

Voter Expectations of Government Formation in Coalition Systems:

The Importance of the Information Context

Online Supporting Information

European Journal of Political Research

Shaun Bowler

Department of Political Science
University of California, Riverside
shaun.bowler@ucr.edu

Gail McElroy

Department of Political Science
Trinity College Dublin
mcelroy@tcd.ie


Stefan Müller

School of Politics and International Relations
University College Dublin
stefan.mueller@ucd.ie

A Predicting the probability of a majority of seats

We estimate the probability of a coalition to have a majority based on aggregating opinion polls (see extensively Bender and Bauer, 2018). Figure A1 shows how the probability of a majority for one or more parties changes when considering only minimal-winning coalitions or also surplus majority governments, i.e. coalitions that include more parties than required for a majority. One example clarifies this difference: If a coalition between SPD and the CDU already has an estimated probability of 100 per cent to gain a majority of seats in parliament, adding the FDP to this coalition would not change the majority. The x-axis shows the probabilities if we assign the value 0 to surplus governments (because in Germany surplus governments are highly unusual). The y-axis gives all surplus governments the value 100, even if at least two of these parties already have an estimated probability of 100 percent to gain a majority of seats. The coefficients of the *Probability of a Majority* decrease slightly in our conditional logit models when we assign a probability of 100 to surplus governments. This is not surprising as, for instance, a coalition of CDU and SPD with a clear majority would not add a third party to the cabinet. In the main part of the paper, we opt for the more conservative estimate which assigns a probability of 100 per cent to surplus majority governments.

Figure A 1: Comparing the probabilities of majorities for coalitions based on the inclusion or exclusion of surplus majority governments. Small random noise added to each point to avoid overplotting.



B Estimating coalition signals in newspapers

Coalition Signals in Newspapers is one of the central independent variables in our article. We use quantitative text analysis to analyze pre-electoral coalition signals using a large corpus of media reports about the relationship between parties. The analysis was conducted with the following approach:

1. Download all available German newspaper articles between January 2009 and December 2017 from *NexisLexis* that mention at least one of the main political parties, or at least one of the potential coalition formats, as well as a term that indicates working together in a coalition (coalesce, work together, coalition, alliance), and the term federal or state election.¹
2. Import the 15,980 relevant downloaded articles as a *quanteda* (Benoit et al., 2018) text corpus.
3. Create a dictionary containing geographical terms for each German state (e.g. name of state, capitol of state) and terms about the federal political level (e.g. name of chancellor, Berlin, Bundestag). Apply this dictionary to the text corpus using *Newsmap*, a semi-supervised approach to geographical news classification (Watanabe, 2018). Based on the full text, each article gets assigned to the federal or state level. If an article is classified as reporting about the state level, the name of the state that is most likely to be reported about is also added as a document-level variable.
4. Reshape the text corpus to the level of sentences resulting of a corpus with 760,161 documents. Each document contains one sentence.


¹ The following expression is the original query: “koalition* OR zusammen arbeiten OR koalieren OR Bündnis AND CDU OR CSU OR SPD OR Sozialdemokraten OR Linke OR Linkspartei OR Grünen OR Grüne OR Piraten OR Piratenpartei OR AfD OR FDP OR Südschleswigscher Wählerverband OR schwarz-rot* OR rot-grün* OR schwarz-gelb* OR sozialliberal* OR Ampel OR rot-rot OR rot-rot-grün* OR schwarz-grün* AND Bundestagswahl* OR Landtagswahl* OR Bürgerschaftswahl*”.

5. Apply a dictionary with names of the parties or coalitions to each sentence. If a sentence contains a word indicating cooperation, governing together or signaling a coalition², and at least two terms about two different parties, the sentence is assigned to one of the potential coalitions. If a sentence explicitly mentions one coalition option (e.g. “grand coalition”, “red-green coalition”) and a term indicating cooperation, the sentence is also classified as discussing a potential government. 19,889 sentences are classified as relevant, i.e. they contain the names of at least two parties/a coalition and a word indicating cooperation. Figure A2 lists the most frequent words and phrases in the sentences that have been classified as relevant, i.e. that mention at least two parties or a coalition and a term indicating cooperation. The most frequent terms strengthen the face validity of the classification. Party names and descriptions of coalition, such as red green (a coalition between the SPD and Greens) or grand coalition for a coalition between the CDU/CSU and SPD, are among the most frequent words. Moreover, terms like percentage, federal election, government, continuation, end, question, federal, state election, bundestag indicate that the sentences indeed capture upcoming German elections and coalitions.
6. For each of the 22 elections (19 state and 3 federal elections) subset all articles that are about the respective state/federal level based on the *Newsmap* classification. Filter all articles published within two years before the start of the respective GLES survey reporting about this state/the federal level.

² We selected the following “glob”-style wildcard expression as terms indicating cooperation or a coalition: “koali*”, “eingeh*”, “regier*”, “koooper*”, “arbeit*”, “bündnis*”. The wildcard matches ensure that terms such as Koalition (coalition) and koalieren (coalesce) would be picked up with the wildcard expression “koali*”. While the choice of keywords can certainly be extended or refined, all of these terms usually indicate some form of cooperation and avoid too many false-positive matches.

7. Group the dataset by classified coalitions and count the number of mentions for each government option.
8. Merge the aggregated data for each election with the survey dataset. For each coalition option to be evaluated by the respondents, we count the number of classified newspaper mentions for this government option during the two years before the election.
9. To make the measure comparable across elections, we rescale the variable to a 0–100 scale for each election. A value of 0 means that potential coalition partners have not been mentioned at all in the two years prior to an election; a value of 100 implies that all mentions were devoted to the same government option. Note that we scale this variable by dividing by two standard deviations for the conditional logit regressions. This procedure makes the variable more comparable to the dummy variables in the regression (Gelman, 2008).

Figure A 2: The 50 most frequent terms and multi-word expressions in sentences classified as containing signals for a coalition option




C The impact of the survey instrument

The survey instruments differ across elections. Six state elections and the 2017 federal have an entirely open question format and simply ask respondents to name which party or parties will govern after the election (“Government parties: binary”). Three state elections and the 2009 federal election ask respondents to choose one coalition from a pre-defined set of choices (“Coalitions: binary”). The remaining 10 state elections and the 2013 federal election present respondents with a set of 5–10 coalition options, and respondents need to evaluate the likelihood that each coalition will govern (“Coalitions: continuous”). Figure 2 in the paper plots the proportion of correct predictions for each of the question formats. While it is not possible to completely disentangle the effects based on the survey instrument from election-specific factors, we clearly observe, both for the federal and state elections, that respondents are much more likely to predict the correct coalition when potential coalitions are presented in the binary format and respondents must select one. When coalitions predict the probability of governments based on the continuous scales, the proportion of correct predictions decreases substantively hovering at around 20 per cent. For the binary question of the government party/parties, we observe similarly low degrees of accuracy compared to the continuous coalition scale for state elections, but a higher proportion for the 2017 federal election. The survey instrument seems to have an impact on correct predictions. Future work should consider randomly varying the wording *within* an election survey, as, we cannot entirely disentangle election-specific effects from survey instrument effects here.

As described in the main part of the paper, the survey instruments differ across elections. 10 state elections and the 2013 federal election present respondents with a set of 5–10 coalition options, and respondents need to evaluate the likelihood that each coalition will govern (“Coalitions: continuous”). We check whether the number of coalitions to be evaluated influences the predictive accuracy. One could imagine that evaluating more coalitions results

in lower chances of getting it right. However, Figure A3 does not offer evidence for such an effect. We do not observe any consistent trends due to the number of government options presented to respondents.

Figure A 3: Controlling for survey instrument effects due to variation in the number of governments to evaluate in terms of the probability of governing after an election (in the continuous question format).




Note: Figure shows the proportion of correctly predicted coalitions based on the numbers of coalitions that a respondent needed to evaluate in the survey. Vertical error bars show 95 per cent confidence intervals.

D Predicting “don not know” responses or missing answers

What drives missing answers in the prediction of governments? The main driver of “don’t know” responses is the manner in which the question on coalition predictions is asked. When respondents are presented with a variety of possible coalitions and need to assess the likelihood of the coalition to be formed, missing answers are on the lowest levels (Figure A4). Missing values increase when respondents should select one or more parties that will govern after the election. The highest values (between 10 and 22 per cent) of missing values occurred in election studies that force respondents to choose one coalition from a pre-defined set of choices (“Coalitions: binary”).

Figure A 4: Percentage of “don't know/no answer” responses for coalition prediction question



We ran a multilevel logistic regression with a dummy indicating whether or not a respondent predicted a coalition. Models 1 and 2 of Table A1 show that respondents in surveys

on Land elections are more likely to reply “don’t know” to the question on predicted coalitions, when compared with federal election survey respondents. Moreover, if respondents are explicitly asked for the party or parties that will form the government (Coalitions – Binary). Respondents with no interest at all in the campaign are also most likely not to reply to the question on predicted governments. Male respondents are significantly more likely to predict a coalition than female respondents, and respondents with lower education (No A-Levels) are more likely not to predict a coalition.

Table A 1: Predicting missing answers in the coalition prediction survey item

	Model 1	Model 2
Prediction Question: Coalitions - Continuous (ref.: Coa. - Binary)	-1.84 (0.15) ^{***}	-1.87 (0.16) ^{***}
Prediction Question: Government Parties - Binary	-0.78 (0.14) ^{***}	-0.90 (0.17) ^{***}
State election	-0.80 (0.13) ^{***}	-0.78 (0.15) ^{***}
Interest in the Election: Not much (ref.: No interest at all)		-0.76 (0.09) ^{***}
Interest in the Election: Medium		-1.18 (0.09) ^{***}
Interest in the Election: Strong		-1.63 (0.10) ^{***}
Interest in the Election: Very strong		-1.81 (0.15) ^{***}
Female		0.38 (0.06) ^{***}
Education: No A-Levels		0.31 (0.08) ^{***}
AIC	8871.93	7802.66
BIC	8910.54	7886.99
Log Likelihood	-4430.97	-3890.33
Num obs.	16653	15778
Num groups: Elections	22	22

^{***}p < 0.001; ^{**}p < 0.01; ^{*}p < 0.05

E The most distant parties in coalitions

We measure the perceived distance between government parties as the absolute distance between the left-right position of the most left and most right party of a coalition. To ensure comparability, we specified the most left and right party for each coalition option in our sample. Table A2 reports, for all coalitions, which party was regarded as the most right party (first party) and the most left party (second party).

Table A 2: The coding of the most left and most right party in various potential governments

Coalition	Most distant parties
CDU, AfD	AfD - CDU
CDU, FDP	CDU - FDP
CDU, FDP, Greens	CDU - Greens
CDU, Greens	CDU - Greens
CDU, SPD	CDU - SPD
CDU, FW	CDU - FW
SPD, FDP	FDP - SPD
SPD, FDP, Greens	FDP - Greens
SPD, Greens	SPD - Greens
SPD, Left	SPD - Left
SPD, Greens, FW	FW - Greens
SPD, FDP	SPD - FDP
SPD, Left, Greens	SPD - Left
CDU, AfD	CDU - AfD
CDU	(no distance)
SPD	(no distance)

F Predicting the government in state elections

The results in the paper are based on separate conditional logistic regression models for each election. We repeat the analysis by aggregating all elections into a single dataset and running only one model. We cluster the observation by elections. First, we turn to the 15 state elections for which we have measures for the predicted government, as well as the desired government.³ Model 1 of Table A3 is the basic model that includes both the *Desired Government* and the *Probability of Majority* and controls for the *Incumbent Government* and the ideological distance between the two most extreme parties in a coalition.

We observe strong and robust “*Wishful Thinking*” effects in state elections across all model specifications. A respondent is much more likely to predict the government that is also his desired government. The smallest observed coefficient of 1.22 for *Desired Government* in the more conservative model corresponds to an odds ratio of 3.3. In substantive terms, the government option that is a respondent’s desired coalition is around 3.3 times more likely to be the predicted coalition, all other variables held constant. The *Probability of a Majority* has the expected positive influence on predicting a government over all alternative governments. The *Incumbent Government* also has a higher probability of being selected as the predicted coalition. The *Perceived Subjective Distance* between the between the parties has the expected negative coefficient. If the absolute distance in terms of left-right positions between a choice of parties increases, a respondent is less likely to predict this government option.

³ Five surveys do not contain the items required to construct the measure for the desired coalition.

Table A 3: Predicting which government option is selected as the predicted coalition from the choice set of all coalitions. The models only include the state elections. Robust standard errors clustered by election.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Desired Government	1.22*** (0.12)		1.22*** (0.12)	1.93*** (0.10)
Probability of a Majority (stand.)	0.28*** (0.06)	0.29*** (0.07)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.58** (0.20)
Incumbent Government	0.57*** (0.11)	0.71*** (0.12)	0.31 (0.22)	0.79** (0.27)
Perceived Distance Between Parties (stand.)	-0.36*** (0.09)	-0.54*** (0.10)	-0.35*** (0.09)	-0.74*** (0.10)
Ideological Distance Government and Respondent (stand.)		-0.47*** (0.08)		
Coalition Signals in Newspapers (stand.)			0.22 (0.12)	0.40* (0.15)
AIC	107520.06	118169.85	107433.37	18443.88
R ²	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.11
Max. R ²	0.75	0.74	0.75	0.37
Num. events	20473	21906	20473	5852
Num. obs.	81649	90235	81649	55026
Missings	25481	16895	25481	15019

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

Model 2 replicates Model 1, but we replace the *Desired Coalition* dummy variable with a continuous measure of the distance between left-right self-placement and the respondent's

perception of the left-right ideology of a given government option. We observe a negative and statistically significant effect, which mirrors the findings from Model 1. If a government is perceived to be ideologically distant from a respondent, she is *less* likely to predict this coalition option. Model 3 and 4 add the *Positive Coalition Signals*, derived from the quantitative text analysis of media reports. When pooling all elections, the relationship is positive, but not statistically significant. Note that *Positive Coalition Signals* and *Incumbent Government* tend to be multicollinear since incumbent parties are usually portrayed as being cooperative and being willing to form a coalition in the upcoming cycle. Removing incumbent government from the model leads to larger and statistically significant estimates.

Recall that the continuous measures of the assumed likelihood of a government to be formed can result in more than one prediction if a respondent gives two or more coalitions the same score.⁴ Model 4 restricts the sample to those respondents who predicted just one coalition which increases the size of the coefficients.

G Predicting the government in federal elections

Next, we reproduce the models described above for the three federal elections in 2009, 2013, and 2017 (Table A4). The coefficients for the three federal elections are in the same direction as the coefficients for the state elections, but the sizes of the coefficients are usually larger. Again, the *Desired Government* and the alternative measure of the ideological proximity between a respondent and the government have the expected effects. The coefficient of *Probability of a Majority* is also much larger than for the state elections. These differences indicate that respondents seem to be more aware of arithmetically (im)possible governments in first-order elections. This finding is unsurprising as media coverage about federal elections is far more extensive, and polling results for the federal level are conducted and reported

⁴ Randomly drawing one of these options and ignoring the other coalitions does not change the results.

weekly. The *Incumbent Government* effect is however not significant at the federal level, in contrast with the state level elections. The reason for the difference between the state and federal level is probably a result of the decline of the Free Democrats (FDP) prior to the 2013 election. This junior coalition partner between 2009 and 2013 lost public support and it seemed unlikely that the governing coalition could remain in office. Therefore, respondents tended to (correctly) predict a “Grand coalition” between the CDU/CSU and SPD and did not forecast a continuation of the CDU/CSU and FDP.

In the federal elections, the *Perceived Distance Between Parties* has the expected negative effect. Governments with larger differences are less likely to be the predicted coalition. *Coalition Signals in Newspapers* also exerts a positive and sizeable influence on coalition predictions, especially when focusing only on respondents who predicted one coalition (Model 4).

Table A 4: Predicting which government option is selected as the predicted government from the choice set of all governments. The models only include the federal elections. Robust standard errors clustered by election.


	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Desired Government	1.35*** (0.31)		1.25*** (0.29)	1.48*** (0.09)
Probability of a Majority (stand.)	0.91*** (0.21)	0.81*** (0.21)	0.45 (0.29)	0.39 (0.45)
Incumbent Government	1.06*** (0.31)	1.17*** (0.32)	-0.02 (0.63)	-0.56 (0.96)
Perceived Distance Between Parties (stand.)	-0.94** (0.30)	-0.95** (0.31)	-0.87** (0.30)	-1.11*** (0.24)
Ideological Distance Government and Respondent (stand.)		-0.47*** (0.05)		
Coalition Signals in Newspapers (stand.)			1.06*** (0.31)	1.69** (0.52)
AIC	18406.53	25133.70	18024.43	10832.67
R ²	0.12	0.09	0.13	0.16
Max. R ²	0.48	0.52	0.48	0.40
Num. events	6173	6700	6173	4500
Num. obs.	35004	39613	35004	31481
Missings	8432	3823	8432	6117

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

H Robustness tests

Figure A5 reproduces Figure 4, but instead of the *Desired Government* we use the *Ideological Distance Between a Respondent and the Government Option*. A lower value indicates that a respondent’s ideological left-right position is close to the perceived left-right position of the government option. If the “wishful thinking” assertion holds, we should observe a negative effect: a larger distance makes it less likely that a respondent predicts this option. Indeed, we find negative coefficients in 15 out of 18 elections, confirming that our conclusions regarding *Wishful Thinking* effects do not depend on the measurement of a *Desired Government*.


Figure A 5: Predicting which government option is selected as the predicted government from the choice set of all governments. The coefficients are derived from 22 models, one for each election in the sample that includes information on the desired government.



In additional models we also account for common and previously formed coalitions. Figure A6 lists the coalitions that have been formed on the Land level between January 1990 and May 2017 (106 governments), along with the number of formed coalitions. Note that this list does not distinguish between the party of the prime minister and smaller coalition parties.

More precisely, coalitions between CDU and the SPD (with a CDU prime minister) and a coalition between the SPD and CDU (with an SPD prime minister) are counted as the same coalition. We follow this approach given that respondents in the surveys are asked for their predicted coalition and not (necessarily) which party will be the largest party in the government. We also recoded CSU to CDU in order to merge all formed coalitions with the harmonised coalition options presented to respondents. The plot shows that grand coalitions between the CDU and SPD, coalitions between the SPD and Greens, and coalitions between the CDU and FDP have been the most common governments in German states between 1990 and 2017. For the regression analysis, we code the six governments that have been formed at least five times as “typical” governments for German state and federal elections.⁵

Figure A 6: The frequency of coalitions that have been formed on the land level between 1990 and 2017




We use this binary variable of coalitions that have been formed at least five times as a measure of common coalitions, add this variable to the conditional logit regression and interact

⁵ These governments are CDU, SPD; SPD, Greens; CDU, FDP; CDU; SPD; SPD, Left.

the measure with the *Probability of a Majority* to test whether common coalitions with a high probability of obtaining a majority of seats are more likely to be selected by respondents. The coefficients in Figure A7 suggests that this tends to be the case in the majority of elections.

Figure A 7: Predicting which government option is selected as the predicted government from the choice set of all governments. The coefficients are derived from 22 models, one for each election in the sample that includes information on the desired government. All models include an interaction between common coalitions and the probability of a majority of seats.



We consider the left-right placements of parties by individual respondents as the most suitable measure for the *Perceived Distance Between Parties* and also the best measure for the distance between a coalition’s left-right position and the respondent’s left-right position (*Ideological Distance Government and Respondent*). However, as a robustness test we also estimate the left-right positions of parties, the left-right distance between coalition parties, and the average left-right position of a coalition using Wordscores, a supervised method for scaling of party positions. We rely on the Wordscores estimates of all manifestos from German state elections between 1990 and 2019 provided by Bräuninger et al. (2020).

First, it is worthy of note that the Wordscores left-right positions and voters’ placements of the parties correlate very highly. Across the 19 subnational elections, the correlations range

between 0.89 and 0.99 (Figure A8).⁶ The left-right distance between the two most extreme parties also correlates highly ($r=0.73$) when comparing distances derived from Wordscores and from party placements by voters (Figure A9).

Second, we rerun the conditional logit models using Wordscores estimates for the 19 subnational elections. The substantive results remain the same for all elections, and the directions of the remaining coefficients do not change when using the variables based on Wordscores positions (Figure A10). Only in one of the 19 elections, a larger ideological distance between the respondent and the average left-right position of the coalition (based on Wordscores) increases the probability of selecting this government option, offering further support for the “wishful thinking” hypothesis. The ideological distance between the parties, based on Wordscores estimates, also has the expected negative effect in most elections. The findings regarding party-level characteristics are robust to evaluations by voters or latent positions derived from political text.

⁶ Note that Bräuninger et al. (2020) use survey ratings by experts as the reference scores for the Wordscores algorithm and not by using voter placements. The high correlations are thus not circular and not an artefact of identical measurement.

Figure A 8: Correlations between party placements by voters and Wordscores estimates of state election manifestos




Figure A 9: Comparing perceived distances between the two most extreme parties in a coalition based on respondents' evaluations and Wordscores estimates





Figure A 10: Predicting which government option is selected as the predicted government from the choice set of all governments. The coefficients are derived from 19 models, one for each state election in the sample. The ideological measures are based on Wordscores estimates, rather than evaluations by the respondents



I Election surveys used in this paper

We have merged and harmonised variables from the following surveys, conducted prior to German state elections and federal elections between 2009 and 2017.

Federal elections

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Scherer, Philipp; Bytzek Evelyn; Bieber, Ina (2017): Vorwahl-Querschnitt (GLES 2009). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5300 Datenfile Version 5.0.1, doi: 10.4232/1.12804.

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2017): Vorwahl-Querschnitt (GLES 2013). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5700 Datenfile Version 2.0.1, doi: 10.4232/1.12808

Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Bieber, Ina; Stövsand, Lars-Christopher; Dietz, Melanie; Scherer, Philipp (2017): Vorwahl-Querschnitt (GLES 2017). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln: ZA6800 Datenfile Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12990.

State elections

Baden-Württemberg

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Bieber, Ina; Bytzek, Evelyn; Scherer, Philipp (2015): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl Baden-Württemberg 2011 (GLES 2009). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5328 Datenfile Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12392.

Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Schoen, Harald; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Henckel, Simon; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2016): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl in Baden-Württemberg 2016 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5741 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, doi: 10.4232/1.12531.

Bavaria

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2014): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl Bayern 2013 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5736 Datenfile Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12039.

Berlin

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Bieber, Ina; Bytzek, Evelyn; Scherer, Philipp (2011): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl Berlin 2011 (GLES 2009). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5329 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11054.

Brandenburg

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Henckel, Simon; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2015): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl Brandenburg 2014 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5739 Datenfile Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12284.

Hesse

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2015): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl Hessen 2013 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5737 Datenfile Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12422.

Lower Saxony

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2014): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl Niedersachsen 2013 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5735 Datenfile Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12038.

Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Bieber, Ina; Bytzek, Evelyn; Scherer, Philipp (2011): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2011 (GLES 2009). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5330 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11053.

Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Schoen, Harald; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Henckel, Simon; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2016): Langfrist-Online Tracking zur Landtagswahl in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2016 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5744 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, doi: 10.4232/1.12674.

North Rhine-Westphalia

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Bieber, Ina; Bytzek, Evelyn; Scherer, Philipp (2013): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl Nordrhein-Westfalen 2010 (GLES 2009). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5324 Datenfile Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11504.

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2015): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl Nordrhein-Westfalen 2012 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5333 Datenfile Version 1.1.0, doi:10.4232/1.12343.

Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Schoen, Harald; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Henckel, Simon; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2017): Langfrist-Online Tracking zur Landtagswahl in Nordrhein-Westfalen 2017 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA6820 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12852.

Rhineland-Palatinate

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Bieber, Ina; Bytzek, Evelyn; Scherer, Philipp (2015): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl Rheinland-Pfalz 2011 (GLES 2009). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5327 Datenfile Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12391.

Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Schoen, Harald; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Henckel, Simon; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2016): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl in Rheinland-Pfalz 2016 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5743 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, doi: 10.4232/1.12533.

Saxony

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Henckel, Simon; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2015): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl Sachsen 2014 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5738 Datenfile Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12283.

Saxony-Anhalt

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Bieber, Ina; Bytzek, Evelyn; Scherer, Philipp (2015): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl

Sachsen-Anhalt 2011 (GLES 2009). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5325 Datenfile Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12390.

Schleswig-Holstein

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2013): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl Schleswig-Holstein 2012 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5332 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11757.

Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Schoen, Harald; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Henckel, Simon; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2017): Langfrist-Online Tracking zur Landtagswahl in Schleswig-Holstein 2017 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA6819 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12851.

Thuringia

Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Henckel, Simon; Bieber, Ina; Scherer, Philipp (2015): Langfrist-Online-Tracking zur Landtagswahl Thüringen 2014 (GLES). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5740 Datenfile Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12285.