Online Appendix for *Crisis Management and Territorial Preferences: Experimental Evidence from the Pandemic*

I. The Model

A representative individual has a preference for the optimal number of political actors participating in the decision N_m^*, which is the result of maximizing her utility.

$$maxU_i = G_i(\delta)P(N,\delta) - C_i(N) \tag{1}$$

As δ is exogenous, the only variable in maximizing utility is N.

First-order condition (F.O.C.):

$$G_i(\delta)P(N,\delta) - C_i(N) = 0 \tag{2}$$

Given the specific conditions of the functions, there is a value of N for a representative individual (N_m^*) that maximizes the utility and would be an implicit function of δ.

$$N_m^* = f(\delta) \tag{3}$$

Using the implicit function theorem, we conclude that N_m^* is a negative function of δ, so the higher the crisis, the higher the preference for centralization, $N_{crisis}^* < N_{nocrisis}^*$. The implicit function theorem allows us to calculate the sign of the first derivative according to the following formula (where F is the first equation of the first-order condition):

$$f_\delta = -\frac{\frac{\partial F}{\partial \delta}}{\frac{\partial F}{\partial N}} \tag{4}$$

To calculate the sign of (4) we need to calculate the sign of the partial derivatives. From the assumptions of the model ($P_{N\delta} < 0$, G is positive, $G_\delta > 0$ and $P_N < 0$) we can predict that the sign of the first derivative is negative:

$$\frac{\partial F}{\partial \delta} = P_{N\delta}(N,\delta)G(\delta) + G_\delta(\delta)P_N(N,\delta) < 0 \tag{5}$$

From the assumptions of the model ($P_{NN} < 0$, $G > 0$, and $C_{NN} < 0$) we can predict that the sign of the second derivative is also negative.

$$\frac{\partial F}{\partial N} = P_{NN}(N,\delta)G(\delta) - C_{NN}(N) < 0 \tag{6}$$

From equations (5) and (7) we can conclude that:

$$f_\delta = -\frac{\frac{\partial F}{\partial \delta}}{\frac{\partial F}{\partial N}} < 0 \tag{7}$$

Finally, it is important to note that we make an important assumption that explains why N^* depends negatively on δ. That assumption is that the probability to reach an agreement P is decreasing in N, but in a decreasing pace with the intensity of inefficiencies caused by the crisis ($P_{N\delta} < 0$). In Figure A1 we see the implications of this assumption. The difference between the curves widens as N increases (when N increases, the probability of reaching an agreement is lower in the context of a crisis - where δ is higher) than when there is no crisis. When N = 0, then, logically, the crisis does not affect the probability of reaching an agreement.

Figure A1: The relationship between P and N with($_1$) and without($_0$) a Crisis



II. Survey Details and Ethical Considerations

As this paper involves human subjects research, ethical issues are of relevance in its data collection, analysis, and storage phases. In particular, issues of privacy, confidentiality and the obtaining of informed consent are important, and ethics approval for the research has been sought and obtained from the institutions that are leading the project. Then, the design of our project meets the Ethics and Research Protocols and Guidelines of the IE RESEARCH COMMITTEE - IE UNIVERSITY (IERC-12/2020-2021). In addition, the comparative survey was conducted in different countries by companies that are certified with the AccessPanels-specific ISO standard.

The article abides by best ethical practices in the use of personal information and in the storage, backing up, and securing of the data. To ensure authenticity and avoid duplicate versions of the data files, we identify milestone versions of the files to keep and store them in a single location. Team members have regularly tracked and synchronized them.

III. Covariate Balance regarding Treatment 1

i. Pooled Cross-Sectional Sample (June-July 2020)

Table A1: Covariate Balance, Multilevel Coordination Failure (Treatment 1)

Variables		Control Group	Treatment Group	T-test Difference	F-Test for Joint Orthogonality (p-value)
Australia	Female (N=333/335)	0.543 (0.027)	0.537 (0.039)	-0.006	0.872
	Age (N=333/335)	47.77 (0.786)	46.94 (1.110)	-0.834	0.452
	Covid Exposure (N=333/335)	0.141 (0.029)	0.048 (0.040)	-0.093	0.021**
	Unemployed (N=333/335)	0.057 (0.013)	0.066 (0.018)	0.008	0.643
	Ideology (N=278/299)	5.636 (0.131)	5.699 (0.182)	0.062	0.733
	Incumbent voters (N=333/335)	0.372 (0.027)	0.400 (0.037)	0.027	0.464
	Attachment (N=333/335)	0.444 (0.087)	0.460 (0.099)	0.015	0.905
Austria	Female (N=338/338)	0.494 (0.027)	0.456 (0.038)	-0.038	0.317
	Age (N=338/338)	48.11 (0.89)	47.58 (1.265)	-0.532	0.674
	Covid Exposure (N=338/338)	0.346 (0.045)	0.355 (0.065)	0.009	0.891
	Unemployed (N=338/338)	0.017 (0.006)	0.009 (0.009)	0.009	0.315
	Ideology (N=331/331)	4.737 (0.115)	5.024 (0.163)	0.287	0.079*
	Incumbent voters (N=338/338)	0.358 (0.026)	0.370 (0.037)	0.112	0.750
	Attachment (N=338/338)	0.198 (0.092)	0.494 (0.116)	0.296	0.046**
Brazil	Female (N=333/333)	0.546 (0.027)	0.498 (0.039)	-0.048	0.215
	Age (N=333/333)	40.55 (0.829)	41.73 (1.172)	1.171	0.318
	Covid Exposure (N=333/333)	0.826 (0.063)	0.834 (0.090)	0.009	0.920
	Unemployed (N=333/333)	0.150 (0.018)	0.114 (0.026)	-0.036	0.170
	Ideology (N=312/319)	5.679 (0.161)	5.862 (0.226)	0.182	0.420
	Incumbent voters (N=333/333)	0.162 (0.019)	0.153 (0.028)	-0.009	0.750
	Attachment (N=333/333)	0.063 (0.095)	-0.183 (0.123)	0.246	0.114

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A1: Continued

Variables		Control Group	Treatment Group	T-test Difference	F-Test for Joint Orthogonality (p-value)
Canada	Female (N=334/334)	0.517 (0.027)	0.479 (0.039)	-0.039	0.315
	Age (N=334/334)	3.889 (0.094)	3.943 (0.133)	0.053	0.687
	Covid Exposure (N=334/334)	0.206 (0.027)	0.135 (0.038)	-0.072	0.063*
	Unemployed (N=334/334)	0.092 (0.016)	0.099 (0.023)	0.006	0.793
	Ideology (N=311/309)	4.893 (0.125)	4.929 (0.177)	0.035	0.844
	Incumbent voters (N=334/334)	0.296 (0.025)	0.338 (0.036)	0.042	0.245
	Attachment (N=328/329)	3.5640 (0.025)	3.720 (0.0620)	0.156	0.619
France	Female (N=669/669)	0.526 (0.019)	0.510 (0.027)	-0.016	0.548
	Age (N=669/669)	54.13 (0.594)	54.01 (0.840)	-0.121	0.885
	Covid Exposure (N=669/669)	1.227 (0.025)	1.868 (0.036)	-0.040	0.259
	Unemployed (N=669/669)	0.032 (0.006)	0.027 (0.009)	-0.006	0.521
	Ideology (N=609/605)	5.470 (0.098)	5.354 (0.139)	-0.116	0.406
	Incumbent voters (N=669/669)	0.131 (0.013)	0.145 (0.019)	0.134	0.476
	Attachment (N=669/669)	0.968 (0.136)	1.109 (0.096)	0.141	0.303
Germany	Female (N=669/669)	0.529 (0.019)	0.499 (0.027)	-0.029	0.274
	Age (N=669/669)	50.38 (0.620)	50.08 (0.877)	-0.305	0.728
	Covid Exposure (N=669/669)	0.217 (0.029)	0.271 (0.041)	0.054	0.186
	Unemployed (N=669/669)	0.015 (0.005)	0.030 (0.008)	0.015	0.065*
	Ideology (N=639/637)	4.793 (0.075)	4.720 (0.106)	-0.072	0.492
	Incumbent voters (N=669/669)	0.372 (0.019)	0.372 (0.026)	0.000	1.000
	Attachment (N=669/669)	2.831 (0.019)	2.976 (0.026)	0.145	0.443
Italy	Female (N=331/334)	0.552 (0.027)	0.506 (0.039)	-0.046	0.226
	Age (N=331/334)	48.64 (0.906)	46.37 (1.279)	-1.913	0.135
	Covid Exposure (N=331/334)	0.362 (0.045)	0.347 (0.064)	-0.015	0.811
	Unemployed (N=331/334)	0.118 (0.019)	0.183 (0.027)	0.065	0.019**
	Ideology (N=305/308)	5.102 (0.144)	5.136 (0.203)	0.034	0.864
	Incumbent voters (N=331/334)	0.311 (0.026)	0.347 (0.036)	0.036	0.322
	Attachment (N=331/334)	-0.048 (0.026)	-0.039 (0.036)	0.009	0.956

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A1: Continued

Variables		Control Group	Treatment Group	T-test Difference	F-Test for Joint Orthogonality (p-value)
New Zealand	Female (N=336/331)	0.515 (0.027)	0.553 (0.038)	0.038	0.326
	Age (N=336/331)	48.57 (0.849)	48.11 (1.205)	-0.463	0.701
	Covid Exposure (N=336/331)	0.389 (0.051)	0.284 (0.072)	-0.106	0.143
	Unemployed (N=336/331)	0.056 (0.013)	0.069 (0.019)	0.013	0.492
	Ideology (N=299/290)	5.073 (0.131)	4.921 (0.187)	-0.153	0.414
	Incumbent voters (N=336/331)	0.521 (0.027)	0.589 (0.038)	0.068	0.080*
	Attachment (N=336/331)	1.289 (0.113)	1.356 (0.122)	0.068	0.684
Poland	Female (N=333/349)	0.534 (0.027)	0.513 (0.038)	-0.022	0.572
	Age (N=333/349)	43.88 (0.840)	44.32 (1.175)	0.429	0.715
	Covid Exposure (N=333/349)	0.114 (0.032)	0.163 (0.045)	0.049	0.279
	Unemployed (N=333/349)	0.081 (0.014)	0.068 (0.020)	-0.012	0.542
	Ideology (N=310/325)	5.229 (0.141)	5.157 (0.196)	-0.072	0.714
	Incumbent voters (N=333/349)	0.270 (0.024)	0.246 (0.033)	-0.024	0.477
	Attachment (N=333/349)	0.297 (0.119)	0.464 (0.112)	0.167	0.306
Spain	Female (N=640/663)	0.511 (0.020)	0.534 (0.249)	0.22	0.406
	Age (N=640/663)	49.601 (0.684)	48.648 (1.243)	0.959	0.317
	Covid Exposure (N=640/663)	0.312 (0.030)	0.410 (0.035)	0.097	0.034**
	Unemployed (N=640/663)	0.136 (0.013)	0.149 (0.014)	0.013	0.490
	Ideology (N=564/597)	4.433 (0.104)	4.054 (0.106)	0.269	0.01***
	Incumbent voters (N=640/663)	0.293 (0.018)	0.324 (0.018)	-0.030	0.233
	Attachment (N=640/663)	-0.5 (0.130)	0.670 (0.129)	0.170	0.355
Sweden	Female (N=338/338)	0.526 (0.027)	0.476 (0.038)	-0.050	0.192
	Age (N=338/338)	52.01 (0.879)	50.84 (1.243)	-1.174	0.345
	Covid Exposure (N=338/338)	0.553 (0.050)	0.719 (0.071)	0.165	0.021**
	Unemployed (N=338/338)	0.035 (0.015)	0.059 (0.016)	0.024	0.148
	Ideology (N=327/322)	5.116 (0.147)	5.385 (0.209)	0.269	0.200
	Incumbent voters (N=338/338)	0.287 (0.024)	0.231 (0.034)	-0.057	0.097*
	Attachment (N=338/338)	3.065 (0.152)	2.911 (0.177)	-0.154	0.509

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A1: Continued

Variables		Control Group	Treatment Group	T-test Difference	F-Test for Joint Orthogonality (p-value)
UK	Female (N=337/338)	0.507 (0.027)	0.485 (0.038)	-0.022	0.565
	Age (N=337/338)	47.06 (0.865)	46.95 (1.223)	-0.107	0.931
	Covid Exposure (N=337/338)	0.225 (0.043)	0.325 (0.061)	0.099	0.102
	Unemployed (N=337/338)	0.056 (0.013)	0.065 (0.018)	0.009	0.636
	Ideology (N=296/302)	4.777 (0.131)	4.950 (0.184)	0.173	0.348
	Incumbent voters (N=337/338)	0.350 (0.026)	0.379 (0.037)	0.019	0.595
	Attachment (N=337/338)	-0.178 (0.133)	0.133 (0.163)	0.210	0.140
USA	Female (N=669/668)	0.539 (0.019)	0.527 (0.027)	-0.012	0.643
	Age (N=669/668)	45.45 (0.771)	46.12 (1.007)	0.671	0.505
	Covid Exposure (N=669/668)	0.076 (0.015)	0.051 (0.022)	-0.025	0.249
	Unemployed (N=669/668)	0.111 (0.012)	0.114 (0.017)	0.003	0.855
	Ideology (N=650/633)	5.681 (0.114)	5.687 (0.163)	0.005	0.972
	Incumbent voters (N=669/668)	0.321 (0.018)	0.328 (0.026)	0.006	0.801
	Attachment (N=669/668)	0.769 (0.104)	0.760 (0.103)	0.009	0.949

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

IV. Testing for the Validity of our Priming

Our particular priming experiment mentions World Health Organization's recommendations and the opinion of experts as authority arguments in the fight against the pandemic. This could be a problematic wording if a non-negligible part of our sample holds populist anti-scientific attitudes that deactivate the effect of this treatment or if the supporters of a populist party get persuaded by their party's specific agenda. For instance, Trump's Republican Administration signed USA's formal withdrawal from the WHO in the middle of the COVID-19 crisis. Below, we test for the validity of our priming by graphing the predicted values of an interaction between our treatment variable and country-specific individuals' response to the following question: *In your opinion, what is the likelihood that scientists are hiding information from (DEMONYM) about the coronavirus epidemic?* We do the same thing with populist parties' voters in countries with prominent populist political parties and leaders. In France we identify as such voters of *La France Insoumise* and *Rassemblement National*, in Germany, voters of *Alternative für Deutschland* and *Die Linke*, in Spain, voters of *Vox*, and in the USA, *Republican* voters. Results confirm that neither of these moderators seem to uncover a differential treatment effect on our dependent variable. That is, the positive or significant effects of our treatment don't appear to be circumscribed only to those that don't distrust scientists or voters of non-populist parties. Moreover, neither populist

attitudes nor choices seem to be particularly related to preferences on vertical distribution of power.

i. Populist Attitudes

Figure A1: Effect of the "Likelihood Scientists are Hiding Information from Australians"



Figure A2: Effect of the "Likelihood Scientists are Hiding Information from Austrians"



Figure A3: Effect of the "Likelihood Scientists are Hiding Information from Brazilians"



Figure A4: Effect of the "Likelihood Scientists are Hiding Information from Canadians"



Figure A5: Effect of the "Likelihood Scientists are Hiding Information from the French"



Figure A6: Effect of the "Likelihood Scientists are Hiding Information from Germans"



Figure A7: Effect of the "Likelihood Scientists are Hiding Information from Italians"



Figure A8: Effect of the "Likelihood Scientists are Hiding Information from New Zealanders"



Figure A9: Effect of the "Likelihood Scientists are Hiding Information from Polish"



Figure A10: Effect of the "Likelihood Scientists are Hiding Information from Spanish"



Figure A11: Effect of the "Likelihood Scientists are Hiding Information from Swedish"



Figure A12: Effect of the "Likelihood Scientists are Hiding Information from British"



Figure A13: Effect of the "Likelihood Scientists are Hiding Information from Americans"



ii. Populist Behavior

Figure A14: Effect of Voting for a Populist Party



iii. Perceptions about the Role of the European Union

The obvious question in those countries in our sample that are members of the European Union is which is the role that citizens assign to this level of government when managing a threat. With the aim of capturing this opinion, we replicated one of Amat et al.'s (2020)[1] experiments in our Spanish November sample. We divided respondents into three groups and asked each group to choose a

[1]Specifically, we refer to the experiment described in Table 2, Figure 2, in Amat, Francesc, Andreu Arenas, Albert Falcó-Gimeno, and Jordi Muñoz. 2020. "*Pandemics Meet Democracy. Experimental Evidence from the COVID-19 Crisis in Spain.*" SocArXiv. April 6. doi:10.31235/osf.io/dkusw.

government level in the fight against one of the following three different global threats: the pandemic, climate change and international terrorism. Table A2 shows the average choice of respondents by threat in each of the samples. Interestingly, the pandemic seems to be the only threat for which a majority of respondents prefers a national rather than a supranational response.

Table A2

	COVID-19 pandemic	Climate Change	International Terrorism
EU	28.57	43.72	55.94
Central Government	21.55	12.06	16.09
Regional Government	21.30	21.86	7.92
None of them	3.51	1.76	0.50
Other	15.04	11.31	8.42
DK/DA	10.03	9.30	11.14
N	399	398	404

V. Regression Tables of the Main Analyses

Table A3

	DV: Preferred Vertical Distribution of Power				
	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3	Model A4	Model A5
Treatment 1	0.269***	0.260***	0.255***	0.262***	0.201**
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.070)
Age	-0.008	-0.009*	-0.009*	-0.009*	-0.009*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Gender	-0.308***	-0.300***	-0.300***	-0.304***	-0.304***
	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Unemployed	-0.123	-0.137	-0.137	-0.092***	-0.091
	(0.105)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.106)	(0.106)
COVID exposure	0.098***	0.099***	0.099	0.097***	0.098
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Ideology	0.008	0.006	0.006	0.010	0.010
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Identity		0.122*	0.120**		
		(0.059)	(0.055)		
Identity*					
Treatment 1			0.005		
			(0.014)		
Partisanship				0.726***	0.630***
				(0.135)	(0.146)
Partisanship*					
Treatment 1					0.190
					(0.128)
constant	6.204***	6.234***	6.009***	5.978***	6.204***
	(0.228)	(0.226)	(0.244)	(0.239)	(0.228)
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08
Observations	10,570	10,567	10,567	10,570	10,567

Standard errors clustered by country | $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Model A1 is our baseline model, which we use throughout the paper. Figure 4 in the main text shows the interaction between our main effect and a country dummy. Models A2 to A5 present the results of our individual-level study, with identity and partisanship as the main treatment moderators. In Figures 5 and 6 of the article, we also introduce a country identifier to capture country-specific individual-level heterogeneous treatment effects through three-way interactions.

Table A4

	DV: Preferred Vertical Distribution of Power			
	Model A6	Model A7	Model A8	Model A9
Treatment 1	0.269***	0.332**	0.267***	0.286*
	(0.047)	(0.132)	(0.048)	(0.146)
Age	-0.003	-0.003	-0.006	-0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Gender	-0.284***	-0.284***	-0.289***	-0.289***
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.087)
Unemployed	-0.139	-0.138	-0.103	-0.103
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)
COVID exposure	0.058	0.058	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.125)	(0.125)
Ideology	0.006	0.006	0.008	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
RAI	0.033	0.035		
	(0.021)	(0.020)		
RAI*				
Treatment 1		-0.003		
		(0.007)		
Total PPI			-0.936	-0.919
			(0.644)	(0.672)
Total PPI*				
Treatment 1				-0.035
				(0.262)
constant	4.608***	4.576***	6.009***	5.856***
	(0.519)	(0.495)	(0.244)	(0.417)
Country Fixed-Effects	No	No	No	No
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
Observations	10,570	10,570	10,546	10,546

Standard errors clustered by country | $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Given our preregistered expectations regarding the moderating role of contextual factos, in Table A4 we include our main contextual moderators. Models A6-A7 control and moderate by each country's score in the Regional Authority Index. Specifically, according to our pre-registered expectations, "*we expect the treatment to have a stronger effect in countries with federal or quasi-federal structures than in unitary countries with more centralized structures. In federal or quasi-federal countries, regions or states enjoy higher levels of autonomy over health care, public health, and social services, increasing the costs of intergovernmental coordination. The treatment will have a stronger effect in countries where coordination costs are higher due to decentralized governance.*" The RAI coefficients do not reach any significance, but we present them here anyway. Models A8-A9 control and moderate by each country's score in the Protective Policy Index; specifically, A9 presents the results depicted in Figure 7 in the paper.

VI. More on the Contextual Moderators

i. The Moderating Role of Regionally Variant Total Protective Policy Index

Figure A15



Instead of using country-level average policy efforts, Figure A15 replicates the estimation in Figure 7 in the main text using subcentral and central governments total policy efforts (Shvetsova et al. 2022), a variable that can potentially take different values in each region. Even if the number of observations in some of the regions in the pooled cross-sectional sample is too small, and thus these analyses should be interpreted with caution, results confirm the negative effect of higher levels of policy efforts on centripetal preferences. They also confirm the existence of a significant ATE in regions with low levels of multilevel policy efforts in Brazil, France, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Although some of the predictions in Spain and the UK are actually extrapolations outside of the range of observed data with respect to the moderator, the graphs reinforce the logic exposed in Section VII.i of the paper.

ii. Country-specific Analyses (June & December 2020)

Table A5

	DV: Preferred Vertical Distribution of Power					
	Model BRA Jun	Model BRA Dec	Model FRA Jun	Model FRA Dec	Model GER Jun	Model GER Dec
Treatment 1	0.300	0.205	0.307*	0.277***	0.403***	0.398***
	(0.280)	(0.132)	(0.170)	(0.078)	(0.127)	(0.105)
Age	-0.006	0.013*	-0.018***	-0.022***	-0.017***	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Gender	-0.176	-0.037	-0.012	-0.014	-0.272***	-0.301***
	(0.136)	(0.183)	(0.116)	(0.099)	(0.127)	(0.083)
Unemployed	-0.203	-0.471*	-0.885***	0.223	-0.182	-0.490
	(0.240)	(0.272)	(0.170)	(0.304)	(0.417)	(0.473)
COVID exposure	0.061	0.093	0.079	0.166*	0.060	0.144
	(0.085)	(0.128)	(0.101)	(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.106)
Ideology	0.468***	0.408***	0.084**	0.045**	-0.112***	-0.117**
	(0.045)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.045)
constant	5.910***	4.933***	4.703***	4.966***	5.817***	5.671***
	(0.523)	(0.395)	(0.272)	(0.316)	(0.199)	(0.360)
Region Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.27	0.24	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.07
Observations	631	626	1,214	1,271	1,276	1,297

Standard errors clustered by region | $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A6

	DV: Preferred Vertical Distribution of Power					
	Model POL Jun	Model POL Dec	Model ESP Jun	Model ESP Dec	Model UK Jun	Model UK Dec
Treatment 1	0.445*	0.582***	0.177	0.373*	0.165	0.362
	(0.211)	(0.127)	(0.150)	(0.186)	(0.170)	(0.208)
Age	-0.030***	-0.025***	0.005	0.012	-0.003	-0.008**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Gender	0.075	-0.144	-0.704***	-0.599***	-0.115	-0.238
	(0.121)	(0.165)	(0.153)	(0.193)	(0.158)	(0.179)
Unemployed	0.003	-0.030	-0.172	0.362	0.815	-0.447
	(0.361)	(0.612)	(0.195)	(0.208)	(0.210)	(0.571)
COVID exposure	0.331**	0.021	0.090	0.296	0.208**	0.026
	(0.128)	(0.099)	(0.169)	(0.290)	(0.091)	(0.189)
Ideology	0.184***	0.274***	0.147	-0.007	0.300***	0.295***
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.088)	(0.003)	(0.061)	(0.077)
constant	4.161***	3.801***	4.398***	4.804***	3.408***	3.951***
	(0.272)	(0.310)	(0.405)	(0.432)	(0.438)	(0.346)
Region Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.25	0.27	0.16	0.14	0.20	0.20
Observations	635	616	1,161	916	598	421

Standard errors clustered by region | $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

VII. The Effect of Treatment 2

Table A7

	DV: Preferred Vertical Distribution of Power	
	Model A8	Model A9
Treatment 2	-0.099**	-0.097**
	(0.044)	(0.043)
Age	-0.009	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Gender	-0.343***	-0.326***
	(0.088)	(0.091)
Unemployed	-0.284***	-0.262**
	(0.074)	(0.096)
COVID exposure	0.113***	0.054
	(0.032)	(0.088)
Ideology	0.0001	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.008)
RAI		0.032
		(0.020)
constant	6.185***	4.739***
	(0.240)	(0.482)
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes	No
R^2	0.05	0.02
Observations	10,518	10,518

Standard errors clustered by country | $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$