

These are the Appendices to the paper “Mass Attitudes towards Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine: Tentative Support for Top-Down Opinion Formation”

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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics: Analysis 1

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
War Responsibility - Ukraine vs Russia	12221	2.39	5.16	-10	10
War Responsibility - NATO vs Russia	12221	2.56	5.22	-10	10
War Responsibility: NATO vs Ukraine	12221	.16	2.83	-10	10
War Responsibility - Combined Likert Scale	12221	5.97	2.54	0	10
Preferred outcome of the war in Ukraine	10341	1.63	.66	1	3
Pacifism	12221	.58	.24	0	1
Conservative Authoritarianism	12221	.41	.24	0	1
Extreme Left	12221	.12	.32	0	1
Center	12221	.47	.5	0	1
Moderate Left	12221	.13	.34	0	1
Moderate Right	12221	.14	.34	0	1
Extreme Right	12221	.15	.35	0	1
Incumbent Support	12221	.37	.35	0	1
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity	12221	.41	.2	0	1
Conspiracy Beliefs	12221	.53	.31	0	1
Altern. News Consumption	12221	.4	.2	0	1
Man	12221	.48	.5	0	1
Woman	12221	.52	.5	0	1
Other Gender	12221	0	.04	0	1
Primary or none	12221	.16	.36	0	1
Vocational Education	12221	.35	.48	0	1
High School Education	12221	.28	.45	0	1
University Education	12221	.21	.41	0	1
Czechia	12221	.2	.4	0	1
France	12221	.2	.4	0	1
Poland	12221	.2	.4	0	1
Romania	12221	.21	.4	0	1
Slovakia	12221	.2	.4	0	1

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics: Analysis 2

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Current Situation Responsibility: NATO vs Russia	24261	4.33	6.23	-10	10
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity	16572	.27	.25	0	1
Extreme Left	24261	.03	.17	0	1
Moderate Left	24261	.25	.44	0	1
Moderate Right	24261	.24	.43	0	1
Extreme Right	24261	.03	.18	0	1
Woman	24261	.48	.5	0	1
Primary Education or None	24250	.08	.27	0	1
Vocational Education	24250	.14	.35	0	1
High School Education	24250	.46	.5	0	1
University Education	24250	.32	.47	0	1
Age: 18-24	24261	.09	.29	0	1
Age: 25-34	24261	.15	.36	0	1
Age: 35-44	24261	.17	.37	0	1
Age: 45-54	24261	.17	.38	0	1
Age: 55+	24261	.42	.49	0	1
Denmark	24261	.08	.28	0	1
Germany	24261	.08	.28	0	1
Greece	24261	.04	.2	0	1
Spain	24261	.08	.28	0	1
France	24261	.08	.28	0	1
Italy	24261	.08	.28	0	1
Netherlands	24261	.04	.2	0	1
United Kingdom	24261	.08	.28	0	1
Finland	24261	.04	.2	0	1
Sweden	24261	.08	.28	0	1
Bulgaria	24261	.04	.2	0	1
Hungary	24261	.04	.2	0	1
Lithuania	24261	.04	.2	0	1
Poland	24261	.04	.2	0	1
Romania	24261	.04	.2	0	1
Slovakia	24261	.04	.2	0	1
Croatia	24261	.04	.2	0	1

Note: Party Proximity is available only for 16,572 respondents.

Table A3: Descriptive Statistics: CHES data

	count	mean	sd	min	max
Belgium	11	8.58	2.17	3.50	9.67
Denmark	12	8.94	0.36	8.00	9.17
Germany	7	6.65	3.37	1.09	9.36
Greece	8	6.03	3.28	1.75	10.00
Spain	13	6.17	1.66	3.88	8.75
France	11	6.32	1.88	3.00	8.20
Ireland	9	6.80	1.24	4.60	8.17
Italy	8	6.66	2.35	3.14	9.00
Netherlands	17	7.47	2.41	0.80	9.75
United Kingdom	11	8.57	0.43	7.75	9.20
Portugal	11	7.28	2.84	1.83	9.67
Austria	5	7.13	2.93	2.50	9.67
Finland	9	8.41	0.55	7.67	9.10
Sweden	8	8.49	1.13	6.08	9.33
Bulgaria	8	5.89	3.52	0.40	9.90
Czech Republic	10	6.87	3.43	0.78	9.89
Estonia	6	8.72	1.49	6.70	9.80
Hungary	9	7.18	3.43	1.00	9.80
Latvia	11	6.80	2.71	1.60	9.29
Lithuania	11	6.70	2.62	2.50	10.00
Poland	8	7.88	2.17	2.60	9.30
Romania	7	6.80	1.66	4.00	8.50
Slovakia	11	6.35	3.59	0.71	10.00
Slovenia	5	7.47	1.38	6.00	9.17
Croatia	15	8.09	1.58	4.12	9.62
Turkey	5	4.17	1.58	2.00	5.88
Norway	10	8.01	0.97	5.50	9.00
Switzerland	7	7.68	1.57	4.25	8.75
Malta	2	6.58	0.12	6.50	6.67
Iceland	9	8.56	0.80	7.33	9.33
Total	274	7.32	2.34	0.40	10.00

Note: This is the descriptive statistics for the variable “Kremlin_ties”, which we use to construct our variable *Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity*. The unit of analysis in this table is a political party.

Appendix B: Information on Sampling and Weighting: the FC Dataset

The dataset is based on a survey fielded via computer-assisted online interviews by the survey company Cint between November 21 and December 11, 2023. For each country, we obtained a quota-based sample defined in terms of sex, age, region, size of municipality, and education based on the most recent census information. A few of the quotas were not met in some countries, all our analyses apply a post-stratification weight, which ensures that our samples are perfectly representative of the given adult population in terms of the given socio-demographics (i.e., they correspond to the desired marginal distribution observed in the census). The weight was created via raking and the package *iterake* accessible at : <https://github.com/ttrodrigz/iterake>. However, the correction by the weight is very slight, which is reflected in the fact that the weight does not change our substantive results. We show below the unweighted distribution of our dependent variables in Figures A3 and A4, and a replication of the main analyses without the weights in Table A13.

It should be noted that our sampling and data collection procedures are comparable to those applied by recent publications on the same topic (Thomson et al., 2023; Stolle, 2024). As discussed in the main text, the distribution of our dependent variables is consistent with probabilistically sampled data from Eurobarometers and quote-based data from the Solidarity in Europe project. Table A4 below demonstrates that, for instance, in terms of voter turnout, our data fit nearly perfectly the real-world statistics. This is particularly the case for the Czech Republic, France, and Poland, where the official and reported turnout rates are nearly identical. It is possible that, for Slovakia and Romania, we have samples that are, on average, slightly more politically active than the rest of the population. However, it is much more likely that the higher turnout rates in the survey reflect social desirability (over-reporting) and recall bias. The two elections in question had the lowest officially recorded turnout and occurred the furthest back in time.

Table A4: Comparing statistic on Turnout in Presidential Elections


Country	Election Year	Official Turnout	Survey Turnout	Difference (Survey vs Official)
CZ	2023	70.2	69.5	-0.7
FR	2022	72	71.4	-0.6
PL	2020	68.2	71.4	3.2
RO	2019	54.9	64.0	9.1
SK	2019	42.6	56.0	13.4

2nd round of Presidential elections. Turnout is reported in percentage and the differences in turnout are in percentage points. The official turnout statistics come from the five countries' statistical offices.

Appendix C: Energy Prices in the Five Countries under Study

Figure [A1](#) below displays the evolution of retail energy prices in the five countries from Analysis 1. The data come from Eurostat and cover the 2013-2024 period. They demonstrate that in all five countries, energy prices significantly deviated from their long-term pre-war levels by 2023. The increase was partially mitigated only in Romania and Slovakia, but it was still clearly observable. These Eurostat figures align with reports by leading energy markets analysts. These reports note that “rising energy and food prices have disproportionately impacted low-income households” and that “government measures to mitigate inflation are viewed as insufficient across income groups, particularly by low-income households, suggesting a need for more targeted support” (Charalambakis et al., [2022](#)). In Eastern Europe, “the introduced price caps were often limited to consumption below the national average, leading to steep cost increases for households with larger or inefficient homes” (Ernst & Young, [2024](#)).

Figure A1: Energy Prices Change in the Five Countries Under Study



Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data. Electricity prices for household consumers are defined as follows: Average national price in Euro per kWh including taxes and levies applicable for the first semester of each year for medium size household consumers (Consumption Band Dc with annual consumption between 2500 and 5000 kWh).

Appendix D: Operationalisation of Hypotheses 1.2 and 4.1 (Analysis 1)


The operationalisation of the hypothesis draws on the following question: “Some companies trade with business partners from foreign countries, while others conduct business operations mostly within their country’s national borders. Over the past five years, how significant were the following countries to the operations of your business or the company you worked for? On the scale below, 0 means that ‘not at all significant’ and 10 means ‘extremely significant’. If you were self-employed, estimate the importance of those countries for your professional activities. If you changed jobs, try to estimate the average significance of those foreign countries for your businesses or employers over the last five years. If you were not engaged in any economic activities (unemployed, retired etc.), select “without economic activities”.”

List of countries (presented in a randomized order): Germany, Spain, Russia, Great Britain, Italy.

The variable *Business Importance (Russia)* uses respondents’ assessment of Russia. The distribution of the responses to the survey question and that of the final variable are shown in Figure A2 below. As the wording above shows, the survey question was asked only to those respondents who had engaged in any economic activity in the past five years (9,285 out of 12,221 respondents). Out of them, 1,412 respondents answered don’t know. Our variable code those who did not have any

economic activity and don't know as 0 since, clearly, they do not (DKs) or cannot (economically inactive) blame any hardship in their economic activity on Russia. This coding means that roughly 4,226 of respondents (35% of the total) attribute some business importance to Russia. As an aside, when we exclude the DKs and the economically inactive from the analysis, the substantive results do not change. The regression coefficient of *Business Importance (Russia)* changes from $-.16$ (in the main text's Table 1) to $-.17$ (see Table A17 in the robustness checks below).

Figure A2: Distribution of the Variable *Business Importance (Russia)*



N is 7,873 for the survey question (on the left) and 12,221 for the variable (on the right).

Operationalisation of Hypothesis 4.1: Factor Analysis

We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis drawing on the tetrachoric correlations coefficients⁴² among eight binary variables measuring the use of different channels for receiving political news.⁴³ The Eigenvalues in Tab A5 suggest that especially the first two factors are meaningful. Based on the loadings in Table A6, the first factor differentiates those who consume political news and those who do not (all items exhibit positive loadings). The second factor appears to indicate a propensity to favour traditional media (positive loadings) over alternative sources of political news (negative loadings). We thus use the second factor, after reverse-coding (higher values mean more consumption of political news from alternative sources) and rescaling to a 0-1 range, to construct the independent variable *Altern. News Consumption*.

Table A5: Eigenvalues

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8
1.86	0.86	0.21	0.02	-0.15	-0.18	-0.20	-0.25

Note: The FC Dataset. The tables for the eigenvalues for different factors.

Table A6: Factor Loadings

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Television	0.20	0.51	0.14
Radio	0.48	0.43	0.05
Newspapers	0.51	0.36	0.02
Mainstream Websites	0.47	0.06	-0.24
Alternative Websites	0.48	-0.14	-0.24
Social Media	0.44	-0.31	0.19
Chat Applications	0.57	-0.37	0.19
Political Emails	0.59	-0.19	-0.03

Note: The FC Dataset. Factor 2 is used for the Variable *Altern. News Consumption*, which operationalises Hypothesis 4.1. It is positively associated with traditional media (the first four variables) and negatively associated with alternative political news sources (the latter four variables).

⁴²The use of the standard Persons correlation coefficients, less adapted for binary variables, yields substantively similar results (the signs of factor loadings for factor 2 are exactly the same).

⁴³The respondents were asked: "What channels do you primarily use for receiving political news?" The choice included: television, radio, newspapers, mainstream news websites, alternative news websites, social media, chat applications, and emails with political content.

Appendix E: Full Analysis 3

As discussed in the manuscript, the role of party proximity observed in our analyses could be potentially driven by reverse causality. If we observe a strong relationship between voters' party proximity and support for Russia, it may be partly because Russia's aggression has prompted some individuals to distance themselves from pro-Kremlin parties and refuse to vote for them. Theoretically, this scenario is unlikely to be the main driver of the potential association between the two variables as, based on the existing research, voters care much more about domestic issues than foreign policy (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Lavine et al., 1996; Guisinger, 2009; Saunders, 2022, p. 227). Furthermore, elections in most EU member states could affect the war in Ukraine during the period under study only indirectly at best.

Empirically, we propose a strategy to estimate the significance of the reverse causal path (i.e., from war preferences to party preferences). Its main dependent variable *Probability of Party Switching* records the difference between each respondent's maximal PTV and their PTV for the party for which the respondent voted in the last legislative election. The variable ranges from 0 (respondents are likely to vote in the future for the same party as in the last election) to 10 (respondents are very unlikely to vote for the same party as in the last election). We conduct an OLS regression analysis where the main explanatory factor is the differences between the proximity to Russia of the party for which respondents voted in the last legislative election (0-10 scale) and respondents' own position based on the aforementioned combined Ukraine-Russia-NATO Likert scale (0-10). For ease of interpretation, we transform these differences, which may range from -10 to +10, into three independent variables on a 0-1 scale. The first, *Party-Respondent Distance*, uses the absolute values of the original differences divided by 10. The variable *Respondents Closer to Russia* takes positive values only for those respondents who are more pro-Russian than the party they voted for in the last election (other respondents being coded as 0). Finally, the variable *Respondents Closer to Ukraine/NATO* takes positive values only for those respondents who are less pro-Russian than the party they voted for in the last election (again, other respondents being coded as 0).

We conduct this analysis only for two countries that held the last legislative election before the start of Russia's invasion and where the invasion thus could not affect past vote choice: Czechia (election in 2021) and Romania (election in

2020).⁴⁴ The underlying logic is straightforward: if respondents and their past vote choice differ in their pro-Russian positions and this matters for future vote choice, differences in PTVs should be positively associated with differences between respondents' and parties' positions towards Russia. In our sample, roughly 18% of Czechs and 30% of Romanians consider changing their vote in the next election (i.e., they indicate a higher PTV for a different party than the one for which they voted before the invasion). This percentage aligns with the current levels of party volatility in the region (Emanuele et al., 2020).

Table A7: Party-Respondent Disagreement on the Conflict and Vote Switching

	DV: Probability of Party Switch				DV: War Reponsibility - Combined Likert Scale
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Party-Respondent distance (abs. val.)		0.82 (0.27)**			
Respondents closer to Russia			-0.06 (0.29)		
Respondents closer to Ukraine/NATO			1.03 (0.29)***	1.05 (0.27)***	
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity					-7.50 (0.38)***
Constant	0.55 (0.05)***	0.36 (0.07)***	0.41 (0.06)***	0.40 (0.05)***	8.43 (0.14)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3013	3013	3013	3013	3013
R2	0.019	0.026	0.031	0.031	0.163

Note: The sample includes only Czech and Romanian respondents who voted in their respective countries' last legislative elections. All independent variables are on a 0-1 scale, and all dependent variables are on a 0-10 scale. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Tabel A7 presents the results. Models 1 to 3 indicate that the full-scale war in Ukraine may have led some voters to switch their allegiances. Model 1 regresses the probability of party switching (0-10 scale) on the absolute value of the distance between the respondent's position on the conflict and that of the party for which she voted in the last election. The maximal distance is associated with a 0.8 increase in the probability of switching. The next two models reveal that the distance's effect is directionally asymmetric. When respondents are closer to Russia compared with their vote choice from the last election, they are not more likely to defect. This indicates that respondents who vote for pro-Russian parties do so primarily for other reasons than these parties' attitudes towards the war. Conversely, when respondents are closer to Ukraine/NATO and see their formerly preferred

⁴⁴While recall questions have been artfully used by recent research (Stiers, 2019; Dassonneville, 2022), they may introduce some degree of bias due to memory problems or citizens desire for consistency (Waldahl & Aardal, 2000). However, these problems tend to be minor in the aggregate (Dassonneville & Hooghe, 2018). They are probably even less acute in our case than in earlier studies since, in our paper, the distance between the last legislative elections and our fieldwork is significantly shorter than a standard 4-year legislative term (two years in Czechia and three years in Romania).


party hold a pro-Russian position, the probability of party switching increases by up to 1 point. For some voters, the aggression presumably made party support for Russia intolerable.

Although these results are consistent with an effect of the conflict on voters' preferences, its magnitude appears fairly limited. When the combined Likert scale, used for the calculation of the independent variables in Models 1 to 3, is regressed on *Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity* in Model 4, the regression coefficient is substantively 7.5 times as strong. It thus seems likely, not only theoretically but also empirically, that the strong association between party proximity and attitudes towards the conflict, observed in Analyses 1 and 2 and Model 4 here, are mostly driven by the cues parties provide to their voters. Switches in party allegiances presumably explain only little.⁴⁵

⁴⁵In theory, attitudes towards Russia and Ukraine may have structured vote choice in the countries under study already prior to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. However, this seems unlikely given how little foreign policy generally matters in elections (Saunders, 2022, p. 227) and how marginally relevant Russia and the conflict in Ukraine was to European voters prior to 2022 (Orenstein, 2019, p. 35).


Appendix F: Replications of Figures 2 & 3 without Weights

Figure A3: Replication of Figure 2: Responsibility for the War: Ukraine vs Russia



The figure shows average differences in perceptions of Russia's and Ukraine's responsibility for the war. Positive values indicate that respondents attribute stronger responsibility to Russia. 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A4: Replication of Figure 3: Preferred outcome of the War



95% confidence intervals.

Appendix G: Analysis 1.1 - Robustness & Additional Analyses

Table A8: Model 7 from Table 1 replicated by Country

	(1) CZ	(2) FR	(3) PL	(4) RO	(5) SK
<i>Economic Factors:</i>					
Business Importance (Russia)	−0.08 (0.03)*	−0.28 (0.04)***	−0.23 (0.04)***	−0.13 (0.04)***	−0.05 (0.03)
Energy Crisis (difficult)	−0.10 (0.04)**	−0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	−0.06 (0.04)
<i>Ideology:</i>					
Extreme Left	0.01 (0.35)	0.15 (0.40)	−0.61 (0.35)	−0.37 (0.38)	−0.60 (0.39)
Moderate Left	0.42 (0.30)	−0.03 (0.34)	−0.13 (0.28)	−1.25 (0.39)**	0.06 (0.32)
Moderate Right	0.17 (0.31)	0.15 (0.29)	0.31 (0.40)	0.69 (0.39)	1.13 (0.23)***
Extreme Right	−0.40 (0.44)	0.75 (0.36)*	0.67 (0.42)	−0.28 (0.38)	0.97 (0.29)***
Conservative Authoritarianism	−3.79 (0.50)***	−4.48 (0.57)***	−3.83 (0.59)***	−3.03 (0.53)***	−1.98 (0.54)***
Pacifism	0.95 (0.46)*	−1.69 (0.63)**	1.23 (0.48)*	0.46 (0.57)	0.86 (0.44)*
<i>Partisan Alignment:</i>					
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity	−9.40 (0.96)***	−6.61 (1.48)***	−7.90 (1.77)***	−1.90 (1.60)	−7.69 (0.80)***
Incumbent Support	0.09 (0.51)	0.88 (0.42)*	−0.31 (0.50)	0.09 (0.43)	1.28 (0.50)*
<i>Disinformation:</i>					
Altern. News Consumption	−3.42 (0.56)***	−0.52 (0.58)	−1.48 (0.59)*	−0.96 (0.65)	−1.82 (0.47)***
Conspiracy Beliefs	−4.05 (0.43)***	−2.81 (0.44)***	−2.37 (0.43)***	−1.36 (0.44)**	−4.72 (0.38)***
<i>Controls:</i>					
Woman	−0.80 (0.21)***	−0.42 (0.21)*	−0.07 (0.23)	−0.31 (0.24)	−0.23 (0.20)
Other Gender	−0.76 (0.73)	−4.56 (1.32)***	1.97 (2.85)	−2.78 (1.42)*	0.18 (0.95)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.01)***	0.03 (0.01)**	−0.01 (0.01)
Vocational Education	−0.38 (0.33)	0.63 (0.35)	−0.15 (0.47)	0.49 (0.35)	0.43 (0.34)
High School Education	−0.01 (0.35)	0.33 (0.36)	0.99 (0.47)*	0.60 (0.51)	0.71 (0.34)*
University Education	−0.13 (0.37)	1.17 (0.33)***	0.75 (0.49)	2.15 (0.50)***	0.50 (0.38)
Constant	10.25 (0.68)***	7.92 (1.10)***	6.46 (0.85)***	3.06 (1.15)**	8.42 (0.83)***
N	2408	2449	2454	2506	2404
R2	0.340	0.270	0.196	0.139	0.509

Note: The DV is coded from -10 (Ukraine is fully responsible for the war) to 10 (Russia is fully responsible for the war). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A9: The Effect of Ideology By Country

	(1) CZ	(2) FR	(3) PL	(4) RO	(5) SK
<i>Ideology:</i>					
Extreme Left	−1.11 (0.41)**	−0.32 (0.41)	0.31 (0.39)	−0.69 (0.37)	−3.27 (0.46)***
Moderate Left	−0.08 (0.36)	0.41 (0.41)	0.76 (0.32)*	−1.31 (0.42)**	−1.04 (0.38)**
Moderate Right	2.35 (0.37)***	−0.28 (0.32)	−0.34 (0.39)	1.63 (0.44)***	2.12 (0.33)***
Extreme Right	0.88 (0.51)	−1.32 (0.33)***	0.06 (0.38)	−0.62 (0.40)	0.34 (0.39)
Constant	1.49 (0.16)***	3.36 (0.18)***	4.40 (0.18)***	1.79 (0.18)***	1.03 (0.17)***
N	2408	2449	2454	2506	2404
R2	0.032	0.014	0.004	0.025	0.073

Note: The DV is coded from -10 (Ukraine is fully responsible for the war) to 10 (Russia is fully responsible for the war). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A10: Responsibility for the War (NATO vs. Russia) Regressed on Predictors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Economic Factors:</i>							
Business Importance (Russia)		-0.29 (0.02)***				-0.16 (0.02)***	-0.14 (0.02)***
Energy Crisis (difficult)		-0.17 (0.02)***				-0.04 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
<i>Ideology:</i>							
Extreme Left			-0.99 (0.19)***			-0.59 (0.18)**	-0.49 (0.18)**
Moderate Left			-0.35 (0.17)*			-0.20 (0.16)	-0.26 (0.16)
Moderate Right			1.05 (0.16)***			0.66 (0.14)***	0.48 (0.14)***
Extreme Right			0.17 (0.18)			0.38 (0.17)*	0.42 (0.17)*
Conservative Authoritarianism			-6.43 (0.25)***			-3.51 (0.26)***	-3.32 (0.26)***
Pacifism			-0.47 (0.26)			0.09 (0.24)	0.02 (0.24)
<i>Partisan Alignment:</i>							
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity				-13.62 (0.41)***		-8.47 (0.43)***	-8.84 (0.43)***
Incumbent Support				0.09 (0.19)		0.23 (0.19)	0.24 (0.19)
<i>Disinformation:</i>							
Altern. News Consumption					-3.94 (0.27)***	-2.98 (0.25)***	-2.33 (0.26)***
Conspiracy Beliefs					-5.53 (0.19)***	-3.31 (0.20)***	-3.21 (0.20)***
<i>Controls:</i>							
Woman							-0.33 (0.10)**
Other Gender							-0.92 (1.23)
Age							0.02 (0.00)***
Vocational Education							0.44 (0.18)*
High School Education							0.94 (0.19)***
University Education							1.06 (0.20)***
Constant	2.34 (0.13)***	3.77 (0.18)***	4.78 (0.23)***	6.99 (0.19)***	6.89 (0.18)***	9.75 (0.28)***	7.94 (0.37)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221
R2	0.047	0.083	0.143	0.181	0.187	0.291	0.301

Note: The DV is coded from -10 (NATO is fully responsible for the war) to 10 (Russia is fully responsible for the war). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A11: Responsibility for the War (NATO vs. Ukraine) Regressed on Predictors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Economic Factors:</i>							
Business Importance (Russia)		0.00 (0.01)				0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Energy Crisis (difficult)		-0.00 (0.01)				0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
<i>Ideology:</i>							
Extreme Left			-0.09 (0.11)			-0.08 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.11)
Moderate Left			-0.01 (0.10)			-0.01 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.10)
Moderate Right			0.03 (0.09)			0.01 (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)
Extreme Right			0.04 (0.11)			0.04 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)
Conservative Authoritarianism			-0.02 (0.15)			0.03 (0.17)	0.06 (0.18)
Pacifism			-0.39 (0.16)*			-0.37 (0.16)*	-0.40 (0.17)*
<i>Partisan Alignment:</i>							
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity				-0.06 (0.25)		0.03 (0.28)	0.04 (0.28)
Incumbent Support				0.10 (0.12)		0.04 (0.13)	0.03 (0.13)
<i>Disinformation:</i>							
Altern. News Consumption					-0.41 (0.17)*	-0.42 (0.17)*	-0.39 (0.18)*
Conspiracy Beliefs					-0.11 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.13)
<i>Controls:</i>							
Woman							0.06 (0.07)
Other Gender							0.00 (0.22)
Age							-0.00 (0.00)
Vocational Education							0.20 (0.12)
High School Education							0.25 (0.12)*
University Education							0.25 (0.13)
Constant	0.56 (0.07)***	0.58 (0.10)***	0.80 (0.14)***	0.56 (0.12)***	0.79 (0.11)***	0.96 (0.19)***	0.76 (0.25)**
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221
R2	0.011	0.011	0.012	0.011	0.012	0.013	0.014

Note: The DV is coded from -10 (NATO is fully responsible for the war) to 10 (Ukraine is fully responsible for the war). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A12: Table 1 Replicated Using a Combined Scale for Russia, Ukraine, and NATO

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Economic Factors:</i>							
Business Importance (Russia)		-0.17 (0.01)***				-0.10 (0.01)***	-0.09 (0.01)***
Energy Crisis (difficult)		-0.05 (0.01)***				0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)*
<i>Ideology:</i>							
Extreme Left			-0.24 (0.09)**			-0.08 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
Moderate Left			-0.11 (0.08)			-0.05 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)
Moderate Right			0.41 (0.08)***			0.25 (0.07)***	0.18 (0.07)**
Extreme Right			-0.07 (0.09)			0.12 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)
Conservative Authoritarianism			-3.18 (0.12)***			-1.53 (0.12)***	-1.47 (0.12)***
Pacifism			-0.37 (0.12)**			-0.05 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.11)
<i>Partisan Alignment:</i>							
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity				-7.19 (0.20)***		-4.37 (0.20)***	-4.51 (0.20)***
Incumbent Support				-0.16 (0.09)		0.05 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)
<i>Disinformation:</i>							
Altern. News Consumption					-1.69 (0.12)***	-1.24 (0.11)***	-1.01 (0.12)***
Conspiracy Beliefs					-3.28 (0.09)***	-2.17 (0.09)***	-2.14 (0.09)***
<i>Controls:</i>							
Woman							-0.12 (0.05)*
Other Gender							0.00 (0.52)
Age							0.01 (0.00)***
Vocational Education							0.09 (0.08)
High School Education							0.25 (0.09)**
University Education							0.27 (0.09)**
Constant	5.70 (0.06)***	6.30 (0.09)***	6.98 (0.11)***	8.20 (0.09)***	8.14 (0.08)***	9.50 (0.13)***	8.88 (0.17)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221
R2	0.069	0.116	0.163	0.218	0.255	0.357	0.362

Note: The DV is Likert scale combining the individual scales on blame attribution to Russia, Ukraine (reverse-coded), and NATO (reverse-coded) respectively. It is coded from 0 (Ukraine and NATO are fully responsible for the War) to 10 (Russia is fully responsible for the war). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A13: Table 1 Replicated without Weights

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Economic Factors:</i>							
Business Importance (Russia)		-0.30 (0.01)***				-0.17 (0.01)***	-0.16 (0.01)***
Energy Crisis (difficult)		-0.18 (0.02)***				-0.04 (0.01)*	-0.01 (0.01)
<i>Ideology:</i>							
Extreme Left			-0.81 (0.14)***			-0.42 (0.13)**	-0.37 (0.13)**
Moderate Left			-0.21 (0.13)			-0.13 (0.12)	-0.20 (0.12)
Moderate Right			1.18 (0.13)***			0.69 (0.12)***	0.55 (0.12)***
Extreme Right			0.26 (0.13)*			0.35 (0.12)**	0.32 (0.12)**
Conservative Authoritarianism			-6.55 (0.18)***			-3.51 (0.18)***	-3.42 (0.18)***
Pacifism			-0.52 (0.18)**			0.06 (0.17)	0.04 (0.17)
<i>Partisan Alignment:</i>							
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity				-13.55 (0.32)***		-8.32 (0.33)***	-8.64 (0.33)***
Incumbent Support				0.09 (0.14)		0.20 (0.14)	0.23 (0.14)
<i>Disinformation:</i>							
Altern. News Consumption					-3.82 (0.21)***	-2.88 (0.20)***	-2.33 (0.21)***
Conspiracy Beliefs					-5.58 (0.14)***	-3.19 (0.14)***	-3.09 (0.14)***
<i>Controls:</i>							
Woman							-0.38 (0.08)***
Other Gender							-0.79 (1.11)
Age							0.02 (0.00)***
Vocational Education							0.21 (0.15)
High School Education							0.56 (0.15)***
University Education							0.61 (0.16)***
Constant	2.02 (0.10)***	3.51 (0.13)***	4.44 (0.16)***	6.46 (0.16)***	6.43 (0.14)***	9.10 (0.21)***	7.62 (0.28)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221
R2	0.055	0.095	0.158	0.200	0.197	0.307	0.314

Note: The DV is coded from -10 (Ukraine is fully responsible for the war) to 10 (Russia is fully responsible for the war). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A14: Separate Models for All Independent Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Business Importance (Russia)	-0.28 (0.02)***								
Energy Crisis (difficult)		-0.12 (0.02)***							
Extreme Left			-0.91 (0.19)***						
Moderate Left			-0.16 (0.17)						
Moderate Right			1.11 (0.17)***						
Extreme Right			-0.27 (0.18)						
Conservative Authoritarianism				-6.40 (0.24)***					
Pacifism					0.28 (0.26)				
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity						-13.55 (0.37)***			
Incumbent Support							2.42 (0.18)***		
Altern. News Consumption								-4.82 (0.27)***	
Conspiracy Beliefs									-5.77 (0.19)***
Constant	2.29 (0.13)***	2.44 (0.17)***	1.75 (0.13)***	3.95 (0.14)***	1.61 (0.20)***	6.42 (0.16)***	1.24 (0.12)***	3.73 (0.16)***	4.86 (0.15)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221	12221
R2	0.091	0.067	0.072	0.149	0.062	0.196	0.085	0.096	0.176

Note: The DV is coded from -10 (Ukraine is fully responsible for the war) to 10 (Russia is fully responsible for the war). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A15: Interactions Between Ideology and Media Diet

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Extreme Left	-1.32 (0.46)**		
Altern. News Consumption	-5.13 (0.39)***	-5.72 (0.56)***	-4.61 (0.78)***
Extreme Left × Altern. News Consumption	1.45 (0.98)		
Moderate Left	-0.50 (0.37)		
Moderate Left × Altern. News Consumption	0.96 (0.82)		
Moderate Right	0.71 (0.34)*		
Moderate Right × Altern. News Consumption	0.80 (0.78)		
Extreme Right	-0.43 (0.38)		
Extreme Right × Altern. News Consumption	0.59 (0.83)		
Conservative Authoritarianism		-7.55 (0.51)***	
Conservative Authoritarianism × Altern. News Consumption		3.65 (1.18)**	
Pacifism			0.40 (0.55)
Pacifism × Altern. News Consumption			-0.37 (1.30)
_cons	3.81 (0.20)***	6.15 (0.25)***	3.50 (0.35)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	12221	12221	12221
R2	0.104	0.176	0.096

Note: The DV is coded from -10 (Ukraine is fully responsible for the war) to 10 (Russia is fully responsible for the war). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The results show that the effect of media diet is not moderated by left-right ideology or pacifism. The only substantively and statistically significant interaction is with conservative authoritarianism. It seems that, for conservative authoritarians, the effect is weaker than for other respondents, which could be due to ceiling effects (conservative authoritarians being already distinctively pro-Russian).

Table A16: Pacifism & Disinformation

	(1)	(2)
Pacifism	0.28 (0.26)	0.77 (0.24)**
Altern. News Consumption		-3.52 (0.26)***
Conspiracy Beliefs		-5.46 (0.19)***
Constant	1.61 (0.20)***	5.66 (0.22)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes
N	12221	12221
R2	0.062	0.195

Note: The DV is coded from -10 (Ukraine is fully responsible for the war) to 10 (Russia is fully responsible for the war). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A17: Replication of Model 7 from Table 1: Age Squared; Authoritarianism and Cultural Conservatism Entered Separately; and Alternative Version of Variable *Business Importance (Russia)*

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Economic Factors:</i>			
Business Importance (Russia)	−0.14 (0.02)***	−0.15 (0.02)***	
Business Importance (Russia) V2			−0.17 (0.02)***
Energy Crisis (difficult)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
<i>Ideology:</i>			
Extreme Left	−0.49 (0.18)**	−0.45 (0.18)*	−0.51 (0.22)*
Moderate Left	−0.26 (0.16)	−0.27 (0.16)	−0.27 (0.19)
Moderate Right	0.48 (0.14)***	0.44 (0.14)**	0.50 (0.16)**
Extreme Right	0.41 (0.17)*	0.36 (0.17)*	0.41 (0.20)*
Conservative Authoritarianism	−3.32 (0.26)***		−3.13 (0.31)***
Authoritarianism		−1.07 (0.18)***	
Conservatism		−2.23 (0.17)***	
Pacifism	0.02 (0.24)	0.02 (0.24)	0.13 (0.29)
<i>Partisan Alignment:</i>			
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity	−8.83 (0.43)***	−8.72 (0.43)***	−8.29 (0.50)***
Incumbent Support	0.24 (0.19)	0.23 (0.19)	−0.03 (0.22)
<i>Disinformation:</i>			
Altern. News Consumption	−2.30 (0.26)***	−2.27 (0.26)***	−1.90 (0.30)***
Conspiracy Beliefs	−3.22 (0.20)***	−3.41 (0.21)***	−3.28 (0.25)***
<i>Controls:</i>			
Woman	−0.33 (0.10)**	−0.34 (0.10)**	−0.30 (0.13)*
Other Gender	−0.88 (1.24)	−0.91 (1.22)	0.84 (2.93)
Age	0.04 (0.02)*	0.02 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.00)***
Age × Age	−0.00 (0.00)		
Vocational Education	0.42 (0.18)*	0.44 (0.18)*	0.70 (0.24)**
High School Education	0.93 (0.19)***	0.96 (0.19)***	1.17 (0.25)***
University Education	1.05 (0.20)***	1.07 (0.19)***	1.33 (0.26)***
Constant	7.58 (0.50)***	7.92 (0.37)***	7.65 (0.46)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	12221	12221	7873
R2	0.301	0.304	0.309

Note: Model 1 controls for a quadratic (and not linear) operationalisation of Age. Model 2 replaces the index *Conservative Authoritarianism* by two separate measures of authoritarianism and cultural conservatism. In Model 3, the variable *Business Importance (Russia)* excludes don't know answers and economically inactive. All models confirm the findings from the main text. The DV is coded from -10 (Ukraine is fully responsible for the war) to 10 (Russia is fully responsible for the war). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A18: Robustness Check: Seemingly Unrelated Regression

	DV from Analysis 1	DV from Analysis 2
<i>Economic Factors:</i>		
Business Importance (Russia)	−0.19 (0.01)***	−0.02 (0.00)***
Energy Crisis (difficult)	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.00)
<i>Ideology:</i>		
Extreme Left	−0.48 (0.15)**	−0.03 (0.02)
Moderate Left	−0.21 (0.14)	−0.01 (0.02)
Moderate Right	0.55 (0.13)***	0.06 (0.02)***
Extreme Right	0.24 (0.13)	0.04 (0.02)*
Conservative Authoritarianism	−3.52 (0.19)***	−0.27 (0.02)***
Pacifism	0.04 (0.18)	−0.00 (0.02)
<i>Partisan Alignment:</i>		
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity	−8.47 (0.36)***	−1.05 (0.04)***
Incumbent Support	0.21 (0.16)	0.15 (0.02)***
<i>Disinformation:</i>		
Altern. News Consumption	−2.87 (0.22)***	−0.32 (0.03)***
Conspiracy Beliefs	−3.54 (0.16)***	−0.35 (0.02)***
Constant	9.53 (0.23)***	2.09 (0.03)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes
N	10341	10341
R2	0.328	0.307

Note: The DV is coded from -10 (Ukraine is fully responsible for the war) to 10 (Russia is fully responsible for the war). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

This analysis conducts a seemingly unrelated regression analysis to account for the possible correlation of residuals between Analysis 1.1 and Analysis 1.2. Given the computational and mathematical constraints (the need to use the same method for both regression analyses), the second dependent variable is considered ordinal and analysed via a linear probability model. The results are strongly consistent with those reported in the main text.

Table A19: Robustness Check: Support for European Integration

	(1)	(2)
Support for European Integration	2.71 (0.18)***	1.39 (0.18)***
<i>Ideology:</i>		
Extreme Left	−0.67 (0.17)***	−0.36 (0.17)*
Moderate Left	−0.29 (0.15)	−0.25 (0.15)
Moderate Right	0.86 (0.15)***	0.45 (0.14)**
Extreme Right	0.04 (0.18)	0.35 (0.16)*
Conservative Authoritarianism	−5.81 (0.24)***	−3.23 (0.24)***
Pacifism	−0.03 (0.25)	0.39 (0.23)
<i>Economic Factors:</i>		
Business Importance (Russia)		−0.16 (0.02)***
Energy Crisis (difficult)		0.01 (0.02)
<i>Partisan Alignment:</i>		
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity		−8.06 (0.44)***
Incumbent Support		0.17 (0.19)
<i>Disinformation:</i>		
Altern. News Consumption		−1.89 (0.26)***
Conspiracy Beliefs		−3.00 (0.19)***
<i>Controls:</i>		
Woman		−0.37 (0.10)***
Other Gender		−0.79 (1.14)
Age		0.02 (0.00)***
Vocational Education		0.23 (0.18)
High School Education		0.70 (0.19)***
University Education		0.79 (0.19)***
Constant	2.87 (0.23)***	6.21 (0.39)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes
N	12221	12221
R2	0.185	0.318

Note: The DV is coded from -10 (Ukraine is fully responsible for the war) to 10 (Russia is fully responsible for the war). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

This analysis introduces an additional ideological variable: *Support for European Integration*. It was measured using the standard Eurobarometer item asking whether European integration has already gone too far (0 on a 0–10 scale) or should be pushed further (10) and, like all other independent variables, it was recoded to a 0–1 range. We do not include this variable in the main models because we consider it conceptually too close to one component of our dependent variables (support/blame of NATO), which increases the risk of confounding and reverse causality.

The regression results indicate a positive association between support for European integration and support for Ukraine in the war. However, this association is substantively weaker than those of the three leading predictors identified in our main analyses (Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity, Conservative Authoritarianism, and Conspiracy Beliefs). This suggests that the omission of this variable in the main analysis does not significantly bias our analysis in favour of top-down models.

Appendix H: Analysis 1.2 - Robustness & Additional Analyses

Table A20: Preferred Outcome of the War: Ukraine's vs. Russia's Victory

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Economic Factors:</i>							
Business Importance (Russia)		-0.18 (0.01)***				-0.14 (0.02)***	-0.12 (0.02)***
Energy Crisis (difficult)		-0.07 (0.02)***				-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
<i>Ideology:</i>							
Extreme Left			-0.83 (0.14)***			-0.46 (0.17)**	-0.40 (0.17)*
Moderate Left			-0.35 (0.14)*			-0.15 (0.16)	-0.15 (0.16)
Moderate Right			0.67 (0.16)***			0.58 (0.17)***	0.56 (0.18)**
Extreme Right			-0.25 (0.13)			0.14 (0.15)	0.23 (0.15)
Conservative Authoritarianism			-3.23 (0.20)***			-1.70 (0.23)***	-1.64 (0.24)***
Pacifism			0.33 (0.21)			0.77 (0.23)***	0.69 (0.23)**
<i>Partisan Alignment:</i>							
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity				-9.22 (0.41)***		-7.09 (0.44)***	-7.44 (0.46)***
Incumbent Support				0.26 (0.22)		0.54 (0.20)**	0.52 (0.20)**
<i>Disinformation:</i>							
Altern. News Consumption					-2.55 (0.24)***	-2.14 (0.26)***	-1.79 (0.26)***
Conspiracy Beliefs					-3.84 (0.20)***	-2.67 (0.22)***	-2.67 (0.22)***
<i>Controls:</i>							
Woman							0.11 (0.11)
Other Gender							2.37 (1.37)
Age							0.01 (0.00)*
Vocational Education							0.58 (0.18)***
High School Education							0.69 (0.19)***
University Education							0.70 (0.20)***
Constant	1.38 (0.09)***	2.09 (0.14)***	2.44 (0.17)***	4.66 (0.21)***	4.69 (0.19)***	6.82 (0.31)***	5.73 (0.39)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	10341	10341	10341	10341	10341	10341	10341
Pseudo R2	0.045	0.071	0.090	0.131	0.124	0.200	0.206


Note: The result of a multinomial logit regression (first part). Positive values mean stronger support for Ukraine's victory. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A21: Preferred Outcome of the War: Neither Russia's nor Ukraine's vs. Russia's Victory

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Economic Factors:</i>							
Business Importance (Russia)		-0.05 (0.01)***				-0.04 (0.01)**	-0.04 (0.01)**
Energy Crisis (difficult)		0.01 (0.02)				0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
<i>Ideology:</i>							
Extreme Left			-1.03 (0.14)***			-0.83 (0.15)***	-0.80 (0.15)***
Moderate Left			-0.50 (0.14)***			-0.39 (0.15)**	-0.37 (0.15)*
Moderate Right			0.35 (0.16)*			0.40 (0.17)*	0.45 (0.17)**
Extreme Right			-0.69 (0.13)***			-0.34 (0.13)*	-0.26 (0.14)
Conservative Authoritarianism			-1.42 (0.19)***			-0.84 (0.21)***	-0.82 (0.22)***
Pacifism			0.99 (0.20)***			1.28 (0.21)***	1.24 (0.22)***
<i>Partisan Alignment:</i>							
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity				-4.10 (0.36)***		-3.42 (0.39)***	-3.68 (0.41)***
Incumbent Support				-0.20 (0.21)		-0.06 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.19)
<i>Disinformation:</i>							
Altern. News Consumption					-1.30 (0.23)***	-1.13 (0.24)***	-1.08 (0.24)***
Conspiracy Beliefs					-1.91 (0.19)***	-1.45 (0.21)***	-1.46 (0.21)***
<i>Controls:</i>							
Woman							0.21 (0.10)*
Other Gender							1.65 (1.40)
Age							-0.00 (0.00)
Vocational Education							0.40 (0.16)*
High School Education							0.40 (0.17)*
University Education							0.55 (0.18)**
Constant	1.53 (0.09)***	1.61 (0.13)***	1.75 (0.17)***	3.30 (0.20)***	3.39 (0.18)***	4.16 (0.29)***	3.94 (0.36)***
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	10341	10341	10341	10341	10341	10341	10341
Pseudo R2	0.045	0.071	0.090	0.131	0.124	0.200	0.206

Note: The result of a multinomial logit regression (second part). Positive values mean stronger support for neither's victory. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure A5: Replication of Figure 4 by Country



Note: Average Marginal effects from the multinomial logit analyses (Model 6 in Tables 2 and 3). The coefficients indicate changes in the probability of preferring Ukraine's victory (over any other outcome) resulting from one-unit changes in the independent variables (holding other variables at their observed values). 95% confidence intervals.

These country-specific results strongly resemble those from the aggregated model presented in Figure 4. In each country, respondents' support for Ukraine's victory is the most strongly (and negatively) associated with *Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity*, *Conspiracy Beliefs*, *Altern. News Consumption*, and *Conservative Authoritarianism*. All these marginal effects are substantively and statistically significant and in the hypothesised direction.

Appendix I: Analysis 2 - Robustness & Additional Analyses

The analysis presented in Table A22 tests whether greater proximity to political parties is associated with a stronger alignment on the position towards the conflict in Ukraine. The variable *Strong Party Proximity* is dummy coded as one for those who declare being close to the same party as for which they voted in the last election. The result demonstrates that such respondents align more strongly with their party's position on the conflict in Ukraine, which is consistent with the idea of cueing.

Table A22: Role of Strong Party Proximity

	(1)
<i>Partisan Alignment:</i>	
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity	−5.33 (0.34)***
Strong Party Proximity	1.29 (0.15)***
Strong Party Proximity × Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity	−2.27 (0.43)***
Extreme Left	−0.86 (0.32)**
Moderate Left	0.39 (0.12)**
Moderate Right	0.72 (0.12)***
Extreme Right	−0.07 (0.29)
Woman	−0.25 (0.09)**
Age: 25-34	0.63 (0.22)**
Age: 35-44	0.96 (0.22)***
Age: 45-54	1.92 (0.21)***
Age: 55+	2.76 (0.19)***
Vocational Education	1.05 (0.22)***
High School Education	0.91 (0.19)***
University Education	1.18 (0.20)***
_cons	4.62 (0.28)***
Country FE	Yes
N	16563
R2	0.229

Note: SiE data. The DV is coded from -10 (NATO is fully responsible for the current situation) to 10 (Russia is fully responsible for the current situation). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A23: Analysis by Country

	(1) DK	(2) DE	(3) GR	(4) ES	(5) FR	(6) IT	(7) NL	(8) UK	(9) FI	(10) SE	(11) BG	(12) HU	(13) LT	(14) PL	(15) RO	(16) SK	(17) HR
Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity	-6.94 (4.81)	-6.00 (0.53)***	-4.70 (1.05)***	-5.52 (0.88)***	-5.70 (1.09)***	-1.38 (0.84)	-6.26 (1.01)***	-8.91 (5.51)	-12.64 (2.94)***	-2.75 (1.05)**	-7.31 (0.89)***	-7.14 (0.73)***	-6.69 (1.54)***	-4.46 (0.99)***	-7.64 (1.64)***	-9.93 (0.79)***	-4.57 (2.14)*
Extreme Left	-0.49 (1.05)	0.81 (1.37)	-1.72 (1.68)	-2.10 (1.36)	-0.76 (1.25)	-6.02 (2.14)**	6.65 (1.02)***	0.13 (0.69)	0.07 (1.02)	-0.27 (0.76)	-0.68 (1.79)	1.16 (1.76)	-3.29 (2.33)	0.79 (2.02)	-0.92 (1.21)	-2.72 (1.37)*	-0.99 (1.48)
Moderate Left	0.19 (0.34)	1.48 (0.34)***	-0.00 (0.65)	1.03 (0.44)*	-0.68 (0.50)	1.66 (0.55)**	1.80 (0.55)**	0.84 (0.32)*	-0.84 (0.44)	0.86 (0.36)*	-0.47 (0.74)	0.64 (0.69)	-1.16 (0.80)	0.81 (0.48)	0.17 (0.69)	-1.52 (0.82)	-0.18 (0.71)
Moderate Right	0.77 (0.34)*	-0.28 (0.39)	1.14 (0.71)	1.58 (0.47)***	-0.10 (0.53)	0.21 (0.53)	1.53 (0.54)**	0.32 (0.38)	0.14 (0.39)	1.77 (0.36)***	3.72 (0.79)***	-1.01 (0.59)	0.23 (0.62)	0.46 (0.50)	1.14 (0.63)	1.90 (0.64)**	1.80 (0.69)**
Extreme Right	1.05 (0.75)	-1.46 (1.79)	-0.87 (2.06)	1.66 (1.20)	-1.03 (0.89)	-1.25 (1.52)	-1.41 (1.98)	-2.21 (1.00)*	0.49 (0.74)	0.69 (0.67)	2.43 (1.63)	-1.84 (0.91)*	-0.11 (0.97)	0.43 (1.08)	-0.65 (1.77)	-2.53 (2.01)	2.04 (1.42)
Woman	-0.56 (0.26)*	-0.06 (0.30)	-1.24 (0.53)*	-0.56 (0.32)	0.18 (0.38)	-0.00 (0.40)	-0.40 (0.42)	0.20 (0.25)	0.01 (0.31)	-0.26 (0.26)	-1.02 (0.61)	-0.24 (0.46)	0.75 (0.54)	-0.11 (0.40)	-0.38 (0.53)	-0.58 (0.51)	-0.43 (0.56)
Age: 25-34	0.49 (0.60)	0.94 (0.71)	1.08 (1.15)	0.02 (0.84)	0.76 (0.80)	-0.07 (0.79)	2.23 (0.96)*	1.54 (0.64)*	2.05 (0.97)*	1.37 (0.76)	0.10 (1.37)	2.56 (1.11)*	1.83 (1.20)	-1.20 (0.93)	-0.76 (1.11)	-0.34 (1.14)	-1.02 (1.40)
Age: 35-44	0.99 (0.70)	1.51 (0.71)*	-1.57 (1.25)	1.65 (0.79)*	1.27 (0.77)	-1.19 (0.79)	1.89 (1.00)	1.47 (0.62)*	2.28 (0.98)*	2.93 (0.73)***	-0.97 (1.24)	2.00 (1.09)	0.51 (1.37)	0.49 (0.87)	0.03 (1.10)	-0.14 (1.12)	-0.55 (1.37)
Age: 45-54	2.62 (0.53)***	2.52 (0.71)***	0.20 (1.03)	2.16 (0.79)**	2.20 (0.75)**	-0.14 (0.78)	2.91 (1.03)**	2.95 (0.61)***	2.79 (0.96)**	3.26 (0.72)***	0.26 (1.27)	2.12 (1.09)	2.61 (1.16)*	1.75 (0.90)	0.82 (1.13)	-0.44 (1.11)	1.10 (1.33)
Age: 55+	2.72 (0.48)***	4.40 (0.62)***	-0.69 (0.92)	3.18 (0.73)***	4.58 (0.66)***	0.48 (0.74)	4.35 (0.89)***	4.21 (0.55)***	3.03 (0.94)**	4.71 (0.68)***	-0.51 (1.23)	3.21 (1.02)**	2.69 (1.16)*	3.32 (0.76)***	2.06 (1.07)	-0.56 (1.05)	2.30 (1.27)
Vocational Education	-0.02 (0.64)	1.52 (0.63)*	-0.16 (1.22)	2.12 (1.07)*	1.26 (1.02)	1.13 (0.86)	3.46 (1.09)**	1.86 (0.73)*	-0.44 (0.64)	0.96 (0.72)	0.44 (1.63)	1.31 (1.58)	3.31 (2.22)	-2.91 (1.74)	3.14 (1.47)*	0.20 (2.97)	0.75 (1.28)
High School Education	-0.06 (0.55)	0.67 (0.60)	0.38 (0.97)	2.58 (0.99)**	2.01 (0.74)**	1.00 (0.89)	2.63 (1.05)*	1.60 (0.71)*	0.18 (0.45)	1.04 (0.55)	0.45 (1.42)	0.24 (1.50)	1.59 (1.87)	0.26 (1.19)	1.85 (0.84)*	1.53 (0.83)	0.98 (1.05)
University Education	-0.14 (0.56)	1.40 (0.60)*	0.69 (0.94)	2.59 (0.99)**	3.73 (0.80)***	0.89 (0.94)	2.96 (1.06)**	1.74 (0.71)*	0.16 (0.50)	1.11 (0.57)	0.29 (1.38)	0.14 (1.58)	3.37 (1.93)	1.03 (1.23)	2.85 (1.00)**	1.37 (0.88)	1.57 (1.16)
Constant	5.92 (0.80)***	2.39 (0.80)**	2.73 (1.32)*	1.59 (1.23)	2.05 (0.97)*	1.78 (1.13)	0.87 (1.25)	3.46 (1.17)**	7.91 (1.20)***	2.90 (0.89)**	3.02 (1.64)	3.73 (1.63)*	2.51 (2.05)	5.19 (1.27)***	3.10 (1.19)**	5.27 (1.15)***	1.48 (1.48)
N	1628	1434	618	1484	1152	1254	683	1464	827	1751	564	612	651	774	540	608	519
R2	0.074	0.196	0.096	0.108	0.125	0.046	0.189	0.101	0.073	0.133	0.257	0.283	0.187	0.175	0.165	0.332	0.092

Note: The DV is coded from -10 (NATO is fully responsible for the current situation) to 10 (Russia is fully responsible for the current situation). OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

In most countries (14/17), *Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity* is the strongest and statistically significant predictor of pro-Russian attitudes. As regards the remaining three countries, *Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity* yields the strongest regression coefficient also in Denmark and the UK, but it does not reach the conventional 0.05 threshold of statistical significance there. The only country where ideology seems to exert a more substantial effect than party proximity is Italy, where the extreme left blames NATO for the current situation in Ukraine.

Appendix J: Overview of Survey Questions

These are the questions from the questionnaire for the FC Dataset. As stated in the main text, before the analysis, some the following scales were inverted and all of them were adjusted to a 0-1 range.

Variable	Survey Question	Response
Blame attribution (dependent variable, analysis 1)	Since February 2022, there has been an open conflict between Ukraine and Russia. To what extent do you attribute responsibility for the conflict to the following entities? On the scale below, 0 means "the entity is not at all responsible" and 10 means "the entity is totally responsible. Entities (presented in a randomized order): Russia; Ukraine; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	1) 0 "Not at all responsible" ; 2) 1 ; 3) 2 ; 4) 3 ; 5) 4 ; 6) 5 ; 7) 6 ; 8) 7 ; 9) 8 ; 10) 9 ; 11) 10 "Totally responsible"
Preference regarding the outcome of the war (dependent variable, analysis 2)	How would you like the conflict between Ukraine and Russia to end?	1) Ukraine's victory ; 2) Neither Russia's nor Ukraine's victory ; 3) Russia's victory ; 4) Don't know
Business Importance (Russia)	Some companies trade with business partners from foreign countries, while others conduct business operations mostly within their country's national borders. Over the past five years, how significant were the following countries to the operations of your business or the company you worked for? On the scale below, 0 means that 'not at all significant' and 10 means 'extremely significant'. If you were self-employed, estimate the importance of those countries for your professional activities. If you changed jobs, try to estimate the average significance of those foreign countries for your businesses or employers over the last five years. If you were not engaged in any economic activities (unemployed, retired etc.), select "without economic activities". List of countries (presented in a randomized order): Germany ; Spain ; Russia ; Great Britain ; Italy	1) 0 "Not at all significant" ; 2) 1 ; 3) 2 ; 4) 3 ; 5) 4 ; 6) 5 ; 7) 6 ; 8) 7 ; 9) 8 ; 10) 9 ; 11) 10 "Extremely significant"
Energy Crisis	How has your household coped with the rise in energy prices since Autumn 2021? On the scale below, 0 means 'my household has coped with extreme difficulty' and 10 means 'my household has coped with no difficulty at all'.	1) 0 "With extreme difficulty" ; 2) 1 ; 3) 2 ; 4) 3 ; 5) 4 ; 6) 5 ; 7) 6 ; 8) 7 ; 9) 8 ; 10) 9 ; 11) 10 "With no difficulty at all"
Ideology (left-right)	In politics, people sometimes talk about the "left" and the "right". Where would you personally place yourself?	Scale from 0 to 10
Conservative Authoritarianism (two questions)	To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements? "We need a strong leader, even if he bends the rules and circumvents the law to get things done." and "Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish."	1) 0 "Disagree strongly" ; 2) 1 ; 3) 2 ; 4) 3 ; 5) 4 ; 6) 5 ; 7) 6 ; 8) 7 ; 9) 8 ; 10) 9 ; 11) 10 "Agree strongly"
Pacifism (two questions)	To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements? "The use of military force is never justified." and "War is sometimes necessary to protect a country's interests"	1) 0 "Disagree strongly" ; 2) 1 ; 3) 2 ; 4) 3 ; 5) 4 ; 6) 5 ; 7) 6 ; 8) 7 ; 9) 8 ; 10) 9 ; 11) 10 "Agree strongly"

Pro-Kremlin Proximity	Party	Some people are quite certain that they will always vote for the same political party. Others reconsider in each election which party they will vote for. How likely is it that you will ever vote for a candidate from each of the following political parties? On the scale below, 0 means that 'I will certainly never vote for this party' and 10 means 'I will certainly vote for this party at some time'.	1) 0 "Never vote" ; 2) 1 ; 3) 2 ; 4) 3 ; 5) 4 ; 6) 5 ; 7) 6 ; 8) 7 ; 9) 8 ; 10) 9 ; 11) 10 "Certainly vote"
Incumbent Support		To what extent do you support the incumbent <i>[name]</i> cabinet? On the scale below, 0 means that 'I do not support the <i>[name]</i> cabinet at all' and 10 means 'I totally support the <i>[name]</i> cabinet'.	1) 0 "No support at all" ; 2) 1 ; 3) 2 ; 4) 3 ; 5) 4 ; 6) 5 ; 7) 6 ; 8) 7 ; 9) 8 ; 10) 9 ; 11) 10 "Total support"
Alternative News Consumption		What channels do you primarily use for receiving political news? (you can choose several options)	1) Television; 2) Radio; 3) Newspapers; 4) Mainstream news websites; 5) Alternative news websites; 6) Social media; 7) Chat Applications; 8) Emails with political content ; 9) Discussion with family and friends ; 10) None of the above
Conspiracy Beliefs (two questions)		To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements? "The world is governed by a secret society of economic elites." and "The covid-19 pandemic was orchestrated by governments to control their populations."	1) 0 "Disagree strongly" ; 2) 1 ; 3) 2 ; 4) 3 ; 5) 4 ; 6) 5 ; 7) 6 ; 8) 7 ; 9) 8 ; 10) 9 ; 11) 10 "Agree strongly"
Gender		What is your gender	1) Man ; 2) Woman ; 3) Other
Age		In what year were you born?	1920 (...) 2005
Education		What is the highest level of study you have completed?	Country-specific answers.

Appendix K: Discussion of Additional Ideological Factors

Regarding ideology, research on the United States and several Western European countries highlights the importance of cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism for explaining foreign policy attitudes. Our study, which originally focused primarily on Eastern Europe, did not include these scales due to space constraints and because prior research suggests that they are closely associated with the general left–right dimension (Rathbun, 2007; Nincic et al., 2010; Isernia et al., 2025). We thank one of the reviewers for noting that our pacifism measure is conceptually close to the core of militant internationalism. Importantly, this variable is only weakly related to our outcome, which indicates that the omission of a standard militant internationalism scale is unlikely to substantively alter our findings. At the same time, a more comprehensive examination of how these two scales relate to Europeans’ attitudes toward the war in Ukraine would be a valuable avenue for future research. Nor do our main analyses test attitudes toward European integration, as we consider them conceptually too close to views on NATO (one of our dependent variables), which increases the risk of confounding and reverse causality. That said, we incorporate support for European integration (0-10 scale, recoded to 0-1 range) in an additional replication of Analysis 1.1 in Appendix Table A19. Greater support for European integration is positively associated with a more pro-Ukrainian attitude ($p < 0.001$) but, substantively, the magnitude of the new variable’s regression coefficient (1.39) is nearly six times smaller than that of *Pro-Kremlin Party Proximity* (-8.06) and less than half of that of *Conservatism Authoritarianism* (-3.24) in the full model. This demonstrates that omitting support for European integration in the main analysis does not significantly bias our analysis in favour of the top-down model.

Appendix L: Appendix Bibliography

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