

Online Appendix for  
“News Sharing on Social Media: Mapping the  
Ideology of News Media Content, Politicians,  
and the Mass Public”

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## A Validating estimates for ordinary users


To validate our news-sharing measure of ideology for ordinary users, we use a unique set of survey and social media data from a representative sample of Twitter users that were collected during the 2016 US presidential election campaign. The survey data were collected through the public opinion firm YouGov and consist of responses to a standard battery of political questions and the Twitter user names of respondents who gave permission for their survey responses be linked to their Twitter timelines.<sup>1</sup> These data are useful because they allow us to compare common attitudinal and partisan-based measures of ideology with our news-sharing measure as estimated from the news shared by respondents on social media. The survey and Twitter data were collected in 2016 and contain responses and social media posts from 1,341 respondents. However, many social media users are not, in general, politically engaged in their online behavior, and thus we use the subset of data from the 481 respondents (36%) who posted at least five links to national news media stories.

To estimate media scores for these survey respondents, we use social media data both from these respondents and from politicians (members of Congress, governors, members of executive) when fitting the model. Although the data collection periods for the YouGov respondents (2016) and politicians (2015-2021) differ, we include data from the latter to increase estimation precision (given the relatively small set of survey respondents). Nevertheless, despite temporal differences in collection periods, as we will see, estimates of the news-sharing ideology of ordinary users are highly correlated with survey-based measures from those same users.

We investigate the convergent validity of the news-sharing measure by examining its relationship with three separate survey-based measures of ideology and partisanship. First, we construct an issue-based ideological scale using survey responses to eight policy-related questions concerning issues salient during the 2016 US presidential campaign. These questions

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<sup>1</sup>The collection of these survey and social media data was approved by the New York University Institutional Review Board (IRB-12-9058).



**Figure A1: Comparison between media scores and survey-based measures of political ideology.** Points in Panels A and B are sized relative to the number of news media articles tweeted by each survey respondent.

concern, for example, attitudes toward building a wall on the border with Mexico, expanding the Affordable Care Act, and whether free trade is beneficial to the economy. From responses to the eight policy-related questions, we build a policy-based ideological index ( $\alpha = 0.83$ ) (complete survey question text is available in [Appendix H](#)). Second, we use a measure of respondents’ judgments about their own ideology by using a standard ideological placement scale. Finally, we measure partisanship using a seven-item scale that ranges from “Strong Democrat” to “Strong Republican.”

We calibrate our expectations about the relationship between the news-sharing and survey-based measures of ideology by first calculating the correlation between each pair of the survey-based measures. As one would expect, pairwise comparisons of measures based on survey data are relatively highly correlated, with an average correlation of 0.64.<sup>2</sup> To examine the relationship between the news-sharing measure and each of the survey-based

<sup>2</sup> $\rho^{(\text{self-placement, issues})} = 0.62$  (se = 0.01),  $\rho^{(\text{self-placement, party ID})} = 0.56$  (se = 0.01),  $\rho^{(\text{issues, party ID})} = 0.73$  (se = 0.01).

measures, we present these data graphically in [Figure A1](#). In Panels A and B, we see that both the issue-based and self-placement ideological scales are similarly highly correlated with the sharing-based measure. In Panel C, we show that the strength of partisanship is highly correlated with the news-sharing measure of ideology, with independents (center box plot) finding themselves as centrists on the news-sharing measure. Finally, we note that ideology as measured by media scores is more highly correlated with each survey-based measure (0.73, on average) as the survey-based measures are correlated between themselves (0.64, on average, as noted above).

## B Estimates with and without party-level priors

In the main article, we provide media score estimates of politicians using a model that includes political party-level information through a hierarchical prior on politicians' media scores. In other words, we set priors such that the ideology estimates for Democratic politicians,  $\theta_{i,p=D}$ , are given a common prior specific to Democrats:

$$\theta_{i,p=D} \sim \text{Normal}(\mu_{p=D}^{(\theta)}, \sigma_{p=D}^{(\theta)}), \quad (\text{A1})$$

and a separate prior for the ideology,  $\theta_{i,p=R}$ , of Republicans:


$$\theta_{i,p=R} \sim \text{Normal}(\mu_{p=R}^{(\theta)}, \sigma_{p=R}^{(\theta)}). \quad (\text{A2})$$

It is useful for estimation to include such information, especially when data are scarce, such as for politicians who share relatively little news. Nevertheless, it is also important to examine how well the model performs absent this party-level information by fitting a model that includes a prior on the ideology estimates that is common to all actors. We thus fit the same model as in the main article, but remove any party information by dropping the subscript  $p$  on  $\theta_{ip}$ , thus setting all parameters  $\theta_i$  to come from a common distribution:


$$\theta_i \sim \text{Normal}(\mu^{(\theta)}, \sigma^{(\theta)}). \quad (\text{A3})$$

The correlation between estimates with and without the party-level prior is 0.99 (se = 0.004); is 0.99 (se = 0.010) for Democrats only; and 0.99 (se = 0.008) for Republicans only. The differences in the estimates are driven primarily by media score estimates from members of Congress who tweet very little and who are therefore pulled in more strongly by the party-level prior. This is why the much smaller points shown in [Figure A3](#) (which denote fewer news articles shared) are those that diverge most from the model with party-level priors.

A. With party-specific priors over theta




B. With common prior over theta (no party-specific priors)




**Figure A2: Histograms of media scores for members of Congress comparing a model with party-level priors to one with a common prior).** This figure presents histograms of the ideology of members of Congress as estimated from their news-sharing behavior for a model *with* separate priors on the ideology parameters for Democratic and Republican politicians (top panel), and *without* party-level priors (bottom panel).

A. Democrats



B. Republicans



With party-specific prior over theta

**Figure A3: Scatterplot comparing media scores for members of Congress from a model with party-level priors to one with a common prior).** This figure presents differences in estimates of  $\theta_i$  in a model with a common prior over all parameters  $\theta_i$  (y axis), and a model with separate priors on  $\theta_{ip}$  depending on whether a given politician is a Republican or Democrat (x axis). Point sizes are proportional to the number of news media links shared by each politician.

## C Ideological diversity in the sharing of national news media

The primary goal of the measurement model is to estimate the ideology of politicians, users, and news media organizations. The variance parameter in the model,  $\omega_m$ , however, also provides a substantively interesting quantity in that it indicates the extent to which political ideology drives sharing of a given news media domain: a larger value of  $\omega_m$  indicates that the ideological distance between a user and news media site is less predictive of whether a news media domain  $m$  is shared by users in general.<sup>3</sup> For example, we might expect that larger, more general mainstream news organizations (e.g. nytimes.com, washingtonpost.com, wsj.com, foxnews.com) will be shared by users across the political spectrum in comparison to much more ideologically narrow news sites.

To investigate this, we present in [Figure A4](#) the estimates of  $\omega_m$  for the 150 most frequently shared news organizations. In general, as expected, well-known large and medium-sized news organizations have values of  $\omega_m$  that are the largest. For instance, the New York Times, Washington Post, and CNN have some of the largest estimated values of  $\omega_m$  indicating that despite their ideological position, they are broadly shared across the ideological spectrum i.e., a user’s or politician’s ideological distance from these outlets is less predictive of whether they will be shared than the much more niche news media that have substantially smaller values of  $\omega_m$ . Finally, we note that alternatively one could model these parameters at the user level (i.e.  $\omega_i$ ), to capture differences in the extent that some users are ideologically diverse in their sharing of news media, and others more ideologically narrow. However, the precision of such parameters would require relatively substantial amounts of data for each user (compared to the present data, in which there are many observations per media organization), and thus we in general prefer a model with the dispersion parameter modeled at the level of the media organization.

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<sup>3</sup>Interpreting variance parameters for substantive reasons has also been done in related work with ideological scaling models (e.g. [Lauderdale, 2010](#); [Peterson and Spirling, 2018](#); [Eady and Loewen, 2021](#)).






Figure A4: Variance parameters  $\omega_m$  for the 150 most shared news domains.

## D List of national news media organizations

Table A1: List of national news domains

News Media	Domain
1 ABC News	abcnews.go.com
2 Accuracy in Media	aim.org
3 AlterNet	alternet.org
4 American Conservative	theamericanconservative.com
5 American Prospect	prospect.org
6 American Spectator	spectator.org
7 American Thinker	americanthinker.com
8 Anti-Media	theantimedia.org
9 Associated Press	apnews.com
10 Atlanta Black Star	atlantablackstar.com
11 attn:	attn.com
12 Axios	axios.com
13 Bipartisan Report	bipartisanreport.com
14 BIZPAC Review	bizpacreview.com
15 Black America Web	blackamericaweb.com
16 Black News	blacknews.com
17 Blavity	blavity.com
18 Bloomberg	bloomberg.com
19 Boston Review	bostonreview.net
20 Breitbart	breitbart.com
21 Business Insider	businessinsider.com
22 BuzzFeed News	buzzfeednews.com
23 C-Span	c-span.org
24 Campus Reform	campusreform.org
25 CBS News	cbsnews.com
26 Christian Broadcasting Network	cbn.com/cbnnews
27 Christian Science Monitor	csmonitor.com
28 Circa	circa.com
29 City Journal	city-journal.org
30 CNBC	cnbc.com
31 CNN	cnn.com
32 Color Lines	colorlines.com
33 Columbia Journalism Review	cjr.org
34 Commentary	commentarymagazine.com
35 Common Dreams	commondreams.org
36 Conservative Review	conservativereview.com
37 Conservative Tribune	conservativetribune.com
38 Cook Political Report	cookpolitical.com

39	Counter Punch	counterpunch.org
40	CQ Roll Call	rollcall.com
41	Crisis Magazine	crisismagazine.com
42	Crooked Media	crooked.com
43	Crooks and Liars	crooksandliars.com
44	CRTV	crtv.com
45	Current Affairs	currentaffairs.org
46	Daily Kos	dailykos.com
47	Daily Signal	dailysignal.com
48	Daily Wire	dailywire.com
49	Democracy NOW!	democracynow.org
50	Dissent Magazine	dissentmagazine.org
51	Drudge Report	drudgereport.com
52	Elite Daily	elitedaily.com
53	Epoch Times	theepochtimes.com
54	FactCheck.org	factcheck.org
55	FAIR	fair.org
56	First Things	firstthings.com
57	FiveThirtyEight	fivethirtyeight.com
58	Forbes	forbes.com
59	Foreign Affairs	foreignaffairs.com
60	Foreign Policy	foreignpolicy.com
61	Fortune	fortune.com
62	Fox News	foxnews.com
63	Fox News Business	foxbusiness.com
64	Frontpage Mag	frontpagemag.com
65	Full Measure News	fullmeasure.news
66	Gallup News	gallup.com
67	GOOD	good.is
68	Governing	governing.com
69	Ground Truth	thegroundtruthproject.org
70	Harper's Magazine	harpers.org
71	Harvard Business Review	hbr.org
72	HLN	cnn.com/hln
73	HotAir	hotair.com
74	Huffington Post	huffingtonpost.com
75	In These Times	inthesetimes.com
76	Independent Journal Review	ijr.com
77	Infowars	infowars.com
78	Inquisitr	inquisitr.com
79	InstaPundit	instapundit.com
80	Intellihub News	intellihub.com
81	International Business Times	ibtimes.com
82	Jacobin	jacobinmag.com
83	Jezebel	jezebel.com

84	Just Security	justsecurity.org
85	Lawfare	lawfareblog.com
86	Levin TV	levintv.com
87	LifeZette	lifezette.com
88	Mad World News	madworldnews.com
89	Mashable Social Good	mashable.com
90	McClatchy	mcclatchydc.com
91	Media Matters	mediamatters.org
92	Media Research Center	mrc.org
93	Media Research Center CNS News	cnsnews.com
94	Media Research Center MRCTV	mrctv.org
95	Media Research Center Newsbusters	newsbusters.org
96	Mediaite	mediaite.com
97	Mic News	mic.com
98	Mint Press News	mintpressnews.com
99	Morning Consult	morningconsult.com
100	Mother Jones	motherjones.com
101	Ms. Magazine	msmagazine.com
102	MSNBC	msnbc.com
103	National Affairs	nationalaffairs.com
104	National Interest	nationalinterest.org
105	National Journal	nationaljournal.com
106	National Review	nationalreview.com
107	NBC News	nbcnews.com
108	New York Magazine	nymag.com
109	New York Observer	observer.com
110	Newsmax	newsmax.com
111	NewsOne	newsone.com
112	Newsweek	newsweek.com
113	Nieman Journalism Lab	niemanlab.org
114	Now This	nowthisnews.com
115	NPR	npr.org
116	One American News	oann.com
117	OZY	ozy.com
118	Pacific Standard	psmag.com
119	Palmer Report	palmerreport.com
120	PBS	pbs.org
121	PEW Research	pewresearch.org
122	PJ Media	pjmedia.com
123	Political Insider	thepoliticalinsider.com
124	Politico	politico.com
125	Politicus USA	politicususa.com
126	Politifact	politifact.com
127	Poynter	poynter.org
128	Project Veritas	projectveritas.com

129	Project Veritas Action	projectveritasaction.com
130	ProPublica	propublica.org
131	Public Policy Polling	publicpolicypolling.com
132	Quartz	qz.com
133	Quinnipiac Polling	poll.qu.edu
134	Rare	rare.us
135	Rasmussen Reports	rasmussenreports.com
136	Raw Story	rawstory.com
137	Real Clear Politics	realclearpolitics.com
138	Reason	reason.com
139	Red State	redstate.com
140	Reuters	reuters.com
141	Reuters TV	reuters.tv
142	Reveal	revealnews.org
143	Reverb Press	reverbpress.com
144	Revolver.News	revolver.news
145	Right Side Broadcasting Network	rsbn.tv
146	Right Wing News	rightwingnews.com
147	Right Wing Watch	rightwingwatch.org
148	Salon	salon.com
149	Share Blue	shareblue.com
150	Slate	slate.com
151	Snopes	snopes.com
152	Southern Poverty Law Center	splcenter.org
153	Splinter	splinternews.com
154	Stars and Stripes	stripes.com
155	Talking Points Memo	talkingpointsmemo.com
156	Task and Purpose	taskandpurpose.com
157	Telemundo Noticias	telemundo.com/noticias
158	The Atlantic	theatlantic.com
159	The Baffler	thebaffler.com
160	The Blaze	theblaze.com
161	The Bulwark	thebulwark.com
162	The Center for Public Integrity	publicintegrity.org
163	The Conversation US	theconversation.com
164	The Daily Banter	thedailybanter.com
165	The Daily Beast	thedailybeast.com
166	The Daily Caller	dailycaller.com
167	The Daily Dot	dailydot.com
168	The Dispatch	thedispatch.com
169	The Economist US	economist.com
170	The Federalist	thefederalist.com
171	The Guardian US	theguardian.com
172	The Hill	thehill.com
173	The Intercept	theintercept.com

174	The Marshall Project	themarshallproject.org
175	The McLaughlin Group	mclaughlin.com
176	The Nation	thenation.com
177	The National Pulse	thenationalpulse.com
178	The New Republic	newrepublic.com
179	The New York Post	nypost.com
180	The New York Times	nytimes.com
181	The New Yorker	newyorker.com
182	The Onion	theonion.com
183	The Politichicks	politichicks.com
184	The Progressive	progressive.org
185	The Real News	therealnews.com
186	The Resurgent	theresurgent.com
187	The Right Scoop	therightscoop.com
188	The Root	theroot.com
189	The Stream	stream.org
190	The Voice of America	voanews.com
191	The Week	theweek.com
192	The Weekly Standard	weeklystandard.com
193	The Young Turks	tytnetwork.com
194	Think Progress	thinkprogress.org
195	TIME	time.com
196	Townhall	townhall.com
197	True Pundit	truepundit.com
198	Truth Dig	truthdig.com
199	Truthout	truth-out.org
200	Twitchy Team	twitchy.com
201	United Press International	upi.com
202	Univision Noticias	univision.com
203	US News & World Report	usnews.com
204	USA Today	usatoday.com
205	Vanity Fair	vanityfair.com
206	VICE	vice.com
207	Vox	vox.com
208	Wall Street Journal	wsj.com
209	Washington Examiner	washingtonexaminer.com
210	Washington Free Beacon	freebeacon.com
211	Washington Monthly	washingtonmonthly.com
212	Washington Post	washingtonpost.com
213	Washington Times	washingtontimes.com
214	Western Journal	westernjournal.com
215	WND	wnd.com
216	World Affairs	worldaffairsjournal.org
217	World News Network	wn.com
218	World Politics Review	worldpoliticsreview.com


219 World Socialist Web Site  
220 Yahoo News

[wsws.org](http://wsws.org)  
[yahoo.com/news](http://yahoo.com/news)

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## E Comparing estimates from Barberá (2015) between all users and users who share news media

In Figure 7 of the main article, we present side-by-side estimates of the ideology of ordinary users and members of Congress based on news-sharing behavior and following behavior. In both panels of that figure, the estimates shown are for the same users. These users are those who both followed 3+ political actors (the follower-based model cutoff in Barberá, 2015) and who shared at least five news media articles (the cut-off used in the article for calculating a user’s media score). To see differences between the follower-based estimates for users who share news compared to all users, we present this comparison in Figure A5. As the figure shows, the sort of users who share at least five news media articles are more ideologically polarized than the full set of users. Theoretically, this makes sense given that users who share political news are more likely to be politically engaged generally, which can be associated, for example, with more polarized ideological positioning (Argyle and Pope, 2022).



**Figure A5: Comparison of follower-based ideology among users who share at least five news media links and all users.** This figure presents density plots of the follower-based (Barberá, 2015) ideology of ordinary users and members of Congress among users who have shared 5 (panel A) or more news media stories and all users (panel B). Panel A of this figure is equivalent to Panel A in Figure 7 of the main article.



## F Ideology estimates of The Squad and Freedom Caucus

In Figure 4 of the main article, we show that media scores for politicians are highly correlated with their ideology as estimated from roll-call data (i.e. NOMINATE scores). We also demonstrate that members of “The Squad”—a vocal progressive caucus on the ideological left—are estimated further to the left of the vast majority of their colleagues in the Democratic Party. The Squad’s placement to the far left has high face validity, being consistent with popular and expert perceptions of their positioning, even if roll-call estimates suggest that members of The Squad are centrist (Duck-Mayr and Montgomery, 2023).




Figure A6: Ideology of members of Congress from news-sharing compared to NOMINATE (Freedom Caucus & The Squad).

In Figure A6, we also show media score estimates for members of the right-wing “Freedom Caucus”, a caucus of the most conservative Republicans in the House. Estimates for members of the Freedom Caucus, as would be expected, are to the far right of most of their Republican colleagues, and consistent with their roll-call voting ideology. The largest outlier among members of the Freedom Caucus is Devin Nunes, whose voting record (NOMINATE) ideology

is the most moderate among the Freedom Caucus and whose NOMINATE score is to the left of the median Republican member of Congress. This is theoretically consistent with Nunes' serving as a congressman in California in a relatively split Republican/Democratic district. However, in his public communications, and position as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Nunes was well-known as one of Donald Trump's most vocal and loyal supporters (Zengerle, 2018). He eventually resigned from office to become the CEO of Donald Trump's "Trump Media and Technology Group." Last, we note that the member of the Freedom Caucus who is the furthest to the ideological right according to news-sharing behavior (furthest right triangle in Figure A6) is Louis Gohmert. He is also the furthest to the ideological right among all Republican politicians in the 116th Congress.

## G Validity of media scores for members of Congress by year


In this section, we investigate the convergent validity of measures of ideology based on news sharing data when relatively little data are available. To do so, we estimate media scores for members of Congress separately with data from 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020.<sup>4</sup> Results are presented in [Figure A7](#). Panel A presents estimates as shown in Figure 4 from the main article, with high correlations between media scores and NOMINATE scores overall ( $\rho = 0.96$ , on average in the Senate and House) and within-party ( $\rho = 0.62$ , on average within the Democratic and Republican parties in each chamber). In Panel B, we report correlations between media scores computed by year (i.e. using substantially less data) and NOMINATE scores. The correlations are lower per year, suggesting that with less data we are, unsurprisingly, unable to estimate political actors' media scores as precisely as we can with the larger pooled dataset. However, the correlation between media scores is high overall ( $\rho = 0.96$ , in the Senate and House per year on average), with within-party correlations that are somewhat lower ( $\rho = 0.47$ , on average among Democrats and Republicans in each chamber). Thus while we lose precision, the estimates are clearly still meaningful. To give some sense of differences in the amount of data per politician in each sample, we note that the median number of shared news links per politician in the pooled dataset (Panel A) is 258. In the data subsetted by year, the median number of shares per politician is 57 (Panel B).

We also compare media scores from each individual year of data to those calculated from the pooled data. This provides us with some idea of how closely a single year's data might compare to a more ideal case in which many more data are available. The average overall correlation between estimates from each year's data and the pooled data is  $\rho = 0.98$ ; the average within-party correlation (calculated separately per chamber) is  $\rho = 0.78$ . Using one year's worth of data will thus provide estimates that are relatively highly correlated with the same measure that was estimated with substantially more data. However, as noted


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<sup>4</sup>As noted in the main article, the politicians we examine are from the 116th Congress, which ends after the end of 2020 (on January 3, 2021).

**A. Complete dataset**



**B. Data subsetted by year**



**Figure A7: Ideology of members of Congress from news-sharing compared to NOMINATE (per year).**

above, convergent validity (assessed with roll-call voting ideology) will be lower, a fact that researchers should keep in mind.

Finally, for applied research, one may wonder about the extent that having fewer data (e.g. a year's worth), may change the results of a substantive question of interest. To examine this, we test whether the results from the main article regarding electoral competitiveness

	DV: Ideological extremity as measured by news sharing				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
District alignment	0.130 (0.044)	0.156 (0.048)	0.154 (0.045)	0.100 (0.046)	0.065 (0.049)
Republican	0.008 (0.015)	0.008 (0.016)	0.003 (0.015)	0.010 (0.015)	0.012 (0.017)
Senator	-0.036 (0.019)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.056 (0.020)	-0.061 (0.021)
Nominate score	0.591 (0.092)	0.350 (0.099)	0.349 (0.092)	0.200 (0.095)	0.391 (0.103)
Nominate score $\times$ Republican	0.161 (0.114)	0.244 (0.124)	0.295 (0.116)	0.379 (0.120)	0.267 (0.131)
Intercept	-0.030 (0.016)	-0.043 (0.017)	-0.039 (0.016)	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.012 (0.018)
Data used to calculate media scores:	Pooled	2020	2019	2018	2017
N	527	496	496	474	440

**Table A2: Relationship between members of Congress’s ideological extremity, as measured by news-sharing, and district/state alignment (using pooled and by-year data)**

and the extremeness of news sharing-based ideology is replicable with data from only a single year of data. To do so, we replicate Model (4) from Table 2 in the main article, using estimates obtained from subsets of data from the years 2017 thru 2020 separately. Results are presented in [Table A2](#). Model (1) is a replication of the result with the pooled data (i.e. the same regression result as shown in the main article). Models 2–5 show the relationship between district co-partisan alignment and the ideology of members of Congress with media score estimates from separate years of data. As the results demonstrate, the relationship of interest (district alignment) is similar in magnitude and sign across the models. And, as in the pooled model (Model 1), the estimated relationship between district co-partisan alignment and politicians’ media scores are statistically significant at the 95% level in Models 2–4. In sum, although using less data unsurprisingly results in lower convergent validity, the results from an applied example are nevertheless robust to using media score estimates with only a single year of data.

## H Survey questions from social-media-linked survey data

Below we present the question wording and response categories for the questions used to examine the relationship between the news-sharing measure of political ideology and the survey-based measures.

### Issue-based ideological scale

To build the issue-based ideological scale, the survey indicators used were constructed from responses to the following 8 questions.

#### 1. Immigration

As shown on the scale below, some people think that the U.S. should deport all illegal immigrants and others think we should instead provide them with a path to citizenship. And of course others have opinions in between, such as allowing illegal immigrants to obtain guest worker status.

Please place yourself on this scale. Then place each of the following national figures on the same scale. [0, 1, ..., 99, 100]

0: Deport all illegal immigrants back to their home countries

100: Provide all illegal immigrants an eventual path to citizenship

## 2. Building a wall

As shown on the scale below, some people think we should build a wall between the United States and Mexico, while others think that this would be a foolish waste of resources and not address real issues of immigration. And of course some people have opinions in between.

Please place yourself on this scale. Then place each of the following national figures on the same scale. [0, 1, ..., 99, 100]

0: Build a wall

100: Address immigration Issues via other means

## 3. Tariffs

As shown on the scale below, some people think that we should increase tariffs on goods from China to protect American jobs from unfair competition, others think that this would lead to a trade war that would harm the American economy and cost jobs. And of course some people have opinions in between.

Please place yourself on this scale. Then place each of the following national figures on the same scale. [0, 1, ..., 99, 100]

0: Increase tariffs on China

100: A trade war would cost jobs

#### 4. Free trade

As shown on the scale below, some people think that we should reduce trade with other countries to protect American jobs from foreign competition, while others believe that we should increase trade to benefit American consumers and create more markets for American goods. And of course others have opinions in between.

Please place yourself on this scale. Then place each of the following national figures on the same scale. [0, 1, ..., 99, 100]

0: Reduce free trade with other countries

100: Increase free trade with other countries

#### 5. Use of military force

As shown on the scale below, some people think that military force should be used only as a last resort, while other people think that military force is usually the best way to solve international problems. And of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between.

Please place yourself on this scale. Then place each of the following national figures on the same scale. [0, 1, ..., 99, 100]

0: Military force should be used only as a last resort

100: Military force is usually the best way to solve international problems



## 6. Health care

The Affordable Care Act, signed into law by President Obama in 2010, restructured the U.S. health care system. As shown on the scale below, some people think that the health care law should be repealed entirely, while others think it should be expanded to cover more people and services. And of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, such as simply keeping the law as it is now.

Please place yourself on this scale. Then place each of the following national figures on the same scale. [0, 1, ..., 99, 100]

0: Completely repeal the entire health care law

100: Expand the health care law's coverage

## 7. Barring Muslims from entering the US

As shown on the scale below, some people think we should bar Muslims from entering the US to prevent terrorism, others think it is an essential aspect of the United States that we do not discriminate based on religion, and of course some people have opinions in between.

Please place yourself on this scale. Then place each of the following national figures on the same scale. [0, 1, ..., 99, 100]

0: Bar Muslims From Entering the US

100: Do Not Discriminate Based on Religion

## 8. Obamacare

As shown on the scale below, some people think we should repeal Obamacare and start over to handle health insurance, others think we should leave Obamacare in place, but expand coverage, and of course some people have opinions in between.

Please place yourself on this scale. Then place each of the following national figures on the same scale. [0, 1, ..., 99, 100]

0: Repeal Obamacare, Start Over

100: Keep Obamacare, Expand Coverage

## Ideological self-placement

The ideological self-placement measure was collected from the following question:

As shown on the scale below, some people in the U.S. tend to identify more with the political left, while others tend to identify more with the political right. And of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between. Please place yourself on this scale. Then place both of the U.S.'s two major parties on the same scale. Then, place each of the following candidates for president on the same scale. [0, 1, ..., 99, 100]

0: Far left

100: Far right

## Party Identification

The party identification measure was collected from the following two-part (conditional) question:

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...

Democrat

Republican

Independent

Other

Not sure

The above question was followed by options to probe the strength of each respondent's partisanship:

Strong Democrat (if response was Democrat)

Not very strong Democrat (if response was Democrat)

Strong Republican (if response was Republican)

Not very strong Republican (if response was Republican)

The Democratic Party (if response was Independent or Other)

The Republican Party (if response was Independent or Other)

Neither (if response was Independent or Other)

Not sure (if response was Independent or Other)

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