**Online supplementary material**

Value-Driven Contention in China: Appendices

#### Appendix A: Keywords used to identify protest-related media content

The keywords used for Chinese sources were generated by first sending a list of 30 terms to five experts on contentious politics in China (four native speakers and one non-native speaker) to ask for comments. A subsequently amended list of 58 terms was then manually tested on one dissident medium, seven mainland Chinese newspapers and seven Chinese newspapers from Hong Kong and Taiwan for coverage and efficiency. The following 25 terms were extracted:

群体性事件 *quntixing shijian* (mass incident); 群体事件 *qunti shijian* (mass incident); 示威 *shiwei* (demonstration); 游行 *youxing* (parade); 骚乱 *saoluan* (riot); 集会 *jihui* (assembly); 上街 *shangjie* (take to the streets); 静坐 *jingzuo* (sit-in); 集体上访 *jitishangfang* (collective petition); 请愿 *qingyuan* (petition); 闹事 *naoshi* (trouble-making); 扰乱社会秩序 *raoluan shehui zhixu* (disrupt social order); 扰乱公共秩序 *raoluan gonggong zhixu* (disrupt public order); 罢课 *bake* (student/teacher strike); 罢市 *bashi* (shopkeeper’s strike); 讨说法 讨个说法 *tao (ge) shuofa* (demand an explanation); 停工 *ting gong* (work stoppage); 罢工 *bagong* (strike); 讨薪 *taoxin* (salary bargaining); 暴力抗法 *baoli kangfa* (violent resistance against law enforcement); 喊口号 *han kouhao* (shout slogans); 横幅 *hengfu* (banner); 警民冲突 *jingmin chongtu* (police–people conflict); 催泪弹 *cui lei dan* (tear gas canisters)

The keywords used for LexisNexis followed Weidman, Nils B., and Espen Geelmuyden Rød. 2019. *The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: “protest,” “demonstration,” “rally,” “campaign,” “riot” and “picket.” We added “strike” and “unrest” to these terms.

#### Appendix B: Dimensions of value-driven protests

| **Value-driven Identity** | **Value-driven Claims** |
| --- | --- |
|  | *No* | *Yes* |
| No | 2,775 (98%) | 13 (0.5%) |
| Yes | 21 (0.7%) | 33 (1.2%) |
| Total | 2,796 (98%) | 46 (1.6%) |

*Note:* Missing values are not displayed.

#### Appendix C: Inter-rater reliability

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Brennan and Prediger’s κ (% agreement); for variables coded from media content only** |
| Value-driven claims  | 0.97 (98) |
| Value-driven identity  | 0.97 (98) |
| Participants  | 0.87 (95) |
| Blockades  | 0.85 (92) |
| Violence  | 0.94 (97) |
| Loyalty  | 0.97 (98) |
| Central policy  | 0.92 (96) |
| Target | 0.91 (96) |
| Policing  | 0.74 (87) |
| Arrests  | 0.92 (96) |
| Coercion  | 0.92 (96) |
| Non-state repression  | 0.81 (90) |
| Concessions  | 0.94 (97) |

*Notes:* Based on 139 cases coded in parallel in intervals throughout the coding process.

#### Appendix D: Logit regression model on value-driven protests

| **Variables** | **Value-driven** |
| --- | --- |
|  | *OR1* | *95% CI1* | *P* |
| ***Blockades*** | 0.17 | 0.00, 2.92 | 0.311 |
| ***Central policy*** | 3.11 | 0.58, 17.42 | 0.186 |
| ***Loyalty*** | 1.27 | 0.13, 10.41 | 0.831 |
| ***Protest target*** |  |  |  |
|  Not state | Ref. | Ref. |  |
|  < District | 2.53 | 0.22, 27.80 | 0.432 |
|  District | 8.47 | 1.19, 80.30 | **0.041** |
|  City/Province | 7.74 | 1.12, 76.30 | 0.051 |
|  Centre | 21842.33 | 1081.12, 1523052.36 | **<0.001** |
| ***Central location*** | 2.82 | 0.85, 9.89 | 0.094 |
| ***Participants (log)*** | 0.50 | 0.26, 0.86 | **0.019** |
| ***Year*** |  |  |  |
|  2014 | Ref. | Ref. |  |
|  2015 | 1.45 | 0.33, 7.02 | 0.630 |
|  2016 | 3.87 | 0.56, 28.5 | 0.165 |
| ***City*** |  |  |  |
|  Guangzhou | Ref. | Ref. |  |
|  Chongqing | 635.77 | 7.11, 574704.86 | **0.020** |
|  Shanghai | 225.12 | 3.01, 183664.12 | **0.045** |
| ***Intercept*** | 0.00 | 0.00, 0.03 | **0.002** |
| No. Obs. |  |  | 2,306 |
| AIC |  |  | 131 |

*Notes: 1*OR = Odds Ratio, CI = Confidence Interval. The control variable ***source type*** is not displayed. P <= 0.05 highlighted in bold.

#### Appendix E: Multinomial logit model on state repression (Ref. “No police”)

| **Characteristic** | **Police** | **Arrests or Coercion** |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | *OR1* | *95% CI1* | *P* | *OR1* | *95% CI1* | *P* |
| ***Value-driven*** |  0.37 | 0.18, 0.74 |  **0.005** |  0.33 | 0.17, 0.67 |  **0.002** |
| ***Intercept*** | 0.62 | 0.55, 0.69 | **<0.001** | 0.68 | 0.61, 0.76 | **<0.001** |
| N |  |  |  |  |  | 2,010 |
| AIC |  |  |  |  |  | 4,300 |

*Notes: 1*OR = Odds Ratio, CI = Confidence Interval. P <= 0.05 highlighted in bold.

#### Appendix F: Multinomial logit model on state repression (Ref. “Police only”)

| **Variables** | **No Police** | **Arrests or Coercion** |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | *OR1* | *95% CI1* | *P* | *OR1* | *95% CI1* | *P* |
| ***Value-driven*** | 2.71 | 1.35, 5.43 | **0.005** | 0.91 | 0.37, 2.19 | 0.827 |
| ***Intercept*** | 1.62 | 1.46, 1.81 | **<0.001** | 1.10 | 0.98, 1.24 | 0.103 |
| No. Obs. |  |  |  |  |  | 2,010 |
| AIC |  |  |  |  |  | 4,300 |

*Notes: 1*OR = Odds Ratio, CI = Confidence Interval. P <= 0.05 highlighted in bold.

#### Appendix G: Multinomial logit model state repression (Ref. “Police only”)

| **Variables** | **No Police** | **Arrests or Coercion** |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | *OR1* | *95% CI1* | *P* | *OR1* | *95% CI1* | *P* |
| ***Value-driven*** | 8.46 | 1.27, 56.4 | **0.027** | 0.57 | 0.07, 4.71 | 0.599 |
| ***Violence*** | 0.55 | 0.27, 1.15 | **0.110** | 3.05 | 1.72, 5.40 | **<0.001** |
| ***Blockades*** | 0.68 | 0.51, 0.92 | **0.013** | 1.00 | 0.73, 1.38 | 0.991 |
| ***Central policy*** | 1.18 | 0.63, 2.22 | 0.600 | 0.86 | 0.43, 1.73 | 0.679 |
| ***Loyalty*** | 0.77 | 0.41, 1.46 | 0.419 | 0.58 | 0.27, 1.27 | 0.174 |
| ***Protest target*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Not state | Ref. | Ref. |  | Ref. | Ref. |  |
|  < District | 0.67 | 0.44, 1.01 | 0.054 | 2.82 | 1.90, 4.19 | **<0.001** |
|  District | 0.87 | 0.47, 1.62 | 0.658 | 2.84 | 1.54, 5.25 | **<0.001** |
|  City/Province | 0.57 | 0.28, 1.16 | 0.124 | 1.63 | 0.83, 3.19 | 0.158 |
|  Centre | 0.03 | 0.00, 0.27 | **0.002** | 1.44 | 0.17, 12.0 | 0.736 |
| ***Central location*** | 0.91 | 0.69, 1.20 | 0.505 | 0.89 | 0.65, 1.21 | 0.447 |
| ***Participants (log)*** | 0.69 | 0.61, 0.78 | **<0.001** | 1.10 | 0.98, 1.24 | 0.120 |
| ***Year*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  2014 | Ref. | Ref. |  | Ref. | Ref. |  |
|  2015 | 0.92 | 0.70, 1.21 | 0.540 | 1.51 | 1.10, 2.08 | **0.011** |
|  2016 | 1.14 | 0.81, 1.59 | 0.456 | 2.13 | 1.46, 3.11 | **<0.001** |
| ***City*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Guangzhou | Ref. | Ref. |  | Ref. | Ref. |  |
|  Chongqing | 1.03 | 0.77, 1.40 | 0.824 | 2.07 | 1.44, 2.97 | **<0.001** |
|  Shanghai | 0.77 | 0.57, 1.04 | 0.084 | 1.95 | 1.37, 2.79 | **<0.001** |
| ***Intercept*** | 18.6 | 7.67, 45.0 | **<0.001** | 0.33 | 0.13, 0.82 | **0.017** |
| No. Obs. |  |  |  |  |  | 1,662 |
| AIC |  |  |  |  |  | 3,334 |

*Notes:**1*OR = Odds Ratio, CI = Confidence Interval. The control variable ***source type*** is not displayed. P <= 0.05 highlighted in bold.

#### Appendix H: Logit model on state concessions

| **Variable** | **OR***1* | **95% CI***1* | **P** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Value-driven*** | 0.20 | 0.03, 0.66 | **0.027** |
| ***Intercept*** | 0.17 | 0.15, 0.20 | **<0.001** |
| No. Obs. |  |  | 1,476 |
| AIC |  |  | 1,196 |

*Notes: 1*OR = Odds Ratio, CI = Confidence Interval. P <= 0.05 highlighted in bold.

#### Appendix I: Protest targets and the rates of concessions

| **Target** | **Concessions** |
| --- | --- |
|  | *No* | *Yes* |
|  |  |  |
|  ***Not state*** | 817 (86%) | 134 (14%) |
|  ***< District*** | 128 (83%) | 26 (17%) |
|  ***District*** | 53 (84%) | 10 (16%) |
|  ***City/Province*** | 56 (86%) | 9 (14%) |
|  ***Centre*** | 18 (100%) | 0 (0%) |
| **Total** | 1,072 (86%) | 179 (14%) |

*Notes:* The cases displayed are restricted to those included in Table 4, Model 2.