SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

"Stick to the Status Quo"?

A conjoint experiment with German adolescents on democratic designs

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A1 Distribution sample and population

Table 1. Distribution sample and population

	Sample	9th grade Baden-Württemberg, Germany[1]	9th grade Germany[2]	Adult population Baden-Württemberg[3]	Adult population Germany[4]
Total	1970	104 132	764 663	11 280 257	83 237 124
Sex					
Male	49,5 %	51,5 %	51,7 %	49,7 %	49,3 %
Female	45,8 %	48,5 %	48,3 %	50,3 %	50,7 %
Prefer not to say	4,6 %	-	-	-	-
Education					
"Werkreal-/Hauptschule"	8,5 %	8 %	9,3 %	-	-
"Realschule"	39,3 %	36 %	17,7 %	-	-
"Gymnasium"	34,9 %	35 %	35,5 %	-	-
"Integrierte Gesamtschule" / "Gemeinschaftsschule"	17,3 %	16,5 %	21,4 %	-	-
„Schularten besonderer Art / Schulen mit mehreren Bildungsgängen"	-	-	12,7 %	-	-
"Förderschule"	-	4,6 %	3,4 %		

[1] Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg (2022). Statistische Berichte Baden-Württemberg. Allgemeinbildende Schulen in Baden-Württemberg im Schuljahr 2021/22. Artikel Nr. 3231 21001.
[2] Destatis. Statistisches Bundesamt (2022). Statistischer Bericht – Allgemeinbildende Schulen – Schuljahr 2021/2022.
[3] Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder. Statistikportal (2022). Fläche und Bevölkerung nach Ländern.
[4] Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder. Statistikportal (2022). Fläche und Bevölkerung nach Ländern.

A2 Pre-Conjoint Information

(translated from German)

Next is a brief overview of how differently a political decision-making process for deciding on a CO2 tax might be structured. Please read through the following points.

Who is involved in the decision-making process?
Different people can be involved in a decision-making process:

A citizens' forum: randomly drawn citizens who are composed like the the population (reflection of the society)



A parliament with politicians democratically elected by citizens

An assertive leader who has been democratically elected by citizens

How does the decision-making process work?
The decision-making process can be different:
- Public opinion (the opinions that exist in society) is given special consideration
- The opinion of experts (i.e., for example, researchers, but also activists who are actively involved in the topic) is given special consideration
- The main institution/actor is primarily considering on their own what is best

How do the participants or the institution/person involved reach a decision?
How the participants or the institution/person involved come to a decision can vary:
- Thorough thought can be given to the decision. Different arguments can be considered and advantages and disadvantages can be discussed and compared.
- The decision can be made without thorough consideration, comparison and discussion. Events can be reacted to quickly.

Who makes the final decision?
The participants or the institution/person involved can:
- Make a binding decision themselves
- Pass on a recommendation to the population or to others.

In doing so, the main institution/actor does not have the final say:

o If the decision is passed on to the population, citizens can vote on whether or not to accept the proposal in a direct vote (referendum). This is done as in an election via ballots, which are then counted (direct democracy).
o When the decision is passed on to parliament, elected representatives (politicians) vote on whether or not to accept the proposal.

A3 Conjoint task examples



Hier siehst Du den ersten Vergleich. Bitte lies Dir diesen aufmerksam durch und gib dann an, welche Option Du für eine Entscheidung über eine CO_2-Steuer für Flüge bevorzugst.

Bitte beachte: Menschen haben unterschiedliche Ansichten darüber, wie Entscheidungen getroffen werden sollen. Es gibt keine richtige oder falsche Antwort, sondern es geht um Deine persönliche Meinung.

	Option A	Option B
Wer ist an der Entscheidung beteiligt?	Bürgerforum mit ausgelosten Bürgerinnen und Bürgern	Parlament (Bundestag) mit demokratisch gewählten Politikerinnen und Politikern
Wie läuft der Prozess ab?	Überlegt in erster Linie alleine, was das Beste ist	Besondere Berücksichtigung der Meinung von Expertinnen und Experten
Wie kommen die Beteiligten bzw. der/die Beteiligte zu einer Entscheidung?	Effizient und schnell	Effizient und schnell
Wie wird die Entscheidung getroffen?	Empfehlung an das Parlament, welches die abschließende Entscheidung trifft	Abschließende und verbindliche Entscheidung
Was ist das Ergebnis?	Für CO2-Steuer	Für CO2-Steuer

Welche der beiden Optionen bevorzugst Du?

Option A

Option B

Inwiefern würdest Du die Entscheidung in Option A akzeptieren?

überhaupt nicht | eher nicht | teils/teils | eher ja | voll und ganz

Inwiefern würdest Du die Entscheidung in Option B akzeptieren?

überhaupt nicht | eher nicht | teils/teils | eher ja | voll und ganz



	Option A	Option B
Wer ist an der Entscheidung beteiligt?	Parlament (Bundestag) mit demokratisch gewählten Politikerinnen und Politikern	Durchsetzungsfähige/r Staatschef/in, der/die demokratisch gewählt wurde
Wie läuft der Prozess ab?	Besondere Berücksichtigung der Meinung von Expertinnen und Experten	Besondere Berücksichtigung der öffentlichen Meinung
Wie kommen die Beteiligten bzw. der/die Beteiligte zu einer Entscheidung?	Effizient und schnell	Durchdacht und langsam
Wie wird die Entscheidung getroffen?	Abschließende und verbindliche Entscheidung	Abschließende und verbindliche Entscheidung
Was ist das Ergebnis?	Für CO2-Steuer	Gegen CO2-Steuer

Welche der beiden Optionen bevorzugst Du?

Option A

Option B

Inwiefern würdest Du die Entscheidung in Option A akzeptieren?

überhaupt nicht | eher nicht | teils/teils | eher ja | voll und ganz

Inwiefern würdest Du die Entscheidung in Option B akzeptieren?

überhaupt nicht | eher nicht | teils/teils | eher ja | voll und ganz

A4 Variables

Measurement of dependent variables

Choice

Which Scenario do you prefer? (1= „Scenario A“, 2= „Scenario B“)

Rating

To what extent would you accept the decision in Scenario A? (1= „not at all accept“, 2= „not accept“, 3= „partly“, 4= „accept“, 5= „extremely accept“)

To what extent would you accept the decision in Scenario B? (1= „not at all accept“, 2= „not accept“, 3= „partly“, 4= „accept“, 5= „extremely accept“)

Mean	*Median*	*SD*
3,18	3	0,96

Rating Subgroups

	Mean	***t***	***p-value***
Dissatisfied – satisfied	3.1 – 3.26	-12.55	< 0.001
Low pol. interest – high pol. interest	3.1 – 3.21	-8.55	<0.001
Education low – Education high	3.13 – 3.27	-9.8	<0.001

Measurement of issue salience and outcome favourability

Issue Salience

How important or unimportant is the issue "climate change" for you personally? (1= „not at all important“, 2= „not important“, 3= „partly“, 4= „important“, 5= „very important“)

Mean	*Median*	*SD*
3,49	4	1,11

There are various things in life that can be of concern to us at the moment. Which, if any, of the following issues do you personally feel concerned about at the present? … climate change? (1= „not at all worried“, 2= „not very worried“, 3= „somewhat worried“, 4= „very worried“, 5= „extremely worried“)

Mean	*Median*	*SD*
3,2	3	1,19

Outcome Favourability

Preference Match and Mismatch were computed by comparing two variables: 1. The preference of the respondent regarding the measurement (Carbon tax on flights) and 2. The result of the decision-making process (for or against Carbon tax on flights).

Preference regarding the measurement

Various measures are being discussed to curb climate change. For example, a so-called "CO_2 tax" on flights is proposed to reduce CO_2 emissions. CO_2 is the biggest contributor to global warming and therefore also to climate change. If the measure was implemented, flights would become massively more expensive.

How strongly do you personally support or oppose the measure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions? (1= „strongly oppose“, 2= „oppose“, 3= „partly oppose/support“, 4= „support“, 5= „strongly support“)

Mean	*Median*	*SD*
2,87	3	1,03

Values higher than 3 were coded as approval.

Outcome Favourability was coded as a binary variable (0 = Preference Mismatch; 1 = Preference Match). Preference Match was assigned, when the result of the decision-making process aligned with the preference (result = in favour of CO_2 tax AND preference = in favour of CO_2 tax OR result = against CO_2 tax AND preference = against CO_2 tax) and preference Mismatch was assigned, when the result didn't align with the preference (result = in favour of CO_2 tax AND preference ≠ in favour of CO_2 tax OR result = against CO_2 tax AND preference ≠ against CO_2 tax).

Grouping Variables

Political Dissatisfaction

How satisfied are you with the democracy in Germany? (1= „not at all satisfied“, 2= „fairly dissatisfied“, 3= „neither satisfied nor dissatisfied“, 4= „fairly satisfied“, 5= „very satisfied“)

Political Interest

How interested would you say you are in politics? (1= „not at all interested“, 2= „not very interested“, 3= „middling“, 4= „somewhat interested“, 5= „very interested“)

Education

Education was assigned by assigning the specific school of the respondent to the three school tracks.

The grouping variables *Political Dissatisfaction* and *Political Interest* were computed using a median split, that followed two rules:

- If median > mean then 'low' is assigned for < median and 'high' for ≥ median;
- If median < mean then 'low' is assigned for ≤ median and 'high' for > median.

Results of the Median Split

	N (long)	mean	median	median-split
Democratic satisfaction	23198	3.35	3	> 3 (satisfied) ≤ 3 (dissatisfied)
Political Interest	23318	2.78	3	≥ 3 (high pol. interest) < 3 (low pol. interest)

Robustness Check Variables

Time pre-conjoint Information

Duration respondents spend on information page in seconds.

Time Conjoint

Accumulated duration respondents spend with the conjoint tasks in seconds.

The robustness check grouping variables *Time Information* and *Time Conjoint* were computed using a median split, that followed two rules:

- If median > mean then 'low' is assigned for < median and 'high' for ≥ median;
- If median < mean then 'low' is assigned for ≤ median and 'high' for > median.

Results of the Median Split

	mean	median	median-split
Information Time	35.47	12.18	> 12.18 (more time) ≤ 12.18 (less time)
Conjoint Time	176.4	165.57	> 165.57 (more time) ≤ 165.57 (less time)

Attention Check

In the middle of the online survey, the following question appeared:

This question is about your ability to pay attention. Please do not tick any option below, just click the "Next" button at the bottom of the page. This way we test if you have read the questions carefully.

- I am very focused when completing tasks
- My ability to concentrate fluctuates depending on the situation
- When I do something for school, I often get distracted easily

(1= „yes“, 2= „no“)

If respondents didn't follow the instruction and answered the questions, they were assigned as "not attentive".

A5 Feature distribution and Subsets

Due to the one restriction in the conjoint design (parliament * inclusion of parliament), the feature level "inclusion parliament" is unevenly distributed in the full dataset (see Figure A5.1). We include this restriction in the equation when computing the main models. In the subgroup analyses, we additionally compute the conditional AMCEs within two subsets that we create along the restriction, as described by Leeper (2022) in the documentation of the "cregg" package used in R (https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/cregg/cregg.pdf). Subset 1 does not contain any cases where "inclusion parliament" was part of the case combinations. This approach leads to an overrepresentation of "parliament", so we randomly draw 2/3 of the parliament cases. Doing this results in a randomized subset in which the characteristics of the features are evenly distributed (see Figure A5.2). Subset 2 contains no cases in which "parliament" was part of the case combinations. This leads to a randomized subset in which the feature values are evenly distributed (see Figure A5.3). All analyses in which we compute conditional AMCEs are computed once using the full dataset and once with each of the both subsets. Subset 1 will always be referred to as Subset A and Subset 2 as Subset B. Because these subsets are associated with lower case numbers and omit one feature level each, the results may differ slightly from the ones with the full data. However, this is only the case for effects that were previously only marginally significant and/or those that were very small. The substantive results do not differ from the results in the text.

Figure A5. 1: Distribution Features full data



Note: 23438 cases.

Figure A5. 2: Distribution Features subset A



Note: 15631 cases.

Figure A5. 3: Distribution Features subset B



Note: 15614 cases.

A6 Additional Analysis

Marginal Means Baseline Model (Choice Outcome)

Figure A6. 1: Marginal Means (choice outcome variable)



Note: Benchmark model using Marginal Means for all respondents. Standard errors clustered at the individual level to take into account that each respondent made several comparisons. N = 23.438 (1970 respondents × 8-12 scenarios). Effects are measured in percentage points. Weighted data.

Marginal Means Baseline Model (Rating Outcome)

Figure A6. 2: Marginal Means (rating outcome variable)



Note: Benchmark model using Marginal Means for all respondents. Standard errors clustered at the individual level to take into account that each respondent made several comparisons. N = 23.438 (1970 respondents × 8-12 scenarios). Effects are measured in percentage points. Weighted data.

AMCEs Baseline Model (Rating Outcome)

Figure A6. 3: Effects of Design Levels on rating



Note: Benchmark model for all respondents. Standard errors clustered at the individual level to take into account that each respondent made several comparisons. N = 23.438 (1970 respondents × 8-12 scenarios). Effects are measured in percentage points. Weighted data.

Subgroups Conditional AMCE´s Choice

Political Dissatisfaction

Figure A6. 4: Conditional AMCE for Political Dissatisfaction (choice outcome variable; full data)



Note: Heterogeneity in effects of attribute variations. The left panel shows AMCE for respondents with high satisfaction. The panel in the middle shows AMCE for respondents with low satisfaction. The right panel shows differences in AMCE between low compared to high political satisfaction.

Figure A6. 5: Conditional AMCE for Political Dissatisfaction (choice outcome variable; subset A)



Note: Heterogeneity in effects of attribute variations. The left panel shows AMCE for respondents with high satisfaction. The panel in the middle shows AMCE for respondents with low satisfaction. The right panel shows differences in AMCE between low compared to high political satisfaction.

Figure A6. 6: Conditional AMCE for Political Dissatisfaction (choice outcome variable; subset B)



Note: Heterogeneity in effects of attribute variations. The left panel shows AMCE for respondents with high satisfaction. The panel in the middle shows AMCE for respondents with low satisfaction. The right panel shows differences in AMCE between low compared to high political satisfaction.

Political Interest

Figure A6. 7: Conditional AMCE for Political Interest (choice outcome variable; full data)



Note: Heterogeneity in effects of attribute variations. The left panel shows AMCE for respondents with high political interest. The panel in the middle shows AMCE for respondents with low political interest. The right panel shows differences in AMCE between low compared to high political interest.

Figure A6. 8: Conditional AMCE for Political Interest (choice outcome variable; subset A)



Note: Heterogeneity in effects of attribute variations. The left panel shows AMCE for respondents with high political interest. The panel in the middle shows AMCE for respondents with low political interest. The right panel shows differences in AMCE between low compared to high political interest.

Figure A6. 9: Conditional AMCE for Political Interest (choice outcome variable; subset B)



Note: Heterogeneity in effects of attribute variations. The left panel shows AMCE for respondents with high political interest. The panel in the middle shows AMCE for respondents with low political interest. The right panel shows differences in AMCE between low compared to high political interest.

Education

Figure A6. 10: Conditional AMCE for Education (choice outcome variable; full data)



Note: Heterogeneity in effects of attribute variations. The left panel shows AMCE for respondents with high education. The panel in the middle shows AMCE for respondents with low education. The right panel shows differences in AMCE between low compared to high education.

Figure A6. 11: Conditional AMCE for Education (choice outcome variable; subset A)



Note: Heterogeneity in effects of attribute variations. The left panel shows AMCE for respondents with high education. The panel in the middle shows AMCE for respondents with low education. The right panel shows differences in AMCE between low compared to high education.

Figure A6. 12: Conditional AMCE for Education (choice outcome variable; subset B)



Note: Heterogeneity in effects of attribute variations. The left panel shows AMCE for respondents with high education. The panel in the middle shows AMCE for respondents with low education. The right panel shows differences in AMCE between low compared to high education.

Overview Subgroups

Figure A6. 13: Overview subgroups conditional AMCEs (choice outcome variable; subset A)



Note: Effects show the increase/decrease in the probability of choosing a scenario for a particular attribute level relative to its baseline level for the specific group (dissatisfied; politically interested; education high) minus the probability of choosing a scenario for the opposite group (satisfied; not politically interested; education low) for the same attribute level relative to its baseline category. Reference categories not shown. Weighted data.

Figure A6. 14: Overview subgroups conditional AMCEs (choice outcome variable; subset B)



Note: Effects show the increase/decrease in the probability of choosing a scenario for a particular attribute level relative to its baseline level for the specific group (dissatisfied; politically interested; education high) minus the probability of choosing a scenario for the opposite group (satisfied; not politically interested; education low) for the same attribute level relative to its baseline category. Reference categories not shown. Weighted data.

Subgroups Marginal Means Choice

Political Dissatisfaction

Figure A6. 15: Marginal Means for Political Dissatisfaction (choice outcome variable; full data)



Figure A6. 16: Marginal Means for Political Dissatisfaction (choice outcome variable; subset A)



Figure A6. 17: Marginal Means for Political Dissatisfaction (choice outcome variable; subset B)



Political Interest

Figure A6. 18: Marginal Means for Political Interest (choice outcome variable; full data)



Figure A6. 19: Marginal Means for Political Interest (choice outcome variable; subset A)



Figure A6. 20: Marginal Means for Political Interest (choice outcome variable; subset B)



Education

Figure A6. 21: Marginal Means for Education (choice outcome variable; full data)



Figure A6. 22: Marginal Means for Education (choice outcome variable; subset A)



Figure A6. 23: Marginal Means for Education (choice outcome variable; subset B)



Subgroup Models

(AMCE´s Rating and Choice Outcome and MM´s Rating and Choice Outcome)

Political Dissatisfaction

Figure A6. 24: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Political Dissatisfaction (full data)



Note: Effects show differences for politically dissatisfied compared to politically satisfied respondents where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A6. 25: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Political Dissatisfaction (subset A)



Note: Effects show differences for politically dissatisfied compared to politically satisfied respondents where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A6. 26: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Political Dissatisfaction (subset B)



Note: Effects show differences for politically dissatisfied compared to politically satisfied respondents where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Political Interest

Figure A6. 27: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Political Interest (full data)



Note: Effects show differences for politically interested compared to not less politically interested respondents where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A6. 28: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Political Interest (subset A)



Note: Effects show differences for politically interested compared to not less politically interested respondents where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A6. 29: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Political Interest (subset B)



Note: Effects show differences for politically interested compared to not less politically interested respondents where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Education

Figure A6. 30: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Education (full data)



Note: Effects show differences for high educated compared to not low educated respondents where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A6. 31: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Education (subset A)



Note: Effects show differences for high educated compared to not low educated respondents where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A6. 32: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Education (subset B)



Note: Effects show differences for high educated compared to not low educated respondents where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Outcome favourability

Conditional AMCE´s Choice

Figure A6. 33: Conditional AMCE for Outcome Favourability (choice outcome variable; full data)



Note: Heterogeneity in effects of attribute variations. The left panel shows AMCE for respondents with preference match (winners). The panel in the middle shows AMCE for respondents with preference mismatch (loser). The right panel shows differences in AMCE between winners compared to losers.

Figure A6. 34: Conditional AMCE for Outcome Favourability (choice outcome variable; subset A)



Note: Heterogeneity in effects of attribute variations. The left panel shows AMCE for respondents with preference match (winners). The panel in the middle shows AMCE for respondents with preference mismatch (loser). The right panel shows differences in AMCE between winners compared to losers.

Figure A6. 35: Conditional AMCE for Outcome Favourability (choice outcome variable; subset B)



Note: Heterogeneity in effects of attribute variations. The left panel shows AMCE for respondents with preference match (winners). The panel in the middle shows AMCE for respondents with preference mismatch (loser). The right panel shows differences in AMCE between winners compared to losers.

Marginal Means Choice

Figure A6. 36: Marginal Means for Outcome Favourability (choice outcome variable; full data)



Figure A6. 37: Marginal Means for Outcome Favourability (choice outcome variable; subset A)



Figure A6. 38: Marginal Means for Outcome Favourability (choice outcome variable; subset B)



Overview Outcome Favourability

Figure A6. 39: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Outcome Favourability (full data)



Note: Effects show differences for winners (preference match) compared to losers (preference mismatch) where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A6. 40: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Outcome Favourability (subset A)



Note: Effects show differences for winners (preference match) compared to losers (preference mismatch) where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A6. 41: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Outcome Favourability (subset B)



Note: Effects show differences for winners (preference match) compared to losers (preference mismatch) where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

A7 Robustness Checks

Causal effects by contest rounds

Figure A7. 1: Causal effects by contest rounds. Grouped (1; full data)



Note: The plot shows the effects by pooled task rounds. 1.: N (rated options) = 3.910; 2.: N (rated options) = 3.892; 3.: N (rated options) = 3.902; 4.: N (rated options) = 3.912; 5.: N (rated options) = 3.912; 6.: N (rated options) = 3.910.

Figure A7. 2: Causal effects by contest rounds. Grouped (2; full data)



Note: The plot shows the effects by pooled task rounds. 1.: N (rated options) = 3.910; 1-2.: N (rated options) = 7.802; 1-3.: N (rated options) = 11.704; 1-4.: N (rated options) = 15.616; 1-5.: N (rated options) = 19.528; 1-6.: N (rated options) = 23.438.

Figure A7. 3: Causal effects by contest rounds (3; full data)



Note: The plot shows the effects by pooled task rounds. 1.: N (rated options) = 3.910; 1-3.: N (rated options) = 11.704; 1-6.: N (rated options) = 23.438.

Overview

Figure A7. 4: Estimated Differences (AMCE) for different groups of adolescents (full data)



Note: Effects show the increase/decrease in the probability of choosing a scenario for a particular attribute level relative to its baseline level for the specific group (respondents that spent more time with the information; respondents that spent more time with the conjoint; attentive respondents) minus the probability of choosing a scenario for the opposite group (respondents that spent less time with the information; respondents that spent less time with the conjoint; not attentive respondents) for the same attribute level relative to its baseline category. Reference categories not shown. Weighted data.

Figure A7. 5: Estimated Differences (AMCE) for different groups of adolescents (subset A)



Note: Effects show the increase/decrease in the probability of choosing a scenario for a particular attribute level relative to its baseline level for the specific group (respondents that spent more time with the information; respondents that spent more time with the conjoint; attentive respondents) minus the probability of choosing a scenario for the opposite group (respondents that spent less time with the information; respondents that spent less time with the conjoint; not attentive respondents) for the same attribute level relative to its baseline category. Reference categories not shown. Weighted data.

Figure A7. 6: Estimated Differences (AMCE) for different groups of adolescents (subset B)



Note: Effects show the increase/decrease in the probability of choosing a scenario for a particular attribute level relative to its baseline level for the specific group (respondents that spent more time with the information; respondents that spent more time with the conjoint; attentive respondents) minus the probability of choosing a scenario for the opposite group (respondents that spent less time with the information; respondents that spent less time with the conjoint; not attentive respondents) for the same attribute level relative to its baseline category. Reference categories not shown. Weighted data.

Robustness Check Models

Information Time

Figure A7. 7: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Information Time (full data)



Note: Effects show differences for respondents that spent more time with the information compared to respondents that spent less time with the information where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A7. 8: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Information Time (subset A)



Note: Effects show differences for respondents that spent more time with the information compared to respondents that spent less time with the information where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A7. 9: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Information Time (subset B)



Note: Effects show differences for respondents that spent more time with the information compared to respondents that spent less time with the information where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Conjoint Time

Figure A7. 10: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Conjoint Time (full data)



Note: Effects show differences for respondents that spent more time with the conjoint compared to respondents that spent less time with the conjoint where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A7. 11: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Conjoint Time (subset A)



Note: Effects show differences for respondents that spent more time with the conjoint compared to respondents that spent less time with the conjoint where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A7. 12: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Conjoint Time (subset B)



Note: Effects show differences for respondents that spent more time with the conjoint compared to respondents that spent less time with the conjoint where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Attention

Figure A7. 13: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Attention (full data)



Note: Effects show differences for respondents that passed the attention check (high attention) compared to respondents that didn't pass the attention check (low attention) where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A7. 14: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Attention (subset A)



Note: Effects show differences for respondents that passed the attention check (high attention) compared to respondents that didn't pass the attention check (low attention) where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

Figure A7. 15: Difference plots (AMCE and marginal means, rating and choice outcome variables) for Attention (subset B)



Note: Effects show differences for respondents that passed the attention check (high attention) compared to respondents that didn't pass the attention check (low attention) where AMCE represent differences in conjoint effect sizes and marginal means represent descriptive differences in preferences.

A8 Student Experiment

Note: the experiment with students from the University of Stuttgart used the same conjoint design but added one issue, namely delivery of weapons to war-affected countries.

Figure A8. 1: Effects of Design Levels on choice. Student experiment



Note: Benchmark model for all respondents. Standard errors clustered at the individual level to take into account that each respondent made several comparisons. N = 1938 (163 respondents × 10-12 scenarios). Effects are measured in percentage points. Weighted data.

Figure A8. 2: Marginal Means for Issue (choice outcome variable). Student experiment



A9 Deviations from Pre-registration

The study including the hypotheses and the basic conjoint design was pre-registered on OSF on February 21, 2022. The following link is a link to the pre-registration

In general, most aspects of the pre-registration plan were implemented in the article. This includes the study design as well as the attributes and attribute levels of the conjoint. The article also uses the described statistical models to analyze the conjoint and test the expectations.

The following elements deviate (or slightly deviate) from the pre-registration:

1.) Hypotheses

Not all hypotheses were evaluated in the article. For reasons of space, the focus was on the general preferences and those of the relevant subgroups.

Regarding the general hypotheses, only H1.1 ("Overall, pupils prefer representative and participatory forms of decision-making compared to executive forms.") was included in the form of two opposing expectations (Expectation 1a and 1b). In addition, H1.4 ("Pupils prefer when the outcome corresponds to their own substantive preferences.") was included for outcome favorability (Expectation 4). H1.2 and H1.3 are assumptions about general preferences that were not included as expectations, but are presented and discussed in detail in the results.

In addition, only selected subgroups were included in the article, namely "political satisfaction" and "political sophistication".

H2.4 on political sophistication ("Politically sophisticated pupils prefer participatory forms of decision-making to executive or representative forms of decision-making (compared to politically less sophisticated pupils)"; Expectation 3a) was included in the analysis. In addition, an alternative expectation about politically sophisticated pupils was included as well, namely that the latter might also prefer the status quo due to their higher socio-economic status (see Expectation 3b).

H2.5 ("Politically satisfied pupils and pupils with high levels of political trust prefer a representative form of decision-making to executive and participatory forms (compared to politically dissatisfied pupils and pupils with low levels of political trust)"was partially included (without political trust; Expectation 3a) and analyzed and discussed in the article.

2.) Contributors

The contributors do not match the authors in the article, since they were involved in the youth study project, but not in the conjoint experiment, the analyses or the article. Nevertheless, we thank them in the acknowledgements for their support in conducting the youth study from which the data originates.