Online Appendix
Bring in the Experts? Citizen Preferences for Independent Experts in Political Decision-Making Processes

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Contents

Appendix A: Survey and Experiment Information

A1. Conjoint Experiment

An example of the policy process vignette for a respondent (combination of Policy issue 4, Process A (1-2-2), Process B (3-1-2)) is presented in Figure 1 in the manuscript.

Policy issues: Randomized at the question level

1. Security and Counter-terrorism
2. Immigration and Refugee settlement
3. Taxation, Wages and Pensions
4. Carbon Emissions and Climate Change
5. Civil Partnerships and Same-sex Marriage

Policy Process Vignettes: 2 Policy designs presented to each respondent

ATTRIBUTE 1 Policy Design: A policy plan that is designed by...

1. the national government
2. a committee of independent experts
3. the EU institutions

ATTRIBUTE 2 Decision-makers: The final decision is taken...

1. through a national referendum
2. through a vote in the national parliament
3. by agreement in committee of independent experts
4. at the EU level

ATTRIBUTE 3 Policy Implementation: The implementation and progress of the decision is overseen by...

1. a parliamentary committee from all political parties
2. an appointed team of independent experts
3. the EU institutions

A2. Samples and Weights

The conjoint experiment was administered as part of an online survey in seven European countries in the summer-autumn of 2017. The commercial survey provider partner (Dalia Research) ensures recruited adult national samples representative of the population according to age, gender and rural/urban location (using post-stratification weights). Weights were not included in the analyses of the conjoint experiment to avoid interfering with the randomization of experimental treatments and hindering causal inferences. Miratrix et al. (2018) find that the sample average treatment effect (SATE) estimates do not differ substantially from weighted counterparts of a population average treatment effect (PATE), when samples are recruited by high-quality online survey firms. Table 2 below presents key demographic characteristics and ideological positioning for the unweighted/weighted sample in each country.

Table 1: Survey Information

Country	Number of Respondents	Post-stratification Weights
Germany	1090	Yes
France	1046	Yes
Greece	1008	Yes
Italy	1037	Yes
Netherlands	1096	Yes
Poland	1013	Yes
Romania	1067	Yes
Total	9449	Yes

Table 2: Information on Weights

	Male	Female	Age	Low Educ	Med Educ	High Educ	Left-Right ID
Total	50.8%	49.3%	38.2 yrs	19.5%	42.5%	38.0%	5.5/10
Total wgt	49.9%	50.1	38.6 yrs	24.0%	51.4%	24.7%	5.5/10
Germany	50.4%	49.6%	39.9 yrs	42.8%	37.0%	20.2%	4.9/10
Germany wgt	50.4%	49.6%	39.9 yrs	41.4%	37.4%	21.2%	5.0/10
France	48.0%	52.0%	38.9 yrs	7.3%	51.1%	41.6%	5.3/10
France wgt	49.1%	50.9%	38.6 yrs	8.3%	60.0%	31.8%	5.3/10
Greece	52.3%	47.4%	35.9 yrs	6.7%	45.1%	48.1%	5.4/10
Greece wgt	49.4%	50.5%	37.8 yrs	11.3%	65.0%	23.7%	5.5/10
Italy	48.2%	51.8%	40.5 yrs	25.0%	44.7%	30.2%	5.5/10
Italy wgt	49.7%	50.3%	40.0 yrs	40.3%	41.8%	17.3%	5.6/10
Netherlands	49.9%	50.1%	38.0 yrs	28.2%	40.9%	30.9%	5.6/10
Netherlands wgt	50.1%	49.9%	38.3 yrs	30.4%	38.4%	31.2%	5.6/10
Poland	54.7%	45.3%	36.7 yrs	19.2%	34.2%	46.4%	5.8/10
Poland wgt	49.8%	50.2%	37.9 yrs	26.2%	45.1%	28.8%	5.8/10
Romania	52.1%	47.9%	37.4 yrs	5.3%	44.7%	50.0%	6.0/10
Romania wgt	50.4%	49.6%	37.3 yrs	8.9%	72.8%	18.3%	5.8/10

A3. Balance tests

Balance tests for age, gender, educational level, left-right ideology and political tryst were carried out across the 36 profiles. The results show no significant differences between the groups exposed to each profile:

Age (χ^2= 71.4, Pr = 0.430)

Gender (χ^2= 44.4, Pr = 0.132)

Education (χ^2= 85.78, Pr = 0.100)

LR ideology (χ^2= 34.9, Pr = 0.471)

Political Trust (χ^2= 67.8, Pr = 0.551)

Table 3: Profile Frequencies

Full Profile	Design Stage	Decision Stage	Implementation Stage	Frequency
1	EUinstitutions	Referendum	Experts	453
2	Experts	NationalRepresentatives	EUinstitutions	452
3	NationalRepresentatives	EUinstitutions	NationalRepresentatives	441
4	Experts	Experts	NationalRepresentatives	439
5	EUinstitutions	Experts	Experts	436
6	EUinstitutions	Experts	EUinstitutions	431
7	EUinstitutions	NationalRepresentatives	EUinstitutions	431
8	EUinstitutions	NationalRepresentatives	Experts	430
9	NationalRepresentatives	Referendum	NationalRepresentatives	429
10	Experts	Referendum	NationalRepresentatives	428
11	EUinstitutions	EUinstitutions	NationalRepresentatives	426
12	EUinstitutions	EUinstitutions	EUinstitutions	425
13	EUinstitutions	Referendum	NationalRepresentatives	420
14	EUinstitutions	Referendum	EUinstitutions	418
15	EUinstitutions	Experts	NationalRepresentatives	414
16	Experts	NationalRepresentatives	NationalRepresentatives	414
17	NationalRepresentatives	EUinstitutions	EUinstitutions	414
18	Experts	Referendum	EUinstitutions	408
19	Experts	EUinstitutions	NationalRepresentatives	406
20	NationalRepresentatives	EUinstitutions	Experts	400
21	NationalRepresentatives	NationalRepresentatives	Experts	399
22	NationalRepresentatives	Referendum	Experts	399
23	Experts	Experts	EUinstitutions	398
24	NationalRepresentatives	NationalRepresentatives	EUinstitutions	398
25	NationalRepresentatives	Experts	EUinstitutions	394
26	NationalRepresentatives	NationalRepresentatives	NationalRepresentatives	392
27	EUinstitutions	EUinstitutions	Experts	389
28	EUinstitutions	NationalRepresentatives	NationalRepresentatives	389
29	Experts	EUinstitutions	Experts	386
30	NationalRepresentatives	Experts	Experts	385
31	Experts	Referendum	Experts	384
32	Experts	NationalRepresentatives	Experts	381
33	Experts	Experts	Experts	378
34	Experts	EUinstitutions	EUinstitutions	376
35	NationalRepresentatives	Experts	NationalRepresentatives	376
36	NationalRepresentatives	Referendum	EUinstitutions	375

Appendix B: Regression Results and Robustness Checks

B1. Regression results

The table below presents results following Ordinary Least Square linear regresion, following Hainmueller et al. (2014). Full sample (seven countries), grouping all policy areas together. Model 1 shows the base model (AMCEs plotted in Figure 1 in the paper), Model 2 includes country fixed effects and Model 3 shows results following a Jackknife test.

Table 4: Regression Results

Variables	Model 1 Base Model	Model 2 Country FE	Model 3 Jaccknife
Design: Independent Experts	.091***	.091***	.091***
	(.010)	(.010)	(.018)
Design: EU Institutions	-.020**	-.020**	-.020
	(.010)	(.010)	(.016)
Design: National Representatives (reference category)			
Decision: Referendum	.054***	.054***	. 054**
	(.012)	(.012)	(.015)
Decision: Independent Experts	.003	.003	.003
	(.012)	(.012)	(.015)
Decision: EU Institutions	-.065***	-.065***	-.065***
	(.012)	(.012)	(.010)
Decision: National Representatives (reference category)			
Implementation: Independent Experts	.089***	.089***	.089***
	(.010)	(.010)	(.015)
Implementation: EU Institutions	.003	.003	.003
	(.010)	(.010)	(.017)
Implementation: National Representatives (reference category)			
Constant	.450***	.451***	.450***
	(.011)	(.011)	(.018)
France		-.002	
		(.002)	
Greece		-.0008	
		(.002)	
Italy		.-0005	
		(.002)	
Netherlands		-.002	
		(.002)	
Poland		.0009	
		(.002)	
Romania		.001	
		(.002)	
Germany (ref. cat)			
Observations	14,714	14,714	14,714

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B2. Regression results, controlling for covariates (respondent characteristics)

Tables 4 and 5 below present Ordinary Least Square linear regresion results, following Hainmueller et al. (2014), controlling for key respondent demographic characteristics. Full sample (seven countries), grouping all policy areas together. Model 1 controls for age, Model 2 controls for gender, Model 3 controls for education (Table 4). Models 4 and 5 control for left-right ideological self-placement and for trust in national political institutions (national government and national parliament) .

Table 5: Regression Results

Variables	Model 1 Gender	Model 2 Age	Model 3 Education
Design: Independent Experts	.071***	.122***	.073***
	(.014)	(.030)	(.023)
Design: EU Institutions	-.040***	.093***	-.067***
	(.014)	(.030)	(.023)
Design: National Representatives (reference category)			
Decision: Referendum	.048***	.052	.032
	(.016)	(.035)	(.026)
Decision: Independent Experts	.002	-.010	-.027
	(.016)	(.036)	(.026)
Decision: EU Institutions	-.062***	.019	-.083***
	(.016)	(.036)	(.026)
Decision: National Representatives (reference category)			
Implementation: Independent Experts	.087***	.083***	.101***
	(.014)	(.030)	(.022)
Implementation: EU Institutions	.009	.112***	.023
	(.014)	(.030)	(.023)
Implementation: National Representatives (reference category)			
Constant	.474***	.349***	.478***
	(.018)	(.040)	(.029)
Design: Nat Representatives * female	-.039**		
	(.020)		
Design: Experts * female	-.0004		
	(.020)		
Decision: Nat Representatives * female	-.011		
	(.023)		
Decision: Experts * female	-.021		
	(.023)		
Decision: EU Institutions * female	-.015		
	(.023)		
Implementation: National Representatives * female	.012		
	(.020)		
Implementation: Independent Experts * female	.017		
	(.020)		
Female	.015		
	(.021)		

Table 4 continued from previous page	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Variables	Gender	Age	Education
Design: Experts * age		.000	
		(.001)	
Design: EU Institutions * age		-.003***	
		(.001)	
Decision: Experts * age		.000	
		(.001)	
Decision: EU Institutions * age		-.002***	
		(.001)	
Decision: Referendum * age		.000	
		(.001)	
Implementation: Independent Experts * age		.000	
		(.001)	
Implementation: EU Institutions * age		-.003***	
		(.001)	
Age		.003***	
		(.001)	
Design: Experts * Med Education			.000
			(.028)
Design: Experts * High Education			.048*
			(.028)
Design: EU Institutions * Med Education			.037
			(.027)
Design: EU Institutions * High Education			.082***
			(.027)
Decision: Experts * Med Education			.039
			(.032)
Decision: Experts * High Education			.018
			(.032)
Decision: EU Institutions * Med Education			.024
			(.031)
Decision: EU Institutions * High Education			.022
			(.032)
Decision: Referendum * Med Education			.041
			(.031)
Decision: Referendum * High Education			-.013
			(.032)
Implementation: Experts * Med Education			-.018
			(0.027)
Implementation: Experts * High Education			-.012
			(0.027)
Implementation: EU Institutions * Med Education			-.019
			(.028)
Implementation: EU Institutions * High Education			-.032
			(.028)
Med Education			-.027
			(.029)
High Education			-.044
			(.030)

Table 6: Regression Results

Variables	Model 4 LR ideology	Model 5 Political Trust
Design: Independent Experts	.109***	.201***
	(.028)	(.024)
Design: EU Institutions	.047*	-.005
	(.027)	(.024)
Design: National Representatives (reference category)		
Decision: Referendum	.056*	.161***
	(.031)	(.028)
Decision: Independent Experts	.028	.042
	(.032)	(.028)
Decision: EU Institutions	-.008	-.058**
	(.031)	(.028)
Decision: National Representatives (reference category)		
Implementation: Independent Experts	.095***	.147***
	(.026)	(.024)
Implementation: EU Institutions	-.016	.020
	(.027)	(.024)
Implementation: National Representatives (reference category)		
Constant	.405***	.346***
	(.029)	(.024)
Design: Experts * LR	-.003	
	(.005)	
Design: EU Institutions * LR	-.012***	
	(.005)	
Decision: Experts * LR	-.006	
	(.005)	
Decision: EU Institutions * LR	-.010*	
	(.005)	
Decision: Referendum * LR	.000	
	(.005)	
Implementation: Independent Experts * LR	-.001	
	(.005)	
Implementation: EU Institutions * LR	.004	
	(.005)	
LR	.008*	
	(.006)	

Table 5 continued from previous page	Model 4	Model 5
Variables	LR ideology	Political Trust
Design: Experts * PolTrust		-.035***
		(.007)
Design: EU Institutions * PolTrust		-.005
		(.007)
Decision: Experts * PolTrust		-.015*
		(.008)
Decision: EU Institutions * PolTrust		-.002
		(.008)
Decision: Referendum * PolTrust		-.034***
		(.008)
Implementation: Independent Experts * PolTrust		-.018***
		(.007)
Implementation: EU Institutions * PolTrust		-.005
		(.008)
Political Trust		.033***
		(.007)
Observations	14,714	14,714

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B3. Regression results per policy area

Table 7: Regression Results per policy area

Variables	Model 1 Environment	Model 2 LGBTQ	Model 3 Immigration	Model 4 Security	Model 5 Economy
Design: Experts	.181***	.058*	.070**	.103***	.053**
	(.023)	(.022)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)
Design: EU Institutions	.025	-.028	.002	-.008	-.087***
	(.022)	(.022)	(.022)	(.022)	(.022)
Design: Nat. Representatives (reference category)					
Decision: Referendum	.067***	.062***	.044*	.041	.054**
	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)
Decision: Experts	.075***	-.028	-.041	-.041	.023
	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)
Decision: EU Institutions	.009	-.053**	-.097***	-.059**	-.116***
	(.027)	(.025)	(.027)	(.025)	(.026)
Decision: Nat.Representatives (reference category)					
Implementation: Experts	.129***	.050**	.069***	.118***	.091***
	(.023)	(.022)	(.023)	(.022)	(.022)
Implementation: EU Institutions	.059***	-.015	-.035	.009	.003
	(.023)	(.022)	(.023)	(.022)	(.022)
Implementation: Nat.Representatives (reference category)					
Constant	.342***	.483***	.483***	.443***	.492***
	(.024)	(.024)	(.025)	(.024)	(.024)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,802	3,008	2,974	2,954	2,976

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B4. Regression results per country

Table 8: Regression Results per Country

Variables	Model 1 Germany	Model 2 France	Model 3 Greece	Model 4 Italy	Model 5 Netherlands	Model 6 Poland	Model 7 Romania
Design: Independent Experts	.158***	.069**	.121***	.096***	.020	.110**	.062**
	(.026)	(.027)	(.027)	(.026)	(.026)	(.027)	(.027)
Design: EU Institutions	-.010	-.054**	-.042	-.014	-.076***	-.004	.044
	(.026)	(.026)	(.027)	(.026)	(.025)	(.026)	(.027)
Design: National Representatives (reference category)							
Decision: Referendum	.009	.080***	.091***	.076***	.001	.095***	.033
	(.030)	(.031)	(.030)	(.031)	(.030)	(.032)	(.030)
Decision: Independent Experts	-.004	-.040	-.030	.048	.007	-.079**	.005
	(.030)	(.031)	(.030)	(.031)	(.030)	(.032)	(.030)
Decision: EU Institutions	-.077***	-.089***	-.067**	-.026	-.074**	-.090***	-.025
	(.031)	(.031)	(.031)	(.031)	(.030)	(.031)	(.030)
Decision: National Representatives (reference category)							
Implementation: Independent Experts	.137***	.071***	.017	.108***	.082***	.079***	.127***
	(.027)	(.028)	(.038)	(.034)	(.030)	(.030)	(.038)
Implementation: EU Institutions	.007	-.025	-.077***	.051*	-.012	.011	.061**
	(.028)	(.028)	(.037)	(.033)	(.030)	(.029)	(.037)
Implementation: National Representatives (reference category)							
Constant	.424***	.492***	.482***	.397***	.512***	.451***	.400***
	(.027)	(.030)	(.030)	(.028)	(.028)	(.027)	(.029)
Observations	2,180	2,092	2,016	2,074	2,192	2,026	2,134

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix C: Marginal Means Results

Overall Results



Figure 1: Calculated marginal means

By policy



Figure 2: Calculated marginal means by policy

By country



Figure 3: Calculated marginal means by country

Appendix D: Alternative Visualizations of AMCEs

AMCEs using "Independent Experts" as the reference category



Figure 4: AMCEs

AMCEs using "Independent Experts" as the reference category by Policy Area



Figure 5: AMCEs by policy

AMCEs using "Independent Experts" as the reference category by Country



Figure 6: AMCEs by country

Alternative Visualizations of AMCEs

Effects by policy area in the same figure.



Figure 7: AMCEs by policy

Effects by Country



Figure 8: AMCEs by country

Appendix E: Robustness checks

E1. Profile order effects

The order of a profile (first or second) was not significantly associated with profile selection (χ^2= 2.037, Pr = 0.154).

E2. Repetitive profile problems

Some respondents encountered profiles that assigned each policy task to the same actor. Even though these are still logical combinations, it is possible that respondents prefer delegating different stages of the political process to different actors, irrespective of who these actors are. To make sure these repetitive profiles do not bias the results, I remove all comparisons that included at least one repetitive profile. This leaves the total number of comparisons to N=6,211 across the seven countries. I replicate the analyses presented in the research note without any problematic profile comparisons and adding constraints.

Table 9: Calculated AMCEs excluding repetitive profiles

Attribute	Level	AMCE (st.error)
Design	National Representatives	.00 (NA)
Design	Experts	**.089 (.011)**
Design	EU institutions	**-.025 (.011)**
Decision	National Representatives	.00 (NA)
Decision	Experts	-.005 (.013)
Decision	Referendum	**.048 (.012)**
Decision	EU institutions	**-.071 (.013)**
Implementation	National Representatives	.00 (NA)
Implementation	Experts	**.088 (.011)**
Implementation	EU institutions	-.001 (.011)

Note: Statistically significant effects at .05 level in bold.

Overall Results



Figure 9: AMCEs excluding repetitive profiles

Results by policy



Figure 10: AMCEs by policy

Results by country



Figure 11: AMCEs by country

E3. Unrealistic profiles

Some respondents encountered profiles, though still possible combinations, are less realistic and likely to encounter in the world of policy making. These include policies that are designed at the National Level and then decided at the EU level and policies that are decided at the decided in the National level and then implemented at the EU level. To make sure these less realistic processes do not bias the results, I remove all comparisons that included the combinations mentioned above. I replicate the analyses presented in the research note without any unrealistic profile comparisons and adding constraints.

Table 10: Calculated AMCEs excluding unrealistic profiles

Attribute	Level	AMCE (st.error)
Design	National Representatives	.00 (NA)
Design	Experts	**.086 (.013)**
Design	EU institutions	**-.024 (.014)**
Decision	National Representatives	.00 (NA)
Decision	Experts	.009 (.013)
Decision	Referendum	**.048 (.013)**
Decision	EU institutions	**-.065 (.015)**
Implementation	National Representatives	.00 (NA)
Implementation	Experts	**.087 (.010)**
Implementation	EU institutions	.007 (.011)

Note: Statistically significant effects at .05 level in bold.

Overall Results



Figure 12: AMCEs excluding unrealistic profiles

Results by policy



Figure 13: AMCEs by policy

Results by country



Figure 14: AMCEs by country

Appendix F: Robustness Checks with Subgroup Analysis

Subgroup analyses using age, gender, education, left-right ideology, national political trust and preferences for technocratic expertise. These subgroup analyses further support the robustness of the results: There are no differences between the comparison of delegating tasks to nationally elected representatives and independent experts across gender, across educational level nor across left-right ideological self-placement.

In accordance with expectations, there are some differences across respondents with different levels of trust in national politics (respondents with high levels of trust do not prefer experts over national representatives) and across respondents who think "having experts, not government, govern according to what they think is best" is a bad (dichexp=0) or good (dichexp=1) way of governing their country (World Values Survey question).



Figure 15: Subgroup analysis: Marginal means by gender



Figure 16: Subgroup analysis: AMCEs by gender



Figure 17: Subgroup analysis: Marginal means by age category



Figure 18: Subgroup analysis: AMCEs by age category



Figure 19: Subgroup analysis: Marginal means by education



Figure 20: Subgroup analysis: AMCEs by education



Figure 21: Subgroup analysis: Marginal means by left-right ideology



Figure 22: Subgroup analysis: AMCEs by left-right ideology



Figure 23: Subgroup analysis: Marginal means by political trust



Figure 24: Subgroup analysis: AMCEs by political trust



Figure 25: Subgroup analysis: Marginal means by preference for experts making decisions



Figure 26: Subgroup analysis by preference for experts making decisions

Appendix G: Policy Area Results and Significance Tests

This section of the Appendix presents significance tests across effects for different policy areas. We use stata's *suest* function that allows tests for intramodel and cross-model hypotheses. First we, present a comparison of the regression coefficients for independent experts at the *policy-design* stage across all five policy areas. Second, we present a comparison of the regression coefficients for independent experts at the *decision-making* stage and finally, a comparison of the regression coefficients for the *implementation* stage.

1. Policy-design

   Environment (reg. coef.=.181) - LGBTQ (reg. coef.=.058) : χ^2=15.28 , Pr<.001

   Environment (reg. coef.=.181) - Immigration (reg. coef.=.07) : χ^2=12.13 , Pr<.001

   Environment (reg. coef.=.181) - Economy (reg. coef.=.053) : χ^2=16.31 , Pr<.001

   Environment (reg. coef.=.181) - Security (reg. coef.=.102) : χ^2=6.18 , Pr=.013

   LGBTQ (reg. coef.=.058) - Immigration (reg. coef.=.07) : χ^2=.15 , Pr=.695

   LGBTQ (reg. coef.=.058) - Economy (reg. coef.=.053) : χ^2=1.98 , Pr=.160

   LGBTQ (reg. coef.=.058) - Security (reg. coef.=.102) : χ^2=.03 , Pr=.866

   Immigration (reg. coef.=.07) - Economy (reg. coef.=.053) : χ^2=.31 , Pr=.579

   Immigration (reg. coef.=.07) - Security (reg. coef.=.102) : χ^2=1.01 , Pr=.316

   Economy (reg. coef.=.053) - Security (reg. coef.=.102) : χ^2=2.43 , Pr=.119

2. Decision-making

   Environment (reg. coef.=.075) - LGBTQ (reg. coef.=-.028) : χ^2=7.98 , Pr=.005

   Environment (reg. coef.=.075) - Immigration (reg. coef.=-.041) : χ^2=10.09 , Pr=.002

   Environment (reg. coef.=.075) - Economy (reg. coef.=.022) : χ^2=2.03 , Pr=.154

   Environment (reg. coef.=.075) - Security (reg. coef.=-.041) : χ^2=9.88 , Pr=.002

LGBTQ (reg. coef.=-.028) - Immigration (reg. coef.=-.041) : χ^2=.13 , Pr=.719

LGBTQ (reg. coef.=-.028) - Economy (reg. coef.=.022) : χ^2=1.91 , Pr=.167

LGBTQ (reg. coef.=-.028) - Security (reg. coef.=-.041) : χ^2=.12 , Pr=.728

Immigration (reg. coef.=-.041) - Economy (reg. coef.=.022) : χ^2=3.01 , Pr=.083

Immigration (reg. coef.=-.041) - Security (reg. coef.=-.041) : χ^2=.00 , Pr=.991

Economy (reg. coef.=.022) - Security (reg. coef.=-.041) : χ^2=2.93 , Pr=.087

3. Implementation

Environment (reg. coef.=.128) - LGBTQ (reg. coef.=.05) : χ^2=6.17 , Pr=.013

Environment (reg. coef.=.128) - Immigration (reg. coef.=.069) : χ^2=4.49 , Pr=.0418

Environment (reg. coef.=.128) - Economy (reg. coef.=.091) : χ^2=1.46 , Pr=.228

Environment (reg. coef.=.128) - Security (reg. coef.=.118) : χ^2=.11 , Pr=.739

LGBTQ (reg. coef.=.05) - Immigration (reg. coef.=.069) : χ^2=.37 , Pr=.545

LGBTQ (reg. coef.=.05) - Economy (reg. coef.=.091) : χ^2=1.72 , Pr=.190

LGBTQ (reg. coef.=.05) - Security (reg. coef.=.118) : χ^2=4.77 , Pr=.029

Immigration (reg. coef.=.069) - Economy (reg. coef.=.091) : χ^2=.48 , Pr=.489

Immigration (reg. coef.=.069) - Security (reg. coef.=.118) : χ^2=2.44 , Pr=.119

Economy (reg. coef.=.091) - Security (reg. coef.=.118) : χ^2=.79 , Pr=.376