Supplementary Materials

for Andreas Dür, Robert A. Huber, and Yannick Stiller, It's Trade, Stupid! How Changes in Trade Competitiveness Affect Incumbents' Electoral Success, *EJPR*.

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A Descriptive statistics

The study at hand includes Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Mongolia, Peru, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Uruguay.

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Change in vote share	3254	-0.04	0.12	-0.68	0.69
Decreasing STC	2681	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
Stable STC	2681	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Increasing STC	2681	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00
Clarity of responsibility high	3590	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00
Political Ideology Far-Left	3321	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00
Political Ideology Left	3321	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Political Ideology Center	3321	0.14	0.34	0.00	1.00
Political Ideology Right	3321	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
Political Ideology Far-Right	3321	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00

Table A1: Descriptive statistics of variables

B Complementary regression tables

Table B1: Hypothesis 1: Binned Δ STC and Δ incumbent vote share

	Model 1
Δ STC Stable	2.67 (0.53)***
Δ STC Increase	1.84 (0.47)***
(Intercept)	−6.87 (1.21)***
AIC	18530.70
BIC	18565.64
Log Likelihood	−9259.35
N	2498
Group: Parties	79
Group: Country	29
Var. Party	26.78
Var. Country	25.13
Var. Residuals	89.93

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Table B2: Hypothesis 2: Binned Δ STC, clarity of responsibility, and Δ incumbent vote share

	Model 2
Δ STC Stable	0.84 (0.65)
Δ STC Increase	0.81 (0.58)
Clarity of responsibility: High	−0.79 (1.03)
Δ STC Stable × Clarity of responsibility: High	5.15 (1.11)***
Δ STC Stable × Clarity of responsibility: High	2.95 (1.00)***
(Intercept)	−6.69 (1.28)***
AIC	18503.78
BIC	18556.19
Log Likelihood	−9242.89
N	2498
Group: Parties	79
Group: Country	29
Var. Party	25.81
Var. Country	26.51
Var. Residuals	89.04

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Table B3: Hypothesis 2: Binned Δ STC, political ideology, and Δ incumbent vote share

	Model 3
Δ STC Stable	1.55 (1.47)
Δ STC Increase	0.24 (1.35)
Ideology: Left-wing	0.33 (2.93)
Ideology: Center	−0.82 (3.44)
Ideology: Right-wing	2.87 (3.33)
Ideology: Far-right	1.60 (2.89)
Δ STC Stable × LW	−0.37 (1.81)
Δ STC Increase × LW	2.89 (1.62)*
Δ STC Stable × Center	5.90 (1.96)***
Δ STC Increase × Center	2.56 (1.88)
Δ STC Stable × RW	0.38 (2.03)
Δ STC Increase × RW	0.65 (1.85)
Δ STC Stable × FR	0.78 (1.82)
Δ STC Increase × FR	1.07 (1.62)
(Intercept)	−7.28 (2.61)***
AIC	17309.31
BIC	17412.93
Log Likelihood	−8636.65
N	2338
Group: Parties	70
Group: Country	28
Var. Party	27.99
Var. Country	21.53
Var. Residuals	89.61

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model. Standard errors in brackets.

C Alternative operationalisation of dependent variable

The main dependent variable captures the change in percentage points of incumbents' electoral results from $t-1$ to t. In order to test the robustness of these findings, we replace the absolute change in electoral results with the relative change, that is $\frac{VS_t - VS_{t-1}}{VS_{t-1}}$, where VS represents the vote share and t indicates the time point. In other words, a five percentage point loss results in a value of -0.125 for a party that had 40 percent at $t-1$ but -0.5 for a party that had 10 percent at $t-1$. Tables C1 to C3 provide the regression tables and figures C1 and C2 visualise the results for the interaction effects.

The results correspond with those reported in the paper. According to Table C1, incumbents with stable or increasing STC fare substantially better than those facing decreases in subnational trade competitiveness. Specifically, a decrease is on average associated with a loss of more than a fifth of the incumbent's electoral support (or -22.02 percent). Figure C1 suggests that changes in STC mostly affect the incumbent's fate when the clarity of responsibility is high (also see Table C2). Finally, Figure C2 shows that centrist parties are most affected by STC changes. In contrast to the main results, we observe a slightly more pronounced effect of right-wing ideology, in line with Hypothesis 3. Overall, these findings add support to our argument.

Table C1: Robustness check for hypothesis 1: Alternative dependent variable

	Model 1
Δ STC Stable	10.89 (2.33)***
Δ STC Increase	7.20 (2.09)***
(Intercept)	−22.02 (4.16)***
AIC	25956.19
BIC	25991.13
Log Likelihood	−12972.09
N	2498
Group: Parties	79
Group: Country	29
Var. Party	731.38
Var. Country	112.23
Var. Residuals	1763.25

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Figure C1: Robustness check for hypothesis 2: Alternative dependent variable



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 2 in Table C2.

Table C2: Robustness check for hypothesis 2: Alternative dependent variable

	Model 2
Δ STC Stable	4.16 (2.87)
Δ STC Increase	3.88 (2.56)
Clarity of responsibility: High	0.73 (4.52)
Δ STC Stable × Clarity of responsibility: High	18.77 (4.91)***
Δ STC Stable × Clarity of responsibility: High	9.34 (4.44)**
(Intercept)	−22.12 (4.42)***
AIC	25925.08
BIC	25977.49
Log Likelihood	−12953.54
N	2498
Group: Parties	79
Group: Country	29
Var. Party	688.30
Var. Country	124.69
Var. Residuals	1750.65

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Figure C2: Robustness check for hypothesis 3: Alternative dependent variable



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 3 in Table C3.

Table C3: Robustness check for hypothesis 3: Alternative dependent variable

	Model 3
Δ STC Stable	5.31 (6.67)
Δ STC Increase	5.38 (6.08)
Ideology: Left-wing	4.48 (12.73)
Ideology: Center	−0.76 (15.52)
Ideology: Right-wing	5.65 (14.09)
Ideology: Far-right	4.07 (13.01)
Δ STC Stable × LW	−4.80 (8.16)
Δ STC Increase × LW	3.80 (7.33)
Δ STC Stable × Center	23.50 (8.88)***
Δ STC Increase × Center	3.38 (8.50)
Δ STC Stable × RW	14.21 (9.19)
Δ STC Increase × RW	6.07 (8.35)
Δ STC Stable × FR	3.44 (8.23)
Δ STC Increase × FR	−2.57 (7.32)
(Intercept)	−23.00 (10.92)**
AIC	24309.22
BIC	24412.85
Log Likelihood	−12136.61
N	2338
Group: Parties	70
Group: Country	28
Var. Party	710.55
Var. Country	0.00
Var. Residuals	1833.11

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

D Alternative measures of STC

Huber, Stiller, and Dür (2023) present four different measures, two of which (Trade Balance and Net) account for both imports and exports. The Symmetric and Additive STC entirely focus on exports, following (Balassa 1965). In this section of the Appendix, we replicate the main-text findings for the three measures not used in the main part. Tables D1 to D3 contain the relevant estimates and Figures D1 and D2 replicate Figures 1 and 2.

We generally observe a similar tendency across all measures. However, measures that account for both exports and imports show (on average) stronger effects. This may speak to the overall importance of import-competition when understanding the globalization-related effects of economic voting.

Table D1: Robustness check for hypothesis 1: Alternative STC measures

	Net STC	Sym. STC	Add. STC
Δ STC Stable	1.76***	1.18**	0.91
	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.55)
Δ STC Increase	0.97**	0.44	0.80*
	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)
(Intercept)	−6.22***	−5.83***	−5.92***
	(1.21)	(1.21)	(1.22)
AIC	18546.84	18552.68	18554.32
BIC	18581.78	18587.62	18589.26
Log Likelihood	−9267.42	−9270.34	−9271.16
N	2498	2498	2498
Group: Parties	79	79	79
Group: Country	29	29	29
Var. Party	26.37	26.37	26.28
Var. Country	25.24	25.59	25.53
Var. Residuals	90.56	90.77	90.84

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Table D3: Robustness check for hypothesis: 3: Alternative STC measures

	Net STC	Sym. STC	Add. STC
Δ STC Stable	1.76	0.13	−1.59

	Net STC	Sym. STC	Add. STC
	(1.47)	(1.47)	(1.58)
Δ STC Increase	0.89	−1.81	−2.64**
	(1.32)	(1.33)	(1.33)
Ideology: Left-wing	1.38	−0.15	−2.05
	(2.88)	(2.89)	(2.90)
Ideology: Center	0.30	−1.07	−1.48
	(3.40)	(3.39)	(3.41)
Ideology: Right-wing	3.93	1.89	0.54
	(3.26)	(3.28)	(3.29)
Ideology: Far-right	2.74	1.85	1.03
	(2.85)	(2.84)	(2.87)
Δ STC Stable × LW	−1.09	0.49	3.19*
	(1.81)	(1.81)	(1.91)
Δ STC Increase × LW	1.05	3.64**	5.70***
	(1.60)	(1.61)	(1.61)
Δ STC Stable × Center	3.78*	4.84**	6.28***
	(1.98)	(1.96)	(2.14)
Δ STC Increase × Center	1.40	4.17**	4.26**
	(1.86)	(1.85)	(1.82)
Δ STC Stable × RW	−1.15	1.31	2.82
	(2.01)	(2.03)	(2.10)
Δ STC Increase × RW	−0.58	2.47	4.21**
	(1.81)	(1.84)	(1.83)
Δ STC Stable × FR	−0.54	−0.19	0.94
	(1.82)	(1.79)	(1.91)
Δ STC Increase × FR	−0.69	1.08	2.00
	(1.60)	(1.60)	(1.63)
(Intercept)	−7.62***	−5.99**	−4.99*
	(2.56)	(2.57)	(2.59)
AIC	17337.55	17339.79	17334.91
BIC	17441.17	17443.41	17438.54
Log Likelihood	−8650.77	−8651.89	−8649.46
N	2338	2338	2338
Group: Parties	70	70	70
Group: Country	28	28	28
Var. Party	27.53	27.25	27.11
Var. Country	21.15	21.91	22.24
Var. Residuals	90.77	90.86	90.68

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Table D2: Robustness check for hypothesis: 2: Alternative STC measures

	Net STC	Sym. STC	Add. STC
Δ STC Stable	0.84	0.42	−0.46
	(0.65)	(0.64)	(0.67)
Δ STC Increase	0.65	0.27	0.04
	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.58)
Clarity of responsibility: High	0.96	1.33	−0.15
	(1.03)	(1.03)	(1.07)
Δ STC Stable × Clarity of responsibility: High	2.56**	2.20**	4.03***
	(1.11)	(1.10)	(1.18)
Δ STC Stable × Clarity of responsibility: High	0.85	0.40	2.21**
	(0.99)	(1.00)	(1.01)
(Intercept)	−6.61***	−6.36***	−5.96***
	(1.27)	(1.28)	(1.28)
AIC	18535.81	18542.09	18536.90
BIC	18588.22	18594.50	18589.31
Log Likelihood	−9258.90	−9262.05	−9259.45
N	2498	2498	2498
Group: Parties	79	79	79
Group: Country	29	29	29
Var. Party	25.34	25.27	24.94
Var. Country	26.29	26.65	27.09
Var. Residuals	90.26	90.49	90.32

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Figure D1: Robustness check for hypothesis 2: Alternative STC measures



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 2 in Table D2.

Figure D2: Robustness check for hypothesis 3: Alternative STC measures



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 3 in Table D3.

E Robustness check: Continuous measure of STC

In the main paper, we use a binned variant of the continuous STC change. As outlined in the research design, the groups are formed by considering half of a standard deviation around the country mean as stable. More negative values are considered a decrease and more positive values are considered an increase.

To test the robustness of our findings, we use the continuous measure of STC changes in this Appendix section. To account for the potentially non-linear nature of the relationship between changes in subnational trade competitiveness and changes in electoral results we also add the square of STC changes. Table E1 shows the regression results for hypotheses 1 to 3.

Starting with Hypothesis 1, in Figure E1 we observe a slight upwards trend across levels of STC change. Importantly, the average marginal effect of STC changes is statistically significant (estimated at 3.75 and significant at the 5 percent level). The findings also show that incumbents, on average, lose substantially. Figure E1 replicates Figure 1 from the main text. We observe similar results. In line with Hypothesis 2, the effect of change in STC is driven by countries with a high degree of clarity of responsibility. Finally, Figure E2 provides evidence in line with Hypothesis 3 in the sense that economically right parties are the ones that most benefit from higher values on change in STC.

Figure E1: Robustness check for hypotheses 1: Continuous measure of STC



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 1 in Table E1.

Figure E2: Robustness check for hypothesis 2: Continuous measure of STC



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 2 in Table E1.

Table E1: Robustness check for hypotheses 1-3: Continuous measure of STC

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Δ STC	3.79 (1.58)**	−0.95 (1.83)	4.34 (3.78)
Δ STC sq	−6.24 (4.06)	−7.18 (4.48)	2.57 (9.71)
Ideology: Left-wing			2.01 (2.71)
Ideology: Center			2.13 (3.23)
Ideology: Right-wing			3.67 (3.06)
Ideology: Far-right			2.50 (2.66)
Clarity of responsibility: High		1.93 (0.79)**	
Δ STC × Clarity: High		17.72 (3.56)***	
Δ STC sq × Clarity: High		5.89 (9.90)	
Δ STC × LW			−1.86 (4.75)
Δ STC × Center			−0.65 (4.77)
Δ STC × RW			15.53 (8.94)*
Δ STC × FR			13.74 (7.94)*
Δ STC sq × LW			−22.56 (11.68)*
Δ STC sq × Center			1.01 (12.18)
Δ STC sq × RW			−39.32 (47.48)
Δ STC sq × FR			−39.05 (39.89)
(Intercept)	−5.23 (1.17)***	−6.00 (1.22)***	−6.89 (2.45)***
AIC	18541.87	18504.24	17296.07
BIC	18576.81	18556.65	17399.70
Log Likelihood	−9264.94	−9243.12	−8630.04
N	2498	2498	2338
Group: Parties	79	79	70
Group: Country	29	29	28
Var. Party	26.55	25.81	27.34
Var. Country	25.57	26.52	22.06
Var. Residuals	90.61	89.58	90.72

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Figure E3: Robustness check for hypotheses 3: Continuous measure of STC



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 3 in Table E1.

F Interaction with levels of STC

In a further check we contemplate the possibility that deprived regions may react differently to changes in STC. To this end, we also include the STC *level* at $t-1$ and interact it with the STC change variable outlined in the main models. Tables F1 to F3 show the regression results, while Figures F1 to F3 visualise the interaction terms.

Starting with Hypothesis 1, Table F1 returns two non-significant interaction terms. In other words, the relationship of STC change and incumbent vote shares is not conditional on prior levels of STC. Figure F1 confirms this impression. The three colours represent different prior STC levels, namely a low level (-0.25 in red, which amounts to roughly equivalent to two standard deviations below the average level; 0 in green, which is the average level; and 0.25 in blue). We do not observe a meaningful difference between the three ranges for both STC change levels.

Moving on to hypothesis 2, Figure F2 and the corresponding Table F2 suggest that (in the presence of high clarity of responsibility) the relationship between a stable STC and incumbent votes is particularly strong when prior STC levels are low or average. For STC increases, we see this to a lesser extent. Finally, Figure F3 (for ideology) does not show strong differences in point estimates across various prior STC levels (also see Table F3 and the absence of significant interaction terms). All in all, we consider this evidence in line with the expectations outlined in the main-text.

Table F3: Robustness check for hypothesis 3: Interaction with absolute levels of STC

	Model 3
Subnational trade competitiveness	−1.47 (5.29)
Δ STC Stable	1.63 (1.51)
Δ STC Increase	0.23 (1.37)
Ideology: Left-wing	0.26 (2.96)
Ideology: Center	−1.14 (3.48)
Ideology: Right-wing	2.51 (3.36)
Ideology: Far-right	1.46 (2.91)
STC × Δ STC	7.85 (8.05)
STC × Δ STC sq	0.96 (7.47)
STC × LW	0.16 (8.22)
STC × Center	5.05 (8.32)
STC × RW	7.79 (10.81)
STC × FR	2.26 (8.71)

	Model 3
Δ STC Stable × LW	−0.56 (1.87)
Δ STC Stable × Center	6.69 (2.05)***
Δ STCS table × RW	0.56 (2.11)
Δ STC Stable × FR	0.38 (1.87)
Δ STC Increase × LW	2.73 (1.68)
Δ STC Increase × Center	2.86 (1.92)
Δ STC Increase × RW	0.94 (1.91)
Δ STC Increase × FR	1.16 (1.65)
STC × Δ STC × LW	−7.75 (11.24)
STC × Δ STC × Center	0.04 (11.86)
STC × Δ STC × RW	−0.66 (17.53)
STC × Δ STC × FR	−21.86 (12.73)*
STC × Δ STC Increase × LW	5.19 (10.39)
STC × Δ STC Increase × Center	−6.90 (12.05)
STC × Δ STC Increase × RW	−10.55 (14.68)
STC × Δ STC Increase × FR	−6.81 (10.96)
(Intercept)	−7.18 (2.63)***
AIC	17241.13
BIC	17431.12
Log Likelihood	−8587.57
Num. obs.	2338
Num. groups: partyid	70
Num. groups: country_short	28
Var: partyid (Intercept)	27.93
Var: country_short (Intercept)	21.52
Var: Residual	89.59

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Table F1: Robustness check for hypothesis 1: Interaction with absolute levels of STC

	Model 1
Previous STC level	1.14 (2.67)
Δ STC Stable	2.76 (0.55)***
Δ STC Increase	1.90 (0.49)***
Previous STC level $\times\Delta$ STC Stable	0.27 (3.74)
Previous STC level $\times\Delta$ STC Increase	-0.93 (3.37)
(Intercept)	-6.92 (1.22)***
AIC	18525.39
BIC	18577.80
Log Likelihood	-9253.70
N	2498
Group: Parties	79
Group: Country	29
Var. Party	26.79
Var. Country	25.07
Var. Residuals	90.03

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Figure F1: Robustness check for hypothesis 1: Interaction with absolute levels of STC



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 1 in Table F1.

Figure F2: Robustness check for hypothesis 2: Interaction with absolute levels of STC



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 2 in Table F2.

Table F2: Robustness check for hypothesis 2: Interaction with absolute levels of STC

	Model 2
Previous STC level	−0.91 (3.14)
Δ STC Stable	0.95 (0.68)
Δ STC Increase	0.80 (0.59)
Clarity of responsibility: High	−1.05 (1.07)
Previous STC level ×Δ STC Stable	4.86 (4.41)
Previous STC level ×Δ STC Increase	0.04 (4.17)
Previous STC level × Clarity of responsibility: High	7.52 (5.87)
Δ STC Stable × Clarity of responsibility: High	5.28 (1.15)***
Δ STC Increase × Clarity of responsibility: High	3.24 (1.04)***
Previous STC level ×Δ STC Stable × Clarity: High	−20.50 (8.18)**
Previous STC level ×Δ STC Increase × Clarity: High	−5.20 (7.18)
(Intercept)	−6.70 (1.29)***
AIC	18482.10
BIC	18569.45
Log Likelihood	−9226.05
Num. obs.	2498
Num. groups: partyid	79
Num. groups: country_short	29
Var: partyid (Intercept)	25.37
Var: country_short (Intercept)	26.86
Var: Residual	89.00

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Figure F3: Robustness check for hypothesis 3: Interaction with absolute levels of STC



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 3 in Table F3.

G Interaction with the size of tradable sectors

The analyses in the main-text investigated the effect of STC change in general. We argue that the effect is due to citizens perceiving these changes and then punishing incumbents in elections. Plausibly, this effect should be stronger when the size of the tradable sector is larger in a region. We define the tradable sector as all goods sectors as well as tradable service sectors (namely financial services, insurance services, and information services). We thereby follow the classification from Huber, Stiller, and Dür (2023). To operationalize this, we took the share of workers employed in the tradable sector in a region.

To investigate whether the effect of STC change is stronger when the tradable sector is larger, we interact the tradable sector size at $t-1$ and interact it with the STC change variable outlined in the main models. Tables G1 to G3 show the regression results, while Figures G1 to G3 visualise the interaction terms.

Starting with Hypothesis 1, Table G1 returns two positive and statistically significant interaction terms. In other words, the relationship of STC change and incumbent vote shares is strongly conditional on the sector share. Figure G1 confirms this impression. The three colours represent different tradable sector shares: a low level (0.1 in red, which is roughly equivalent to 1.5 standard deviations below the average level of 0.3), the average level (0.3, in green), and a high level (0.5, in blue).[8] While we do not observe an effect of STC change on the electoral results when the tradable sector is very small, we observe a strong effect when the tradable sector is large.

Moving on to Hypothesis 2, Figure G2 and the corresponding Table G2 again suggest that the relationship between a stable STC and incumbent votes is particularly strong when the tradable sector is large. Finally, Figure G3 also shows the moderating effect of tradable sector size. In general, our results are driven by regions with average or large tradable sectors. All in all, the findings concerning the moderating effect of tradable sector size provide additional strong evidence in line with the underlying theoretical model.

Table G3: Robustness check for hypothesis 3: Interaction with tradable sector size

	Model 3
Size of trabable sector	27.28 (9.89)***
Δ STC Stable	5.60 (4.34)
Δ STC Increase	5.99 (4.14)
Ideology: Left-wing	10.43 (4.63)**
Ideology: Center	15.09 (5.22)***

[8]Note the precise values for the mean are 0.32, and the standard deviation is 0.16.

	Model 3
Ideology: Right-wing	6.31 (5.62)
Ideology: Far-right	6.15 (4.94)
Tradable size × Δ STC	−12.86 (12.21)
Tradable size × Δ STC sq	−17.96 (12.04)
Tradable size × LW	−31.74 (11.03)***
Tradable size × Center	−44.50 (11.38)***
Tradable size × RW	−6.83 (16.14)
Tradable size × FR	−12.70 (13.34)
Δ STC Stable × LW	−4.81 (4.94)
Δ STC Stable × Center	−14.95 (5.24)***
Δ STCS table × RW	−0.51 (5.87)
Δ STC Stable × FR	−1.63 (5.28)
Δ STC Increase × LW	−7.34 (4.59)
Δ STC Increase × Center	−9.86 (5.15)*
Δ STC Increase × RW	−2.39 (5.56)
Δ STC Increase × FR	−1.71 (4.92)
Tradable size × Δ STC × LW	14.14 (13.81)
Tradable size × Δ STC × Center	52.61 (13.72)***
Tradable size × Δ STC × RW	−0.35 (19.64)
Tradable size × Δ STC × FR	7.02 (16.57)
Tradable size × Δ STC Increase × LW	31.48 (13.18)**
Tradable size × Δ STC Increase × Center	33.29 (14.00)**
Tradable size × Δ STC Increase × RW	6.09 (18.44)
Tradable size × Δ STC Increase × FR	6.36 (15.49)
(Intercept)	−15.93 (4.16)***
AIC	17185.85
BIC	17375.83
Log Likelihood	−8559.92
Num. obs.	2338
Num. groups: partyid	70
Num. groups: country_short	28
Var: partyid (Intercept)	28.99
Var: country_short (Intercept)	24.54
Var: Residual	87.45

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Table G1: Robustness check for hypothesis 1: Interaction with absolute levels of STC

	Model 1
Size of trabable sector	−3.53 (2.96)
Δ STC Stable	−2.04 (1.19)*
Δ STC Increase	−1.32 (1.11)
Size of trabable sector ×Δ STC Stable	15.15 (3.42)***
Size of trabable sector ×Δ STC Increase	10.06 (3.28)***
(Intercept)	−5.86 (1.56)***
AIC	18498.43
BIC	18550.84
Log Likelihood	−9240.22
N	2498
Group: Parties	79
Group: Country	29
Var. Party	26.40
Var. Country	27.95
Var. Residuals	89.01

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Figure G1: Robustness check for hypothesis 1: Interaction with tradable sector size



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 1 in Table G1.

Figure G2: Robustness check for hypothesis 2: Interaction with tradable sector size



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 2 in Table G2.

Table G2: Robustness check for hypothesis 2: Interaction with tradable sector size

	Model 2
Size of trabable sector	0.62 (3.82)
Δ STC Stable	0.81 (1.58)
Δ STC Increase	−1.53 (1.47)
Clarity of responsibility: High	1.76 (1.99)
Size of tradable sector $\times\Delta$ STC Stable	0.20 (4.69)
Size of tradable sector $\times\Delta$ STC Increase	7.66 (4.44)*
Size of tradable sector $\times$ Clarity of responsibility: High	−6.50 (5.65)
Δ STC Stable $\times$ Clarity of responsibility: High	−4.93 (2.41)**
Δ STC Increase $\times$ Clarity of responsibility: High	1.48 (2.23)
Size of tradable sector $\times\Delta$ STC Stable $\times$ Clarity: High	31.07 (6.82)***
Size of tradable sector $\times\Delta$ STC Increase $\times$ Clarity: High	3.50 (6.53)
(Intercept)	−7.12 (1.75)***
AIC	18435.72
BIC	18523.07
Log Likelihood	−9202.86
Num. obs.	2498
Num. groups: partyid	79
Num. groups: country_short	29
Var: partyid (Intercept)	25.13
Var: country_short (Intercept)	28.60
Var: Residual	87.31

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Figure G3: Robustness check for hypothesis 3: Interaction with tradable sector size



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 3 in Table G3.

H Controlling for GNI per capita growth

To investigate the robustness of our findings, we additionally include GNI per capita growth (as a conventional measure of economic voting). Tables H1 to H3 show the results while Figures H1 and H2 visualise the results, replicating Figures 1 and 2. Unsurprisingly, GNI per capita growth is positively associated with incumbent vote shares. In other words, a higher GNI per capita growth strengthens the incumbent's result. While the results for trade competitiveness are mildly weaker in this model (as was to be expected, as GNI per cpaita growth also mediates the effect of changes in STC), the overall underlying direction of coefficients remains similar.

Table H1: Robustness check for hypothesis 1: Controlling for GNI per capita growth

	Model 1
Δ STC Stable	2.06 (0.53)***
Δ STC Increase	1.83 (0.48)***
GNI per capita growth	31.43 (2.44)***
(Intercept)	−9.38 (1.43)***
AIC	17514.51
BIC	17554.91
Log Likelihood	−8750.26
N	2371
Group: Parties	78
Group: Country	29
Var. Party	24.89
Var. Country	40.59
Var. Residuals	86.77

***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Table H2: Robustness check for hypothesis 2: Controlling for GNI per capita growth

	Model 2
Δ STC Stable	0.65 (0.66)
Δ STC Increase	0.91 (0.58)
Clarity of responsibility: High	−0.37 (1.07)
GNI per capita growth	30.37 (2.45)***
Δ STC Stable × Clarity of responsibility: High	3.97 (1.12)***
Δ STC Stable × Clarity of responsibility: High	2.67 (1.01)***
(Intercept)	−9.23 (1.47)***
AIC	17496.80
BIC	17554.51
Log Likelihood	−8738.40
N	2371
Group: Parties	78
Group: Country	29
Var. Party	24.04
Var. Country	39.75
Var. Residuals	86.26

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

Figure H1: Robustness check for Hypothesis 2: Controlling for GNI per capita growth



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 2 in Table H2.

Figure H2: Robustness check for Hypothesis 3: Controlling for GNI per capita growth



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 3 in Table H3.

Table H3: Robustness check for hypothesis 3: Controlling for GNI per capita growth

	Model 3
Δ STC Stable	−1.46 (1.49)
Δ STC Increase	−0.65 (1.34)
Ideology: Left-wing	0.14 (2.84)
Ideology: Center	−2.64 (3.26)
Ideology: Right-wing	2.97 (3.25)
Ideology: Far-right	0.34 (2.75)
GNI per capita growth	32.99 (2.48)***
Δ STC Stable × LW	1.91 (1.81)
Δ STC Increase × LW	3.67 (1.62)**
Δ STC Stable × Center	8.05 (1.95)***
Δ STC Increase × Center	3.05 (1.86)
Δ STC Stable × RW	3.20 (2.03)
Δ STC Increase × RW	1.83 (1.83)
Δ STC Stable × FR	4.01 (1.85)**
Δ STC Increase × FR	2.47 (1.63)
(Intercept)	−9.22 (2.64)***
AIC	16279.86
BIC	16388.19
Log Likelihood	−8120.93
N	2211
Group: Parties	69
Group: Country	28
Var. Party	21.93
Var. Country	39.64
Var. Residuals	85.88

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the country- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.

I Investigating country-variation through jack-knifing

In order to understand whether individual cases drive our results, we investigated the sensitivity of our results to dropping individual countries. Figures I1 to I3 show the point estimates and suggest that the findings are robust to dropping individual countries. While there is some variation within estimates, the overall estimates remain robust.

Figure I1: Robustness check for hypothesis 1: Jackknifing



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

Figure I2: Robustness check for hypothesis 2: Jackknifing



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

Figure I3: Robustness check for hypothesis 3: Jackknifing



Note: The ranges represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

J Alternative random effect specification

Our main models include random intercepts for countries and parties. A more restrictive specification is to replace the country random intercept with a country-year (or election) intercept. Table J1 shows the findings for hypothesis 1. Although this model is very restrictive, with the random intercepts capturing much of the variation, the findings suggest that STC changes are associated with incumbent vote share changes. While for stable STC the coefficient just misses statistical significance (the p-value is 0.103), increases in STC are statistically significant. We refrain from replicating these analyses for hypothesis 2 and 3, since the moderators have next to no variation within these groups.

Table J1: Robustness check for hypothesis 1: Random effects on elections

	Model 1
Δ STC Stable	0.62 (0.38)
Δ STC Increase	0.69 (0.35)**
(Intercept)	-5.49 (1.14)***
AIC	17097.58
BIC	17132.52
Log Likelihood	-8542.79
N	2498
Group: Parties	103
Group: Elections	79
Var. Party	80.93
Var. Country	26.37
Var. Residuals	45.41

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Entries are unstandardised coefficients from a linear mixed-effects model with random intercepts at the election- and party-level. Standard errors in brackets.