**Supplemental Appendix for “‘Still Doin’ Time’: An Analysis of the Conditional Effects of Legislative Term Limits on State Incarceration Rates”**

This appendix proceeds with two sections. First, we present a model that controls for partisan polarization. Second, we show a model in which the dependent variable involves correctional expenditures.

**Appendix A**

**Controlling for Political Polarization**

We have conducted an additional robustness check that involve data provided by Shor and McCarty (2011). Olson and Rogowski (2020) find that legislative term limits helped drive polarization in state chambers. It is possible that the increased effect that ideology has on incarceration rates for term limited states is being driven by polarization. To determine whether this is the case, we take the absolute difference between the NPAT score of each party’s median member in the lower chamber. It should be noted that the earliest year in NPAT state ideology database is 1993. We only focus on the lower chamber because Hamm, Hedlund, and Martorano (2001) find there is little difference between lower and upper chambers in state legislatures. Higher values indicate the legislature is more polarized. We use the same control variables and model specification as described in the main text. We present the results in Table A.

Our interactive variable remains statistically significant with the inclusion of the polarization measure—albeit the substantive effects are slightly smaller than the results in Table 1. It should be noted that the polarization measure is not statistically significant in the model. Because it appears that polarization has little effect on incarceration rates, we do not include it in the main text.

**Table A1.** State Incarceration Rates with Polarization Measure, 1994–2017

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Coefficient |
| Variable | (S.E.) |
| Legislative term limits × Government ideology | -0.401\* |
|  | (0.222) |
| Legislative term limits | 29.366\* |
|  | (15.663) |
| Government ideology | 0.133 |
|  | (0.094) |
| Citizen ideology | -0.208 |
|  | (0.223) |
| Legislative professionalism | 15.853 |
|  | (26.149) |
| Polarization | -2.959 |
|  | (7.532) |
| % Non-White | 7.667 |
|  | (53.574) |
| Income per capita | -2.299 |
|  | (5.745) |
| Economy size | -3.335\* |
|  | (1.357) |
| State minimum wage | 0.195 |
|  | (1.023) |
| Unemployment rate | -2.993\* |
|  | (1.228) |
| Poverty rate | 0.444 |
|  | (0.459) |
| Violent crime rate | 0.010 |
|  | (0.016) |
| Property crime rate | 0.003 |
|  | (0.002) |
| Interestgroup activity | 0.583 |
|  | (0.615) |
| Correctional expenditures*t-1* | 0.823\* |
|  | (0.026) |
| Constant | 76.837\* |
|  | (38.441) |
| BIC | 9,340 |
| Number of observations | 1,065 |

*Note*: Unit of analysis is a state in a given year. Dependent variable is the number of inmates in a state prison (per 100,000). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Coefficients estimated from a linear model. Model includes state and year fixed effects. Presented in parenthesis are robust standard errors clustered on each state. Bold entries indicate our main independent variables. \**p* ≤ 0.05 (all one-tailed tests).

**Appendix B**

**Correctional Budget Data**

It is important to test whether our theoretical expectation holds against different measures of incarceration. Specifically, we examine correctional spending within a state over time. We use the Stuckey et al. (2007) operationalization. Using data from the US Census Bureau (i.e., Annual Survey of State Government Finances), we calculate the percentage of a state’s budget that is allocated for corrections relative to the entire total expenditures. These data are available from 1994 and 2017. We use the same control variables and estimator has described in the main text.

The results are shown in Table B1. The Legislative Term Limits × Government Ideology interaction fails to reach statistical significance. We argue one reason that our variable of interest is not statistically significant with this alternative measure is because the increased use of private government facilities. Those facilities are not included in the state and federal adult correctional facilities census data.

**Table B1.** State Correctional Expenditures, 1994–2017

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 |
|  | Coefficient |
| Variable | (SE) |
| Legislative term limits × Government ideology | 0.001 |
|  | (0.024) |
| Legislative term limits | -0.886 |
|  | (1.614) |
| Government liberalism | 0.003 |
|  | (0.001) |
| Citizen liberalism | -0.009 |
|  | (0.015) |
| Legislative professionalism | 0.147 |
|  | (3.110) |
| % Non-White | -9.586\* |
|  | (5.008) |
| Income per capita | 0.379 |
|  | (0.540) |
| Economy size | -0.204 |
|  | (0.197) |
| State minimum wage | 0.295 |
|  | (0.178) |
| Unemployment rate | -0.219\* |
|  | (0.087) |
| Poverty rate | 0.018 |
|  | (0.052) |
| Violent crime rate | 0.003\* |
|  | (0.001) |
| Property crime rate | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) |
| Interest group activity | 0.120\* |
|  | (0.064) |
| Correctional expenditures*t-1* | 0.685\* |
|  | (0.029) |
| Constant | 5.748\* |
|  | (2.729) |
| BIC | 5,649 |
| Number of observations | 1,200 |
|  | |

*Note*: Unit of analysis is a state in a given year. Dependent variable is the percentage of state expenditures dedicated to correctional facilities. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Coefficients estimated from a linear model. Model includes state and year fixed effects (\**p* ≤ 0.05, all one-tailed tests).

**References**

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