Supporting Information
Collective Irresponsibility: Corporate Reputations and the Role of Associations in Lobbying

A Human Subjects Research Procedure and Ethics

The surveys fielded for this paper was approved by the internal review boards of the researcher's universities. Respondents were recruited from the existing respondent pool of survey firm Respondi. Before beginning the survey, all participants read an informational text, which explained that they were taking part in a research study that aimed to learn more about public opinion and consumption choices among residents of their country. Respondents had to give their explicit consent before being forwarded to the survey. The survey used no deception and did not ask sensitive questions of the respondents. All respondents remained anonymous, as Respondi did not share any personal information with the researchers, and the survey did not record IP addresses. Respondents were compensated at the standard rate Respondi pays to participants in surveys that last around 10 minutes.

B Explanation of Coding of InfluenceMap Data

B.1 Coding Whether a Company is "Consumer Facing"

InfluenceMap provides data for companies that it classifies into 21 sectors. For the analyses, I maintain these classifications with one exception: In the original data, are a few financial firms classified as "Banks" and one financial firm (Blackrock) classified as "Asset Management", while all others, including other banks and asset managers, are coded as "Financials." Instead, I classify all banks and asset managers as "Financials." In addition to the sectors, the data also contains one category called "all sectors" for rare conglomerates that are active in many different sectors.

Table B.1: Overview Sectors Covered by InfluenceMap Scoring

	Sector	n Firms	Example Firms
1	All Sectors	4	SK Inc.
2	Automobiles	38	BMW, ZF Friedrichshafen
3	Business Services	2	Daiwa House Industry
4	Chemicals	32	Bayer, Dow Inc.
5	Commercial Services	3	Accenture, Uber
6	Construction Materials	16	Cemex, Heidelberg Cement
7	Consumer Staples	31	Unilever, Heineken
8	Energy	104	ExxonMobil, Siemens Energy
9	Financials	53	BNP Paribas, Goldman Sachs
10	Food Products	8	Tyson Foods, Cargill
11	Healthcare	22	Pfizer, Novo Nordisk
12	Industrials	40	Rockwool, Airbus
13	Information Technology	32	Foxconn, Microsoft
14	Media	1	Disney
15	Metals & Mining	60	Tata Steel, BHP
16	Paper & Forest Products	6	International Paper Company
17	Retailing	18	H&M, Amazon
18	Telecommunications	16	Comcast, Orange
19	Transportation	48	Air Canada, Moller Maersk
20	Utilities	70	EDF, PG&E

To code whether a company is consumer-facing, I follow the following coding rules: A company is coded as consumer-facing if all of the following criteria apply:

1. The company derives large parts of its revenue (at least 25%) from products that are sold to retail consumers

2. The producer must be clearly identifiable by the consumer, meaning that e.g. those who produce packaging or machine parts for consumer products are not coded as 1

3. The producer cannot operate with a monopoly, or near monopoly for its retail-facing business. For example, utilities that derive most of their income from monopolies on energy supply, or pharmaceutical companies that mostly sell patented medicine are not coded as 1

There are some edge-cases in the data, where companies derive a small portion of their income from selling to retail-consumers in somewhat competitive markets. In the main specification, I code these companies as not consumer-facing. However, in an alternative specification, I

code an intermediate level of 0.5 for such edge-cases. These include, for example, utility companies that are largely monopolies, but that sell electricity to some competitive retail markets, as well as energy companies that derive a small portion of their income from petrol sales to retail consumers at gas stations. The table below shows a sample of the resulting coding decisions.

Table B.2: Sample of Coding Decisions for Consumer Facing Variable

Company	Engagement	Sector	Region	Ind. Score	As. Score	CF 1	CF 2	Notes
Ørsted	43.00	Energy	Europe	78.00	79.00	0.00	0.00	
IKEA	47.00	Retailing	Europe	80.00	75.00	1.00	1.00	
Apple	19.00	Information Technology	North America	86.00	64.00	1.00	1.00	
Alstom	14.00	Transportation	Europe	82.00	63.00	0.00	0.00	
Mars	17.00	Consumer Staples	North America	88.00	62.00	1.00	1.00	
Netflix	10.00	Information Technology	North America	82.00	58.00	1.00	1.00	
LONGi Green Energy Technology	19.00	Energy	Asia	71.00	71.00	0.00	0.00	
Saint-Gobain	31.00	Construction Materials	Europe	78.00	60.00	0.00	0.50	Sells some products to private home owners
Moller Maersk (Maersk)	45.00	Transportation	Europe	75.00	63.00	0.00	0.00	
Novo Nordisk	24.00	Healthcare	Europe	79.00	60.00	0.00	0.00	
easyJet	42.00	Transportation	Europe	73.00	54.00	1.00	1.00	
DuPont	13.00	Chemicals	North America	66.00	55.00	0.00	0.50	Sells some retail consumables
Bank Of America	12.00	Financials	North America	57.00	53.00	1.00	1.00	
Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS)	11.00	Energy	Asia	51.00	61.00	0.00	0.00	
SinoPec	26.00	Energy	Asia	60.00	58.00	0.00	0.50	Sells at gas stations
Bluescope Steel	24.00	Metals & Mining	Oceania	59.00	58.00	0.00	0.00	
Mercedes-Benz Group	28.00	Automobiles	Europe	61.00	54.00	1.00	1.00	
BHP	33.00	Metals & Mining	Oceania	66.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	
Foxconn (Hon Hai)	5.00	Information Technology	Asia	64.00	67.00	0.00	0.00	
AGL Energy	29.00	Utilities	Oceania	66.00	73.00	0.00	0.50	Sells to some competitive electricity markets
La Poste	6.00	Transportation	Europe	56.00	74.00	0.00	0.50	Lost monopoly power, but still by far largest provider
Tyson Foods	10.00	Food Products	North America	59.00	37.00	1.00	1.00	
Yancoal	8.00	Metals & Mining	Oceania	35.00	37.00	0.00	0.00	
Peabody	6.00	Metals & Mining	North America	19.00	34.00	0.00	0.00	

B.2 Calculation of Position Details

Underlying the overall scores InfluenceMap awards to companies' individual and association lobbying are matrix tables that capture different kinds of lobbying on various policy issues. Figure B.1 shows an example of such a matrix table. InfluenceMap provides such tables for companies, but also for associations, and lists all scored associations connected to a company in a company's detailed profile.

To calculate details of position-taking, I use 11 out of the 13 policy categories - excluding the two rows on transparency, as they don't directly capture lobbying. I then take the average across all forms of lobbying for a policy to proxy the company's overall position. For example, for the firm in the example table, the score regarding "Land Use" averages to an overall position of 0.5. This is then compared to the average of the equivalent scores for all associations the company is connected to in the analysis. In cases where there are no observed instances of lobbying – e.g. for the example company there is no captured lobbying on renewable energy – this is coded as the firm remaining silent.

Figure B.1: Example of InfluenceMap Scoring Table

QUERIES	DATA SOURCES						
	Main Web Site	Corporate Media	CDP Responses	Direct Consultation with Governments	Media Reports	CEO Messaging	Financial Disclosures
Communication of Climate Science	1	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Alignment with IPCC on Climate Action	1	NS	0	2	1	1	1
Supporting the Need for Regulations	1	NS	1	0	NS	1	NS
Support of UN Climate Process	1	0	0	NS	NS	1	NS
Transparency on Legislation	-1	NA	0	NA	NA	NA	NS
Carbon Tax	1	NS	1	NS	NS	NS	NS
Emissions Trading	1	1	1	NS	NS	NS	NS
Energy and Resource Efficiency	NS	NS	1	NS	NS	NS	NS
Renewable Energy	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Energy Transition & Zero Carbon Technologies	1	0	NS	1	0	1	1
GHG Emission Regulation	NS	NS	1	0	NS	NS	NS
Disclosure on Relationships	-1	NS	1	NA	NA	NA	NS
Land Use	0	NS	NS	NS	NS	1	NS

C Additional Results, InfluenceMap Scores

Table C.1: Regression Results InfluenceMap Score Divergence, Alternative Way of Coding Consumer-Facing Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	0.756	-10.100***	-11.480***
	(1.364)	(1.203)	(1.895)
Consumer Facing	6.855**	5.819**	3.598*
	(2.095)	(1.820)	(1.401)
Num.Obs.	479	479	479
Fixed Effects Region	No	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects Sector	No	No	Yes
AIC	4602.1	4516.5	4356.4
BIC	6592.0	6481.3	6246.2

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.2: Regression Results InfluenceMap Score Divergence, Only Firms with Engagement Ratings of Over 10%

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	1.987	-7.500+	-10.117***
	(1.210)	(4.038)	(1.969)
Consumer Facing	6.717**	6.178**	4.182***
	(2.559)	(2.362)	(0.778)
Num.Obs.	335	335	335
Fixed Effects Region	No	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects Sector	No	No	Yes
AIC	3177.2	3133.3	2991.6
BIC	4447.3	4380.5	4170.1

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.3: Regression Results InfluenceMap Score Divergence, Excluding Financial Sector

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	1.048	-10.100***	-11.291***
	(1.305)	(1.206)	(1.904)
Consumer Facing	7.944**	7.114**	5.013***
	(2.730)	(2.362)	(1.037)
Num.Obs.	436	436	436
Fixed Effects Region	No	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects Sector	No	No	Yes
AIC	4200.1	4111.5	3965.0
BIC	5969.8	5856.8	5641.0

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.4: Regression Results that Disaggregate Source of Different Climate Scores

	Firm Greener than Association Mean				Association Engages, Firm Silent			
	OLS	logit	OLS	logit	OLS	logit	OLS	logit
(Intercept)	0.631***	0.536***	0.631***	0.536***	0.183***	-1.519	0.175	-1.513***
	(0.016)	(0.068)	(0.016)	(0.068)	(0.010)	(0.927)	(0.141)	(0.064)
Consumer Facing	0.085**	0.388**	0.085**	0.388**	0.005	-0.129	-0.009	-0.017
	(0.027)	(0.127)	(0.027)	(0.127)	(0.018)	(0.179)	(0.024)	(0.114)
Mean Association Position					-0.051***	-0.366***	-0.050***	-0.359***
					(0.011)	(0.084)	(0.012)	(0.080)
Consumer Facing:Mean Association Position					-0.047*	-0.416**	-0.053*	-0.372*
					(0.022)	(0.157)	(0.021)	(0.158)
Num.Obs.	3610	3610	3610	3610	4338	4338	4338	4338
Fixed Effects Region	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Fixed Effects Sector	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

D Vignette Treatment Texts (English Translations)

Control Text Read by All

In the next part of the survey, we will show you short texts, which summarize a recent report on the topic of climate change and aviation. In these texts, we may provide you with information about two airlines. These airlines are real companies, which we will refer to as "Airline A" and "Airline B" in this study.

[pagebreak]

Please read the following summary of a recent report on the topic of climate change and flying:

"Air travel is currently one of the most CO2-intensive forms of travel, as it relies heavily on oil-based fuel.
To limit CO2 emissions from aviation, the EU has proposed a number of policy measures.
For example, the EU is considering tax on jet fuel.
It has also proposed to strengthen the Emissions Trading System, which limits the amount of CO2 airlines are allowed to emit."

Treatment 1: Firm Lobbying Against Climate Policy

In addition, the report outlines the lobbying positions interest groups in the airline industry took in response to the EU policy proposals. This information is summarized below:

- (brown airline) advocated against a jet fuel tax
- (brown airline) advocated against a stricter emissions trading system for airlines
- The report contained no further information on the lobbying positions of (green airline)."

Treatment 2: Firm Lobbying For Climate Policy

In addition, the report outlines the lobbying positions interest groups in the airline industry took in response to the EU policy proposals. This information is summarized below:

- (green airline) advocated in favor of a jet fuel tax
- (green airline) advocated in favor of a stricter emissions trading system for airlines
- The report contained no further information on the lobbying positions of (brown airline)."

Treatment 3: Firm Lobbing For and Against Climate Policy

In addition, the report outlines the lobbying positions interest groups in the airline industry took in response to the EU policy proposals. This information is summarized below:

- (brown airline) advocated against a jet fuel tax
- (green airline) advocated in favor of a jet fuel tax
- (brown airline) advocated against a stricter emissions trading system for airlines
- (green airline) advocated in favor of a stricter emissions trading system for airlines

Treatment 4: Association Lobbying Against Climate Policy

In addition, the report outlines the lobbying positions interest groups in the airline industry took in response to the EU policy proposals. This information is summarized below:

- The association of European airlines – Airlines for Europe – advocated against a jet fuel tax
- The association of European airlines – Airlines for Europe – advocated against a stricter emissions trading system for airlines
- The report contained no further information on the lobbying positions of Airline A or Airline B.

Treatment 5: Association Lobbying Against, Firm Lobbying Against Climate Policy

In addition, the report outlines the lobbying positions interest groups in the airline industry took in response to the EU policy proposals. This information is summarized below:

- The association of European airlines – Airlines for Europe – advocated against a jet fuel tax
- (brown airline) advocated against a jet fuel tax
- The association of European airlines – Airlines for Europe – advocated against a stricter emissions trading system for airlines
- (brown airline) advocated against a stricter emissions trading system for airlines
- The report contained no further information on the lobbying positions of (green airline)."

Treatment 6: Association Lobbying Against, Firm Lobbying For Climate Policy

In addition, the report outlines the lobbying positions interest groups in the airline industry took in response to the EU policy proposals. This information is summarized below:

- The association of European airlines – Airlines for Europe – advocated against a jet fuel tax
- (green airline) advocated in favor of a jet fuel tax
- The association of European airlines – Airlines for Europe – advocated against a stricter emissions trading system for airlines
- (green airline) advocated in favor of a stricter emissions trading system for airlines
- The report contained no further information on the lobbying positions of (brown airline)."

Treatment 7: Association Lobbying Against, Firms Lobbying For and Against Climate Policy

In addition, the report outlines the lobbying positions interest groups in the airline industry took in response to the EU policy proposals. This information is summarized below:

- The association of European airlines – Airlines for Europe – advocated against a jet fuel tax
- (green airline) advocated in favor of a jet fuel tax

- (brown airline) advocated in against a jet fuel tax
- The association of European airlines – Airlines for Europe – advocated against a stricter emissions trading system for airlines
- (green airline) advocated in favor of a stricter emissions trading system for airlines
- (brown airline) advocated against a stricter emissions trading system for airlines”

E Additional Survey Results

E.1 Climate Concern and Mitigation Policy Support among Participants

Figure E.1: Level of Climate Concern among Consumers



Figure E.2: Level of Support for Mitigation Policies among Consumers



E.2 Regression Table, Main Results

Table E.1: Regression Table, Main Survey Experiment Results

	Pr(Green over Brown)	Pr(Brown over Train)	Pr(Green over Train)	Reduce Future Flying
Intercept	0.408***	0.761***	0.670***	0.914***
	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.039)
T1: Brown Firm	0.280***	−0.084**	−0.044	0.074
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.064)
T2: Green Firm	0.282***	−0.081**	−0.070*	0.029
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.067)
T3: Green and Brown Firms	0.384***	−0.065*	−0.038	0.045
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.068)
T4: Association	0.019	−0.021	−0.039	−0.045
	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.054)
T5: Association and Brown Firm	0.208***	−0.035	−0.038	0.040
	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.066)
T6: Association and Green Firm	0.299***	−0.017	−0.027	−0.018
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.069)
T7: All Actors	0.361***	−0.088**	−0.011	0.107
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.066)
Cost Difference 4	−0.236***			
	(0.009)			
Cost Difference 8	−0.263***			
	(0.009)			
Cost Difference 30	−0.372***			
	(0.009)			
Num.Obs.	14 552	3638	3638	2296
R2	0.175	0.005	0.002	0.003
Adj. R2	0.174	0.004	0.000	0.000
F	307.796	2.862	0.971	1.120

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

E.3 Consumer Choices, Separate Choice Tasks

Figure E.3: Treatment Effects Choice Between Airlines, by Cost Difference



Note: Figure shows separate treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals for choice tasks between brown and green airline's flights. Dependent variable is a binary indicator of choosing the green airline's flight.

Table E.2: Regression Table, Separate Choices Between Two Airlines

	0 Euros	4 Euros	8 Euros	30 Euros
Intercept	0.499***	0.103***	0.094***	0.065***
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)
T1: Brown Firm	0.140***	0.387***	0.355***	0.238***
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.025)
T2: Green Firm	0.163***	0.392***	0.331***	0.242***
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.025)
T3: Green and Brown Firms	0.237***	0.491***	0.471***	0.337***
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)
T4: Association	−0.042+	0.048*	0.038+	0.029
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.021)
T5: Association and Brown Firm	0.094**	0.302***	0.277***	0.160***
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)
T6: Association and Green Firm	0.184***	0.388***	0.385***	0.237***
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)
T7: All Actors	0.208***	0.483***	0.464***	0.288***
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Num.Obs.	3638	3638	3638	3638
R2	0.043	0.165	0.155	0.088
R2 Adj.	0.041	0.163	0.153	0.086
Log.Lik.	−2499.275	−2153.581	−2106.696	−1788.001
F	23.062	102.472	95.001	49.976
RMSE	0.48	0.44	0.43	0.40

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

E.4 Consumer Choices, by Country

Figure E.4: Treatment Effects Choice Between Airlines, by Country Sample



Note: Figure shows separate treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals for each country sample for pooled choice tasks between brown and green airline flights. Dependent variable is a binary indicator of choosing the green airline's flight.

Table E.3: Regression Table, Choice between Two Airlines by Country

	Germany	Italy	France	Netherlands
Intercept	0.421***	0.392***	0.416***	0.403***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)
T1: Brown Firm	0.276***	0.307***	0.248***	0.277***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.040)
T2: Green Firm	0.335***	0.235***	0.275***	0.261***
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
T3: Green and Brown Firms	0.396***	0.397***	0.384***	0.359***
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.046)
T4: Association	−0.005	0.048*	−0.015	0.047+
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.025)
T5: Association and Brown Firm	0.143**	0.239***	0.248***	0.201***
	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.036)
T6: Association and Green Firm	0.350***	0.228***	0.336***	0.257***
	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.045)
T7: All Actors	0.376***	0.353***	0.367***	0.335***
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Cost Difference 4	−0.189***	−0.242***	−0.271***	−0.249***
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Cost Difference 8	−0.226***	−0.261***	−0.298***	−0.272***
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Cost Difference 30	−0.326***	−0.379***	−0.390***	−0.398***
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Num.Obs.	3968	3476	3528	3580

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table E.4: Regression Table, Choice between Green Airline and Train by Country

	Germany	Italy	France	Netherlands
Intercept	0.714***	0.888***	0.383***	0.712***
	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.034)
T1: Brown Firm	−0.076	−0.058	−0.045	−0.042
	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.063)	(0.059)
T2: Green Firm	−0.075	−0.165**	−0.102+	0.005
	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.057)
T3: Green and Brown Firms	0.000	−0.097*	−0.002	−0.065
	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.062)	(0.062)
T4: Association	−0.021	−0.093*	−0.023	−0.023
	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.048)
T5: Association and Brown Firm	−0.114+	−0.066	−0.023	0.009
	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.063)	(0.059)
T6: Association and Green Firm	−0.058	−0.051	−0.020	0.010
	(0.059)	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.063)
T7: All Actors	0.041	−0.135**	0.025	−0.025
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.066)	(0.062)
Num.Obs.	992	869	882	895

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table E.5: Regression Table, Choice between Brown Airline and Train by Country

	Germany	Italy	France	Netherlands
Intercept	0.714***	0.865***	0.765***	0.706***
	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.034)
T1: Brown Firm	−0.118*	−0.077	−0.044	−0.077
	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.060)
T2: Green Firm	−0.094	−0.130*	−0.106+	0.011
	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.057)
T3: Green and Brown Firms	−0.077	−0.139**	−0.026	−0.024
	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.061)
T4: Association	0.003	−0.095*	0.018	−0.007
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.048)
T5: Association and Brown Firm	−0.055	−0.083+	−0.035	0.015
	(0.062)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.060)
T6: Association and Green Firm	−0.037	−0.015	−0.003	−0.012
	(0.059)	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.064)
T7: All Actors	−0.048	−0.213***	0.000	−0.092
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.064)
Num.Obs.	992	869	882	895

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table E.6: Regression Table, Willingness to Reduce Future Flying by Country

	Germany	Italy	France	Netherlands
Intercept	1.076***	0.943***	0.837***	0.784***
	(0.079)	(0.062)	(0.086)	(0.075)
T1: Brown Firm	0.067	0.205+	0.049	−0.106
	(0.131)	(0.105)	(0.156)	(0.120)
T2: Green Firm	0.148	−0.088	0.000	0.062
	(0.133)	(0.110)	(0.158)	(0.132)
T3: Green and Brown Firms	0.018	0.249*	−0.057	−0.179
	(0.142)	(0.106)	(0.141)	(0.134)
T4: Association	0.003	−0.205*	0.026	0.008
	(0.109)	(0.094)	(0.121)	(0.106)
T5: Association and Brown Firm	−0.121	−0.005	0.237	0.078
	(0.138)	(0.115)	(0.151)	(0.139)
T6: Association and Green Firm	−0.076	−0.117	0.260+	−0.086
	(0.150)	(0.103)	(0.147)	(0.139)
T7: All Actors	−0.091	0.232*	0.110	0.128
	(0.124)	(0.112)	(0.165)	(0.140)
Num.Obs.	574	707	451	564

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

E.5 Additional Results: Attractiveness and Climate Friendliness Ratings

Figure E.5: Change in Attractiveness Ratings of Travel Options



Note: Figure shows vignette treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals for consumers' attractiveness ratings of the two airlines' flights. Ratings measured on a scale of 0 (very unattractive) to 10 (very attractive). Results are pooled across all four choice tasks between two flights. Regressions include choice-task fixed effects and cluster standard errors by respondent.

Table E.7: Regression Table, ATE on Attractiveness and Climate Friendliness Ratings for Each Airline

	Attr. Rating Brown Airline	Attr. Rating Green Airline	C.F. Rating Brown Airline	C.F. Rating Brown Airline
Intercept	7.314***	7.103***	4.862***	4.884***
	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.089)
T4: Association	−0.612***	−0.459***	−0.171	−0.124
	(0.114)	(0.110)	(0.126)	(0.124)
T3: Green and Brown Firms	−1.265***	0.277*	−0.371*	1.209***
	(0.152)	(0.137)	(0.157)	(0.153)
T6: Association and Green Firm	−0.932***	0.026	−0.169	0.805***
	(0.140)	(0.133)	(0.162)	(0.158)
T1: Brown Firm	−1.211***	−0.189	−0.411**	0.230
	(0.141)	(0.129)	(0.152)	(0.149)
T2: Green Firm	−1.149***	−0.185	−0.353*	0.688***
	(0.143)	(0.135)	(0.154)	(0.151)
T5: Association and Brown Firm	−1.197***	−0.493***	−0.458**	0.119
	(0.146)	(0.139)	(0.157)	(0.153)
T7: All Actors	−1.345***	0.009	−0.584***	0.785***
	(0.149)	(0.137)	(0.157)	(0.154)
Cost Difference 4	0.089**	−0.520***		
	(0.028)	(0.031)		
Cost Difference 8	0.156***	−0.667***		
	(0.028)	(0.031)		
Cost Difference 30	0.284***	−1.314***		
	(0.030)	(0.036)		
Num.Obs.	14 246	14 188	3557	3563

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

E.6 Heterogeneity of Effects

Figure E.6: ATE on DVs that Measure Switching Away from Airline Sector, by Climate Worry



Note: Figure shows vignette treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals for consumers' choice regarding switching away from the airline sector. For individuals with high climate worry, ATE is the combination of the main coefficient for the treatment and the interaction term between the treatment and the climate worry variable. From left to right: Binary variable of consumers choosing the brown airline's flight over the train; Binary variable of consumers choosing the green airline's flight over the train; Linear measure of willingness to reduce flying along three-point scale.

Table E.8: Regression Table, ATE on DVs that Measure Switching Away from Airline Sector, by Climate Worry

	Pr(Green over Brown)	Pr(Brown over Train)	Pr(Green over Train)	Reduce Future Flying
Intercept	0.417***	0.829***	0.766***	0.442***
	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.083)
T4: Association	0.001	−0.023	−0.012	−0.030
	(0.031)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.112)
T3: Green and Brown Firms	0.129*	−0.013	−0.104	−0.100
	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.071)	(0.127)
T6: Association and Green Firm	0.181***	0.016	0.062	−0.042
	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.143)
T1: Brown Firm	0.114**	−0.053	−0.095	0.058
	(0.044)	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.128)
T2: Green Firm	0.160***	0.007	−0.034	−0.153
	(0.046)	(0.058)	(0.068)	(0.116)
T5: Association and Brown Firm	0.084+	−0.003	−0.041	−0.049
	(0.045)	(0.058)	(0.067)	(0.131)
T7: All Actors	0.097*	−0.083	−0.034	0.102
	(0.046)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.138)
Cost Difference 4	−0.237***			
	(0.009)			
Cost Difference 8	−0.265***			
	(0.009)			
Cost Difference 30	−0.373***			
	(0.009)			
Climate Worry	−0.008	−0.082*	−0.114*	0.598***
	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.093)
T4: Association:Climate Worry	0.020	0.007	−0.035	−0.025
	(0.034)	(0.056)	(0.062)	(0.127)
T3: Green and Brown Firms:Climate Worry	0.315***	−0.059	0.086	0.175
	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.079)	(0.146)
T6: Association and Green Firm:Climate Worry	0.148**	−0.042	−0.106	−0.004
	(0.056)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.160)
T1: Brown Firm:Climate Worry	0.207***	−0.044	0.062	0.018
	(0.050)	(0.068)	(0.075)	(0.146)
T2: Green Firm:Climate Worry	0.146**	−0.109	−0.049	0.224
	(0.052)	(0.067)	(0.076)	(0.137)
T5: Association and Brown Firm:Climate Worry	0.152**	−0.043	−0.003	0.130
	(0.050)	(0.067)	(0.076)	(0.150)
T7: All Actors:Climate Worry	0.324***	−0.007	0.023	−0.002
	(0.051)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.155)
Num.Obs.	14 292	3573	3573	2252

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure E.7: ATE on DVs that Measure Switching Away from Airline Sector, by Climate Policy Support



Note: Figure shows vignette treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals for consumers' choice regarding switching away from the airline sector. For individuals with high climate policy support, ATE is the combination of the main coefficient for the treatment and the interaction term between the treatment and the climate policy support variable. From left to right: Binary variable of consumers choosing the brown airline's flight over the train; Binary variable of consumers choosing the green airline's flight over the train; Linear measure of willingness to reduce flying along three-point scale.

Table E.9: Regression Table, ATE on DVs that Measure Switching Away from Airline Sector, by Climate Policy Support

	Pr(Green over Brown)	Pr(Brown over Train)	Pr(Green over Train)	Reduce Future Flying
Intercept	0.376***	0.847***	0.738***	0.471***
	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.057)
T4: Association	0.019	0.038	−0.002	−0.040
	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.081)
T3: Green and Brown Firms	0.176***	0.002	−0.061	−0.040
	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.056)	(0.097)
T6: Association and Green Firm	0.178***	0.020	0.024	−0.033
	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.092)
T1: Brown Firm	0.143***	−0.016	−0.020	0.029
	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.094)
T2: Green Firm	0.208***	−0.020	−0.010	0.035
	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.097)
T5: Association and Brown Firm	0.134***	−0.005	0.012	0.105
	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.101)
T7: All Actors	0.179***	−0.059	−0.010	0.062
	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.104)
Cost Difference 4	−0.234***			
	(0.009)			
Cost Difference 8	−0.261***			
	(0.009)			
Cost Difference 30	−0.371***			
	(0.009)			
Climate Policy Support	0.044*	−0.127***	−0.094*	0.675***
	(0.017)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.071)
T4: Association:Climate Policy Support	0.000	−0.081+	−0.054	0.006
	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.102)
T3: Green and Brown Firms:Climate Policy Support	0.297***	−0.087	0.032	0.101
	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.068)	(0.123)
T6: Association and Green Firm:Climate Policy Support	0.183***	−0.054	−0.083	0.069
	(0.044)	(0.056)	(0.065)	(0.121)
T1: Brown Firm:Climate Policy Support	0.211***	−0.099+	−0.034	0.084
	(0.040)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.120)
T2: Green Firm:Climate Policy Support	0.114**	−0.100+	−0.096	0.051
	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.125)
T5: Association and Brown Firm:Climate Policy Support	0.117**	−0.051	−0.090	−0.070
	(0.039)	(0.056)	(0.064)	(0.129)
T7: All Actors:Climate Policy Support	0.263***	−0.035	−0.007	0.060
	(0.044)	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.128)
Num.Obs.	14 204	3551	3551	2232

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

E.7 Main Results, Regressions with Demographic Weights

Figure E.8: Vignette Treatment Effects on Consumer Choices, Weighted Regressions



Note: Vignette treatment effects on the choice between two airlines with 95% confidence intervals, based on regressions with demographic weights for income, age, region and gender. Upper left panel: Dependent variable is binary indicator of choosing green airline's flight. Regressions pool choices across all four comparisons between two airlines' flights, with choice-task fixed effects and standard errors clustered by respondent. Upper right panel: Vignette treatment effects on choice between brown airline's flight and train, with 95% confidence interval. Dependent variable is a binary measure of choosing brown airline's flight. Lower left panel: Vignette treatment effects on choice between green airline's flight and train, with 95% confidence interval. Dependent variable is binary measure of choosing green airline's flight. Lower right panel: Vignette treatment effects on stated willingness to reduce flying in the future due to climate change with 95% confidence intervals. Outcome variable measured on three-point scale (Not Willing (-1), Maybe Willing (0), Willing (1))

Table E.10: Regression Table, Main Survey Experiment Results, Weighted Regressions

	Pr(Green over Brown)	Pr(Brown over Train)	Pr(Green over Train)	Reduce Future Flying
Intercept	0.411***	0.768***	0.676***	0.883***
	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.039)
T1: Brown Firm	0.273***	−0.099***	−0.046	0.109+
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.065)
T2: Green Firm	0.274***	−0.070*	−0.069*	0.050
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.067)
T3: Green and Brown Firms	0.386***	−0.058*	−0.037	0.066
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.068)
T4: Association	0.018	−0.015	−0.030	−0.008
	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.054)
T5: Association and Brown Firm	0.211***	−0.043	−0.051	0.062
R2	0.174	0.006	0.002	0.003
Adj. R2	0.173	0.004	0.000	0.000
F	305.289	3.152	0.929	0.938
	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.066)
T6: Association and Green Firm	0.298***	−0.016	−0.031	0.035
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.069)
T7: All Actors	0.355***	−0.085**	−0.020	0.107
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.066)
Cost Difference 4	−0.240***			
	(0.009)			
Cost Difference 8	−0.266***			
	(0.009)			
Cost Difference 30	−0.371***			
	(0.009)			
Num.Obs.	14 552	3638	3638	2296

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

E.8 Main Results, Regressions with Demographic Control Variables

Table E.11: Regression Table, Main Survey Experiment Results, With Demographic Controls

	Pr(Green over Brown)	Pr(Brown over Train)	Pr(Green over Train)	Reduce Future Flying
Intercept	0.349***	0.861***	0.424***	0.933***
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.077)
T1: Brown Firm	0.277***	-0.081**	-0.058*	0.073
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.063)
T2: Green Firm	0.280***	-0.080**	-0.084**	0.026
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.066)
T3: Green and Brown Firms	0.383***	-0.067*	-0.041	0.037
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.067)
T4: Association	0.018	-0.019	-0.040+	-0.040
	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.053)
T5: Association and Brown Firm	0.208***	-0.035	-0.045	0.042
	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.065)
T6: Association and Green Firm	0.299***	-0.016	-0.031	-0.028
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.068)
T7: All Actors	0.358***	-0.088**	-0.023	0.102
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.065)
Cost Difference 4	-0.236***			
	(0.009)			
Cost Difference 8	-0.264***			
	(0.009)			
Cost Difference 30	-0.372***			
	(0.009)			
Male	-0.021+	-0.015	-0.008	-0.072*
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.035)
Age	0.008*	-0.033***	-0.022***	0.038**
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.012)
Income Quintile 2	0.014	0.057*	0.063**	-0.138*
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.057)
Income Quintile 3	0.030+	0.039+	0.035	-0.068
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.058)
Income Quintile 4	0.040*	0.075**	0.089***	-0.246***
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.056)
Income Quintile 5	0.043*	0.093***	0.094***	-0.159**
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.060)
Germany	0.069***	-0.076***	0.322***	0.167**
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.051)
Italy	0.001	0.042*	0.459***	0.029
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.049)
Netherlands	-0.002	-0.062**	0.335***	-0.122*
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.051)
Num.Obs.	14536	3634	3634	2293
R2	0.180	0.033	0.130	0.035
Adj. R2	0.179	0.028	0.126	0.028
F	167.868	7.671	33.690	5.208

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

E.9 Main Results, Only Participants that Correctly Answered Questions on Vignette Treatments

Table E.12: Regression Table, Main Survey Experiment Results, Only Respondents Who Answered Questions on Vignette Treatments Correctly

	Pr(Green over Brown)	Pr(Brown over Train)	Pr(Green over Train)	Reduce Future Flying
Intercept	0.434***	0.761***	0.670***	0.914***
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.038)
T1: Brown Firm	0.347***	-0.096**	-0.053	0.147*
	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.074)
T2: Green Firm	0.330***	-0.039	-0.027	-0.025
	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.076)
T3: Green and Brown Firms	0.441***	-0.029	-0.033	0.031
	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.087)
T4: Association	-0.007	-0.023	-0.057*	-0.066
	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.061)
T5: Association and Brown Firm	0.246***	-0.018	-0.037	-0.053
	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.103)
T6: Association and Green Firm	0.377***	0.008	0.010	-0.088
	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.126)
T7: All Actors	0.545***	-0.129*	0.007	0.197
	(0.040)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.127)
Cost Difference 4	-0.272***			
	(0.011)			
Cost Difference 8	-0.297***			
	(0.012)			
Cost Difference 30	-0.405***			
	(0.012)			
Num.Obs.	8380	2095	2095	1321
R2	0.256	0.006	0.003	0.008
Adj. R2	0.255	0.003	-0.001	0.003
F	287.596	1.864	0.801	1.585

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

E.10 Respondents' Assumptions about Associations

How consumers react to information on association lobbying should be guided by their assumptions regarding how associations function. At the end of the survey, participants were asked whether they think the two airlines the treatment texts mentioned were part of the association Airlines for Europe. The survey also asked respondents to indicate their best guess of how many members' positions associations' lobbying typically reflects. Results are presented in Figure E.9.

Figure E.9: Assumptions of Association Membership and Representation



Note: Figure shows histograms for survey responses regarding underlying assumptions about association membership and associations' representativeness.

The majority of respondents assumed that both airlines were members of the association. Table E.13 breaks down the membership beliefs by treatment group. Most respondents also

believed that associations such as A4E represent most, but not all, of their members' policy preferences. This showcases why lobbying collectively can circumvent damage to individual companies' reputations. If outside observers assume that most or all companies in a sector are members of business associations, and, as the experiment has shown, switching between sectors in reaction to lobbying is rare, then lobbying collectively avoids reputational costs by distributing blame.

Table E.13: Guess Whether Airline is Member of Association by Treatment Group

	% Believe Green Airline Member	% Believe Brown Airline Member
Control Group	67.6	63.4
T1: Brown Firm	66.3	62.1
T2: Green Firm	73.8	43.7
T3: Green and Brown Firms	75.6	44.8
T4: Association	71.6	71.6
T5: Association and Brown Firm	57.9	73.7
T6: Association and Green Firm	56.0	58.3
T7: All Actors	53.9	67.4

Answers to these two questions also explain why consumers' reaction to treatment five - association and brown firm lobbying - was more muted than their reaction to just the brown firm's lobbying in treatment group one. Absent other information, most respondents assumed that the green firm was an association member and that the association's anti-mitigation position likely represented both firms' climate policy positions. The answers further help explain why reactions to lobbying by the green firm in treatment six were *not* muted by the association's simultaneous brown lobbying. Although the majority of survey respondents in the two treatment groups that mention both the green firm and the association's lobbying still believed that the green firm was a member of the association, most respondents did not believe that all association members are always represented by association lobbying and thus did not discount the information on green lobbying in treatments six and seven.

F Media Reporting on Climate Lobbying

Here, I use English-language newspaper articles from Europe to confirm that the media frequently reports businesses' climate lobbying. Specifically, I draw on ten British and Irish newspapers, which span the political spectrum and identify all archived articles for the years between 1989 and 2020 that report on climate lobbying by companies or business groups. To assemble the media data, I first downloaded media articles from Nexis from 1989 to 2020, using keyword searches for terms such as "climate lobby group". The searches resulted in around 9,000 articles from ten prominent British and Irish newspapers: Guardian (leans left-center), Financial Times (leans center), Independent (leans left-center), The Times (leans right-center), The Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday (tabloid, leans right), The Sunday Times (leans right-center), The Daily Telegraph (tabloid, leans right), The Daily Express (tabloid, leans right), The Irish Times (leans left), Irish Independent (leans right).

I then employed a dictionary method to filter out articles that were not about climate lobbying. To do so, I manually coded a training data set comprised of 500 randomly selected articles and developed a classification code used to classify all remaining articles.

To detect mentions of specific firms and associations in newspaper articles, I collected lists of both firm and association names. Association names were taken from the EU's transparency register and from the associations named in the training dataset, which I collected manually. This procedure resulted in a total of around 4000 unique association names. Firm names were collected from the Amadeus company database and the 2021 Forbes 2000 list of the world's largest publicly listed firms. This resulted in around half a million unique firm names.

As firm and association names are often equivalent to common words in the English language, I used a three-step process to identify company and association names in the articles. First, the NLP entity classification algorithm found all likely "organizations" within the texts. Second, I searched over the vectors of firm and association names to find which of these "organizations" may be firms or business groups. Lastly, I manually checked all firm and association names that this method found and deleted false positives.

Figure F.1 shows the number of articles that mention companies' or business associations' climate lobbying published by the ten newspapers each year. These articles mention 710 unique firms and 148 unique associations, the most frequently mentioned of which are listed in table F.1. Clearly, the media frequently reports on businesses' climate lobbying.

Figure F.1: Number of Media Articles on Business Climate Lobbying Published per Year



Table F.1: Companies and Associations Mentioned Most Frequently in the Sample of Articles

Rank	Company	Mentions	Association	Mentions
1	British Petroleum	371	Confederation of British Industry	246
2	Shell	369	British Chamber of Commerce	72
3	ExxonMobil	251	Irish Farmers Association	48
4	EDF	111	American Petroleum Institute	45
5	British Airways	100	Make UK	40
6	National Grid	95	IBEC	39
7	Facebook	71	Energy UK	33
8	Google	68	Renewable UK	33
9	Chevron	68	World Coal Association	29
10	Heathrow Limited	66	US Chamber of Commerce	27
11	HSBC	63	BusinessEurope	26
12	RWE	63	Society of Motor Maufacturers and Traders	24
13	Volkswagen	60	Minerals Council of Australia	21
14	Ford	60	International Air Transport Association	20
15	British Gas	57	European Automobile Manufacturers' Association	20
16	BHP	57	Institute of Directors	19
17	Toyota	53	Global Climate Coalition	18
18	BMW	52	British Wind Energy Association	16
19	Tesco	51	American Legislative Council	15
20	Centrica	50	Association of British Insurers	14

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