



Online Appendix

Figure A1: Number of New Administrative Cases Filed, District Court Level, 1982-2021




Source: Supreme Court of Japan (various years).

Figure A2: Number of New Administrative Appeals Filed, Prefectural Level, 2002-2019



Source: Soumusho (n.d.).

Figure A3: Percentage of Administrative Appeals that were Decided in Favor of Appellants, 2002-19, Prefectural Level



Source: Calculated from Somusho (n.d.). Note that the reformed administrative appeals system came into effect in 2016.

Table A1: Japanese Lawyers' Public Service Activities, by Geographical Area

	Handled civil legal aid case	Number of civil legal aid cases handled	Offered free legal counseling	% of time spent on individual clients
Lawyers who have never served	45.4%	9.9	54.5%	49.3%
Lawyers who have served	59.2%	14.5	65.5%	58.0%
All lawyers	48.6%	9.7	57.4%	51.5%
Lawyers who have never served, in Tokyo	23.5%	2.9	46.1%	35.2%
Lawyers who have served, in Tokyo	25.0%	2.5	56.9%	49.1%
Lawyers who have never served, in	56.8%	5.9	57.0%	53.5%

Osaka				
Lawyers who have served, in Osaka	48.1%	6.1	61.5%	47.4%
Lawyers who have never served, in cities with High Courts	73.4%	18.2	69.7%	63.5%
Lawyers who have served, in cities with High Courts	64.6%	12.3	72.3%	59.2%
Lawyers who have never served in cities without High Courts	74.6%	25.3	66.1%	72.8%
Lawyers who have served, in cities without High Courts	70.9%	21.1	67.4%	63.5%

Table A2: Summary Statistics

Variable Name	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Claimant win rate	141	.096	.088	0	.333
% Lawyers	220	.359	.131	0	.667
% Local Bureaucrats	235	.106	.138	0	.400
% Professors	235	.324	.190	0	.800
# of Reviewers	213	6.136	2.262	3	12


Table A3: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	-.329** (.130)	-.372*** (.128)
% Lawyers	.500*** (.055)	.451*** (.074)
% Local Bureaucrats	.410*** (.054)	.353*** (.040)
% Professors	.564*** (.143)	.457*** (.128)
# of Reviewers	.019*** (.005)	.014 (.003)***
Constant	-.411*** (.098)	-.317*** (.073)

Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	86	86
R ²	0.1054	0.1341

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .1$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A4: Tests of H2 through H5: Determinants of Appointment of Lawyers by Governor, 2016-21



For each graph, N=173. Horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals. For Governor Partisanship in Figure 2(d), the reference category are governors who are not endorsed by any party.

Table A4: Tests of H2, H3, and H4, Determinants of the Percentage of Lawyers Appointed on ACRBs, 2016-21

	H2		H3		H4	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	.051 (.062)	.051 (.061)	.025 (.063)	.024 (.064)	.033 (.063)	.030 (.062)
Governor Terms	-.009* (.005)	-.009* (.005)				
Gov. Win Margin			.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)		
Divided Gov't					.008 (.006)	.008 (.006)
# of Reviewers	-.005 (.014)	-.005 (.013)	-.004 (.015)	-.004 (.014)	-.003 (.015)	-.003 (.014)
Constant	.407*** (.092)	.406*** (.086)	.383*** (.101)	.384*** (.096)	.375*** (.101)	.377*** (.095)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
N	173	173	173	173	173	173
R ²	0.2477	0.2479	0.1513	0.1387	0.2619	0.2248

***p ≤ .01, **p ≤ .05, *p ≤ .1. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A5: Tests of H5, Determinants of the Percentage of Lawyers Appointed on ACRBs, 2016-21


	H5	
	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	.049 (.067)	.048 (.069)
LDP Governor	-.008 (.009)	-.008 (.009)
Leftist Governor	.032* (.019)	.033* (.019)
# of Reviewers	-.000 (.015)	-.000 (.014)
Constant	.346*** (.107)	.346*** (.103)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	173	173
R ²	0.1192	0.1189

***p ≤ .01, **p ≤ .05, *p ≤ .1. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A6: Tests of H2 through H5 Combined, Determinants of the Percentage of Lawyers Appointed on ACRBs, 2016-21

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	.034 (.064)	.032 (.065)
Governor Terms	-.007** (.003)	-.007* (.003)
Governor Win Margin (%)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Governor w/Majority	.009* (.005)	.009 (.006)
LDP Governor	.000 (.005)	.000 (.005)
Leftist Governor	.052 (.035)	.051 (.035)
# of Reviewers	-.003 (.014)	-.003 (.013)
Constant	.379*** (.093)	.381*** (.088)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	173	173
R ²	0.1378	0.1254

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .1$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A5: Test of H2 through H5, with Lawyers per 1,000 population Included

Note: N=173. Horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals.

Table A7: Tests of H2, H3, and H4, Determinants of the Percentage of Lawyers Appointed on ACRBs, 2016-21 with Lawyers per 1,000 population Included

	H2		H3		H4	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	.051 (.062)	.050 (.061)	.026 (.064)	.023 (.063)	.032 (.063)	.029 (.062)
Governor Terms	-.009* (.005)	-.009* (.005)				
Gov. Win Margin			.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)		
Divided Gov't					.008 (.006)	.007 (.006)
# of Reviewers	.005 (.014)	-.005 (.013)	-.004 (.015)	-.005 (.015)	-.003 (.015)	-.004 (.014)
Lawyers per 1,000 pop.	.108 (.147)	.081 (.236)	.089 (.196)	.078 (.263)	.094 (.171)	.075 (.254)
Constant	.389*** (.092)	.394*** (.082)	.369*** (.098)	.373*** (.090)	.360*** (.100)	.366*** (.091)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
N	173	173	173	173	173	173
R ²	0.1377	0.1717	0.0887	0.0967	0.1069	0.1373

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .1$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A8: Tests of H5, Determinants of the Percentage of Lawyers Appointed on ACRBs, 2016-21 with Lawyers per 1,000 population Included

	H5	
	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	.048 (.070)	.048 (.069)
LDP Governor	-.008 (.009)	-.008 (.009)
Leftist Governor	.033* (.019)	.032* (.019)
# of Reviewers	-.000 (.015)	-.001 (.015)
Lawyers per 1,000 pop.	.046 (.157)	.048 (.245)
Constant	.339*** (.105)	.339*** (.098)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	173	173
R ²	0.1139	0.1115

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .1$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A9: Tests of H2, H3, and H4, Determinants of the Percentage of Lawyers Appointed on ACRBs, 2016-21. With Lawyers per Population Variable Included

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	.058 (.077)	.058 (.076)
Governor Terms	-.008* (.004)	-.008* (.004)
Governor Win Margin (%)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Governor w/Majority	.011* (.006)	.011 (.007)
LDP Governor	-.012 (.010)	-.012 (.011)
Leftist Governor	.024 (.017)	.024 (.016)
# of Reviewers	-.001 (.015)	-.001 (.014)
Lawyers per 1,000 pop.	.045 (.169)	.059 (.234)
Constant	.361*** (.097)	.358*** (.091)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	173	173
R ²	0.1911	0.1708

***p \leq .01, **p \leq .05, *p \leq .1. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A10: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with Lawyer Career Length Included (Mean Career Length)

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	-.428** (.176)	-.462** (.178)
% Lawyers	.491*** (.099)	.506*** (.103)
% Local Bureaucrats	.396 (.070)	.340*** (.028)
% Professors	.600 (.224)	.549** (.267)
Mean Year Admitted to Bar (Shortest Career)	-.000 (.006)	-.005 (.006)
# of Reviewers	.022 (.005)	.021*** (.005)
Constant	-.049 (12.081)	6.625 (9.279)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	70	70

R ²	0.0490	0.0712
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***p \leq .01, **p \leq .05, *p \leq .1. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A11: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with % Law Professors in Model

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Lagged Dep. Var.	-.381*** (.130)	-.410*** (.128)	-.337** (.132)	-.379*** (.130)
% Lawyers	.434*** (.128)	.410*** (.115)	.526*** (.079)	.483*** (.109)
% Local Bureaucrats	.238** (.118)	.182* (.103)	.281*** (.089)	.207** (.089)
% Professors			.594*** (.150)	.497*** (.147)
% Law Professors	-.123 (.076)	-.144* (.084)	-.145*** (.040)	-.167*** (.055)
# of Reviewers	.027*** (.010)	.026** (.011)	.035*** (.006)	.032*** (.008)
Constant	-.179*** (.051)	-.153*** (.036)	-.480*** (.098)	-.401*** (.092)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
N	86	86	86	86
R ²	0.1035	0.1087	0.0836	0.0986

***p \leq .01, **p \leq .05, *p \leq .1. Standard errors in parentheses.


Table A12: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with Change in Reviewers in Model

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Lagged Dep. Var.	-.226 (.136)	-.280** (.137)	-.251* (.137)	-.306** (.135)
% Lawyers	.629*** (.087)	.521*** (.052)	.758*** (.147)	.595*** (.119)
% Local Bureaucrats	.553*** (.083)	.446*** (.051)	.581*** (.103)	.451*** (.072)
% Professors	.530* (.272)	.551** (.209)	.214 (.318)	.354 (.434)
Change in Reviewers	-.029** (.012)	-.023* (.012)		
# New Reviewers			-.013** (.006)	-.009 (.005)
# of Reviewers	.020*** (.006)	.014*** (.002)	.017*** (.005)	.013* (.007)
Constant	-.474*** (.133)	-.406*** (.089)	-.392*** (.113)	-.350* (.184)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No	Yes	No

N	80	80	80	80
R ²	0.0299	0.0395	0.0331	0.0558

*** p ≤ .01, ** p ≤ .05, * p ≤ .1. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A6: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with Governors’ Partisanship in Model




N = 86. Horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals.

Table A13: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with Governors’ Partisanship in Model

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	-.324** (.131)	-.358*** (.128)
% Lawyers	.521*** (.093)	.441*** (.069)
% Local Bureaucrats	.418*** (.068)	.348*** (.033)
% Professors	.689*** (.190)	.512*** (.102)
LDP Governors	-.019 (.022)	-.026 (.022)
Leftist Governors	-.027 (.030)	-.004 (.024)
# of Reviewers	.010** (.004)	.007* (.004)
Constant	-.381*** (.117)	-.275*** (.074)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	86	86
R ²	0.0625	0.1068

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .1$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A7: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with ACRBs’ Caseloads in Model




N = 86. Horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals.

Table A14: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with ACRBs’ Caseloads in Model

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	-.347** (.132)	-.382*** (.128)
% Lawyers	.448*** (.061)	.405*** (.071)
% Local Bureaucrats	.409*** (.054)	.364*** (.038)
% Professors	.545*** (.141)	.459*** (.120)
ACRB Caseloads	-.001* (.000)	-.001* (.000)
# of Reviewers	.013*** (.006)	.008* (.004)
Constant	-.324*** (.110)	-.242*** (.083)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	86	86
R ²	0.0644	0.0710

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .1$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A8: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with Changes in Governor’s Partisanship in Model




N =86. Horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals.

Table A15: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with Changes in Governor’s Partisanship in Model

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	-.363** (.140)	-.412*** (.138)
% Lawyers	.498*** (.053)	.450*** (.065)
% Local Bureaucrats	.404** (.056)	.349*** (.036)
% Professors	.534*** (.153)	.426*** (.129)
Change in Governor Partisanship (0/1)	-.031 (.040)	-.038 (.033)
# of Reviewers	.019*** (.005)	.014*** (.003)
Constant	-.395*** (.104)	-.302*** (.070)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	86	86
R ²	0.1226	0.1590

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .1$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A9: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with Changes in Governor in Model



N = 86. Horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals.

Table A16: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with Changes in Governor in Model

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	-.337** (.130)	-.383*** (.123)
% Lawyers	.428** (.180)	.307** (.114)
% Local Bureaucrats	.397*** (.070)	.332*** (.026)
% Professors	.534*** (.172)	.408*** (.129)
Change in Governor (0/1)	-.010 (.021)	-.020 (.015)
# of Reviewers	.019*** (.006)	.013*** (.002)
Constant	-.366** (.160)	-.235** (.088)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	86	86
R ²	0.1171	0.1649

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .1$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A17: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with Year of Lawyers’ Bar Admission in Model

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	-.428** (.176)	-.457** (.179)
% Lawyers	.491*** (.099)	.397*** (.131)
% Local Bureaucrats	.396*** (.070)	.347*** (.039)
% Professors	.600** (.224)	.588** (.264)
Year Admitted to Bar	-.000 (.006)	-.002 (.007)
# of Reviewers	.022*** (.005)	.016*** (.006)
Constant	-.049 (12.081)	-.353 (.217)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	70	70
R ²	0.0490	0.0495

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .1$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A18: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with Year of Lawyers’ Bar Admission in Model

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	-.325** (.134)	-.361** (.134)
% Lawyers	.905*** (.047)	.893*** (.047)
% Local Bureaucrats	.397*** (.069)	.323*** (.000)
% Professors	.602*** (.153)	.562*** (.153)
Mean Year of Bar Admission: 1979-90 (Ref: Admitted 2000-2013)	.104*** (.038)	.070*** (.021)
1990-2000	.031 (.054)	-.014 (.034)
# of Reviewers	.036** (.014)	.023*** (.006)
Constant	-.694*** (.120)	-.569*** (.034)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	86	86
R ²	0.1088	0.0858

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .1$. Standard errors in parentheses. The 1979-90 category includes 1979 and 1990; the 1990-2000 category includes mean years of bar admission greater than but not including 1990 and less than and including 2000.

Figure A10: Determinants of “Win-Rates” for Claimants, 2016, 2018, 2019, with Year of Lawyers’ Bar Admission in Model



N = 86. Horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals. The 1979-90 category includes 1979 and 1990; the 1990-2000 category includes mean years of bar admission greater than but not including 1990 and less than and including 2000.

Table A19: Robustness Check for H5, Determinants of the Percentage of Lawyers Appointed on ACRBs, 2016-21 with Change in Partisan Orientation of Governors in Model

	H5	
	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	.042 (.659)	.039 (.065)
Change from Leftist to Conservative Governor	-.005 (.005)	-.005 (.005)
Change from Conservative to Leftist Governor	.022 (.022)	.021 (.023)
# of Reviewers	-.005 (.015)	-.005 (.014)
Constant	.387*** (.103)	.389*** (.097)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	173	173
R ²	0.2603	0.2207

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .1$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A20: Robustness Check, Determinants of the Percentage of Lawyers Appointed on ACRBs, 2016-21 with Change in Partisan Orientation of Governors in Model

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dep. Var.	.032 (.064)	.037 (.065)
Change from Leftist to Conservative Governor	.003 (.007)	.003 (.007)
Change from Conservative to Leftist Governor	-.002 (.018)	-.001 (.019)
Governor Terms	-.011** (.006)	-.011** (.005)
Governor Win Margin (%)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Governor w/Majority	.010 (.007)	.010 (.006)
# of Reviewers	-.003 (.013)	-.003 (.013)
Constant	.395*** (.091)	.393*** (.086)
Prefectural FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No
N	173	173
R ²	0.1207	0.1447

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .1$. Standard errors in parentheses.