A. Interview data

The interview data were collected in Brussels in April 2018. The data collection was registered at the Research Ethics Office of King's College London (Research Ethics Minimal Risk Registration Form MR/17/18-434). The interviews were conducted mainly to gather information about the process of political programming and priority setting. Therefore, we contacted, and conducted interviews with, EU officials who are or were involved in this process at different stages and in different institutions. We conducted five anonymous, semi-structured interviews with a total of ten interviewees. Four of the five interviews were recorded for our own use and subsequently transcribed. We were not allowed to record the remaining interview, but took extensive notes. Table A provides further details on the type of EU officials interviewed.

Table A: Interviews and type of interviewees

N^o	Date and time	Interviewee(s) (type)
1.	23 April, 2:30pm	Three officials, European Commission
2.	24 April, 9:30am	Three officials, European Commission
3.	24 April, 3:00pm	Official, European Commission
4.	24 April, 4:30pm	Two officials, Council of the European Union
5.	24 April, 4:30pm	Official, European Parliament

Our interview guide included the following general questions:

− Could you explain the cycle that leads to the publication of the work programme?

− Where and when does it start? What are the different phases? Who is involved in the process and how?

− Has the process changed over time?

− What role, if any, does the European Parliament play in the process?

− What role, if any, does the Council of the European Union play in the process?

− What role, if any, do the member states play in the process? More generally, would you say that national-level politics plays any role in the process?

− Has there been change over time in the involvement of other institutions?

- Could you tell us about the different categories of priorities included in the work programme?
- Could you tell us about what type of files are being prioritised? Have you seen any patterns in terms of the sort of files prioritised?
- Have you observed any broader changes over time in terms of the type of files prioritised?
- Could you tell us what it means for a file to be a priority in the work programme? Once prioritised, (how) are these files different from 'normal' files?
- Has the process following publication of the work programme changed over time?
- How are the work programmes and their priorities related to other strategic documents of the EU?
- The Commission has allegedly become more presidential and political. Has this changed the dynamics of priority-setting and priority delivery? If so, why and how?
- Have you observed any differences in the way work programmes are established across Commissions?
- Finally, could you explain the purpose of the annual programming process?

B. Operationalisation and descriptives

Public issue salience

Our variable *public issue salience* was created using Eurobarometer data on the question: 'What do you think are the two most important issues facing (your country) at the moment?'. To help respondents answer, they are presented with a card featuring around fourteen 'important issues', including 'crime', 'the educational system', 'terrorism', and 'unemployment'. Most issues are part of all Eurobarometer waves we took into consideration, but some are included in some surveys only. That is, in the early years, respondents were offered the options 'defence' and 'public transport', but these were taken off later due to their non-salience. 'Government debt' was added in 2012 (see Table B1).

The question has only been asked since 2002, and we use a one-year lag. Hence, we have missing values for the first four periods in our data. Our main *public issue salience* measure is based on EU-wide issue salience scores, with population weights to account for the size of member states. We calculated scores for the different issue areas and periods, and divided the percentages by two to correct for the fact that respondents could—and typically did—choose up to two issues.[1] We log transformed the variable to deal with its positive skewedness.

To assign issue salience scores to legislative proposals, wherever possible, we linked the legislative proposals to the issue areas of the Eurobarometer. The linking process was not completely straightforward because proposals are not necessarily explained with a focus on the 'important issue' they address. To address this challenge, we asked whether the Commission could—at least in principle—have stated a link between its proposal and an 'important issue'. For instance, if a proposal aims to, in some way, address policy issues in health care, we linked it to 'the health care system'. In cases where more than one issue category applied, we opted for the category that was most obviously addressed by the proposal. Figure B1 shows the distribution of our observations (including priorities) across categories, per Commission.

Even though we conceived the issue categories in broad terms,[2] a majority of proposals (60 percent) could still not be linked to any of the important issues. A more qualitative evaluation

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[1] More specifically, the total percentage in the different surveys ranged from 188.3 to 194.9.
[2] For instance, proposals on digitalisation aimed to improve the EU's competitiveness were—the specificity of the proposal notwithstanding—still linked to 'the economic situation'.

of these proposals suggested that the issues covered by them were not particularly salient overall. This was at least partially confirmed in our comparison of media attention scores for proposals with and without link to the Eurobarometer categories. Using (and updating) a media attention measure created by Reh et al. (2013),[3] and available for all legislative proposals, an independent t-test showed that the attention scores for observations linked to Eurobarometer categories (M=0.39; SD=0.69) were significantly higher than those for 'non-linked' observations (M=0.21; SD=0.49), t(6551)= 12.37), p=0.00. Based on this finding, we assigned the value of 0 to observations that could not be linked to the Eurobarometer categories.

Yet, this operationalisation is not unproblematic: some of the uncategorised observations may well touch on issues that citizens do actually deem important. This is, indeed, what our analysis of media attention suggests: some of the uncategorised observations actually have rather high media attention scores. Therefore, we ran two sets of robustness checks. First, we ran models with a more restricted operationalisation (and, therefore, a smaller number of observations), where we turned the imputed value of 0 into missing for those legislative proposals that had attracted at least some domestic media attention (scores higher than 0 on the media attention measure). Second, we ran models in which we replaced our public issue salience measure with the media attention measure. Though media attention is only a proxy for public issue salience, the measure is not subject to the missing value problem from which our public issue salience measure suffers. As Tables C4 and C5 in the Appendix show, the results are very similar.

Finally, whilst we cannot fully address the question of whether some European 'publics' are more important for the Commission than others, we ran our main model with two alternative operationalisations of public issue salience: (a) a measure in which all countries carry equal weight (rather than weights based on size), and (b) a measure of public issue salience that only includes what used to be the four biggest member states (France, Germany, Italy and the UK). As Table C2 in this Appendix demonstrates, the results hardly change.

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[3] The measure captures the average number of mentions of the legislative proposal in selected English-, French, German- and Italian-language newspapers, and is log-transformed to deal with considerable positive skewedness.

Table B1: Issues included in Eurobarometer surveys used

	57.2	60.1	62.0	64.2	66.1	68.1	70.1	72.4	74.2	76.3	78.1	80.1	82.3	84.3	86.2	88.3
Crime	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Public transport	●	●	●	●												
Economic situation	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Rising prices/inflation	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Taxation	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Unemployment	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Terrorism	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Defence/Foreign affairs	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●						
Housing	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Government debt											●	●	●	●	●	●
Immigration	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Health care system	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
The educational system	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Pensions	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
The environment/energy	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

Note: The Eurobarometer waves are the autumn waves that were run a year before the publication of the WP (one-year lag). The exception is 2002, when the spring Eurobarometer was the (only) wave including the 'most important issue' question.

Figure B1: The policy agenda of the European Commission, by Eurobarometer categories

Notes: Residual category excluded; all proposals under Prodi are included, although no Eurobarometer data available for the first years.

Governing parties issue salience

To capture the salience of issues for governing parties (henceforth: government issue salience), we linked the policy area of a co-decision file to the corresponding policy category of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). The identification of the substantive policy categories and the aggregation of the CMP policy items was inspired by Hagemann et al. (2017), Wüst and Faas (2007) and Klüver and Spoon (2015).

Based on a qualitative assessment of its content, each legislative file was assigned to one of the 17 policy categories. These categories have CMP scores that are based on the share of party manifesto data (or 'quasi-sentences' in CMP jargon) for a specific policy area. Table B2 lists our 17 policy categories and the linked CMP policy items. Observations that could not be linked to any policy category were incorporated in the 'residual' category. However, this only applies to 349 observations, corresponding to 4.3 percent of the total. Figure B2 shows the distribution of our observations (including priorities) across categories (excluding the residual category), by Commission.

Government issue salience varies across policy areas and over time. Country scores are calculated on the basis of manifestos issued by political parties for each general election; these party scores are carried forward to the next general election. Country-level salience measures are calculated by using the averages of CMP scores of parties in government coalitions, weighted by seat share in the lower house (ParlGov dataset; Döring & Manow 2016).

In a second aggregation step, we created an EU-level measure, computing a weighted average of all country measures based on the population share in the EU-15; EU-25; EU-27 and EU-28 in a given period (Penn World Table; Feenstra et al. 2015). We multiplied the values by ten, to make them more intuitive and easier to interpret.

We also calculated alternative operationalisations of *party issue salience* with (a) all countries carrying equal weight; (b) only the (then) four biggest member states (France, Germany, Italy, UK); (c) only those countries that held the Council Presidency in a given period; (d) all parties represented in the lower chamber. They all correlate strongly (the correlation between governing party salience and EU Council salience, with r=0.69 and p<0.00, being the lowest) and, unsurprisingly, have a similar effect on priority-setting (cf. Table C3 below).

Table B2: Policy categories and CMP codes

	Policy category	CMP codes
1.	Agriculture and fisheries	703
2.	Citizens' and human rights	201
3.	Constitutionalism	203; 204
4.	Culture	502
5.	Education	506; 507
6.	Environmental protection	501; 416
7.	External relations (except international trade)	101; 102; 103; 104; 105
8.	Government and administrative efficiency	303
9.	International and European trade (including harmonisation)	107; 109; 406; 407
10.	Crime and justice	605
11.	Macroeconomic policy	404; 408; 409; 410; 414; 415
12.	Business regulation and incentives (except environmental regulation)	401; 402; 403; 412
13.	Migration and border control	601; 602
14.	Minorities	607; 608; 705
15.	Research and development	411
16.	Employment and social policy (except education)	504; 505; 701; 702
17.	Demographic groups	706
18.	Residual	n/a

Figure B2: The policy agenda of the European Commission, CMP categories

Note: Residual category excluded.

Table B3: Operationalisation of *EU expansion*

	Legislation coded as expanding the EU's competences	Example
(a)	Legislation extending the rights of the European Commission or other supranational institutions (e.g., the European Central Bank) vis-à-vis the member states	"Economic governance: common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit in the euro area. 'Two pack'"
(b)	Legislation strengthening the decision-making powers of the European Commission and increasing implementation demands imposed on national authorities	"Environment: implementation of the Community law, minimal criteria for inspections"
(c)	Legislation extending the inclusiveness of EU policies and increasing the extent to which constituencies can influence them	"Socrates programme: including Turkey as a beneficiary country"
(d)	Legislation creating a new agency or supranational institution with a set of competences	"Maritime safety: creation of a European Agency, package Erika II"
(e)	Legislation introducing minimum requirements, mandatory labelling requirements or other rules in an area where the minimum requirements were not set at the EU-level before, whether related to a new category of products or a new sector	"Transport of dangerous goods by road, inland waterways or rail: examination requirements for safety advisers"
(f)	Legislation introducing a new line of activity with a new budget, including in developing countries	"Combating Aids, malaria and tuberculosis: research partnership Europe/developing countries"

Table B4: Descriptive statistics

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Priority	8,098	0.09	0.29	0	1
Public issue salience	6,557	2.87	4.75	0	25.38
Public issue salience (log transformed)	6,557	0.77	1.02	0	3.27
Government issue salience	7,749	2.32	1.43	0.84	7.30
Public Euroscepticism	8,098	14.63	2.18	10.4	18.5
Eurosceptic vote share	8,098	4.34	1.73	1.52	6.94
National elections	8,098	2.71	1.49	0.58	5.71
EU expansion	8,098	0.45	0.50	0	1
Redistribution	8,098	0.40	0.49	0	1
Complexity (original)	8,093	21.53	20.54	1	284
Complexity (log transformed)	8,093	2.76	0.80	0	5.65
Distance	8,098	0.59	0.39	0.11	1.69
Final year	8,098	0.19	0.39	0	1
Prodi Commission	8,098	0.24	0.43	0	1
Barroso I Commission	8,098	0.25	0.44	0	1
Barroso II Commission	8,098	0.28	0.45	0	1
Juncker Commission	8,098	0.22	0.42	0	1

Table B5: Correlation matrix: Independent and control variables

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)
(a) Public issue salience	1													
(b) Government issue salience	0.07*	1												
(c) Public Euroscepticism	-0.03†	-0.32*	1											
(d) Eurosceptic vote share	0.05*	0.34*	-0.49*	1										
(e) National elections	-0.00	-0.01	0.37*	-0.11*	1									
(f) EU expansion	0.18*	0.07*	-0.07*	0.10*	0.01	1								
(g) Redistribution	0.04*	0.21*	-0.03†	0.09*	0.01	0.21*	1							
(h) Complexity	0.19*	-0.03†	0.13*	-0.00	-0.01	0.38*	0.18*	1						
(i) Euclidean distance	0.03†	0.40*	-0.53*	0.71*	0.08*	0.09*	0.05*	-0.11*	1					
(j) Final year	0.00	-0.01	-0.31*	0.11*	-0.58*	-0.01	-0.03†	0.02^	-0.17*	1				
(k) Prodi Commission	-0.00	0.44*	-0.67*	0.69*	-0.05*	0.07*	0.08*	-0.16*	0.72*	0.02^	1			
(l) Barroso I Commission	-0.04*	-0.08*	-0.04*	-0.44*	0.01	-0.09*	-0.12*	-0.14*	-0.16*	0.02^	-0.33*	1		
(m) Barroso II Commission	-0.06*	-0.16*	0.55*	-0.51*	0.07*	-0.06*	-0.00	0.06*	-0.40*	0.01	-0.35*	-0.37*	1	
(n) Juncker Commission	0.11*	-0.19*	0.14*	0.30*	-0.03*	0.08*	0.05*	0.24*	-0.34*	-0.06*	-0.30*	-0.31*	-0.34*	1

Notes: Pearson r correlations for continuous variables; Spearman rho correlations for other relations; ^p<0.1; †p<0.05, *p<0.01

C. Additional models and robustness checks

Table C1: Explaining the Commission's legislative priorities, one-way clustering

	Model 1	Model 2
Public issue salience	0.24 (0.06)***	0.23 (0.05)***
Government issue salience	0.07 (0.08)	
Public Euroscepticism	0.30 (0.20)	
Eurosceptic vote share	0.04 (0.24)	
National elections	-0.24 (0.13)*	-0.29 (0.06)***
EU expansion	0.61 (0.21)***	0.60 (0.17)***
Redistribution	0.00 (0.17)	
Complexity	0.59 (0.06)***	0.62 (0.06)***
Distance	2.03 (1.01)**	1.95 (0.90)**
Final year	1.07 (0.88)	
Commission		
Barroso I	1.53 (0.60)***	1.70 (0.39)***
Barroso II	0.49 (0.97)	1.45 (0.50)***
Juncker	2.69 (0.42)***	3.08 (0.12)***
Constant	-11.85 (3.21)***	-7.13 (0.76)***
N	6,293	6,556
Log-pseudolikelihood	-1491.50	-1534.84
Wald χ^2	4121.17***	1207.89***
Pseudo-R^2	0.25	0.24

Notes: Logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by period; *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table C2: Explaining the Commission's legislative priorities, using alternative operationalisations of public issue salience (based on Model 4)

	Model 1	Model 2
Public issue salience (unweighted)	0.22 (0.06)***	
Public issue salience (Big Four)		0.24 (0.07)***
Government issue salience	0.06 (0.09)	0.09 (0.08)
Public Euroscepticism	0.30 (0.20)	0.30 (0.20)
Eurosceptic vote share	0.04 (0.23)	0.03 (0.24)
National elections	-0.24 (0.12)*	-0.23 (0.12)*
EU expansion	0.62 (0.22)***	0.61 (0.22)***
Redistribution	-0.01 (0.18)	0.01 (0.18)
Complexity	0.60 (0.08)***	0.59 (0.08)***
Distance	2.02 (1.00)**	2.04 (1.00)**
Final year	1.07 (0.88)	1.08 (0.88)
Commission		
Barroso I	1.53 (0.60)**	1.54 (0.61)**
Barroso II	0.49 (0.98)	0.50 (0.98)
Juncker	2.69 (0.42)***	2.71 (0.42)***
Constant	-11.80 (3.19)***	-11.87 (3.22)***
N	6,293	6,293
Log-pseudolikelihood	-1494.18	-1491.96
Wald χ^2	2974.62***	2925.44***
Pseudo-R^2	0.24	0.25

Notes: Logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by period and legislative file. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed)

Table C3: Explaining the Commission's legislative priorities, using alternative operationalisations of party issue salience (based on Model 4)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Public issue salience	0.23 (0.07)***	0.24 (0.07)***	0.23 (0.07)***	0.23 (0.07)***
Government issue salience (unweighted)	0.02 (0.03)			
Government issue salience (Big Four)		0.02 (0.03)		
Government issue salience (Council Presidency)			0.03 (0.02)	
Parliament issue salience				0.09 (0.08)
Public Euroscepticism	0.30 (0.20)	0.30 (0.20)	0.29 (0.19)	0.30 (0.20)
Eurosceptic vote share	0.04 (0.24)	0.04 (0.24)	0.04 (0.23)	0.04 (0.23)
National elections	-0.24 (0.13)*	-0.24 (0.13)*	-0.24 (0.12)*	-0.24 (0.12)*
EU expansion	0.61 (0.22)***	0.61 (0.22)***	0.61 (0.22)***	0.61 (0.22)***
Redistribution	0.02 (0.18)	0.02 (0.18)	-0.00 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.18)
Complexity	0.59 (0.08)***	0.59 (0.08)***	0.59 (0.07)***	0.59 (0.08)***
Distance	2.04 (1.00)**	2.04 (1.00)**	2.02 (1.00)**	2.02 (1.00)**
Final year	1.06 (0.88)	1.06 (0.88)	1.02 (0.86)	1.08 (0.87)
Commission				
Barroso I	1.44 (0.59)**	1.44 (0.59)**	1.35 (0.59)**	1.56 (0.59)***
Barroso II	0.39 (0.96)	0.38 (0.96)	0.33 (0.94)	0.50 (0.96)
Juncker	2.58 (0.37)***	2.57 (0.37)***	2.53 (0.36)***	2.72 (0.40)***
Constant	-11.70 (3.24)***	-11.71 (3.25)***	-11.59 (3.13)***	-11.98 (3.19)***
N	6,293	6,293	6,293	6,293
Log-pseudolikelihood	-1492.12	-1492.19	-1489.89	-1490.24
Wald χ^2	3148.32***	2937.28***	2913.60***	2683.03***
Pseudo-R^2	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.25

Notes: Logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by period and legislative file. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed)

Table C4: Explaining the Commission's legislative priorities, using a more restricted public issue salience operationalisation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Public issue salience	0.43 (0.07)***	0.45 (0.08)***	0.33 (0.10)***	0.31 (0.07)***
Government issue salience	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)	0.05 (0.09)	
Public Euroscepticism		-0.01 (0.12)	0.35 (0.21)	
Eurosceptic vote share		0.60 (0.20)***	0.12 (0.24)	
National elections			-0.24 (0.15)	
EU expansion			0.64 (0.25)**	0.60 (0.21)***
Redistribution			0.07 (0.18)	
Complexity			0.51 (0.11)***	0.54 (0.10)***
Distance			2.01 (0.96)**	2.50 (1.21)**
Final year			1.13 (0.96)	
Commission				
Barroso I	0.55 (0.23)**	2.63 (0.71)***	1.64 (0.57)***	1.46 (0.42)**
Barroso II	0.25 (0.39)	2.35 (0.98)**	0.35 (1.02)	1.18 (0.67)*
Juncker	2.43 (0.49)***	3.33 (0.76)***	2.56 (0.39)***	2.92 (0.36)***
Constant	-4.20 (0.19)***	-8.11 (2.09)***	-12.79 (3.71)***	-7.85 (1.00)***
N	5,069	5,069	5,068	5,315
Log-pseudolikelihood	-1322.05	-1264.39	-1167.52	-1240.94
Wald χ^2	129.89***	166.59***	4589.80***	520.66***
Pseudo-R^2	0.17	0.20	0.26	0.23

Notes: Logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by period and legislative file.
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed)

Table C5: Explaining the Commission's legislative priorities, using media attention instead of public issue salience

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Media attention	0.55 (0.09)***	0.56 (0.09)***	0.40 (0.11)***	0.38 (0.11)***
Government issue salience	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	
Public Euroscepticism		-0.04 (0.10)	0.22 (0.17)	
Eurosceptic vote share		0.51 (0.19)***	0.19 (0.20)	
National elections			-0.33 (0.11)***	-0.32 (0.07)***
EU expansion			0.58 (0.20)***	0.53 (0.19)***
Redistribution			-0.17 (0.14)	
Complexity			0.53 (0.07)***	0.54 (0.07)***
Distance			1.36 (0.67)**	1.36 (0.61)**
Final year			0.44 (0.72)	
Commission				
Barroso I	-0.35 (0.34)**	1.51 (0.70)**	1.01 (0.75)	0.62 (0.67)
Barroso II	-0.48 (0.47)	1.51 (0.86)*	0.20 (1.06)	0.40 (0.70)
Juncker	1.74 (0.51)***	2.62 (0.61)***	2.09 (0.62)***	2.24 (0.51)***
Constant	-3.13 (0.32)***	-6.09 (1.91)***	-9.76 (2.52)***	-5.42 (1.01)***
N	7,745	7,745	7,740	8,089
Log-pseudolikelihood	-2063.33	-2002.89	-1878.45	-1962.38
Wald χ^2	97.04***	103.40***	255.91***	222.83***
Pseudo-R^2	0.13	0.16	0.21	0.20

Notes: Logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by period and legislative file.
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed)

Table C6: Explaining legislative priorities, excluding 'straightforward' files†

	Model 1	Model 2
Public issue salience	0.22 (0.06)***	0.22 (0.05)***
Government issue salience	0.08 (0.09)	
Public Euroscepticism	0.32 (0.21)	
Eurosceptic vote share	0.04 (0.24)	
National elections	-0.24 (0.13)*	-0.30 (0.06)***
EU expansion	0.51 (0.21)**	0.52 (0.18)***
Redistribution	-0.11 (0.19)	
Complexity	0.57 (0.08)***	0.60 (0.08)***
Distance	1.95 (1.01)*	1.89 (0.93)**
Final year	1.12 (0.91)	
Commission		
Barroso I	1.53 (0.61)**	1.70 (0.40)***
Barroso II	0.42 (1.00)	1.43 (0.51)***
Juncker	2.69 (0.42)***	3.09 (0.13)***
Constant	-11.79 (3.34)***	-6.89 (0.81)***
N	5,441	5,702
Log-pseudolikelihood	-1426.82	-1473.39
Wald χ^2	2609.86***	995.58***
Pseudo-R^2	0.24	0.23

Notes: Logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by period and legislative file; *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed).

†We include in this category files repealing existing legislation, files adapting the procedure to the new Comitology system or other institutional reform, and codification files.

Table C7: The effect of government issue salience on prioritisation, excluding public issue salience

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Government issue salience	0.08 (0.05)	0.10 (0.06)*	0.10 (0.06)*
Public Euroscepticism			0.22 (0.17)
Eurosceptic vote share			0.20 (0.20)
National elections		-0.28 (0.08)***	-0.33 (0.11)***
EU expansion		0.59 (0.18)***	0.62 (0.19)***
Redistribution		-0.10 (0.14)	-0.10 (0.14)
Complexity		0.61 (0.07)***	0.60 (0.07)***
Distance		1.39 (0.57)**	1.34 (0.66)**
Final year		0.16 (0.36)	0.42 (0.71)
Commission			
Barroso I	-0.32 (0.34)	0.88 (0.62)	1.05 (0.73)
Barroso II	-0.48 (0.46)	0.60 (0.66)	0.17 (1.05)
Juncker	1.65 (0.51)***	2.39 (0.50)***	1.97 (0.62)***
Constant	-2.95 (0.31)***	-5.99 (0.98)***	-9.85 (2.53)***
N	7,749	7,744	7,744
Log-pseudolikelihood	-2107.38	-1918.81	-1900.31
Wald χ^2	22.19***	302.45***	258.75***
Pseudo-R^2	0.11	0.19	0.20

Notes: Logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by period and legislative file. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed)

Table C8: Explaining legislative priorities, using change in Euroscepticism

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Public issue salience		0.33 (0.07)***	0.26 (0.06)***	0.22 (0.06)***
Government issue salience		0.04 (0.07)	0.03 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)
Public Euroscepticism (change)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.17 (0.09)*	
Eurosceptic vote share (change)	2.15 (1.30)*	2.24 (1.48)		1.82 (1.77)
National elections			-0.16 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.13)
EU expansion			0.56 (0.24)**	0.57 (0.20)***
Redistribution			0.12 (0.16)	-0.00 (0.18)
Complexity			0.60 (0.09)***	0.60 (0.08)***
Distance			1.15 (1.69)	1.73 (0.97)*
Final year			0.74 (0.80)	0.67 (0.52)
Commission				
Barroso I	-0.53 (0.34)	-0.23 (0.35)	1.08 (1.22)	1.71 (0.40)***
Barroso II	-0.88 (0.48)*	-0.64 (0.51)	0.85 (1.21)	1.19 (0.44)***
Juncker	0.74 (0.42)*	0.95 (0.48)*	2.30 (1.31)*	3.02 (0.36)***
Constant	-2.53 (0.29)***	-3.15 (0.36)***	-6.72 (1.91)***	-7.53 (0.88)***
N	7,825	6,026	6,025	6,293
Log-pseudolikelihood	-1871.26	-1388.91	-1321.82	-1504.30
Wald χ^2	65.65***	178.60***	817.98***	5210.86***
Pseudo-R^2	0.08	0.12	0.16	0.24

Notes: Logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by period and legislative file.
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed)