**Appendix**

1. **Additional example of policy change**

Tax Deductions for Childcare Fees

In 2017, delegate He Dan was concerned with tax reforms in order to reduce the burden of parenting for families and actively advocated the inclusion of childcare fees between the age of 0-3 in the scope of tax deductions in the national PPCC. Chairman Wang Yang specially praised this proposal and thought it was well articulated but cautioned that it was necessary to consider how this proposal will affect the government’s fiscal revenue and asked for necessary calculations. After returning from the annual session, He Dan and colleagues immediately went ahead and calculated the proposed reform’s impact on the government’s fiscal situation and found that it was minimal. After additional rounds of review by the Ministry of Finance that subsequently also oversaw its implementation, childcare fees for children until the age of 3 can now be deducted from taxes.

1. **Generalizing from the case of Hainan**

As mentioned in the main text, Hainan is the only province that used to publish all delegate proposals as well as the corresponding government responses. The reasons behind this decision can only be subject to speculation and there does not seem to be a correlation between improved transparency and other key variables (Truex 2016). In this case, the increased transparency is helpful because it generates a full body of proposals and responses. Cities such as Shanghai or Shenzhen also publish some government responses, but it cannot be determined whether these are selected randomly or chosen deliberately to make the authorities appear responsive. As the descriptive data from Hainan show in Figure 1, there are many non-positive responses which suggest that the provincial government has not made substantial efforts to whitewash its track record.

Except for the increased transparency, there is also little reason to assume that the political processes concerning the PPCCs as such are different from those in other provinces in China. The central government authorities have increased their efforts in standardizing the internal practices of the PPCCs so that there are no regional variations in how the institutions work. Especially with the incorporation of new members, the history of the PPCC system from the 1990s onwards was generally marked by a move to routinize and standardize its workings. In recent years, the party-state has attempted to regulate different aspects of PPCC working procedures, most notably the mechanisms of submitting proposals and requiring government departments to respond to them in a timely manner (e.g., Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Further Strengthening the Handling of Proposals by the People’s Political Consultative Conference in 2012). Observers hold that especially with the Opinions on Further Strengthening the Building of the System of Multiparty Cooperation and Political Consultation Led by the CCP issued in 2005, the CPPCC’s role in policymaking has increased and moved beyond mere ceremonial participation (Lin 2014). The Delegate Handbooks also do not differ substantially from each other across provinces or localities.

Furthermore, the PPCCs, as the embodiment of the United Front principle, as well as the MPGs, mass organizations, and others have been managed by the United Front Work Department (UFWD) since 1954 (e.g., Groot 2004; Wang and Groot 2018). Besides the UFWD’s leadership on all levels regarding united front work (e.g., see the recent *Regulations on the United Front Work of the Communist Party of China* issued in 2021), this also gives them veto power, if not absolute control, over issues such as the PPCC budgets and the selection of PPCC members. Under China’s hierarchical command chains and the strict administration of the UFWD, there is hardly room for regional variation. Taking these factors together, this suggests that processes within the Hainan PPCC are similar to that of any other PPCC in China. In fact, given that Hainan is often used as a pilot site any leading practices there concerning responsiveness may be the vanguard of expanding such reforms across the country.[[1]](#footnote-1)

Table 1 below also shows that besides being significantly smaller and less populated than the mean and median provinces in China, Hainan is relatively similar to the average province in terms of GDP per capita, level or urbanization, and share of party members among its population. Further research on high-level corruption also does not show that Hainan can be considered a significant outlier in this category (Cole et al. 2009). In addition, except for the increased transparency regarding PPCC proposals and responses, Hainan Province also does not appear to be more transparent relative to other provinces regarding other government information (e.g., Wu and Bauer 2010; Deng et al., 2013). Although this does not suggest that Hainan is representative of other provinces in China, it suggests that these indicators give no significant reason to suspect that Hainan Province is substantially different from other provinces.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Chinese Provinces

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Log GDP per capita[[2]](#footnote-2) | Log Population[[3]](#footnote-3) | Log Area[[4]](#footnote-4) | Urban Population[[5]](#footnote-5) | CCP Penetration[[6]](#footnote-6) |
| Hainan | 1,75 | 6,98 | 4,53 | 59,26 | 516 |
| Mean | 1,80 | 7,54 | 5,22 | 60,85 | 587 |
| Median | 1,75 | 7,59 | 5,23 | 59,44 | 590 |

Nevertheless, it may be argued that the argument and mechanism of valuing expertise put forward in this article may not be generalizable to other provinces. Delegates and provincial government departments may work together differently than in other places due to the perceived responsiveness indicated by Hainan’s improved transparency, the relatively small size of the province, its status as special economic zone, or relative shortage of experts. Given the strong central emphasis on valuing expertise and government departments’ own incentives not to make false promises since they can be held partially accountable (Liu 2022), this may not be a weighty concern. Yet, while there is no way of guaranteeing this, a thought experiment may further suggest that this is not the case.

An indirect way of thinking about whether the government bureaucrats who decide whether to accept or act upon the proposals is to examine the frequency of proposals across provinces. The idea is that if government bureaucrats are equally concerned with good governance and soliciting policy expertise across provinces, they should be equally responsive across provinces. But since government responses cannot be observed across provinces, I make the assumption that PPCC delegates make proposals if they believe that government bureaucrats will take them seriously (Truex 2016). Conditional on this assumption, if the frequency of PPCC delegate proposals is fairly balanced across provinces (i.e., number of proposals weighted by size of PPCC), then one may be more confident that the inference from Hainan can travel to other provinces in China.

For this purpose, I have collected the number of proposals submitted annually to each provincial PPCC in China from 1998 to 2021. Table 2 below shows the mean and median number of proposals filed over the years for every province and the number of observations for which this data was available to find through government work reports. The data shows differences across provinces with Beijing and Xinjiang being the places where most proposals are submitted per delegate and Jilin the province with the least proposals submitted. Hainan Province is by no means an outlier here but instead is very close to the mean and median values. This can be taken as evidence that inferences from Hainan may travel to at least some other provinces in China.

Table 2: Filed Proposals Across Provinces

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Province | Mean Filed Proposals/Delegate | Median Filed Proposals/Delegate | Observations |
| Beijing | 1,58 | 1,57 | 20/24 |
| Tianjin | 1,25 | 1,28 | 7/24 |
| Hebei | 0,86 | 0,86 | 13/24 |
| Shanxi | 1,25 | 1,30 | 11/24 |
| Inner Mongolia | 1,22 | 1,25 | 16/24 |
| Liaoning | 0,77 | 0,76 | 7/24 |
| Jilin | 0,60 | 0,56 | 5/24 |
| Heilongjiang | 0,82 | 0,80 | 15/24 |
| Shanghai | 1,30 | 1,19 | 15/24 |
| Jiangsu | 0,91 | 0,89 | 22/24 |
| Zhejiang | 1,17 | 1,18 | 13/24 |
| Anhui | 1,09 | 1,12 | 17/24 |
| Fujian | 1,22 | 1,23 | 9/24 |
| Jiangxi | 0,82 | 0,75 | 5/24 |
| Shandong | 0,94 | 0,96 | 15/24 |
| Henan | 0,83 | 0,80 | 11/24 |
| Hubei | 0,93 | 0,93 | 15/24 |
| Hunan | 1,06 | 1,06 | 18/24 |
| Guangdong | 0,65 | 0,67 | 4/24 |
| Guangxi | 0,76 | 0,78 | 14/24 |
| Hainan | 1,10 | 1,11 | 20/24 |
| Chongqing | 1,49 | 1,52 | 12/24 |
| Sichuan | 1,02 | 1,03 | 14/24 |
| Guizhou | 1,24 | 1,24 | 7/24 |
| Yunnan | 1,17 | 1,20 | 12/24 |
| Tibet | 0,63 | 0,65 | 11/24 |
| Shaanxi | 1,20 | 1,22 | 11/24 |
| Gansu | 1,41 | 1,41 | 21/24 |
| Qinghai | 0,80 | 0,84 | 12/14 |
| Ningxia | 1,17 | 1,15 | 8/24 |
| Xinjiang | 1,50 | 1,47 | 14/24 |

Ultimately, it impossible to gauge the representativeness and generalizability of the findings from a study of one province as pointed out by related previous work (e.g., Truex 2016; Liu 2022). Thus, I would like to leave it to the reader to make a judgement about the generalizability from the case of Hainan but given the evidence provided in the main manuscript and the appendix, I am inclined to believe in the value of these findings beyond the immediate context of Hainan Province.

1. **Structure of Proposals**

Figure 1: Common Proposal

Graphical user interface, text

Description automatically generated

1. **Coding Scheme**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Category** | **Name** | **Main characteristic** | **Characteristics** |
| 5 | Positive response | Holds that actions will be taken as proposed | * Suggestion will be implemented * Response is also specific on how and when suggestion will be implemented (in accordance with original proposal) * Addresses suggestion specifically * Expresses agreement with severity of problem * Positive tone; commends proposer/suggestion |
| 4 | Slightly positive response | * Offers general support but vague pledges that action will be taken * Relatively vague key words like “strengthen”, “develop”, “explore”, and “pay attention” without offering clear plans of action that government can be held accountable for * Expresses agreement with severity of problem |
| 3 | Neutral |  | * Responsible department needs to conduct more research to give response |
| 2 | Slightly negative response | No action taken as proposed | * May express agreement with severity of problem   BUT   * Currently unable to implement (e.g. because of lack of budget) / or prior work has been done already and is deemed sufficient * Or simply ignores specific suggestions |
| 1 | Negative response | * Outright rejection on substantive basis (e.g. described issue not seen as problem; or suggestion proposed not seen as solution) |

99: Department is not responsible; hence no specific response can be given (excluded from analyses)

1. **Examples of Government Responses**

**Response 1:**

Suggestions on Strengthening the Management of Teachers in Private Schools

The quality of private schools is a hot issue that society pays increasing attention to. This year, some members of the national PPCC have conducted research on the country's private schools, and the information obtained is mixed. The good news is that since the reform and opening up, private schools have sprung up like mushrooms after rain and developed rapidly. Under the social background of large-scale education in poor countries, private schools have made great contributions to the development of our country's education and become the leader of socialist education. The important part now is to develop in coordination with public education. Yet, there are concerns about the many problems to be solved in private schools, the most prominent of which is the chaotic management of teachers in private schools… Here are some suggestions:

Pay attention to the education and training of teachers in private schools. The government has made great efforts to train qualified teachers for the whole society, including for private schools. However, the government does not pay enough attention to the continuing education of in-service teachers in private schools. It is a problem that there are no specific arrangements for private school teachers’ training in the overall teacher training plan. Or, there are specific arrangements but due to the lack of training funds or the lack of teachers from private schools, teachers cannot be sent to participate in the training. Education and teacher training is seriously lagging behind, teachers' teaching concepts are outdated, and teaching methods are old-fashioned, which affects the smooth development of new curriculum reform in private schools. The government has to find a way to solve these problems. Strengthening the continuing education and training of in-service teachers in private schools is an important task to ensure that teachers in private schools adapt to the teaching requirements of the new situation and to ensure the quality of education and teaching in private schools. The relevant education department of the government should incorporate its training into the overall plan, make a unified arrangement, pay close attention to it, and implement it. In particular, it is necessary to strengthen teachers’ moral education. It is necessary to carry out educational activities with the content of "speaking of unity, discipline, dedication, love of school, love of students, and love of career" among teachers of private schools, and learn that teachers' professional ethics are not standardized. Formulate a strict learning system, improve the political and ideological quality of teachers, strictly manage the system, and standardize the professional behavior of teachers; earnestly inspect and supervise, and promote the strengthening of the moral construction of teachers in private schools.

Government Response:

Private schools are responsible for the training of teachers in private schools. Private schools should consciously strengthen teacher training, improve the quality of teachers, improve the quality of education and teaching, and win the trust of society based on the needs of the school's survival and development. Otherwise, the school will die on its own without the approval of parents and students. Education administrative departments should not force teachers at private schools to participate in training.[[7]](#footnote-7)

**Response 2:**

Suggestion on the Construction of a Highway from Maogan Township, Baoting County to Xian'an Stone Forest and Xianlong Cave

The road from Maogan Township, Baoting County to Xian'an Stone Forest and Xianlong Cave Area is 17 kilometers long. It is the only connection for 22 villages and more than 3,000 people to the outside world. Xian'an Stone Forest and Xianlong Cave Area in Maogan Township, Baoting County are rare tropical karst stone forest landforms and caves in China. The Xian'an Stone Forest covers an area of ​​more than 500 acres. There are caves in Xianlong Cave Area, mountains in the cave, rivers under the cave, stalactites, stone mantles, and other terrains distributed in the cave. According to the research of relevant experts, the cave extends up to the Lizhi Valley in Sanya City. There are nearly 1,000 kinds of animal and plant resources and vast virgin forests in the Xian'an Stone Forest and Fanqiu near the Xianlong Cave Area, as well as the Maola Cave Reservoir, a key project under construction in Hainan. The whole area constitutes an important tourism resource with development value. There used to be a dirt road from Maogan Township, Baoting County to Ta'an Stone Forest and Ta Long Cave. However, due to the long-term disrepair and poor road conditions, it is extremely difficult for people in this area to go in and out. This does not only affect the life of the people in the area but also seriously restricts the development of the local economy. To this end, we suggest that the provincial government incorporate the highway from Maogan Township to Xian'an Stone Forest and Xianlongdong into the road construction plan for townships and towns in our province this year, and allocate special funds for the construction of this highway to create conditions for the development of tourism there. It also solves the problem of mobility for the local people. The highway from Maogan Township to Xian'an Stone Forest and Xianlong Cave is planned to be built into the third-level standard of the mountain area, the width of the roadbed is 7.5 meters, the width of the road surface is 6 meters, the side ditch is hardened, and the protection works are added. According to the calculation of relevant departments organized by our county, about 15 million yuan will be needed to rebuild this highway.

Government Response:

At present, more than 14,000 kilometers of township roads in our province are sandy soil roads. The road conditions are extremely poor and need to be gradually reformed. More importantly, there are still more than 100 administrative villages in our province that have no roads. To improve their basic travel conditions is our unshirkable responsibility. Therefore, the reconstruction of township roads with poor road conditions and helping administrative villages without roads to build roads are the key points of this year's road construction in our province, as well as the requirements put forward by the provincial party committee and government for our province's road construction. Due to the heavy task of reconstruction of rural highways and the construction of the "Access Project" in our province this year, the funding gap is relatively large. Therefore, your proposal to build the highway from Maogan Township to Xian'an Stone Forest and Xianlong Cave in Baoting County has no source of funds. However, our department will consider it in the "Eleventh Five-Year" rural road planning and implement it as soon as possible depending on the funding situation. Thank you for your concern and support for highway construction in our province.

**Response 3:**

Suggestions on Accelerating the Construction of Guilin Yang University New District

Guilin Yang University New District is the "aircraft carrier" for the provincial party committee and the provincial government to implement the strategy of revitalizing the province through science and education. Under construction from the end of 2005 to 2008, it has begun to take shape, with a total area of ​​about 300,000 m2. At present, 23,000 students from three colleges and universities, namely Hainan Normal University, Qiongtai Normal College, and Hainan Vocational and Technical College of Foreign Economics and Trade, have relocated to the new area of ​​Guilinyang University, and the teaching work has been carried out normally. Provincial leaders including Wei Liucheng, Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, Luo Baoming, Governor, Fang Xiaoyu, Executive Vice Governor, Jiang Sixian, and other provincial leaders are very concerned about the construction of the new area of ​​Guilin Yang University New District, and have held several on-site office meetings to solve related problems. However, due to the relatively short construction time of the new district of colleges and universities, imperfect supporting facilities, and inadequate logistics management, some new situations, problems, and challenges have emerged…Straighten out the new district system of colleges and universities. It is suggested that Guilin Yang University New District should be placed under the management of Haikou City in order to solve some deep historical problems.

Government Response:

The "Suggestions on Accelerating the Construction of Guilin Yang University New District" put forward by you at the second meeting of the Fifth Hainan Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference has been received, and the reply is as follows:…2. Issues concerning the administrative management system of the new district of colleges and universities:

At present, the provincial government has requested the Provincial Department of Education, the Provincial General Administration of Agricultural Reclamation, the Haikou Municipal Government, and the universities in Guilin Yang University New District to conduct research on the administrative management system of the new university district and report their opinions to the provincial government before the end of July this year. I believe that soon the administrative management system of the new district of colleges and universities will be straightened out under the great attention of the provincial government.

**Response 4:**

Proposal on Relocating the Bus Stop of the Lottery Center in the South Section of Haifu Road

At this stage, Haikou has more than 200,000 cars, more than 100,000 motorcycles, and a large number of electric bicycles. The urban traffic congestion problem is becoming more and more serious. Haifu Road is the main road in Haikou. It is the only way to connect the provincial government with the Provincial Party Committee, the Provincial People's Congress, the PPCC, and other important institutions. It is very important to ensure smooth traffic on that road. However, we found that the Lottery Center bus stop at the intersection of the southern section of the road and the entrance of Bailong South Road has become an obstacle to smooth traffic and should be relocated. The notice board at the bus station of the Lottery Center shows that a total of 18 lines of buses stop and pick up passengers there. There is a lot of traffic here during peak hours. Here, several batches of buses stop to drop off and pick up passengers one after another; besides, all kinds of cars are lined up in long queues waiting for the traffic lights. There are cars trying to pass through the crowd of cars and drive towards Bailong South Road so that the already narrow road becomes even more crowded, chaotic, and dangerous. We suggest: 1. This bus stop should be relocated to other appropriate places in the road section to solve the problem of improper setting of this stop, causing traffic congestion, chaos, and danger…

Government Response:

The "Proposal on Relocating the Bus Stop of the Lottery Center in the South Section of Haifu Road" has been received. We thank the members for their concern and support for the city's traffic management work. The relevant information is hereby answered as follows:

The issues raised in the proposal are very pertinent, and the situation reflected is true. The bus stop is about 20 meters away from the traffic lights on the sidewalk. When the red light is on, the straight vehicles waiting for the red light, the vehicles turning towards Bailong Road, and the buses stopping at the station are intertwined, and congestion often occurs. The traffic department listed this station as an unreasonable site to be relocated last year, but since the reconstruction project of the Guoxing Avenue Interchange has not been completed, the Lottery Center Station and Xiayangcun station involved in the ramp (four stations in total) all need to be relocated. Adjustments will be made according to the location of the planned site of the road section after the completion of the Guoxing Interchange.

**Response 5:**

Suggestions on Setting Up Traffic Lights at the Intersections of Wentan Road, Meiqun Road and Guoxing Avenue

Guoxing Avenue in Haikou City is a major traffic road. The intersection of Guoxing Avenue, Wentan Road and Meiqun Road is a major intersection of Guoxing Avenue. There are Hainan Square, Provincial Library, Haikou Vocational and Technical College, Haikou Women and Children's Hospital, and other large institutions nearby. There are many people crossing Guoxing Avenue. Since the road of Guoxing Avenue is wide and straight, the vehicles passing by the road are traveling very fast. At present, since there are no road signals at this intersection, pedestrians and non-motor vehicles who want to cross Guoxing Avenue can only take the zebra crossing, but most of them drive on Guoxing Avenue. Generally, the vehicles passing by will not take the initiative to slow down, which brings major safety hazards to pedestrians passing through, especially at night. In addition, since there are no road signals, the traffic at this intersection is also very chaotic when the traffic flow is heavy. In order to ensure the safety of pedestrians, it is suggested that the relevant departments of Haikou City can set up traffic lights at the intersection as soon as possible to eliminate the current safety hazards. There are still many similar intersections in Haikou. I hope the relevant departments can investigate and understand on the spot and set up relevant road signal facilities as soon as possible.

Government Response:

The "Suggestions on Setting Up Traffic Lights at the Intersections of Wentan Road, Meiqun Road and Guoxing Avenue" has been received. Thank you for your concern and support for our city's traffic management work, and hereby reply to the relevant situation as follows:

Before the Spring Festival in 2006, our city set up traffic lights at this intersection, and perfected the installation of traffic signs and markings and other supporting traffic facilities.

1. **Intercoder Reliability Tests**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Measurement | Coefficient | Standard Error | P |
| Percent Agreement | 0.8693 | 0.0084 | 0.000 |
| Brennan and Prediger | 0.8432 | 0.0101 | 0.000 |
| Cohen/ Conger’s Kappa | 0.8084 | 0.0125 | 0.000 |
| Scott/Fleiss’ Kappa | 0.8077 | 0.0126 | 0.000 |
| Gwet’s AC | 0.8488 | 0.0097 | 0.000 |
| Krippendorff’s Alpha | 0.8078 | 0.0126 | 0.000 |

1. **Coding of Government Responses by Coder**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Coder** | | |  |
| **Response** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **Total** |
| **1** | 76  2.12 | 71  2.42 | 75  2.45 | 222  2.32 |
| **2** | 1,128  31.44 | 828  28.18 | 895  29.22 | 2,851  29.73 |
| **3** | 62  1.73 | 76  2.59 | 73  2.38 | 211  2.20 |
| **4** | 1,646  45.88 | 1,733  58.99 | 1,372  44.79 | 4,751  49.55 |
| **5** | 608  16.95 | 144  4.90 | 562  18.35 | 1,314  13.70 |
| **99**  (Excluded from analysis) | 68  1.90 | 86  2.93 | 86  2.81 | 240  2.50 |
| **Total** | 3,588  100.00 | 2,938  100.00 | 3,063  100.00 | 9,589  100.00 |

1. **Data Missingness**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Missing Values | Percentage of Missing Values | Imputed Values |
| Entrepreneurs  Academics | 166  166 | 2.97  2.97 | 154  154 |
| Professionals | 166 | 2.97 | 154 |
| Party Membership | 136 | 2.43 | 124 |
| Leadership | 132 | 2.36 | - |
| Gender | 8 | 0.14 | - |
| Experience | 113 | 2.02 | - |
| Native | 1936 | 34.58 | 1876 |
| Number of Proposals | 2 | 0.04 | - |
| Number of Authors | 45 | 0.80 | - |
| Joint Proposals | 36 | 0.39 | - |
| Collective Proposals | 36 | 0.39 | - |
| Sentiment Score (Whole Proposal) | 246 | 2.63 | - |
| Sentiment Score (Problem Description) | 246 | 2.63 | - |

1. **Descriptive Statistics (Non-Imputed Dataset)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | N | Mean | Standard Dev. | Min | Max |
| Government Response | 9,349 | 3.44 | 1.13 | 1 | 5 |
| Category-5 Response | 9,349 | 0.14 | 0.35 | 0 | 1 |
| Evidence | 9,350 | 0.53 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Existing Laws | 9,350 | 0.80 | 1.27 | 0 | 11 |
| Type-Token Ratio | 9,350 | 0.46 | 0.08 | 0.24 | 0.84 |
| Entrepreneurs | 5,432 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Academics | 5,432 | 0.12 | 0.32 | 0 | 1 |
| Professionals | 5,432 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0 | 1 |
| Party Member | 5,462 | 0.27 | 0.45 | 0 | 1 |
| Leadership | 5,466 | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0 | 1 |
| Party Congress | 9,350 | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0 | 1 |
| Party Secretary | 9,350 | 0.09 | 0.37 | 0 | 4 |
| Provincial Party Secretary | 9,350 | 0.03 | 0.19 | 0 | 3 |
| Governor | 9,350 | 0.02 | 0.17 | 0 | 4 |
| Gender | 5,590 | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |
| Experience | 5,485 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Native | 3,662 | 0.41 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Ethnic Minority | 5,579 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 |
| Number of Proposals | 5,596 | 2.70 | 2.67 | 1 | 17 |
| Number of Depts | 9,350 | 1.12 | 0.55 | 1 | 10 |
| Local Issue | 9,350 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 |
| Length of Proposal | 9,350 | 1809.64 | 1051 | 150 | 11193 |
| Joint Proposal | 9,314 | 0.04 | 0.21 | 0 | 1 |
| Collective Proposal | 9,314 | 0.40 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Number of Authors | 5,558 | 1.24 | 1.35 | 1 | 16 |
| Sentiment Score (Proposal) | 9,104 | 0.43 | 0.30 | -0.57 | 1 |
| Sentiment Score  (Problem Description) | 9,104 | 0.29 | 0.32 | -1 | 1 |

1. **Descriptive Statistics (Imputed Dataset)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | N | Mean | Standard Dev. | Min | Max |
| Government Response | 336,564 | 3.44 | 1.13 | 1 | 5 |
| Category-5 Response | 336,564 | 0.14 | 0.35 | 0 | 1 |
| Evidence | 336,600 | 0.53 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Existing Laws | 336,600 | 0.80 | 1.27 | 0 | 11 |
| Type-Token Ratio | 336,600 | 0.46 | 0.08 | 0.24 | 0.84 |
| Entrepreneurs | 200,942 | 0.36 | 0.48 | -1.37 | 2.20 |
| Academics | 200,942 | 0.12 | 0.32 | -1.03 | 1.31 |
| Professionals | 200,942 | 0.10 | 0.30 | -1.19 | 1.21 |
| Party Member | 200,972 | 0.27 | 0.45 | -1.15 | 1.73 |
| Leadership | 196,776 | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0 | 1 |
| Party Congress | 336,600 | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0 | 1 |
| Party Secretary | 336,600 | 0.09 | 0.37 | 0 | 4 |
| Provincial Party Secretary | 336,600 | 0.03 | 0.19 | 0 | 3 |
| Governor | 336,600 | 0.02 | 0.17 | 0 | 4 |
| Gender | 201,240 | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |
| Experience | 197,460 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Native | 197,492 | 0.39 | 0.48 | -1.89 | 2.34 |
| Ethnic Minority | 200,844 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 |
| Number of Proposals | 201,456 | 2.70 | 2.67 | 1 | 17 |
| Number of Depts | 336,600 | 1.12 | 0.55 | 1 | 10 |
| Local Issue | 336,600 | 1.12 | 0.55 | 1 | 10 |
| Length of Proposal | 336,600 | 1809,64 | 1050,95 | 150 | 11193 |

1. **Baseline Results (Coder 2)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Government Response | | | | |
|  | Ordinal | | Dichotomous | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Evidence | 0.11\*  (0.04) | 0.06  (0.05) | 0.22\*\*  (0.06) | 0.17\*  (0.08) |
| Existing Laws | 0.04\*  (0.02) | 0.07\*\*  (0.02) | 0.09\*\*\*  (0.02) | 0.10\*  (0.04) |
| Type-Token Ratio | -0.31  (0.41) | 0.12  (0.50) | 1.84\*\*  (0.61) | 1.41†  (0.74) |
| Entrepreneurs |  | -0.10  (0.07) |  | -0.05  (0.11) |
| Academics |  | -0.23\*  (0.09) |  | -0.24  (0.15) |
| Professionals |  | -0.06  (0.10) |  | 0.06  (0.15) |
| Party Member |  | 0.05  (0.07) |  | 0.06  (0.10) |
| Leadership |  | 0.16†  (0.08) |  | 0.41\*\*\*  (0.11) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | -0.08  (0.10)  0.34†  (0.19)  0.04  (0.16)  0.001  (0.29)  -0.41†  (0.25) | -0.03  (0.13)  0.44  (0.28)  0.24  (0.22)  0.20  (0.35)  -0.60†  (0.32) | -0.48\*  (0.19)  0.50\*  (0.21)  -0.57†  (0.34)  0.31  (0.34)  -1.02†  (0.56) | -0.26  (0.24)  0.65\*  (0.31)  -0.30  (0.45)  0.72†  (0.41)  -0.35  (0.56) |
| Party Secretary | 0.07  (0.05) | 0.03  (0.07) | 0.08  (0.08) | 0.08  (0.11) |
| Provincial Party Secretary | -0.12  (0.10) | -0.14  (0.14) | -0.28  (0.21) | -0.23  (0.29) |
| Governor | 0.04  (0.11) | -0.22  (0.14) | 0.07  (0.18) | -0.62†  (0.35) |
| Gender |  | 0.11†  (0.06) |  | -0.05  (0.09) |
| Experience |  | -0.03  (0.05) |  | 0.07  (0.08) |
| Native |  | 0.11  (0.07) |  | 0.04  (0.10) |
| Ethnic Minority |  | -0.02  (0.08) |  | -0.10  (0.12) |
| Number of Proposals |  | -0.01  (0.01) |  | -0.03†  (0.02) |
| Number of Depts | 0.36\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.35\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.31\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.35\*\*\*  (0.05) |
| Local Issue | -0.02  (0.06) | -0.07  (0.08) | -0.002  (0.09) | -0.05  (0.11) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0001\*\*\*  (0.00003) | -0.0002\*\*\*  (0.00004) | -0.0001\*  (0.00006) | -0.0003\*\*\*  (0.00008) |
| N | 9,349 | 5,459 | 9,349 | 5,459 |

Note: † p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These are ordered logistic regression results (Models 1-2) and logistic regression results (Models 3-4).

1. **Baseline Results (Coder 3)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Government Response | | | | |
|  | Ordinal | | Dichotomous | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Evidence | 0.11\*\*  (0.04) | 0.07  (0.05) | 0.23\*\*\*  (0.06) | 0.18\*  (0.08) |
| Existing Laws | 0.04\*  (0.02) | 0.07\*\*  (0.03) | 0.09\*\*\*  (0.02) | 0.11\*\*  (0.04) |
| Type-Token Ratio | -0.38  (0.41) | 0.07  (0.50) | 1.32\*\*  (0.61) | 1.12  (0.72) |
| Entrepreneurs |  | -0.09  (0.07) |  | -0.006  (0.10) |
| Academics |  | -0.23\*  (0.09) |  | -0.24  (0.15) |
| Professionals |  | -0.06  (0.10) |  | 0.04  (0.14) |
| Party Member |  | 0.07  (0.07) |  | 0.12  (0.10) |
| Leadership |  | 0.15†  (0.08) |  | 0.38\*\*  (0.11) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | -0.08  (0.10)  0.28  (0.18)  0.03  (0.16)  0.03  (0.30)  -0.44†  (0.24) | -0.07  (0.13)  0.36  (0.27)  0.20  (0.22)  0.27  (0.37)  -0.64\*  (0.32) | -0.41\*  (0.18)  0.31  (0.21)  -0.68\*  (0.34)  0.34  (0.32)  -1.08\*  (0.53) | -0.41†  (0.24)  0.44  (0.31)  -0.41  (0.45)  0.81\*  (0.38)  -0.55  (0.57) |
| Party Secretary | 0.10†  (0.06) | 0.06  (0.07) | 0.17\*  (0.08) | 0.16  (0.10) |
| Provincial Party Secretary | -0.10  (0.11) | -0.07  (0.15) | -0.15  (0.20) | 0.09  (0.25) |
| Governor | 0.05  (0.11) | -0.23†  (0.14) | 0.06  (0.17) | -0.75\*  (0.37) |
| Gender |  | 0.10  (0.06) |  | -0.08  (0.09) |
| Experience |  | -0.02  (0.05) |  | 0.12  (0.08) |
| Native |  | 0.11  (0.07) |  | 0.05  (0.10) |
| Ethnic Minority |  | -0.01  (0.08) |  | -0.07  (0.12) |
| Number of Proposals |  | -0.01  (0.01) |  | -0.03†  (0.02) |
| Number of Depts | 0.35\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.35\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.32\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.36\*\*\*  (0.05) |
| Local Issue | -0.04  (0.06) | -0.06  (0.08) | -0.04  (0.09) | -0.04  (0.11) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0001\*\*\*\*  (0.00003) | -0.0002\*\*\*  (0.00004) | -0.0002\*\*  (0.00006) | -0.0003\*\*\*  (0.00008) |
| N | 9,349 | 5,459 | 9,349 | 5,459 |

Note: † p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These are ordered logistic regression results (Models 1-2) and logistic regression results (Models 3-4).

1. **Baseline Results with Non-imputed dataset**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Government Response | | | | |
|  | Ordinal | | Dichotomous | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Evidence | 0.11\*  (0.04) | -0.009  (0.07) | 0.22\*\*  (0.06) | 0.05  (0.10) |
| Existing Laws | 0.04\*  (0.02) | 0.09\*\*  (0.03) | 0.07\*\*  (0.03) | 0.16\*\*  (0.05) |
| Type-Token Ratio | -0.34  (0.41) | -0.23  (0.65) | 1.68\*\*  (0.62) | 1.96\*  (0.96) |
| Entrepreneurs |  | -0.17†  (0.09) |  | 0.002  (0.14) |
| Academics |  | -0.23\*  (0.11) |  | -0.21  (0.18) |
| Professionals |  | -0.14  (0.13) |  | -0.30  (0.24) |
| Party Member |  | 0.05  (0.08) |  | 0.19  (0.13) |
| Leadership |  | 0.11  (0.10) |  | 0.30\*  (0.14) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | -0.10  (0.10)  0.32†  (0.19)  0.04  (0.16)  0.04  (0.30)  -0.40†  (0.24) | 0.08  (0.17)  0.87\*  (0.34)  -0.18  (0.26)  0.69  (0.97)  -1.15\*\*  (0.35) | -0.56\*\*  (0.20)  0.44\*  (0.21)  -0.56†  (0.34)  0.43  (0.33)  -0.92†  (0.53) | -0.29  (0.28)  0.95\*  (0.38)  1.82\*\*  (0.58)  -0.90  (0.83) |
| Party Secretary | 0.09  (0.06) | 0.23\*\*  (0.08) | 0.13  (0.08) | 0.39\*\*\*  (0.11) |
| Provincial Party Secretary | -0.13  (0.10) | -0.11  (0.17) | -0.30  (0.21) | 0.28  (0.33) |
| Governor | 0.06  (0.11) | -0.36\*  (0.18) | 0.13  (0.17) | -1.45\*  (0.64) |
| Gender |  | -0.01  (0.08) |  | -0.09  (0.12) |
| Experience |  | -0.01  (0.07) |  | 0.25\*  (0.11) |
| Native |  | 0.13†  (0.08) |  | 0.03  (0.12) |
| Ethnic Minority |  | -0.09  (0.10) |  | -0.33†  (0.17) |
| Number of Proposals |  | -0.02†  (0.01) |  | -0.03\*  (0.02) |
| Number of Depts | 0.36\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.35\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.31\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.32\*\*\*  (0.06) |
| Local Issue | -0.03  (0.06) | 0.09  (0.09) | -0.008  (0.09) | 0.04  (0.13) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0001\*\*\*\*  (0.00003) | -0.0002\*\*  (0.00006) | -0.0001\*  (0.00006) | -0.0002\*  (0.0001) |
| N | 9,349 | 3,540 | 9,349 | 3,519 |

Note: † p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These are ordered logistic regression results (Models 1-2) and logistic regression results (Models 3-4).

1. **Excluding Delegates not based in Hainan**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Government Response | | | | |
|  | Ordinal | | Dichotomous | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Evidence | 0.12\*\*  (0.04) | 0.07  (0.06) | 0.24\*\*\*  (0.07) | 0.18\*  (0.09) |
| Existing Laws | 0.03  (0.04) | 0.04  (0.02) | 0.06\*  (0.03) | 0.06  (0.09) |
| Type-Token Ratio | -0.21  (0.43) | 0.35  (0.53) | 1.91\*\*  (0.65) | 1.45†  (0.79) |
| Entrepreneurs |  | -0.11  (0.08) |  | 0.002  (0.12) |
| Academics |  | -0.26\*\*  (0.09) |  | -0.31\*  (0.15) |
| Professionals |  | -0.08  (0.10) |  | 0.005  (0.16) |
| Party Member |  | 0.05  (0.07) |  | 0.08  (0.10) |
| Leadership |  | 0.14  (0.09) |  | 0.44\*\*\*  (0.12) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | -0.14  (0.10)  0.31  (0.19)  0.02  (0.17)  0.05  (0.30)  -0.42†  (0.25) | -0.09  (0.14)  0.40  (0.30)  0.22  (0.24)  0.28  (0.37)  -0.62†  (0.32) | -0.64\*\*  (0.21)  0.43†  (0.22)  -0.54  (0.34)  0.44  (0.33)  -1.01†  (0.56) | -0.33  (0.25)  0.60†  (0.34)  -0.20  (0.45)  0.92\*  (0.39)  -0.36  (0.59) |
| Party Secretary | 0.10†  (0.06) | 0.09  (0.07) | 0.13  (0.08) | 0.15  (0.11) |
| Provincial Party Secretary | -0.11  (0.10) | -0.11  (0.14) | -0.27  (0.21) | -0.19  (0.29) |
| Governor | 0.06  (0.11) | -0.22  (0.14) | 0.14  (0.17) | -0.60†  (0.35) |
| Gender |  | 0.13\*  (0.06) |  | -0.02  (0.10) |
| Experience |  | -0.03  (0.06) |  | 0.11  (0.09) |
| Native |  | 0.09  (0.07) |  | 0.02  (0.12) |
| Ethnic Minority |  | -0.03  (0.08) |  | -0.10  (0.13) |
| Number of Proposals |  | -0.01  (0.01) |  | -0.02  (0.02) |
| Number of Depts | 0.39\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.40\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.33\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.40\*\*\*  (0.06) |
| Local Issue | -0.04  (0.06) | -0.07  (0.08) | -0.01  (0.09) | -0.01  (0.11) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0001\*\*\*\*  (0.00003) | -0.0001\*\*  (0.00004) | -0.0001†  (0.00006) | -0.0003\*\*  (0.00009) |
| N | 8,825 | 4,935 | 8,825 | 4,935 |

Note: † p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These are ordered logistic regression results (Models 1-2) and logistic regression results (Models 3-4).

1. **Excluding Responses of Category 3**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Government Response | | | | |
|  | Ordinal | | Dichotomous | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Evidence | 0.12\*\*  (0.04) | 0.07  (0.06) | 0.23\*\*\*  (0.06) | 0.17\*  (0.08) |
| Existing Laws | 0.04\*  (0.02) | 0.07\*\*  (0.02) | 0.07\*\*  (0.06) | 0.08\*  (0.04) |
| Type-Token Ratio | -0.32  (0.42) | 0.04  (0.51) | 1.67\*\*  (0.62) | 1.13  (0.74) |
| Entrepreneurs |  | -0.07  (0.07) |  | 0.03  (0.11) |
| Academics |  | -0.23\*  (0.09) |  | -0.25†  (0.15) |
| Professionals |  | -0.08  (0.10) |  | 0.03  (0.15) |
| Party Member |  | 0.05  (0.07) |  | 0.09  (0.10) |
| Leadership |  | 0.15†  (0.09) |  | 0.39\*\*  (0.11) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | -0.08  (0.10)  0.33†  (0.19)  0.07  (0.16)  0.06  (0.31)  -0.37  (0.28) | -0.009  (0.14)  0.41  (0.27)  0.31  (0.23)  0.29  (0.37)  -0.57  (0.41) | -0.54\*\*  (0.20)  0.45\*  (0.22)  -0.53  (0.34)  0.44  (0.33)  -0.87  (0.55) | -0.21  (0.24)  0.61\*  (0.31)  -0.18  (0.45)  0.90†  (0.40)  -0.14  (0.59) |
| Party Secretary | 0.08  (0.06) | 0.05  (0.07) | 0.12  (0.08) | 0.14  (0.10) |
| Provincial Party Secretary | -0.12  (0.10) | -0.16  (0.14) | -0.29  (0.21) | -0.25  (0.29) |
| Governor | 0.12  (0.12) | -0.20  (0.16) | 0.17  (0.18) | -0.56  (0.35) |
| Gender |  | 0.11†  (0.06) |  | -0.03  (0.09) |
| Experience |  | -0.03  (0.06) |  | 0.08  (0.08) |
| Native |  | 0.11  (0.07) |  | 0.02  (0.10) |
| Ethnic Minority |  | -0.02  (0.08) |  | -0.10  (0.12) |
| Number of Proposals |  | -0.01  (0.01) |  | -0.03†  (0.02) |
| Number of Depts | 0.39\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.39\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.33\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.37\*\*\*  (0.05) |
| Local Issue | -0.03  (0.06) | -0.06  (0.08) | -0.008  (0.09) | -0.01  (0.11) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0001\*\*\*\*  (0.00003) | -0.0002\*\*\*  (0.00004) | -0.0001\*  (0.00006) | -0.0003\*\*\*  (0.00008) |
| N | 9,138 | 5,305 | 9,138 | 5,305 |

Note: † p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These are ordered logistic regression results (Models 1-2) and logistic regression results (Models 3-4).

1. **Department-Fixed Effects**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Government Response | | | | |
|  | Ordinal | | Dichotomous | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Evidence | 0.05  (0.04) | -0.004  (0.06) | 0.16\*  (0.07) | 0.10  (0.09) |
| Existing Laws | 0.04\*  (0.02) | 0.06\*  (0.03) | 0.07\*\*  (0.03) | 0.08\*  (0.04) |
| Type-Token Ratio | -0.19  (0.43) | 0.16  (0.54) | 1.93\*\*  (0.65) | 1.25  (0.80) |
| Entrepreneurs |  | -0.13†  (0.07) |  | -0.08  (0.11) |
| Academics |  | -0.25\*  (0.10) |  | -0.32\*  (0.16) |
| Professionals |  | -0.03  (0.11) |  | -0.13  (0.16) |
| Party Member |  | 0.06  (0.07) |  | 0.06  (0.11) |
| Leadership |  | 0.21\*  (0.09) |  | 0.53\*\*\*  (0.12) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | 0.02  (0.10)  0.42\*  (0.19)  -0.01  (0.17)  0.14  (0.31)  -0.30  (0.25) | 0.08  (0.13)  0.48†  (0.28)  0.08  (0.24)  0.43  (0.38)  -0.35  (0.34) | -0.43\*  (0.20)  0.60\*\*  (0.23)  -0.47  (0.34)  0.59†  (0.35)  -1.09†  (0.62) | -0.07  (0.25)  0.86\*  (0.34)  -0.18  (0.47)  1.34\*\*  (0.44)  -0.05  (0.56) |
| Party Secretary | -0.006  (0.06) | -0.11  (0.07) | -0.04  (0.10) | -0.17  (0.14) |
| Provincial Party Secretary | -0.17  (0.11) | -0.20  (0.14) | -0.27  (0.20) | -0.12  (0.27) |
| Governor | 0.11  (0.11) | -0.12  (0.14) | 0.17  (0.17) | -0.58†  (0.34) |
| Gender |  | 0.16\*  (0.06) |  | 0.02  (0.10) |
| Experience |  | 0.003  (0.06) |  | 0.17†  (0.09) |
| Native |  | 0.12†  (0.07) |  | 0.08  (0.11) |
| Ethnic Minority |  | -0.06  (0.08) |  | -0.11  (0.13) |
| Number of Proposals |  | -0.003  (0.01) |  | -0.02  (0.02) |
| Number of Depts | 0.35\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.32\*\*\*  (0.06) | 0.31\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.31\*\*\*  (0.06) |
| Local Issue | 0.02  (0.08) | -0.10  (0.10) | -0.02  (0.12) | -0.19  (0.15) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0001\*\*  (0.00003) | -0.0001\*\*  (0.00005) | -0.00008  (0.00006) | -0.0003\*\*  (0.00009) |
| Department FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| N | 9,332 | 5,449 | 9,227 | 5,312 |

Note: † p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These are ordered logistic regression results (Models 1-2) and logistic regression results (Models 3-4).

1. **Topic-Fixed Effects**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Government Response | | | | |
|  | Ordinal | | Dichotomous | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Evidence | 0.08†  (0.04) | 0.03  (0.06) | 0.19\*\*  (0.06) | 0.12  (0.08) |
| Existing Laws | 0.04\*  (0.02) | 0.06\*  (0.02) | 0.06\*  (0.03) | 0.07†  (0.04) |
| Type-Token Ratio | -0.24  (0.41) | 0.12  (0.50) | 1.80\*\*  (0.62) | 1.25†  (0.74) |
| Entrepreneurs |  | -0.08  (0.07) |  | 0.01  (0.11) |
| Academics |  | -0.23\*  (0.09) |  | -0.27†  (0.15) |
| Professionals |  | -0.08  (0.10) |  | -0.01  (0.15) |
| Party Member |  | 0.06  (0.07) |  | 0.09  (0.10) |
| Leadership |  | 0.18\*  (0.09) |  | 0.43\*\*\*  (0.11) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | -0.09  (0.10)  0.36†  (0.19)  0.06  (0.16)  -0.03  (0.30)  -0.36  (0.24) | -0.009  (0.13)  0.49†  (0.28)  0.26  (0.22)  0.24  (0.36)  -0.46  (0.32) | -0.57\*\*  (0.20)  0.47\*  (0.22)  -0.49  (0.34)  0.32  (0.33)  -0.95†  (0.54) | -0.23  (0.24)  0.72\*  (0.31)  -0.25  (0.45)  0.86\*  (0.40)  -0.15  (0.56) |
| Party Secretary | 0.08  (0.06) | 0.06  (0.07) | 0.14†  (0.08) | 0.16  (0.10) |
| Provincial Party Secretary | -0.13  (0.10) | -0.14  (0.14) | -0.29  (0.21) | -0.24  (0.29) |
| Governor | 0.05  (0.11) | -0.20  (0.14) | 0.11  (0.17) | -0.64†  (0.35) |
| Gender |  | 0.12\*  (0.06) |  | -0.01  (0.09) |
| Experience |  | -0.04  (0.05) |  | 0.07  (0.08) |
| Native |  | 0.10  (0.07) |  | 0.01  (0.10) |
| Ethnic Minority |  | -0.02  (0.08) |  | -0.09  (0.12) |
| Number of Proposals |  | -0.02  (0.01) |  | -0.03†  (0.02) |
| Number of Depts | 0.36\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.35\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.33\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.36\*\*\*  (0.05) |
| Local Issue | -0.03  (0.06) | -0.05  (0.08) | 0.02  (0.09) | 0.01  (0.11) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0001\*\*\*\*  (0.00003) | -0.0002\*\*\*  (0.00004) | -0.0001†  (0.00006) | -0.0003\*\*  (0.00008) |
| N | 9,341 | 5,453 | 9,341 | 5,453 |

Note: † p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These are ordered logistic regression results (Models 1-2) and logistic regression results (Models 3-4).

1. **Department-Clustered Standard Errors**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Government Response | | | | |
|  | Ordinal | | Dichotomous | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Evidence | 0.11†  (0.06) | 0.06  (0.07) | 0.22\*  (0.08) | 0.15  (0.11) |
| Existing Laws | 0.04†  (0.02) | 0.07\*  (0.03) | 0.07\*  (0.03) | 0.08  (0.05) |
| Type-Token Ratio | -0.33  (0.48) | 0.09  (0.57) | 1.67†  (0.88) | 1.18  (0.88) |
| Entrepreneurs |  | -0.08  (0.08) |  | 0.03  (0.13) |
| Academics |  | -0.23\*  (0.10) |  | -0.25\*  (0.12) |
| Professionals |  | -0.06  (0.10) |  | 0.05  (0.17) |
| Party Member |  | 0.06  (0.11) |  | 0.10  (0.13) |
| Leadership |  | 0.16  (0.10) |  | 0.41\*\*  (0.13) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | -0.10  (0.18)  0.32  (0.25)  0.04  (0.21)  0.04  (0.17)  -0.40  (0.37) | -0.02  (0.16)  0.44  (0.41)  0.27  (0.26)  0.28  (0.30)  -0.58  (0.42) | -0.55†  (0.33)  0.44†  (0.25)  -0.56†  (0.32)  0.43  (0.28)  -0.92\*  (0.46) | -0.22  (0.32)  0.64  (0.41)  -0.23  (0.34)  0.90\*  (0.44)  -0.24  (0.53) |
| Party Secretary | 0.09  (0.08) | 0.05  (0.11) | 0.13  (0.15) | 0.14  (0.18) |
| Provincial Party Secretary | -0.13  (0.13) | -0.14  (0.16) | -0.31  (0.25) | -0.24  (0.36) |
| Governor | 0.08  (0.11) | -0.20  (0.15) | 0.14  (0.20) | -0.61†  (0.34) |
| Gender |  | 0.12  (0.08) |  | -0.02  (0.11) |
| Experience |  | -0.04  (0.08) |  | 0.08  (0.10) |
| Native |  | 0.10  (0.08) |  | 0.009  (0.14) |
| Ethnic Minority |  | -0.04  (0.11) |  | -0.10  (0.17) |
| Number of Proposals |  | -0.01  (0.01) |  | -0.03  (0.02) |
| Number of Depts | 0.36\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.35\*\*\*  (0.07) | 0.31\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.35\*\*\*  (0.05) |
| Local Issue | -0.03  (0.08) | -0.05  (0.10) | -0.009  (0.09) | -0.009  (0.13) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0001\*\*\*\*  (0.00004) | -0.0002\*\*\*  (0.00004) | -0.0001  (0.00008) | -0.0003\*\*\*  (0.00008) |
| N | 9,332 | 5,449 | 9,332 | 5,449 |

Note: † p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These are ordered logistic regression results (Models 1-2) and logistic regression results (Models 3-4).

1. **OLS Regressions (Models 1-2)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Government Response |  |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 |
| Evidence | 0.05\*  (0.2) | 0.02  (0.03) |
| Existing Laws | 0.02†  (0.01) | 0.04\*\*  (0.01) |
| Type-Token Ratio | -0.38  (0.24) | -0.11  (0.30) |
| Entrepreneurs |  | -0.05  (0.05) |
| Academics |  | -0.15\*  (0.06) |
| Professionals |  | -0.06  (0.06) |
| Party Member |  | 0.02  (0.04) |
| Leadership |  | 0.07  (0.05) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | -0.03  (0.06)  0.15  (0.10)  0.05  (0.10)  0.0009  (0.16)  -0.24  (0.16) | 0.005  (0.08)  0.18  (0.15)  0.21  (0.14)  0.11  (0.19)  -0.34  (0.21) |
| Party Secretary | 0.05  (0.03) | 0.03  (0.04) |
| Provincial Party Secretary | -0.07  (0.06) | -0.08  (0.08) |
| Governor | 0.04  (0.07) | -0.12  (0.09) |
| Gender |  | 0.08\*  (0.04) |
| Experience |  | -0.03  (0.03) |
| Native |  | 0.07†  (0.04) |
| Ethnic Minority |  | -0.004  (0.05) |
| Number of Proposals |  | -0.007  (0.006) |
| Number of Depts | 0.20\*\*\*  (0.02) | 0.18\*\*\*  (0.02) |
| Local Issue | -0.02  (0.04) | -0.04  (0.04) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.00008\*\*\*\*  (0.00002) | -0.0001\*\*\*  (0.00003) |
| N | 9,349 | 5,459 |

Note: † p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

1. **Results before 2013**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Government Response | | | | |
|  | Ordinal | | Dichotomous | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Evidence | 0.002  (0.06) | -0.001  (0.10) | 0.13  (0.10) | 0.16  (0.18) |
| Existing Laws | 0.004  (0.03) | -0.01  (0.06) | 0.05  (0.04) | -0.05  (0.11) |
| Type-Token Ratio | -0.24  (0.55) | -0.98  (0.89) | 1.80\*  (0.90) | -0.14  (1.63) |
| Entrepreneurs |  | -0.12  (0.17) |  | -0.11  (0.28) |
| Academics |  | -0.39\*  (0.19) |  | -0.58†  (0.35) |
| Professionals |  | 0.05  (0.20) |  | -0.09  (0.33) |
| Party Member |  | -0.03  (0.13) |  | -0.53\*  (0.24) |
| Leadership |  | 0.21  (0.16) |  | 0.40  (0.25) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | -0.32  (0.23)  0.91\*\*  (0.31)  0.15  (0.19)  0.45  (0.48)  0.03  (0.28) | -0.03  (0.41)  2.61\*\*\*  (0.68)  0.50†  (0.27)  0.53  (1.69)  0.11  (0.33) | -1.03†  (0.61)  0.95\*  (0.38)  -0.67  (0.48)  0.82  (0.52) | 0.18  (0.80)  3.02\*\*\*  (0.85)  -0.76  (1.05)  2.87\*\*  (0.99) |
| Party Secretary | -0.13  (0.16) | -0.36†  (0.21) | -0.08  (0.22) | 0.06  (0.57) |
| Provincial Party Secretary | -0.24  (0.18) | -0.17  (0.28) | 0.02  (0.29) | -0.04  (0.58) |
| Governor | 0.24†  (0.13) | -0.13  (0.17) | 0.05  (0.20) |  |
| Gender |  | 0.32\*  (0.13) |  | 0.19  (0.22) |
| Experience |  | -0.10  (0.1) |  | 0.14  (0.18) |
| Native |  | 0.25  (0.16) |  | 0.35  (0.18) |
| Ethnic Minority |  | -0.21  (0.16) |  | -0.39  (0.30) |
| Number of Proposals |  | 0.01  (0.02) |  | -0.01  (0.03) |
| Number of Depts | 0.60\*\*\*  (0.09) | 0.52\*\*  (0.19) | 0.52\*\*\*  (0.11) | 0.38  (0.26) |
| Local Issue | 0.05  (0.08) | 0.16  (0.14) | 0.005  (0.13) | 0.24  (0.22) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.00007  (0.00004) | -0.0002†  (0.00008) | -0.0006  (0.00008) | -0.0004†  (0.00002) |
| N | 4,329 | 1,616 | 4,312 | 1,583 |

Note: † p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These are ordered logistic regression results (Models 1-2) and logistic regression results (Models 3-4).

1. **Results after 2012**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Government Response | | | | |
|  | Ordinal | | Dichotomous | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Evidence | 0.18\*\*  (0.06) | 0.05  (0.09) | 0.28\*\*  (0.08) | 0.12  (0.14) |
| Existing Laws | 0.07\*\*  (0.02) | 0.10\*  (0.04) | 0.09\*\*  (0.03) | 0.17\*\*  (0.05) |
| Type-Token Ratio | 0.27  (0.64) | -0.33  (0.97) | 2.34\*\*  (0.89) | 1.44  (1.31) |
| Entrepreneurs |  | -0.33\*\*  (0.12) |  | -0.39\*  (0.18) |
| Academics |  | 0.18  (0.17) |  | 0.17  (0.26) |
| Professionals |  | -0.29†  (0.16) |  | 0.23  (0.18) |
| Party Member |  | -0.08  (0.10) |  | 0.20  (0.16) |
| Leadership |  | 0.44\*\*  (0.16) |  | 0.59\*\*  (0.19) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | -0.07  (0.12)  0.10  (0.23)  0.21  (0.31)  -0.24  (0.41)  -0.58  (0.38) | 0.14  (0.17)  -0.23  (0.44)  1.50†  (0.88)  -0.33  (0.52)  -1.18†  (0.68) | -0.53\*  (0.22)  0.26  (0.26)  -0.23  (0.49)  0.15  (0.44)  -0.57  (0.59) | -0.31  (0.31)  0.19  (0.58)  1.51  (0.93)  0.25  (0.60)  -0.10  (0.95) |
| Party Secretary | 0.08  (0.06) | 0.17†  (0.09) | 0.11  (0.09) | 0.28\*  (0.12) |
| Provincial Party Secretary | -0.09  (0.12) | 0.04  (0.17) | -0.57†  (0.31) | -0.74†  (0.43) |
| Governor | -0.21  (0.25) | -1.06\*\*\*  (0.28) | 0.46  (0.39) |  |
| Gender |  | -0.14  (0.10) |  | -0.45\*\*  (0.16) |
| Experience |  | -0.06  (0.09) |  | 0.20  (0.14) |
| Native |  | 0.08  (0.11) |  | -0.10  (0.16) |
| Ethnic Minority |  | 0.06  (0.13) |  | -0.14  (0.21) |
| Number of Proposals |  | -0.02  (0.03) |  | -0.002  (0.03) |
| Number of Depts | 0.28\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.41\*\*\*  (0.06) | 0.23\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.30\*\*\*  (0.07) |
| Local Issue | -0.08  (0.09) | 0.12  (0.14) | 0.03  (0.12) | 0.16  (0.19) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0002\*\*  (0.00005) | -0.0002\*  (0.00008) | -0.0002†  (0.00008) | -0.0002†  (0.00001) |
| N | 5,020 | 2,091 | 5,020 | 2,073 |

Note: † p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These are ordered logistic regression results (Models 1-2) and logistic regression results (Models 3-4).

1. **Key Proposals by Occupational Backgrounds**

Every year a select number of proposals (about 3 percent of all submitted proposals) that are “comprehensive, forward-looking, and strategic, and ha[ve] important reference value for macro decision-making and long-term planning”[[8]](#footnote-8) and are deemed to address important issues are awarded the title of key proposals (重点提案). Their implementation will be under special supervision often by the PPCCs’ Chairmen or Vice-Chairmen themselves. Thus, the designation as key proposal is an important alternative indicator of the expected implementation of proposals. For these purposes, I have collected the key proposals from Hainan and three additional provinces (Anhui, Jiangsu, and Liaoning) and assessed the occupational backgrounds of the individuals that were awarded this title. Unfortunately, data availability is a concern even for selecting the key proposals and thus, they could only be collected for varying time periods. However, this additional analysis achieves a wide geographical coverage within China as the four selected provinces cover regions in Northern and Southern China as well as rich coastal areas and developing inland provinces. The table below shows the selected key proposals by the occupational backgrounds of the submitting delegates in the four provinces. The distribution demonstrates that government officials are also in a slightly more favorable position to receive this honor but that other delegates such as academics and entrepreneurs are also frequently awarded. Thus, the key proposals provide further evidence for the results of the quantitative analysis.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Occupational Group[[9]](#footnote-9) | Number of Key Proposals | | | |
|  | Province A | Province B | Province C | Province D |
| Provincial Government Officials | 7 (15.6) | 9 (27.3) | 12 (19.0) | 1 (4.8) |
| Local Government Officials | 8 (17.8) | 6 (18.2) | 16 (25.4) | 10 (47.6) |
| Academics | 8 (17.8) | 8 (24.2) | 16 (25.4) | 2 (9.5) |
| Entrepreneurs | 10 (22.2) | 5 (15.2) | 5 (7.9) | 0 (0) |
| SOE | 2 (4.4) | 1 (3.0) | 2 (3.2) | 0 (0) |
| Professionals | 5 (11.1) | 2 (6.1) | 6 (9.5) | 2 (9.5) |
| Dem Party | 1 (2.2) | 0 (0) | 1 (1.6) | 2 (9.5) |
| Govt-affiliated Org | 1 (2.2) | 1 (3.0) | 4 (6.3) | 1 (4.8) |
| Religious Figure | 0 (0) | 1 (3.0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) |
| Unknown | 3 (6.7) | 0 (3.0) | 1 (1.6) | 3 (14.3) |
| Years | 2006-2020 | 2019-2020 | 2018-2021 | 2020-2021 |
| Total[[10]](#footnote-10) | 45 (100) | 33 | 63 | 21 |

1. **Alternative Explanation: Grievances and Collective Action**

An alternative explanation may place more emphasis on the role of collective action and grievances. As Chen et al. (2016:384) note, “threats of collective action cause local officials to be more publicly responsive”. To be sure, it is extremely unlikely that PPCC delegates themselves will take their demands to the street but nevertheless, their actions can highlight issues that have the potential to unlock collective action among the population. Similarly, grievances have been highlighted as a major mobilizing force in driving collective action (e.g., Hurst and O’Brien 2002). As institutions have been characterized as useful in preempting the emergence of collective action by transmitting information about citizens’ preferences (Distelhorst and Hou 2017), one may also expect to see the government responding more positively to proposals that highlight grievances and illustrate the potential for collective action.

These aspects have been operationalized in four different ways. For one, proposals have been distinguished by way of submission. They can either be authored by single delegates, co-signed by several individual delegates (joint proposals), or written by a denominated faction of delegates such as those of the minor parties or certain committees (collective proposals). Following the collective action argument, one would expect that especially joint proposals will receive more positive responses compared to individual ones as they signal that an issue can cut across individual delegate interests. In the second step, the analysis focuses on joint proposals and determines whether the number of delegates that signed the proposal affects the government’s responsiveness. A higher number of delegates should signal more potential for collective action and should be responded to more positively following this line of argument.

Finally, for every proposal, a sentiment score has been calculated that highlights the conveyed feelings of the proposal. The score ranges from -1 to 1 where a higher score illustrates a more positive language, while a score closer to -1 is deemed more negative and critical. This score has been calculated with the help of the *bixin* package for Python. Compared to other sentiment analysis tools, this package has the advantage that it does not solely rely on customers’ product ratings and reviews but also includes news as well as financial reports whose words figure prominently in some of the proposals. For this potential explanation, one would expect proposals with a lower sentiment score associated with more positive responses as their critical and negative language hints at the delegates’ grievances that may be even more pronounced among the population. The sentiment scores were calculated for the entire proposals as well as for the problem description sections of the proposals, excluding the final section of proposals with suggested solutions (see Section 26 in the Appendix for an illustration of the common proposal structure).

Table 3 below highlights these additional hypotheses in a total of eight models. Models 1 to 4 utilize ordered logistic regressions for the ordinal response variable whereas Models 5 to 8 use logistic regressions for the binary dependent variable.

Table 3: Collective Action and Grievance-based alternative explanation

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Government Response | | | | | | | | |
|  | Ordinal | | | | Dichotomous | | | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | Model 7 | Model 8 |
| Joint Proposal | 0.05  (0.10) | 0.05  (0.10) |  |  | 0.07  (0.15) | 0.07  (0.15) |  |  |
| Collective Proposal | 0.01  (0.04) | 0.009  (0.04) |  |  | -0.03  (0.06) | -0.03  (0.06) |  |  |
| Number of Authors |  |  | -0.03  (0.02) | -0.03  (0.02) |  |  | -0.02  (0.03) | -0.02  (0.03) |
| Sentiment (Proposal) | -0.01  (0.09) |  | 0.10  (0.11) |  | -0.23†  (0.13) |  | -0.10  (0.16) |  |
| Sentiment (Problem Description) |  | -0.09  (0.06) |  | -0.03  (0.08) |  | -0.15  (0.10) |  | -0.11  (0.11) |
| Evidence | 0.10\*  (0.04) | 0.09\*  (0.04) | 0.12\*  (0.05) | 0.11\*  (0.05) | 0.18\*\*  (0.07) | 0.18\*\*  (0.07) | 0.14  (0.08) | 0.13  (0.08) |
| Existing Laws | 0.04\*  (0.02) | 0.04\*  (0.02) | 0.07\*\*  (0.02) | 0.07\*\*  (0.02) | 0.06\*  (0.03) | 0.06\*  (0.03) | 0.07†  (0.08) | 0.07†  (0.34) |
| Type-Token Ratio | -0.50  (0.42) | -0.58  (0.42) | -0.20  (0.52) | -0.32  (0.52) | 1.25†  (0.64) | 1.26†  (0.64) | 0.90  (0.75) | 0.84  (0.76) |
| Party Congress  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5 | -0.04  (0.10)  0.31†  (0.19)  0.03  (0.16)  0.05  (0.30)  -0.40  (0.25) | -0.03  (0.10)  0.31†  (0.19)  0.05  (0.16)  0.06  (0.30)  -0.40  (0.25) | -0.04  (0.13)  0.16  (0.30)  0.13  (0.21)  0.21  (0.37)  -0.70\*  (0.30) | -0.03  (0.13)  0.17  (0.30)  0.16  (0.21)  0.23  (0.37)  -0.69\*  (0.30) | -0.57\*\*  (0.21)  0.38†  (0.22)  -0.70†  (0.37)  0.45  (0.33)  -0.90†  (0.53) | -0.57\*\*  (0.21)  0.38†  (0.22)  -0.70†  (0.37)  0.45  (0.33)  -0.91†  (0.52) | -0.36  (0.25)  0.47  (0.31)  -0.54  (0.48)  0.70†  (0.39)  -0.49  (0.53) | -0.37  (0.25)  0.47  (0.31)  -0.54  (0.48)  0.69†  (0.39)  -0.50  (0.53) |
| Party Secretary | 0.10  (0.06) | 0.10†  (0.06) | 0.09  (0.07) | 0.10  (0.07) | 0.16†  (0.09) | 0.16†  (0.09) | 0.23\*  (0.10) | 0.24\*  (0.10) |
| Prov Party Secretary | -0.06  (0.10) | -0.04  (0.10) | -0.09  (0.13) | -0.07  (0.13) | -0.29  (0.22) | -0.16  (0.22) | -0.33  (0.32) | -0.32  (0.32) |
| Governor | 0.04  (0.11) | 0.04  (0.11) | -0.27†  (0.14) | -0.26†  (0.14) | 0.16  (0.17) | 0.16  (0.17) | -0.58†  (0.34) | -0.58†  (0.34) |
| Number of Depts | 0.36\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.36\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.35\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.35\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.33\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.33\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.37\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.37\*\*\*  (0.05) |
| Local Issue | -0.04  (0.06) | -0.04  (0.06) | -0.002  (0.08) | -0.002  (0.08) | -0.04  (0.09) | -0.03  (0.09) | 0.02  (0.11) | 0.03  (0.11) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0001\*\*\*  (0.00003) | -0.0001\*\*\*  (0.00003) | -0.0002\*\*\*  (0.00004) | -0.0002\*\*\*  (0.00004) | -0.0001\*  (0.00006) | -0.0001\*  (0.00006) | -0.0003\*\*\*  (0.00008) | -0.003\*\*\*  (0.00008) |
| N | 9,075 | 9,075 | 5,406 | 5,406 | 9,075 | 9,075 | 5,406 | 5,406 |
| Pseudo R² | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |

Note: † p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001, Robust standard errors in parentheses. These are ordered logistic regression results (Models 1-4) and logistic regression results (Models 5-8).

As the results highlight, the collective action and grievance argument can hardly be sustained in this case. There is no evidence that joint or collective proposals are preferred by the government in any of the models. In regard to grievances, the sentiment scores of the proposals and their problem description sections are also largely non-significant except for Model 5 where the coefficient is negative and significant on the p < 0.1 level suggesting that more critical proposals tend to receive more positive responses. However, overall, this still constitutes very limited evidence for this alternative explanation.

1. **Cross-locality and Cross-sectoral Collaborations**

An even stronger signal of the importance of the issues in the proposal may be cross-sectoral collaboration or that of delegates from different localities (e.g., Gueorguiev 2021). In other words, when delegates from different functional sectors or those that are based in different cities come together to jointly raise a problem in a PPCC proposal, this may raise the issues’ rank on the government’s agenda. Analyzing the character of the joint proposals however, I find extremely limited evidence that these are treated with higher priority by the government among joint proposals and among all proposals. While Model 4 below suggests that cross-sectoral collaborations are indeed more likely to receive Category 5 responses, this result is to be taken with caution since I find that almost all joint proposals are the product of cooperation beyond the own sector. In regard to cross-locality collaborations, I find that they are even detrimental for receiving favorable government responses in the ordinal models, but these results should also be interpreted carefully due to the relatively small number of collaborations in the overall sample as well as the low number of proposals signed by delegates from different locations in the province.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Government Response | | | |
|  | Joint Proposals | | All Proposals | |
|  | Ordinal  Model 1 | Dichotomous  Model 2 | Ordinal  Model 3 | Dichotomous  Model 4 |
| Geographic Collaboration | -1.29\*  (0.50) | -0.73  (0.55) | -0.64\*  (0.30) | -0.52  (0.43) |
| Sectoral Collaboration | 0.23  (0.34) | 0.39  (0.51) | 0.30  (0.19) | 0.55\*  (0.24) |
| Sentiment Score (Proposal) | 0.30  (0.75) | 0.48  (1.16) | -0.02  (0.09) | -0.23†  (0.13) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | 0.85  (0.75)  -  -  -1.41  (0.95)  -0.43  (0.16) | 0.79  (0.82)  -  -  -1.20  (1.32)  - | -0.06  (0.10)  0.35†  (0.18)  0.02  (0.16)  -0.01  (0.30)  -0.38  (0.25) | -0.59\*\*  (0.21)  0.42†  (0.22)  -0.70†  (0.37)  0.39  (0.33)  -0.89†  (0.53) |
| Party Secretary | 0.19  (0.62) | 1.14†  (0.68) | 0.12\*  (0.06) | 0.17\*  (0.09) |
| Governor | -2.66\*  (1.30) | - | 0.03  (0.11) | 0.14  (0.18) |
| Prov Party Secretary | -0.43  (0.78) | -0.89  (1.53) | -0.07  (0.10) | -0.32  (0.22) |
| Existing Laws | -0.32†  (0.16) | -0.18  (0.19) | 0.04\*  (0.02) | 0.06\*  (0.03) |
| Evidence | 0.60†  (0.31) | 0.90\*  (0.44) | 0.11\*  (0.04) | 0.19\*\*  (0.07) |
| Type-Token Ratio | -5.79†  (3.12) | -2.50  (4.33) | -0.63  (0.43) | 1.27†  (0.65) |
| Number of Depts | 0.75\*\*  (0.24) | 0.79†  (0.44) | 0.35  (0.04) | 0.32\*\*\*  (0.04) |
| Local Issue | -0.33  (0.41) | -0.99†  (0.59) | -0.04  (0.06) | -0.02  (0.09) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0003  (0.0002) | -0.0003  (0.0003) | -0.0001\*\*\*  (0.00003) | -0.0002\*  (0.00006) |
| N | 245 | 220 | 8,916 | 8,916 |
| Pseudo R² | 0.09 | 0.15 | 0.007 | 0.02 |

Note: †p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p <0.001, Robust standard errors in parentheses. These are ordered logistic regression results (Models 1-3) and logistic regression results (Models 4-6).

1. **Responsiveness to High-Status Individuals**

An alternative explanation may focus on the role of the status in society of the delegates. Since the PPCCs are used to coopt high-status individuals (e.g., Yan 2011), government departments may also be more likely to respond positively to suggestions coming from high-status individuals. It is difficult (if not impossible) to quantify the status of individuals across different occupations (e.g., government officials, academics, and entrepreneurs). Therefore, an analysis covering all delegates is not feasible. Instead, the below analysis will take this alternative explanation seriously by differentiating individuals within the same occupations according to their status as measured by available and suitable proxies. Ultimately, the below additional analysis reveal that high-status individuals are not systematically advantaged in the responses they get from the government regarding their submitted proposals.

The first analysis compares provincial-level government officials with those working on the local levels. Government officials working on the provincial level should enjoy a higher social status and therefore, according to this alternative explanation also be advantaged in receiving systematically more positive responses from the government. Nevertheless, the results from the analysis below do not confirm this expectation. If anything, provincial government officials may be at a slight disadvantage as shown in Model 2 below.

The second analysis has used the biographical dataset of Hainan PPCC delegates to identify the full professors in the subsample of academic proposers. Full professors are assumed to be of higher social status than the other categories that can be found in the sample including Associate Professors, Assistant Professors, and Research Fellows. In the interest of maintaining a reasonable sample size, however, these have all been collapsed into a single category. The analysis shows that the coefficients found for the variable of Full Professor are indistinguishable from 0 and therefore, they do not seem to receive systematically more positive responses from the government than academics that are not full professors.

Finally, regarding private entrepreneurs, a suitable proxy for status in society may be the firms’ registered capital with the idea being that entrepreneurs of larger, and more financially valuable businesses enjoy a higher status in society. This is naturally an imperfect proxy since status is not synonymous with financial resources. Nevertheless, given the variety of businesses that delegates in the sample manage, this is likely to be the most generalizable proxy across a number of industries. The information about companies’ registered capital has been collected primarily from Tianyancha (天眼查) and similar websites. Due to the high variation in company size, the natural logarithm of this variable has been computed and used in the below regression analysis. The results highlight that companies’ registered capital is far from being a significant factor in determining whether entrepreneurs’ proposals are received positively by the government or not.

* 1. Comparing provincial- and local-level government officials

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Government Response |  |
|  | Model 1 (Ordinal) | Model 2 (Dichotomous) |
| Evidence | -0.07  (0.11) | 0.003  (0.16) |
| Existing Laws | 0.05  (0.04) | 0.04  (0.07) |
| Type-Token Ratio | -0.40  (1.02) | 0.16  (1.44) |
| Provincial Govt. Official | -0.17  (0.12) | -0.35†  (0.19) |
| Party Member | -0.06  (0.11) | 0.07  (0.17) |
| Leadership | 0.82\*\*  (0.25) | 1.26\*\*\*  (0.26) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | -0.07  (0.24)  1.27  (0.42)  0.09  (0.30)  0.002  (0.56)  -0.85\*  (0.36) | -0.77†  (0.42)  1.33\*  (0.58)  -1.33  (1.06)  0.52  (0.62) |
| Party Secretary | 0.03  (0.13) | 0.23  (0.18) |
| Provincial Party Secretary | -0.69\*\*  (0.24) | 0.29  (0.47) |
| Governor | -0.09  (0.26) | -0.38  (0.61) |
| Gender | -0.005  (0.11) | 0.05  (0.15) |
| Experience | 0.25\*  (0.11) | 0.44\*\*  (0.15) |
| Native | -0.03  (0.13) | -0.13  (0.20) |
| Ethnic Minority | -0.14  (0.13) | -0.36†  (0.20) |
| Number of Proposals | -0.01  (0.03) | -0.0007  (0.04) |
| Number of Depts | 0.25\*\*  (0.09) | 0.04  (0.17) |
| Local Issue | 0.04  (0.14) | -0.07  (0.19) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0001  (0.00009) | -0.0004\*  (0.0002) |
| N | 1,660 | 1,651 |

* 1. Comparing Full Professors and other academics

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Government Response |  |
|  | Model 1 (Ordinal) | Model 2 (Dichotomous) |
| Evidence | 0.35\*  (0.18) | 0.58†  (0.31) |
| Existing Laws | 0.01  (0.07) | 0.17  (0.31) |
| Type-Token Ratio | 0.14  (1.47) | 1.79  (2.69) |
| Full Professor | -0.11  (0.21) | 0.15  (0.34) |
| Party Member | 0.29  (0.30) | -0.04  (0.53) |
| Leadership | 0.35  (0.28) | 0.88\*  (0.36) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | -0.47  (0.36)  -2.61\*\*\*  (0.46)  -2.32\*\*\*  (0.42)  -0.98  (0.69) | -0.64  (1.19)  1.21  (1.21) |
| Party Secretary | 0.10  (0.17) | 0.41  (0.39) |
| Gender | 0.21  (0.22) | 0.37  (0.39) |
| Experience | -0.35†  (0.18) | -0.002  (0.29) |
| Native | 0.15  (0.29) | -0.04  (0.61) |
| Ethnic Minority | -0.98\*  (0.39) | -1.17  (0.90) |
| Number of Proposals | -0.02  (0.03) | -0.04  (0.06) |
| Number of Depts | 1.15\*\*  (0.37) | 1.73\*\*\*  (0.42) |
| Local Issue | 0.23  (0.31) | 0.27  (0.39) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0001  (0.00001) | -0.0002  (0.0003) |
| N | 633 | 608 |

* 1. Comparing Firms

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Government Response |  |
|  | Model 1 (Ordinal) | Model 2 (Dichotomous) |
| Evidence | 0.21†  (0.12) | 0.07  (0.18) |
| Existing Laws | 0.20\*\*\*  (0.06) | 0.21\*\*  (0.07) |
| Type-Token Ratio | 2.43†  (1.31) | 0.10  (1.99) |
| Registered Capital (log) | -0.003  (0.04) | -0.02  (0.05) |
| Party Member | 0.26  (0.23) | 0.35  (0.30) |
| Leadership | -0.06  (0.19) | 0.25  (0.30) |
| Party Congress  X Year 1  X Year 2  X Year 3  X Year 4  X Year 5 | -0.27  (0.37)  0.37  (0.86)  1.11†  (0.60)  2.28†  (1.18)  -0.92  (0.77) | -0.27  (0.57)  0.22  (0.79)  0.99  (1.21)  3.02\*\*  (0.99)  -0.42  (1.29) |
| Party Secretary | 0.67\*\*  (0.20) | 0.83\*\*\*  (0.23) |
| Gender | -0.29  (0.23) | -0.74†  (0.40) |
| Experience | -0.04  (0.14) | -0.17  (0.22) |
| Native | 0.20  (0.19) | 0.11  (0.29) |
| Ethnic Minority | 0.26  (0.22) | -0.37  (0.37) |
| Number of Proposals | 0.001  (0.02) | -0.01  (0.03) |
| Number of Depts | 0.29\*  (0.14) | 0.56\*\*\*  (0.16) |
| Local Issue | -0.28†  (0.0001) | -0.45†  (0.27) |
| Length of Proposal | -0.0002  (0.0001) | -0.0007\*\*  (0.0002) |
| N | 1234 | 1234 |

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1. I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Log GDP per capita in 2019, National Bureau of Statistics [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Log Population in 2019, National Bureau of Statistics [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Log Area in km², National Bureau of Statistics [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Ratio or urban population in percent of overall population in province in 2019, National Bureau of Statistics [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Party members per 10,000 citizens in 2010, taken from Koss (2018:23) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Note that both, proposal and government response are from 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. ‘Measures for the Selection and Supervision of Key Proposals of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference’ (http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2018/01/30/ARTI1517280092357533.shtml) [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Note that in the case that the key proposals here were submitted by several individual delegates, only the occupational background of the lead signee were recorded. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Note that the number here denotes the key proposals submitted by individual delegates and does not include those submitted by MPGs, mass organizations, and special committees. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)