

# Online Appendix

for

## *What explains trust in institutions? Multi-disciplinary evidence from an international survey*

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### A1 Supplementary Information about the Trustlab

**Explanatory variables used in prior studies** Several explanatory variables in our analysis are drawn from economics, behavioral science, psychology, sociology, and political science. In a second step, we classify these variables into three categories: (i) individual characteristics, such as intrinsic beliefs, values, or expectations; (ii) perceptions of institutions; and (iii) societal attitudes. This classification does not constrain interpretation, as explanatory power is computed at the level of each variable and can be readily aggregated across any grouping of interest.

Table A1: Sources and Measurement of Survey Variables

| Variable                                     | Source of question                             | Source from literature review | Measurement                                   |
|----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| <b>Individual determinants: expectations</b> |                                                |                               |                                               |
| Risk                                         | DIW Berlin, German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) | Fehr (2009)                   | 0-10 Likert scale (Willingness to take risks) |

Table A1: – continued

| Variable                                                 | Source of question                           | Source from literature review                                                              | Measurement                                             |
|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| Financial security                                       | Eurobarometer                                | Bouckaert et al. (2002); Inglehart and Norris (2016)                                       | 0-10 Likert scale (Expectations for household finances) |
| Expected trustworthiness                                 | Ashraf et al. (2006), Sapienza et al. (2013) | Fehr (2009)                                                                                | Expectation of return in Trust Game                     |
| <b>Individual determinants: values</b>                   |                                              |                                                                                            |                                                         |
| Religiosity                                              | ESS-ERIC, European Social Survey (ESS)       | Schoenfeld (1978); Traunmüller (2011)                                                      | 0-10 Likert scale (Importance of religion)              |
| Partisan of current government                           |                                              | Pew (2015)                                                                                 | Dummy from political orientation                        |
| Left-wing political orientation                          | Kroh (2007)                                  |                                                                                            | 0-10 Likert scale (Left-Right); dummy for below 5       |
| Centre political orientation                             | Kroh (2007)                                  |                                                                                            | 0-10 Likert scale (Left-Right); dummy for equal to 5    |
| Right-wing political orientation                         | Kroh (2007)                                  |                                                                                            | 0-10 Likert scale (Left-Right); dummy for above 5       |
| Missing political orientation                            | Kroh (2007)                                  |                                                                                            | 0-10 Likert scale (Left-Right); base category           |
| <b>Perception of institutions: government competence</b> |                                              |                                                                                            |                                                         |
| Government responsiveness                                | OECD, Trustlab                               | Algan and Cahuc (2013); Bouckaert (2012), Nooteboom (2007)                                 | 0-10 Likert scale (Likelihood of resolving complaint)   |
| Government reliability                                   | OECD, Trustlab                               | Algan and Cahuc (2013); Bouckaert (2012), Nooteboom (2007)                                 | 0-10 Likert scale (Likelihood of help in disaster)      |
| Satisfaction with education services                     | Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey   | Bouckaert and van de Walle (2003); Kampen et al. (2006); Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2013) | 0-10 Likert scale                                       |
| Satisfaction with health-care services                   | Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey   | Bouckaert and van de Walle (2003); Kampen et al. (2006); Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2013) | 0-10 Likert scale                                       |

Table A1: – continued

| Variable                                                           | Source of question                                   | Source from literature review                                                              | Measurement                                                      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Satisfaction with public transportation                            | Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey           | Bouckaert and van de Walle (2003); Kampen et al. (2006); Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2013) | 0-10 Likert scale                                                |
| Satisfaction with welfare benefits                                 | Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey (adapted) | Bouckaert and van de Walle (2003); Kampen et al. (2006); Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2013) | 0-10 Likert scale                                                |
| Satisfaction with security and crime prevention services           | Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey (adapted) | Bouckaert and van de Walle (2003); Kampen et al. (2006); Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2013) | 0-10 Likert scale                                                |
| Satisfaction with cultural facilities                              | Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey (adapted) | Bouckaert and van de Walle (2003); Kampen et al. (2006); Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2013) | 0-10 Likert scale                                                |
| Satisfaction with environmental services                           | Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey (adapted) | Bouckaert and van de Walle (2003); Kampen et al. (2006); Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2013) | 0-10 Likert scale                                                |
| <b>Perception of institutions: government integrity and values</b> |                                                      |                                                                                            |                                                                  |
| Government integrity (petty corruption)                            | OECD, Trustlab                                       | Anderson and Tverdova (2003); Algan and Cahuc (2013) Bouckaert (2012), Nooteboom (2007)    | 0-10 Likert scale (Likelihood employee accepts bribe)            |
| Government integrity (revolving door)                              | OECD, Trustlab                                       | Anderson and Tverdova (2003); Algan and Cahuc (2013) Bouckaert (2012), Nooteboom (2007)    | 0-10 Likert scale (Likelihood politician accepts job for favors) |
| Government integrity (high-level corruption)                       | OECD, Trustlab                                       | Anderson and Tverdova (2003); Algan and Cahuc (2013) Bouckaert (2012), Nooteboom (2007)    | 0-10 Likert scale (Likelihood Congress member accepts bribe)     |

Table A1: – continued

| Variable                                          | Source of question                           | Source from literature review                                                                 | Measurement                                                      |
|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Government openness                               | OECD, Trustlab                               | Algan and Cahuc (2013); Bouckaert and Nooteboom (2012), (2007)                                | 0-10 Likert scale (Likelihood of having a voice)                 |
| Government fairness                               | OECD, Trustlab                               | Algan and Cahuc (2013); Bouckaert and Nooteboom (2012); Wang (2016)                           | 0-10 Likert scale (Likelihood of equal treatment for minorities) |
| <b>Societal attitudes: social preferences</b>     |                                              |                                                                                               |                                                                  |
| Cooperation (experimental)                        | Isaac et al. (1984); Fehr and Gächter (2000) | Algan and Cahuc (2009); Bowles and Gintis (2007); Falk et al. (2015); Fehr and Camerer (2004) | Amount sent in Public Goods Game                                 |
| Reciprocity (experimental)                        |                                              | Fehr (2009)                                                                                   | Amount returned in Trust Game (strategy method)                  |
| Negative reciprocity                              | Falk et al. (2016)                           | Fehr and Schmidt (2003)                                                                       | 0-10 Likert scale (Willingness to punish unfairness)             |
| Positive reciprocity                              | Falk et al. (2016)                           | Fehr and Schmidt (2003)                                                                       | 0-10 Likert scale (Willingness to return a favor)                |
| Altruism (experimental)                           | Güth et al. (1982)                           | Andreoni (1989); Anderson et al. (1998)                                                       | Amount sent in Dictator Game                                     |
| Donation (experimental)                           | Algan et al. (2016)                          |                                                                                               | Donation from experimental earnings                              |
| Altruism                                          | Falk et al. (2016)                           |                                                                                               | 0-10 Likert scale (Willingness to give to good causes)           |
| Trustworthiness (experimental)                    | Berg et al. (1995)                           |                                                                                               | Amount returned in Trust Game                                    |
| Preferences for tax redistribution (experimental) | Alesina et al. (2018)                        | Alesina et al. (2018)                                                                         | Slider-based allocation of tax burden                            |
| <b>Societal attitudes: social capital</b>         |                                              |                                                                                               |                                                                  |
| Neighborhood connectedness                        | Putnam (2000); Putnam (2007); Uslaner (2012) | Putnam (2000); Putnam (2007); Uslaner (2012)                                                  | 0-10 Likert scale                                                |

Table A1: – continued

| Variable                                                                | Source of question                                                                      | Source from literature review                                                                                        | Measurement                                                                          |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Regular social contact                                                  | ESS-ERIC, European Social Survey (ESS)                                                  | Putnam (2000); Li, Pickles and Savage (2005); Welch, Sikkink and Loveland (2007); Gianville and Paxton (2013)        | Categorical frequency question; dummy for several days a week or daily               |
| No social contact                                                       | ESS-ERIC, European Social Survey (ESS)                                                  | Putnam (2000); Li, Pickles and Savage (2005); Welch, Sikkink and Loveland (2007); Gianville and Paxton (2013)        | Categorical frequency question; dummy for never                                      |
| Regular volunteering <sup>†</sup>                                       | ESS-ERIC, European Social Survey (ESS)                                                  | Putnam (2000); Bekkers (2012); Sivesind (2012)                                                                       | Categorical frequency question; dummy for once a week, several days a week, or daily |
| No volunteering <sup>†</sup>                                            | ESS-ERIC, European Social Survey (ESS)                                                  | Putnam (2000); Bekkers (2012); Sivesind (2012)                                                                       | Categorical frequency question; dummy for never                                      |
| <b>Societal attitudes: immigration</b>                                  |                                                                                         |                                                                                                                      |                                                                                      |
| Perceived diversity <sup>†</sup>                                        | Adapted from Preklet and Valentine (2016)                                               | Rothstein and Uslander (2005); Algan and Cahuc (2015); Putnam (2000); Alesina and La Ferrara (2002); Uslander (2012) | Slider-based percentage estimate (0-100)                                             |
| Perceptions of immigrants integration                                   | Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey                                              | Inglehart and Norris (2016)                                                                                          | 0-10 Likert scale                                                                    |
| Attitude towards immigration                                            | Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey                                              | Inglehart and Norris (2016)                                                                                          | 0-10 Likert scale                                                                    |
| <b>Societal attitudes: social mobility</b>                              |                                                                                         |                                                                                                                      |                                                                                      |
| Perceptions of social mobility                                          | Adapted from Gallup, Have and Have-Nots: Perceptions of Fairness and Opportunity - 1998 |                                                                                                                      | 0-10 Likert scale                                                                    |
| <b>Societal attitudes: digitalization and globalization preferences</b> |                                                                                         |                                                                                                                      |                                                                                      |
| Attitude towards globalization                                          | U.S. National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES); Mansfield and Mutz (2009)               | Inglehart and Norris (2015); Swank and Betz (2002); Scheve and Slaughter (2007)                                      | 0-10 Likert scale                                                                    |

Table A1: – continued

| Variable                          | Source of question | Source from literature review | Measurement                                              |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| Info from Internet a lot          | OECD, Trustlab     |                               | Categorical frequency question; dummy for a lot          |
| Info from Internet little to none | OECD, Trustlab     |                               | Categorical frequency question; dummy for little or none |

<sup>†</sup>Not included in the regression analyses, as these variables were not part of the survey in Japan.

**Sample Overview** As shown in Table A2, the sample provides a broadly representative snapshot of national populations along the targeted variables of gender, education, and income. The table compares sample means against corresponding population statistics for the working-age population. Gender distributions, in particular, closely mirror official national figures. Some deviations in socioeconomic composition are expected and typical of online survey samples (see, e.g., Alesina et al., 2018; Stantcheva, 2023). Specifically, individuals with higher education levels are overrepresented in several countries, notably Germany and Japan. Unemployed individuals are also somewhat overrepresented relative to official labor force statistics, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Table A2: Sample Demographics

| Characteristic                    | Germany     | UK          | Italy       | Japan       | Slovenia    | USA         |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>Individual Characteristics</i> |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| Female                            | 0.50 (0.51) | 0.54 (0.51) | 0.51 (0.52) | 0.49 (0.52) | 0.50 (0.50) | 0.51 (0.51) |
| Age: 25–54                        | 0.67 (0.60) | 0.67 (0.62) | 0.69 (0.63) | 0.66 (0.66) | 0.68 (0.64) | 0.57 (0.64) |
| Age: 55–64                        | 0.21 (0.25) | 0.19 (0.20) | 0.19 (0.19) | 0.21 (0.21) | 0.21 (0.22) | 0.32 (0.22) |
| <i>Income Level</i>               |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| Low                               | 0.36 (0.40) | 0.59 (0.40) | 0.47 (0.47) | 0.24 (0.40) | 0.67 (0.40) | 0.50 (0.40) |
| Medium                            | 0.23 (0.20) | 0.19 (0.20) | 0.19 (0.19) | 0.15 (0.20) | 0.15 (0.20) | 0.20 (0.20) |
| High                              | 0.41 (0.40) | 0.22 (0.40) | 0.34 (0.34) | 0.62 (0.40) | 0.17 (0.40) | 0.30 (0.40) |
| <i>Education Level</i>            |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| Low                               | 0.29 (0.26) | 0.50 (0.21) | 0.51 (0.51) | 0.41 (0.15) | 0.50 (0.56) | 0.20 (0.40) |
| Medium                            | 0.37 (0.56) | 0.15 (0.34) | 0.17 (0.17) | 0.11 (0.38) | 0.16 (0.21) | 0.38 (0.28) |
| High                              | 0.34 (0.18) | 0.34 (0.46) | 0.32 (0.32) | 0.48 (0.28) | 0.35 (0.24) | 0.42 (0.32) |
| <i>Labor Force Status</i>         |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| Employed                          | 0.62 (0.65) | 0.56 (0.64) | 0.56 (0.56) | 0.53 (0.52) | 0.63 (0.65) | 0.55 (0.57) |
| Self-employed                     | 0.07 (0.07) | 0.08 (0.12) | 0.11 (0.11) | 0.11 (0.05) | 0.07 (0.07) | 0.08 (0.04) |
| Unemployed                        | 0.05 (0.02) | 0.10 (0.03) | 0.13 (0.11) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.11 (0.02) | 0.12 (0.02) |
| Observations                      | 1,108       | 1,053       | 1,016       | 2,504       | 1,011       | 1,136       |

*Notes:* Table displays sample means with corresponding population means in parentheses: Sample (Pop.). Population data are for the working-age (15–65 years old) population. **Income:** Low, medium, and high income correspond to the first two, the third, and the last two quintiles of the national income distribution, respectively. **Education:** Low education corresponds to a high school degree or less; Medium to vocational or other non-tertiary diplomas; High to a university degree. **Population Sources:** Age and gender statistics are from the CIA World Factbook. Educational attainment statistics are from the United States Census Bureau (USA), Statistisches Bundesamt (DEU, 2018), OECD.Stat (GBR, 2018; ITA, 2017), Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SVN, 2017), and National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (JPN, 2017). Employment statistics are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (USA, 2018), Statistisches Bundesamt (DEU, 2018), Labour Force Survey (GBR, 2018), Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ITA, 2016), Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SVN, 2017), and National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (JPN, 2017).

**Sample Quality and Exclusions** To ensure the validity of our findings, the raw data were cleaned using several quality control criteria prior to analysis. First, we excluded respondents with invalid Implicit Association Test (IAT) data, defined by excessively fast or slow response times or a high error rate. Second, we removed participants who showed signs of inattentiveness, such as providing identical answers across three separate batteries of questions (“straight-lining”). Third, for the regression analyses, we excluded respondents with more than five missing values on key variables. In

addition, an automated check identified respondents who completed the entire survey in an infeasibly short time (under 10 minutes) so that they did not join the dataset. Table A3 details the number of respondents at each stage of this data-cleaning process.

Table A3: Sample Attrition and Quality Exclusions by Country

|                                         | DEU         | GBR        | ITA        | JPN         | SVN        | USA         | Total       |
|-----------------------------------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| Initial Sample (Completed)              | 1198        | 1053       | 1105       | 2504        | 1075       | 1348        | 8263        |
| <i>Less Exclusions for Quality:</i>     |             |            |            |             |            |             |             |
| Invalid IAT                             | 63          | 0          | 62         | —           | 47         | 151         | 323         |
| Inattentive Response                    | 27          | 0          | 27         | 0           | 17         | 61          | 132         |
| Analysis Sample                         | 1108        | 1053       | 1016       | 2504        | 1011       | 1136        | 7828        |
| <i>Less Exclusions for Regressions:</i> |             |            |            |             |            |             |             |
| Missing Values (>5)                     | 56          | 85         | 25         | 330         | 19         | 84          | 599         |
| <b>Final Regression Sample</b>          | <b>1052</b> | <b>968</b> | <b>991</b> | <b>2174</b> | <b>992</b> | <b>1052</b> | <b>7229</b> |

*Notes:* The table details the sample attrition from initial survey completion to the final sample used in regressions. The ‘Analysis Sample’ is the initial sample less quality exclusions. The ‘Final Regression Sample’ is the analysis sample less cases with excessive missing values. The IAT exclusion was not applicable to the Japan sample (—), due to unavailability of this module. “Inattentive Response” refers to “straight-lining” (providing identical answers to all questions on multiple screens).

**Detailed Summary Statistics** Tables A4 and A5 provide detailed summary statistics by country. Table A4 covers demographics and measures of trust - explicit, implicit, and experimental - while Table A5 reports perceptions of government competence and integrity. Together, they illustrate meaningful cross-country variation and offer context for interpreting the main results. Notably, patterns of institutional trust broadly align with citizens’ evaluations of governance, though not perfectly, underscoring the importance of examining both attitudes and perceptions.

Table A4: Summary Statistics by Country

| Variable                     | Country       |               |               |               |               |               |                |
|------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
|                              | DEU           | GBR           | ITA           | JPN           | SVN           | USA           | Total          |
| <i>Demographic Controls</i>  |               |               |               |               |               |               |                |
| N                            | 1,108 (14.2%) | 1,053 (13.5%) | 1,016 (13.0%) | 2,504 (32.0%) | 1,011 (12.9%) | 1,136 (14.5%) | 7,828 (100.0%) |
| Female                       | 0.503 (0.500) | 0.536 (0.499) | 0.508 (0.500) | 0.489 (0.500) | 0.495 (0.500) | 0.511 (0.500) | 0.503 (0.500)  |
| Age: 18–34                   | 0.273 (0.445) | 0.368 (0.482) | 0.291 (0.455) | 0.294 (0.456) | 0.299 (0.458) | 0.261 (0.440) | 0.296 (0.457)  |
| Age: 35–49                   | 0.304 (0.460) | 0.282 (0.450) | 0.344 (0.475) | 0.367 (0.482) | 0.349 (0.477) | 0.239 (0.427) | 0.323 (0.468)  |
| Age: 50–65                   | 0.380 (0.486) | 0.300 (0.459) | 0.313 (0.464) | 0.339 (0.473) | 0.303 (0.460) | 0.444 (0.497) | 0.347 (0.476)  |
| HH income: 1st quintile      | 0.187 (0.390) | 0.341 (0.474) | 0.203 (0.402) | 0.132 (0.338) | 0.357 (0.479) | 0.237 (0.425) | 0.221 (0.415)  |
| HH income: 2nd–4th quintile  | 0.585 (0.493) | 0.549 (0.498) | 0.614 (0.487) | 0.458 (0.498) | 0.590 (0.492) | 0.603 (0.489) | 0.546 (0.498)  |
| HH income: 5th quintile      | 0.228 (0.420) | 0.059 (0.236) | 0.183 (0.387) | 0.411 (0.492) | 0.053 (0.225) | 0.160 (0.367) | 0.225 (0.418)  |
| Born in country              | 0.925 (0.263) | 0.895 (0.307) | 0.965 (0.185) | 0.998 (0.045) | 0.948 (0.223) | 0.910 (0.286) | 0.950 (0.218)  |
| <i>Trust in Institutions</i> |               |               |               |               |               |               |                |
| <i>Self-reported</i>         |               |               |               |               |               |               |                |
| Government                   | 4.791 (2.406) | 3.848 (2.553) | 3.344 (2.384) | 3.760 (2.367) | 3.430 (2.299) | 4.425 (2.685) | 3.918 (2.486)  |
| Judicial system              | 5.786 (2.413) | 5.228 (2.507) | 4.314 (2.465) | 4.269 (2.275) | 3.865 (2.522) | 5.275 (2.568) | 4.716 (2.514)  |
| Civil servants               | 5.609 (2.156) | 4.745 (2.454) | 4.326 (2.245) | 3.961 (2.276) | 3.854 (2.331) | 5.472 (2.377) | 4.554 (2.401)  |
| Police                       | 6.776 (2.187) | 5.932 (2.509) | 6.067 (2.227) | 4.669 (2.240) | 5.948 (2.455) | 6.230 (2.525) | 5.717 (2.459)  |
| <i>Implicit</i>              |               |               |               |               |               |               |                |
| Government                   | 0.173 (0.381) | 0.168 (0.381) | 0.115 (0.352) | —             | 0.129 (0.351) | 0.210 (0.392) | 0.164 (0.377)  |
| Judicial system              | 0.173 (0.391) | 0.153 (0.375) | 0.200 (0.338) | —             | 0.158 (0.397) | 0.145 (0.367) | 0.164 (0.373)  |
| <i>Interpersonal Trust</i>   |               |               |               |               |               |               |                |
| Self-reported                | 6.610 (2.099) | 6.565 (2.229) | 6.079 (2.106) | 5.470 (2.129) | 6.489 (1.836) | 6.600 (2.291) | 6.171 (2.180)  |
| Experimental (Trust Game)    | 6.476 (2.834) | 5.893 (2.948) | 5.999 (2.934) | 5.216 (3.325) | 6.313 (3.019) | 6.052 (3.016) | 5.850 (3.110)  |

*Notes:* The table displays means, with standard deviations in parentheses. The 'N' row shows the number of respondents and their percentage of the total sample. **Self-reported trust** variables are measured on a 0–10 scale. **Implicit trust** is the D-score from an Implicit Association Test; data were not available for Japan (—). **Experimental trust** is the amount (0–10) sent by the respondent as Player A in a standard Trust Game. All other demographic variables are binary indicators.

Table A5: Perceptions of Governance Quality by Country (0-10 Scale)

| Variable                               | DEU  |        | GBR  |        | ITA  |        | JPN  |        | SVN  |        | USA  |        | Total |        |
|----------------------------------------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|-------|--------|
|                                        | Mean | (SD)   | Mean | (SD)   | Mean | (SD)   | Mean | (SD)   | Mean | (SD)   | Mean | (SD)   | Mean  | (SD)   |
| <i>Government Competence</i>           |      |        |      |        |      |        |      |        |      |        |      |        |       |        |
| Responsiveness                         | 4.24 | (2.55) | 4.55 | (2.65) | 2.95 | (2.33) | 3.34 | (2.23) | 3.23 | (2.33) | 4.48 | (2.87) | 3.72  | (2.53) |
| Reliability                            | 5.98 | (2.49) | 5.17 | (2.74) | 4.42 | (2.62) | 4.65 | (2.13) | 5.01 | (2.83) | 5.68 | (2.68) | 5.07  | (2.57) |
| <i>Satisfaction with:</i>              |      |        |      |        |      |        |      |        |      |        |      |        |       |        |
| Education                              | 5.53 | (2.26) | 5.64 | (2.26) | 5.01 | (2.13) | 4.76 | (1.99) | 5.76 | (2.29) | 5.36 | (2.69) | 5.24  | (2.27) |
| Health Care                            | 6.00 | (2.25) | 5.96 | (2.38) | 5.18 | (2.25) | 5.25 | (2.05) | 5.05 | (2.32) | 4.69 | (2.76) | 5.34  | (2.34) |
| Transport                              | 6.17 | (2.15) | 5.50 | (2.33) | 4.53 | (2.16) | 5.69 | (2.03) | 5.97 | (2.37) | 5.78 | (2.47) | 5.63  | (2.27) |
| Welfare                                | 5.33 | (2.54) | 4.75 | (2.54) | 4.10 | (2.28) | 4.69 | (2.12) | 4.14 | (2.59) | 4.97 | (2.71) | 4.68  | (2.44) |
| Security                               | 5.66 | (2.23) | 5.32 | (2.38) | 4.88 | (2.27) | 5.49 | (2.05) | 5.87 | (2.39) | 5.96 | (2.50) | 5.53  | (2.29) |
| Culture                                | 6.74 | (1.89) | 6.42 | (2.04) | 5.36 | (2.10) | 5.77 | (1.87) | 6.95 | (2.06) | 6.78 | (2.18) | 6.24  | (2.08) |
| Environment                            | 5.82 | (2.14) | 5.75 | (2.26) | 4.33 | (2.27) | 5.45 | (1.94) | 5.92 | (2.47) | 5.87 | (2.52) | 5.52  | (2.27) |
| Average                                | 5.88 | (1.66) | 5.64 | (1.83) | 4.77 | (1.75) | 5.29 | (1.65) | 5.68 | (1.73) | 5.61 | (2.06) | 5.45  | (1.79) |
| <i>Government Integrity and Values</i> |      |        |      |        |      |        |      |        |      |        |      |        |       |        |
| Integrity (Petty Corruption)           | 5.18 | (2.50) | 4.96 | (2.78) | 3.13 | (2.41) | 5.04 | (2.49) | 3.88 | (2.74) | 4.52 | (2.77) | 4.56  | (2.69) |
| Integrity (High-Level)                 | 3.08 | (2.32) | 3.52 | (2.47) | 2.10 | (2.10) | 3.92 | (2.49) | 3.41 | (3.15) | 3.26 | (2.56) | 3.34  | (2.59) |
| Integrity (Political)                  | 4.08 | (2.46) | 3.69 | (2.59) | 2.25 | (2.18) | 3.89 | (2.48) | 2.78 | (2.49) | 3.34 | (2.65) | 3.44  | (2.55) |
| Openness                               | 5.39 | (2.48) | 5.32 | (2.56) | 4.28 | (2.42) | 3.79 | (2.19) | 2.27 | (2.30) | 6.04 | (2.63) | 4.40  | (2.67) |
| Fairness                               | 6.01 | (2.32) | 5.69 | (2.48) | 4.76 | (2.49) | 4.32 | (2.07) | 4.93 | (2.65) | 5.73 | (2.76) | 5.09  | (2.49) |

*Notes:* The table displays means and standard deviations (SD) for perceptions of governance quality, based on responses to survey questions on a 0-10 scale. Full question wording is available in the supplemental questionnaire.

**Detailed main regressions** Table A6 presents the complete results from the multivariate regressions analyzing the correlates of our various trust measures. The models estimate the determinants for ten dependent variables, including self-reported and implicit trust in government and the judiciary, trust in civil servants and the police, and self-reported and experimental trust in others. Results are also shown for political orientation on a 0–10 left–right scale (0 = extreme left, 10 = extreme right). These estimates form the basis for the summary tables discussed in the main text, which for clarity display only the most statistically significant coefficients. The models are estimated on multiply imputed data and include country fixed effects. For each independent variable, the table reports the normalized coefficient with its corresponding robust standard error in parentheses.

Table A6: The correlates of trust in institutions and in others (Estimates on multiply imputed data)

| Dependent variable                                        | Trust in government |                    | Trust in judicial system |                      | Trust in                       | Trust in               | Trust in others     |                      | Extreme              | Extreme               |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
|                                                           | Self reported       | Implicit           | Self reported            | Implicit             | civil servants (Self reported) | police (Self reported) | Self reported       | Experimental         | left (Self reported) | right (Self reported) |
|                                                           | (1)                 | (2)                | (3)                      | (4)                  | (5)                            | (6)                    | (7)                 | (8)                  | (9)                  | (10)                  |
| <b>Individual determinants: socio-economic background</b> |                     |                    |                          |                      |                                |                        |                     |                      |                      |                       |
| Age: 18-34                                                | -0.038<br>(0.03)    | -0.016*<br>(0.01)  | -0.089****<br>(0.03)     | -0.038****<br>(0.01) | -0.067***<br>(0.03)            | -0.173****<br>(0.03)   | -0.011<br>(0.03)    | -0.031<br>(0.04)     | -0.006**<br>(0.00)   | -0.002<br>(0.00)      |
| Age: 35-49                                                | -0.042*<br>(0.02)   | -0.015*<br>(0.01)  | -0.015<br>(0.02)         | -0.017**<br>(0.01)   | -0.032<br>(0.02)               | -0.096****<br>(0.02)   | 0.008<br>(0.02)     | 0.005<br>(0.04)      | -0.004*<br>(0.00)    | 0.001<br>(0.00)       |
| Female                                                    | -0.018<br>(0.02)    | -0.015**<br>(0.01) | -0.021<br>(0.02)         | -0.007<br>(0.01)     | -0.002<br>(0.02)               | 0.020<br>(0.02)        | -0.007<br>(0.02)    | -0.135****<br>(0.03) | 0.001<br>(0.00)      | -0.002<br>(0.00)      |
| High school or less                                       | -0.026<br>(0.03)    | 0.015<br>(0.01)    | -0.037<br>(0.03)         | -0.010<br>(0.01)     | -0.043<br>(0.03)               | -0.050*<br>(0.03)      | 0.010<br>(0.03)     | -0.003<br>(0.04)     | -0.006*<br>(0.00)    | 0.004<br>(0.00)       |
| Tertiary education                                        | 0.002<br>(0.03)     | 0.011<br>(0.01)    | 0.074**<br>(0.03)        | -0.010<br>(0.01)     | 0.007<br>(0.03)                | -0.034<br>(0.03)       | -0.011<br>(0.03)    | 0.042<br>(0.04)      | -0.001<br>(0.00)     | 0.001<br>(0.00)       |
| Both parents achieved high school or less                 | 0.009<br>(0.03)     | 0.010<br>(0.01)    | 0.032<br>(0.03)          | 0.006<br>(0.01)      | 0.044<br>(0.03)                | 0.029<br>(0.03)        | -0.018<br>(0.03)    | -0.014<br>(0.04)     | 0.001<br>(0.00)      | -0.004<br>(0.00)      |
| One parent has tertiary education                         | -0.002<br>(0.03)    | -0.004<br>(0.01)   | 0.002<br>(0.03)          | 0.014<br>(0.01)      | 0.006<br>(0.03)                | -0.005<br>(0.03)       | 0.008<br>(0.03)     | 0.007<br>(0.04)      | 0.002<br>(0.00)      | -0.001<br>(0.00)      |
| Income in quintile 2                                      | 0.007<br>(0.03)     | 0.006<br>(0.01)    | -0.007<br>(0.03)         | 0.003<br>(0.01)      | 0.052**<br>(0.03)              | 0.033<br>(0.03)        | -0.028<br>(0.03)    | 0.027<br>(0.04)      | 0.002<br>(0.00)      | 0.001<br>(0.00)       |
| Income in quintile 3                                      | -0.029<br>(0.03)    | 0.009<br>(0.01)    | -0.004<br>(0.03)         | 0.005<br>(0.01)      | 0.041<br>(0.03)                | 0.021<br>(0.03)        | -0.033<br>(0.03)    | -0.011<br>(0.04)     | 0.001<br>(0.00)      | -0.000<br>(0.00)      |
| Income in quintile 4                                      | -0.012<br>(0.03)    | 0.007<br>(0.01)    | 0.016<br>(0.03)          | 0.002<br>(0.01)      | 0.036<br>(0.03)                | 0.055**<br>(0.03)      | -0.004<br>(0.03)    | -0.009<br>(0.04)     | -0.002<br>(0.00)     | -0.002<br>(0.00)      |
| Income in quintile 5                                      | -0.001<br>(0.03)    | 0.016<br>(0.01)    | 0.053*<br>(0.03)         | 0.012<br>(0.01)      | 0.047<br>(0.03)                | 0.063**<br>(0.03)      | 0.011<br>(0.03)     | -0.037<br>(0.05)     | -0.002<br>(0.00)     | 0.003<br>(0.00)       |
| Unemployed                                                | -0.041*<br>(0.02)   | 0.002<br>(0.01)    | -0.031<br>(0.02)         | 0.001<br>(0.01)      | -0.034<br>(0.02)               | -0.013<br>(0.02)       | -0.048**<br>(0.02)  | -0.005<br>(0.03)     | 0.002<br>(0.00)      | -0.001<br>(0.00)      |
| Inactive                                                  | 0.016<br>(0.02)     | 0.007<br>(0.01)    | 0.002<br>(0.02)          | 0.015**<br>(0.01)    | 0.032<br>(0.02)                | 0.025<br>(0.02)        | -0.063***<br>(0.02) | -0.027<br>(0.03)     | -0.002<br>(0.00)     | -0.004*<br>(0.00)     |
| Country native                                            | -0.013<br>(0.02)    | 0.008<br>(0.01)    | 0.025<br>(0.02)          | 0.004<br>(0.01)      | 0.009<br>(0.02)                | 0.047**<br>(0.02)      | 0.007<br>(0.02)     | -0.001<br>(0.03)     | 0.005***<br>(0.00)   | 0.002<br>(0.00)       |
| Living in mid-size town                                   | 0.010<br>(0.03)     | 0.011<br>(0.01)    | 0.032<br>(0.03)          | -0.000<br>(0.01)     | -0.012<br>(0.03)               | -0.009<br>(0.03)       | -0.004<br>(0.03)    | -0.006<br>(0.04)     | -0.000<br>(0.00)     | -0.006**<br>(0.00)    |
| Living in large city                                      | 0.034<br>(0.03)     | 0.017*<br>(0.01)   | 0.019<br>(0.03)          | -0.004<br>(0.01)     | -0.028<br>(0.03)               | -0.054*<br>(0.03)      | 0.007<br>(0.03)     | -0.014<br>(0.04)     | 0.000<br>(0.00)      | 0.001<br>(0.00)       |
| <b>Individual determinants: expectations</b>              |                     |                    |                          |                      |                                |                        |                     |                      |                      |                       |
| Risk-loving                                               | 0.030               | -0.015*            | -0.013                   | -0.016*              | 0.028                          | -0.081***              | 0.143****           | 0.078**              | -0.001               | 0.004                 |

Table A6: – continued

| Dependent variable                                                 | Trust in government       |                           | Trust in judicial system  |                            | Trust in                                 | Trust in                         | Trust in others               |                               | Extreme                        | Extreme                          |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
|                                                                    | Self reported<br>(1)      | Implicit<br>(2)           | Self reported<br>(3)      | Implicit<br>(4)            | civil servants<br>(Self reported)<br>(5) | police<br>(Self reported)<br>(6) | Self reported<br>(7)          | Experim-<br>ental<br>(8)      | left<br>(Self reported)<br>(9) | right<br>(Self reported)<br>(10) |
| Financial security                                                 | (0.03)<br>0.139****       | (0.01)<br>-0.012          | (0.03)<br>0.062**         | (0.01)<br>0.005            | (0.03)<br>0.082***                       | (0.03)<br>0.033                  | (0.03)<br>0.058*              | (0.04)<br>0.018               | (0.00)<br>-0.001               | (0.00)<br>0.005                  |
| Expected trustworthiness of others                                 | (0.03)<br>0.028<br>(0.02) | (0.01)<br>0.005<br>(0.01) | (0.03)<br>0.008<br>(0.03) | (0.01)<br>-0.001<br>(0.01) | (0.03)<br>0.032<br>(0.02)                | (0.03)<br>-0.019<br>(0.02)       | (0.03)<br>0.118****<br>(0.03) | (0.04)<br>0.202****<br>(0.04) | (0.00)<br>-0.003<br>(0.00)     | (0.00)<br>0.001<br>(0.00)        |
| <b>Individual determinants: values</b>                             |                           |                           |                           |                            |                                          |                                  |                               |                               |                                |                                  |
| Religiosity                                                        | 0.141****<br>(0.03)       | 0.000<br>(0.01)           | 0.065**<br>(0.03)         | 0.002<br>(0.01)            | 0.099****<br>(0.02)                      | 0.048*<br>(0.02)                 | 0.063**<br>(0.03)             | -0.033<br>(0.04)              | -0.015****<br>(0.00)           | 0.017****<br>(0.00)              |
| Partisan of current government                                     | 0.189****<br>(0.02)       | 0.006<br>(0.01)           | 0.110****<br>(0.02)       | -0.000<br>(0.01)           | 0.064***<br>(0.02)                       | -0.004<br>(0.02)                 | -0.035<br>(0.02)              | 0.069**<br>(0.03)             |                                |                                  |
| Left-wing political orientation                                    | 0.011<br>(0.03)           | 0.005<br>(0.01)           | 0.101***<br>(0.03)        | 0.013<br>(0.01)            | 0.030<br>(0.03)                          | -0.083***<br>(0.03)              | 0.104***<br>(0.03)            | -0.015<br>(0.04)              |                                |                                  |
| Centre political orientation                                       | 0.021<br>(0.03)           | 0.004<br>(0.01)           | -0.016<br>(0.03)          | 0.015<br>(0.01)            | -0.000<br>(0.03)                         | -0.010<br>(0.03)                 | 0.101***<br>(0.04)            | -0.084*<br>(0.05)             |                                |                                  |
| Right-wing political orientation                                   | 0.029<br>(0.04)           | 0.007<br>(0.01)           | -0.117***<br>(0.04)       | 0.005<br>(0.01)            | -0.031<br>(0.04)                         | -0.027<br>(0.04)                 | 0.111***<br>(0.04)            | -0.117**<br>(0.05)            |                                |                                  |
| <b>Perception of institutions: government competence</b>           |                           |                           |                           |                            |                                          |                                  |                               |                               |                                |                                  |
| Government responsiveness                                          | 0.192****<br>(0.04)       | 0.006<br>(0.01)           | 0.094**<br>(0.04)         | 0.004<br>(0.01)            | 0.176****<br>(0.04)                      | -0.016<br>(0.04)                 | 0.190****<br>(0.04)           | 0.005<br>(0.05)               | -0.000<br>(0.00)               | -0.005<br>(0.00)                 |
| Government reliability                                             | 0.336****<br>(0.03)       | 0.014<br>(0.01)           | 0.180****<br>(0.04)       | 0.007<br>(0.01)            | 0.194****<br>(0.03)                      | 0.061*<br>(0.03)                 | 0.067**<br>(0.03)             | -0.006<br>(0.04)              | 0.003<br>(0.00)                | -0.010***<br>(0.00)              |
| Satisfaction with education services                               | 0.283****<br>(0.03)       | -0.006<br>(0.01)          | 0.261****<br>(0.04)       | 0.005<br>(0.01)            | 0.218****<br>(0.04)                      | 0.125****<br>(0.04)              | 0.114***<br>(0.04)            | 0.001<br>(0.05)               | -0.005<br>(0.00)               | -0.011***<br>(0.00)              |
| Satisfaction with health care services                             | 0.181****<br>(0.04)       | 0.014<br>(0.01)           | 0.256****<br>(0.04)       | -0.005<br>(0.01)           | 0.154****<br>(0.04)                      | 0.112***<br>(0.04)               | 0.116***<br>(0.04)            | -0.005<br>(0.05)              | 0.006*<br>(0.00)               | -0.001<br>(0.00)                 |
| Satisfaction with public transportation                            | 0.013<br>(0.03)           | -0.006<br>(0.01)          | -0.039<br>(0.04)          | -0.006<br>(0.01)           | 0.067*<br>(0.03)                         | -0.009<br>(0.03)                 | 0.084**<br>(0.03)             | -0.009<br>(0.04)              | 0.006**<br>(0.00)              | -0.001<br>(0.00)                 |
| Satisfaction with welfare benefits                                 | 0.236****<br>(0.04)       | -0.008<br>(0.01)          | 0.128****<br>(0.04)       | -0.005<br>(0.01)           | 0.180****<br>(0.03)                      | -0.003<br>(0.04)                 | -0.007<br>(0.03)              | -0.074*<br>(0.04)             | -0.003<br>(0.00)               | -0.002<br>(0.00)                 |
| Satisfaction with security and crime prevention services           | 0.287****<br>(0.03)       | 0.006<br>(0.01)           | 0.519****<br>(0.04)       | 0.020**<br>(0.01)          | 0.330****<br>(0.04)                      | 1.034****<br>(0.04)              | 0.137****<br>(0.04)           | 0.107**<br>(0.05)             | -0.004<br>(0.00)               | 0.002<br>(0.00)                  |
| Satisfaction with cultural facilities                              | -0.049<br>(0.03)          | 0.013<br>(0.01)           | 0.041<br>(0.04)           | -0.019<br>(0.01)           | 0.043<br>(0.04)                          | 0.071*<br>(0.04)                 | -0.003<br>(0.04)              | -0.063<br>(0.05)              | 0.003<br>(0.00)                | 0.003<br>(0.00)                  |
| Satisfaction with environmental services                           | 0.001<br>(0.04)           | -0.005<br>(0.01)          | 0.041<br>(0.04)           | 0.003<br>(0.01)            | -0.015<br>(0.04)                         | -0.022<br>(0.04)                 | 0.084**<br>(0.04)             | 0.037<br>(0.05)               | -0.007*<br>(0.00)              | 0.010**<br>(0.00)                |
| <b>Perception of institutions: government integrity and values</b> |                           |                           |                           |                            |                                          |                                  |                               |                               |                                |                                  |
| Government integrity (petty corruption)                            | -0.065**<br>(0.03)        | 0.003<br>(0.01)           | 0.173****<br>(0.03)       | 0.012<br>(0.01)            | 0.229****<br>(0.03)                      | 0.141****<br>(0.03)              | 0.021<br>(0.03)               | 0.080*<br>(0.04)              | -0.001<br>(0.00)               | -0.009***<br>(0.00)              |
| Government integrity (revolving door)                              | 0.027<br>(0.04)           | 0.003<br>(0.01)           | -0.112***<br>(0.04)       | 0.004<br>(0.01)            | -0.066*<br>(0.04)                        | -0.039<br>(0.04)                 | 0.066*<br>(0.04)              | -0.021<br>(0.05)              | -0.003<br>(0.00)               | -0.000<br>(0.00)                 |
| Government integrity (high-level corruption)                       | 0.317****<br>(0.04)       | -0.003<br>(0.01)          | 0.215****<br>(0.04)       | -0.001<br>(0.01)           | 0.145****<br>(0.04)                      | 0.079*<br>(0.04)                 | 0.015<br>(0.04)               | -0.009<br>(0.05)              | 0.002<br>(0.00)                | -0.007<br>(0.00)                 |
| Government openness                                                | 0.083**<br>(0.04)         | 0.010<br>(0.01)           | 0.208****<br>(0.04)       | 0.015<br>(0.01)            | 0.198****<br>(0.04)                      | 0.082**<br>(0.04)                | -0.004<br>(0.04)              | -0.022<br>(0.05)              | 0.003<br>(0.00)                | -0.000<br>(0.00)                 |
| Government fairness                                                | 0.180****                 | -0.010                    | 0.159****                 | 0.004                      | 0.186****                                | 0.252****                        | -0.028                        | -0.018                        | -0.010***                      | 0.019****                        |

Table A6: – continued

| Dependent variable                                          | Trust in government |                    | Trust in judicial system |                   | Trust in            | Trust in            | Trust in others     |                     | Extreme              | Extreme              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                                                             | Self                | Implicit           | Self                     | Implicit          | civil servants      | police              | Self                | Experim-            | left                 | right                |
|                                                             | reported            | (2)                | reported                 | (4)               | (Self reported)     | (Self reported)     | reported            | ental               | (Self reported)      | (Self reported)      |
|                                                             | (1)                 |                    | (3)                      |                   | (5)                 | (6)                 | (7)                 | (8)                 | (9)                  | (10)                 |
|                                                             | (0.03)              | (0.01)             | (0.03)                   | (0.01)            | (0.03)              | (0.03)              | (0.03)              | (0.04)              | (0.00)               | (0.00)               |
| <b>Societal attitudes: social preferences</b>               |                     |                    |                          |                   |                     |                     |                     |                     |                      |                      |
| Cooperation (experimental)                                  | -0.019<br>(0.02)    | -0.005<br>(0.01)   | 0.013<br>(0.02)          | -0.007<br>(0.01)  | -0.009<br>(0.02)    | -0.006<br>(0.02)    | 0.016<br>(0.03)     | 1.027****<br>(0.04) | 0.001<br>(0.00)      | -0.003<br>(0.00)     |
| Reciprocity (experimental)                                  | -0.006<br>(0.02)    | 0.015**<br>(0.01)  | 0.009<br>(0.02)          | 0.005<br>(0.01)   | 0.014<br>(0.02)     | -0.000<br>(0.02)    | 0.021<br>(0.02)     | 0.020<br>(0.03)     | 0.001<br>(0.00)      | -0.007***<br>(0.00)  |
| Negative reciprocity                                        | -0.008<br>(0.03)    | 0.002<br>(0.01)    | -0.049*<br>(0.03)        | 0.007<br>(0.01)   | -0.055**<br>(0.03)  | 0.012<br>(0.03)     | 0.034<br>(0.03)     | -0.019<br>(0.04)    | 0.003<br>(0.00)      | 0.008***<br>(0.00)   |
| Positive reciprocity                                        | -0.001<br>(0.03)    | 0.000<br>(0.01)    | 0.055**<br>(0.03)        | 0.019**<br>(0.01) | 0.027<br>(0.03)     | 0.156****<br>(0.03) | 0.080***<br>(0.03)  | 0.082**<br>(0.04)   | 0.001<br>(0.00)      | 0.008***<br>(0.00)   |
| Altruism (experimental)                                     | 0.028<br>(0.03)     | 0.027***<br>(0.01) | -0.004<br>(0.03)         | 0.009<br>(0.01)   | 0.041<br>(0.02)     | 0.045*<br>(0.02)    | 0.070***<br>(0.03)  | 0.446****<br>(0.04) | 0.001<br>(0.00)      | 0.003<br>(0.00)      |
| Donation (experimental)                                     | 0.032<br>(0.02)     | 0.003<br>(0.01)    | 0.076****<br>(0.02)      | -0.002<br>(0.01)  | 0.068****<br>(0.02) | 0.017<br>(0.02)     | -0.013<br>(0.02)    | 0.071**<br>(0.03)   | -0.001<br>(0.00)     | -0.007****<br>(0.00) |
| Altruism                                                    | 0.040<br>(0.03)     | 0.008<br>(0.01)    | 0.041<br>(0.03)          | 0.009<br>(0.01)   | 0.112****<br>(0.03) | 0.085***<br>(0.03)  | 0.251****<br>(0.03) | 0.040<br>(0.04)     | 0.005<br>(0.00)      | -0.004<br>(0.00)     |
| Trustworthiness (experimental)                              | 0.010<br>(0.03)     | -0.016*<br>(0.01)  | 0.046*<br>(0.03)         | -0.008<br>(0.01)  | 0.004<br>(0.02)     | 0.045*<br>(0.03)    | -0.005<br>(0.03)    | 0.588****<br>(0.04) | 0.003<br>(0.00)      | 0.002<br>(0.00)      |
| Aversion to inequality (tax ratio)                          | -0.051**<br>(0.02)  | 0.012<br>(0.01)    | -0.024<br>(0.02)         | 0.006<br>(0.01)   | -0.010<br>(0.02)    | -0.042*<br>(0.02)   | 0.011<br>(0.03)     | 0.073**<br>(0.03)   | 0.003<br>(0.00)      | -0.002<br>(0.00)     |
| <b>Societal attitudes: social capital</b>                   |                     |                    |                          |                   |                     |                     |                     |                     |                      |                      |
| Neighborhood connectedness                                  | 0.113****<br>(0.03) | 0.017*<br>(0.01)   | 0.045<br>(0.03)          | 0.006<br>(0.01)   | 0.095****<br>(0.03) | 0.112****<br>(0.03) | 0.301****<br>(0.03) | -0.066*<br>(0.04)   | -0.005*<br>(0.00)    | 0.007**<br>(0.00)    |
| Regular social contact                                      | -0.013<br>(0.02)    | 0.007<br>(0.01)    | 0.003<br>(0.02)          | -0.006<br>(0.01)  | -0.025<br>(0.02)    | 0.009<br>(0.02)     | 0.011<br>(0.02)     | -0.008<br>(0.03)    | 0.002<br>(0.00)      | 0.008***<br>(0.00)   |
| No social contact                                           | 0.004<br>(0.02)     | 0.015<br>(0.01)    | -0.040*<br>(0.02)        | 0.010<br>(0.01)   | -0.010<br>(0.02)    | -0.033<br>(0.02)    | -0.033<br>(0.03)    | -0.023<br>(0.04)    | 0.003<br>(0.00)      | 0.011****<br>(0.00)  |
| <b>Societal attitudes: diversity</b>                        |                     |                    |                          |                   |                     |                     |                     |                     |                      |                      |
| Perception of immigrants integration                        | 0.050*<br>(0.03)    | 0.007<br>(0.01)    | 0.043<br>(0.03)          | 0.007<br>(0.01)   | 0.040<br>(0.03)     | -0.032<br>(0.03)    | 0.053*<br>(0.03)    | 0.020<br>(0.04)     | -0.001<br>(0.00)     | -0.011****<br>(0.00) |
| Attitude towards immigration                                | 0.065**<br>(0.03)   | -0.004<br>(0.01)   | 0.160****<br>(0.03)      | -0.001<br>(0.01)  | 0.101****<br>(0.03) | -0.030<br>(0.03)    | 0.096****<br>(0.03) | 0.018<br>(0.04)     | 0.023****<br>(0.00)  | -0.015****<br>(0.00) |
| <b>Societal attitudes: social mobility</b>                  |                     |                    |                          |                   |                     |                     |                     |                     |                      |                      |
| Perceptions of social mobility                              | 0.080***<br>(0.03)  | 0.017**<br>(0.01)  | 0.077**<br>(0.03)        | -0.017*<br>(0.01) | 0.012<br>(0.03)     | 0.077***<br>(0.03)  | 0.127****<br>(0.03) | 0.027<br>(0.04)     | -0.014****<br>(0.00) | 0.004<br>(0.00)      |
| <b>Societal attitudes: digitalisation and globalisation</b> |                     |                    |                          |                   |                     |                     |                     |                     |                      |                      |
| Attitudes towards globalization                             | 0.051**<br>(0.03)   | 0.008<br>(0.01)    | 0.071***<br>(0.03)       | 0.015*<br>(0.01)  | 0.027<br>(0.03)     | 0.044<br>(0.03)     | 0.019<br>(0.03)     | 0.008<br>(0.04)     | 0.001<br>(0.00)      | -0.002<br>(0.00)     |
| Info from internet: a lot                                   | -0.041*<br>(0.02)   | -0.003<br>(0.01)   | -0.019<br>(0.02)         | -0.002<br>(0.01)  | 0.004<br>(0.02)     | 0.005<br>(0.02)     | 0.019<br>(0.02)     | 0.011<br>(0.03)     | 0.009****<br>(0.00)  | 0.006**<br>(0.00)    |
| Info from internet: little to none                          | -0.005<br>(0.02)    | 0.008<br>(0.01)    | -0.045**<br>(0.02)       | 0.009<br>(0.01)   | -0.045**<br>(0.02)  | -0.025<br>(0.02)    | -0.002<br>(0.02)    | 0.031<br>(0.03)     | 0.001<br>(0.00)      | -0.000<br>(0.00)     |
| Country fixed effects                                       | Yes                 | Yes                | Yes                      | Yes               | Yes                 | Yes                 | Yes                 | Yes                 | Yes                  | Yes                  |

Table A6: – continued

| Dependent variable | Trust in government  |                 | Trust in judicial system |                 | Trust in                                 | Trust in                         | Trust in others      |                     | Extreme                        | Extreme                          |
|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
|                    | Self reported<br>(1) | Implicit<br>(2) | Self reported<br>(3)     | Implicit<br>(4) | civil servants<br>(Self reported)<br>(5) | police<br>(Self reported)<br>(6) | Self reported<br>(7) | Experimental<br>(8) | left<br>(Self reported)<br>(9) | right<br>(Self reported)<br>(10) |
| N                  | 7185                 | 2803            | 7161                     | 2775            | 7132                                     | 7194                             | 7108                 | 7229                | 7229                           | 7229                             |

*Notes:* This table reports OLS estimates with Huber–White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Results are based on multiple imputation. The analysis sample retains respondents with five or fewer missing covariate values. Missing covariates are multiply imputed ( $m = 10$ ) in Stata using `mi impute mvn`, i.e., a joint multivariate-normal model conditional on observed predictors (including country dummies). Self-reported trust in others is based on the survey question which asks the respondents “In general, how much do you trust people?”, with a 0-10 scale. Experimental trust in others is equal to player A’s sent amount to player B in a trust game with equal endowment and multiplicative factor 3. Self-reported trust in government/judicial system is based on a survey question that asks respondents “On a scale from zero to ten, how much trust do you have in the government/judicial system?” Experimental trust in the government/judicial system refers to the IAT-D score, which is constructed according to standard procedures, see [Greenwald et al. \(2003\)](#). All independent variables are normalised in order to compare effect sizes. Standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

## A2 Supplementary Statistics, Figures, and Analyses

**Country-Specific Correlates of Trust in Government** Table [A7](#) disaggregates the analysis to explore the determinants of self-reported trust in government within each of the six surveyed countries. Each column presents the results of a separate multivariate regression, displaying only the correlates that are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. As all independent variables have been standardized, the reported coefficients can be interpreted as the standard deviation change in trust associated with a one-standard-deviation change in the predictor. To highlight the most influential factors in each national context, variables are ranked in descending order based on the absolute value of their coefficients. This country-by-country approach offers a more detailed account of how the importance of various institutional perceptions, societal attitudes, and individual characteristics varies across different political and cultural settings.

Table A7: Key Correlates of Self-Reported Trust in Government by Country

|                                              | Germany    | United Kingdom                                            | Italy                                                      | Japan                                                    | Slovenia                                                    | United States                                              |
|----------------------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| Satisfaction w/security and crime prevention | 0.432 **** | Government reliability<br>0.383 ****                      | Government reliability<br>0.435 ****                       | Satisfaction w/education service<br>0.362 ****           | Government integrity (high-level corruption)<br>-0.293 **** | Satisfaction w/education service<br>0.358 ****             |
| Government integrity (high-level corruption) | 0.343 ***  | Government integrity (high-level corruption)<br>0.335 **  | Government responsiveness<br>0.403 ****                    | Government fairness<br>0.301 ****                        | Government openness<br>0.369 ****                           | Satisfaction w/security and crime prevention<br>0.332 **** |
| Satisfaction w/welfare benefits              | 0.286 ***  | Satisfaction w/security and crime prevention<br>0.306 *** | Satisfaction w/security and crime prevention<br>0.290 **** | Government reliability<br>0.292 ****                     | Age 18-34<br>-0.323 ****                                    | Government responsiveness<br>0.329 ***                     |
| Government reliability                       | 0.238 ***  | Perception of social mobility<br>0.255 ***                | Partisan of current government<br>0.208 ***                | Religiosity<br>0.252 ****                                | Satisfaction w/public transportation<br>-0.293 ****         | Government integrity (high-level corruption)<br>0.322 **   |
| Satisfaction w/education service             | 0.225 **   | Partisan of current government<br>0.250 **                | Satisfaction w/welfare benefits<br>0.198 **                | Financial security<br>0.244 ****                         | Satisfaction w/education service<br>0.282 ****              | Government fairness<br>0.290 ***                           |
| Satisfaction w/health care service           | 0.216 **   | Satisfaction w/public transportation<br>0.235 ***         | Satisfaction w/education service<br>0.190 **               | Partisan of current government<br>0.233 ****             | Satisfaction w/welfare benefits<br>0.203 **                 | Neighborhood connectedness<br>0.285 ****                   |
| Attitude towards immigration (culture)       | 0.217 ***  | Satisfaction w/welfare benefits<br>0.216 **               | Info from Internet (a lot)<br>-0.161 ***                   | Satisfaction w/welfare benefits<br>0.185 ***             | Satisfaction w/health care service<br>0.203 **              | Partisan of current government<br>0.274 ***                |
|                                              |            | Tertiary education<br>0.186 **                            |                                                            | Satisfaction w/health care service<br>0.166 **           | Government reliability<br>0.196 **                          | Government integrity (petty corruption)<br>-0.220 **       |
|                                              |            | Neighborhood connectedness<br>0.185 **                    |                                                            | Left-wing political orientation<br>-0.155 ***            | Satisfaction w/security and crime prevention<br>0.161 **    |                                                            |
|                                              |            | Trustworthiness (experimental)<br>0.183 ***               |                                                            | Satisfaction w/security and crime prevention<br>0.154 ** | Left-wing political orientation<br>0.158 **                 |                                                            |
|                                              |            | Left-wing political orientation<br>-0.182 **              |                                                            | Globalization attitude<br>0.136 ***                      | Education: High school or less<br>-0.159 **                 |                                                            |
|                                              |            | Government fairness<br>0.180 **                           |                                                            | Income in quintile 3<br>-0.140 ***                       | Financial security<br>0.130 **                              |                                                            |
|                                              |            | Religiosity<br>0.175 **                                   |                                                            | Attitude to inequality (tax ratio)<br>-0.103 **          |                                                             |                                                            |
|                                              |            | Lives in a city<br>0.166 **                               |                                                            | Donation (experimental)<br>0.0798 **                     |                                                             |                                                            |
|                                              |            | Attitude to inequality (tax ratio)<br>0.118 **            |                                                            | Born in country<br>0.0614 ****                           |                                                             |                                                            |
| Observations (N)                             | 1,046      | 959                                                       | 986                                                        | 2,159                                                    | 985                                                         | 1,050                                                      |

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates with Huber–White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Results are based on multiple imputation. The analysis sample retains respondents with five or fewer missing covariate values. Missing covariates are multiply imputed (m = 10) in Stata using `mi impute mvn`, i.e., a joint multivariate-normal conditional on observed predictors (including country dummies). All independent variables are normalized in order to compare effect sizes. Variables are ranked by decreasing order of coefficient's absolute value. Variables belonging to the category of perceived governance quality are highlighted in blue. \*\* p < 0.05; \*\*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\*\* p < 0.001.

**Relative explanatory power of key determinants (Pratt decomposition)** We quantify the contribution of each covariate using the Pratt (1987) decomposition of  $R^2$  (often reported as  $\beta_k r_{kY}$  in the literature; see Grömping (2006); Johnson and Lebreton (2004)). With all variables standardized, the overall fit can be written as

$$R^2 = \text{Var}(\hat{Y}) = \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k \text{Cov}(X_k, Y) = \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k r_{kY}, \quad (1)$$

so that each regressor  $k$  receives a share  $s_k = \beta_k r_{kY}$  and the shares add up linearly to  $R^2$ . Because covariates can offset each other,  $s_k$  may be negative.

Table A8 reports the decomposition results for eight outcomes. While the findings offer clear insights into the structure of (institutional) trust, they remain correlational and are limited to the observed covariates; unmeasured factors may also play an important role. For self-reported trust in government, the judiciary, civil service, and police, *attitudes towards institutions* dominate, accounting for 77.4%, 78.3%, 77.6%, and 74.7% of the respective  $R^2$ . Within this block, perceived *government competence* alone contributes 60.7%, 58.1%, 54.8%, and 60.4%. Integrity and values also play a role, though their marginal contributions are considerably smaller.

The picture shifts when examining trust in fellow citizens. For overall *Trust (Survey)*, explanatory power is divided between societal attitudes (45.4%) and institutional attitudes (38.7%). In the incentivized *Trust (Experimental)* game, the  $R^2$  is driven almost entirely by *societal attitudes* (90.2%), with *social preferences* alone accounting for 90.1%. Institutional attitudes are nearly irrelevant (0.3%).

Implicit associations with government and the judiciary show a different pattern: they are far less responsive to perceived performance. Instead, individual characteristics and societal attitudes explain 81.5% (*IAT Government*) and 81.6% (*IAT Judiciary*) of the  $R^2$ , with socio-economic background alone capturing 25.8% and 31.2%, respectively. Country fixed effects are roughly three times as influential as in explicit trust, suggesting that deep-rooted historical or cultural factors shape subconscious associations.

This contrasts sharply with the self-reported measures for the same institutions, which are overwhelmingly driven by perceptions of government competence and integrity. Some shares are negative (e.g., social capital for experimental trust, expectations for police trust), reflecting suppressor effects: these variables correlate negatively with the outcome once the dominant predictors are accounted for, underscoring the importance of multicollinearity when interpreting raw associations.

In sum, the decomposition reinforces a central distinction highlighted in prior work (Intawan and Nicholson, 2018): explicit trust reflects conscious, evaluative responses to institutional performance, while implicit trust is more deeply rooted in stable traits - such as socio-economic background, national context, and general social preferences. These findings suggest that the two measures capture distinct psychological processes: one deliberative, the other intuitive.

Table A8: Relative explanatory power of trust determinants (Pratt decomposition)

|                                       | Trust<br>(Survey) | Trust<br>(Exp.) | Trust in<br>Govt. | IAT<br>Govt. | Trust in<br>Judiciary | IAT<br>Judiciary | Trust in<br>Civil Serv. | Trust in<br>Police |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| <b>Individual characteristics</b>     | <b>15.9</b>       | <b>9.5</b>      | <b>12.8</b>       | <b>41.0</b>  | <b>10.5</b>           | <b>52.8</b>      | <b>12.7</b>             | <b>13.4</b>        |
| Country fixed effects                 | 2.18              | 0.93            | 1.74              | 11.70        | 5.90                  | 16.70            | 6.66                    | 11.32              |
| Socio-economic background             | 0.74              | 1.58            | 0.63              | 25.82        | 1.40                  | 31.15            | 0.79                    | 1.81               |
| Expectations                          | 10.63             | 6.45            | 4.52              | 0.44         | 1.48                  | 1.66             | 3.06                    | -0.20              |
| Religiosity, values & partisanship    | 2.38              | 0.51            | 5.95              | 3.06         | 1.68                  | 3.29             | 2.22                    | 0.47               |
| <b>Attitudes towards institutions</b> | <b>38.7</b>       | <b>0.3</b>      | <b>77.4</b>       | <b>18.5</b>  | <b>78.3</b>           | <b>18.4</b>      | <b>77.6</b>             | <b>74.7</b>        |
| Government competence                 | 38.49             | 0.29            | 60.69             | 14.84        | 58.13                 | 8.95             | 54.79                   | 60.35              |
| Government integrity and values       | 0.17              | 0.01            | 16.71             | 3.64         | 20.16                 | 9.46             | 22.81                   | 14.30              |
| <b>Societal attitudes</b>             | <b>45.4</b>       | <b>90.2</b>     | <b>9.8</b>        | <b>40.5</b>  | <b>11.3</b>           | <b>28.8</b>      | <b>9.7</b>              | <b>12.0</b>        |
| Social preferences                    | 15.89             | 90.13           | 1.45              | 17.64        | 1.71                  | 19.41            | 2.78                    | 6.27               |
| Social capital                        | 18.09             | -0.33           | 2.81              | 10.21        | 1.45                  | 1.21             | 2.65                    | 3.74               |
| Immigration / diversity               | 4.99              | 0.22            | 2.39              | 1.39         | 4.73                  | 0.83             | 3.48                    | -0.95              |
| Social mobility                       | 5.90              | 0.14            | 2.46              | 7.65         | 2.12                  | -0.17            | 0.25                    | 2.08               |
| Digitalisation & globalisation        | 0.54              | 0.06            | 0.65              | 3.59         | 1.24                  | 7.51             | 0.50                    | 0.81               |
| <b>Total</b>                          | <b>100.0</b>      | <b>100.0</b>    | <b>100.0</b>      | <b>100.0</b> | <b>100.0</b>          | <b>100.0</b>     | <b>100.0</b>            | <b>100.0</b>       |

*Notes:* Entries are percentage-point contributions to  $R^2$  obtained via the Pratt decomposition,  $s_k = \beta_k r_{kY}$ , with variables standardized. Negative values arise when a regressor's covariance with  $Y$  (conditional on the rest) is opposite in sign to its coefficient. "Exp." refers to Experimental. "Govt." refers to Government. "Serv." refers to Service.

**Correlation matrices by country** Across the six countries, several common patterns emerge from the correlation matrices presented in Figures A5 through A10. First, self-reported trust in different state institutions (government, judicial system, civil service, and police) are consistently and strongly inter-correlated. Second, self-reported trust in others is significantly and positively correlated with trust in these state institutions in all examined countries. Third, behaviorally measured experimental trust exhibits only weak or non-significant correlations with all other self-reported trust measures, a consistent finding across the board.

However, there are also some differences between the countries. The strength of the correlations varies; for instance, the correlations among the four primary institutional trust measures are exceptionally high in Japan (e.g., trust in government and trust in the civil service at 0.90; Figure A8) compared to other nations like Italy (0.64; Figure A7) and the US (0.72; Figure A10). Furthermore, the relationship between implicit and explicit trust in government is not uniform. While it is moderately positive in countries like Italy (0.21; Figure A7) and Germany (0.17; Figure A5), the correlation is substantially weaker in the United Kingdom (0.11; Figure A6), Slovenia (0.11; Figure A9), and the United States (0.07; Figure A10).




Figure A5: Correlation Matrix of Trust Measures for Germany

*Notes:* The figure displays Pearson correlation coefficients between self-reported, implicit, and experimental trust measures from the German sample. The color scale indicates the strength of the correlation, from high positive correlations (dark red) to weak or low correlations (blue). Asterisks denote statistical significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .




Figure A6: Correlation Matrix of Trust Measures for United Kingdom

*Notes:* The figure displays Pearson correlation coefficients between self-reported, implicit, and experimental trust measures from the British sample. The color scale indicates the strength of the correlation, from high positive correlations (dark red) to weak or low correlations (blue). Asterisks denote statistical significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .




Figure A7: Correlation Matrix of Trust Measures for Italy

*Notes:* The figure displays Pearson correlation coefficients between self-reported, implicit, and experimental trust measures from the Italian sample. The color scale indicates the strength of the correlation, from high positive correlations (dark red) to weak or low correlations (blue). Asterisks denote statistical significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .




Figure A8: Correlation Matrix of Trust Measures for Japan

*Notes:* The figure displays Pearson correlation coefficients between self-reported, implicit, and experimental trust measures from the Japanese sample. Implicit trust measures were not available in the Japanese survey. The color scale indicates the strength of the correlation, from high positive correlations (dark red) to weak or low correlations (blue). Asterisks denote statistical significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .




Figure A9: Correlation Matrix of Trust Measures for Slovenia

*Notes:* The figure displays Pearson correlation coefficients between self-reported, implicit, and experimental trust measures from the Slovenian sample. The color scale indicates the strength of the correlation, from high positive correlations (dark red) to weak or low correlations (blue). Asterisks denote statistical significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .




Figure A10: Correlation Matrix of Trust Measures for the United States

*Notes:* The figure displays Pearson correlation coefficients between self-reported, implicit, and experimental trust measures from the US sample. The color scale indicates the strength of the correlation, from high positive correlations (dark red) to weak or low correlations (blue). Asterisks denote statistical significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Distributions of trust measures** The kernel density plots in Figure A11 provide a direct visualization of the response distributions for each measurement type, corroborating the PCA findings. The self-reported measures show wide distributions across the 0-10 scale. In contrast, the implicit (IAT) measures are characterized by sharp, narrow peaks around a small positive value. The experimental trust game reveals a third unique pattern, with notable peaks at zero, the midpoint, and the maximum of the scale. These distinct shapes underscore how each methodology captures a different facet of trust.




Figure A11: Distributions of Trust Measures

*Notes:* This figure presents Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of the pooled trust distributions. Bandwidths are 1.2 for self-reported measures and 0.9 for implicit (IAT-based) and experimental measures.

**Psychological traits (UK & Italy)** Several studies have documented the influence of psychological traits on trust. In two surveys (Italy and the United Kingdom) we have collected 15 variables of self-assessed psychological traits following the ‘Big Five’ framework, and have re-examined the role of psychological factors on trust and political outcomes. Table [A9](#) explores the relationship between personality traits and various measures of trust for the UK and Italian subsamples, controlling for a full set of demographic and attitudinal variables. The results indicate that while several psychological factors are statistically significant, their substantive effect sizes are generally modest. Personality traits appear most consistently correlated with self-reported interpersonal trust; for example, individuals who self-identify as more relaxed, sociable, or forgiving tend to report higher trust in others. In contrast, the links between personality and trust in specific state institutions are weaker and more sporadic. Notably, some traits, such as sociability and talkativeness, also show a significant relationship with implicit trust in the judicial system, suggesting that automatic attitudes may be partly rooted in underlying personality.

Table A9: Trust and psychological factors in the United Kingdom and Italy

|                                                | Trust in others       |                      | Trust in government   |                          | Trust in judicial system |                        | Trust in civil servants | Trust in the police  | Extreme Left           | Extreme Right          |
|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Measurement method:                            | Self-reported         | Experimental         | Self-reported         | Implicit (IAT)           | Self-reported            | Implicit (IAT)         | Self-reported           | Self-reported        | Self-reported          | Self-reported          |
|                                                | (1)                   | (2)                  | (3)                   | (4)                      | (5)                      | (6)                    | (7)                     | (8)                  | (9)                    | (10)                   |
| <b>Personality traits (Big Five Inventory)</b> |                       |                      |                       |                          |                          |                        |                         |                      |                        |                        |
| Rude                                           | 0.00329<br>(0.0179)   | 0.0315<br>(0.0379)   | 0.0199<br>(0.0397)    | -0.0196****<br>(0.00349) | 0.0310<br>(0.0301)       | 0.00658<br>(0.00645)   | -0.0223<br>(0.0458)     | 0.0225<br>(0.0185)   | -0.00155<br>(0.00153)  | 0.00938<br>(0.00945)   |
| Forgive                                        | 0.0511**<br>(0.0255)  | 0.0256<br>(0.0871)   | -0.0720**<br>(0.0366) | -0.00371<br>(0.00610)    | -0.0885**<br>(0.0398)    | -0.00370<br>(0.00801)  | -0.00126<br>(0.0448)    | 0.00592<br>(0.0370)  | -0.00169<br>(0.00179)  | 0.00924<br>(0.00954)   |
| Considerate                                    | 0.0812<br>(0.0509)    | 0.131*<br>(0.0702)   | -0.150***<br>(0.0486) | -0.0125<br>(0.0123)      | -0.0589<br>(0.0506)      | -0.000328<br>(0.0118)  | -0.0446<br>(0.0485)     | -0.0690<br>(0.0508)  | 0.00126<br>(0.00464)   | -0.00105<br>(0.00670)  |
| Lazy                                           | -0.0167<br>(0.0473)   | -0.00137<br>(0.0634) | 0.0632<br>(0.0463)    | -0.00190<br>(0.0109)     | 0.0548<br>(0.0522)       | -0.0217**<br>(0.0108)  | 0.0549<br>(0.0472)      | -0.0244<br>(0.0494)  | -0.00131<br>(0.00539)  | 0.00524<br>(0.00589)   |
| Thorough                                       | -0.0117<br>(0.0571)   | -0.140*<br>(0.0761)  | -0.0498<br>(0.0515)   | 0.000141<br>(0.0135)     | 0.0765<br>(0.0576)       | 0.00548<br>(0.0137)    | 0.0523<br>(0.0558)      | 0.0946<br>(0.0604)   | -0.00661<br>(0.00532)  | 0.000962<br>(0.00608)  |
| Efficient                                      | -0.142**<br>(0.0593)  | -0.0278<br>(0.0805)  | 0.0186<br>(0.0528)    | 0.0243*<br>(0.0138)      | -0.0747<br>(0.0610)      | 0.00317<br>(0.0139)    | 0.0226<br>(0.0561)      | 0.0446<br>(0.0656)   | 0.00233<br>(0.00501)   | 0.0125**<br>(0.00629)  |
| Relaxed                                        | 0.219****<br>(0.0589) | -0.0185<br>(0.0792)  | -0.00585<br>(0.0585)  | -0.00536<br>(0.0142)     | 0.0985<br>(0.0632)       | 0.0148<br>(0.0135)     | 0.0148<br>(0.0589)      | 0.0783<br>(0.0623)   | -0.00571<br>(0.00585)  | -0.00287<br>(0.00778)  |
| Nervous                                        | 0.118*<br>(0.0632)    | 0.0286<br>(0.0876)   | -0.0145<br>(0.0621)   | -0.0236<br>(0.0155)      | -0.0352<br>(0.0651)      | -0.00717<br>(0.0153)   | 0.0694<br>(0.0645)      | -0.0303<br>(0.0641)  | -0.00116<br>(0.00668)  | -0.00187<br>(0.00729)  |
| Worries a lot                                  | -0.174***<br>(0.0572) | -0.0541<br>(0.0818)  | -0.0394<br>(0.0586)   | 0.0246*<br>(0.0139)      | -0.0975<br>(0.0639)      | -0.0000823<br>(0.0138) | -0.142**<br>(0.0606)    | 0.0134<br>(0.0592)   | -0.000738<br>(0.00619) | 0.00326<br>(0.00731)   |
| Reserved                                       | -0.00581<br>(0.0497)  | 0.0477<br>(0.0714)   | 0.0763<br>(0.0515)    | 0.00489<br>(0.0116)      | 0.0503<br>(0.0549)       | 0.00993<br>(0.0110)    | 0.0400<br>(0.0529)      | 0.0772<br>(0.0555)   | 0.00252<br>(0.00515)   | -0.00305<br>(0.00682)  |
| Sociable                                       | 0.140**<br>(0.0622)   | -0.0197<br>(0.0833)  | -0.0403<br>(0.0620)   | -0.00726<br>(0.0149)     | -0.00352<br>(0.0618)     | -0.0294**<br>(0.0149)  | 0.0347<br>(0.0612)      | 0.0245<br>(0.0673)   | -0.00420<br>(0.00780)  | 0.00518<br>(0.00848)   |
| Talkative                                      | 0.117**<br>(0.0582)   | 0.0597<br>(0.0765)   | 0.0885<br>(0.0541)    | -0.000149<br>(0.0139)    | 0.0907<br>(0.0604)       | 0.0326**<br>(0.0132)   | 0.0488<br>(0.0572)      | 0.0546<br>(0.0626)   | 0.00475<br>(0.00735)   | -0.00156<br>(0.00685)  |
| Artistic                                       | -0.0894*<br>(0.0493)  | -0.0603<br>(0.0680)  | 0.0141<br>(0.0491)    | -0.0175<br>(0.0120)      | 0.0544<br>(0.0536)       | 0.00781<br>(0.0112)    | 0.0452<br>(0.0511)      | -0.123**<br>(0.0553) | 0.00388<br>(0.00488)   | -0.0169**<br>(0.00680) |
| Imaginative                                    | -0.0667<br>(0.0560)   | -0.0500<br>(0.0737)  | -0.0607<br>(0.0502)   | 0.00593<br>(0.0129)      | -0.0362<br>(0.0577)      | 0.0187<br>(0.0122)     | -0.0887<br>(0.0586)     | 0.0297<br>(0.0592)   | -0.00390<br>(0.00543)  | 0.00209<br>(0.00648)   |
| Original                                       | -0.00293<br>(0.0585)  | 0.0375<br>(0.0754)   | 0.0164<br>(0.0551)    | 0.00123<br>(0.0135)      | -0.0152<br>(0.0593)      | -0.0200<br>(0.0130)    | -0.0105<br>(0.0579)     | -0.0564<br>(0.0619)  | 0.0167**<br>(0.00688)  | 0.00740<br>(0.00683)   |
| N                                              | 1945                  | 1951                 | 1937                  | 1456                     | 1940                     | 1456                   | 1921                    | 1943                 | 1951                   | 1951                   |

*Notes:* OLS regressions estimated via multiple imputation (10 imputations). The sample includes respondents from the United Kingdom and Italy only. All independent variables, including personality traits, are normalized. The models include the full set of controls for individual characteristics, perceptions of governance quality, and societal factors. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .