Appendix

Contents

1 Descriptive Statistics



Figure A1: Condemnations by Group 1995-2016
NSAGs that were never condemned at the UNSC are excluded.



Figure A2: Condemnations of NSAGs by State, 1995-2016
States that never condemned NSAGs are excluded.



Figure A3: Most Frequent UNSC Member States to Name and Shame States, 1995-2016

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Naming and Shaming	14,835	0.023	0.149	0	1
P5	14,835	0.333	0.471	0	1
Physical Integrity	14,835	0.728	0.268	0.068	0.990
One-Sided Violence	14,835	1.349	2.262	0.000	10.313
External Support	14,835	0.052	0.221	0	1
Intensity	14,835	4.983	1.657	0.000	10.280
Secessionist	14,835	0.420	0.494	0	1
Peacekeeping	14,835	0.991	2.975	0.000	11.555
Prior Shame	14,835	0.112	0.316	0	1
Resolutions	14,835	0.228	0.514	0.000	2.485

1.1 E10 Coalescing on the Same NSAGs

We tested whether the E10, basing their decision on global protection norms, are more likely to coalesce on the same groups than the P5. To do this, we created separate yearly concentration ratios for the P5 and the E10 by dividing their total number of naming and shaming events by the number of groups they targeted each year. A ratio of one indicates complete dispersion – all naming and shaming events targeted different actors. Conversely, a higher ratio indicates that condemnations are concentrated on a narrower group of actors.

As shown in Figure A4, the E10's average concentration ratio from 1995-2016 was 2.47, while the P5's average was 1.63. This indicates that the E10 are, in fact, more likely to focus their naming and shaming on the same groups, in comparison with the P5.



Figure A4: P5 and E10 Concentration Ratio (Events / Unique Targets) Over Time, 1995-2016

2 Additional Regressions

2.1 Operationalizes Partnerships as Alliances

If the UNSC member state is in a military alliance with the government fighting against the NSAG, the UNSC member state may be compelled to support their ally and deride the enemy of their friend.

The dummy variable *Allies* takes on a value of one if the UNSC member state is in a offensive or defensive military alliance with any state actively fighting the NSAG (Leeds et al. 2002). Nonagression pacts, neutrality pacts, and consultation pacts are excluded. The reported results below are consistent with the distinct definitions of *Allies* and *External Support* and indicative that they capture different phenomena. In accordance with our theory, our focus is on *External Support* as it captures concrete support to partner governments (such as weapons and other materiel) and more specifically captures civil war involvement.

Table A2: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*: Operationalizes Partnerships as Formal Alliances

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
One-Sided Violence		1.172***	1.177***
		(0.043)	(0.046)
One-Sided Violence*P5		0.925	0.921
		(0.041)	(0.043)
Allies	1.147		1.136
	(0.253)		(0.250)
Allies*P5	1.110		1.244
	(0.314)		(0.341)
P5	1.116	1.471	1.423
	(0.283)	(0.499)	(0.493)
Physical Integrity	1.274	1.349	1.287
	(0.498)	(0.527)	(0.520)
Intensity	1.579***	1.431***	1.414***
	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Secessionist	1.694*	1.887**	1.952***
	(0.350)	(0.369)	(0.395)
Peacekeeping	1.049**	1.057**	1.058***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Resolutions	1.480***	1.420**	1.423**
	(0.171)	(0.160)	(0.160)
Prior Shame	10.107***	10.098***	9.881***
	(1.784)	(1.858)	(1.808)
Intercept	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	14 835	14 835	14 835
AIC	2360.1	2336.0	2337.7
BIC	2436.1	2412.0	2429.0
Log.Lik.	−1170.044	−1157.997	−1156.852

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

2.2 Includes Interaction Between Partnerships and Protection Norms

Table A3 shoes the odds ratios from logistic regressions that explore possible interaction effects between our primary independent variables.

Model 1 includes an interaction effect between the variable *External Support* and *One-Sided Violence* alongside relevant controls. While the variable *One-Sided Violence* is statistically significant and greater than one, the interaction between *External Support* and *One-Sided Violence* is not statistically significant. We conclude there are no significant interaction effects between our primary independent variables.

Model 2 includes a three-way interaction between *External Support*, *One-Sided Violence*, and the variable P5 to test if a state's P5 status alters how *One-Sided Violence* influences the effect of *External Support*.

Table A3: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*: Includes Interaction Between Strategic Partnerships and Protection Norms

	Model 1	Model 2
External Support	2.604	1.128
	(1.405)	(1.047)
External Support*P5		2.741
		(2.889)
One-Sided Violence	1.160***	1.182***
	(0.038)	(0.044)
One-Sided Violence*P5		0.916
		(0.041)
Ext. Sup.*OSV	0.875	0.935
	(0.069)	(0.162)
Ext. Sup.*OSV*P5		0.989
		(0.178)
P5		1.170
		(0.318)
Physical Integrity	1.240	1.159
	(0.445)	(0.415)
Intensity	1.425***	1.429***
	(0.085)	(0.083)
Secessionist	1.966***	1.915**
	(0.396)	(0.385)
Peacekeeping	1.061***	1.059**
	(0.018)	(0.020)
Resolutions	1.421**	1.435**
	(0.159)	(0.166)
Prior Shame	9.572***	9.565***
	(1.621)	(1.509)
Intercept	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	14 835	14 835
AIC	2328.7	2327.1
BIC	2404.8	2433.6
Log.Lik.	−1154.355	−1149.562

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

2.3 Includes Rebel Group Strength as Control

Militarily weak groups commit more violence against civilians in civil wars (Hultman 2007). The UNSC may also be more familiar with violence committed by large, militarily capable NSAGs. As such, we include the variable *Strength*, a five-point measure of NSAGs' military capabilities relative to the government forces they are fighting (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009).

Due to data limitations, including the variable *Strength* reduces our sample and the results are less significant. However, they are in line with our findings presented in the paper showing that one-sided violence is a significant predictor of naming and shaming NSAGs but the P5 are also more likely to name and shame when they provide support to governments fighting NSAGs.

Table A4: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*: Includes Rebel Group Strength

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
External Support	0.313		0.412
	(0.278)		(0.359)
External Support*P5	7.066+		6.564+
	(7.303)		(6.758)
One-Sided Violence		1.217**	1.211***
		(0.075)	(0.070)
One-Sided Violence*P5		0.959	0.943
		(0.065)	(0.066)
P5	1.045	1.477	1.223
	(0.176)	(0.547)	(0.373)
Physical Integrity	1.422	1.646	1.505
	(0.561)	(0.700)	(0.623)
Intensity	1.445***	1.254**	1.151+
	(0.079)	(0.089)	(0.083)
Strength			2.199***
			(0.291)
Secessionist	2.083**	2.404***	3.321***
	(0.539)	(0.609)	(0.848)
Peacekeeping	1.028	1.049	1.047
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Resolutions	3.405***	3.005***	2.726***
	(0.595)	(0.559)	(0.500)
Prior Shame	4.677***	4.868***	6.210***
	(1.082)	(1.264)	(1.575)
Intercept	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	8970	8970	8970
AIC	1263.0	1250.8	1224.0
BIC	1334.0	1321.9	1316.4
Log.Lik.	−621.480	−615.421	−599.022

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

2.4 Interdependence

Appendix Tables A5-A8 explore interdependencies between actors. If a NSAG is named and shamed by a certain UNSC member state, does that influence the likelihood that the NSAG is subsequently named and shamed by another UNSC member state?

Table A5 separates out prior shaming by the P5 and E10.

- *P5 Shamed Prior* is a dummy variable that indicates whether a P5 UNSC member state has named and shamed a given NSAG in the three prior years.
- *E10 Shamed Prior* is a dummy variable that indicates whether a E10 UNSC member state has named and shamed a given NSAG in the three prior years.

In Table A5, the coefficients for *P5 Shamed Prior* and *E10 Shamed Prior* are both greater than one and statistically significant. Where another UNSC member state, either an E10 or a P5 member, has recently named and shamed a group, other states are more likely to also do so. The results correspond to the main findings presented in the paper.

Table A5: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*: Includes P5 and E10 Prior Shaming

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
External Support	0.833	0.864	0.765
	(0.226)	(0.261)	(0.216)
External Support*P5	2.935*	3.019*	2.972*
	(1.420)	(1.391)	(1.390)
One-Sided Violence	1.179***	1.213***	1.195***
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.045)
One-Sided Violence*P5	0.892*	0.893*	0.893*
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
P5	1.249	1.229	1.257
	(0.350)	(0.339)	(0.356)
Physical Integrity	1.156	1.162	1.197
	(0.437)	(0.450)	(0.459)
Intensity	1.365***	1.408***	1.366***
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Secessionist	1.955**	1.492*	1.827**
	(0.417)	(0.285)	(0.383)
Peacekeeping	1.051**	1.081***	1.071***
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Resolutions	1.578***	1.407*	1.324*
	(0.170)	(0.196)	(0.168)
P5 Shamed Prior		7.785***	5.123***
		(1.332)	(1.673)
E10 Shamed Prior	9.306***		6.571***
	(1.594)		(1.341)
Intercept	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	14 835	14 835	14 835
AIC	2333.6	2384.8	2307.8
BIC	2424.9	2476.1	2414.3
Log.Lik.	−1154.798	−1180.424	−1139.892

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A6 explores whether UNSC member states are more or less likely to name and shame a rebel group that a specific P5 member has already named and shamed.

- *US Shamed Prior* is a dummy variable that indicates whether the United States (US) has named and shamed a given NSAG in the three prior years.
- *UK Shamed Prior* is a dummy variable that indicates whether the United Kingdom has named and shamed a given NSAG in the three prior years.
- *France Shamed Prior* is a dummy variable that indicates whether France has named and shamed a given NSAG in the three prior years.
- *Russia Shamed Prior* is a dummy variable that indicates whether Russia has named and shamed a given NSAG in the three prior years.
- *China Shamed Prior* is a dummy variable that indicates whether China has named and shamed a given NSAG in the three prior years.
- *UK Shamed Prior* is a dummy variable that indicates whether the United Kingdom has named and shamed a given NSAG in the three prior years.

The asterisk in the variable name *Prior Shame** signifies that *Prior* Shame has been modified to exclude shaming by the UNSC member state being analyzed in the model. For instance, in Model 1, *US Shamed Prior* indicates prior naming and shaming by the US, while *Prior Shame** represents prior naming and shaming by any other UNSC permanent member (France, the UK, Russia, or China) or an E10 state.

Of the five permanent members of the UNSC, only the coefficient for the variable *China Shamed Prior* is less than one (though the coefficient is not statistically distinguishable from one).

In the saturated model (Model 6), the coefficients for the variables *US Shamed Prior*, *UK Shamed Prior*, *E10 Shamed Prior* are greater than one and statistically significant; states are more likely to name and shame a NSAG where the US, the UK, or an E10 member has already done so. The variable *China Shamed Prior* is statistically significant and less than one, indicating UNSC member

states are less likely to name and shame a NSAG after China has done so.

Across all six models, the results correspond to the main findings presented in the paper.

Table A6: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*: Includes Individual P5 Prior Shaming

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
External Support	0.743	0.758	0.922	0.727	0.819	0.720
	(0.221)	(0.204)	(0.284)	(0.217)	(0.219)	(0.242)
External Support*P5	2.855*	3.058*	2.703*	3.221*	2.977*	3.143*
	(1.431)	(1.479)	(1.317)	(1.626)	(1.369)	(1.749)
One-Sided Violence	1.186***	1.199***	1.183***	1.192***	1.184***	1.223***
	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.047)
One-Sided Violence*P5	0.896*	0.892*	0.894*	0.891*	0.893*	0.893*
	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.046)
P5	1.269	1.265	1.240	1.256	1.244	1.264
	(0.352)	(0.359)	(0.356)	(0.344)	(0.349)	(0.349)
Physical Integrity	1.208	1.179	1.144	1.193	1.144	1.219
	(0.472)	(0.445)	(0.437)	(0.455)	(0.418)	(0.465)
Intensity	1.399***	1.368***	1.389***	1.334***	1.416***	1.291***
	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.073)	(0.083)
Secessionist	1.652*	1.843**	1.774**	1.920**	1.857**	1.658**
	(0.323)	(0.378)	(0.369)	(0.393)	(0.374)	(0.316)
Peacekeeping	1.061**	1.057**	1.059**	1.070***	1.054**	1.059**
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Prior Shame*	6.127***	7.897***	7.059***	8.385***	9.791***	
	(1.111)	(1.477)	(1.245)	(1.494)	(1.664)	
Resolutions	1.493***	1.400**	1.416**	1.380**	1.470***	1.543***
	(0.174)	(0.178)	(0.167)	(0.164)	(0.167)	(0.187)
US Shamed Prior	2.345***					1.756*
	(0.424)					(0.391)
UK Shamed Prior		2.179***				1.455*
		(0.286)				(0.229)
France Shamed Prior			2.143***			1.497*
			(0.337)			(0.284)
Russia Shamed Prior				2.360***		1.493
				(0.533)		(0.440)
China Shamed Prior					0.780	0.515**
					(0.161)	(0.129)
E10 Shamed Prior						5.578***
						(1.029)
Intercept	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	14 835	14 835	14 835	14 835	14 835	14 835
AIC	2308.2	2296.3	2318.1	2307.0	2323.8	2292.3
BIC	2407.0	2395.2	2416.9	2405.9	2422.7	2421.6
Log.Lik.	−1141.079	−1135.155	−1146.028	−1140.501	−1148.915	−1129.171

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A7 asks: do Russia and China respond to the Western P5 powers? That is to say, if Western powers name and shame a NSAG, are Russia and China more or less likely to name and shame the group?

Models 1 and 2 test whether the decisions of Russia and China are influenced by the US's naming and shaming of NSAGs.

The variable *US Shamed Prior* is a dummy variable that indicates whether the US has named and shamed a given NSAG in the three prior years. The variables *Russia FE* and *China FE* are fixed effects for Russia and China. The interactions *US Shamed Prior*Russia FE* and *US Shamed Prior*China FE* test whether Russia and China are more or less likely to name and shame a NSAG if the US has previously condemned the group.

The asterisk in the variable name *Prior Shame** signifies that *Prior* Shame has been modified to exclude shaming by the UNSC member state being analyzed in the model. For instance, in Model 1, *US Shamed Prior* indicates prior naming and shaming by the US, while *Prior Shame** represents prior naming and shaming by any other UNSC permanent member (France, the UK, Russia, or China) or an E10 member state.

In Model 1, the interaction between *US Shamed Prior* and *Russia FE* is statistically significant and less than one. Russia may be uniquely less likely to name and shame a NSAG after the US has done so. In Model 2 the interaction between *US Shamed Prior* and *China FE* is not statistically significant. Some of the paper's primary findings, specifically the interaction between *One-Sided Violence* and the *P5* variable. The model exhibits significant multicollinearity because the *P5* variable is highly correlated with the fixed effects for the US, UK, and France. This overlap makes it difficult for the model to disentangle the unique effect of P5 membership from the broader effect of being a major Western power. A direct consequence of this multicollinearity is the inflation of the model's standard errors. As a result, the interaction term becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero, masking a potentially genuine effect.

Models 3 and 4 examine whether the decisions of Russia and China are responsive to naming and shaming by the Western P5 powers.

The variable *Western Shamed Prior* is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the US, the United Kingdom, or France has named and shamed a given NSAG in the three prior years. Interacting *Western Shamed Prior* with the Russia and China fixed effects reveals that Russia and China are *more* likely to name and shame a NSAG after Western powers have named and shamed a group.

Table A7: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*: Do Russia and China Respond to Western Powers?

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
External Support	0.739	0.743	0.767	0.768
	(0.223)	(0.217)	(0.213)	(0.219)
External Support*P5	2.652*	2.635	2.799*	2.765*
	(1.270)	(1.368)	(1.306)	(1.383)
One-Sided Violence	1.185***	1.185***	1.193***	1.193***
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.044)
One-Sided Violence*P5	0.900*	0.900*	0.896*	0.897*
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.045)
P5	1.391	1.448	1.369	1.432
	(0.404)	(0.398)	(0.382)	(0.391)
Physical Integrity	1.086	1.022	1.107	1.032
	(0.460)	(0.416)	(0.462)	(0.399)
Intensity	1.402***	1.402***	1.375***	1.376***
	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.077)
Secessionist	1.648*	1.651*	1.794**	1.798**
	(0.332)	(0.336)	(0.366)	(0.371)
Peacekeeping	1.061**	1.062**	1.067***	1.067**
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Prior Shame*	6.139***	6.144***	5.114***	5.118***
	(1.079)	(1.090)	(0.941)	(0.945)
Resolutions	1.491**	1.489***	1.365*	1.363*
	(0.182)	(0.179)	(0.168)	(0.169)
US Shamed Prior	2.405***	2.391***		
	(0.430)	(0.431)		
US Shamed Prior*Russia Fe	0.666**			
	(0.101)			
US Shamed Prior*China FE		0.777		
		(0.113)		
Western Shamed Prior			2.802***	2.823***
			(0.424)	(0.420)
Western Prior*Russia			1.406**	
			(0.168)	
Western Prior*China				1.320*
				(0.155)
Russia FE	0.701		0.537**	
	(0.161)		(0.128)	
China FE		0.519**		0.417***
		(0.119)		(0.101)
Intercept	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	14 835	14 835	14 835	14 835
AIC	2309.3	2306.5	2299.0	2296.0
BIC	2423.4	2420.6	2413.0	2410.0
Log.Lik.	−1139.671	−1138.254	−1134.484	−1132.981

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A8 examines whether naming and shaming by Russia or China influences Western P5 states' decisions to name and shame NSAGs.

Model 1 specifically tests if prior naming and shaming by Russia or China affects the US' decision. The variable *Russia/China Shamed Prior* indicates whether Russia or China has named and shamed a given NSAG in the three prior years. While the coefficient is statistically significant and greater than one, indicating that other UNSC member states are more likely to name and shame after a NSAG after Russia or China have done so, the interaction between the variable *Russia/China Shamed Prior* and a fixed effect for the US (*US FE*) is not significant.

Model 2 tests if Russia and China naming and shaming a NSAG influences the likelihood that the United Kingdom publicly condemns the group. Similarly, while the coefficient for the variable *Russia/China Shamed Prior* is statistically significant and greater than one, indicating UNSC member states are more likely to name and shame a NSAG after Russia or China has named and shamed the group, it does not appear that the UK is uniquely less or more likely to name and shame a group that has been condemned by Russia or China. The interaction between *Russia/China Shamed Prior* and a fixed effect for the United Kingdom (*UK FE*) is not significant.

Model 3 examines if Russia and China's decision-making alters France's behavior. The variable *Russia/China Shamed Prior* continues to be significant and the interaction between this variable and a fixed effect for France (*France FE*) is significant and less than one. When Russia and China names and shames a group, France becomes more likely to name and shame a group by a factor of 1.099.[27] The odds ratio of less than one for the France interaction term indicates that the main effect is dampened for France compared to other UNSC members, resulting in only a slight increase in its likelihood to name and shame a group.

Model 4 examines if naming and shaming by Russia and China influences the decision-making of the Western P5 (US, UK, France). While the coefficient for *Russia/China Shamed Prior* is statistically significant and greater than one, indicating that UNSC member states as a whole are more likely to

27. We obtain this by multiplying 0.592 by 1.858.

name and shame a NSAG after Russia or China have condemned the group, the interaction effect with *Western* - a dummy variable for the US, UK, France - is not statistically distinguishable from a null effect. Western powers do not appear more or less likely to name and shame a NSAG after Russia or China have already done so.

The variable *Prior Shame** (see description above) remains positive and significant.

The variables *P5* is correlated with the fixed effects for the US, UK, and France. Due to this significant overlap, the model cannot easily distinguish the unique effect of being a P5 member from the effect of being a Western power. This inflates the standard errors of the coefficients in the model. As a result, even if a real effect exists, the high standard errors cause the interaction term to be statistically indistinguishable from zero, making it appear insignificant.

Table A8: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*: Do Western Powers Respond to Russia and China?

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
External Support	0.758	0.761	0.757	0.772
	(0.228)	(0.225)	(0.220)	(0.225)
External Support*P5	2.253	3.072*	3.154*	2.325
	(0.992)	(1.630)	(1.582)	(1.136)
One-Sided Violence	1.173***	1.178***	1.176***	1.172***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)
One-Sided Violence*P5	0.902*	0.893*	0.896*	0.907
	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.048)
P5	1.067	1.291	1.213	0.707
	(0.286)	(0.406)	(0.372)	(0.167)
Physical Integrity	1.043	1.210	1.157	0.756
	(0.384)	(0.478)	(0.447)	(0.295)
Intensity	1.389***	1.378***	1.377***	1.383***
	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.077)
Secessionist	1.952***	1.964***	1.970**	1.963***
	(0.388)	(0.391)	(0.406)	(0.401)
Peacekeeping	1.071***	1.070***	1.070***	1.071***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Prior Shame*	8.769***	8.572***	8.550***	8.711***
	(1.480)	(1.472)	(1.453)	(1.529)
Resolutions	1.359*	1.364*	1.365*	1.355*
	(0.174)	(0.179)	(0.175)	(0.184)
Western				2.595***
				(0.595)
Russia/China Shamed Prior	1.685*	1.715*	1.763**	1.759*
	(0.357)	(0.368)	(0.351)	(0.426)
RC Prior*Western				0.918
				(0.214)
US FE	2.215***			
	(0.394)			
Russia/China Prior*US FE	1.347			
	(0.264)			
UK FE		0.880		
		(0.217)		
Russia/China Prior*UK FE		0.884		
		(0.229)		
France FE			1.203	
			(0.286)	
Russia/China Prior*Fr FE			0.579*	
			(0.128)	
Intercept	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	14 835	14 835	14 835	14 835
AIC	2307.6	2319.8	2319.2	2308.5
BIC	2421.7	2433.8	2433.3	2422.6
Log.Lik.	−1138.800	−1144.882	−1144.598	−1139.249

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

2.5 Controls for Terrorism

Data on terrorism drawn from the Terrorism in Armed Conflict project (Fortna, Lotito, and Rubin 2022), which integrates the Uppsala Conflict Data Project sample of rebel organizations with START's Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (START 2020). *Terrorism 1* is the total number terror incidents in a year, with UCDP rebel groups linked to direct name matches in the GTD as well as recognized armed wings of rebel groups. *Terrorism 2* is the total number terror incidents in a year, with UCDP rebel groups linked to direct name matches in the GTD, recognized armed wings of rebel groups, rebel group factions and umbrella organizations. *Terrorism 3* is the total number terror fatalities in a year, with UCDP rebel groups linked to direct name matches in the GTD as well as recognized armed wings of rebel groups. *Terrorism 4* is the total number terror fatalities in a year, with UCDP rebel groups linked to direct name matches in the GTD, recognized armed wings of rebel groups, rebel group factions and umbrella organizations. Due to data limitations, the sample is reduced but the results are largely in line with the results presented in the paper. However, we believe that the effect of the differential effect of one-sided violence for the E10 and P5 is dampened by the partial overlap between committing deliberate violence against civilians and terrorist tactics.

Table A9: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*: Includes Terrorism

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
External Support	0.801	0.743	0.747	0.725
	(0.474)	(0.446)	(0.488)	(0.454)
External Support*P5	3.884+	4.030+	4.005+	4.075+
	(2.812)	(2.974)	(3.031)	(3.023)
One-Sided Violence	1.205***	1.204***	1.223***	1.215***
	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.068)
One-Sided Violence*P5	0.935	0.933	0.935	0.933
	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.064)
P5	1.226	1.238	1.234	1.243
	(0.365)	(0.354)	(0.364)	(0.393)
Physical Integrity	0.927	0.940	0.944	0.949
	(0.413)	(0.422)	(0.424)	(0.421)
Intensity	1.281**	1.255**	1.254**	1.245**
	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.088)	(0.090)
Secessionist	1.990**	1.976**	1.952**	1.939**
	(0.524)	(0.491)	(0.477)	(0.481)
Peacekeeping	1.038	1.043	1.041	1.044
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Resolutions	2.348***	2.327***	2.372***	2.332***
	(0.349)	(0.339)	(0.359)	(0.370)
Prior Shame	5.671***	5.514***	5.468***	5.454***
	(1.198)	(1.239)	(1.114)	(1.184)
Terrorism1	0.993+			
	(0.004)			
Terrorism2		0.996		
		(0.005)		
Terrorism3			0.998+	
			(0.001)	
Terrorism4				0.999
				(0.001)
Intercept	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Num.Obs.	11 055	11 055	11 055	11 055
AIC	1606.0	1609.8	1605.7	1608.6
BIC	1701.1	1704.9	1700.7	1703.7
Log.Lik.	−790.007	−791.917	−789.851	−791.325

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

2.6 Controls for Peace Negotiations

In the table below, we include a control for NSAGs that have entered into peace negotiations with one or more of the governments they are fighting. Data comes from Nilsson and Svensson (2023). Due to data limitations, including the variable *Negotiations* limits our sample to Africa and the Americas and the number of observations is substantially reduced.

Table A10: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*: Includes Peace Negotiations

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
External Support	1.083		1.318
	(0.452)		(0.603)
External Support*P5	2.249		2.057
	(1.164)		(1.109)
One-Sided Violence		1.179***	1.181***
		(0.052)	(0.050)
One-Sided Violence*P5		0.912	0.896
		(0.052)	(0.064)
P5	0.814	1.439	1.211
	(0.151)	(0.551)	(0.426)
Physical Integrity	0.756	0.894	0.758
	(0.320)	(0.397)	(0.331)
Intensity	1.378***	1.226**	1.195**
	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.078)
Secessionist	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Peacekeeping	0.925**	0.945*	0.939*
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Resolutions	1.634***	1.580***	1.651***
	(0.220)	(0.207)	(0.212)
Prior Shame	7.060***	6.848***	6.352***
	(1.535)	(1.462)	(1.319)
Negotiations			1.253
			(0.191)
Intercept	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Num.Obs.	5205	5205	5205
AIC	1186.2	1178.5	1174.3
BIC	1251.8	1244.1	1259.6
Log.Lik.	−583.110	−579.260	−574.167

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

2.7 Includes Third-Party Support to NSAGs

Includes *Ext. Support to NSAG* - a dummy variable that take a value of one where the UNSC member state is providing militarily relevant aid to a given NSAG in a given year and a value of zero otherwise (Meier et al. 2023). The results correspond to the main findings presented in the paper.

Table A11: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*: Include External Support to NSAGs

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
External Support	0.857		0.864
	(0.220)		(0.251)
External Support*P5	2.675*		2.798*
	(1.240)		(1.324)
One-Sided Violence		1.172***	1.179***
		(0.043)	(0.044)
One-Sided Violence*P5		0.925	0.894*
		(0.041)	(0.045)
Ext Support to NSAG			0.000***
			(0.000)
P5	0.885	1.471	1.243
	(0.165)	(0.502)	(0.349)
Physical Integrity	1.130	1.349	1.130
	(0.413)	(0.574)	(0.418)
Intensity	1.574***	1.431***	1.419***
	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.080)
Secessionist	1.664*	1.887**	1.895**
	(0.342)	(0.383)	(0.388)
Peacekeeping	1.050**	1.057**	1.057**
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Resolutions	1.485**	1.420**	1.441**
	(0.184)	(0.168)	(0.165)
Prior Shame	9.808***	10.098***	9.542***
	(1.718)	(1.858)	(1.610)
Intercept	0.000***	0.000***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	14 835	14 835	14 835
AIC	2347.6	2336.0	2325.1
BIC	2423.7	2412.0	2424.0
Log.Lik.	−1163.815	−1157.997	−1149.548

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

2.8 Includes Linear Time Trend

The table below includes a linear time trend. The results correspond to the main findings presented in the paper.

Table A12: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*: Includes Linear Time Trend

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
External Support	0.857		0.738
	(0.228)		(0.199)
External Support*P5	2.675*		2.949*
	(1.251)		(1.388)
One-Sided Violence		1.172***	1.195***
		(0.043)	(0.045)
One-Sided Violence*P5		0.925	0.894*
		(0.041)	(0.044)
P5	0.885	1.471	1.263
	(0.171)	(0.497)	(0.341)
Physical Integrity	1.130	1.349	1.194
	(0.408)	(0.535)	(0.446)
Intensity	1.574***	1.431***	1.388***
	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.080)
Secessionist	1.664*	1.887**	2.095***
	(0.362)	(0.381)	(0.449)
Peacekeeping	1.050**	1.057**	1.040*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Resolutions	1.485**	1.420**	1.602***
	(0.180)	(0.167)	(0.181)
Prior Shame	9.808***	10.098***	7.990***
	(1.747)	(1.942)	(1.405)
Time			1.040***
			(0.011)
Intercept	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	14 835	14 835	14 835
AIC	2347.6	2336.0	2314.5
BIC	2423.7	2412.0	2413.3
Log.Lik.	−1163.815	−1157.997	−1144.240

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

2.9 Rare Events Logit Model

Most NSAGs are never named and shamed at the UNSC. Below we use Firth's bias-reduced logistic regression (Firth 1993); a modification of traditional logistic regression designed to improve parameter estimation in situations where the number of events is relatively low by introducing a penalization term to the likelihood function, which helps reduce small-sample bias. The results correspond to the main findings presented in the paper.

Table A13: Odds Ratios from Rare-Events Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
External Support	0.871		0.840
	(0.225)		(0.225)
External Support*P5	2.632**		2.868**
	(1.319)		(1.404)
One-Sided Violence		1.172***	1.179***
		(0.043)	(0.044)
One-Sided Violence*P5		0.925	0.894*
		(0.041)	(0.045)
P5	0.888	1.473*	1.250
	(0.169)	(0.504)	(0.338)
Physical Integrity	1.125	1.343	1.143
	(0.416)	(0.563)	(0.429)
Intensity	1.570***	1.429***	1.416***
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.078)
Secessionist	1.665***	1.887***	1.895***
	(0.357)	(0.372)	(0.387)
Peacekeeping	1.050**	1.057***	1.058***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Resolutions	1.486***	1.420***	1.438***
	(0.181)	(0.161)	(0.164)
Prior Shame	9.746***	10.026***	9.479***
	(1.703)	(1.883)	(1.618)
Intercept	0.000***	0.000***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	14 835	14 835	14 835
McFadden's R2	0.280	0.283	0.288
AIC	2347.7	2336.1	2324.6
BIC	2423.7	2412.1	2415.8
Log.Lik.	−1163.841	−1158.026	−1150.296

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

2.10 Split Sample

Below we report results for the E10 and P5 separately by splitting the sample. The results are in line with our main results presented in the paper. The E10 are more likely to name and shame NSAGs as one-sided violence increases. The sample of the P5 is small, but the results indicate that when the P5 provide external support to the governments fighting NSAGs, the likelihood of naming and shaming increases. While one-sided violence is to some extent associated with naming and shaming also for the P5, the effect is larger for the E10.

	E10			P5		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
External Support	0.772		0.802	1.955+		1.906+
	(0.210)		(0.222)	(0.761)		(0.742)
One-Sided Violence		1.154***	1.152***		1.088*	1.080+
		(0.047)	(0.044)		(0.046)	(0.050)
Physical Integrity	0.732	0.733	0.741	4.406***	6.723***	4.544***
	(0.280)	(0.269)	(0.284)	(0.716)	(2.690)	(0.762)
Intensity	1.692***	1.488***	1.501***	1.446***	1.409***	1.361***
	(0.082)	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.126)
Secessionist	1.635+	1.860*	1.847*	1.924*	2.020**	2.046*
	(0.429)	(0.452)	(0.445)	(0.591)	(0.541)	(0.586)
Peacekeeping	1.065**	1.076**	1.075**	1.031	1.033	1.035
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Resolutions	1.405*	1.335+	1.336+	1.550**	1.481**	1.502**
	(0.231)	(0.205)	(0.214)	(0.224)	(0.201)	(0.202)
Prior Shame	9.678***	9.219***	9.382***	10.582***	12.016***	10.440***
	(2.173)	(1.934)	(2.038)	(2.530)	(3.502)	(2.526)
Intercept	0.000***	0.001***	0.001***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	9900	9900	9900	4950	4950	4950
AIC	1507.2	1490.7	1492.1	825.0	829.5	824.3
BIC	1564.8	1548.3	1556.9	877.0	881.6	882.9
Log.Lik.	−745.618	−737.326	−737.041	−404.495	−406.764	−403.174

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

2.11 Matched Sample

In this section we investigate if there is variance in whether the E10 have strong relations with states in civil conflict and if the lack of relevant ties explains the E10 results. In other words, do E10 states with ties behave as P5 with ties, but states without ties behave differently?

Figure A5 shows the annual instances of civil war support from UNSC members between 1995 and 2016. Since E10 members on the Council are twice as numerous as P5 members, one would expect their total support to be proportionally larger if they intervened at the same per-member rate. However, the figure shows that while E10 states provided support more often in absolute terms, they did so at a rate far lower than their numerical representation would suggest.



Figure A5: Annual Count of Governments Receiving Support from UNSC Members, 1995-2016

We use matching to investigate whether E10 states with an equal number of global ties as the P5 are more likely to behave like the P5. We created a new sample that sought a nearest neighbor match with replacement, applying a caliper of 0.1 standard deviations, on the number of governments each UNSC member state supported in a civil war in a given year.[28] In doing so, we sought to modify

28. We choose to execute matching without replacement, as allowing replacement reduced the effective sample size to a small fraction of the original sample.

the E10 sample such that it approximated the P5 sample in the number of governments UNSC member states were supporting. The test statistic from a Welch's two sample t-test comparing the number of governments P5 and E10 member states were providing external support to is -0.642, with a p-value of 0.52, indicating that the matching procedure created a dataset relatively balanced in the degree that each type of UNSC member state was providing support to governments fighting civil wars.

The regression results using the matched sample are shown in Table A14. Limiting our sample to the P5 and E10 with similar degrees of global support for governments fighting NSAGs, with respect to the variable External Support, the results remain largely consistent with the paper's main findings. The interaction effect between *External Support* and *P5* is statistically significant with an odds ratio of 2.885. While the odds ratio for variable *One-Sided Violence* is greater than one and statistically significant, the interaction between *One-Sided Violence* and the variable *P5* is no longer significant. This is due to the matching process dropping several observations of E10 states that, despite having few international ties, had named and shamed NSAGs committing significant one-sided violence.

Table A14: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
External Support	0.777		0.749
	(0.244)		(0.233)
External Support*P5	2.676*		2.885*
	(1.293)		(1.475)
One-Sided Violence		1.138**	1.151***
		(0.045)	(0.047)
One-Sided Violence*P5		0.952	0.920
		(0.044)	(0.047)
P5	0.832	1.262	1.070
	(0.161)	(0.415)	(0.302)
Physical Integrity	1.223	1.493	1.240
	(0.466)	(0.626)	(0.477)
Intensity	1.577***	1.452***	1.437***
	(0.102)	(0.092)	(0.096)
Secessionist	1.695*	1.855**	1.858**
	(0.370)	(0.376)	(0.431)
Peacekeeping	1.038+	1.043*	1.042*
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Resolutions	1.187	1.151	1.174
	(0.159)	(0.142)	(0.165)
Prior Shame	14.143***	14.529***	13.607***
	(2.784)	(3.108)	(3.011)
Intercept	0.000***	0.000***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	9258	9258	9258
AIC	1613.1	1612.1	1604.3
BIC	1684.4	1683.4	1689.9
Log.Lik.	−796.547	−796.045	−790.143

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

2.12 Sequence of Naming and Shaming

How do groups first get mentioned? Figure A6 is a histogram of the first state to name a NSAG in our sample. The US is clear outlier, with Rwanda and the P5 constituting the top six.

Are P5 condemnations primarily motivated by geopolitical calculations, with E10 members lending their support only when those actions are consistent with international norms? Conversely, do E10 members initiate condemnations based on normative principles, with the P5 participating only when it aligns with their strategic interests? While Table 2 includes the variable *Prior Shame* to partially capture ripple effects, and Tables A5 distinguished prior shaming by E10 and P5 members, in Table A15 we look for conditional effects of prior shaming by E10 and P5 members.

In Table A15, Model 1 examines whether there is a conditional effect - if a P5 or E10 state is more or less likely to name and shame a group if an E10 or P5 member has named and shamed the group in the three years prior. Neither the interactions *P5 Shamed Prior*P5* nor *E10 Shamed Prior*P5* are statistically significant.

Does the P5 typically initiate condemnations based on political interests, with the E10 only following suit if normative principles align? Model 2 addresses this question with a triple interaction to assess if the effect of a clear norm violation (*One-Sided Violence*) on the likelihood of shaming is different for P5 and E10 members, depending on who issued a prior condemnation.



Figure A6: First State to Name and Shame a NSAG
States that never name and shame a NSAG are excluded.

Table A15: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression on *Naming and Shaming*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
External Support	0.776	0.797	3.162
	(0.215)	(0.227)	(2.194)
External Support*P5	2.906*	2.843	1.163
	(1.492)	(1.573)	(0.964)
One-Sided Violence	1.198***	1.196***	1.194***
	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.044)
One-Sided Violence*P5		0.894*	
		(0.050)	
P5	1.209	1.300	1.077
	(0.336)	(0.407)	(0.282)
Physical Integrity	1.205	1.169	1.256
	(0.452)	(0.442)	(0.468)
Intensity	1.348***	1.358***	1.367***
	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Secessionist	1.793**	1.691**	1.783**
	(0.371)	(0.341)	(0.362)
Peacekeeping	1.072***	1.074***	1.073***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Resolutions	1.351*	1.451**	1.323*
	(0.181)	(0.165)	(0.174)
(Intercept)	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num.Obs.	14 835	14 835	14 835
AIC	2314.4	2285.1	2304.9
BIC	2428.5	2429.6	2449.4
Log.Lik.	−1142.210	−1123.572	−1133.431

Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by country.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

To ease the interpretability of the triple interaction, Figure A7 plots predicted one-sided violence, comparing outcomes for P5 and E10 member states based on whether the targeted group had been shamed by a P5 state in the prior three years.

Figure A7 shows that when the P5 have not previously shamed a group, the E10 are more likely to name and shame a group as the amount of *One-Sided Violence* increases. When a P5 member state has recently named and shamed a group, the E10 do not follow suit, as there is a negative correlation between *One-Sided Violence* and condemnations. This may be the result of E10 states wishing to distinguish themselves as norm entrepreneurs, choosing to name and shame different organizations than the P5, in line with our theoretical logic. It is important to note that this negative correlation subsides significantly as the amount of *One-Sided Violence* increases.



Figure A7: Predicted Probability of Shaming by E10/P5 Status and Prior P5 Condemnation

Do E10 members name and shame based on normative principles, with the P5 then choosing to follow suit only when it aligns with their strategic interests? Model 3 and Figure A8 address this question. In Figure A8, we can compare the two solid blue lines to assess how the P5 react when the

E10 have previously named and shamed a group. This appears to be the case. For a P5 member, the interaction effect between prior E10 shaming and *External Support* is 2.264. This means that, for a P5, prior shaming by an E10 strengthens the effect of External Support on the odds of shaming by a factor of 2.26.[29].



Figure A8: Predicted Probability of Shaming by E10/P5 Status and Prior E10 Condemnation

29. 2.26 is obtained by multiplying the odds ratios 0.438 and 5.168 to get 2.264.

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