

Appendix

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1 Introduction

This Appendix proceeds as follows. Section 2 adopts Asiedu et al. (2021)’s approach to a structured ethics appendix for social science research. In it, we refer frequently to the Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research approved by the APSA Council in 2020. We also draw on Baron and Young (2022, 2), who outline an approach to ethical research in environments of political violence. They focus on four areas: better documentation of risk assessments, avoiding negative psychological outcomes like emotional distress and post-traumatic stress disorder, assessing the adequacy of the informed consent process, and monitoring negative consequences during and after the research.

The remainder of the Appendix includes supporting information. Section 3 presents more information about the survey, including completion times, balance statistics, the correlation between our measures of regime support, and more information about how we use county-level night lights data as a measure of urbanization. Section 4.2 presents additional visualizations of the direct question data and supporting regression tables for the main text. Section 5 provides more information about our list experiments, including the experimental protocol and robustness checks for design, floor, and ceiling effects. We show the results about ethnicity, education, and CCP membership discussed in the main text. We also show null list experiment results for other demographic correlates that are not discussed in the main text. Finally, we show that our main results are robust to a series of robustness checks: excluding respondents who failed a basic attention check, including respondents who completed the survey in any amount of time, removing the statistical corrections for ceiling and floor effects, excluding respondents who engaged in “satisficing” behavior, and reweighting the survey data to match the census more precisely.

2 Ethical Considerations

This section adopts Asiedu et al. (2021)’s approach to a structured ethics appendix for social science research.¹ In it, we refer frequently to the Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research approved by the APSA Council in 2020. We also draw on Baron and Young (2022, 2), who outline an approach to ethical research in environments of political violence. They focus on four areas: better documentation of risk assessments, avoiding negative psychological outcomes like emotional distress and post-traumatic stress disorder, assessing the adequacy of the informed consent process, and monitoring negative consequences during and after the research.

¹We omit two sections that are most suited to randomized controlled trials, the principal focus of Asiedu et al. (2021)’s work: “Policy Equipose and Scarcity” across treatment arms of a study and “Researcher Roles with Respect to Implementation.”

2.1 Overview of Research Procedures

Participants were recruited by a private survey company. The sample was constructed using quota sampling to be balanced on the most recent census on age, sex, province, and income. All respondents were over the age of 18. Their participation was voluntary and they were free to end the survey at any time. The survey began with a standard waiver designed to secure informed consent.² The waiver stated that this was an academic research study run by the coauthors. It specified that the data would be used solely for research purposes, and that in order to protect participants' anonymity we would not record any personally identifying information such as names or email addresses. We provided contact information (email, mail, and phone number) in case respondents had questions about the research or their rights as participants. The project did not involve deception. Participants were fairly compensated by the private survey company, in keeping with the financial remuneration typical in the market for survey responses in China. The full survey protocol and IRB proposal (which was granted exempt status) are available upon request.

2.2 Potential Harms to Participants or Nonparticipants from the Interventions or Policies

Our survey posed minimal risk to survey participants and nonparticipants. We arrived at this conclusion by considering special vulnerabilities, impacts on broader social groups, and the level of psychological harm caused to participants.

Participants were over the age of 18 and were recruited to reflect the national population, so there is nothing to suggest that our respondents were particularly vulnerable compared to typical citizens. Due to the steps we took to ensure anonymity, the prospects for reprisals against participants was minimal. In particular, participants' access to future government or private sector services was not changed by participation in the study. Potential impacts on nonparticipants in the study are unlikely. Our sample size is not large enough to have broader social or political effects. Accordingly, our study does not "compromise the integrity of political processes for research purposes" (American Political Science Association Council 2020, 13).

The core issue for us to consider is the level of psychological harm that may be caused to respondents by being asked potentially sensitive questions about their support for the incumbent regime. In evaluating this potential harm, we follow the model of Young (2018), which was subsequently discussed in Baron and Young (2022) as an example of how to consider appropriate levels of potential psychological harm to participants. Young (2018) asked citizens in Zimbabwe to reflect upon their prior experiences with state repression. This, obviously, could cue emotional distress and even post-traumatic stress disorder. To evaluate the potential for reprisals against survey participants, the author consulted with local collaborators and a domestic human rights monitor and concluded

²In particular, we complied with the guidance on informed consent from American Political Science Association Council (2020, 6-7).

that the risk of punishment for participating in the research was “justifiably low” (5). In our case, we observed that several previous studies in China and other repressive autocracies had fielded similar questions about regime support in both a direct and indirect context (Johnston and Quek 2018; Robinson and Tannenbergh 2019; Frye et al. 2017). We were in touch with the survey company and did not receive any reports of actual harms to the firm or participants after the survey research had been conducted. One of the coauthors attended the “Getting China Right” conference on June 3-4, 2022 at the University of Michigan, which convened over 50 China specialists. None of the eight experts on the panel on survey methods in China had ever heard of reprisals against survey respondents in China.

We also use Young (2018) as a benchmark for acceptable levels of emotional distress. Asking respondents to reflect upon their own experiences with state repression, which social scientists refer to as “re-traumatization,” is likely to cue far more distress than being asked about your opinion about politics, including hypothetical protest participation. Though reflecting on politics in an authoritarian context may be disheartening, doing so is less distressing than reflecting on personal experiences with past episodes of violent state repression. We conclude that the likelihood of our survey traumatizing or re-traumatizing respondents is low. And, what evidence there is about re-traumatization in the context of academic studies suggests that it is limited. Baron and Young (2022, 6) cite Jorm, Kelly and Morgan (2007)’s review of studies on trauma in psychiatry which tracked participants over time and found no long-term negative effects of participation.

2.3 Potential Harms from Data Collection or Research Protocols

We followed standard practices for securing informed consent from participants in our study (American Political Science Association Council 2020, 6-7). A crucial aspect for us is anonymity. Asiedu et al. (2021, 11) caution that confidentiality is “key to safeguarding and reducing the risk of potential stigmatization of participants, especially for a vulnerable population.” In our case, the vulnerable population includes potential dissenters who harbor anti-regime views. To protect their confidentiality, we take several steps. First, we collect no personally identifying information. The most personal information we collect is IP addresses which we geolocate to China’s 3,000 counties (which are approximately the size of US counties). We have multiple respondents in each county. China’s counties are, furthermore, quite populous. From the 2010 census, the county with the smallest population was Zanda, Tibet, with 6,567 residents. The vast majority of counties had over 100,000 residents and the largest, Pudong New Area in Shanghai, had over 5 million residents. In short, collecting IP addresses that are geolocated to counties does not pose a risk of reprisal to participants. We did not ask respondents about their past involvement in incriminating behaviors like protest, only about their hypothetical willingness to protest in the future. By asking respondents to indicate how many items rather than which items they agree with, our list experiments about sensitive political views inherently confer an additional layer of anonymity. And again, respondents

were free to leave the survey at any time.

2.4 Financial and Reputational Conflicts of Interest

None of the researchers have financial or reputational conflicts of interest concerning the research findings. We disclosed the grants that supported this research to the Editors in the standard journal article submission form and will do so in the published article as well. We do not have a public presence or reputation outside academia that has been built around a certain finding.

2.5 Intellectual Freedom

We did not have any contractual limitations on our ability to report the results of the study. We did not make any commitments to let anyone comment upon or read our research before submission or publication. No one has proprietary intellectual property in the research. We voluntarily decided not to report the name of the private survey company that conducted the research. The company did not request this. We follow Johnston and Quek (2018)’s practice: we are happy to report the name of this survey firm to the Editors, but prefer not to publish it.

2.6 Feedback to Participants or Communities

Asiedu et al. (2021, 14) note that researchers typically focus on securing informed consent but do not place enough attention on “engaging with research participants, local government, and communities after the research is complete.” Without disclosing information that would identify the authors at this point in the review process, we have publicly disseminated the results of our prior survey research in China and plan to do so again.

2.7 Foreseeable Misuse of Research Results

Asiedu et al. (2021, 15) caution that in an environment of power imbalances, the powerful may use the research results in order to harm participants or nonparticipants. In particular, “Research might reveal a vulnerability of a sub-population that can be exploited for the gain of a more powerful party.” Our study does not provide any information that would help the CCP target sub-populations for repression.

3 More Information on Survey

3.1 Survey Duration

The median response time was 12 minutes in the first wave and 10 minutes in the second wave. We restrict attention to respondents who completed the survey in between the 10th percentile of

completion times (5 minutes) and the 90th percentile of completion times (25 minutes). We found this range to correspond to a reasonable amount of time during pilots.

3.2 Survey Balance

Table 1: Survey Balance

Variable	Survey Wave 1	Survey Wave 2	Census
<i>Sex</i>			
Female	44.7	45.1	49
Male	55.3	54.9	51
<i>Ethnic Han</i>			
Han	88.1	90.5	92
Other	11.9	9.5	8
<i>Age</i>			
18-24	18.3	16.5	16
25-34	22.6	22.4	22
35-44	23.7	27.2	24
45-54	18.2	18.7	17
55-64	11.9	13.1	11
65-75	4.7	1.6	10
<i>Income (CNY)</i>			
< 15,000	10.0	11.2	20
15,000-24,999	23.9	28.3	22
25,000-64,999	41.2	35.7	42
65,000-149,999	15.4	14.8	10
149,999-249,999	7.3	8.5	5
≥ 250,000	2.3	1.6	1
<i>Province</i>			
Anhui	4.0	5.1	5
Beijing	2.4	1.3	1
Chongqing	2.4	2.2	2
Fujian	3.6	3.2	3
Gansu	2.1	2.7	2
Guangdong	6.4	6.1	6
Guangxi	4.2	4.7	4
Guizhou	3.2	3.3	3
Hainan	0.006	1.7	1
Hebei	4.7	5.0	5
Heilongjiang	3.0	3.2	3
Henan	7.1	5.3	8
Hubei	4.2	5.2	5
Hunan	3.2	4.2	5
Inner Mongolia	2.2	2.7	2
Jiangsu	5.9	5.9	6
Jiangxi	2.6	2.6	3
Jilin	1.4	2.2	2
Liaoning	3.1	3.2	3
Ningxia	0.01	0.007	0
Qinghai	0.005	0.009	0
Shaanxi	3.6	2.8	3
Shandong	5.1	4.9	7
Shanghai	1.5	1.1	1
Shanxi	2.1	1.9	3
Sichuan	6.1	5.6	7
Tianjin	1.2	1.1	1
Tibet	0.004	0.008	0
Xinjiang	2.9	3.3	2
Yunnan	3.4	3.2	3
Zhejiang	4.9	3.9	4

Notes: Most recent census data from 2010.

3.3 Correlation of Regime Support Questions

Responses to our five primary outcome variables under direct questioning exhibit moderate correlation. Tables 2 and 3 present the associated correlation matrices for the June 2020 and November 2020 survey waves, respectively. For the June 2020 wave, the correlation coefficients between variables are generally 0.5 or higher, the Cronbach’s α value is 0.73, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.73, and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity yields a χ^2 value of 5629.14. For the November 2020 wave, the the correlation coefficients between variables are again generally 0.5 or higher, the Cronbach’s α value is 0.69, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.72, and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity yields a χ^2 value of 8353.73.

Table 2: Correlation Matrix (June 2020)

	Support for Xi Jinping	Govt Works for the People	System of Govt is Best	Willing to Protest
Support for Xi Jinping	1	0.510	0.490	-0.380
Govt Works for the People	0.510	1	0.490	-0.270
System of Govt is Best	0.490	0.490	1	-0.250
Willing to Protest	-0.380	-0.270	-0.250	1

Table 3: Correlation Matrix (November 2020)

	Support for Xi Jinping	Govt Works for the People	System of Govt is Best	Willing to Protest
Support for Xi Jinping	1	0.480	0.520	-0.230
Govt Works for the People	0.480	1	0.490	-0.190
System of Govt is Best	0.520	0.490	1	-0.210
Willing to Protest	-0.230	-0.190	-0.210	1

3.4 Night Lights as a Measure of Urbanization

To measure urbanization, we located respondents’ IP addresses within China’s 3,000 counties, which are approximately the size of US counties. We then computed each county’s average nighttime lights in 2019, using high quality satellite imagery data from the Visible and Infrared Imaging Suite developed by the Earth Observation Group (Elvidge et al. 2021). Night lights have been used as one approximation of urbanization in political science research and are appealing because they are hyper local.

4 More Information on Direct Questions

4.1 Additional Visualizations




Figure 1: Direct Questions: Reason for Not Protesting




Figure 2: Direct Questions (Density Plot)

4.2 Regression Tables: Correlates of (Expressed) Regime Support

Does expressed support for the CCP vary according to demographic characteristics? We probe this by estimating a series of models of the form

$$Y_i \geq \text{Somewhat Agree} = \alpha + \beta X_i + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

where the outcome Y_i equals 1 if respondent i at least somewhat agreed with the direct question prompts in the main text and the vector X_i includes respondent i 's demographic characteristics. We estimate (1) with a simple linear probability model.

The June results appear in Table 4; the November results appear in Table 5. Models 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 exclude covariates, so that the constant α simply gives the mean level of regime support. The striking feature is how little demographic characteristics condition levels of expressed support. Party members and non-members overwhelmingly say they support the CCP, as do the young and old, the highly educated and the less so, the affluent and the poor, the urban and the rural. Men say they support the CCP at roughly the same rates as women. The only demographic characteristic that has a relatively consistent effect is ethnicity, but even this is modest. Ethnic Han are generally between 3% and 7% less likely to say they support the CCP than non-ethnic Han.

Again, this is consistent with widespread preference falsification due to fear of repression: Whatever their demographic background, political affiliation, and socio-economic standing, citizens overwhelmingly say they support the CCP.

Table 4: Results for direct questioning, June 2020

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Support Xi Jinping (1)	(2)	Govt Works for the People (3)	(4)	System of Govt is Best (5)	(6)	Willing to Protest (7)	(8)	Fear (0) or Support (1) (9)	(10)
Party	0.024 (0.016)		-0.004 (0.019)		0.031 (0.022)		-0.025 (0.026)		0.061*** (0.021)	
Education	0.009 (0.008)		-0.005 (0.009)		0.003 (0.011)		-0.050*** (0.013)		-0.003 (0.011)	
Ethnic Han	-0.047** (0.019)		-0.030 (0.023)		-0.063** (0.027)		0.033 (0.032)		-0.065** (0.028)	
Male	-0.015 (0.012)		-0.005 (0.014)		-0.011 (0.016)		0.019 (0.020)		-0.019 (0.017)	
Age	-0.001 (0.0004)		0.0002 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)		0.002** (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)	
Income	-0.007 (0.005)		0.024*** (0.006)		0.0003 (0.008)		-0.007 (0.009)		-0.002 (0.008)	
Light	-0.004 (0.021)		0.033 (0.025)		-0.027 (0.030)		-0.017 (0.035)		-0.029 (0.031)	
Constant	0.927*** (0.006)	0.986*** (0.042)	0.896*** (0.007)	0.866*** (0.049)	0.848*** (0.008)	0.897*** (0.058)	0.253*** (0.010)	0.448*** (0.069)	0.908*** (0.008)	1.026*** (0.059)
Observations	2,005	1,956	2,005	1,956	2,005	1,956	2,005	1,956	1,213	1,187
R ²	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.021	0.000	0.013

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table 5: Results for direct questioning, November 2020

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Support Xi Jinping (1)	(2)	Govt Works for the People (3)	(4)	System of Govt is Best (5)	(6)	Willing to Protest (7)	(8)	Fear (0) or Support (1) (9)	(10)
Party	0.011 (0.015)		0.002 (0.017)		0.044** (0.022)		0.097*** (0.027)		0.046* (0.026)	
Education	0.012** (0.006)		0.016** (0.007)		0.038*** (0.009)		0.002 (0.011)		-0.007 (0.010)	
Ethnic Han	0.030* (0.017)		0.064*** (0.020)		0.057** (0.026)		-0.066** (0.031)		0.061** (0.029)	
Male	-0.006 (0.010)		0.005 (0.011)		0.011 (0.015)		0.029 (0.018)		0.011 (0.016)	
Age	0.001*** (0.0004)		0.002*** (0.0005)		0.002*** (0.001)		-0.002*** (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)	
Income	-0.001 (0.004)		0.017*** (0.005)		-0.001 (0.007)		-0.017** (0.008)		-0.006 (0.007)	
Light	-0.022 (0.017)		0.033 (0.020)		0.004 (0.026)		-0.023 (0.031)		-0.025 (0.028)	
Constant	0.956*** (0.005)	0.864*** (0.034)	0.937*** (0.006)	0.688*** (0.040)	0.886*** (0.007)	0.603*** (0.053)	0.172*** (0.009)	0.429*** (0.063)	0.913*** (0.008)	0.924*** (0.060)
Observations	1,883	1,844	1,883	1,844	1,883	1,844	1,883	1,844	1,316	1,281
R ²	0.000	0.009	0.000	0.028	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.008

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

5 More Information on List Experiments

5.1 List Experiment Prompts

The list experiment prompts appear in Table 6. The sensitive item appears in bold at the top; in reality, its placement was randomized. For comparison, several of these questions were drawn from previous surveys in China (Jiang and Yang 2016; Huang 2018; Robinson and Tannenbergh 2019). To mitigate concerns about online surveillance, we made the non-sensitive items as non-verifiable as possible. For instance, rather than “I attend a sports match once a week,” we used the more ambiguous “I consider myself a sports fan.” We regard non-verifiability as an important standard for list experiments conducted in repressive environments characterized by high levels of surveillance. Non-verifiability satisfies the ethical requirement of protecting survey respondents and, because it heightens the sense of anonymity, ensures better quality data. Therefore, we regard non-verifiability as an important improvement over current work (Tang 2016).

To facilitate comparison with the direct questions, we included two list experiments about protest preferences: “I would not be willing to participate in a protest against the government *because I am afraid of the consequences*” and “I would not be willing to participate in a protest against the government *because I support the government’s policies*.”

To avoid ceiling and floor effects (Blair and Imai 2012), we chose nonsensitive items that are negatively correlated with each other (Glynn 2013). To avoid design effects, we chose nonsensitive items that are unambiguous and for which respondents likely have strong opinions (Blair and Imai 2012). We include the same controls as in the direct question models.

We emphasize, however, that list experiments may still be subject to preference falsification. That is, even in the context of the list experiment, some respondents may still prefer not to express sensitive opinions. We expect this to be especially salient in China, where respondents could believe the survey results would be provided to the CCP or be monitored through its extensive digital surveillance apparatus. Consequently, we regard the results of the list experiments as providing an *upper bound* on public support for the CCP. True support may be much lower.

5.2 Design, Floor, and Ceiling Effects

First we check for design effects, which occur when respondents’ preferences over nonsensitive items change with the addition of a sensitive item. For the baseline list experiment models, we compute the Bonferroni-corrected p -values (Blair and Imai 2012), which all approach 1. This suggests there are no design effects.

Next, we check for floor and ceiling effects. Floor effects occur when respondents feel negatively about all nonsensitive items, and so are deterred from expressing a genuine preference for the sensitive item; ceiling effects occur when respondents’ feel positively about all nonsensitive items, as well as the sensitive item. To accommodate both, we model the likelihood that a respondent

Table 6: List Experiment Prompts

<p>I support Comrade Xi Jinping’s leadership. I eat out everyday. Being frugal is a virtue. I love being close to nature.</p>
<p>Overall, the government is working for the people and is responsive to the needs of the people. Air pollution is one of the most important problems in our country. Overall, the quality of life was better 30 years ago. My family is better off now compared to five years ago.</p>
<p>China’s system of government is better than any other I can think of. It is important to follow religious norms and ceremonies. Private ownership of businesses should be increased. Women make equally good political leaders as men.</p>
<p>I would not participate in a protest or a collective walk against the government because I am afraid. I would consider myself a sports fan. I take vitamins every day. Smoking sometimes is a great way to relax.</p>
<p>I would not participate in a protest or a collective walk against the government because I support government policies. I like Italian food. Traditional norms and customs should be followed. Marine ecosystems should be protected.</p>

is subject to both floor and ceiling effects as a function of observed covariates (Blair and Imai 2012). Table 7 and Table 8 show that between 0.5% and 5% of respondents misrepresent their true preferences due to ceiling effects or floor effects. Adjusting for these effects improves model fit; the Bayesian Information Criterion values for the models that incorporate floor and ceiling effects are uniformly higher than for those that do not. The list experiment plots in the main text incorporate these statistical corrections for floor and ceiling effects; we present the uncorrected results below. The estimates are substantively unchanged.

Table 7: Ceiling and Floor Effects (June 2020 Wave)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Support for Xi Jinping	System of Govt is Best	Govt Works for the People	The CCP is Virtuous	Unwilling to Protest: Support	Unwilling to Protest: Fear
Proportion of Liars from Ceiling Effects	0.08331	3e-05	0.01302	0.01513	0.03125	0.00535
Proportion of Liars from Floor Effects	0.00733	0.00076	0.00366	0.0032	0.00326	0.04956

Table 8: Ceiling and Floor Effects (November 2020 Wave)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Support for Xi Jinping	System of Govt is Best	Govt Works for the People	The CCP is Virtuous	Unwilling to Protest: Support	Unwilling to Protest: Fear
Proportion of Liars from Ceiling Effects	0.05733	0.00527	0.02815	0.03322	0.04361	0.00998
Proportion of Liars from Floor Effects	0.00225	0.0027	0.00609	0.00857	0.00288	0.03145

5.3 List Experiment Results: Variation by Ethnicity, Education, and CCP Membership

Next, we probe whether our experiment estimates vary according to other demographic characteristics that we discussed only briefly in the main text due to space constraints. To do so, we use the methods introduced by Imai (2011) and Blair and Imai (2012). These methods use maximum likelihood techniques to probe how the probability of expressing sensitive opinions varies as a function of demographic characteristics. Since the coefficient estimates are difficult to interpret, we present the results as a series of graphics, which appear in Figure 3. The left graphics focus on June; the right graphics on November. The top panel focuses on ethnic Han respondents compared to other respondents. Blue circles represent the share of Han respondents who agree with a given statement. Purple triangles represent the share of non-Han respondents who agree with a given statement. Red squares give the difference between the two estimates, and when the confidence interval excludes zero, the result is statistically significant at the 95% level. The middle panel compares respondents who completed college (blue) to those who completed early middle school (purple).³ The bottom panel compares CCP members (blue) to other respondents (purple).

³The result is robust to other cutoffs.




Figure 3: List Experiment Results, Variation by Ethnicity, Education, and CCP Membership

5.4 List Experiment Results: Other Demographic Correlates

Aside from the three characteristics described above, strikingly, we find that most demographic characteristics do not have clear, consistent effects on regime support, as measured by list experiments. Figure 4 gives these null results.




Figure 4: List Experiments, Other Demographic Correlates

5.5 Basic Robustness Checks: Attention Check, Any Duration, No Ceiling/Floor Corrections

This section shows that our main list experiment results are robust to a series of basic robustness checks. The first panel of Figure 5 restricts attention to respondents who did not fail a basic attention check, reporting the date of New Year’s Day. The second panel includes the entire sample of respondents, rather than excluding those who finished the survey especially quickly or slowly (i.e., below the 10th percentile of completion times, 5 minutes, or above the 90th percentile of completion times, 25 minutes). The third panel removes the statistical corrections for ceiling and floor effects presented in the main text.

5.6 Advanced Robustness Checks: Satisficing, Reweighting

Next, we check for “satisficing” behavior: whether respondents could have been overcome with the cognitive difficulty of counting items in response to survey questions.⁴ Informed by Kramon and Weghorst (2012), we asked respondents three nonsensitive questions directly (whether respondents enjoyed hiking, travel, and whether they preferred urban life to rural life), and later asked respondents about these things in a list experiment. Kramon and Weghorst (2012) found a satisficing rate of 40% in Kenya; ours is around 50%. The first panel of Figure 6 dropped all satisficers. Our results are substantively unchanged.

Finally, our survey was relatively well balanced on the 2010 census. Nonetheless, the bottom panel shows that our results are robust to reweighting observations to match the census more precisely on age and income. The resulting weights range from 0.03 to 3.6 with a median value of 0.34 in the first wave and 0.66 in the second wave. The results are substantively unchanged.

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⁴Bansak et al. (2018) find no evidence of satisficing after asking respondents to perform 30 cognitively demanding conjoint tasks in a row, and suggest that “in similar study contexts researchers can assign dozens of tasks without substantial declines in response quality.”




Figure 5: List Experiment Basic Robustness Checks




Figure 6: List Experiment Advanced Robustness Checks

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