

Online Appendix

Odd Profiles in Conjoint Experimental Designs: Effects on Survey-Taking Attention and Behavior

Kirk Bansak and Libby Jenke

Table of Contents

A Design	i
B Eye-Tracking Technology and Methods	vi
C Search Metric	vi
D Additional Analyses	vii
D.1 Search Patterns	vii
D.2 Within-Condition Analysis of Choice	viii
D.3 Cumulative Effects	ix
E Additional Tables	x
F Additional Figures	xii
G Additional Literature	xxxix

A Design

Gender	Female	Female
Age	71	41
Political experience	U.S. Senator	Mayor
Raise taxes on wealthy	Support	Strongly support
Prior profession	Businessperson	Factory worker
Gun Control	Oppose	Strongly oppose
Political party	Independent	Democrat
Highest education	Private college	Graduate school

Figure A.1: Example of a conjoint table from the candidate scenario

Table A.1: Probabilities of Seeing an Odd Profile in a Trial, by Condition

<i>Condition</i>	Probability
Candidate Choice	
<i>Normal</i>	0
<i>Incongruent</i>	0.56
<i>Nonsensical</i>	0.35
<i>Combined</i>	0.72
Migrant Choice	
<i>Normal</i>	0
<i>Incongruent</i>	0.53
<i>Nonsensical</i>	0.37
<i>Combined</i>	0.79

Table A.2: Attributes and Levels by Condition, Candidate Choice

Attribute	Levels <i>Normal Condition</i>		Levels <i>Incongruent Condition</i>		Levels <i>Nonsensical Condition</i>		Levels <i>Combined Condition</i>	
	Female Male	Female Male	Female Male	Female Male	Female Male	Female Male	Female Male	Female Male
Political Party	Republican Democrat Independent	Republican Democrat Independent	Republican Democrat Independent	Republican Democrat Independent	Republican Democrat Independent	Republican Democrat Independent	Republican Democrat Independent	Republican Democrat Independent
Political Experience	Mayor Governor U.S. Senator U.S. Representative No prior political experience	Mayor Governor U.S. Senator U.S. Representative No prior political experience	Mayor Governor U.S. Senator U.S. Representative No prior political experience	Mayor Governor U.S. Senator U.S. Representative No prior political experience	Mayor Governor U.S. Senator U.S. Representative No prior political experience	Mayor Governor U.S. Senator U.S. Representative No prior political experience	Mayor Governor U.S. Senator U.S. Representative No prior political experience	Mayor Governor U.S. Senator U.S. Representative No prior political experience
Age	41 55 62 71	41 55 62 71	41 55 62 71	41 55 62 71	41 55 62 71	41 55 62 71	41 55 62 71	25 55 62 71
Prior Profession	Businessperson Teacher Military service member Store manager Law enforcement officer Community organizer	Businessperson Teacher Farmer Factory worker Law enforcement officer Community organizer	Businessperson Teacher Farmer Factory worker Law enforcement officer Community organizer	Businessperson Teacher Farmer Factory worker Law enforcement officer Community organizer	Businessperson Teacher Farmer Factory worker Law enforcement officer Community organizer	Businessperson Teacher Farmer Factory worker Law enforcement officer Community organizer	Businessperson Teacher Farmer Factory worker Law enforcement officer Community organizer	Businessperson Teacher Farmer Factory worker Law enforcement officer Community organizer
Highest Education	Public college Private college Graduate school	Public college Private college Graduate school	Public college Private college Graduate school	Public college Private college Graduate school	Public college Private college Graduate school	Public college Private college Graduate school	Public college Private college Graduate school	Public college Private college Graduate school
Break Up Tech Monopolies	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose
Raise Retirement Age	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose
Raise Taxes on Wealthy	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose
Gun Control	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose	Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose

Color coding highlights attribute values involved in odd combinations. Respondents do not see color coding.
See below for explicit specification of odd combinations.

Table A.3: Attributes and Levels by Condition, Immigrant Choice

Attribute	Levels		Levels		Levels	
	Normal Condition		Incongruent Condition		Nonsensical Condition	
Gender	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Language during Interview	Fluent English Broken English Tried but unable to speak English Used an interpreter	Fluent English Broken English Tried but unable to speak English Used an interpreter	Fluent English Broken English Tried but unable to speak English Used an interpreter	Fluent English Broken English Tried but unable to speak English Used an interpreter	Fluent English Broken English Tried but unable to speak English Used an interpreter	Fluent English Broken English Tried but unable to speak English Used an interpreter
Type of immigrant	Employment-based Green Card Family-Based Green Card Asylum seeker UNHCR refugee	Employment-based Green Card Family-Based Green Card Asylum seeker UNHCR refugee	Employment-based Green Card Family-Based Green Card Asylum seeker UNHCR refugee	Employment-based Green Card Family-Based Green Card Asylum seeker UNHCR refugee	Employment-based Green Card Family-Based Green Card Asylum seeker UNHCR refugee	Employment-based Green Card Family-Based Green Card Asylum seeker UNHCR refugee
Age	28 35 45 49 55	28 35 45 49 55	28 35 45 49 55	28 35 45 49 55	28 35 45 49 55	28 35 45 49 55
Country of Origin	China Russia Burundi Cuba Libya Venezuela	China Russia Burundi Cuba Libya Venezuela	China Russia Burundi Cuba Libya Venezuela	China Japan Burundi France Libya Venezuela	China Japan Burundi France Libya Venezuela	China Japan Burundi France Libya Venezuela
Profession	Business manager Teacher Janitor Waiter Salesperson Social worker	Business manager Teacher Janitor Waiter Salesperson Social worker	Business manager Teacher Janitor Waiter Salesperson Social worker	Business manager Teacher Medical doctor Lawyer Salesperson Social worker	Business manager Teacher Medical doctor Lawyer Salesperson Social worker	Business manager Teacher Medical doctor Lawyer Construction worker Childcare provider
U.S.-Equivalent Education Level	U.S. high school U.S. Assoc.'s Degree U.S. college	U.S. high school U.S. Assoc.'s Degree U.S. college	U.S. high school U.S. Assoc.'s Degree U.S. college	U.S. high school U.S. Assoc.'s Degree U.S. college U.S. graduate school	U.S. high school U.S. Assoc.'s Degree U.S. college U.S. graduate school	U.S. high school U.S. Assoc.'s Degree U.S. college U.S. graduate school
Basis for Choosing Location	Reunite with family Economic opportunities Ethnic community Religious community	Reunite with family Economic opportunities Ethnic community Religious community	Reunite with family Economic opportunities Ethnic community Religious community	Reunite with family Economic opportunities Ethnic community Religious community	Reunite with family Economic opportunities Ethnic community Religious community	Reunite with family Economic opportunities Ethnic persecution Religious persecution
Reason for Leaving Country of Origin						Reunite with family Economic opportunities Ethnic persecution Religious persecution

Color coding highlights attribute values involved in odd combinations. Respondents do not see color coding. See below for explicit specification of odd combinations.

Table A.4: Odd Combinations, Candidate Choice

Odd Combination Type	(Attribute 1) Level	(Attribute 2) Level
Incongruent	(Political Party) Republican	(Raise Taxes on Wealthy) Strongly support
Incongruent	(Political Party) Republican	(Raise Taxes on Wealthy) Support
Incongruent	(Political Party) Democrat	(Raise Taxes on Wealthy) Strongly oppose
Incongruent	(Political Party) Democrat	(Raise Taxes on Wealthy) Oppose
Incongruent	(Political Party) Republican	(Gun Control) Strongly support
Incongruent	(Political Party) Republican	(Gun Control) Support
Incongruent	(Political Party) Democrat	(Gun Control) Strongly oppose
Incongruent	(Political Party) Democrat	(Gun Control) Oppose
Incongruent	(Highest Education) Graduate school	(Prior Profession) Factory worker
Incongruent	(Highest Education) Graduate school	(Prior Profession) Farmer
Nonsensical	(Age) 25	(Political Experience) Governor
Nonsensical	(Age) 25	(Political Experience) U.S. Senator
Nonsensical	(Age) 25	(Political Experience) U.S. Representative
Nonsensical	(Age) 25	(Prior Profession) Medical doctor
Nonsensical	(Highest Education) Public college	(Prior Profession) Lawyer
Nonsensical	(Highest Education) Private college	(Prior Profession) Lawyer
Nonsensical	(Highest Education) Public college	(Prior Profession) Medical doctor
Nonsensical	(Highest Education) Private college	(Prior Profession) Medical doctor

Table A.5: Odd Combinations, Immigrant Choice

Odd Combination Type	(Attribute 1) Level	(Attribute 2) Level
Incongruent	(Type of immigrant) Employment-based Green Card	(Reason for Leaving Country of Origin) Ethnic persecution
Incongruent	(Type of immigrant) Employment-based Green Card	(Reason for Leaving Country of Origin) Religious persecution
Incongruent	(Type of immigrant) Family-based Green Card	(Reason for Leaving Country of Origin) Ethnic persecution
Incongruent	(Type of immigrant) Family-based Green Card	(Reason for Leaving Country of Origin) Religious persecution
Incongruent	(Type of immigrant) Asylum seeker	(Reason for Leaving Country of Origin) Reunite with family
Incongruent	(Type of immigrant) Asylum seeker	(Reason for Leaving Country of Origin) Economic opportunities
Incongruent	(Type of immigrant) UNHCR refugee	(Reason for Leaving Country of Origin) Reunite with family
Incongruent	(Type of immigrant) UNHCR refugee	(Reason for Leaving Country of Origin) Economic opportunities
Incongruent	(Gender) Female	(Profession) Construction worker
Incongruent	(Gender) Male	(Profession) Childcare provider
Incongruent (Combined Condition)	(U.S.-Equivalent Education Level) U.S. graduate school	(Profession) Construction worker
Incongruent (Combined Condition)	(U.S.-Equivalent Education Level) U.S. graduate school	(Profession) Childcare provider
Nonsensical	(Type of immigrant) Asylum seeker	(Country of Origin) Japan
Nonsensical	(Type of immigrant) Asylum seeker	(Country of Origin) France
Nonsensical	(Type of immigrant) UNHCR refugee	(Country of Origin) Japan
Nonsensical	(Type of immigrant) UNHCR refugee	(Country of Origin) France
Nonsensical	(U.S.-Equivalent Education Level) U.S. high school	(Profession) Medical doctor
Nonsensical	(U.S.-Equivalent Education Level) U.S. Associate's degree	(Profession) Medical doctor
Nonsensical	(U.S.-Equivalent Education Level) U.S. college	(Profession) Medical doctor
Nonsensical	(U.S.-Equivalent Education Level) U.S. high school	(Profession) Lawyer
Nonsensical	(U.S.-Equivalent Education Level) U.S. Associate's degree	(Profession) Lawyer
Nonsensical	(U.S.-Equivalent Education Level) U.S. college	(Profession) Lawyer

B Eye-Tracking Technology and Methods

A Tobii T60XL eye-tracker was used in our study. A 395 by 485 mm LCD monitor with a resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels housed the eye-tracker. Subjects were seated about 700 mm from the screen. The sampling rate of the Tobii T60XL is 60 Hz, and its accuracy is within 0.5 degrees.²⁴

Before beginning the experiment, calibration was carried out, which solved for the location of respondents' gazes by estimating geometric characteristics of respondents' eyes (i.e., the location of the cornea and fovea) while they fixated on five predetermined screen positions. Calibration was again carried out between the experimental scenarios to avoid losses in accuracy and precision (i.e., drift) that can result from exaggerated respondent movement during the experiment.

Eye movement patterns were captured using fixation analysis. A fixation velocity algorithm was used to differentiate fixations from saccades; we used a velocity threshold of 30 ms (Holmqvist et al., 2011). These fixations were then used to measure attention using the *fixation density*, or number of fixations, associated with areas of interest (AOIs) on the screen.

Specifically, fixations were detected using the Tobii I-VT Fixation Filter, a fixation velocity algorithm. Two criteria are used by this algorithm to define fixations. The first is a minimum fixation duration threshold. Because this is the least amount of time that a fixation is defined to be, this threshold must allow visual input to occur in the brain. 60 milliseconds (ms) has been found to be the threshold at which this occurs when respondents are reading (Over et al., 2007; Radach, Huestegge and Reilly, 2008), and thus a minimum fixation duration of 60 ms was used. Secondly, an upper velocity threshold, which separates fixations from saccades, must be chosen. Komogortsev et al. (2010) recommended 30 degree/second, which has been identified as the lowest velocity for saccades (Holmqvist et al., 2011). Gaze points below this threshold were classified as fixations, while gaze points above this threshold were classified as saccades.

Optic artefacts, oculomotor noise, system-inherent inaccuracy, and environmental noise are sources of noise in eye-tracking data. The I-VT Fixation Filter deals with such errors in several ways. Data losses of short duration are often caused by optic artefacts or oculomotor noise like microsaccades. Data loss accounted for by such factors should be filled in. But this type of data loss must be distinguished from data loss due to purposeful movements of the eyes off the screen or blinks. Given that the minimum blink duration is 75 ms (Komogortsev et al., 2010), gaps that were a maximum of 75 ms were linearly interpolated using a gap fill-in function.

AOIs must be chosen by the researcher when using eye-tracking to define the regions of the stimulus that data is gathered in. It is necessary to add a margin to the area of the stimulus of interest in order to account for the inherent imperfect precision of eye-trackers. In creating our AOIs, we added a margin to the top, bottom, left, and right of each attribute level that was equal to the vertical space in the conjoint table between two attribute levels, divided by two. Thus, our AOIs were as large as possible (without overlapping) given our conjoint tables. The width of each AOI differed according to the length of the attribute level and ranged from 2.19 degree (for a candidate's age) to 19.74 degree (the "tried but unable to speak English" level of immigrant's language ability), but the height was equivalent between attribute levels, at 3.03 degree.

C Search Metric

The search metric proposed by Böckenholt and Hyman (1994) is given by

$$SM = \frac{\sqrt{N}((\frac{AD}{N}(r_a - r_d) - (D - A))}{\sqrt{A^2(D - 1) + D^2(A - 1)}}, \quad (1)$$

where A indicates the number of profiles, D indicates the number of attributes, r_a indicates the number of transitions within a profile (i.e., staying in the same profile and moving from attribute to another

²⁴Accuracy is the difference between the true and the measured gaze position, measured in degrees of visual angle. To aid in interpretation, note that the visual angle of the width of the thumb held at an arm's length is about two degree. This means that there may have been approximately a quarter thumb-width's distance from an arm's length away from the scene between where respondents were actually looking and where the eye-tracker measured their gaze location.

attribute), r_d indicates the number of transitions across profile (i.e., looking at an attribute’s value for one profile and then transitioning to the other profile’s value on the same attribute), and N indicates the number of transitions ($N = r_a + r_d + X$), where X indicates mixed/diagonal transitions.

D Additional Analyses

Here, we present further details on additional analyses introduced in the main manuscript.

D.1 Search Patterns

In this section, we analyze the effect of odd profiles on sequential search patterns (H_E). As explained above, odd combinations should theoretically lead to an increase in within-profile search. To investigate, we use the search metric proposed in Böckenholt and Hynan (1994), which compares the number of vertical to horizontal transitions in a respondents’ gaze progression and yields a measure of a respondent’s preference for within-profile vs. within-attribute transitions.²⁵ In the table structure employed in our experiment—where the columns are profiles and the rows are attributes—a positive search metric indicates a preference for within-profile (vertical) transitions, while a negative search metric indicates a preference for within-attribute (horizontal) transitions.

Our first analyses concern the effect of odd combinations within-condition. As stated above, these within-condition analyses are not vulnerable to comparability issues due to attribute substitutions across conditions. These analyses are possible because the specific number of odd combinations present within any conjoint profile or task varies with the attribute randomization.

Figure A.2 shows the results, with panels (a) and (b) corresponding to the candidate and immigrant scenarios, respectively. The results are broken down individually for each condition, as well as shown when pooling all of the conditions (other than the normal condition, where there are no odd combinations). For each respondent-task (each conjoint table viewed), we calculate the search metric for the gaze progression in that task, and we then code each task as having had a positive search metric or not. The points in the figure denote the effect of the number of odd combinations present in a task on the proportion of tasks with a positive search metric, estimated via linear least squares with respondent fixed effects, along with 95% confidence intervals clustered by respondent. We see limited evidence of an effect on search patterns. Only one of the estimates is statistically significant (the pooled analysis for the candidate scenario), but its substantive magnitude is a meager one percentage-point (pp) effect, on par with the magnitudes of the other estimates. Figure A.3 shows the results in terms of standardized effects, further highlighting the small substantive magnitude of all of the estimates.²⁶ Figure A.4 shows similar results using the average search metric value, rather than the proportion of tasks with a positive search metric.

Next, we present between-condition analyses. Figure A.5 shows the results across the four treatment conditions. Specifically, we compute the proportion of tasks with a positive search metric for each condition and compare the results across conditions. The results for the candidate scenario are shown in panels (a) and (b) of Figure A.5, with the former panel displaying the proportions for each treatment condition and the latter panel displaying the effects of the treatment conditions on the proportions (with the normal condition as the baseline). Both panels include 95% confidence intervals clustered by respondent. The treatment effects shown in panel (b) are estimated with linear least squares regression that also included respondent fixed effects. Panels (c) and (d) display analogous results for the immigrant scenario.

As can be seen, the majority of tasks across all conditions do not have a positive search metric, consistent with previous research (Jenke et al., 2021) and indicative of a propensity for within-attribute search. Furthermore, and more notable in the context of the present study, there appears to be little to no difference in the average search patterns across treatment conditions. As shown in panels (b) and (d), the effect of the treatments are all statistically indistinguishable from zero and substantively

²⁵See the Appendix Section C for details on this metric.

²⁶The standard deviation of the number of odd combinations in a conjoint table range from 0.81 to 1.45 across scenarios and conditions.

small, with the largest point estimate (the combined condition relative to the normal condition in the candidate scenario) being a 3.1 percentage point (pp) effect. Figure A.6 in the Appendix shows the results of the same analysis when considering the average search metric value, rather than the proportion of tasks with a positive search metric and similarly shows limited evidence of effects.

One potential concern about the analysis of search patterns relates to the fact that each respondent was exposed to all four conditions (though in random order). If it is the case that there is search behavior carryover between conditions, this could have an equalizing effect on search patterns between conditions, which would attenuate any effects in the between-condition analysis. To take this possibility into account, we perform the same analyses as described above but only consider the first condition each respondent undertook. The results are shown in Figures A.7-A.10. As can be seen, the resulting estimates are much noisier, given these analyses make use of only a quarter of the data. Further, in these analyses, there is some limited *prima facie* evidence of effects of odd combinations on search behavior. At the same time, however, the evidence is inconsistent across the between-condition and within-condition results in ways that call into question the existence of meaningful systematic effects. For instance, in the between-condition analysis, the estimated effect of the combined condition in the candidate scenario is statistically significant, as shown in panels (a) and (b) of Figure A.8; however, the within-condition analysis results in a statistically insignificant effect for the same condition and scenario, as shown in panel (a) of Figure A.7. We see similar inconsistency for the incongruent and nonsensical conditions for the immigrant scenario.

In sum, we find little evidence that odds profiles substantially affect respondents' information search patterns. The point estimates of the effects are mostly positive, which is consistent with our theoretical expectations and hence may suggest the possibility of small effects that require follow-up research with larger samples to more precisely nail down. At the same time, however, the results are generally insignificant from both a statistical standpoint and a substantive magnitude perspective, and there are inconsistencies across the analyses. We also do not find more pronounced effects for the nonsensical condition relative to the incongruent condition, as we expected on theoretical grounds (H_F). In totality, this suggests that the systematic effects of odd profiles on search patterns, if they exist, are not particularly consequential.

D.2 Within-Condition Analysis of Choice

Here, we describe a more fine-grained within-condition analysis of the effect of odd combinations on respondent choice. Specifically, we assess the effect of specific attributes being involved in an odd combination on the AMCEs for all other attributes. For instance, in the combined condition of the candidate scenario, some profiles featured an odd combination involving age, while others did not; the question is whether the AMCEs for the other attributes (aside from age and the additional attributes involved in the odd combination) changed as a result of that oddness.

This investigation is important because odd combinations may lead respondents to focus their attention in very specific ways that may be obscured when analyzing the effects of the overall amount of oddness contained in a profile. On the one hand, it may be that some odd combinations lead respondents to focus in particular on the attributes involved in the odd combination. This may lead them to put less weight on the other attributes and hence attenuate the other AMCEs. On the other hand, other individual odd combinations may result in respondents ignoring the attributes involved in the odd combination, thereby strengthening the AMCEs of other attributes. As an example, respondents' attention towards the odd combination of an immigrant who was a UNHCR refugee from France may increase as they try to think of a reason why someone might be a refugee from France. On the other hand, the odd combination of an immigrant who had a high school level of education and was a medical doctor would be more likely to immediately strike a respondent as implausible, leading him or her to potentially ignore these odd attributes in their choice calculus.

We focus on the combined condition, as the combined condition features the largest volume of odd combinations and thus allows for the strongest test of potential effects of oddness. We perform our analysis on an attribute-by-attribute basis in Figures A.30-A.36 for the candidate scenario and Figures A.37-A.42 for the immigrant scenario. Each figure shows the effect of a particular attribute of interest on AMCEs when it was and was not involved in an odd combination. For each figure, the

left panel shows the AMCEs of the other attributes for profiles in which the attribute of interest is not in an odd combination, the middle panel shows the same when the attribute of interest is in an odd combination, and the right panel shows the differences. As can be seen, there are no systematic patterns. Only a handful of the AMCE differences are statistically significant, consistent with chance statistical significance and/or idiosyncratic changes.

D.3 Cumulative Effects

We replicate the within-condition results associated with Hypotheses A and B (reported in Table 2) when using a cumulative measure of the number of odd combinations. Within condition and using the same outcomes as previously (described in the Information Search subsection of the Results section), we regress the outcomes on the cumulative number of odd combinations a respondent has seen (i.e. the number of odd combinations in the present profile in the question plus the sum of odd combinations in all profiles seen prior). The regressions also include respondent fixed effects as previously. In addition, the regressions control for the conjoint task number, which is critical for this investigation given that previous research has shown that learning over time leads respondents to look at fewer attributes and use fewer fixations as they proceed through additional conjoint tasks irrespective of odd combinations (Jenke et al., 2021). As shown by the results displayed in Tables A.7 – A.8, there is once again no meaningful evidence of odd combinations influencing information search behavior. None of the estimates reach statistical significance at $p < 0.05$, and once again the standardized effects are negligible.

We also replicate the within-condition results associated with Hypotheses C and D (reported in Figure 2) when using cumulative measures of each attribute being in an odd combination. Specifically, for each condition and each attribute that has the possibility of being odd in that condition, we regress that attribute’s number of fixations in a profile on the cumulative number of times that attribute has been in an odd combination up to that task in the condition (i.e. whether it is in an odd combination in the present profile plus the number of times it was in an odd combination in all previous profiles in the condition). As in the analysis reported in the previous paragraph, respondent fixed effects and a control for the conjoint task number are again included. Figure A.20 shows the results; as can be seen, there is limited to no evidence of effects, with small effects, inconsistent directionality, and only one estimate achieving statistical significance at $p < 0.05$.

We also replicate the within-condition results associated with Hypothesis E when using a cumulative number of odd combinations. Similar to Figure A.2, we use linear least squares to regress the binary indicator of a task having a positive search metric on a cumulative measure of odd combinations (i.e. the number of odd combinations in the present task in the question plus the sum of odd combinations in all tasks prior within the condition). As above, respondent fixed effects and a control for the conjoint task number are again included. Figure A.13 shows the results, which are comprised of small and statistically insignificant effect estimates.

Finally, we also conduct within-condition analyses of cumulative effects on choice behavior, associated with Hypotheses G and H. To do so, similar to Figures 4 – 5, we subset data in the Combined condition and estimate the difference in AMCEs across the two subsets. To capture the possibility of cumulative effects, we subset the data by respondents and define the subsets based on how many odd combinations each respondent sees within the condition, using the median number to split the respondents roughly in half. As a result, each respondent in one subset has viewed more odd combinations than each of the respondents in the other subset. As shown by the results in Figures A.43 – A.44, there is limited to no meaningful evidence of cumulative effects on choice behavior. The only statistically significant estimates of the differences across subsets at $p < 0.05$ pertain to the AMCEs associated with the Political Experience attribute in the Candidate scenario, which could simply be consistent with chance given the number of AMCEs estimated.

E Additional Tables

Condition	Outcome	Estimate	p value	95% CI	Standardized effect	Std. eff. 95% CI
Incongruent	(a) Attributes viewed	-0.013	0.612	[-0.063, 0.037]	-0.005	[-0.023, 0.013]
Incongruent	(Odd attributes viewed)	0.052	0.002	[0.019, 0.086]	0.030	[0.011, 0.049]
Incongruent	(Normal attributes viewed)	-0.065	0.000	[-0.095, -0.036]	-0.039	[-0.057, -0.021]
Incongruent	(b) Fixations	0.300	0.040	[0.014, 0.586]	0.020	[0.001, 0.038]
Incongruent	(Odd fixations)	0.378	0.000	[0.176, 0.579]	0.037	[0.017, 0.057]
Incongruent	(Normal fixations)	-0.077	0.268	[-0.214, 0.059]	-0.010	[-0.028, 0.008]
Nonsensical	(a) Attributes viewed	0.027	0.313	[-0.025, 0.079]	0.009	[-0.008, 0.026]
Nonsensical	(Odd attributes viewed)	0.011	0.491	[-0.02, 0.042]	0.006	[-0.011, 0.023]
Nonsensical	(Normal attributes viewed)	0.016	0.295	[-0.014, 0.046]	0.010	[-0.008, 0.028]
Nonsensical	(b) Fixations	0.087	0.586	[-0.226, 0.399]	0.005	[-0.012, 0.021]
Nonsensical	(Odd fixations)	0.007	0.937	[-0.167, 0.181]	0.001	[-0.016, 0.017]
Nonsensical	(Normal fixations)	0.080	0.382	[-0.099, 0.259]	0.007	[-0.009, 0.024]
Combined	(a) Attributes viewed	0.011	0.587	[-0.029, 0.051]	0.005	[-0.013, 0.023]
Combined	(Odd attributes viewed)	0.013	0.431	[-0.02, 0.046]	0.007	[-0.011, 0.025]
Combined	(Normal attributes viewed)	-0.002	0.800	[-0.019, 0.014]	-0.003	[-0.024, 0.019]
Combined	(b) Fixations	0.246	0.041	[0.01, 0.482]	0.019	[0.001, 0.037]
Combined	(Odd fixations)	0.201	0.049	[0.001, 0.4]	0.018	[0, 0.036]
Combined	(Normal fixations)	0.045	0.172	[-0.02, 0.11]	0.012	[-0.005, 0.03]

Table A.6: Within-Condition Effects of Number of Odd Combinations in a Profile, Both Scenarios Pooled. Standardized effects correspond to the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the odd combinations on the number of standard deviations increased in the outcome.

Condition	Outcome	Estimate	p value	95% CI	Standardized effect	Std. eff. 95% CI
Incongruent	(a) Attributes viewed	-0.017	0.291	[-0.048, 0.014]	-0.034	[-0.096, 0.029]
Incongruent	(Odd attributes viewed)	-0.014	0.160	[-0.034, 0.006]	-0.048	[-0.114, 0.019]
Incongruent	(Normal attributes viewed)	-0.003	0.753	[-0.018, 0.013]	-0.010	[-0.072, 0.052]
Incongruent	(b) Fixations	0.018	0.851	[-0.165, 0.2]	0.007	[-0.064, 0.077]
Incongruent	(Odd fixations)	0.023	0.716	[-0.1, 0.146]	0.012	[-0.054, 0.078]
Incongruent	(Normal fixations)	-0.005	0.892	[-0.083, 0.072]	-0.006	[-0.085, 0.074]
Nonsensical	(a) Attributes viewed	-0.025	0.262	[-0.07, 0.019]	-0.042	[-0.116, 0.032]
Nonsensical	(Odd attributes viewed)	-0.007	0.624	[-0.034, 0.021]	-0.018	[-0.091, 0.055]
Nonsensical	(Normal attributes viewed)	-0.019	0.119	[-0.042, 0.005]	-0.062	[-0.139, 0.016]
Nonsensical	(b) Fixations	0.026	0.833	[-0.215, 0.267]	0.007	[-0.057, 0.071]
Nonsensical	(Odd fixations)	0.017	0.814	[-0.123, 0.157]	0.009	[-0.062, 0.079]
Nonsensical	(Normal fixations)	0.009	0.898	[-0.13, 0.148]	0.004	[-0.059, 0.068]
Combined	(a) Attributes viewed	0.000	0.972	[-0.027, 0.028]	0.001	[-0.07, 0.073]
Combined	(Odd attributes viewed)	-0.001	0.957	[-0.024, 0.023]	-0.002	[-0.073, 0.07]
Combined	(Normal attributes viewed)	0.001	0.761	[-0.006, 0.008]	0.013	[-0.071, 0.097]
Combined	(b) Fixations	0.039	0.662	[-0.135, 0.212]	0.018	[-0.063, 0.1]
Combined	(Odd fixations)	0.036	0.653	[-0.122, 0.194]	0.019	[-0.063, 0.1]
Combined	(Normal fixations)	0.002	0.842	[-0.02, 0.025]	0.008	[-0.068, 0.083]

Table A.7: Within-Condition Effects of Cumulative Number of Odd Combinations (current profile and all previous profiles viewed within the condition), Candidate Scenario. Standardized effects correspond to the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the cumulative number of odd combinations (by the final task at the end of the condition) on the number of standard deviations increased in the outcome.

Condition	Outcome	Estimate	p value	95% CI	Standardized effect	Std. eff. 95% CI
Incongruent	(a) Attributes viewed	0.000	0.993	[-0.036, 0.037]	0.000	[-0.058, 0.059]
Incongruent	(Odd attributes viewed)	-0.001	0.898	[-0.022, 0.019]	-0.004	[-0.06, 0.053]
Incongruent	(Normal attributes viewed)	0.001	0.894	[-0.02, 0.023]	0.004	[-0.058, 0.067]
Incongruent	(b) Fixations	-0.018	0.888	[-0.265, 0.229]	-0.005	[-0.072, 0.062]
Incongruent	(Odd fixations)	-0.039	0.569	[-0.172, 0.094]	-0.018	[-0.081, 0.044]
Incongruent	(Normal fixations)	0.021	0.782	[-0.127, 0.169]	0.010	[-0.063, 0.084]
Nonsensical	(a) Attributes viewed	-0.026	0.186	[-0.065, 0.013]	-0.043	[-0.106, 0.021]
Nonsensical	(Odd attributes viewed)	-0.017	0.135	[-0.039, 0.005]	-0.050	[-0.115, 0.015]
Nonsensical	(Normal attributes viewed)	-0.009	0.430	[-0.032, 0.014]	-0.026	[-0.091, 0.039]
Nonsensical	(b) Fixations	-0.093	0.580	[-0.42, 0.235]	-0.025	[-0.113, 0.063]
Nonsensical	(Odd fixations)	-0.109	0.241	[-0.291, 0.073]	-0.052	[-0.139, 0.035]
Nonsensical	(Normal fixations)	0.016	0.861	[-0.167, 0.2]	0.008	[-0.08, 0.096]
Combined	(a) Attributes viewed	0.014	0.302	[-0.013, 0.041]	0.037	[-0.034, 0.108]
Combined	(Odd attributes viewed)	0.016	0.116	[-0.004, 0.036]	0.054	[-0.013, 0.122]
Combined	(Normal attributes viewed)	-0.002	0.707	[-0.013, 0.009]	-0.017	[-0.105, 0.071]
Combined	(b) Fixations	0.123	0.190	[-0.061, 0.306]	0.050	[-0.025, 0.125]
Combined	(Odd fixations)	0.077	0.311	[-0.072, 0.226]	0.040	[-0.037, 0.117]
Combined	(Normal fixations)	0.046	0.118	[-0.012, 0.103]	0.060	[-0.015, 0.136]

Table A.8: Within-Condition Effects of Cumulative Number of Odd Combinations (current profile and all previous profiles viewed within the condition), Immigrant Scenario. Standardized effects correspond to the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the cumulative number of odd combinations (by the final task at the end of the condition) on the number of standard deviations increased in the outcome.

F Additional Figures




Figure A.2: Effect of the number of odd combinations on the proportion of decision tasks with positive search metric, within condition




Figure A.3: Standardized effect of the number of odd combinations on the proportion of decision tasks with positive search metric, within condition






Figure A.4: Effect of the number of odd combinations on the mean search metric, within condition


(a) Candidate scenario, levels



(b) Candidate scenario, differences



(c) Immigrant scenario, levels



(d) Immigrant scenario, differences




Figure A.5: Proportion of decision tasks with positive search metric, across conditions







Figure A.6: Mean search metric, across conditions





Figure A.7: Effect of the number of odd combinations on the proportion of decision tasks with positive search metric, within condition, only for first condition seen by respondents







Figure A.8: Proportion of decision tasks with positive search metric, across conditions, only first condition seen by respondents







Figure A.9: Mean search metric, across conditions, only first condition seen by respondents






Figure A.10: Effect of the number of odd combinations on the mean search metric, within condition, only for first condition seen by respondents

(a) Results pooled over both scenarios, fixations per profile



(b) Results pooled over both scenarios, attributes viewed per profile






Figure A.11: Mean number of fixations and attributes viewed per profile, across conditions, pooled over both scenarios


(a) Candidate scenario, fixations per profile



(b) Candidate scenario, attributes viewed per profile



(c) Immigrant scenario, fixations per profile



(d) Immigrant scenario, attributes viewed per profile





Figure A.12: Mean number of fixations and attributes viewed per profile, across conditions, only for first condition seen by respondents

(a) Candidate scenario



(b) Immigrant scenario





Figure A.13: Cumulative effect of the number of odd combinations on the proportion of decision tasks with positive search metric, within condition

(a) Candidate scenario



(b) Immigrant scenario





Figure A.14: Number of fixations on each attribute per profile, across conditions, only first condition seen by respondents

(a) Candidate scenario



(b) Immigrant scenario





Figure A.15: Proportion of profiles in which attribute was viewed, across conditions

(a) Candidate scenario



(b) Immigrant scenario





Figure A.16: Duration of fixations on each attribute per profile, across conditions

(a) Candidate scenario



(b) Immigrant scenario





Figure A.17: Standardized effects of attribute being in odd combination on number of fixations on the attribute, within condition. Standardized effects correspond to the increase in the number of standard deviations of the outcome (i.e. number of fixations on attribute in question) resulting from the attribute being in an odd combination vs. not.

(a) Candidate scenario



(b) Immigrant scenario





Figure A.18: Effect of attribute being in odd combination on number of fixations on the attribute, within condition, only first condition seen by respondents

(a) Candidate scenario



(b) Immigrant scenario





Figure A.19: Effect of attribute being in odd combination on duration of fixations on the attribute, within condition

(a) Candidate scenario



(b) Immigrant scenario




Figure A.20: Effect of cumulative frequency of attribute being in odd combination on number of fixations on the attribute, within condition




Figure A.21: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (candidate scenario), results from Normal condition, Incongruent condition, and difference




Figure A.22: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (candidate scenario), results from Normal condition, Combined condition, and difference




Figure A.23: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (immigrant scenario), results from Normal condition, Incongruent condition, and difference




Figure A.24: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (immigrant scenario), results from Normal condition, Combined condition, and difference




Figure A.25: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (candidate scenario), results from Incongruent condition, Combined condition, and difference





Figure A.26: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (immigrant scenario), results from Incongruent condition, Combined condition, and difference

(a) Candidate scenario



(b) Immigrant scenario




Figure A.27: Attribute partial R2 across conditions




Figure A.28: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (Candidate scenario), Nonsensical condition, by number of odd combinations in profile, and difference




Figure A.29: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (Immigrant scenario), Nonsensical condition, by number of odd combinations in profile, and difference




Figure A.30: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (candidate scenario), Combined condition, whether or not there is an odd combination involving Age, and difference




Figure A.31: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (candidate scenario), Combined condition, whether or not there is an odd combination involving Party, and difference




Figure A.32: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (candidate scenario), Combined condition, whether or not there is an odd combination involving Political Experience, and difference




Figure A.33: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (candidate scenario), Combined condition, whether or not there is an odd combination involving Prior Profession, and difference




Figure A.34: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (candidate scenario), Combined condition, whether or not there is an odd combination involving Highest Education, and difference




Figure A.35: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (candidate scenario), Combined condition, whether or not there is an odd combination involving Tax Position, and difference




Figure A.36: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (candidate scenario), Combined condition, whether or not there is an odd combination involving Gun Control Position, and difference




Figure A.37: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (immigrant scenario), Combined condition, whether or not there is an odd combination involving Gender, and difference




Figure A.38: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (immigrant scenario), Combined condition, whether or not there is an odd combination involving Migrant Type, and difference




Figure A.39: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (immigrant scenario), Combined condition, whether or not there is an odd combination involving Country of Origin, and difference




Figure A.40: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (immigrant scenario), Combined condition, whether or not there is an odd combination involving Profession, and difference




Figure A.41: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (immigrant scenario), Combined condition, whether or not there is an odd combination involving Education, and difference




Figure A.42: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (immigrant scenario), Combined condition, whether or not there is an odd combination involving Reason for Leaving Country of Origin, and difference




Figure A.43: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (candidate scenario), combined condition, subsetted by respondents based on number of odd combinations viewed by respondent, and difference




Figure A.44: Effects of attributes on respondent choice (immigrant scenario), combined condition, subsetted by respondents based on number of odd combinations viewed by respondent, and difference

G Additional Literature

Examples of methodological and applied research in political science that address concerns about and/or implications of odd conjoint profiles include the following.

- [A1] Abramson, Scott F, Korhan Koçak and Asya Magazinnik. 2022. “What do we learn about voter preferences from conjoint experiments?” *American Journal of Political Science* 66(4):1008–1020.
- [A2] Adem, Muna and Denise Ambriz. 2023. “What Makes a Citizen? Contemporary Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenry.” *Social Forces* 102(2):730–752.
- [A4] Auerbach, Adam Michael and Tariq Thachil. 2018. “How clients select brokers: Competition and choice in India’s slums.” *American Political Science Review* 112(4):775–791.
- [A5] Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Lucy Martin and Kenneth Scheve. 2017. “The structure of American income tax policy preferences.” *The Journal of Politics* 79(1):1–16.
- [A6] Bansak, Kirk, Jens Hainmueller, Daniel J Hopkins and Teppei Yamamoto. 2021. Conjoint Survey Experiments. In *Advances in Experimental Political Science*, ed. James N Druckman and Donald P Green. Cambridge University Press chapter 2.
- [A6] Barnes, Lucy, Jack Blumenau and Benjamin E Lauderdale. 2022. “Measuring attitudes toward public spending using a multivariate tax summary experiment.” *American Journal of Political Science* 66(1):205–221.
- [A10] Bechtel, Michael M, Federica Genovese and Kenneth F Scheve. 2019. “Interests, norms and support for the provision of global public goods: the case of climate co-operation.” *British Journal of Political Science* 49(4):1333–1355.
- [A8] Bechtel, Michael M and Roman Liesch. 2020. “Reforms and redistribution: Disentangling the egoistic and sociotropic origins of voter preferences.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 84(1):1–23.
- [A9] Berinsky, Adam J, Tesalia Rizzo, Leah R Rosenzweig and Elisha Heaps. 2020. “Attribute affinity: US natives’ attitudes toward immigrants.” *Political Behavior* 42(3):745–768.
- [A10] Cammett, Melani, Christiana Parreira, Dominika Kruszewska-Eduardo and Sami Atallah. 2022. “Commitment to the “national” in post-conflict countries: public and private security provision in Lebanon.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66(7-8):1235–1262.
- [A12] Carnes, Nicholas and Noam Lupu. 2016. “Do voters dislike working-class candidates? Voter biases and the descriptive underrepresentation of the working class.” *American Political Science Review* 110(4):832–844.
- [A12] Chauchard, Simon. 2016. “Unpacking ethnic preferences: Theory and micro-level evidence from North India.” *Comparative Political Studies* 49(2):253–284.
- [A13] Clayton, Katherine, Jeremy Ferwerda and Yusaku Horiuchi. 2021. “Exposure to immigration and admission preferences: Evidence from France.” *Political Behavior* 43(1):175–200.
- [A15] De la Cuesta, Brandon, Naoki Egami and Kosuke Imai. 2022. “Improving the external validity of conjoint analysis: the essential role of profile distribution.” *Political Analysis* 30(1):19–45.
- [A15] Denney, Steven and Christopher Green. 2021. “Who should be admitted? Conjoint analysis of South Korean attitudes toward immigrants.” *Ethnicities* 21(1):120–145.
- [A16] Gallego, Aina and Paul Marx. 2017. “Multi-dimensional preferences for labour market reforms: a conjoint experiment.” *Journal of European public policy* 24(7):1027–1047.
- [A17] Ganter, Flavien. 2023. “Identification of preferences in forced-choice conjoint experiments: Reassessing the quantity of interest.” *Political Analysis* 31(1):98–112.

- [A18] Goplerud, Max, Kosuke Imai and Nicole E Pashley. 2022. “Estimating heterogeneous causal effects of high-dimensional treatments: Application to conjoint analysis.” *arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.01357* .
- [A19] Green-Pedersen, Christoffer and Ida B Hjermlitslev. 2024. “A compromising mindset? How citizens evaluate the trade-offs in coalition politics.” *European Journal of Political Research* 63(2):539–555.
- [A18] Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel J Hopkins. 2015. “The hidden American immigration consensus: A conjoint analysis of attitudes toward immigrants.” *American journal of political science* 59(3):529–548.
- [A19] Hainmueller, Jens, Daniel J Hopkins and Teppei Yamamoto. 2014. “Causal inference in conjoint analysis: Understanding multidimensional choices via stated preference experiments.” *Political Analysis* 22(1):1–30.
- [A22] Ham, Dae Woong, Kosuke Imai and Lucas Janson. 2022. “Using Machine Learning to Test Causal Hypotheses in Conjoint Analysis.” *arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.08343* .
- [A21] Hartman, Alexandra C and Benjamin S Morse. 2020. “Violence, empathy and altruism: Evidence from the Ivorian refugee crisis in Liberia.” *British Journal of Political Science* 50(2):731–755.
- [A22] Hemker, Johannes and Anselm Rink. 2017. “Multiple dimensions of bureaucratic discrimination: Evidence from German welfare offices.” *American Journal of Political Science* 61(4):786–803.
- [A26] Horiuchi, Yusaku, Daniel M Smith and Teppei Yamamoto. 2018. “Measuring voters’ multidimensional policy preferences with conjoint analysis: Application to Japan’s 2014 election.” *Political analysis* 26(2):190–209.
- [A27] Horiuchi, Yusaku, Zachary Markovich and Teppei Yamamoto. 2022. “Does conjoint analysis mitigate social desirability bias?” *Political Analysis* 30(4):535–549.
- [A29] Huff, Connor and Joshua D Kertzer. 2018. “How the public defines terrorism.” *American Journal of Political Science* 62(1):55–71.
- [A28] Kage, Rieko, Frances M Rosenbluth and Seiki Tanaka. 2019. “What explains low female political representation? Evidence from survey experiments in Japan.” *Politics & Gender* 15(2):285–309.
- [A29] Kertzer, Joshua D, Jonathan Renshon and Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2021. “How do observers assess resolve?” *British Journal of Political Science* 51(1):308–330.
- [A30] Knotz, Carlo Michael, Mia Katharina Gandenberger, Flavia Fossati and Giuliano Bonoli. 2021. “Public attitudes toward pandemic triage: evidence from conjoint survey experiments in Switzerland.” *Social Science & Medicine* 285:114238.
- [A31] Leeper, Thomas J and Joshua Robison. 2020. “More important, but for what exactly? The insignificant role of subjective issue importance in vote decisions.” *Political Behavior* 42(1):239–259.
- [A32] Lehrer, Roni, Pirmin Stöckle and Sebastian Juhl. 2024. “Assessing the relative influence of party unity on vote choice: evidence from a conjoint experiment.” *Political Science Research and Methods* 12(1):220–228.
- [A33] Markgraf, Jonas and Guillermo Rosas. 2024. “Borrowing to Self-Insure? Credit Access and Support for Welfare.” *The Journal of Politics* 86(2):642–655.
- [A42] Oliveros, Virginia and Christian Schuster. 2018. “Merit, tenure, and bureaucratic behavior: Evidence from a conjoint experiment in the Dominican Republic.” *Comparative Political Studies* 51(6):759–792.
- [A35] Ono, Yoshikuni and Barry C Burden. 2019. “The contingent effects of candidate sex on voter choice.” *Political Behavior* 41:583–607.

- [A36] Ono, Yoshikuni and Masahiro Yamada. 2020. “Do voters prefer gender stereotypic candidates? Evidence from a conjoint survey experiment in Japan.” *Political Science Research and Methods* 8(3):477–492.
- [A37] Panel, S, Emilien Paulis, J-B Pilet, Sébastien Rojon and Davide Vittori. 2023. “The Lure of Technocrats: A Conjoint Experiment on Preferences for Technocratic Ministers in Six European Countries.” *Political Behavior* pp. 1–24.
- [A38] Peterson, Erik. 2017. “The role of the information environment in partisan voting.” *The Journal of Politics* 79(4):1191–1204.
- [A39] Peyton, Kyle, Chagai M Weiss and Paige E Vaughn. 2022. “Beliefs about minority representation in policing and support for diversification.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 119(52):e2213986119.
- [A40] Rosenberg, Jonas Hultin and Johan Wejryd. 2022. “Attitudes toward competing voting-right requirements: Evidence from a conjoint experiment.” *Electoral Studies* 77:102470.
- [A41] Rudolph, Lukas, Markus Freitag and Paul W Thurner. 2024. “Deontological and consequentialist preferences towards arms exports: A comparative conjoint experiment in France and Germany.” *European Journal of Political Research* 63(2):705–728.
- [A42] Saha, Sparsha and Ana Catalano Weeks. 2022. “Ambitious women: Gender and voter perceptions of candidate ambition.” *Political Behavior* 44(2):779–805.
- [A43] Spilker, Gabriele, Thomas Bernauer and Víctor Umaña. 2016. “Selecting partner countries for preferential trade agreements: Experimental evidence from Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vietnam.” *International Studies Quarterly* 60(4):706–718.