Campaign-Style Personnel Management:
Task Responsiveness and Selective Delocalization during China's Anti-Corruption Crackdown (2013–2020)

Appendix for Online Publication

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Table A1. Summary Statistics, 552 Succession Events

Statistic	St. Dev.	Mean	Median	Min	Max
Year	–	–	2017	2014	2020
Predecessor Departure:					
Predecessor expelled	0.260	0.073	0	0	1
Predecessor retired	0.134	0.018	0	0	1
Predecessor transferred	0.288	0.909	1	0	1
Successor's Personal Characteristics:					
Age	2.761	53.321	54	43	59
Male	0.208	0.955	1	0	1
Years of CCP membership	4.034	32.221	32	19	42
Years of total work	4.125	32.465	33	15	43
Years of local work	3.905	1.661	0	0	36
Predecessor's Personal Characteristics:					
Age	3.329	54.420	54	44	61
Male	0.231	0.944	1	0	1
Years of CCP membership	4.097	31.22	31	18	41
Years of total work	4.960	34.092	34	15	45
Years of local work	4.474	2.146	0	0	36
Provincial Chief Characteristics:					
Age	2.837	61.232	62	51	66
Years of CCP membership	4.480	39.690	41	25	47
Years of local work	5.703	2.916	0	0	38
Years of central work	11.285	9.825	5.2	0	33
Socioeconomic Conditions:					
Per capita GDP (¥)	32,877.15	57,639.26	48,304	10,470	200,152
GDP growth rate (%)	2.915	6.973	7.650	-11.5	14.4
Area (km^2)	23,575.1	16,572.38	12,022	1,456	261,570
Key city	0.319	0.113	0	0	1
Total population (10,000)	257.558	428.225	378.5	21	1,435
Revenue income (10,000)	3,313,184	2,260,456	1,167,278	142,563	33,321,303
Unemployed population	25,133.28	24,083.59	17,836	1,070	291,727
Number of bureaucrats per 1,000	6.32	13.17	11.948	1.574	70.370
Number of obs.	551				

Table A2. Comparison of Successors to Departed and Expelled Predecessors
Full sample: all 551 leadership successions

Variables	Difference of Means		*p-value*
	Predecessor is		
Successor Characteristics	Expelled	Transferred/Retired	
Successor Personal Characteristics			
Age	53.675	53.294	0.369
Male	0.925	0.957	0.462
Years of CCP membership	30.921	30.066	0.096*
Years of total work experience	33.675	32.369	0.072*
Years of local work experience	0.465	1.754	0.0003***
Predecessor Personal Characteristics			
Age (last year before succession)	54.975	54.380	0.246
Male	1.000	0.939	0.0001***
Years of CCP membership	32.027	31.161	0.209
Years of total work experience	36.000	33.949	0.004***
Years of local work experience	3.519	2.038	0.111
Most recent previous position:			
A lower post, same city	0.075	0.341	0.0001***
Other city, same province	0.325	0.309	0.840
Provincial-level authorities	0.450	0.304	0.098*
Any locality outside province	0.150	0.047	0.083*
Central authorities	0.025	0.004	0.407
Non-government institutions	0	0.008	0.045**
Count of turnovers, by year:			
2014	3	36	
2015	15	76	
2016	9	87	
2017	7	131	
2018	1	88	
2019	1	41	
2020	4	53	
Total count of turnovers:	40	511	

Note: Categories of one's "most recent previous position" are not mutually exclusive. An official could be a local official while concurrently serving provincial roles (e.g. a member of the provincial Party standing committee). Please see Appendix Part B for specific explanation of our coding rules. Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A3. Comparison of Successors to Departed and Expelled Predecessors
Subsample: only cities with at least one corruption incident

Variables	Difference of Means		*p-value*
	Predecessor is		
Successor Characteristics	Expelled	Transferred/Retired	
Successor Personal Characteristics			
Age	53.675	53.705	0.957
Male	0.925	0.932	0.905
Years of CCP membership	30.921	31.068	0.857
Years of total work experience	33.675	33.159	0.575
Years of local work experience	0.465	3.254	0.002***
Predecessor Personal Characteristics			
Age (last year before succession)	54.975	55.023	0.945
Male	1.000	0.909	0.044**
Years of CCP membership	32.027	32.045	0.984
Years of total work experience	36.000	35.227	0.449
Years of local work experience	3.519	1.089	0.022**
Most recent previous position:			
A lower post, same city	0.075	0.455	0.0001***
Other city, same province	0.325	0.227	0.324
Provincial-level authorities	0.450	0.250	0.057*
Any locality outside province	0.150	0.091	0.415
Central authorities	0.025	0	0.324
Non-government institutions	0	0	–
Count of turnovers, by year:			
2014	3	5	
2015	15	6	
2016	9	2	
2017	7	14	
2018	1	8	
2019	1	4	
2020	4	5	
Total count of turnovers:	40	44	

Note: Categories of one's "most recent previous position" are not mutually exclusive. An official could be a local official while concurrently serving provincial roles (e.g. a member of the provincial Party standing committee). Please see Appendix Part B for specific explanation of our coding rules. Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A4. Baseline Estimates, Complete Regression Results
Corresponding to Table 2 of the main text.

	Dependent variable:			
	Successor promoted locally		Successor sent down from above	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Full sample	*Subsample*	*Full sample*	*Subsample*
Key independent variable:				
(Baseline: normal departure)				
Dummy: predecessor expelled	−0.267***	−0.474**	0.166*	0.274**
	(0.073)	(0.192)	(0.099)	(0.130)
City socioeconomic variables:				
Log of GDP per capita, 1 yr lag	−0.060	0.498	0.037	−0.414
	(0.101)	(0.311)	(0.102)	(0.351)
GDP growth rate, 1 yr lag	−0.010	−0.031	−0.002	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.042)	(0.008)	(0.029)
Log of land area	0.001	0.287	0.063	−0.415**
	(0.041)	(0.256)	(0.044)	(0.162)
Key city	−0.178**	0.637	0.262***	−0.674
	(0.088)	(0.479)	(0.092)	(0.458)
Log of total population, 1 yr lag	−0.016	0.473	−0.021	−0.507
	(0.102)	(0.443)	(0.097)	(0.427)
Log of revenue income, 1 yr lag	−0.029	−1.065**	0.037	0.831*
	(0.078)	(0.392)	(0.076)	(0.455)
Unemployment rate, 1 yr lag	0.037	0.487*	−0.012	−0.651***
	(0.046)	(0.256)	(0.041)	(0.215)
Log of bureaucrat density, 1 yr lag	0.058	0.006	0.020	0.458
	(0.096)	(0.437)	(0.090)	(0.424)
Predecessor's personal covariates:				
Age	0.006	0.070	−0.00004	−0.093*
	(0.014)	(0.048)	(0.014)	(0.047)
Gender	−0.204**	−0.357	0.236**	−0.049
	(0.088)	(0.394)	(0.103)	(0.412)
Years in CCP	0.003	−0.021	−0.003	0.019
	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.023)
Years of local work	−0.004	0.0005	0.002	0.012
	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.022)
Years of total work	0.002	−0.010	0.002	0.023
	(0.009)	(0.035)	(0.009)	(0.029)
Provincial chief covariates:				
Age	0.013	−0.014	−0.001	−0.053
	(0.015)	(0.048)	(0.013)	(0.038)
Years in CCP	0.006	−0.004	0.001	0.024
	(0.009)	(0.043)	(0.008)	(0.041)
Years of local work	−0.005	−0.005	−0.001	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.027)	(0.005)	(0.033)
Years of central work	−0.002	−0.005	0.006**	−0.007
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.011)
Connect to predecessor	−0.001	0.066	0.015	−0.037
	(0.051)	(0.180)	(0.052)	(0.219)
Convicted later for corruption	−0.117	−0.261	−0.060	1.340***
	(0.135)	(0.551)	(0.137)	(0.376)
Provincial F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓
City clustered S.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓
Complete obs.	517	73	517	73
R^2	0.127	0.594	0.146	0.667
Adjusted R^2	0.030	0.056	0.051	0.228
Residual Std. Error	0.460	0.449	0.457	0.420

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A5. Baseline Estimates, with Alternative Coding for Independent Variable
Three-way breakdown of predecessor departure: transferred, retired, and expelled

	Dependent variable:			
	Successor promoted locally		Successor sent down from above	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Full sample	*Subsample*	*Full sample*	*Subsample*
Key independent variable:				
(Baseline: Predecessor transferred)				
Dummy: predecessor expelled	−0.265***	−0.501**	0.177*	0.356***
	(0.074)	(0.207)	(0.100)	(0.129)
Dummy: predecessor retired	0.095	−0.380	0.416*	1.141**
	(0.224)	(0.456)	(0.226)	(0.496)
City socioeconomic variables:				
Log of GDP per capita, 1 yr lag	−0.061	0.481	0.033	−0.365
	(0.101)	(0.327)	(0.101)	(0.348)
GDP growth rate, 1 yr lag	−0.011	−0.028	−0.002	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.043)	(0.008)	(0.028)
Log of land area	−0.0002	0.262	0.059	−0.340**
	(0.041)	(0.267)	(0.044)	(0.144)
Key city	−0.175**	0.559	0.280***	−0.441
	(0.088)	(0.502)	(0.091)	(0.440)
Log of total population, 1 yr lag	−0.015	0.402	−0.014	−0.295
	(0.102)	(0.473)	(0.096)	(0.417)
Log of revenue income, 1 yr lag	−0.031	−0.977**	0.031	0.568
	(0.078)	(0.432)	(0.076)	(0.449)
Unemployment rate, 1 yr lag	0.038	0.414	−0.008	−0.433
	(0.046)	(0.289)	(0.042)	(0.258)
Log of bureaucrat density, 1 yr lag	0.060	0.018	0.030	0.421
	(0.096)	(0.446)	(0.092)	(0.372)
Predecessor's personal covariates:				
Age	0.004	0.068	−0.003	−0.086
	(0.014)	(0.050)	(0.014)	(0.051)
Gender	−0.205**	−0.414	0.238**	0.121
	(0.088)	(0.434)	(0.103)	(0.469)
Years in CCP	0.004	−0.015	−0.004	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.030)
Years of local work	−0.005	0.001	−0.001	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.021)
Years of total work	0.003	−0.010	0.003	0.024
	(0.009)	(0.036)	(0.009)	(0.031)
Provincial chief covariates:				
Age	0.013	−0.019	−0.002	−0.039
	(0.015)	(0.051)	(0.012)	(0.039)
Years in CCP	0.006	−0.006	0.001	0.031
	(0.009)	(0.045)	(0.008)	(0.041)
Years of local work	−0.005	−0.007	−0.0002	0.017
	(0.006)	(0.028)	(0.006)	(0.036)
Years of central work	−0.002	−0.005	0.006**	−0.006
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.011)
Connect to predecessor	−0.001	0.039	0.018	0.043
	(0.051)	(0.202)	(0.053)	(0.226)
Convicted later for corruption	−0.114	−0.208	−0.054	1.180***
	(0.138)	(0.571)	(0.127)	(0.353)
Provincial F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓
City clustered S.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓
Complete obs.	517	73	517	73
R^2	0.128	0.597	0.155	0.699
Adjusted R^2	0.028	0.034	0.058	0.278
Residual Std. Error	0.460	0.454	0.456	0.406

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A6. Full Model Specification (1)

Outcome variable: dummy variable that successor is promoted from the same city

	Dependent variable:				
	Dummy: successor promoted from local leadership team				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Full	Full	Full	Full	Subsample
Key independent variable: (Baseline: normal departure)					
Predecessor expelled	−0.288***	−0.276***	−0.276***	−0.267***	−0.474**
	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.192)
Socioeconomic indicators:					
Log of GDP per capita, 1 yr lag		−0.058	−0.064	−0.060	0.498
		(0.092)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.311)
GDP growth rate, 1 yr lag		−0.009	−0.010	−0.010	−0.031
		(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.042)
Log of land area		−0.001	0.0001	0.001	0.287
		(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.256)
Key city		−0.204**	−0.171**	−0.178**	0.637
		(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.479)
Log of total population, 1 yr lag		−0.014	−0.025	−0.016	0.473
		(0.098)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.443)
Log of revenue income, 1 yr lag		−0.004	−0.025	−0.029	−1.065**
		(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.392)
Unemployment rate, 1 yr lag		0.023	0.032	0.037	0.487*
		(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.256)
Log of bureaucrat density, 1 yr lag		0.055	0.048	0.058	0.006
		(0.096)	(0.100)	(0.096)	(0.437)
Predecessor's other covariates:					
Age			0.004	0.006	0.070
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.048)
Gender			−0.203**	−0.204**	−0.357
			(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.394)
Years in CCP			0.005	0.003	−0.021
			(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.022)
Years of local work			−0.004	−0.004	0.0005
			(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.020)
Years of total work			0.003	0.002	−0.010
			(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.035)
Provincial chief covariates:					
Age				0.013	−0.014
				(0.015)	(0.048)
Years in CCP				0.006	−0.004
				(0.009)	(0.043)
Years of local work				−0.005	−0.005
				(0.006)	(0.027)
Years of central work				−0.002	−0.005
				(0.003)	(0.011)
Connect to predecessor				−0.001	0.066
				(0.051)	(0.180)
Convicted later for corruption				−0.117	−0.261
				(0.135)	(0.551)
Provincial F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
City clustered S.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Complete obs.	551	537	517	517	73
R^2	0.079	0.109	0.123	0.127	0.594
Adjusted R^2	0.021	0.036	0.037	0.030	0.056
Residual Std. Error	0.463	0.459	0.458	0.460	0.449

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A7. Full Model Specification (2)

Outcome variable: dummy that successor is sent down from upper-level authorities

	Dependent variable:				
	Dummy: Successor sent down from upper-level authority				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Full	Full	Full	Full	Subsample
Key independent variable: (Baseline: normal departure)					
Predecessor expelled	0.203**	0.195**	0.171*	0.166*	0.274**
	(0.088)	(0.095)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.130)
City socioeconomic variables:					
Log of GDP per capita, 1 yr lag		−0.008	0.025	0.037	−0.414
		(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.351)
GDP growth rate, 1 yr lag		−0.004	−0.001	−0.002	0.014
		(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.029)
Log of land area		0.059	0.068	0.063	−0.415**
		(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.162)
Key city		0.264***	0.262***	0.262***	−0.674
		(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.458)
Log of total population, 1 yr lag		−0.070	−0.035	−0.021	−0.507
		(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.427)
Log of revenue income, 1 yr lag		0.059	0.049	0.037	0.831*
		(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.455)
Unemployment rate, 1 yr lag		−0.013	−0.014	−0.012	−0.651***
		(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.215)
Log of density of public servants, 1 yr lag		−0.012	0.005	0.020	0.458
		(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.424)
Predecessor's other personal covariates:					
Age			−0.00000	−0.00004	−0.093*
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.047)
Gender			0.227**	0.236**	−0.049
			(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.412)
Years in CCP			−0.003	−0.003	0.019
			(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.023)
Years of local work			0.002	0.002	0.012
			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.022)
Years of total work			0.001	0.002	0.023
			(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.029)
Provincial chief covariates:					
Age				−0.001	−0.053
				(0.013)	(0.038)
Years in CCP				0.001	0.024
				(0.008)	(0.041)
Years of local work				−0.001	0.010
				(0.005)	(0.033)
Years of central work				0.006**	−0.007
				(0.002)	(0.011)
Connect to predecessor				0.015	−0.037
				(0.052)	(0.219)
Convicted later for corruption				−0.061	1.340***
				(0.137)	(0.376)
Provincial F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
City clustered S.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Complete obs.	551	537	517	517	73
R^2	0.075	0.121	0.138	0.146	0.667
Adjusted R^2	0.016	0.048	0.054	0.051	0.228
Residual Std. Error	0.466	0.459	0.457	0.457	0.420

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A8. Robustness Check with Alternative Outcome Variable (1)

Alternative outcome variable: dummy variable for previous local experience

	Dependent variable:				
	Dummy: Any local work experience before appointment				
	(1) Full	(2) Full	(3) Full	(4) Full	(5) Subsample
Key independent variable: (Baseline: normal departure:)					
Predecessor expelled	−0.266***	−0.250***	−0.267***	−0.256***	−0.391*
	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.205)
City socioeconomic variables:					
Log of GDP per capita, 1 yr lag		−0.043	−0.033	−0.032	0.069
		(0.099)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.299)
GDP growth rate, 1 yr lag		0.001	−0.001	−0.0004	−0.065*
		(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.033)
Log of land area		−0.018	−0.014	−0.013	0.238
		(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.174)
Key city		−0.112	−0.059	−0.060	0.887*
		(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.444)
Log of total population, 1 yr lag		−0.044	−0.046	−0.039	−0.102
		(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.457)
Log of revenue income, 1 yr lag		0.027	0.003	−0.001	−0.358
		(0.071)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.405)
Unemployment rate, 1 yr lag		0.019	0.027	0.035	0.266
		(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.236)
Log of bureaucrat density, 1 yr lag		−0.036	−0.048	−0.037	−0.897*
		(0.088)	(0.092)	(0.086)	(0.447)
Predecessor's personal covariates:					
Age			−0.005	−0.004	0.011
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.043)
Gender			−0.282***	−0.287***	−0.437
			(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.438)
Years in CCP			−0.001	−0.002	−0.028
			(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.028)
Years of local work			−0.010*	−0.010*	−0.026*
			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.013)
Years of total work			0.009	0.010	0.048*
			(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.025)
Provincial chief covariates:					
Age				0.028**	0.018
				(0.014)	(0.042)
Years in CCP				0.014	0.014
				(0.010)	(0.031)
Years of local work				−0.001	−0.006
				(0.006)	(0.026)
Years of central work				−0.001	−0.003
				(0.003)	(0.008)
Connect to predecessor				0.051	0.115
				(0.051)	(0.234)
Convicted later for corruption				−0.181	−0.538
				(0.131)	(0.473)
Provincial F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
City clustered S.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Complete obs.	551	537	517	517	73
R^2	0.097	0.106	0.131	0.142	0.661
Adjusted R^2	0.039	0.032	0.046	0.046	0.213
Residual Std. Error	0.474	0.476	0.471	0.471	0.431

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A9. Robustness Check with Alternative Outcome Variable (2)

Alternative outcome variable: successor's duration of previous local experience

			Dependent variable:		
	Years: number of prior work experience in assigned locality				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Key independent variable: (Baseline: normal departure)					
Predecessor expelled	−1.650***	−1.848***	−1.759***	−1.837***	−2.829
	(0.434)	(0.487)	(0.543)	(0.632)	(1.972)
City socioeconomic variables:					
Log of GDP per capita, 1 yr lag		−1.281	−1.456	−1.486	−3.085
		(1.086)	(1.191)	(1.140)	(3.374)
GDP growth rate, 1 yr lag		−0.075	−0.111	−0.102	−0.500*
		(0.066)	(0.095)	(0.089)	(0.272)
Log of land area		0.071	0.037	0.042	−0.314
		(0.422)	(0.494)	(0.490)	(2.190)
Key city		1.456*	1.638*	1.708*	8.663*
		(0.854)	(0.908)	(0.917)	(4.701)
Log of total population, 1 yr lag		−1.041	−1.219	−1.282	−3.256
		(0.974)	(1.046)	(1.018)	(3.848)
Log of revenue income, 1 yr lag		0.566	0.638	0.682	1.315
		(0.740)	(0.799)	(0.772)	(3.022)
Unemployment rate, 1 yr lag		0.090	0.189	0.170	0.152
		(0.377)	(0.417)	(0.452)	(2.044)
Log of bureaucrat density, 1 yr lag		−0.190	−0.262	−0.332	−7.306
		(0.619)	(0.651)	(0.651)	(5.051)
Predecessor's personal covariates:					
Age			−0.121	−0.142	−0.063
			(0.119)	(0.129)	(0.385)
Gender			−0.947	−0.903	−2.102
			(0.606)	(0.602)	(3.733)
Years in CCP			−0.007	−0.008	−0.028
			(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.255)
Years of local work			−0.088*	−0.087*	−0.333*
			(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.174)
Years of total work			0.112	0.125*	0.244
			(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.259)
Provincial chief covariates:					
Age				0.032	−0.395
				(0.117)	(0.421)
Years in CCP				−0.022	−0.293
				(0.069)	(0.278)
Years of local work				0.038	0.133
				(0.054)	(0.181)
Years of central work				0.018	−0.039
				(0.021)	(0.053)
Connect to predecessor				0.229	0.635
				(0.449)	(2.811)
Convicted later for corruption				1.161	−2.527
				(2.290)	(4.371)
Provincial F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
City clustered S.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Complete obs.	551	537	517	517	73
R^2	0.091	0.102	0.121	0.127	0.569
Adjusted R^2	0.033	0.028	0.035	0.029	−0.0001
Residual Std. Error	3.841	3.870	3.913	3.923	4.425

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A10. Mechanism Analysis, Complete Regression Results

Corresponding to Table 3 of the main text.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Dependent variable:			
			Dummy: successor promoted from local leadership team			
Key independent variables: (Baseline: normal departure)						
Predecessor expelled	−0.267***	−0.248***	−0.265***	−0.325***	−2.172**	
	(0.073)	(0.095)	(0.088)	(0.080)	(0.992)	
Breakdown: Predecessor expelled alone						−0.252***
						(0.072)
Breakdown: Any DPS expelled simultaneously						−0.325*
						(0.169)
Interaction terms:						
Predecessor expelled × Connected with PPS		−0.060				
		(0.123)				
Predecessor expelled × PPS years of local work			−0.001			
			(0.008)			
Predecessor expelled × Key city				0.320***		
				(0.112)		
Predecessor expelled × Log GDP per capita 1 yr lag					0.179**	
					(0.091)	
Connected with PPS	−0.001	0.004	−0.001	0.001	−0.0003	−0.0005
	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
PPS years of local work	−0.005	−0.005	−0.005	−0.006	−0.006	−0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Key city	−0.178**	−0.178**	−0.178**	−0.218**	−0.187**	−0.177**
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.087)
Log GDP per capita 1 year lag	−0.060	−0.062	−0.060	−0.057	−0.073	−0.060
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.101)
City socioeconomic variables:						
GDP growth rate, 1 yr lag	−0.010	−0.010	−0.010	−0.010	−0.011	−0.010
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Log of land area	0.001	0.001	0.001	−0.0004	−0.0001	0.002
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Log of total population, 1 yr lag	−0.016	−0.017	−0.015	−0.015	−0.019	−0.017
	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.102)
Log of revenue income, 1 yr lag	−0.029	−0.028	−0.030	−0.027	−0.026	−0.030
	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Unemployment rate, 1 yr lag	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.033	0.034	0.037
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Log of bureaucrat density, 1 yr lag	0.058	0.058	0.059	0.057	0.058	0.059
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.096)
Predecessor covariates:						
Age	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.006
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Gender	−0.204**	−0.205**	−0.204**	−0.204**	−0.205**	−0.204**
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.088)
Years in CCP	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Years of local work	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004	−0.005	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Years of total work	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Provincial Party Secretary covariates:						
Age	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Years in CCP	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Years of central work	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Later convicted for corruption	−0.117	−0.120	−0.118	−0.108	−0.111	−0.121
	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.136)
Provincial F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
City clustered S.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Complete obs.	517	517	517	517	517	517
R^2	0.127	0.128	0.127	0.131	0.129	0.128
Adjusted R^2	0.030	0.028	0.027	0.032	0.030	0.028
Residual Std. Error	0.460	0.460	0.460	0.459	0.460	0.460

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Table A11. Mechanism Analysis with Alternative Outcome Variable

Outcome variable: dummy that successor is sent down from upper-level authorities

	Dependent variable:					
	Dummy: successor sent down from upper-level authorities					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Key independent variables:						
(Baseline: normal departure)						
Predecessor expelled	0.166*	0.083	0.230**	0.300***	3.339**	
	(0.099)	(0.123)	(0.115)	(0.102)	(1.684)	
Predecessor expelled alone						0.128
						(0.106)
One or more DPS expelled simultaneously						0.307
						(0.225)
Interaction terms:						
Predecessor expelled × Connected with PPS		0.264				
		(0.200)				
Predecessor expelled × PPS years of local work			−0.020*			
			(0.011)			
Predecessor expelled × Key city				−0.743***		
				(0.184)		
Predecessor expelled × Log GDP per capita 1 yr lag					−0.298*	
					(0.157)	
Connected with PPS	0.015	−0.004	0.017	0.011	0.015	0.015
	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
PPS years of local work	−0.001	−0.001	0.0001	0.00003	0.00004	−0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Key city	0.262***	0.261***	0.260***	0.356***	0.278***	0.260***
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.098)	(0.091)	(0.092)
Log GDP per capita 1 year lag	0.037	0.047	0.049	0.031	0.059	0.037
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.101)
City socioeconomic variables:						
GDP growth rate, 1 yr lag	−0.002	−0.003	−0.001	−0.002	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Log of land area	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.065	0.065	0.061
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Log of total population, 1 yr lag	−0.021	−0.013	−0.018	−0.023	−0.015	−0.016
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.097)
Log of revenue income, 1 yr lag	0.037	0.030	0.036	0.031	0.030	0.037
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Unemployment rate, 1 yr lag	−0.012	−0.010	−0.015	−0.001	−0.006	−0.010
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Log of bureaucrat density, 1 yr lag	0.020	0.027	0.018	0.027	0.023	0.021
	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.090)
Predecessor personal covariates:						
Age	−0.00004	0.001	−0.0003	−0.001	−0.001	−0.0003
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Gender	0.236**	0.244**	0.236**	0.237**	0.240**	0.237**
	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Years in CCP	−0.003	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Years of local work	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Years of total work	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Provincial Party Secretary covariates:						
Age	−0.001	−0.001	−0.0002	−0.002	−0.001	−0.002
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Years in CCP	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Years of central work	0.006**	0.006**	0.005**	0.006**	0.006**	0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Convicted later for corruption	−0.060	−0.048	−0.073	−0.082	−0.072	−0.051
	(0.137)	(0.140)	(0.134)	(0.129)	(0.134)	(0.138)
Provincial F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
City clustered S.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Complete obs.	517	517	517	517	517	517
R^2	0.146	0.150	0.149	0.167	0.152	0.148
Adjusted R^2	0.051	0.053	0.052	0.072	0.055	0.050
Residual Std. Error	0.457	0.457	0.457	0.452	0.456	0.458

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A12. Analysis of all post-crackdown appointments

Independent variable: a dummy indicating whether the leadership appointment is made after the expulsion of *any* former leader since 2013 (including both immediate succession to corrupt officials and all subsequent successions afterwards).

	Dependent variable:			
	Successor promoted locally		*Successor sent down from above*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Full sample	Subsample	Full sample	Subsample
Post-expulsion appointments	−0.041	−0.251	0.038	0.069
	(0.065)	(0.260)	(0.070)	(0.227)
City socioeconomic variables:				
Log of GDP per capita, 1 yr lag	−0.067	0.344	0.041	−0.306
	(0.100)	(0.385)	(0.101)	(0.350)
GDP growth rate, 1 yr lag	−0.009	−0.024	−0.003	0.011
	(0.009)	(0.047)	(0.009)	(0.028)
Log of land area	0.003	0.260	0.062	−0.390**
	(0.041)	(0.271)	(0.045)	(0.182)
Key city	−0.197**	0.669	0.272***	−0.709
	(0.088)	(0.494)	(0.091)	(0.470)
Log of total population, 1 yr lag	−0.029	0.461	−0.014	−0.490
	(0.103)	(0.499)	(0.096)	(0.423)
Log of revenue income, 1 yr lag	−0.019	−1.093**	0.032	0.836*
	(0.079)	(0.415)	(0.076)	(0.442)
Unemployment rate, 1 yr lag	0.032	0.485	−0.009	−0.642***
	(0.048)	(0.299)	(0.041)	(0.214)
Log of bureaucrat density, 1 yr lag	0.058	0.243	0.020	0.351
	(0.096)	(0.549)	(0.090)	(0.434)
Predecessor's Personal Covariates:				
Age	0.009	0.094*	−0.002	−0.107**
	(0.014)	(0.050)	(0.014)	(0.052)
Gender	−0.190**	0.059	0.228**	−0.315
	(0.088)	(0.446)	(0.104)	(0.461)
Years in CCP	0.002	−0.039	−0.003	0.029
	(0.008)	(0.024)	(0.007)	(0.023)
Years of local work	−0.005	−0.002	0.002	0.014
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.005)	(0.024)
Years of total work	0.001	−0.010	0.003	0.024
	(0.009)	(0.038)	(0.009)	(0.032)
Provincial chief covariates:				
Age	0.015	0.014	−0.003	−0.066
	(0.015)	(0.044)	(0.013)	(0.039)
Years in CCP	0.008	0.014	−0.0002	0.015
	(0.009)	(0.046)	(0.008)	(0.042)
Years of local work	−0.005	0.008	−0.001	−0.00002
	(0.006)	(0.032)	(0.005)	(0.037)
Years of central work	−0.003	−0.005	0.006**	−0.007
	(0.003)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.012)
Connect to predecessor	−0.007	0.016	0.019	0.010
	(0.051)	(0.209)	(0.053)	(0.246)
Convicted later for corruption	−0.141	−0.621	−0.046	1.568***
	(0.136)	(0.548)	(0.146)	(0.366)
Provincial F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓
City clustered S.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓
Complete obs.	517	73	517	73
R^2	0.111	0.521	0.141	0.641
Adjusted R^2	0.011	−0.114	0.044	0.166
Residual Std. Error	0.464	0.488	0.459	0.436

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A13. Robustness check, excluding all centrally-intervened cases

In this table, we exclude all leadership appointments in which (1) the successor is transferred from a different province or (2) the successor is a former central official sent down to the locality. In both cases, the appointment decision is more likely to be made by the Centre rather than respective provincial authorities. We hope to understand whether the main effect remains robust when the impact of central intervention is removed.

	Dependent variable:			
	Promoted Locally		Sent down from above	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Full	Subsample	Full	Subsample
(Baseline: normal departure)				
Predecessor expelled	−0.276***	−0.471*	0.208**	0.278
	(0.078)	(0.231)	(0.106)	(0.167)
City socioeconomic variables:				
Log of GDP per capita, 1 yr lag	−0.041	0.768*	0.080	−0.735*
	(0.105)	(0.422)	(0.108)	(0.427)
GDP growth rate, 1 yr lag	−0.011	−0.032	−0.004	0.017
	(0.010)	(0.046)	(0.009)	(0.030)
Log of land area	−0.007	0.333	0.042	−0.471**
	(0.043)	(0.240)	(0.047)	(0.210)
Key city	−0.155	0.765	0.368***	−0.771
	(0.097)	(0.524)	(0.096)	(0.471)
Log of total population, 1 yr lag	0.002	0.762	0.044	−0.621
	(0.107)	(0.676)	(0.101)	(0.621)
Log of revenue income, 1 yr lag	−0.046	−1.432**	0.027	1.210**
	(0.085)	(0.634)	(0.080)	(0.583)
Unemployment rate, 1 yr lag	0.034	0.512	0.005	−0.573
	(0.049)	(0.441)	(0.042)	(0.364)
Log of bureaucrat density, 1 yr lag	0.065	0.110	0.042	0.741
	(0.100)	(0.579)	(0.090)	(0.522)
Predecessor's personal covariates:				
Age	0.006	0.083	−0.001	−0.120*
	(0.015)	(0.055)	(0.014)	(0.059)
Gender	−0.230**	−0.300	0.237**	−0.196
	(0.091)	(0.501)	(0.104)	(0.559)
Years in CCP	0.003	−0.019	0.0002	0.017
	(0.008)	(0.023)	(0.007)	(0.025)
Years of local work	−0.005	−0.013	0.001	0.024
	(0.006)	(0.031)	(0.005)	(0.022)
Years of total work	0.004	−0.007	−0.0003	0.024
	(0.009)	(0.040)	(0.009)	(0.035)
Provincial Party Secretary covariates:				
Age	0.012	−0.024	−0.006	−0.038
	(0.016)	(0.053)	(0.014)	(0.037)
Years in CCP	0.006	−0.004	−0.001	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.045)	(0.008)	(0.040)
Years of local work	−0.005	0.001	−0.002	−0.006
	(0.006)	(0.030)	(0.005)	(0.033)
Years of central work	−0.002	0.003	0.004*	−0.013
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Connect to predecessor	0.010	0.137	0.027	−0.167
	(0.057)	(0.254)	(0.055)	(0.282)
Convicted later for corruption	−0.124	−0.309	−0.054	1.223**
	(0.143)	(0.649)	(0.133)	(0.456)
Provincial F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓
City clustered S.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓
Complete obs.	486	64	486	64
R^2	0.125	0.663	0.189	0.763
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.035	0.092	0.320
Residual Std. Error	0.469	0.470	0.452	0.402

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Table A14. Breakdown of different types of non-local appointments

In this table, we perform additional regressions on whether the expulsion of a corrupt ex-leader will lead to any *particular* type of non-local appointment (within-province transfer; cross-province transfer; sent-down officials from upper-level governments. As the regression results have shown, although a predecessor's expulsion leads to an increased likelihood of all types of non-local appointments (indicated by a positive coefficient), the main effect seems to be driven by the sent-down officials from upper-level authorities.

	Particular types of non-local appointments of incoming officials					
	Within-province transfer		Cross-province transfer		Upper-level sentdown	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Full	Subsample	Full	Subsample	Full	Subsample
(Baseline: normal departure)						
Predecessor expelled	0.057	0.167	0.056	−0.018	0.166*	0.274**
	(0.095)	(0.206)	(0.051)	(0.105)	(0.099)	(0.130)
City socioeconomic variables:						
Log of GDP per capita, 1 yr lag	−0.034	−0.145	0.078	0.079	0.037	−0.414
	(0.101)	(0.446)	(0.047)	(0.264)	(0.102)	(0.351)
GDP growth rate, 1 yr lag	0.010	0.016	−0.002	−0.003	−0.002	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.041)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.029)
Log of land area	−0.025	0.126	−0.037**	0.017	0.063	−0.415**
	(0.046)	(0.203)	(0.015)	(0.107)	(0.044)	(0.162)
Key city	−0.203**	0.180	0.142***	−0.106	0.262***	−0.674
	(0.084)	(0.406)	(0.055)	(0.278)	(0.092)	(0.458)
Log of total population, 1 yr lag	−0.019	−0.440	0.103**	0.504	−0.021	−0.507
	(0.107)	(0.463)	(0.046)	(0.385)	(0.097)	(0.427)
Log of revenue income, 1 yr lag	0.027	0.332	−0.043	−0.148	0.037	0.831*
	(0.087)	(0.422)	(0.038)	(0.349)	(0.076)	(0.455)
Unemployment rate, 1 yr lag	−0.037	−0.108	0.015	0.290	−0.012	−0.651***
	(0.050)	(0.284)	(0.027)	(0.196)	(0.041)	(0.215)
Log of bureaucrat density, 1 yr lag	−0.115	−0.906*	0.035	0.458	0.020	0.458
	(0.086)	(0.505)	(0.038)	(0.379)	(0.090)	(0.424)
Predecessor's personal covariates:						
Age	−0.009	0.028	0.0005	−0.010	−0.0004	−0.093*
	(0.014)	(0.044)	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.047)
Gender	0.007	0.032	−0.024	0.363	0.236**	−0.049
	(0.096)	(0.357)	(0.040)	(0.268)	(0.103)	(0.412)
Years in CCP	−0.003	0.002	0.002	−0.0003	−0.003	0.019
	(0.007)	(0.026)	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.023)
Years of local work	0.004	−0.006	−0.002	−0.005	0.002	0.012
	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.019)	(0.005)	(0.022)
Years of total work	−0.002	−0.022	−0.0003	0.008	0.002	0.023
	(0.008)	(0.031)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.029)
Provincial Party Secretary covariates:						
Age	−0.003	0.044	−0.005	0.015	−0.001	−0.053
	(0.014)	(0.050)	(0.005)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.038)
Years in CCP	−0.001	−0.006	−0.003	−0.018	0.001	0.024
	(0.009)	(0.031)	(0.004)	(0.023)	(0.008)	(0.041)
Years of local work	0.006	0.017	−0.0003	−0.019	−0.001	0.010
	(0.005)	(0.022)	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.033)
Years of central work	−0.001	0.004	−0.001	0.008	0.006**	−0.007
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.011)
Connect to predecessor	−0.066	−0.186	0.027	0.182	0.015	−0.037
	(0.045)	(0.259)	(0.031)	(0.158)	(0.052)	(0.219)
Convicted later for corruption	0.183	−0.566	−0.012	−0.476*	−0.060	1.340***
	(0.147)	(0.432)	(0.081)	(0.245)	(0.137)	(0.376)
Provincial F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
City clustered S.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Complete obs.	517	73	517	73	517	73
R^2	0.134	0.536	0.204	0.654	0.146	0.667
Adjusted R^2	0.037	−0.077	0.114	0.197	0.051	0.228
Residual Std. Error	0.454	0.466	0.213	0.282	0.458	0.420

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A15. Three-way *t* test of difference of means (fraction)
Subsample: turnovers in 84 cities with at least one corruption-related expulsion

	(1) Pre-expulsion	(2) Expulsion	(3) Post-expulsion	(4) Diff: (2)−(3)	(5) Diff: (1)−(3)
A. Dummy: Promoted locally	0.313 (0.479)	0.125 (0.335)	0.535 (0.508)	−0.411***	−0.223
p-value				0.0005	0.1551
B. Dummy: Previous local work	0.437 (0.512)	0.150 (0.362)	0.571 (0.504)	−0.421***	−0.134
p-value				0.0004	0.4079
C. Duration: Previous local work	3.406 (5.992)	0.465 (1.879)	3.167 (4.774)	−2.702**	0.240
p-value				0.007	0.892
D. Dummy: Previous provincial-level work	0.625 (0.500)	0.725 (0.452)	0.500 (0.509)	0.025*	0.125
p-value				0.065	0.434
Number of obs. (total: 84)	16	40	28		

Table A16. Descriptive Statistics of Subsequent Post-Corruption Appointments

Why do some cities see a quick return of locally-connected officials after the tenure of non-local appointees following anti-corruption purges ended, while other cities continue to be governed by non-local appointees for multiple terms? Although the number of subsequent turnovers after the post-corruption appointments ($n = 28$) is too small to make any statistical inference, we are still able to offer some preliminary, exploratory insights into the difference between cities where locally-connected leaders are re-installed after one period ($n = 13$) and localities that are continually governed by non-local officials for multiple periods ($n = 15$).

| Local Appointees ($n = 15$)		Non-local Appointees ($n = 13$)	
City Name	Year	City Name	Year
Jixi, Heilongjiang	2015	Chuzhou, Anhui	2016
Pingxiang, Jiangxi	2016	Yuncheng, Shanxi	2017
Lincang, Yunnan	2017	Taiyuan, Shanxi	2017
Nanchong, Sichuan	2017	Nanjing, Jiangsu	2017
Ya'an, Sichuan	2017	Xingtai, Hebei	2017
Maoming, Guangdong	2017	Yangquan, Shanxi	2018
Daqing, Heilongjiang	2017	Taizhou, Zhejiang	2018
Chuzhou, Anhui	2018	Guangzhou, Guangdong	2019
Lianyungang, Jiangsu	2018	Xingtai, Hebei	2019
Kaifeng, Henan	2018	Yuncheng, Shanxi	2020
Jixi, Heilongjiang	2018	Yangquan, Shanxi	2020
Zhumadian, Henan	2018	Xingtai, Hebei	2020
Maoming, Guangdong	2019	Taizhou, Zhejiang	2020
Tieling, Liaoning	2019		
Xinzhou, Shanxi	2020		

The table above lists the two types of leadership turnovers side-by-side. Apparently, cities that have undergone several terms of non-local appointees tend to have more severe, complicated corruption cases. For example, five of the 13 subsequent non-local appointments (twice in Yuncheng, once in Taiyuan, and twice in Yangquan) have been made in Shanxi Province, where a series of high-profile, intertwined corruption scandals committed by local officials has drawn national attention and resulted in intense investigations from the Centre (see page 13-14 of the main text). Another example of continual non-local appointment is Nanjing, where both the Party Secretary and mayor were consecutively expelled in 2013 and 2014 respectively. Still, those are heuristic observations rather than concrete data analysis, and a deeper understanding of the duration of the de-localization effect requires a larger number of data points in multiple years.

**Figure A1:** Within-city comparison of incoming officials' work experience

Note: Within-city comparison of incoming officials' work experience, grouped by the departure reason of their predecessors. The graphs present all cities which experienced at least one regular leadership turnover and one corruption-related replacement. An official's years of "provincial experience" not only include full-time employment in provincial-level political institutions, but also include concurrent membership in a province's CCP standing committee. Dashed lines show the average years of experience for each type of incoming official.

Figure A2: Comparison of the average tenure lengths of two types of incoming officials

Note: The following two graphs compare the average tenure length of incoming leaders who succeed expelled and regularly departed officials. The left-side graph includes all leadership turnovers (n=551), while the right-side graph focuses on leadership turnovers in 39 cities with at least one corruption scandal (n=84). As shown in the graph, the average tenure of appointees who replace corrupt predecessors last for 3.116 years, while officials who follow regular bureaucratic rotations on average serve a shorter term of 2.525 years (for full sample) or 2.327 years (among corruption-affected cities).

Figure A3: Comparison of the local and provincial experiences of incoming officials appointed at three periods

Note: The two graphs display the local and provincial work experience of incoming officials during the 84 leadership turnovers in 39 corruption-affected cities, grouped by three periods: (1) officials appointed *before* the anti-corruption expulsion, (2) those who *immediately succeed* the expelled official, and (3) those who are appointed in *subsequent* turnovers. The left-side graph shows their length of work experience in the assigned locality, while the right-side graph indicates their length of work experience in the provincial authority (both in years). Red lines indicate the mean value for each category.

B. Description of Key Variables in Dataset

(Unit of observation: city-year; time range: 2013 – 2020)

A. Personal backgrounds of prefecture city

- `Name.` Chinese and English names of an official, according to official biography.

- `Age.` Age of an official by year *t*, , according to official biography.

- `Gender.` Gender of an official as a dummy variable: '1' if female, '0' if male.

- `Length in the CCP.` Number of years that an official has become a member of the Chinese Communist Party by year *t*.

B. Work experience of prefecture city leaders

- `Start/end date of appointment.` The start and end date of an official's tenure in the local leadership position.

- `Immediate previous position.` We use a set of dummy variables to characterize the most recent position from which an official is transferred. We group one's last position into the following categories:

  i. *Local appointees:* A member of the same city's incumbent leadership team (*lingdao banzi/sitao banzi* 领导班子/四套班子, including: a. deputy secretary or standing member of the city's municipal Party committee; b. mayor or deputy mayor of the municipal people's government; c. directors and vice-directors of the standing committee of the municipal People's Congress 市人大; d. chairpersons or vice-chairpersons of the municipal People's Political Consultative Conference 市政协.

  ii. *Non-local appointees: the following positions are counted as "non-local" appointees:*

     1. *(Within-province transfer.)* Leadership or deputy leadership position in another prefecture-level city from the same province. The definition of "leadership" is the same as the previous category.

     2. *(Cross-province transfer)* Any bureaucratic position at any level of bureaucracy in a *different* province other than one's current.

     3. *(Provincial sentdown.)* Any position in provincial-level authorities of the local province. The definition of "provincial-level authorities" is consistent with the variable for one's previous provincial experience.
        a. A leadership position in provincial political institutions, including: provincial Party Secretary/deputy Party Secretary; governor/deputy governor; director, deputy director, or standing member of the provincial People's Congress 省人大; chairperson, deputy chairperson of provincial People's Consultative Conference 省政协;
        b. A high-ranking bureaucrat in the provincial Party committee or government. e.g. the head of provincial CCP Organization Department 省委组织部; head of provincial Department of Transportation 省交通厅.
        c. A leadership position in provincial semi-government agencies, such as the Communist Youth League 共青团, Federation of Labor 工会, or Women's Federation 妇联.
        d. A standing member of provincial Party committee, either as a full-time position or a concurrent position while one also serves as a prefecture city leader.

     4. *(Central sentdown.)* Any bureaucratic position at a central-level political institution, such as the CCP Central Committee 中共中央, the State Council 国务院, the National People's Congress 全国人大, or the People's Political Consultative Conference 全国政协. Additionally, we also count the central organs of semi-government agencies, such as the Communist Youth League Central Committee 共青团中央, All China Federation of Trade Unions 全国总工会, The National Women's Federation 全国妇联, etc.

     5. *(Non-government institutions.)* Any position at non-government "public institutions" 国家事业单位, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), public universities, research institutes, etc.

- `Total work experience.` An official's total number of years in public service, calculated as the difference between one's first year of public service and year *t*.

- `Previous local experience.` We count an official's total number of years serving in any bureaucracy of the assigned city before assuming the current leadership role, including all levels of bureaucracies (prefecture, county, and township) under the jurisdiction of the city. In the regression analysis, this variable is presented both as a dummy variable showing *whether* one had any previous local experience and a continuous variable showing the actual *length* of one's previous local experience.

- `Previous provincial experience.` We count an official's total number of years serving in the provincial bureaucracy that administers their assigned city by year *t*. The definition of "provincial-level authorities" is consistent with the variable for one's immediate previous position.

- `Reasons for departure.` A set of dummies that shows an official's reason of leaving the assigned leadership post as of August 2021, including:

    1. Regular transfer to a different post;
    2. Retirement. For simplicity's sake, we define "retirement" broadly and inclusively in this study. We consider any official to be "retired" if they leave the bureaucracy *not* as a result of formal or informal punishment by upper-level authorities, e.g. voluntary resignation in pursuit of private-sector opportunities.
    3. Expulsion from the Party and/or the cadre rank. Note that from our dataset, the official reasons for one's expulsion *always* include allegations of corruption.

C. Provincial Party Secretary's background

- `Name.` Name of the provincial Party secretary.

- `Age.` The provincial Party secretary's age by year *t*.

- `Gender.` The provincial Party secretary's gender, coded as "1" if female and "0" otherwise. Note: in actual regression analysis, all provincial leaders overseeing the 552 local leadership turnovers are invariably male, so gender not included in the model.

- `Length of CCP membership.` The provincial Party secretary's years of Party membership by year *t*.

- `Length of local work.` The provincial Party secretary's total number of years serving in their assigned province, including all bureaucratic levels (province, prefecture, county, and township), by year *t*.

- `Length of central work.` The provincial Party secretary's total number of years serving in any central-level political institution, by year *t*.

- `Political connection to outgoing leader.` A dummy indicating whether the outgoing prefecture city official was appointed by the incumbent provincial Party secretary at year *t*.

- `Convicted later for corruption.` A dummy indicating whether the provincial Party secretary has been convicted on corruption charges later (as of 2021).

D. City-level socioeconomic indicators.

- `Per capita GDP.` The per capita GDP of a prefecture city reported in its official gazetteer.

- `GDP growth rate.` The GDP growth rate of a city reported in its official gazetteer.

- `Landmass.` The total area of a prefecture city.

- `Key city.` A dummy indicating whether the city is a provincial capital or sub-provincial city.

- `Total population.` The total population of a city in a given year.

- `Revenue income.` The total amount of government revenue of a city in a given year.

- `Unemployment rate.` Percentage of working-age population who are unemployed, as reported in a city's official gazetteer.

- `Bureaucratic density.` The number of public servants per 1,000 residents, per a city's official gazetteer.

C: Illustrative Case Study of Selective De-localization: Huang Lixin

Why do provincial authorities selectively appoint non-localized cadres to govern cities whose former leaders have been expelled for corruption? We provide an illustrative case of Huang Lixin 黄莉新, a senior local official from Jiangsu Province known as the "firefighter-in-chief" (*jiuhuo duizhang* 救火队长) in the Anti-Corruption Campaign.[1] Huang earned this name because she was appointed to leadership positions in several prefecture-level cities where former leaders had been abruptly removed on corruption charges. Huang's primary task in those cities, in the words of an official newspaper, was to "help put down the fire" (*jiuhuo* 救火) – rescuing the local bureaucracy from chaos and dysfunction due to the purge, restoring socioeconomic order and stability, and strengthening top-down control and authority over the city.[2]

Huang was trained as a technocrat specialized in agricultural engineering and flood control. Unlike most Chinese politicians who began as street-level bureaucrats in local authorities, Huang spent her early career as an administrator in the flood prevention agency of Jiangsu Provincial Government with little connection with local politics.[3] Her political career took off in the 2000s, when she was appointed as the Head of Jiangsu's Water Resources Department in 2000 and later as Vice Governor in 2003 in charge of the province's agriculture portfolio.[4] Her image as a non-political public administrator detached from local politics became the rationale for her later appointment to manage corruption-affected cities.

Appointment to Wuxi (December 2011 – January 2015)

Huang's first local appointment came in December 2011, when she was assigned to replace Mao Xiaoping , the former Party Secretary of Wuxi who was abruptly detained by discipline inspection officers on corruption charges. Mao's arrest was conducted in a highly secretive manner, and according to a local official, "nobody but a few top provincial leaders was aware of the upcoming action against Mao."[5] Huang's primary task in Wuxi, as a local newspaper commented, was to "clean up the mess" (*shoushi lantanzi* 收拾烂摊子) caused by the sudden removal of her disgraced predecessor.[6]

1. The Shanghai Observer. 2015. "Guanchang 'jiuhuo duizhang' ruhe xuanchu" (How are those 'firefighters' in politics selected), 28 January 2015, https://www.shobserver.com/news/detail?id=3508. Accessed 28 August 2022.

2. ThePaper.cn. 2015. "Huang Lixin zaidu 'jiuhuo' zhuanren Nanjing shiwei shuji, yu xiaoyou Liao Ruilin gongzhi Nanjing" (Huang Lixin appointed to "put down fire" again, appointed as Nanjing's Party chief to governs Nanjing with her alumnus Liao Ruilin), 25 January 2015, http://m.thepaper.cn/kuaibao_detail.jsp?contid=1297546from=kuaibao. Accessed 28 August 2022.

3. People.cn. n.d. "Huang Lixin jianli" (Biography of Huang Lixin), https://ldzl.people.com.cn/dfzlk/front/personPage4256.htm. Accessed 28 August 2022.

4. Lin Yunshi. 2022. "Huang Lixin ren Zhejiang Zhengxie dangzu shuji, ceng sandu jieti luoma guanyuan" (Huang Lixin named as CPPCC Party chief of Zhejiang, was appointed to replace corrupt officials for three times), *Caixin*, 10 January 2022, https://china.caixin.com/2022-01-10/101828321.html. Accessed 28 August 2022.

5. Sohu.com. 2012. "Mao Xiaoping luoma qianhou: zhong jiwei duban 15 tian shandian chachu" (The moment of Mao Xiaoping's downfall: case under CCDI supervision, processed in 15 days), 17 April 2012, http://news.sohu.com/20120417/n340822968.shtml. Accessed 28 August 2022.

6. Gao, Yuyang. 2016. "Shengwei nü changwei wutian sanbian shenfen, wunian sandu buwei" (This female member of a provincial Party committee changed her title three times in five days, filled three vacuums in five years), *Shanghai Observer*, 20 October 2016, https://www.shobserver.com/wx/detail.do?id=34138. Accessed 28 August 2022.

Upon her arrival in Wuxi, Huang faced enormous governance challenges. First, her corrupt predecessor, Mao Xiaoping, had continuously governed Wuxi as mayor and Party chief for 12 years and had extensive personal networks in the city. The unusual removal of Mao, therefore, has led to broad panic and uncertainty among local officials and the business community. As a national newspaper pointed out, "the top priority for Wuxi's new chief is how to maintain the emotional stability of local cadres, [because] the sudden departure of Mao Xiaoping has created a huge disturbance among officials and citizens."[7] Another urgent task that Huang faced was how to stabilize the local economy and restore business confidence. Known for his pro-business policies, Mao had developed a close relationship with local business and financial sectors. Following his abrupt expulsion, some entrepreneurs questioned the scope of the purge and worried about the political risk of operating and investing in Wuxi.[8]

Huang's reputation as an impartial provincial bureaucrat without local ties enabled her to accomplish her assigned tasks efficiently. Shortly after her appointment, Huang visited the headquarters of all nine county-level subunits in Wuxi to ensure subordinate cadres' support for her leadership. Huang emphasized that her mission was to "implement the decisions and policies of the Center and the province" and warned local cadres to "strictly discipline themselves." Meanwhile, Huang also made strong efforts to reassure local entrepreneurs and restore business confidence. During an economic seminar, Huang claimed that "my top goal [was] to stabilize the public mood... and ensure the continuity and stability of all policies."[9] To demonstrate her support for the business community, Huang visited ten major companies in Wuxi during the first month of her tenure. On her visit, she repeatedly told business executives that "development [was] the first line item of my agenda", promising that Mao's indictment would not disrupt their operation. [10] During Huang's four-year leadership, Wuxi has undergone a period of relative stability and growth.

Appointment to Nanjing (January 2015 – October 2016)

Huang's second "firefighting" mission happened in January 2015, when she was urgently re-appointed as the Party Secretary of Nanjing, the provincial capital of Jiangsu. Huang's assignment was followed by a series of high-profile embezzlement scandals which had led to the removal of both the city's Party Secretary, Yang Weize 杨卫泽, and its mayor Ji Jianye 季建业. The consecutive expulsion of two top leaders in Nanjing, which was unprecedented for a provincial capital, drew national backlash and outcry. A national media newspaper commented that Nanjing's corruption situation was "severe" and "complicated," while another media observed that Nanjing's political leadership "had been helplessly addicted to trading power for money."[11] [12] Those harsh commentaries had apparently placed

7. Yang, Ruifa. 2011. "Wuxi yuan shiwei shuji Mao Xiaoping tubei mianzhi" (Mao Xiaoping, Party chief of Wuxi, was suddenly removed from office), *Sina Finance*, 24 August 2011, https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20111224/011611053654.shtml. Accessed 28 August 2022.

8. Yang 2011.

9. ThePaper.cn 2015

10. ThePaper.cn 2015

11. Feng, Guo'er. 2015. "Zhongjiwei pin 'shuangsha': Nanjing shuji shizhang jie luoma" [CCDI made another "double-strike:" the Party chief and mayor of Nanjing were both expelled], *Sohu.com*, 14 January 2015, https://star.news.sohu.com/s2015/nj/. Accessed 28 August 2022.

12. Zhang, Yan. 2015. "Cong Nanjing luoma shiwei shuji kan 'nengren ganbu' de daoxia" [Observing the downfall of "capable cadres" through the disgraced ex-Party chief of Nanjing], *Henan Economics and Law*, 14 January 2015, https://www.hnjjgc.com/whyl/showinfo.asp?infoid=17789.

Jiangsu's provincial leadership in an embarrassing situation. During an annual People's Congress meeting that immediately followed Yang's downfall, both the Party Chief and the Governor of Jiangsu were notably absent from the press conference, apparently Chinaavoiding questions on the serial corruption scandal.[13]

Huang's assignment to Nanjing reflected the provincial authority's urgent desire to rescue Nanjing's public image and put the city back in control. During Huang's inaugural meeting, the head of Jiangsu's organization department highlighted Huang's non-local background as an impartial provincial bureaucrat who was "capable of separating [her] personal interests from the public ones" and thus "ensuring a smooth leadership transition in Nanjing".[14] Huang's lack of local ties also enabled her to reshuffle Nanjing's local bureaucracy. Shortly after her arrival, Huang convened all high-ranking local officials and declared that she was tasked to "reinforce the rules and disciplines from the Centre and the province," and warned that she would "show no mercy toward corrupt cadres." [15] During the two years of her leadership, a large number of local officials were disciplined due to their involvement in the two ex-leaders' corruption scandals. She also enacted a number of measures to tighten control and supervision over lower-level bureaucratic agencies, including a rule that required all subordinate Party committees to regularly report to the city leadership on the implementation of anti-corruption policies.[16] Apparently, Huang's detachment from the local political establishment enabled her to carry out iron-fisted efforts to strengthen top-down control with little concerns for conflict of interests.

Accessed 28 August 2022.

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