

## Appendix

We asked our respondents how likely they were to vote for Mitchell on a 5-point ordinal scale, with 5 representing the highest likelihood. In our analysis, we maintained these ordinal levels. However, to reflect the dichotomous nature of vote choice, we include a model in the Appendix that collapses our dependent variable into two categories: voting for Mitchell and not voting for Mitchell. This approach offers an alternative interpretation of our results that models the binary choice voters face in real elections. Table A.1 is structured identically to Table 1, except with our dichotomous dependent variable. Respondents who answered “4” or “5” are defined as voting for Mitchell while those responding with a “1”, “2”, or “3” are defined as not voting for Mitchell.

Column 1 presents the endorsement effect across all respondents. The negative direction is broadly consistent with our main analysis, but at lower significance ( $p=0.14$ ). There is thus a possibility that part of our effects are attributable to incremental movements in likelihood that would not yield changes in actual outcomes. However, Columns 2, 3, and 4 present the results of the model segregated by party and are consistent with our main analysis. We find that Democrats reduce their likelihood to vote for Mitchell by 11 points, a similar result to our main analysis. Based on this finding, we can conclude that Democratic respondents were willing to vote for Mitchell when there was no mention of Trump. However, when faced with Trump’s endorsement, their willingness to vote for Mitchell diminishes. Like the main results, the effect of Trump’s endorsement is not significant for Republicans or Independents. While the lower significance on the main finding is notable, the direction of the effect and the within-party analyses are consistent with our main estimates.

We included two additional questions as robustness checks for our results: how favorably the respondent viewed Terry Mitchell—on a 0-100 scale—and the share of \$100 a respondent would be willing to donate to Mitchell using a 0-100 slider. These questions produced similar results to our likelihood to vote for Mitchell questions. While these questions are less directly linked to electoral outcomes, they allowed respondents more latitude in their answers due to the scale. This yields a higher power than the likelihood to vote estimations—although it is still below typical thresholds. For example, a post-hoc power analysis of the endorsement effect on Republicans’ favorability toward Mitchell—an underpowered estimate in our main results—is 0.485, a 17-percentage point increase in power over the likelihood to vote question. The equivalent estimate for Democrats for the favorability question is 0.997, an increase of 0.12 from our main results. Notably, the sample size is the same between our primary research question and the robustness checks, indicating that the change in power stems from the parameters themselves. Regrettably, we cannot decompose that change to identify the portion that is attributable to the scale change or the portion that comes from using a different dependent variable.

The remainder of this Appendix summarizes the results of our robustness checks. Tables A.2-3 and A.4-5 are structured identically to Tables 1-2 in the main text and present results for favorability and donation amount, respectively.

#### A. *Favorability*

Table A.2 summarizes the endorsement effect on favorability toward Mitchell. From Column 1, we see a significant reduction in favorability of 7.5 points sample-wide when

presented with an endorsement. Recall that the likelihood to vote estimate was in the same direction but insignificant. Columns 2, 3, and 4 subset by party and offer further evidence of a net negative impact, as the Democratic point estimate is almost three times the magnitude of the Republican estimate. Indeed, the Democratic estimate is significantly negative and the Republican estimate approaches significance ( $p=.07$ ) in the positive direction, strongly consistent with our main estimates. Column 4 shows that unlike the main estimates, Independents view Terry Mitchell more negatively when he is endorsed by Trump, albeit at marginal significance ( $p=.06$ ). It's an intriguing finding given the estimate on the likelihood to vote model for Independents was a precise zero, and it hints at a meaningful difference in how respondents treat favorability and likelihood to vote, a difference worth exploring in future work.

Column 5 interacts party with the endorsement treatment so we can directly test the equality of within-party groups. Note that the reference group is Independents. Consistent with the main estimates, we find insufficient evidence to conclude that the interaction of an endorsement and partisan identity yields differential effects for Independents and Democrats. What is interesting, however, is that the difference between Republicans and Independents *is significant*. With Independents as the baseline, we find a significant increase in favorability of 15 points when Trump's endorsement is interacted with Republican identity. In conjunction with the preceding point on the point estimate for Republicans, this further suggests that testing favorability induces a different endorsement effect among Independents compared to likelihood to vote.

Table A.2 also includes results for the policy effect. We again see both consistent and new results. Column 1 shows that there is an overall decrease in favorability of 9.1 points

sample-wide when a respondent views conventional policy stances. This is a departure from the likelihood to vote question wherein there was no sample-wide effect. Consistent with our previous analysis, the point estimates for a Trump endorsement in Columns 2-4 are larger in absolute value than the point estimates for conventional policy stances among all three partisan groups. As in the main text, we test to see if either effect is more meaningful for all party IDs. Like the likelihood to vote questions, neither Democrats nor Independents show evidence of a differential effect. But unlike the main body, there is an insignificant difference in effects for Republicans, although there is still a 5.5-point difference in the effects. This is another surprising disparity in the questions, for it suggests that Republican respondents weigh endorsements and policy differently when they vote, but not for their overall view of candidates. Follow-up research on this question would prove particularly insightful.

Table A.3 replicates Table 2 for favorability. The results for Democrats, presented in Column 1, show a consistent story. All three mentions of conventional policy stances—regardless of the endorsement treatment—reduce favorability compared to an unconventional candidate with no mention of Trump. Likewise, a Trump endorsement—even when paired with Democratic policies—brings down Democrats’ favorability rating by 22 points. Column 3, for Independents, reiterates our previous findings. Independents view any mention of Trump or Republican policies negatively. All point estimates are negative, and most are significant or approach significance. And like Democrats, the presence of a Trump endorsement brings down Independents’ favorability of an unconventional Republican by 15.73 points ( $p=.02$ ).

Finally, like our main estimates, the presence of a Trump endorsement is suggestively linked to an increase in Republican favorability toward a hypothetical candidate with

unconventional stances as favorability increases by 8.4 points in the presence of an endorsement ( $p=.08$ ). Given it is in the same direction as our main estimates and just misses conventional significance thresholds, we believe this result sufficiently validates our main estimate.

### *B. Donations*

Tables A.4 and A.5 replicate our main results for our donation robustness check, which asked what share of \$100 respondents would donate to Mitchell. We expect that this question will generate similar results; however, there is undoubtedly a different set of mechanisms once a financial element is introduced. We begin with Table A.4 Column 1 shows that a Trump endorsement reduces the share of \$100 by \$5.90, a significant reduction consistent with both our favorability and likelihood to vote results. Columns 2-4 segregate by party. Unsurprisingly, Democrats reduce their donation by \$13.97 in the presence of a Trump endorsement.

More surprisingly, however, Republicans show even weaker evidence of changing their behavior than in other questions, as a Trump endorsement increases donations by just \$4.52 ( $p=.24$ ). Nevertheless, Republicans demonstrate a significant reduction when a Trump anti-endorsement is present, the first instance of a significant effect of the anti-endorsement. Independents show no evidence of changing their behavior significantly in either direction. Finally, Column 5 interacts endorsement with partisan identity. Like our other results, there is no evidence of a difference in endorsement effect between parties, with a linear hypothesis test for the absolute difference between the interaction of a Trump endorsement and each party yielding a p-value of 0.79.

Table A.4 also includes policy effects for donations. Column 1 shows that conventional policy stances do not have a significant effect sample-wide on donations ( $p=0.20$ ), consistent

with our main results. Columns 2-4 subset by party and show predictable results for Democrats, who reduce their donation by a significant \$12.68, and Republicans, who increase theirs by \$14.05. Consistent with our findings in the main paper, Independents are generally opposed to Republican policies, with their donation falling by a significant \$9.53 when faced with typical Republican policy stances. Column 5 interacts each effect with party, with the results supporting our main estimates in the paper. Specifically, a linear hypothesis test for the effect of an endorsement compared to the effect of policy for each party yields no significant difference between Democrats and Independents. For Republicans, the difference in point estimates falls short of traditional significance ( $p=.052$ ). But given that the direction and difference is consistent with our main estimates, we conclude that this robustness check validates our main findings.

Table A.5 replicates Table 2 for donations. The results for Democrats are identical to the main findings. Compared to an unconventional Republican with no mention of Trump, any mention of conventional stances reduces the amount donated significantly. Likewise, a Trump endorsement reduces the amount donated by \$22.96. For Independents, the results are consistent in magnitude but not in significance. Like the main findings, all point estimates—compared to the unconventional Republican with no mention of Trump—are negative. The change in significance occurs for the endorsement effect; the estimate is associated with a p-value of .066. Again, although the significance falls just short of conventional levels, it is otherwise consistent with our main findings. Therefore, we see no concerns raised by this check.

Republicans, however, do not experience a significant endorsement effect when the candidate is endorsed and holds unconventional policy stances, a finding that runs counter to our main findings. The increase in the amount donated is just \$3.93 ( $p=.49$ ). This lack of change,

unique among our estimates, is surprising. We would posit that the introduction of the financial element may lead to different effects than the other questions. The fact that this occurs for just Republicans, however, hints at a possible disconnect between their view of Trump and their willingness to financially support his allies. We lack evidence to offer any more concrete mechanisms beyond these speculative ones.

**Table A.1**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Likelihood of Voting for Mitchell				
	All Participants (1)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)	Independents (4)	All Participants (5)
Conventional Policy	0.01 (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.06)
Democrat					0.05 (0.07)
Republican					0.05 (0.07)
Endorsement	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)
Anti-Endorsement	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)
Conventional Policy x Democrat					-0.05 (0.07)
Conventional Policy x Republican					0.24*** (0.07)
Democrat x Endorsement					-0.06 (0.08)
Republican x Endorsement					0.10 (0.09)
Democrat x Anti- Endorsement					0.06 (0.08)
Republican x Anti- Endorsement					-0.03 (0.09)
Constant	0.31***	0.32***	0.32***	0.27***	0.27***



	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Observations	1,346	619	481	246	1,346
R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.07
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0004	0.03	0.04	-0.005	0.06
Residual Std. Error	0.45 (df = 1342)	0.42 (df = 615)	0.48 (df = 477)	0.41 (df = 242)	0.44 (df = 1334)
F Statistic	0.81 (df = 3; 1342)	7.78*** (df = 3; 615)	7.25*** (df = 3; 477)	0.61 (df = 3; 242)	9.41*** (df = 11; 1334)

*Note: Baseline for columns 1-4 is unconventional policy and no mention of an endorsement. Baseline for column 5 is unconventional policy, no mention of an endorsement, and independent.*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table A.2**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Terry Mitchell Favorability				
	All Participants (1)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)	Independents (4)	All Participants (5)
Endorsement	-7.49*** (2.17)	-16.92*** (3.12)	5.98* (3.31)	-8.58* (4.61)	-8.58* (4.82)
Anti-Endorsement	1.22 (2.12)	7.22** (3.09)	-7.55** (3.11)	-0.71 (4.67)	-0.71 (4.89)
Democrat					6.88 (4.84)
Republican					-5.51 (4.99)
Conventional Policy	-9.12*** (1.75)	-25.04*** (2.55)	11.50*** (2.63)	-10.04*** (3.71)	-10.04*** (3.88)
Endorsement x Democrat					-8.34 (5.67)
Anti-Endorsement x Democrat					7.94 (5.71)
Endorsement x Republican					14.55** (5.94)
Anti-Endorsement x Republican					-6.84 (5.87)
Democrat x Conventional Policy					-15.00*** (4.58)
Republican x Conventional Policy					21.55*** (4.76)
Constant	56.75*** (1.78)	62.60*** (2.57)	50.21*** (2.61)	55.72*** (4.00)	55.72*** (4.18)
Observations	1,346	619	481	246	1,346

Residual Std. Error	32.14 (df = 1342)	31.59 (df = 615)	28.78 (df = 477)	28.80 (df = 242)	30.11 (df = 1334)
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*Note: Baseline for columns 1-4 is unconventional policy and no mention of an endorsement.*

*Baseline for column 5 is unconventional policy, no mention of an endorsement, and independent.*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table A.3**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Terry Mitchell Favorability		
	Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)	Independents (3)
Conventional Policy x Control	-27.73*** (4.35)	16.05*** (4.46)	-19.31*** (6.94)
Unconventional Policy x Endorsement	-22.06*** (4.51)	8.42* (4.83)	-15.73** (6.59)
Conventional Policy x Endorsement	-39.77*** (4.48)	19.74*** (4.60)	-21.20*** (6.72)
Unconventional Policy x Anti-Endorsement	7.68* (4.32)	-2.91 (4.54)	-6.74 (6.44)
Conventional Policy x Anti-Endorsement	-21.67*** (4.58)	4.37 (4.35)	-14.07** (7.08)
Constant	64.04*** (3.19)	47.86*** (3.20)	60.69*** (5.08)
Observations	619	481	246
Residual Std. Error	31.54 (df = 613)	28.78 (df = 475)	28.76 (df = 240)

*Note: Baseline is unconventional policy and no mention of an endorsement.*

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table A.4**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Donations to Terry Mitchell				
	All Participants (1)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)	Independents (4)	All Participants (5)
Endorsement	-5.90** (2.29)	-13.97*** (3.27)	4.52 (3.87)	-3.18 (4.76)	-3.18 (5.25)
Anti-Endorsement	-1.04 (2.24)	1.85 (3.24)	-8.20** (3.65)	3.36 (4.83)	3.36 (5.31)
Democrat					9.38* (5.27)
Republican					-0.33 (5.43)
Conventional Policy	-2.39 (1.85)	-12.68*** (2.67)	14.05*** (3.08)	-9.53** (3.83)	-9.53** (4.22)
Endorsement x Democrat					-10.79* (6.16)
Anti-Endorsement x Democrat					-1.51 (6.20)
Endorsement x Republican					7.70 (6.45)
Anti-Endorsement x Republican					-11.56* (6.39)
Democrat x Conventional Policy					-3.14 (4.97)
Republican x Conventional Policy					23.58*** (5.17)
Constant	33.61*** (1.88)	38.72*** (2.69)	29.01*** (3.05)	29.34*** (4.13)	29.34*** (4.54)
Observations	1,346	619	481	246	1,346

Residual Std. Error	33.87 (df = 1342)	33.11 (df = 615)	33.71 (df = 477)	29.73 (df = 242)	32.74 (df = 1334)
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*Note: Baseline for columns 1-4 is unconventional policy and no mention of an endorsement.*

*Baseline for column 5 is unconventional policy, no mention of an endorsement, and independent.*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table A.5**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Donations to Terry Mitchell		
	Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)	Independents (3)
Conventional Policy x Control	-20.97*** (4.54)	17.21*** (5.22)	-19.67*** (7.15)
Unconventional Policy x Endorsement	-22.96*** (4.71)	3.93 (5.66)	-12.53* (6.79)
Conventional Policy x Endorsement	-26.67*** (4.69)	22.04*** (5.38)	-13.87** (6.92)
Unconventional Policy x Anti-Endorsement	-2.56 (4.52)	-3.17 (5.31)	-1.89 (6.63)
Conventional Policy x Anti-Endorsement	-15.36*** (4.79)	4.62 (5.10)	-11.90 (7.30)
Constant	43.18*** (3.33)	27.38*** (3.74)	34.78*** (5.24)
Observations	619	481	246
Residual Std. Error	32.97 (df = 613)	33.70 (df = 475)	29.63 (df = 240)

*Note: Baseline is unconventional policy and no mention of an endorsement.*

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

