Deradicalization and the experience of governing

Supplementary materials

Full replication code is available at:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MatteoTiratelli/matteotiratelli.github.io/master/Files/Deradicalization_ReplicationCode.R

A1: Western European socialist and left-wing parties who have ever been in power (1944 - 2021)

Austria	Austrian Social Democratic Party	Iceland	People's Alliance
Belgium	Belgian Socialist Party	Iceland	Union of Liberals and Leftists
Belgium	Flemish Socialist Party	Iceland	The Alliance
Belgium	Francophone Socialist Party	Iceland	The Alliance - Social Democratic Party of Iceland
Belgium	Socialist Party Different	Ireland	Labour Party
Denmark	Social Democratic Party	Ireland	Democratic Left Party
Denmark	Socialist People's Party	Italy	Italian Communist Party
Finland	Finnish People's Democratic Union	Italy	Italian Socialist Party
Finland	Finnish Social Democrats	Italy	Italian Democratic Socialist Party
Finland	Social Democratic League of Workers and Smallholders	Italy	Democrats of the Left
France	French Communist Party	Luxembourg	Communist Party of Luxembourg
France	French Section of the Workers' International	Luxembourg	Socialist Workers' Party of Luxembourg
France	Socialist Party	Netherlands	Radical Political Party

Germany	Social Democratic Party of Germany	Norway	Norwegian Labour Party
Greece	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	Norway	Socialist Left Party
Greece	Progressive Left Coalition	Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left	Sweden	Social Democratic Labour Party
Greece	Democratic Left	Switzerland	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland
Iceland	United Socialist Party		

A2: Variables used from Comparative Manifesto Project (MARPOR 2021a)

The CMP coding procedure works by breaking down manifestos into discrete quasi-sentences which "contain exactly one statement or 'message'" (Manifesto Coding Instructions 4th edition, May 2011, p. 5). Each quasi-sentence is then given a code if it falls into a particular category. An example from the most recent coders handbook is: "We need to address our close ties with our neighbours [code: 107] / as well as the unique challenges facing small business owners in this time of economic hardship [code: 402]" (Manifesto Coding Instructions 4th edition, May 2011, p. 5). Each variable then indicates "the share of quasi-sentences in the respective category calculated as a fraction of the overall number of allocated codes per document" (MARPOR Codebook 2021a, p. 9). This procedure is extremely useful for our purposes because the variables capture not just the party's attitude towards a particular question, but also the salience they attach to it.

Dependent variables:

- 104 Military: Positive
"The importance of external security and defence. May include statements concerning: The need to maintain or increase military expenditure; The need to secure adequate manpower in the military; The need to modernise armed forces and improve military strength; The need for rearmament and self-defence; The need to keep military treaty obligations."

- 105 Military: Negative
"Negative references to the military or use of military power to solve conflicts. References to the 'evils of war'. May include references to: Decreasing military expenditures; Disarmament; Reduced or abolished conscription."

- 203 Constitutionalism: Positive
"Support for maintaining the status quo of the constitution. Support for specific aspects of the manifesto country's constitution. The use of constitutionalism as an argument for any policy."

- 204 Constitutionalism: Negative
"Opposition to the entirety or specific aspects of the manifesto country's constitution. Calls for constitutional amendments or changes. May include calls to abolish or rewrite the current constitution."

- 414 Economic Orthodoxy
"Need for economically healthy government policy making. May include calls for: Reduction of budget deficits; Retrenchment in crisis; Thrift and savings in the face of economic hardship; Support for traditional economic institutions such as stock market and banking system; Support for strong currency."

- 701 Labour Groups: Positive

"Favourable references to all labour groups, the working class, and unemployed workers in general. Support for trade unions and calls for the good treatment of all employees, including: More jobs; Good working conditions; Fair wages; Pension provisions etc. The equivalent variable, Labour Groups Negative (CMP variable 702), is excluded because almost no left-wing party ever makes negative references to those groups (there are only two non-zero scores in the matched dataset), making inference using that variable impossible."

A3-8: Robustness checks

The following materials (A3-8) relate to various robustness tests which can be summarised as:
Daniel Ho et al. (2007) recommend using matching procedures as a preprocessing technique before parametric estimation. In that spirit, I use the matched data in a weighted, OLS regression and control for country-level fixed effects, standardised vote share and (lagged and standardised) overall right-left position with cluster-robust standard errors. This produces extremely similar results (A3). Repeating the OLS approach with a continuous treatment variable (number of years in government) again produces very similar findings, although the coefficients for economic orthodoxy are no longer significant at the 95 per cent level (A4). The results are also robust to changing the parameters of the matching procedure. Relaxing the exact matching criteria by only using two lags of the treatment variable produces extremely similar results (A5). Making it stricter by using four treatment lags produces similar coefficient estimates but, in part because of reduced sample size, the results are not significant at the 95 per cent level (A6). Finally, the findings are robust to using a 10-year time window (A7) and to using the full sample of all west European left parties contained in the CMP (A8). A17 below conducts a simple TWFE model without matching.

A3: Matched OLS estimator with binary treatment

Notes: Analysis as in Figure 5 in main analysis except, instead of using a difference-in-difference estimator, coefficients are from an OLS regression with country-level fixed effects, vote share and (lagged and standardised) right-left position as controls, with robust standard errors (clustered on each matched set).

## A4: Matched OLS estimator with continuous treatment

Notes: Analysis as in Appendix 3 above except the treatment variable is continuous (the number of years the party has been in government since the last election).

A5: DiD estimator matched on two treatment lags

Notes: Analysis as in Figure 5 in main analysis except the exact matching is done using only two treatment lags. The effective sample is n = 450 with 78 matched sets.

A6: DiD estimator matched on four treatment lags


Notes: Analysis as in Figure 5 in main analysis except the exact matching is done using four treatment lags. The effective sample is n = 138 with 38 matched sets.

A7: DiD estimator with 10 year time window

Notes: Analysis as in Figure 5 in main analysis except the time window is extended to ten years. The effective sample is n = 388 with 69 matched sets.

A8: DiD estimator for all left wing parties

Notes: Analysis as in Figure 5 in main analysis, but includes all left wing parties in western Europe (79 parties, and 678 party-election observations) The effective sample after matching is n = 388 with 65 matched sets.

A9: Differences between parties and the average voter (matched)

Notes: Analysis as in Figure 5 in main analysis except the outcome variable is the absolute difference between the party's score and the average voter (proxied by the mean position of parties in that election weighted by their vote share).

## A10: Differences between parties and the average voter (full sample)

Notes: Sample includes all western European social democratic or communist parties who have ever been in government (n = 37) resulting in 473 party-election observations between 1944 and 2021. Points represent the difference in group means (treated vs untreated) of the absolute difference between each party's score and the average voter (proxied by the mean position of parties in that election weighted by their vote share) with block boostrapped standard errors.

A11-14: Placebo tests

The following materials A11-14 present a series of placebo tests: The first is a placebo population test, where one repeats the core analysis on a population which theory suggests should not be affected by the treatment. For reasons explained above, I repeat the analysis looking at liberal, conservative, and Christian democratic parties and, as expected, find that the experience of governing does not seem to impact those parties (i.e., I find no statistically significant results) (A11). Next, I deploy a series of placebo treatment tests, which involve repeating the main analysis but replacing the independent (treatment) variable with something which should theoretically have no effect on the outcome. I try three such placebo treatments: (i) the second lead of the main treatment variable (following the simple logic that future events cannot affect the past) (A12), (ii) random reassignments of the original treatment variable (repeated 1000 times) (A13), and (iii) reversing the treatment condition to look at the effect of a party not being in government (A14). In all three cases, the placebo tests are successful and these artificial treatments (which, by design, should not have any effect on the dependent variables) return no significant results. Taken together, these placebo tests suggest that the research design is sound and that the effects shown in Figure 5 are not simply artefacts of my methodological choices but reflect real patterns in the underlying data.


A11: Placebo population test

Notes: Analysis as in Figure 5 but the population is all Liberal, Christian Democratic and Conservative parties (n = 743 party-election observations).

A12: Placebo treatment test (lead)

Notes: Analysis as in Figure 5 but we use the second lead of the treatment variable as a placebo.

## A13: Placebo treatment test (randomised)

Notes: Analysis as in Figure 5 but coefficients use 1000 randomly generated binary vectors as the treatment variable. 0 and 1 are sampled with equal probability which closely matches the real treatment variable where the probabilities are 0.51 and 0.49.

A14: Placebo treatment test (reversed)

Notes: Analysis as in Figure 5 but using reversing the expected treatment condition (i.e. the dummy variable for being in government goes from 1 to 0).

A15: Variation by single-party or coalition government

Dependent variable	Coefficient for single-party government	P value	R^2	N
MilitPos	0.16	0.74	0.002	59
ConstPos	- 0.34	0.44	0.01	59
EconOrth	- 0.13	0.71	0.002	59
Labour	0.81	0.074	0.06	59

Notes: Linear model $Y = X + e$, where Y is the difference-in-difference coefficient for each matched set, X is a dummy variable set to 0 if the party was in coalition and 1 if it formed a single-party government, and e is the error term. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A16: Variation by party of prime minister or not

Dependent variable	Coefficient for party of prime minister	P value	R^2	N
MilitPos	0.20	0.63	0.004	59
ConstPos	0.10	0.79	0.001	59
EconOrth	- 0.22	0.48	0.009	59
Labour	0.48	0.24	0.024	59

Notes: Linear model $Y = X + e$, where Y is the difference-in-difference coefficient for each matched set, X is a dummy variable set to 1 if the prime minister was from that party and 0 otherwise, and e is the error term.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A17. Two-Way Fixed Effects without matching

The effect of being in government on…		
	Coefficient	Std error (p value)
H1a (MilitPos)	0.279	0.0976 (0.004)**
H1b (MilitNeg)	-0.301	0.0915 (0.001)**
H1c (ConstPos)	0.066	0.108 (0.5)
H1d (ConstNeg)	0.013	0.103 (0.9)
H1e (EconOrth)	0.179	0.0902 (0.05)*
H2a (LabourPos)	-0.221	0.0984 (0.02)**
All estimated via OLS. In each case, the model is as follows: Y = InGov + Year + Country + e. Where Y is the relevant dependent variable, InGov is a binary variable indicating whether or not the party was in government in the previous period, Year + Country are country- and year-level fixed effects, and e is the error term. N = 473 for all models.		