	-0.002	-0.015	-0.059	0.029
Parliamentary vote	Coronavirus	-0.131	-0.166	-0.095	-0.412	-0.460	-0.365	-0.518	-0.557	-0.479	-0.343	-0.382	-0.304	-0.518	-0.601	-0.434	-0.298	-0.334	-0.261
	Climate change	-0.117	-0.150	-0.085	-0.369	-0.420	-0.318	-0.497	-0.534	-0.459	-0.344	-0.380	-0.308	-0.474	-0.569	-0.379	-0.301	-0.339	-0.264
	Major societal challenges	-0.003	-0.039	0.033	-0.317	-0.363	-0.270	-0.420	-0.461	-0.380	-0.265	-0.307	-0.224	-0.423	-0.564	-0.283	-0.193	-0.231	-0.155

Table A13: Results depicted in Figure A11 in the online appendix

Note: AMCE = Score is the average standardized best-worst score. CI = Confidence Interval (two-sided); LL = Lower Limit; UL = Upper Limit. See Figure A11 above for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

	<i>“Which of these approaches do you consider very important for making good decisions?”</i>		
	(% selecting each option, multiple choices possible)		
	Coronavirus	Climate change	Major societal challenges
Expert input	61.1	58.5	55.7
Business input	42.7	37.6	44.4
Citizen input	32.8	36.1	46.5
Quick action	50.8	38.3	38.4
International Coordination	37.0	49.0	34.1
Party consensus	22.9	24.2	28.3
Parliamentary vote	11.8	11.9	17.2
Don’t know	6.0	6.0	6.3
None important	2.9	2.5	2.1

Table A14: Results depicted in Figure A12 in the online appendix

Note: See Figure A12 above for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

<i>“Which of these approaches do you consider very important for making good decisions?”</i> (% selecting each option, multiple choices possible)							
Decision-making procedure	Treatment: type of challenge	Germany	Hungary	Japan	Poland	South Korea	Spain
Expert input	Coronavirus	60.6	70.4	53.9	54.6	63.9	63.0
	Climate change	52.0	71.8	52.3	57.6	58.8	59.7
	Major societal challenges	54.4	67.6	49.2	50.1	57.7	53.6
Business input	Coronavirus	32.6	53.9	35.4	46.6	42.5	46.3
	Climate change	30.2	43.4	31.8	38.9	43.6	38.2
	Major societal challenges	29.2	56.4	36.5	48.4	46.4	47.3
Citizen input	Coronavirus	27.1	37.8	36.7	28.3	38.7	28.9
	Climate change	36.3	37.1	31.2	35.9	44.0	32.4
	Major societal challenges	40.8	49.6	44.5	43.3	54.4	45.2
Quick action	Coronavirus	54.0	46.4	62.0	34.8	56.2	51.0
	Climate change	36.3	41.7	44.0	29.4	37.2	42.4
	Major societal challenges	37.3	33.3	54.0	27.5	41.7	36.1
International coordination	Coronavirus	33.7	34.1	30.9	42.2	36.3	44.9
	Climate change	42.5	51.9	43.8	50.2	48.2	57.9
	Major societal challenges	32.9	31.7	31.5	38.6	34.1	36.5
Party consensus	Coronavirus	20.2	21.5	13.0	35.0	18.5	28.9
	Climate change	22.0	21.4	17.2	33.3	22.0	28.7
	Major societal challenges	25.7	29.0	15.3	41.6	23.8	35.3
Parliamentary vote	Coronavirus	19.8	9.2	5.1	13.0	7.5	14.8
	Climate change	18.5	12.7	5.5	14.4	7.4	12.8
	Major societal challenges	25.9	16.2	9.4	19.6	10.5	22.5
Do not know	Coronavirus	5.5	3.9	10.0	5.7	5.8	5.1
	Climate change	6.4	3.4	10.1	3.9	7.0	5.4
	Major societal challenges	6.1	4.4	7.8	7.2	5.4	7.1
None important	Coronavirus	4.1	3.2	1.9	4.3	1.8	1.8
	Climate change	4.5	1.7	1.6	3.1	2.2	1.9
	Major societal challenges	3.1	0.9	3.6	2.8	0.8	1.7

Table A15: Results depicted in Figure A13 in the online appendix

Note: See Figure A13 above for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

Type of restriction	Country	Score	95% CI (two-sided)		99% CI (two-sided)	
			Lower limit	Upper limit	Lower limit	Upper limit
C o r o n a v i r u s						
Expert input	Full sample	0.349	0.324	0.374	0.315	0.384
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	0.366	0.339	0.394	0.328	0.404
	W/o at least one failed check	0.362	0.339	0.386	0.331	0.394
	W/o two failed checks	0.410	0.386	0.434	0.377	0.443
Business input	Full sample	0.071	0.039	0.102	0.027	0.114
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	0.075	0.041	0.110	0.027	0.123
	W/o at least one failed check	0.062	0.042	0.082	0.035	0.089
	W/o two failed checks	0.074	0.052	0.096	0.044	0.104
Citizen input	Full sample	-0.011	-0.036	0.015	-0.046	0.025
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.017	-0.045	0.011	-0.056	0.022
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.009	-0.034	0.016	-0.042	0.024
	W/o two failed checks	-0.023	-0.052	0.005	-0.062	0.015
Quick action	Full sample	0.164	0.135	0.193	0.123	0.204
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	0.166	0.134	0.198	0.121	0.210
	W/o at least one failed check	0.163	0.136	0.190	0.126	0.200
	W/o two failed checks	0.166	0.135	0.198	0.123	0.209
International coordination	Full sample	-0.038	-0.070	-0.007	-0.082	0.005
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.042	-0.077	-0.007	-0.091	0.007
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.034	-0.063	-0.005	-0.073	0.005
	W/o two failed checks	-0.035	-0.069	-0.001	-0.081	0.011
Party consensus	Full sample	-0.168	-0.190	-0.147	-0.198	-0.139
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.176	-0.199	-0.153	-0.208	-0.144
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.168	-0.188	-0.149	-0.195	-0.142
	W/o two failed checks	-0.187	-0.209	-0.165	-0.217	-0.157
Parliamentary vote	Full sample	-0.366	-0.385	-0.347	-0.393	-0.339
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.372	-0.393	-0.352	-0.401	-0.344
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.376	-0.394	-0.357	-0.401	-0.351
	W/o two failed checks	-0.405	-0.425	-0.385	-0.433	-0.377

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Table A16 continued

Type of restriction	Country	Score	95% CI (two-sided)		99% CI (two-sided)	
			Lower limit	Upper limit	Lower limit	Upper limit
C l i m a t e c h a n g e						
Expert input	Full sample	0.309	0.288	0.329	0.281	0.336
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	0.327	0.305	0.349	0.297	0.357
	W/o at least one failed check	0.316	0.295	0.337	0.288	0.344
	W/o two failed checks	0.363	0.340	0.385	0.332	0.393
Business input	Full sample	0.038	0.020	0.056	0.014	0.063
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	0.033	0.014	0.053	0.007	0.060
	W/o at least one failed check	0.040	0.021	0.058	0.015	0.065
	W/o two failed checks	0.033	0.012	0.054	0.005	0.061
Citizen input	Full sample	0.037	0.012	0.062	0.003	0.071
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	0.031	0.003	0.058	-0.007	0.068
	W/o at least one failed check	0.035	0.009	0.061	0.000	0.070
	W/o two failed checks	0.033	0.004	0.063	-0.007	0.073
Quick action	Full sample	-0.006	-0.031	0.019	-0.040	0.028
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.014	-0.042	0.014	-0.051	0.023
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.005	-0.031	0.021	-0.040	0.030
	W/o two failed checks	-0.012	-0.042	0.017	-0.053	0.028
International coordination	Full sample	0.110	0.090	0.130	0.083	0.137
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	0.125	0.103	0.146	0.095	0.154
	W/o at least one failed check	0.112	0.091	0.133	0.084	0.140
	W/o two failed checks	0.130	0.106	0.153	0.098	0.162
Party consensus	Full sample	-0.140	-0.165	-0.116	-0.173	-0.107
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.140	-0.167	-0.113	-0.177	-0.104
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.142	-0.167	-0.117	-0.176	-0.108
	W/o two failed checks	-0.155	-0.184	-0.126	-0.194	-0.116
Parliamentary vote	Full sample	-0.348	-0.368	-0.329	-0.374	-0.322
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.361	-0.381	-0.340	-0.389	-0.332
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.356	-0.375	-0.336	-0.382	-0.329
	W/o two failed checks	-0.392	-0.412	-0.371	-0.420	-0.364

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Table A16 continued

Type of restriction	Country	Score	95% CI (two-sided)		99% CI (two-sided)	
			Lower limit	Upper limit	Lower limit	Upper limit
Major societal challenges						
Expert input	Full sample	0.277	0.257	0.298	0.250	0.304
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	0.287	0.267	0.308	0.260	0.315
	W/o at least one failed check	0.282	0.262	0.303	0.255	0.310
	W/o two failed checks	0.315	0.293	0.337	0.286	0.344
Business input	Full sample	0.074	0.053	0.095	0.046	0.102
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	0.081	0.059	0.104	0.052	0.111
	W/o at least one failed check	0.075	0.053	0.096	0.046	0.103
	W/o two failed checks	0.090	0.067	0.113	0.059	0.121
Citizen input	Full sample	0.142	0.115	0.169	0.106	0.178
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	0.140	0.111	0.168	0.101	0.178
	W/o at least one failed check	0.146	0.118	0.173	0.109	0.182
	W/o two failed checks	0.150	0.119	0.181	0.108	0.192
Quick action	Full sample	-0.016	-0.039	0.008	-0.047	0.016
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.012	-0.037	0.013	-0.046	0.021
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.014	-0.038	0.009	-0.046	0.018
	W/o two failed checks	-0.021	-0.048	0.005	-0.057	0.014
International coordination	Full sample	-0.116	-0.135	-0.096	-0.141	-0.090
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.119	-0.139	-0.098	-0.146	-0.091
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.117	-0.136	-0.097	-0.143	-0.091
	W/o two failed checks	-0.124	-0.146	-0.102	-0.153	-0.095
Party consensus	Full sample	-0.088	-0.111	-0.065	-0.118	-0.057
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.088	-0.113	-0.063	-0.121	-0.055
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.091	-0.114	-0.067	-0.122	-0.060
	W/o two failed checks	-0.101	-0.127	-0.075	-0.136	-0.066
Parliamentary vote	Full sample	-0.274	-0.298	-0.250	-0.307	-0.242
	W/o fastest/slowest 5%	-0.290	-0.313	-0.266	-0.321	-0.258
	W/o at least one failed check	-0.281	-0.306	-0.257	-0.314	-0.248
	W/o two failed checks	-0.308	-0.333	-0.283	-0.342	-0.274

Table A16: Results depicted in Figure A14 in the online appendix

Note: = Score is the average standardized best-worst score. CI = Confidence Interval. See Figure A14 above for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

Type of restriction	Level of trust/satisfaction	Score	95% CI (two-sided)	
			Lower limit	Upper limit
Citizen input	Trust in national government			
	Low	0.092	0.073	0.111
	Mid	0.017	0.000	0.035
	High	-0.054	-0.086	-0.023
	Satisfaction with national political system			
	Low	0.099	0.080	0.119
	Mid	0.022	0.005	0.039
	High	-0.115	-0.152	-0.078
Expert input	Trust in national government			
	Low	0.348	0.332	0.364
	Mid	0.322	0.307	0.338
	High	0.294	0.265	0.324
	Satisfaction with national political system			
	Low	0.357	0.341	0.373
	Mid	0.308	0.294	0.323
	High	0.292	0.257	0.327

Table A17: Results depicted in Figure A15 in the online appendix

Note: = Score is the average standardized best-worst score. CI = Confidence Interval. See Figure A15 above for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

Type of restriction	Level of self-rated health	Score	95% CI (two-sided)	
			Lower limit	Upper limit
Citizen input	Low	0.125	0.072	0.178
	Mid	0.038	0.023	0.054
	High	0.038	0.017	0.059
Expert input	Low	0.311	0.266	0.355
	Mid	0.329	0.316	0.343
	High	0.328	0.309	0.346

Table A18: Results depicted in Figure A16 in the online appendix

Note: = Score is the average standardized best-worst score. CI = Confidence Interval. See Figure A16 above for further information, case numbers, and data sources.

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