

Online Appendix

Auxiliary State Method: Theory and Application^{*}

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1 Appendix A: Model summary

The equilibrium of the model consists of following nonlinear equations.

- Euler equation

$$E_t \left[M_{t,t+1} \left(\frac{R_t}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right) \right] = 1, \quad (1)$$

where R_t is the gross short-term interest rate; $\Pi_t = P_t/P_{t-1}$ is the gross inflation rate; $M_{t,t+1}$ is the stochastic discount factor:

$$M_{t,t+1} = \beta \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\gamma}, \quad (2)$$

where C denotes composite consumption; β and $1/\gamma$ are the subjective discount factor and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, respectively.

- Gross wage inflation

$$\Pi_t^w = \frac{w_t}{w_{t-1}} \Pi_t, \quad (3)$$

where $w_t = W_t/P_t$ is the real wage; $\Pi_t^w = W_t/W_{t-1}$ is the gross wage inflation rate.

- New Keynesian Phillips Curve for wages

$$\begin{aligned} 0 = & (1 - \varepsilon_w) (1 - \Phi(\Pi_t^w)) N_t - \Phi'(\Pi_t^w) \Pi_t^w N_t + \varepsilon_w \chi \frac{N_t^{\eta+1}}{w_t C_t^{-\gamma}} \\ & + E_t \left[M_{t,t+1} \frac{\Phi'(\Pi_{t+1}^w) (\Pi_{t+1}^w)^2}{\Pi_{t+1}} N_{t+1} \right], \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where N denotes composite labor; $\varepsilon_w, 1/\eta, \chi$ are the elasticity of substitution among differentiated types of labor, the elasticity of labor supply, and the weight of working in the per-period flow utility, respectively; $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the wage adjustment cost:

$$\Phi(x) = \phi_w \left(\frac{\exp(-\psi_w(x - \bar{\Pi})) + \psi_w(x - \bar{\Pi}) - 1}{\psi_w^2} \right), \quad (5)$$

where ϕ_w is the level parameter and ψ_w is the asymmetry parameter. If $\psi_w > 0$, the wage adjustment cost is asymmetric. In particular, the cost to lower a wage relative to the reference wage is higher than to increase it by the same amount. When ψ_w approaches 0, this function becomes a symmetric quadratic function

$$\Phi(x) = \frac{\phi_w}{2} (x - \bar{\Pi})^2.$$

Note that when $\phi_w = 0$ and $\varepsilon_w \rightarrow \infty$, equation (4) becomes a standard marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption

$$\frac{\chi N_t^\eta}{C_t^{-\gamma}} = w_t.$$

- The New Keynesian Phillips curve

$$\left(1 - \varepsilon + \varepsilon \frac{w_t}{Z_t} - \Pi_t \Gamma'(\Pi_t)\right) Y_t + E_t(M_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1} \Gamma'(\Pi_{t+1}) Y_{t+1}) = 0. \quad (6)$$

where Y denotes aggregate output; Z is the technology shock:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(Z_t) &= \rho_Z \ln(Z_{t-1}) + \varepsilon_{Z,t}, \\ \varepsilon_{Z,t} &\sim i.i.d N(0, \sigma_Z^2), \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

and $\Gamma(\cdot)$ is the price adjustment cost function:

$$\Gamma(x) = \phi_p \left(\frac{\exp(-\psi_p(x - \bar{\Pi})) + \psi_p(x - \bar{\Pi}) - 1}{\psi_p^2} \right), \quad (8)$$

where ϕ_p, ψ_p are parameters that determines the level and the asymmetry of price adjustment costs. If $\psi_p > 0$, the price adjustment cost is asymmetric. Particularly, the cost to lower a price relative to the reference price is higher than to increase it by

the same amount. The linex function nests the symmetric quadratic cost when ψ_p approaches 0, i.e., it becomes a quadratic function

$$\Gamma(x) = \frac{\phi_p}{2} (x - \bar{\Pi})^2.$$

- Taylor rule

$$R_t = R^* \left(\frac{GDP_t}{GDP^*} \right)^{\phi_y} \left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi^*} \right)^{\phi_\pi} \quad (9)$$

where $GDP_t \equiv C_t$ denotes the gross domestic product (GDP); GDP^* and Π^* denote the target GDP and inflation, respectively; R^* denotes the intercept of the Taylor rule; ϕ_π, ϕ_y represents how aggressive the central bank responds to stabilizing inflation and output.

- Aggregate output

$$Y_t = Z_t N_t, \quad (10)$$

- The resource constraint

$$C_t = (1 - \Gamma(\Pi_t)) Y_t - w_t N_t \Phi(\Pi_t^w). \quad (11)$$

The equilibrium of the model is governed by the system of seven nonlinear difference equations (1), (3), (4), (6), (9), (10), (11) with respect to seven variables $w_t, C_t, R_t, \Pi_t, \Pi_t^w, N_t$, and Y_t .

2 Appendix B: Deriving the New Keynesian Phillips Curve for wages

We can write household h 's problem in the following Bellman equation:

$$V^h(B_{t-1}^h, W_{t-1}^h, Z_t) = \underbrace{\text{Max}}_{\{C_t^h, N_t^h, W_t^h, B_t^h\}} \left\{ (1 - \beta) \left(\frac{(C_t^h)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \chi \frac{(N_t^h)^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta} \right) + \beta (E_t [V^h(B_t^h, W_t^h, Z_{t+1})]) \right\} \quad (12)$$

subject to

$$P_t C_t^h + R_t^{-1} B_t^h = W_t^h N_t^h (1 - \Phi_t^h) + B_{t-1}^h + D_t^h + T_t^h + A C_t^h \quad (13)$$

$$N_t^h = \left(\frac{W_t^h}{W_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_w} N_t \quad (14)$$

where

$$\Phi_t^h = \Phi \left(\frac{W_t^h}{W_{t-1}^h} \right) = \phi_w \left(\frac{\exp \left(-\psi_w \left(\frac{W_t^h}{W_{t-1}^h} - \bar{\Pi} \right) \right) + \psi_w \left(\frac{W_t^h}{W_{t-1}^h} - \bar{\Pi} \right) - 1}{\psi_w^2} \right). \quad (15)$$

Let λ_t^{h1} and λ_t^{h2} be the Lagrangian multipliers for the budget constraint and the labor demand at time t , respectively. The first-order conditions include

$$(C_t) : (C_t^h)^{-\gamma} - P_t \lambda_t^{h1} = 0, \quad (16)$$

$$(N_t) : -(1 - \beta) \chi (N_t^h)^\eta + W_t^h (1 - \Phi_t^h) \lambda_t^{h1} - \lambda_t^{h2} = 0, \quad (17)$$

$$(W_t) : 0 = \beta V_w^h (B_t^h, W_t^h, Z_{t+1}) \left(N_t^h (1 - \Phi_t^h) - W_t^h N_t^h (\Phi_t^h)' \frac{1}{W_{t-1}^h} \right) \lambda_t^{h1} - \epsilon_w \frac{N_t^h}{W_t^h} \lambda_t^{h2}. \quad (18)$$

$$(B_t) : \beta V_B^h (B_t^h, W_t^h, Z_{t+1}) - R_t^{-1} \lambda_t^{h1} = 0. \quad (19)$$

The envelope theorem implies:

$$\frac{\partial V^h(B_{t-1}^h, W_{t-1}^h, Z_t)}{\partial W_{t-1}^h} \equiv V_w^h(B_{t-1}^h, W_{t-1}^h, Z_t) \quad (20)$$

$$= \left(W_t^h N_t^h (\Phi_t^h)' \frac{W_t^h}{(W_{t-1}^h)^2} \right) \lambda_t^{h1} \quad (21)$$

$$\frac{\partial V^h(B_t^h, W_{t-1}^h, Z_t)}{\partial B_{t-1}^h} \equiv V_B^h(B_{t-1}^h, W_{t-1}^h, Z_t) = \lambda_t^{h1} \quad (22)$$

From equations (16) and (17)

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_t^{h1} &= \frac{(C_t^h)^{-\gamma}}{P_t}; \lambda_{t+1}^{h1} = \frac{(C_{t+1}^h)^{-\gamma}}{P_{t+1}}; \\ \lambda_t^{h2} &= -\chi (N_t^h)^\eta + W_t^h (1 - \Phi_t^h) \frac{(C_t^h)^{-\gamma}}{P_t} \end{aligned}$$

Equation (18) can be simplified to

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= \left(N_t^h (1 - \Phi_t^h) - W_t^h N_t^h (\Phi_t^h)' \frac{1}{W_{t-1}^h} \right) \frac{(C_t^h)^{-\gamma}}{P_t} \\ &\quad - \varepsilon_w \frac{N_t^h}{W_t^h} \left(-\chi (N_t^h)^\eta + W_t^h (1 - \Phi_t^h) \frac{(C_t^h)^{-\gamma}}{P_t} \right) \\ &\quad + \beta \left(N_{t+1}^h (\Phi_{t+1}^h)' \left(\frac{W_{t+1}^h}{W_t^h} \right)^2 \right) \frac{(C_{t+1}^h)^{-\gamma}}{P_{t+1}}, \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= \left(N_t^h (1 - \Phi_t^h) - N_t^h (\Phi_t^h)' \frac{W_t^h}{W_{t-1}^h} \right) \\
&\quad + \varepsilon_w \chi \frac{(N_t^h)^{\eta+1}}{W_t^h} \frac{P_t}{(C_t^h)^{-\gamma}} - \varepsilon_w N_t^h (1 - \Phi_t^h) \\
&\quad + \beta \left(N_{t+1}^h (\Phi_{t+1}^h)' \left(\frac{W_{t+1}^h}{W_t^h} \right)^2 \right) \frac{(C_{t+1}^h)^{-\gamma}}{(C_t^h)^{-\gamma}} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}}, \\
0 &= (1 - \varepsilon_w) N_t^h (1 - \Phi_t^h) - N_t^h (\Phi_t^h)' \frac{W_t^h}{W_{t-1}^h} + \varepsilon_w \chi \frac{(N_t^h)^{\eta+1}}{w_t^h (C_t^h)^{-\gamma}} \\
&\quad + \beta \frac{(C_{t+1}^h)^{-\gamma}}{(C_t^h)^{-\gamma}} \left(N_{t+1}^h (\Phi_{t+1}^h)' \left(\frac{W_{t+1}^h}{W_t^h} \right)^2 \right) \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}}, \tag{23}
\end{aligned}$$

Equation (19) becomes

$$0 = \beta \lambda_{t+1}^{h1} - R_t^{-1} \lambda_t^{h1} \tag{24}$$

$$0 = \beta \frac{(C_{t+1}^h)^{-\gamma}}{P_{t+1}} - R_t^{-1} \frac{(C_t^h)^{-\gamma}}{P_t} \tag{25}$$

In a symmetric equilibrium the optimal wage setting becomes the wage Phillips curve:

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= (1 - \varepsilon_w) (1 - \Phi_t) N_t - \Phi_t' \Pi_t^w N_t + \varepsilon_w \chi \frac{N_t^{\eta+1}}{w_t C_t^{-\gamma}} \\
&\quad + E_t \left[M_{t,t+1} \left(\frac{(\Phi_{t+1})' (\Pi_{t+1}^w)^2}{\Pi_t} N_{t+1} \right) \right], \tag{26}
\end{aligned}$$

and the optimality condition for bonds satisfies:

$$E_t \left[M_{t,t+1} \left(\frac{R_t}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right) \right] = 1, \tag{27}$$

where $w_t = W_t/P_t$ is the real wage, $\Pi_t^w = W_t/W_{t-1}$ is the gross wage inflation, $\Pi_t =$

P_t/P_{t-1} is the gross (price) inflation rate, and the stochastic discount factor is given by

$$M_{t,t+1} = \beta \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\gamma}. \quad (28)$$