**ONLINE APPENDIX**

Tycoon Candidates, Electoral Strategies, and Voter Support:

A Survey Experiment in South Africa

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**Appendix A. Variable descriptions**

*Variable:* Material living standard; Living Standard Measure, based on 25 questions regarding whether or not the respondent has access to different material goods and household amenities.

*Question(s):* Please tell me which of the following are presently in your household. Do you have … ? [Hot running water from a geyser; Computer/s - desktop/laptop; Electric stove; domestic worker; Flush toilet; Motor vehicle, i.e. car, van, bakkie, truck, lorry etc.; Washing machine; Refrigerator or a combined fridge/freezer; Vacuum cleaner/floor polisher; Pay TV (M-Net/DStv/TopTV) subscription; Dishwashing machine; Home security service; Deep freezer – \_free standing; Microwave oven; DVD player/Blu-ray Player; Tumble dryer; Home theatre system; Home telephone (not cellphone); Swimming pool; Tap water in house/on plot; Built-in kitchen sink; TV (television set/s); Air conditioner; Does respondent live in a house, cluster house, townhouse, flat or formal dwelling? Does respondent live in a rural area outside Gauteng and the Western Cape?]

*Response categories:* Yes/No on each item. Variable scaled from 0-12.

*Variable:* Education; respondent’s level of education.

*Question(s):* What is the highest level of education you have completed?

*Response categories:* No schooling; Primary schooling incomplete; Primary schooling complete; Secondary/high school incomplete; Completed Matric; Some college / technikon / university / trade school / still studying; Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school; Completed university degree; Post-graduate degree.

*Variable*: Social grant, does respondent receive a social grant

*Question*: Do you, or anyone else in your household receive any social grants like child support grant, old age pension and disability grant?

*Response categories*: Yes=1; No=1; Don’t know=99 (coded missing).

*Variable*: Information, index of respondent information on politics/economics. In the index correct answers are given the value one (1) and incorrect ones are coded as zero (0) The items pertain to factual questions (as of July/August 2017) with only one correct answer: a) the name of the second largest political party in the South African parliament, b) the official (2017) unemployment rate in South Africa, c) the name of the finance minister in South Africa, and d) the country that is South Africa’s largest trading partner. Questions are shown below and response categories are shown below. Respondents’ index value is sum of correct answers. Don’t know answers are coded as incorrect.

*Questions*: I would also like to ask you some questions about South Africa, the economy, and politics in general.

What is the name of the 2nd largest party in parliament? [Multiple answers shown on showcard; only one response allowed]

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ANC - African National Congress | 1 |
| DA - Democratic Alliance | 2 |
| EFF - Economic Freedom Fighters | 3 |
| COPE - Congress of the People | 4 |
| IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party | 5 |
| Don't know *[Do not read]* | 99 |

What is the OFFICIAL unemployment rate in South Africa? [Multiple answers shown on showcard; only one response allowed]

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 20-24% | 1 |
| 25-29% | 2 |
| 30-34% | 3 |
| 35-39% | 4 |
| 40-44% | 5 |
| Don't know *[Do not read]* | 99 |

Who is the current Finance Minister in South Africa? [Multiple answers shown on showcard; only one response allowed]

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Pravin Gordhan | 1 |
| Trevor Noah | 2 |
| Jacob Zuma | 3 |
| Mcebisi Jonas | 4 |
| Malusi Gigaba | 5 |
| Don't know *[Do not read]* | 99 |

Which country is South Africa's largest trade partner? [Multiple answers shown on showcard; only one response allowed]

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| China | 1 |
| Russia | 2 |
| Zimbabwe | 3 |
| Botswana | 4 |
| USA | 5 |
| Don't know *[Do not read]* | 99 |

*Variable:* ANC partisans, respondents who feel close to the ANC.

*Question(s):* Many people feel close to a particular political party over a long period of time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. What about you? Do you usually think of yourself as close to a particular party? *&* Which party do you feel close to?

*Response categories:* Yes; No; Refuse to answer; Don’t know *&* African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP); African Muslim Party; African National Congress (ANC); Afrikaner Unity Movement; Agang; Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO); Congress of the People (COPE); Democratic Alliance (DA); Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF); Federal Alliance; Freedom Front Plus (FF+); Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP); Minority Front; National Freedom Party; New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP); Pan Africanist Congress (PAC); United Democratic Party (UCDP); United Democratic Movement; Other [Specify]; Don’t know; Refuse to answer.

*Variable:* DA partisans; respondents who feel close to the DA.

*Question(s):* Many people feel close to a particular political party over a long period of time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. What about you? Do you usually think of yourself as close to a particular party? *&* Which party do you feel close to?

*Response categories:* Yes; No; Refuse to answer; Don’t know *&* African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP); African Muslim Party; African National Congress (ANC); Afrikaner Unity Movement; Agang; Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO); Congress of the People (COPE); Democratic Alliance (DA); Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF); Federal Alliance; Freedom Front Plus (FF+); Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP); Minority Front; National Freedom Party; New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP); Pan Africanist Congress (PAC); United Democratic Party (UCDP); United Democratic Movement; Other [Specify]; Don’t know; Refuse to answer.

*Variable*: Rural/urban residence of respondent; Does respondent reside in urban or rural area: Automatically captured by tablet.

*Response categories*: Urban=1; rural=0.

*Variable:* Gender;Respondent’s gender

Registered by interviewer

*Response categories:* Female=1; male=0.

*Variable:* Age; respondent’s age

Asked and registered by interviewer

*Response categories:* Age in years.

*Variable:* Racial classification; respondent’s racial classification by observation only, the interviewer does not ask respondent. Coding follows classification used by Statistics South Africa.

*Response categories:* Black; Coloured (mixed racial affiliation)/Indian, White.

*Variable:* Province; the province where the respondent lives. This information is automatically captured via the GPS coordinates.

*Response categories* (nine provinces): Easter Cape (reference); Free State; Gauteng: KwaZulu-Natal; Limpopo; Mpumalanga; Northern Cape: North West; Western Cape.

**Appendix B.**

Table B. Summary statistics

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Variable* | *Observations* | *Mean* | *Std. dev.* | *Min* | *Max* |
| Experimental group | 1500 | 3 | 1.41 | 1 | 5 |
| Outcome (tycoon support), original five-point scale (0-4) | 1435 | 1.86 | 1.49 | 0 | 4 |
| Outcome (tycoon support), recoded to scale 0-100 | 1435 | 46.41 | 37.21 | 0 | 100 |
| Living standard | 1500 | 4.97 | 3.08 | 0 | 12 |
| Education | 1492 | 3.67 | 1.53 | 0 | 8 |
| Social grant recipient | 1486 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Political awareness/information index | 1500 | 1.83 | 1.08 | 0 | 4 |
| ANC partisans | 1433 | 0.29 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| DA partisans | 1433 | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 |
| Urban/rural | 1500 | 0.70 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| Gender (Female) | 1500 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 1500 | 38.88 | 16.03 | 18 | 95 |
| Black | 1500 | 0.68 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |
| Coloured/Asian | 1500 | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0 | 1 |
| White | 1500 | 0.10 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 |
| Eastern Cape | 1500 | 0.14 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 |
| Free State | 1500 | 0.10 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 |
| Gauteng | 1500 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| KwaZulu-Natal | 1500 | 0.18 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| Limpopo | 1500 | 0.07 | 0.25 | 0 | 1 |
| Mpumalanga | 1500 | 0.06 | 0.24 | 0 | 1 |
| Northern Cape | 1500 | 0.04 | 0.20 | 0 | 1 |
| North West | 1500 | 0.06 | 0.24 | 0 | 1 |
| Western Cape | 1500 | 0.16 | 0.36 | 0 | 1 |

**Appendix C. Power analysis**

For the power analysis, we assume the following parameters:

* alpha=0.5
* power=0.8
* We depart from a mean for the first group (baseline) of 0 and vary the mean of the second group (treatment) in increments of 0.5 until we reach a group mean of 100.
* Standard deviation, s.d.= 50.

Under these assumptions and using a two-sample means test, we first examine how different means for the treatment group relative to the baseline (and therefore different treatment effects) affect the required sample size. We plot the results below.

Figure C1. Power analysis



The plot shows that as the difference-in-means increases, we need smaller samples to detect a difference. To detect the mean difference of around 11, we need a sample size of just less than *n*=300 per group, which is equivalent to the sample size we have for each group. Given the specified assumptions, our experiment is well-powered (0.8) for mean differences around or above 11. To detect a difference-in-means of 15, we would need *n*=176 in each group, and for a difference-in-means of 25 we would need *n*=64 in each group. On the other hand, for very small effect sizes, say 2.5, we would need more than *n*=6000 observations in each group to detect a difference. It is therefore unlikely that small, statistically insignificant differences in our data can be attributed only to small samples sizes.

Second, suppose we have 300 observations in each group (600 in total) and keep the remaining study parameters as above. As shown below, under these assumptions, our analysis is well-powered (0.8) at effect sizes of 11.5.

Figure C2. Power analysis



**Appendix D.**

Table D. Balance tests: Testing covariate balance for experimental groups using multinomial regression

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Model | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Experimental group | Baseline  (Base Outcome) | Treatment 1  (Competence) | Treatment 2  (Framing) | Treatment 3  (Fame/Name recognition) | Treatment 4  (Clientelism) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Living standard | - | -0.03 | -0.07\* | -0.07 | -0.04 |
|  |  | (-0.80) | (-1.69) | (-1.58) | (-0.96) |
| Education | - | -0.03 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
|  |  | (-0.47) | (0.46) | (0.25) | (0.27) |
| Social grant recipient | - | -0.01 | -0.11 | 0.04 | -0.25 |
|  |  | (-0.04) | (-0.57) | (0.23) | (-1.28) |
| Information | - | 0.05 | 0.03 | -0.08 | -0.11 |
|  |  | (0.58) | (0.30) | (-0.94) | (-1.25) |
| ANC partisan | - | -0.39\* | -0.03 | -0.26 | -0.21 |
|  |  | (-1.89) | (-0.17) | (-1.31) | (-1.05) |
| DA partisan | - | 0.05 | 0.32 | 0.26 | 0.47 |
|  |  | (0.15) | (0.96) | (0.75) | (1.37) |
| Black | - | *Reference* | *Reference* | *Reference* | *Reference* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Coloured/Indian | - | -0.13 | 0.14 | -0.04 | -0.00 |
|  |  | (-0.50) | (0.57) | (-0.17) | (-0.00) |
| White | - | 0.58 | 0.45 | 0.54 | -0.09 |
|  |  | (1.52) | (1.17) | (1.41) | (-0.23) |
| Male | - | *Reference* | *Reference* | *Reference* | *Reference* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | - | 0.25 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 0.40\*\* |
|  |  | (1.37) | (0.50) | (1.14) | (2.20) |
| Age | - | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
|  |  | (-1.43) | (0.71) | (0.26) | (0.19) |
| Rural residence | - | *Reference* | *Reference* | *Reference* | *Reference* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Urban residence | - | -0.03 | -0.02 | 0.16 | -0.02 |
|  |  | (-0.12) | (-0.09) | (0.71) | (-0.08) |
| Eastern Cape | - | *Reference* | *Reference* | *Reference* | *Reference* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Free State | - | -0.06 | 0.13 | 0.00 | 0.05 |
|  |  | (-0.16) | (0.36) | (0.01) | (0.14) |
| Gauteng | - | -0.09 | 0.03 | -0.10 | -0.01 |
|  |  | (-0.30) | (0.10) | (-0.33) | (-0.02) |
| KwaZulu-Natal | - | -0.06 | 0.08 | 0.02 | -0.15 |
|  |  | (-0.18) | (0.24) | (0.07) | (-0.48) |
| Limpopo | - | -0.15 | 0.01 | -0.15 | -0.20 |
|  |  | (-0.36) | (0.02) | (-0.37) | (-0.49) |
| Mpumalanga | - | -0.03 | -0.00 | -0.01 | -0.08 |
|  |  | (-0.07) | (-0.01) | (-0.03) | (-0.19) |
| Northern Cape | - | -0.00 | -0.08 | -0.07 | -0.16 |
|  |  | (-0.00) | (-0.16) | (-0.15) | (-0.32) |
| North West | - | -0.33 | 0.04 | -0.09 | -0.26 |
|  |  | (-0.79) | (0.11) | (-0.23) | (-0.63) |
| Western Cape | - | -0.08 | -0.05 | -0.16 | -0.11 |
|  |  | (-0.24) | (-0.15) | (-0.48) | (-0.33) |
| Constant | - | 0.55 | -0.06 | 0.18 | 0.31 |
|  |  | (1.12) | (-0.13) | (0.37) | (0.62) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,416 | 1,416 | 1,416 | 1,416 | 1,416 |

Note. Multinomial regressions where the dependent variable is treatment group (five-group indicator). z-statistics in parentheses. A test of the joint significance of the covariates yield a test statistic () of 23.51, p<0.71, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Appendix E.**

Figure E. Distribution of outcome/dependent variable

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**Appendix F.**

Table F. Figure 1 regression table and ordered logistic regression

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Model | (1) | (2) |
| Method | OLS | Ordered logit |
| Dependent variable | Tycoon support | Tycoon support |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment 1: Competence | 4.71 | 0.22 |
|  | (1.53) | (1.50) |
| Treatment 2: Framing | 3.37 | 0.16 |
|  | (1.09) | (1.07) |
| Treatment 3: Fame | -0.43 | -0.00 |
|  | (-0.14) | (-0.03) |
| Treatment 4: Clientelism | 7.73\*\* | 0.38\*\* |
|  | (2.50) | (2.53) |
| /cut1 |  | -0.96\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-8.62) |
| /cut2 |  | 0.10 |
|  |  | (0.95) |
| /cut3 |  | 0.58\*\*\* |
|  |  | (5.38) |
| /cut4 |  | 1.53\*\*\* |
|  |  | (13.24) |
| Constant | 43.32\*\*\* |  |
|  | (19.79) |  |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,435 | 1,435 |
| R2 | 0.007 |  |

Note. OLS (column 1) and ordered logit (column 2) regressions. Coefficients in column 2 are logged odds. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Figure F1. Straight comparison of means for regression in Figure 1.



Figure F2. Marginal effects of clientelism on probability of tycoon support, using estimates generated from ordered logit regressions in App. F1.

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**Appendix G.**

Table G. Reproducing Figure 1: Regressions with control variables, OLS and ordered logit

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Model | (1) | (2) |
| Method | OLS | Ordered logit |
| Dependent variable | Tycoon support | Tycoon support |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment 1: Competence | 5.03 | 0.25 |
|  | (1.60) | (1.63) |
| Treatment 2: Framing | 2.97 | 0.14 |
|  | (0.95) | (0.90) |
| Treatment 3: Fame | 0.16 | 0.03 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.19) |
| Treatment 4: Clientelism | 7.47\*\* | 0.37\*\* |
|  | (2.37) | (2.40) |
| Living standard | -0.04 | -0.00 |
|  | (-0.07) | (-0.18) |
| Education | 0.67 | 0.04 |
|  | (0.81) | (0.96) |
| Social grant recipient | -5.14\*\* | -0.27\*\* |
|  | (-2.28) | (-2.44) |
| Information | -1.88\* | -0.10\* |
|  | (-1.86) | (-1.94) |
| ANC partisan | 7.26\*\*\* | 0.37\*\*\* |
|  | (3.03) | (3.12) |
| DA partisan | -1.07 | -0.04 |
|  | (-0.28) | (-0.22) |
| Coloured/Indian [reference: Black] | -3.45 | -0.15 |
|  | (-1.15) | (-1.02) |
| White [reference: Black] | 0.84 | 0.07 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.32) |
| Female [reference: Male] | -6.78\*\*\* | -0.32\*\*\* |
|  | (-3.21) | (-3.12) |
| Age | -0.18\*\*\* | -0.01\*\* |
|  | (-2.66) | (-2.51) |
| Urban | -2.34 | -0.15 |
|  | (-0.89) | (-1.18) |
| Free State | 13.63\*\*\* | 0.67\*\*\* |
|  | (3.09) | (3.17) |
| Gauteng | 10.48\*\*\* | 0.54\*\*\* |
|  | (2.87) | (3.02) |
| KwaZulu-Natal | 13.96\*\*\* | 0.67\*\*\* |
|  | (3.81) | (3.71) |
| Limpopo | 7.65 | 0.35 |
|  | (1.60) | (1.43) |
| Mpumalanga | 6.54 | 0.30 |
|  | (1.37) | (1.25) |
| Northern Cape | 5.05 | 0.21 |
|  | (0.88) | (0.73) |
| North West | 8.94\* | 0.43\* |
|  | (1.87) | (1.85) |
| Western Cape | 9.87\*\* | 0.51\*\*\* |
|  | (2.55) | (2.72) |
| /cut1 |  | -1.26\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-4.16) |
| /cut2 |  | -0.16 |
|  |  | (-0.55) |
| /cut3 |  | 0.31 |
|  |  | (1.03) |
| /cut4 |  | 1.29\*\*\* |
|  |  | (4.26) |
| Constant | 49.32\*\*\* |  |
|  | (7.98) |  |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,360 | 1,360 |
| R-squared | 0.059 |  |

Note. OLS (column 1) and ordered logit (column 2) regressions. Coefficients in column 2 are logged odds. t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Appendix H.**

Table H. Reproducing results from Figure 1, including controls and municipality fixed effects

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Model | (1) | (2) |
| Method | OLS | Ordered logit |
| Dependent variable | Tycoon support | Tycoon support |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment 1: Competence | 5.72\* | 0.31\*\* |
|  | (1.82) | (1.97) |
| Treatment 2: Framing | 3.29 | 0.17 |
|  | (1.05) | (1.08) |
| Treatment 3: Fame | -0.08 | 0.04 |
|  | (-0.02) | (0.27) |
| Treatment 4: Clientelism | 6.99\*\* | 0.37\*\* |
|  | (2.21) | (2.31) |
| Living standard | -0.01 | -0.00 |
|  | (-0.02) | (-0.12) |
| Education | 0.45 | 0.03 |
|  | (0.54) | (0.69) |
| Social grant recipient | -5.12\*\* | -0.28\*\* |
|  | (-2.21) | (-2.42) |
| Information | -1.58 | -0.08 |
|  | (-1.52) | (-1.48) |
| ANC partisan | 5.80\*\* | 0.32\*\* |
|  | (2.31) | (2.46) |
| DA partisan | -0.97 | 0.00 |
|  | (-0.25) | (0.01) |
| Coloured/Indian [reference: Black] | -1.31 | -0.07 |
|  | (-0.40) | (-0.40) |
| White [reference: Black] | 1.22 | 0.08 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.34) |
| Female [reference: Male] | -5.71\*\*\* | -0.28\*\*\* |
|  | (-2.63) | (-2.62) |
| Age | -0.18\*\* | -0.01\*\* |
|  | (-2.48) | (-2.26) |
| Urban | -8.41\*\* | -0.48\*\* |
|  | (-2.11) | (-2.35) |
|  |  | (-0.91) |
| /cut2 | - | 0.29 |
|  |  | (0.30) |
| /cut3 | - | 0.79 |
|  |  | (0.82) |
| /cut4 | - | 1.84\* |
|  |  | (1.90) |
| Constant | 44.83\*\* |  |
|  | (2.54) |  |
|  |  |  |
| Municipality fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1,360 | 1,360 |
| R-squared | 0.146 |  |

Note. OLS regressions. Full set of municipality fixed effects included plus full set of control variables. t-statistics in parentheses. t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Appendix I.**

Table I. Reproducing results from Figure 1, including controls and interviewer fixed effects

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Model | (1) | (2) |
| Method | OLS | Ordered logit |
| Dependent variable | Tycoon support | Tycoon support |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment 1: Competence | 5.23 | 0.27 |
|  | (1.60) | (1.59) |
| Treatment 2: Framing | 2.27 | 0.07 |
|  | (0.71) | (0.40) |
| Treatment 3: Fame | 2.40 | 0.14 |
|  | (0.75) | (0.85) |
| Treatment 4: Clientelism | 6.61\*\* | 0.34\*\* |
|  | (1.99) | (1.97) |
| Living standard | -0.14 | -0.01 |
|  | (-0.28) | (-0.46) |
| Education | 1.21 | 0.07 |
|  | (1.40) | (1.46) |
| Social grant recipient | -5.58\*\* | -0.27\*\* |
|  | (-2.34) | (-2.18) |
| Information | -1.40 | -0.08 |
|  | (-1.23) | (-1.26) |
| ANC partisan | 9.53\*\*\* | 0.56\*\*\* |
|  | (3.67) | (3.99) |
| DA partisan | -1.31 | -0.02 |
|  | (-0.33) | (-0.12) |
| Coloured/Indian [reference: Black] | -1.36 | -0.08 |
|  | (-0.41) | (-0.43) |
| White [reference: Black] | 1.08 | 0.13 |
|  | (0.23) | (0.53) |
| Female [reference: Male] | -6.22\*\*\* | -0.34\*\*\* |
|  | (-2.85) | (-3.01) |
| Age | -0.14\*\* | -0.01\*\* |
|  | (-1.99) | (-2.09) |
| Urban | -3.90 | -0.21 |
|  | (-1.31) | (-1.35) |
| Free State | 0.38 | 0.22 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.22) |
| Gauteng | -47.78\* | -17.70 |
|  | (-1.91) | (-0.01) |
| KwaZulu-Natal | 11.55 | 0.75 |
|  | (0.72) | (0.87) |
| Limpopo | -43.54 | -17.24 |
|  | (-1.33) | (-0.01) |
| Mpumalanga | -45.44 | -17.46 |
|  | (-1.52) | (-0.01) |
| Northern Cape | -49.69\* | -17.70 |
|  | (-1.72) | (-0.01) |
| North West | -37.76 | -17.10 |
|  | (-1.45) | (-0.01) |
| Western Cape | -22.94 | -1.79 |
|  | (-0.92) | (-1.16) |
| /cut1 |  | -2.37\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-3.24) |
| /cut2 |  | -1.06 |
|  |  | (-1.47) |
| /cut3 |  | -0.51 |
|  |  | (-0.70) |
| /cut4 |  | 0.60 |
|  |  | (0.83) |
| Constant | 71.02\*\*\* |  |
|  | (4.63) |  |
|  |  |  |
| Interviewer fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1,360 | 1,360 |
| R-squared | 0.235 |  |

Note. OLS regressions. Full set of interviewer fixed effects included plus full set of control variables. t-statistics in parentheses. t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Appendix J.**

Table J. Reproducing results in Figure 1, with controls and interviewer-respondent match

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Model | (1) | (2) |
| Method | OLS | Ordered logit |
| Dependent variable | Tycoon support | Tycoon support |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment 1: Competence | 4.97 | 0.25 |
|  | (1.58) | (1.62) |
| Treatment 2: Framing | 2.97 | 0.14 |
|  | (0.95) | (0.90) |
| Treatment 3: Fame | 0.13 | 0.03 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.18) |
| Treatment 4: Clientelism | 7.45\*\* | 0.37\*\* |
|  | (2.36) | (2.40) |
| Match | 1.99 | 0.09 |
|  | (0.65) | (0.64) |
| Living standard | -0.06 | -0.01 |
|  | (-0.11) | (-0.23) |
| Education | 0.66 | 0.04 |
|  | (0.80) | (0.95) |
| Social grant recipient | -5.19\*\* | -0.27\*\* |
|  | (-2.31) | (-2.46) |
| Information | -1.86\* | -0.09\* |
|  | (-1.84) | (-1.93) |
| ANC partisan | 7.20\*\*\* | 0.37\*\*\* |
|  | (3.00) | (3.09) |
| DA partisan | -1.25 | -0.05 |
|  | (-0.33) | (-0.25) |
| Coloured/Indian [reference: Black] | -2.25 | -0.10 |
|  | (-0.64) | (-0.57) |
| White [reference: Black] | 2.59 | 0.15 |
|  | (0.50) | (0.60) |
| Female [reference: Male] | -6.80\*\*\* | -0.32\*\*\* |
|  | (-3.22) | (-3.13) |
| Age | -0.19\*\*\* | -0.01\*\* |
|  | (-2.69) | (-2.54) |
| Urban | -2.28 | -0.15 |
|  | (-0.87) | (-1.15) |
| Free State | 13.58\*\*\* | 0.67\*\*\* |
|  | (3.07) | (3.16) |
| Gauteng | 10.47\*\*\* | 0.54\*\*\* |
|  | (2.87) | (3.02) |
| KwaZulu-Natal | 13.93\*\*\* | 0.66\*\*\* |
|  | (3.80) | (3.71) |
| Limpopo | 7.59 | 0.34 |
|  | (1.58) | (1.43) |
| Mpumalanga | 6.86 | 0.32 |
|  | (1.43) | (1.32) |
| Northern Cape | 5.39 | 0.23 |
|  | (0.93) | (0.78) |
| North West | 8.96\* | 0.43\* |
|  | (1.87) | (1.85) |
| Western Cape | 9.53\*\* | 0.50\*\*\* |
|  | (2.43) | (2.62) |
| /cut1 |  | -1.19\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-3.68) |
| /cut2 |  | -0.09 |
|  |  | (-0.29) |
| /cut3 |  | 0.38 |
|  |  | (1.19) |
| /cut4 |  | 1.36\*\*\* |
|  |  | (4.21) |
| Constant | 47.72\*\*\* |  |
|  | (7.18) |  |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,360 | 1,360 |
| R-squared | 0.059 |  |

Note. OLS regressions. t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Appendix K.**

Table K. Full results for Figure 2

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Model | (1) | (2) |
| Dependent variable | Tycoon support | Tycoon support |
| Controls | No | Yes |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment 1: Competence | -0.33 | -0.44 |
|  | (-0.06) | (-0.07) |
| Treatment 2: Framing | 7.19 | 5.31 |
|  | (1.21) | (0.87) |
| Treatment 3: Fame | -0.79 | -0.71 |
|  | (-0.13) | (-0.12) |
| Treatment 4: Clientelism | 17.15\*\*\* | 17.11\*\*\* |
|  | (2.94) | (2.88) |
| Living standard | 0.29 | 0.21 |
|  | (0.41) | (0.27) |
| Competence#Living standard | 0.99 | 1.08 |
|  | (1.01) | (1.07) |
| Framing#Living standard | -0.77 | -0.46 |
|  | (-0.76) | (-0.44) |
| Fame#Living standard | 0.08 | 0.20 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.19) |
| Clientelism#Living standard | -1.91\* | -1.96\* |
|  | (-1.93) | (-1.95) |
| Education |  | 0.63 |
|  |  | (0.77) |
| Social grant recipient |  | -5.06\*\* |
|  |  | (-2.25) |
| Information |  | -2.01\*\* |
|  |  | (-1.98) |
| ANC partisan |  | 6.97\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.91) |
| DA partisan |  | -1.26 |
|  |  | (-0.33) |
| Coloured/Indian [reference: Black] |  | -3.11 |
|  |  | (-1.04) |
| White [reference: Black] |  | 0.42 |
|  |  | (0.09) |
| Female [reference: Male] |  | -7.13\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-3.37) |
| Age |  | -0.18\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-2.60) |
| Urban |  | -2.34 |
|  |  | (-0.90) |
| Free State |  | 13.90\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.15) |
| Gauteng |  | 10.49\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.88) |
| KwaZulu-Natal |  | 13.58\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.71) |
| Limpopo |  | 7.90\* |
|  |  | (1.65) |
| Mpumalanga |  | 6.50 |
|  |  | (1.37) |
| Northern Cape |  | 4.33 |
|  |  | (0.75) |
| North West |  | 8.73\* |
|  |  | (1.83) |
| Western Cape |  | 9.65\*\* |
|  |  | (2.49) |
| Constant | 41.85\*\*\* | 48.57\*\*\* |
|  | (10.00) | (6.99) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,435 | 1,360 |
| R-squared | 0.013 | 0.065 |

Note. OLS regressions. Model 2 includes full set of control variables (results for Figure 2). Model 1 includes no control variables. Both models show results for regressions where each treatment is interacted with the living standard measure, scaled 0-12 with zero denoting the poorest people. Since living standards has a minimum value of zero, the constant in Model 1 shows the estimated value of tycoon support in the baseline group (value zero on all treatment variables) for people who are poor (value zero on living standards). The coefficients of the treatment variables show the effect of the treatment for the poorest people relative to the poorest people in the baseline group. For instance, in Model 1, the coefficient of the clientelism treatment shows the estimated effect of clientelism for the poorest people, relative to the poorest people in the baseline group (i.e., clientelism boosts tycoon support among the poorest people). t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Appendix L.**

Table L. Regression table for social grant receipt as moderator

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Model | (1) | (2) |
| Dependent variable | Tycoon support | Tycoon support |
| Controls | No | Yes |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment 1: Competence | 3.35 | 2.82 |
|  | (0.76) | (0.63) |
| Treatment 2: Framing | 5.00 | 5.53 |
|  | (1.13) | (1.22) |
| Treatment 3: Fame | 2.54 | 2.82 |
|  | (0.57) | (0.61) |
| Treatment 4: Clientelism | -0.80 | -1.17 |
|  | (-0.18) | (-0.26) |
| Social grant | -9.25\*\* | -7.51 |
|  | (-2.12) | (-1.64) |
| Competence#Social grant | 1.96 | 4.39 |
|  | (0.32) | (0.70) |
| Framing#Social grant | -3.49 | -4.92 |
|  | (-0.57) | (-0.79) |
| Fame#Social grant | -5.47 | -4.79 |
|  | (-0.88) | (-0.75) |
| Clientelism#Social grant | 15.94\*\*\* | 17.20\*\*\* |
|  | (2.58) | (2.73) |
| Living standard |  | -0.06 |
|  |  | (-0.12) |
| Education |  | 0.75 |
|  |  | (0.92) |
| Information |  | -1.94\* |
|  |  | (-1.93) |
| ANC partisan |  | 7.73\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.23) |
| DA partisan |  | -1.76 |
|  |  | (-0.46) |
| Coloured/Indian [reference: Black] |  | -3.18 |
|  |  | (-1.07) |
| White [reference: Black] |  | 0.72 |
|  |  | (0.16) |
| Female [reference: Male] |  | -6.88\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-3.27) |
| Age |  | -0.19\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-2.77) |
| Urban |  | -2.23 |
|  |  | (-0.86) |
| Free State |  | 13.92\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.16) |
| Gauteng |  | 10.53\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.89) |
| KwaZulu-Natal |  | 13.36\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.66) |
| Limpopo |  | 6.68 |
|  |  | (1.40) |
| Mpumalanga |  | 6.03 |
|  |  | (1.27) |
| Northern Cape |  | 5.32 |
|  |  | (0.93) |
| North West |  | 8.62\* |
|  |  | (1.81) |
| Western Cape |  | 9.94\*\* |
|  |  | (2.58) |
| Constant | 48.21\*\*\* | 50.77\*\*\* |
|  | (15.47) | (7.81) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,423 | 1,360 |
| R-squared | 0.026 | 0.070 |

Note. OLS regressions. Model 1 includes no control variables. Model 2 includes full set of control variables. The table shows results for a regression where each treatment is interacted with the social grant indicator. No control variables are included. Social grant receipt is coded as one (1) for people receiving social grants and zero (0) otherwise. The constant shows the estimated value of tycoon support in the baseline group (value zero on all treatment variables) for people who do not receive social grants (value zero on social grants). The coefficients of the treatment variables show the effect of the treatment for people who do not receive social grants. The coefficient of social grants shows the effect of receiving social grants for respondents in the baseline group. t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.



**Appendix M. Political awareness**

Table M. Regression results for political awareness as moderator

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Model | (1) | (2) |
| Dependent variable | Tycoon support | Tycoon support |
| Controls | No | Yes |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment 1: Competence | 11.11\* | 8.70 |
|  | (1.81) | (1.35) |
| Treatment 2: Framing | 12.34\* | 9.43 |
|  | (1.89) | (1.43) |
| Treatment 3: Fame | 7.55 | 8.10 |
|  | (1.28) | (1.30) |
| Treatment 4: Clientelism | 23.49\*\*\* | 19.56\*\*\* |
|  | (3.85) | (3.11) |
| Information (political awareness) | 2.36 | 1.42 |
|  | (1.12) | (0.65) |
| Competence#Information | -3.41 | -1.96 |
|  | (-1.18) | (-0.66) |
| Framing#Information | -4.76 | -3.41 |
|  | (-1.57) | (-1.12) |
| Fame#Information | -4.37 | -4.26 |
|  | (-1.55) | (-1.45) |
| Clientelism#Information | -8.79\*\*\* | -6.61\*\* |
|  | (-3.05) | (-2.22) |
| Living standard |  | -0.11 |
|  |  | (-0.22) |
| Education |  | 0.68 |
|  |  | (0.83) |
| Social grant |  | -5.10\*\* |
|  |  | (-2.27) |
| ANC partisan |  | 7.09\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.96) |
| DA partisan |  | -1.31 |
|  |  | (-0.34) |
| Coloured/Indian [reference: Black] |  | -3.37 |
|  |  | (-1.13) |
| White [reference: Black] |  | 1.20 |
|  |  | (0.27) |
| Female [reference: Male] |  | -6.90\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-3.26) |
| Age |  | -0.19\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-2.68) |
| Urban |  | -2.25 |
|  |  | (-0.86) |
| Free State |  | 13.64\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.08) |
| Gauteng |  | 10.41\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.85) |
| KwaZulu-Natal |  | 13.91\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.79) |
| Limpopo |  | 7.51 |
|  |  | (1.56) |
| Mpumalanga |  | 6.64 |
|  |  | (1.39) |
| Northern Cape |  | 4.63 |
|  |  | (0.80) |
| North West |  | 9.13\* |
|  |  | (1.91) |
| Western Cape |  | 9.87\*\* |
|  |  | (2.54) |
| Constant | 38.91\*\*\* | 43.48\*\*\* |
|  | (8.87) | (6.11) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,435 | 1,360 |
| R-squared | 0.016 | 0.063 |

Note. OLS regressions. Model 1 includes no control variables. Model 2 includes full set of control variables. The table shows results for a regression where each treatment is interacted with the information/political awareness measure, scaled 0-4 with zero denoting the least informed/least aware. No control variables are included. Since information has a minimum value of zero, the constant shows the estimated value of tycoon support in the baseline group (value zero on all treatment variables) for the least informed people (value zero on information). The coefficients of the treatment variables show the effect of the treatment for the least informed respondents relative to the least respondents in the baseline group. For instance, the coefficient of the clientelism treatment shows the estimated effect of clientelism for the least informed people, relative to the least informed people in the baseline group (i.e., clientelism boosts tycoon support among the least informed). t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Appendix N.**

Table N. Results for Figure 3

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Model | (1) | (2) |
| Dependent variable | Tycoon support | Tycoon support |
| Controls | No | Yes |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment 1: Competence | 6.68 | 6.64 |
|  | (0.70) | (0.68) |
| Treatment 2: Framing | -19.51\*\* | -21.11\*\* |
|  | (-1.99) | (-2.10) |
| Treatment 3: Fame | -11.99 | -13.74 |
|  | (-1.25) | (-1.39) |
| Treatment 4: Clientelism | -5.13 | -7.80 |
|  | (-0.49) | (-0.73) |
| Black | -7.05 | -12.10 |
|  | (-0.92) | (-1.43) |
| Colored | -12.50 | -13.50 |
|  | (-1.46) | (-1.49) |
| Competence#Black | -4.44 | -3.83 |
|  | (-0.44) | (-0.37) |
| Competence#Colored | 3.47 | 3.25 |
|  | (0.30) | (0.27) |
| Framing#Black | 26.00\*\* | 27.52\*\* |
|  | (2.47) | (2.56) |
| Framing#Colored | 24.23\*\* | 24.74\*\* |
|  | (2.06) | (2.07) |
| Fame#Black | 13.87 | 16.68 |
|  | (1.34) | (1.57) |
| Fame#Colored | 9.06 | 11.69 |
|  | (0.77) | (0.97) |
| Clientelism#Black | 16.44 | 19.25\* |
|  | (1.48) | (1.69) |
| Clientelism#Colored | 6.35 | 9.17 |
|  | (0.52) | (0.73) |
| Living standard |  | 0.06 |
|  |  | (0.11) |
| Social grant |  | -4.91\*\* |
|  |  | (-2.19) |
| Education |  | 0.65 |
|  |  | (0.80) |
| Information |  | -1.88\* |
|  |  | (-1.86) |
| ANC partisan |  | 7.06\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.96) |
| DA partisan |  | -1.42 |
|  |  | (-0.37) |
| Female [reference: male] |  | -7.26\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-3.44) |
| Age |  | -0.18\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-2.58) |
| Urban [reference: rural] |  | -2.41 |
|  |  | (-0.92) |
| Eastern Cape (reference) |  | 14.46\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.27) |
| Free State |  | 10.72\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.94) |
| Gauteng |  | 13.89\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.80) |
| KwaZulu-Natal |  | 8.01\* |
|  |  | (1.68) |
| Limpopo |  | 6.89 |
|  |  | (1.45) |
| Mpumalanga |  | 4.92 |
|  |  | (0.86) |
| Northern Cape |  | 8.89\* |
|  |  | (1.86) |
| North West |  | 10.07\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.60) |
| Constant | 50.96\*\*\* | 59.42\*\*\* |
|  | (7.04) | (5.71) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,435 | 1,360 |
| R-squared | 0.024 | 0.071 |

Note. OLS regressions. Model 2 includes full set of control variables (results for Figure 3). Model 1 has no control variables. Both tables show results for a regression where each treatment is interacted with indicators for racial classification, with ‘white’ as the reference group (value 0). In Model 1 (no control variables), the constant shows the estimated value of tycoon support in the baseline group (value zero on all treatment variables) for white respondents (the reference group (0)). The coefficients of the treatment variables show the effect of the treatment for white respondents relative to white respondents in the baseline group. For instance, the coefficient of the framing treatment shows the estimated effect of framing for white respondents, relative to the white respondents in the baseline group (i.e., anti-apartheid framing decreases tycoon support among white respondents). t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Appendix O.**

Table O. Urban-rural difference in treatment effects

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Model | (1) | (2) |
| Dependent variable | Tycoon support | Tycoon support |
| Controls | No | Yes |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment 1: Competence | 4.98 | 2.39 |
|  | (0.88) | (0.41) |
| Treatment 2: Framing | 5.60 | 3.65 |
|  | (1.00) | (0.64) |
| Treatment 3: Fame | 1.76 | 0.47 |
|  | (0.30) | (0.08) |
| Treatment 4: Clientelism | 14.31\*\* | 11.99\*\* |
|  | (2.55) | (2.09) |
| Urban | 1.66 | -1.46 |
|  | (0.35) | (-0.29) |
| Competence#Urban | -0.38 | 3.76 |
|  | (-0.06) | (0.55) |
| Framing#Urban | -3.20 | -0.97 |
|  | (-0.48) | (-0.14) |
| Fame#Urban | -3.08 | -0.44 |
|  | (-0.45) | (-0.06) |
| Clientelism#Urban | -9.50 | -6.52 |
|  | (-1.41) | (-0.95) |
| Living standard |  | -0.05 |
|  |  | (-0.09) |
| Education |  | 0.67 |
|  |  | (0.82) |
| Social grant |  | -5.24\*\* |
|  |  | (-2.32) |
| Information |  | -1.89\* |
|  |  | (-1.87) |
| ANC partisan |  | 7.21\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.01) |
| DA partisan |  | -1.01 |
|  |  | (-0.26) |
| Female [reference: male] |  | -6.91\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-3.26) |
| Age |  | -0.18\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-2.60) |
| Coloured/Indian |  | -3.40 |
|  |  | (-1.14) |
| White |  | 0.70 |
|  |  | (0.16) |
| Eastern Cape (reference) |  | 13.62\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.08) |
| Free State |  | 10.42\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.85) |
| Gauteng |  | 13.78\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.76) |
| KwaZulu-Natal |  | 7.89 |
|  |  | (1.64) |
| Limpopo |  | 6.48 |
|  |  | (1.36) |
| Mpumalanga |  | 5.30 |
|  |  | (0.92) |
| Northern Cape |  | 8.61\* |
|  |  | (1.79) |
| North West |  | 9.83\*\* |
|  |  | (2.53) |
| Constant | 42.15\*\*\* | 48.79\*\*\* |
|  | (10.52) | (7.08) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,435 | 1,360 |
| R-squared | 0.009 | 0.060 |

Note. OLS regressions. Model 1 includes no control variables. Model 2 includes full set of control variables. The table shows results for a regression where each treatment is interacted with an indicator for urban-rural residence, coded 1 for urban and 0 for rural. No control variables are included. The constant shows the estimated value of tycoon support in the baseline group (value zero on all treatment variables) for people in rural areas (value zero on ‘urban’ indicator). The coefficients of the treatment variables show the effect of the treatment for respondents in rural areas in the baseline group. For instance, the coefficient of the clientelism treatment shows the estimated effect of clientelism for respondents in rural areas, relative to the respondents in rural areas in the baseline group (note that the interaction term for clientelism#urban is insignificant). t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Appendix P**

Table P. Treatment effects by voters’ party affiliation (ANC or DA)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Model | (1) | (2) |
| Dependent variable | Tycoon support | Tycoon support |
| Controls | No | Yes |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment 1: Competence | 8.49\*\* | 8.71\*\* |
|  | (2.12) | (2.19) |
| Treatment 2: Framing | 3.25 | 3.26 |
|  | (0.78) | (0.79) |
| Treatment 3: Fame | 0.77 | 1.46 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.36) |
| Treatment 4: Clientelism | 8.70\*\* | 8.65\*\* |
|  | (2.13) | (2.13) |
| ANC partisan | 8.47\* | 10.80\*\* |
|  | (1.73) | (2.19) |
| Competence#ANC partisan | -10.47 | -12.67\* |
|  | (-1.47) | (-1.78) |
| Framing#ANC partisan | -1.59 | -2.11 |
|  | (-0.23) | (-0.31) |
| Fame#ANC partisan | -2.24 | -2.98 |
|  | (-0.32) | (-0.42) |
| Clientelism#ANC partisan | 0.99 | -0.67 |
|  | (0.14) | (-0.10) |
| DA partisan | -0.70 | 1.54 |
|  | (-0.08) | (0.17) |
| Competence#DA partisan | -1.75 | -2.37 |
|  | (-0.14) | (-0.20) |
| Framing#DA partisan | 4.97 | 3.37 |
|  | (0.43) | (0.29) |
| Fame#DA partisan | -2.77 | -3.44 |
|  | (-0.23) | (-0.29) |
| Clientelism#DA partisan | -9.42 | -9.09 |
|  | (-0.81) | (-0.79) |
| Living standard |  | -0.02 |
|  |  | (-0.04) |
| Education |  | 0.66 |
|  |  | (0.81) |
| Social grant |  | -5.25\*\* |
|  |  | (-2.32) |
| Information |  | -1.84\* |
|  |  | (-1.82) |
| Urban [reference: rural] |  | -2.30 |
|  |  | (-0.88) |
| Female [reference: male] |  | -6.72\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-3.17) |
| Age |  | -0.18\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-2.65) |
| Coloured/Indian |  | -3.29 |
|  |  | (-1.10) |
| White |  | 0.29 |
|  |  | (0.07) |
| Free State |  | 14.05\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.17) |
| Gauteng |  | 10.59\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.89) |
| KwaZulu-Natal |  | 13.93\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.79) |
| Limpopo |  | 8.03\* |
|  |  | (1.67) |
| Mpumalanga |  | 6.80 |
|  |  | (1.42) |
| Northern Cape |  | 4.77 |
|  |  | (0.83) |
| North West |  | 9.08\* |
|  |  | (1.89) |
| Western Cape |  | 9.96\*\* |
|  |  | (2.56) |
| Constant | 40.70\*\*\* | 47.71\*\*\* |
|  | (13.99) | (7.43) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,375 | 1,360 |
| R-squared | 0.017 | 0.063 |

Note. OLS regressions. Model 1 includes no control variables. Model 2 includes full set of control variables. The table shows results for a regression where each treatment is interacted an indicator for respondents’ party affiliation (ANC or DA, with ‘other voters’ as the reference). In model 1 – where no control variables are included – the constant shows the estimated value of tycoon support in the baseline group (value zero on all treatment variables) for ‘other’ voters (not ANC or DA supporters) and the coefficients of the treatment variables show the effect of the treatment for ‘other’ voters. Note that this is not a test of partisanship – i.e. partisan alignment of voters and candidates – since we do not provide party labels for the candidates in the experiment. It is simply a test of whether voters’ identifying with a particular party (ANC or DA) are more or less likely to support tycoon candidates. t-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Appendix Q.**

Table Q1. Tests of missingness

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Model | (1) | (2) |
| Dependent variable | Missingness | Missingness |
| Sample | Data for all covariates | Data for covariates with full data only |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment 1 (competence) | -0.02 | -0.01 |
|  | (-1.11) | (-0.34) |
| Treatment 2 (framing) | -0.00 | -0.01 |
|  | (-0.10) | (-0.43) |
| Treatment 3 (fame) | 0.02 | 0.02 |
|  | (1.30) | (0.88) |
| Treatment 4 (clientelism) | -0.01 | -0.00 |
|  | (-0.48) | (-0.02) |
| Living standard | -0.00 | 0.00 |
|  | (-0.22) | (0.30) |
| Education | -0.00 | - |
|  | (-0.83) |  |
| Social grant | -0.00 | - |
|  | (-0.23) |  |
| Political awareness (information | -0.01\* | - |
|  | (-1.70) |  |
| ANC partisan | -0.02\* | - |
|  | (-1.80) |  |
| DA partisan | -0.00 | - |
|  | (-0.05) |  |
| Colored | -0.00 | -0.03 |
|  | (-0.08) | (-1.19) |
| White | -0.02 | -0.03 |
|  | (-0.89) | (-1.07) |
| Female | 0.01 | -0.00 |
|  | (0.64) | (-0.22) |
| Age | 0.00\* | 0.00 |
|  | (1.79) | (1.58) |
| Urban | 0.00 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.14) | (-0.53) |
| Free State | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.09\*\*\* |
|  | (2.65) | (2.92) |
| Guateng | -0.00 | -0.00 |
|  | (-0.21) | (-0.06) |
| KwaZulu Natal | -0.02 | 0.00 |
|  | (-0.98) | (0.18) |
| Limpopo | -0.02 | -0.07\* |
|  | (-0.79) | (-1.86) |
| Mpumalanga | -0.01 | -0.07\* |
|  | (-0.24) | (-1.95) |
| Northern Cape | 0.02 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.63) | (-0.50) |
| North West | -0.04 | -0.06\* |
|  | (-1.51) | (-1.65) |
| Western Cape | -0.04\* | -0.06\*\* |
|  | (-1.76) | (-2.24) |
| Constant | 0.06\* | 0.09\*\* |
|  | (1.92) | (2.40) |
|  |  |  |
| F-test (joint significance) | 1.66 (*p*=0.11) | 0.98 (*p*=0.40) |
| Observations | 1,416 | 1,500 |
| R2 | 0.032 | 0.031 |

Table Q2. T-tests: Comparisons of missing and non-missing observations

Mean 1: Mean 2: Difference: t-statistic:

non-missing missing (Mean1-Mean2) Difference

n=(1360) (n=140)

----------------------------------------------------------------

Living standard 4.986029 4.842857 .1431723 .5235937

Black .6764706 .7571429 -.0806723 -1.956162\*

Colored .2176471 .1571429 .0605042 1.668229\*

White .1058824 .0857143 .0201681 .7439983

Female .5522059 .55 .0022059 .0499427

Age 38.69338 40.72857 -2.035189 -1.430748

Urban .7007353 .6928571 .0078782 .1935612

Eastern Cape .1330882 .1642857 -.0311975 -1.025046

Free State .0845588 .2071429 -.122584 -4.719734\*\*\*

Gauteng .1897059 .2142857 -.0245798 -.7027362

KwaZulu-Natal .1801471 .2214286 -.0412815 -1.200075

Limpopo .0713235 .0357143 .0356092 1.59392

Mpumalanga .0676471 .0285714 .0390756 1.799472\*

Northern Cape .0404412 .0357143 .0047269 .2715931

North West .0669118 .0357143 .0311975 1.436113

Western Cape .1661765 .0571429 .1090336 3.396179\*\*\*

----------------------------------------------------------------

Note. The t-test compares the mean of the covariates for the 1360 observations with non-missing data to the 140 observations with missing data in Table 2 and Figure 2. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Overall, the main raw difference between non-missing and missing observations are on the provinces (Free State and Western Cape) and to a lesser extent on racial classifications. On the remaining covariates, there are not significant differences between the two groups.