Appendix

A Europinions Survey

Table A1: Operationalization of survey variables

Variable	Operationalization
Dependent Variables	
Satisfaction process	Satisfaction with Spitzenkandidaten process *How satisfied are you with the process leading to the selection of a new EC president* 7-point answer scale ranging from (1) *Extremely dissatisfied* to (7) *Extremely satisfied*.
Satisfaction democracy	Satisfaction with democracy in EU *How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the European Union?* 7-point answer scale ranging from (1) *Extremely dissatisfied* to (7) *Extremely satisfied*.
Independent Variables	
Gender	Gender dummy representing female respondents
Age	Age measured in years
Nationality	Country sample to which respondent belongs, included as separate country dummy variables
Education	Education measured according to ES-ISCED coding, recoded to three categories. *Which is the highest degree you have finished (so far)?*

	Country specific education degrees recoded into ISCED 2011 coding following the list of degrees and recoding rules provided in the European Social Survey (ESS). Education was then recategorized into low, medium and high categories. low: ISCED 0, Less than primary low: ISCED 1, Primary low: ISCED 2, Lower secondary low: ISCED 3, upper tier upper secondary medium: ISCED 4, Post-secondary non tertiary medium: ISCED 5, Short-cycle tertiary mediumm: ISCED 6, Bachelor or equivalent high: ISCED 7, Master or equivalent high: ISCED 8, Doctoral or equivalent
Household income	Perceived household income 7-point answer scale from (1) *poor household* to (7) *rich household*
Left-right	Self-placement on left-right scale 11-point answer scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right).
Trust EC	Trust in the European Commission Agreement scale for the following item: *I trust the European Commission.* 7-point answer scale with (1) *Fully disagree* ... (4) *Neither agree nor disagree* ... (7) *Fully agree.*
Interest EU	Political interest in the EU *How interested would you say you are in EU politics?* 7-point answer scale from (1) *not at all interested* to (7) *very interested*
Turnout EP Elections	Turnout in the European Parliament elections *In talking to people about the European Parliament elections we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote due to lack of time, illness or other reasons. Which of the following statements best describes you?*

	Answer options: I did not vote in the European Parliament elections in May this year., I thought about voting this time - but didn't., I usually vote, but didn't this time., I am sure, I did vote in the European Parliament elections in May this year. Recoded into (0) *Did not vote* and (1) *Did vote*
Political knowledge	General political knowledge Knowledge scale combining 3 political knowledge items: 1) *Which party came out as the largest in the last national elections?* Answer options: Five largest national parties, DK 2) *Who is the current minister of finance of Country?* Answer options: Five names of national politicians/ministers, DK 3) *How long is a government term in Country?* Answer options: 3, 4*, 5, 6, 8, DK Answer options were randomized; '*' is the correct answer
EU knowledge	Knowledge about the EU Knowledge scale combining 4 political knowledge items: 1) *How many member states does the European Union have?* Answer options: 25, 26, 27, 28*, 29, DK 2) *Who is currently the president of the European Commission?* Answer options: Jean-Claude Juncker*, Martin Schulz, Donald Tusk, José Manuel Barroso, Frans Timmermans, DK 3) *Which policy area is addressed in an article that has been passed by the European Parliament at the end of March 2019?* Answer options: Parties' campaign spending for the upcoming EP elections, Protection and use of copyrighted material on online platforms*, Labelling of nutrition facts on breakfast cereals, Obligatory separation of plastic and paper garbage across the EU, Lifting restrictions for the use of streaming services across EU member states, DK 4) *Which European political group is now the biggest in the European Parliament after the European elections?* Answer options: JEPP (European People's Party)*, S&D (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe), ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists), Greens-EFA (Greens–European Free Alliance), DK Answer options were randomized; '*' is the correct answer

Knowledge EC candidates

KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EC CANDIDATES

There are a number of politicians running for President of the European Commission. Have you heard of the following candidates?

1) Manfred Weber
2) Frans Timmermans
3) Guy Verhofstadt
4) Margrethe Vestager
5) Bas Eickhout
6) Ska Keller
7) Jan Zahradil

Variable combining individual dummy indicators per candidate with answer options (0) *No* and (1) *Yes*

A.1 Descriptives




Figure A1: Comparison of answers before and after July 2nd. Plot A: "How satisfied are you with the process leading to the selection of a new EC president" Plot B: "How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the European Union?'"




Figure A2: Daily page views of the Ursula von der Leyen (A) and Donald Trump (B) page in June/July 2019 across all 10 language-specific Wikipedia projects.




Figure A3: Daily Google search interest in June/July 2019 (0-100 relative to compared search interest for von der Leyen and Donald Trump in the selected time span) for Ursula von der Leyen (A) and Donald Trump (B) averaged across all 10 countries in the sample.

A.2 Models

Variables were mean-centered in all models.

Table A2: Models without Covariates

	Satisfaction: Process	Satisfaction: EU Democracy
(Intercept)	3.651***	3.669***
	(0.024)	(0.028)
July 2 or later	0.063	0.211***
	(0.048)	(0.056)
Num.Obs.	6643	6643
R2 Adj.	0.000	0.002

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
OLS models. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A3: Models with Covariates

	Satisfaction: Process	Satisfaction: EU Democracy
(Intercept)	3.749***	3.774***
	(0.079)	(0.080)
July 2 or later	0.313*	0.011
	(0.158)	(0.161)
Age	−0.008***	−0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Left-right	0.017	0.010
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Denmark	−0.017	0.088
	(0.096)	(0.091)
Germany	−0.189	0.074
	(0.163)	(0.189)
Hungary	0.001	0.173
	(0.129)	(0.123)
Spain	0.177	0.107
	(0.150)	(0.132)
CzechR	−0.029	−0.042
	(0.079)	(0.083)
France	−0.343+	−0.123
	(0.186)	(0.208)
Greece	0.149	0.001
	(0.209)	(0.188)
Poland	−0.027	0.492***
	(0.218)	(0.149)
Sweden	−0.142	0.043
	(0.141)	(0.187)
Gender: Female	0.202***	0.057
	(0.050)	(0.049)
Education: low	0.183*	−0.009
	(0.085)	(0.080)
Education: medium	0.101+	−0.038
	(0.061)	(0.060)
Household income	0.008	0.041+
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Trust: EC	0.257***	0.512***
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Voted	−0.059	−0.107*
	(0.052)	(0.053)

Continued on next page

Table A3: Models with Covariates (Continued)

Interest EU	0.018	−0.002
	(0.019)	(0.018)
Knowledge EC cand.	0.015	−0.008
	(0.020)	(0.019)
EU Knowledge	−0.062*	−0.021
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Political knowledge	−0.022	0.021
	(0.028)	(0.030)
Num.Obs.	6643	6643
R2 Adj.	0.171	0.384

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
OLS models. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. We omit treatment-covariate interactions from the table.

Table A4: Models without Covariates, July 2 as untreated

	Satisfaction: Process	Satisfaction: EU Democracy
(Intercept)	3.675***	3.750***
	(0.016)	(0.018)
July 3 or later	0.011	−0.027
	(0.032)	(0.036)
Num.Obs.	6643	6643
R2 Adj.	0.000	0.000

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
OLS models. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A5: Models with Covariates, July 2 as untreated

	Satisfaction: Process	Satisfaction: EU Democracy
(Intercept)	3.860***	3.751***
	(0.051)	(0.051)
July 3 or later	−0.016	0.008
	(0.103)	(0.101)
Age	−0.007***	−0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Left-right	0.028***	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.006)
Denmark	0.026	0.055
	(0.082)	(0.073)
Germany	−0.407***	−0.268**
	(0.103)	(0.089)
Hungary	0.114	0.076
	(0.089)	(0.080)
Spain	0.135	0.137+
	(0.083)	(0.078)
CzechR	0.040	−0.016
	(0.116)	(0.109)
France	−0.291**	−0.231**
	(0.089)	(0.076)
Greece	0.252**	−0.050
	(0.090)	(0.087)
Poland	0.298***	0.372***
	(0.082)	(0.073)
Sweden	0.110	0.033
	(0.079)	(0.073)
Gender: Female	0.178***	0.069*
	(0.030)	(0.029)
Education: low	0.128*	0.057
	(0.052)	(0.050)
Education: medium	0.017	−0.020
	(0.035)	(0.033)
Household income	0.017	0.064***
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Trust: EC	0.267***	0.515***
	(0.011)	(0.010)
Voted	−0.060+	−0.064+
	(0.036)	(0.035)
Interest EU	0.033**	0.023*
	(0.012)	(0.011)
Knowledge EC cand.	0.007	−0.021+
	(0.013)	(0.012)
EU Knowledge	−0.082***	−0.027+
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Political knowledge	−0.055**	0.006
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Num.Obs.	6643	6643
R2 Adj.	0.172	0.384

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

OLS models. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. We omit treatment-covariate interactions from the Table.

Table A6: ANOVA Table: Satisfaction: Process

term	df	F	p-value	adjusted p-value
July 2 X Age	1	0.607	0.436	0.654
July 2 X Left-right	1	1.535	0.215	0.509
July 2 X Country	9	2.432	0.009	0.112
July 2 X Gender: Female	1	0.122	0.726	0.792
July 2 X Education	2	1.638	0.194	0.509
July 2 X Household income	1	0.215	0.643	0.792
July 2 X Trust: EC	1	1.087	0.297	0.509
July 2 X Voted	1	0.050	0.823	0.823
July 2 X Interest EU	1	1.433	0.231	0.509
July 2 X Knowledge EC cand.	1	0.180	0.672	0.792
July 2 X Political knowledge	1	1.110	0.292	0.509
July 2 X EU Knowledge	1	3.191	0.074	0.444

ANOVA table for OLS models reported in table A3. Main effects are omitted from the table. F-tests use a heteroscedasticity-robust coefficient covariance matrix. P-values were adjusted using the Benjamini & Hochberg procedure

Table A7: ANOVA Table: Satisfaction: Process, July 2 as untreated

term	df	F	p-value	adjusted p-value
July 2 untreated X Age	1	2.284	0.131	0.298
July 2 untreated X Left-right	1	0.009	0.925	0.925
July 2 untreated X Country	9	1.727	0.077	0.242
July 2 untreated X Gender: Female	1	6.682	0.010	0.117
July 2 untreated X Education	2	1.904	0.149	0.298
July 2 untreated X Household income	1	3.049	0.081	0.242
July 2 untreated X Trust: EC	1	0.051	0.822	0.897
July 2 untreated X Voted	1	1.828	0.176	0.302
July 2 untreated X Interest EU	1	0.219	0.640	0.853
July 2 untreated X Knowledge EC cand.	1	4.592	0.032	0.193
July 2 untreated X Political knowledge	1	0.269	0.604	0.853
July 2 untreated X EU Knowledge	1	0.060	0.807	0.897

ANOVA table for OLS models reported in table A3. Main effects are omitted from the table. F-tests use a heteroscedasticity-robust coefficient covariance matrix. P-values were adjusted using the Benjamini & Hochberg procedure

Table A8: ANOVA Table: Satisfaction: EU Democracy

term	df	F	p-value	adjusted p-value
July 2 X Age	1	0.797	0.372	0.728
July 2 X Left-right	1	1.482	0.223	0.728
July 2 X Country	9	0.832	0.586	0.782
July 2 X Gender: Female	1	0.104	0.747	0.896
July 2 X Education	2	0.612	0.542	0.782
July 2 X Household income	1	2.069	0.150	0.728
July 2 X Trust: EC	1	0.000	0.989	0.989
July 2 X Voted	1	1.218	0.270	0.728
July 2 X Interest EU	1	3.443	0.064	0.728
July 2 X Knowledge EC cand.	1	0.831	0.362	0.728
July 2 X Political knowledge	1	0.031	0.860	0.938
July 2 X EU Knowledge	1	0.637	0.425	0.728

ANOVA table for OLS models reported in table A3. Main effects are omitted from the table. F-tests use a heteroscedasticity-robust coefficient covariance matrix. P-values were adjusted using the Benjamini & Hochberg procedure

Table A9: ANOVA Table: Satisfaction: EU Democracy, July 2 as untreated

term	df	F	p-value	adjusted p-value
July 2 untreated X Age	1	1.182	0.277	0.831
July 2 untreated X Left-right	1	0.022	0.883	0.883
July 2 untreated X Country	9	1.338	0.211	0.831
July 2 untreated X Gender: Female	1	0.068	0.794	0.866
July 2 untreated X Education	2	1.707	0.182	0.831
July 2 untreated X Household income	1	0.113	0.737	0.866
July 2 untreated X Trust: EC	1	1.650	0.199	0.831
July 2 untreated X Voted	1	0.888	0.346	0.831
July 2 untreated X Interest EU	1	0.143	0.706	0.866
July 2 untreated X Knowledge EC cand.	1	0.525	0.469	0.866
July 2 untreated X Political knowledge	1	0.178	0.673	0.866
July 2 untreated X EU Knowledge	1	0.181	0.670	0.866

ANOVA table for OLS models reported in table A3. Main effects are omitted from the table. F-tests use a heteroscedasticity-robust coefficient covariance matrix. P-values were adjusted using the Benjamini & Hochberg procedure

Table A10: Minimum Detectable Effect Size I

Variable	Level	Control	Treated	Cohen's d
Education	High	171	2064	0.223
Education	Low	91	862	0.309
Education	Medium	489	2966	0.137
Gender	Male	364	3095	0.155
Gender	Female	387	2797	0.152
Voted	No	292	1468	0.180
Voted	Yes	459	4424	0.137

Minimum detectable effect size for the treatment effect (July 2 and later treated) within categories. We calculate the smallest Cohen's d for a two-sided test with 80% power and an alpha of 0.05

Table A11: Minimum Detectable Effect Size II

Variable	Level	Control	Treated	Cohen's d
Education	High	1118	1117	0.119
Education	Low	423	530	0.183
Education	Medium	1907	1548	0.096
Gender	Male	1748	1711	0.095
Gender	Female	1700	1484	0.100
Voted	No	955	805	0.134
Voted	Yes	2493	2390	0.080

Minimum detectable effect size for the treatment effect (July 3 and later treated) within categories. We calculate the smallest Cohen's d for a two-sided test with 80% power and an alpha of 0.05

Table A12: Opinion on Spitzenkandidaten System and Direct Election

		Opinion on Spitzenkandidaten (1)	Attitude towards direct election
Age	+10	0.012	−0.012
		(0.010)	(0.036)
Education	high - medium	0.089*	−0.332*
		(0.037)	(0.138)
	medium - low	0.016	−0.394**
		(0.034)	(0.134)
EU Knowledge	+1	0.066***	0.095
		(0.017)	(0.064)
Political Knowledge	+1	−0.003	−0.126+
		(0.021)	(0.072)
Interest EU	+1	0.028*	0.032
		(0.012)	(0.042)
Knowledge EC cand.	+1	−0.006	−0.010
		(0.013)	(0.049)
Left-Right	+1	0.009	0.036
		(0.007)	(0.028)
Trust: EC	+1	−0.037***	−0.181***
		(0.010)	(0.046)
Gender	Female - Male	−0.076**	−0.097
		(0.029)	(0.111)
Num.Obs.		955	955

Model 1: Marginal risk differences for not choosing either the middle category or "Don't Know" for the question: "The indirect election of the next president of the European Commission through the so-called "Spitzenkandidat" system is a good thing". Estimates were calculated from a logistic regression, regressing the listed variables on a binary indicator. Model 2: Marginal mean differences for attitudes towards directly electing the president of the Commission, estimated from an OLS regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard erors in parentheses. Both models are based on data from the Netherlands only.

A.3 Plots




Figure A4: A: Marginal treatment effects on satisfaction with the process of the EC president selection, 95% confidence intervals. B: Marginal treatment effects on satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU, 95% confidence intervals. Marginal effects are based on models reported in Tables A3 and A5. Both plots show effects for categorizing July 2 as "treated" or as "untreated". Dashed lines indicate a range of small effect sizes equivalent to Cohen's d of >=0.2.

B Survey Experiment

B.1 Experiment Materials

Introduction: As you may know, the European Parliament elections will occur on June 6-9, 2024. The result may impact the election of the President of the European Commission. We would like you to imagine the following scenario, which describes how your vote could influence who becomes President of the European Commission.

Group 1: After the election of the European parliament, a majority of the members of parliament vote for a candidate. This candidate is then proposed to the national governments of the EU member states. They need to approve the candidate beforehand. In this scenario, the governments accept the European Parliament's proposal, and elect this candidate as the new President of the European Commission.

Group 2: After the election of the European parliament, a majority of the members of parliament vote for a candidate. This candidate is then proposed to the national governments of the EU member states. They need to approve the candidate beforehand. In this scenario, the governments reject the European Parliament's proposal and elect another person as the new President of the European Commission.

Group 3: Before the elections, party supporters get to decide who becomes their party's leading candidate.

[candidate choice question] [next page]

After the election of the European parliament, a majority of the members of parliament vote for one of the candidates previously nominated by the voters. This candidate is then proposed to the national governments of the EU member states. They need to approve the candidate beforehand. In this scenario, the governments accept the European Parliament's proposal, and elect this candidate as the new President of the European Commission.

Group 4: Before the elections, party supporters get to decide who becomes their party's leading candidate.

[candidate choice question] [next page]

After the election of the European parliament, a majority of the members of parliament vote for one of the candidates previously nominated by the voters. This candidate is then proposed to the national governments of the EU member states. They need to approve the candidate beforehand. In this scenario, the governments reject the European Parliament's proposal and elect another person as the new President of the European Commission.

Group 5: After the election of the European parliament, a majority of the members of parliament vote for a candidate. In this scenario, this candidate becomes the new President of the European Commission.

Group 6: Before the elections, party supporters get to decide who becomes their party's leading candidate.

[candidate choice question] [next page]

After the election of the European parliament, a majority of the members of parliament vote for one of the candidates previously nominated by the voters. In this scenario, this candidate becomes the new President of the European Commission.

B.2 Party-Group Candidate Lists

Survey Question:

[PARTY EP Elections Vote], the party you intend to vote for is a member of the [PARTY GROUP from Party Group Coding] party group at the European level. Who would you like to be [PARTY GROUP from Party Group Coding]'s leading candidate for President of the European Commission in the next European Parliament elections?

Answer options:

European stateswoman/statesman

Official candidate

Celebrity

Other, namely... (open text field)

Don't know

I don't want a leading candidate for my party group.

Candidate lists:

European People's Party:

Christine Lagarde (European stateswoman)

Ursula von der Leyen (official candidate)

Zlatan Ibrahimovic (celebrity)

Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats:

Sanna Marin (European stateswoman)

Nicolas Schmit (official candidate)

BONO (celebrity)

RENEW Europe:

Margrethe Vestager (European stateswoman)

Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (official candidate)

Heidi Klum (celebrity)

The Greens/EFA:

Joschka Fischer (European statesman)

Terry Reintke (official candidate)

Greta Thunberg (celebrity)

European Conservatives and Reformists:

Jarosław Kaczyński (European statesman)

Nicola Procaccini (current Chairman of the party group)

Jose Mourinho (celebrity)

Identity and Democracy:

Marine Le Pen (European stateswoman)

Marco Zanni (current Chairman of the party group)

Gerard Depardieu (celebrity)

The Left:

Yanis Varoufakis (European statesman)

Walter Baier (official candidate)

Marion Cotillard (celebrity)

B.3 Descriptives

Table B1: Balance Tests

Treatment	F	p
Primary vs. others	0.793	0.634
Governments reject vs. others	0.885	0.552
Governments accept vs. others	0.497	0.919
No government choice vs. others	0.472	0.928

Note: Balance tests are conducted using OLS regressions that predict treatment assignment. Covariates tested are: EU general attitude, satisfaction with government, age, gender, education, country, interest in EU politics. F-tests p-values were calculated using randomization inference. The null hypothesis of balanced treatment allocation is not rejected by any test.




Figure B1: Distribution of satisfaction with the process described in the scenario across countries.




Figure B2: Intention to vote in the European elections in the context of the process described in the scenario across countries.




Figure B3: Distribution of Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU across countries.




Figure B4: Distribution of choices during the primary experiment. N = 2798, excluding respondents who were not assigned to the primary condition or who did not make a party choice that could be matched with an official candidate.

Table B2: Metric pretreatment variables.

	Unique	Missing Pct.	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max
Age	68	0	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.5	1.0
Left-Right	11	5	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.4	1.0
EU General	38	1	0.6	0.2	0.0	0.6	1.0
Satisfaction Economy	6	0	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.2	1.0
Satisfaction Government	6	0	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.2	1.0
Satisfaction Democracy	6	0	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.5	1.0
Trust in Politics	14	0	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.3	1.0
Trust in Others	14	0	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.5	1.0
Interest in Politics	5	0	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.5	1.0
Interest in EU Politics	6	0	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.5	1.0
Attachment to the Nation	14	0	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.5	1.0
Cultural Globalization	6	0	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.5	1.0
Economic Globalization	26	0	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.5	1.0
Migration	62	0	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.5	1.0

Table B3: Categorical pretreatment variables.

		N	%
Country	France	1760	20.1
	Germany	1748	19.9
	Italy	1755	20.0
	Poland	1751	20.0
	Sweden	1762	20.1
Education Categories	Low	1864	21.2
	Medium	5028	57.3
	High	1884	21.5
Party Group	ECR	992	11.3
	Empty	3159	36.0
	EPP	1297	14.8
	Greens-EFA	429	4.9
	ID	774	8.8
	GUE-NGL	517	5.9
	Renew	562	6.4
	S&D	1046	11.9
Gender	Male	4213	48.0
	Female	4563	52.0
Attention Check	Passed	6997	79.7
	Failed	1770	20.2

B.4 Models

Variables were mean-centered in all models.

Table B4: Main Models, No Covariates

	Satisfaction: Process	Satisfaction: EU Democracy	Intention to Vote
(Intercept)	0.482***	0.472***	0.655***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Primary	−0.001	−0.002	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Governments Reject	−0.025***	0.003	−0.015*
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Primary X Governments Reject	−0.009	−0.003	0.044**
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Num.Obs.	8771	8772	8771
R2 Adj.	0.002	0.000	0.001

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
OLS models. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses

Table B5: Main Models, with Covariates

	Satisfaction: Process	Satisfaction: EU Democracy	Intention to Vote
(Intercept)	0.481***	0.469***	0.651***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Primary	0.001	0.000	0.010
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Governments Reject	−0.025***	−0.009+	−0.011
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
EU general	0.397***	0.692***	0.239***
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Gov. Satisfaction	0.106***	0.121***	−0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Age (years)	−0.028**	−0.067***	0.140***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Germany	−0.021**	−0.004	0.054***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Italy	−0.005	0.004	−0.046***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Poland	0.027***	0.032***	−0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Sweden	0.006	0.005	−0.022*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Gender: Female	0.019***	0.017***	−0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Education: Medium	−0.003	0.005	0.057***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Education: High	−0.006	−0.006	0.079***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Interest in EU Politics	0.038***	0.011	0.340***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Primary X Governments Reject	−0.001	0.003	0.042**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Num.Obs.	8716	8717	8715
R2 Adj.	0.255	0.464	0.219

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
OLS models. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. We omit treatment-covariate interactions from the Table.

B.5 All Experimental Factors

Table B6: All Experimental Factors, No Covariates

	Satisfaction: Process	Satisfaction: EU Democracy	Intention to Vote
(Intercept)	0.486***	0.472***	0.658***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Primary	0.001	−0.002	−0.006
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Governments Accept	−0.001	0.000	−0.006
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Governments Reject	−0.025***	0.003	−0.019*
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Primary X Governments Accept	−0.014	−0.014	−0.005
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Primary X Governments Reject	−0.016	−0.010	0.041*
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Num.Obs.	8771	8772	8771
R2 Adj.	0.002	0.000	0.001

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
OLS models. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table B7: All Experimental Factors, with Covariates

	Satisfaction: Process	Satisfaction: EU Democracy	Intention to Vote
(Intercept)	0.485***	0.471***	0.653***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Primary	0.001	−0.001	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Governments Accept	0.003	−0.001	−0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Governments Reject	−0.024***	−0.010+	−0.012
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
EU general	0.408***	0.696***	0.237***
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Gov. Satisfaction	0.104***	0.119***	−0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Age (years)	−0.025**	−0.069***	0.141***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Germany	−0.023**	0.000	0.054***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Italy	−0.003	0.006	−0.041***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Poland	0.024***	0.034***	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Sweden	0.002	0.004	−0.023*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Gender: Female	0.018***	0.018***	−0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Education: Medium	0.003	0.002	0.061***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Education: High	−0.001	−0.005	0.079***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Interest in EU Politics	0.038***	0.008	0.341***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Primary X Governments Accept	−0.015	−0.013	−0.015
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Primary X Governments Reject	−0.010	−0.004	0.034*
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Num.Obs.	8716	8717	8715
R2 Adj.	0.255	0.463	0.219

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
OLS models. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. We omit treatment-covariate interactions from the Table.




Figure B5: Predicted means generated from models reported in Table B7 with 95% confidence intervals.

B.6 Robustness Checks

Table B8: Only Attentive Respondents

	Satisfaction: Process	Satisfaction: EU Democracy	Intention to Vote
(Intercept)	0.483***	0.466***	0.664***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Primary	0.008	0.003	0.015+
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Governments Reject	−0.026***	−0.007	−0.012
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Primary X Governments Reject	0.001	−0.010	0.032*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Num.Obs.	6966	6966	6965
R2 Adj.	0.271	0.503	0.223

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
OLS models. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. We omit treatment-covariate interactions from the Table. We exclude respondents that failed a pre-treatment attention check.

Table B9: Only Attentive Respondents who were neither slow nor fast

	Satisfaction: Process	Satisfaction: EU Democracy	Intention to Vote
(Intercept)	0.475***	0.677***	0.455***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Primary	0.005	0.010	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Governments Reject	−0.040***	−0.016	−0.009
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Primary X Governments Reject	−0.017	0.028	−0.022+
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.014)
Num.Obs.	4430	4428	4430
R2 Adj.	0.276	0.236	0.539

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
OLS models. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. We omit treatment-covariate interactions from the table. We exclude respondents that were classified as slow-inattentive or fast-inattentive (Read et al. 2022)

Table B10: Only Respondents with Party Choice

	Satisfaction: Process	Satisfaction: EU Democracy	Intention to Vote
(Intercept)	0.482***	0.468***	0.694***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Primary	0.007	0.001	0.021*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Governments Reject	−0.031***	−0.012+	−0.023*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Primary X Governments Reject	0.014	0.003	0.045*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.019)
Num.Obs.	5583	5583	5584
R2 Adj.	0.249	0.465	0.168

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
OLS models. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. We omit treatment-covariate interactions from the Table. We exclude respondents that did not choose a party for the European elections that was organized in a party group.

Table B11: Only Attentive Respondents with Party Choice

	Satisfaction: Process	Satisfaction: EU Democracy	Intention to Vote
(Intercept)	0.485***	0.466***	0.714***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Primary	0.009	0.000	0.018
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Governments Reject	−0.029***	−0.012	−0.026*
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Primary X Governments Reject	0.010	−0.013	0.028
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.022)
Num.Obs.	4550	4550	4552
R2 Adj.	0.268	0.507	0.164

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
OLS models. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. We omit treatment-covariate interactions from the Table. We exclude respondents that failed a pre-treatment attention check and respondents that did not choose a party for the European elections that was organized in a party group.

Table B12: Only Respondents that Chose a Candidate

	Satisfaction: Process	Satisfaction: EU Democracy	Intention to Vote
(Intercept)	0.493***	0.716***	0.477***
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Governments Reject	-0.031*	-0.006	-0.020
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.013)
Num.Obs.	1475	1475	1475
R2 Adj.	0.246	0.153	0.447

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
OLS models. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. We omit treatment-covariate interactions from the Table. We include only respondents in the primary treatment group that made the choice for a candidate.

B.7 Heterogeneity

To avoid unreliable results, we use a sample splitting approach (Ratkovic 2021). We use an initial data split of half of the respondents to select subgroups with a nonzero effect using the Belloni et al. LASSO model 2013 (we use the seed 1613 for reproducibility). We consider two-way interactions between the two treatment groups and all covariates, and include an interaction between the two treatments. The second split is used to estimate heterogeneous effects through OLS regression, testing only the previously selected subset of interaction effects. The resulting p-values are adjusted for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg 1995). We chose the relatively lenient Benjamini-Hochberg procedure because the goal of this analysis is exploratory. Statistically significant findings should not be understood as confirmatory evidence for real effects, but as inspiration for new hypotheses to be tested in future studies.

Satisfaction with the process: Here, the LASSO model selects the interactions of the primary treatment with general EU attitudes and with Sweden, and the interactions of government intervention with general EU attitudes and medium level of education. In the second half of the data, these interaction effects are tested. Only the interaction of government intervention with medium level of education is statistically significant ($p = 0.019$). However, after correcting for the four tests performed, the p-value is no longer below the 0.05 threshold ($p = 0.079$). Nevertheless, this effect may be of interest as the p is still below a more lenient level of 0.1. Specifically, the interaction describes the effect of Member States rejecting the candidate compared to not rejecting the candidate across levels of formal education. Rejection has a stronger (more negative, $b = -0.048$) effect on satisfaction with the process among respondents with a medium level of education compared to respondents with a low level of education. Among respondents with high levels of education, the interaction effect is of similar magnitude ($b = -0.041$), but not statistically significant ($p = 0.162$).

Voting intention: The LASSO model selects the interactions of the primary treatment with medium education, the interaction of governments rejecting the candidate with high education, political trust, and Sweden. In the test split of the data, none of these effects are statistically significant.

Satisfaction with EU democracy: The LASSO model selects the interaction of the primary treatment with Germany. This interaction effect is not statistically significant in the test split of the data.

We want to make sure that the absence of heterogeneous effects is not due to the specific method we have preregistered. Therefore, we use a second, simpler approach. We simply fit OLS models that include all preregistered interactions. We examine the interactions using F-tests. To adjust for multiple testing, we use the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure on the p-values of the interaction terms.

Using this procedure, we find no statistically significant interaction effects. Therefore, the result of this procedure leads to the same qualitative conclusions as our pre-registered sample splitting approach, which makes us more confident in our results. To illustrate the results, we report the effect of governments rejecting the candidate across countries and education levels for the other two outcomes.

Table B13: ANOVA Table: Satisfaction: Process

term	df	F	p-value	adjusted p-value
Primary X EU General	1	0.511	0.475	0.693
Primary X Age	1	0.632	0.427	0.686
Primary X Gender	1	0.570	0.450	0.686
Primary X EU Knowledge 1	1	0.841	0.359	0.686
Primary X EU Knowledge 2	1	0.197	0.657	0.821
Primary X Life Satisfaction	1	0.739	0.390	0.686
Primary X Satisfaction with Economy	1	1.172	0.279	0.686
Primary X Gov. Satisfaction	1	1.057	0.304	0.686
Primary X Satisfaction with Democracy	1	1.367	0.242	0.686
Primary X Education	2	2.957	0.052	0.418
Primary X Interest in EU Politics	1	0.313	0.576	0.747
Primary X Trust in Politics	1	0.568	0.451	0.686
Primary X Attachment to Nation	1	0.044	0.833	0.889
Primary X Globalisation	1	3.546	0.060	0.418
Primary X Migration Attitude	1	0.099	0.753	0.879
Primary X Country	4	1.695	0.148	0.686
Primary X Left-Right	1	0.058	0.810	0.889
Governments Reject X EU General	1	3.686	0.055	0.418
Governments Reject X Age	1	0.620	0.431	0.686
Governments Reject X Gender	1	1.295	0.255	0.686
Governments Reject X EU Knowledge 1	1	6.889	0.009	0.152
Governments Reject X EU Knowledge 2	1	0.012	0.913	0.921
Governments Reject X Life Satisfaction	1	0.141	0.707	0.854
Governments Reject X Satisfaction with Economy	1	0.716	0.398	0.686
Governments Reject X Gov. Satisfaction	1	0.042	0.838	0.889
Governments Reject X Satisfaction with Democracy	1	0.729	0.393	0.686
Governments Reject X Education	2	6.109	0.002	0.078
Governments Reject X Interest in EU Politics	1	0.359	0.549	0.739
Governments Reject X Trust in Politics	1	0.381	0.537	0.739
Governments Reject X Attachment to Nation	1	0.746	0.388	0.686
Governments Reject X Globalisation	1	1.386	0.239	0.686
Governments Reject X Migration Attitude	1	2.028	0.154	0.686
Governments Reject X Country	4	1.286	0.273	0.686
Governments Reject X Left-Right	1	0.010	0.921	0.921
Primary X Governments Reject	1	1.089	0.297	0.686

ANOVA Table for OLS models. Main effects are omitted from the Table. F-tests use a heteroscedasticity-robust coefficient covariance matrix. P-values were adjusted using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure.




Figure B6: Marginal effect of primary vs. no primary on satisfaction with the process across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B13.




Figure B7: Marginal effect of primary vs. no primary on satisfaction with the process across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B13.




Figure B8: Marginal effect of primary vs. no primary on satisfaction with the process across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B13.




Figure B9: Marginal effect of government intervention vs. no government intervention on satisfaction with the process across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B13.




Figure B10: Marginal effect of government intervention vs. no government intervention on satisfaction with the process across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B13.




Figure B11: Marginal effect of government intervention vs. no government intervention on satisfaction with the process across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B13.

Table B14: ANOVA Table: Satisfaction: EU Democracy

term	df	F	p-value	adjusted p-value
Primary X EU General	1	0.188	0.664	0.989
Primary X Age	1	0.002	0.968	0.989
Primary X Gender	1	1.020	0.313	0.971
Primary X EU Knowledge 1	1	0.013	0.911	0.989
Primary X EU Knowledge 2	1	0.814	0.367	0.971
Primary X Life Satisfaction	1	0.481	0.488	0.971
Primary X Satisfaction with Economy	1	2.167	0.141	0.813
Primary X Gov. Satisfaction	1	0.406	0.524	0.971
Primary X Satisfaction with Democracy	1	0.005	0.943	0.989
Primary X Education	2	2.554	0.078	0.681
Primary X Interest in EU Politics	1	0.033	0.856	0.989
Primary X Trust in Politics	1	0.040	0.841	0.989
Primary X Attachment to Nation	1	1.579	0.209	0.813
Primary X Globalisation	1	0.094	0.759	0.989
Primary X Migration Attitude	1	3.583	0.058	0.681
Primary X Country	4	1.534	0.189	0.813
Primary X Left-Right	1	0.001	0.981	0.989
Governments Reject X EU General	1	0.196	0.658	0.989
Governments Reject X Age	1	0.070	0.792	0.989
Governments Reject X Gender	1	0.188	0.665	0.989
Governments Reject X EU Knowledge 1	1	0.537	0.464	0.971
Governments Reject X EU Knowledge 2	1	0.642	0.423	0.971
Governments Reject X Life Satisfaction	1	0.137	0.712	0.989
Governments Reject X Satisfaction with Economy	1	0.400	0.527	0.971
Governments Reject X Gov. Satisfaction	1	0.432	0.511	0.971
Governments Reject X Satisfaction with Democracy	1	0.000	0.989	0.989
Governments Reject X Education	2	4.739	0.009	0.221
Governments Reject X Interest in EU Politics	1	1.025	0.311	0.971
Governments Reject X Trust in Politics	1	0.105	0.746	0.989
Governments Reject X Attachment to Nation	1	0.306	0.580	0.989
Governments Reject X Globalisation	1	0.701	0.403	0.971
Governments Reject X Migration Attitude	1	6.222	0.013	0.221
Governments Reject X Country	4	1.863	0.114	0.798
Governments Reject X Left-Right	1	1.743	0.187	0.813
Primary X Governments Reject	1	0.078	0.780	0.989

ANOVA Table for OLS models. Main effects are omitted from the Table. F-tests use a heteroscedasticity-robust coefficient covariance matrix. P-values were adjusted using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure.




Figure B12: Marginal effect of primary vs. no primary on satisfaction with EU democracy across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B14.




Figure B13: Marginal effect of primary vs. no primary on satisfaction with EU democracy across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B14.




Figure B14: Marginal effect of primary vs. no primary on satisfaction with EU democracy across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B14.




Figure B15: Marginal effect of government intervention vs. no government intervention on satisfaction with EU democracy across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B14.




Figure B16: Marginal effect of government intervention vs. no government intervention on satisfaction with EU democracy across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B14.




Figure B17: Marginal effect of government intervention vs. no government intervention on satisfaction with EU democracy across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B14.

Table B15: ANOVA Table: Vote Intention

term	df	F	p-value	adjusted p-value
Primary X EU General	1	0.006	0.939	0.939
Primary X Age	1	0.362	0.548	0.860
Primary X Gender	1	0.231	0.631	0.860
Primary X EU Knowledge 1	1	2.308	0.129	0.824
Primary X EU Knowledge 2	1	4.311	0.038	0.442
Primary X Life Satisfaction	1	0.138	0.710	0.860
Primary X Satisfaction with Economy	1	0.048	0.827	0.877
Primary X Gov. Satisfaction	1	0.243	0.622	0.860
Primary X Satisfaction with Democracy	1	0.109	0.741	0.860
Primary X Education	2	0.969	0.379	0.839
Primary X Interest in EU Politics	1	0.064	0.801	0.876
Primary X Trust in Politics	1	1.037	0.309	0.831
Primary X Attachment to Nation	1	1.664	0.197	0.824
Primary X Globalisation	1	0.125	0.724	0.860
Primary X Migration Attitude	1	0.264	0.607	0.860
Primary X Country	4	0.513	0.726	0.860
Primary X Left-Right	1	1.772	0.183	0.824
Governments Reject X EU General	1	0.760	0.383	0.839
Governments Reject X Age	1	0.812	0.367	0.839
Governments Reject X Gender	1	0.421	0.516	0.860
Governments Reject X EU Knowledge 1	1	7.563	0.006	0.104
Governments Reject X EU Knowledge 2	1	0.092	0.762	0.860
Governments Reject X Life Satisfaction	1	2.887	0.089	0.782
Governments Reject X Satisfaction with Economy	1	0.240	0.624	0.860
Governments Reject X Gov. Satisfaction	1	1.364	0.243	0.824
Governments Reject X Satisfaction with Democracy	1	0.102	0.750	0.860
Governments Reject X Education	2	1.429	0.240	0.824
Governments Reject X Interest in EU Politics	1	0.575	0.448	0.860
Governments Reject X Trust in Politics	1	0.536	0.464	0.860
Governments Reject X Attachment to Nation	1	0.015	0.904	0.930
Governments Reject X Globalisation	1	1.156	0.282	0.824
Governments Reject X Migration Attitude	1	1.444	0.230	0.824
Governments Reject X Country	4	0.851	0.493	0.860
Governments Reject X Left-Right	1	1.183	0.277	0.824
Primary X Governments Reject	1	9.087	0.003	0.090

ANOVA Table for OLS models. Main effects are omitted from the Table. F-tests use a heteroscedasticity-robust coefficient covariance matrix. P-values were adjusted using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure.




Figure B18: Marginal effect of primary vs. no primary on intention to vote across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B15.




Figure B19: Marginal effect of primary vs. no primary on intention to vote across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B15.




Figure B20: Marginal effect of primary vs. no primary on intention to vote across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B15.




Figure B21: Marginal effect of government intervention vs. no government intervention on intention to vote across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B15.




Figure B22: Marginal effect of government intervention vs. no government intervention on intention to vote across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B15.




Figure B23: Marginal effect of government intervention vs. no government intervention on intention to vote across covariates. Marginal effects are based on model reported in table B15.