WEB APPENDIX

"Apology Diplomacy: The International Image Effects of Interstate Apologies"

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Appendix A: Research Process

We carried out two survey experiments on U.S.-based respondents: Study 1 in September 2022 and Study 2 in February 2024. We recruited respondents via Lucid and they were paid through Lucid. Both studies were IRB-approved in an expedited review process. The studies did not involve deception, benefit and harm were minimal, no personally identifying information was collected, and we took standard procedures to ensure confidentiality. The studies are in compliance with APSA's Principle and Guidance for Human Subjects Research.

Both studies were preregistered through Open Science Framework (OSF) prior to fielding. (https://osf.io/xkuca/?view_only=e7e79b65c82c4874b7cd7d580f910570). The respective preregistration plans (PAPs) are shown in Documents A-1 and A-2.

Comments regarding PAPs and analyses shown in the manuscript and appendix:

For space reasons, in the manuscript, we focused on a subset of hypotheses and mention others only in passing. However, results from all preregistered analyses are shown in this web appendix. Steps 1/2/3 from the PAPs are referred to as Parts 1/2/3 respectively in the manuscript and the remainder of the appendix. We use the numbering system from our PAPs to link results to specific hypotheses.

The following numbering links the core hypotheses discussed in the manuscript to results in the web appendix:

Effect of Apology is H1a-d
Target Rejection, Conditional on Apology is H5a-d
Target Rejection, Compared to No Apology is H6a-d
Sender Backlash, Conditional on Apology is H7a-c
Sender Backlash, Compared to No Apology is H8a-c.

We note one deviation in numbering. We incorrectly assigned M5i-ii in the PAP for Study 2 to a hypotheses on the mechanism we added (Military Power). M5i-ii is already in use in the PAP for Study 1 (to test the reassurance mechanism in the context of how target rejections vs. acceptances of the apology are received). Here we thus use M5Fi-ii to refer to findings that pertain to M5i-ii in the PAP for Study 2.

Document A-1: Preanalysis Plan for Study 1

1. Motivation

Observers frequently comment that we live in the "age of apology," with international apologies— apologies from one state to another—becoming more common since the mid-1980s (Cunningham 2014, Zoodsma and Schaafsma 2021). In this paper we ask: "Do international audiences update positively or negatively about a country that apologizes for its past transgressions against another state?" Put differently, we examine public opinion responsiveness in State C to an apology by State A for transgressions committed against State B.

We plan to field a survey experiment in which U.S.-based subjects learn about how another state (State A) dealt with a historical transgression against State B (not the U.S.). We hold the identity of States A and B as well as the nature of the transgressions— military invasion and mass atrocities—constant. We randomly vary whether there is an *apology*: whether state A apologizes to state B or not. Next, in

vignettes in which there is an apology, we randomly vary whether respondents only learn about the apology but receive no further information about the domestic response to the apology in the sender state (whether or not there was domestic backlash in State A) and the response of the target state (whether State B rejected or accepted the apology)—we call this the *short-term apology* scenario—or whether we provide additional information about sender domestic backlash and target response—the *long-term apology* scenario.[1]

Additionally, we randomly vary *regime type*: whether State A is a democracy or a nondemocracy at the time of the apology/non-apology. The *regime type* treatment is fully crossed with the *apology* and *no apology* scenarios. Our goal is to explore whether the effects of apologies are consistent across regime types, and how the image-rehabilitation effects of apologies compare to the effects of transitioning to democracy. We present the full set of treatment combinations in Table A-1.

We field our study in the U.S., because, as a military and economic world power and a core member of the group of liberal states, the American response to a foreign country's (non)apology centrally affects that country's fortunes. The U.S. wields influence both directly and indirectly: the U.S. can offer valuable cooperation opportunities to the transgressor, and, at the same time, American support can enhance the transgressor's international status as recognized by other members of the international community.

Our findings about how American voters respond to a (non)apology will provide insights on two fronts. First, our experiments will tell us about how voters in third countries (in this case, the U.S.) react upon learning that another country has attempted to publicly atone for past bad behavior. Understanding how ordinary citizens react is important for several reasons. For one, public opinion affects leaders' foreign policy decisions. But what the public thinks also matters in its own right, for example by making citizens more likely to buy products from or travel to the transgressing country. Second, public opinion can shed light on how the elites who ultimately make foreign policy decisions might react. For example, Kertzer (2020) finds that elites and the mass public show remarkably consistent responses in experiments about political issues. Thus, learning about how apologies shape public attitudes sheds light on whether apologies shape elites' willingness to cooperate, as well.

2. Hypotheses

We develop hypotheses regarding both the potential international benefits and costs of apologies. First, with regard to benefits, we predict that apologies have a positive effect on 1) how favorably third-party audiences view the transgressor (*Favorability*); 2) the willingness of the third-party audience to support their government cooperating with the transgressor (*State-to-State Cooperation*); and 3) the willingness of subjects in the third-party country to conduct personal transactions involving the transgressor by purchasing products manufactured in that country (*Private Transactions*). The first dependent variable thus gets at attitudes towards the transgressor and the second and third dependent variables get at the potential for different types of tangible benefits a sender may receive for apologizing. Regarding the international costs of apologies, we test the hypothesis that 4) apologies increase perceptions of weakness and exploitability of the sender (*Weakness*).

We explore several mechanisms that might underlie the effect of apologies on our four dependent variables. We expect that three key mechanisms could drive increased favorability and willingness to cooperate on an interstate-level and a private citizen-level: 1) *reassurance*: apologies could reduce fear that the transgressor could take similarly aggressive actions directed against the original target or others in the future; 2) *signaling of appropriate values*: apologies might signal that the transgressor subscribes to moral values that the audience—in this case a liberal democracy— shares, which in turn suggests that the

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[1] Below, we refer to these as "short" and "long" apologies for brevity.

transgressor should be considered a respectable member of a community and an international partner, and 3) *sincerity*: given its potential costs, a public apology might indicate that the sender sincerely regrets its past actions and is not simply seeking to move forward in relations with others for its own benefit.[2] We expect that the mechanism that drives perceptions of weakness of the sender is 4) *face loss*: through an apology the sender defers to the target, lowering its own status.

Our experimental scenarios involve a situation in which the transgressor was a nondemocracy at the time of the transgression, but half of the time respondents are told that the transgressor has since transitioned to a democracy while the other half of the time the transgressor remains a nondemocracy.[3] We expect our hypotheses to hold both for democratic and nondemocratic senders: apologies should have a beneficial effect on third-party views of the sender and lead to perceptions of sender weakness whether the sender remains a nondemocracy or transitions to democracy. However, given that the effects could nonetheless differ across regime types, we test each of our hypotheses separately for a democratic state and a nondemocratic one.

Our analysis proceeds in three steps:

Step 1: What is the effect of an apology relative to no apology?

In this first step, for nondemocracies and democracies separately, we compare cases in which a transgressor makes no apology to cases in which the transgressor apologizes but no further information about sender backlash and target reception is provided. In other words, we compare the *no apology*-scenario to the *short apology*-scenario. This analysis will help us establish the baseline effect of an apology: what are the benefits and costs of an apology as it originally occurs and is reported in the media, without information about the domestic reaction in the sender and the target's response, information that is typically only available at a later point?

> H1: *Effect of Apology.* Relative to no apology, an apology…
>> a) (Favorability) increases favorable views of the transgressor.
>> b) (State-to-State Cooperation) increases support for state-to-state cooperation with the transgressor.
>> c) (Private Transactions) increases willingness to transact privately with the transgressor.
>> d) (Weakness): increases perceptions of weakness of the transgressor.

> M1i (*Reassurance mechanism*): An apology reduces perceptions of threat relative to no apology.

> M1ii (*Reassurance mechanism*): Perceptions of greater threat …
>> a) decrease favorable views of the transgressor.
>> b) decrease support for state-to-state cooperation with the transgressor.
>> c) decrease willingness to transact privately with the transgressor.

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[2] We expect that both the *reassurance* and *values* mediators are affected by the *sincerity* mediator: apologies that are, for whatever reason, seen as more sincere should provide more reassurance and more strongly signal appropriate values.

[3] Nondemocracies are more likely to engage the kind of transgression we focus on, but history suggests that apologies are more frequently issued by democracies, including states that recently transitioned. Studying the effects of apologies by both kinds of regimes allows us to draw more general conclusions about how international audiences may respond to an apology. Future research could study whether the effects are different for regimes that were democratic at the time of the transgression.

M2i (*Values mechanism*): An apology increases perceptions of acceptable values relative to no apology.

M2ii (*Values mechanism*): Perceptions of acceptable values …
    a) increase favorable views of the transgressor.
    b) increase support for state-to-state cooperation with the transgressor.
    c) increase willingness to transact privately with the transgressor.

M3i (*Sincerity mechanism*): An apology increases perceptions of sincerity relative to no apology.

M3ii (*Sincerity mechanism*): Perceptions of sincerity …[4]
    a) increase favorable views of the transgressor.
    b) increase support for state-to-state cooperation with the transgressor.
    c) increase willingness to transact privately with the transgressor.
    d) increase perceptions of reassurance.
    e) increase perceptions of values.

M4i (*Face Loss mechanism*): An apology lowers perception of status relative to no apology.

M4ii (*Face Loss mechanism*): Perceptions of status decrease perceptions of weakness of the transgressor.

We will also examine whether democratization moderates the effect of an apology. For our three DVs that measure the beneficial effects of an apology—Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transactions— we formulate competing predictions as to whether an apology has a stronger effect when the country has transitioned to democracy since the transgression occurred, versus remained a nondemocracy. On the one hand, an apology by a democracy (i.e. post-transition) may be seen as more sincerely reflecting remorse for past actions, since the apology is reinforced by a domestic governance structure that also emphasizes the values underlying the apology. This logic would suggest that apologies by countries that have transitioned to democracy have stronger positive effects on Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transactions than apologies by countries that have not transitioned.

H2 (*Dem—Stronger Apology*): The effect of an apology (relative to no apology) on …
    a) favorable views of the transgressor …
    b) support for state-to-state cooperation with the transgressor …
    c) willingness to transact privately with the transgressor …
    …is *larger* if a transgressor has transitioned to democracy than when it remains nondemocracy.

On the other hand, an apology by a nondemocracy may contain more new and potentially surprising information about the transgressor's values and the threat it poses, while an apology by a democracy might be less informative and therefore lead to little updating. By this reasoning, apologies by countries that have *not* transitioned to democracy should have larger effects on Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transactions than apologies by countries that have transitioned.

H3 (*Dem—Weaker Apology*): The effect of an apology (relative to no apology) on …
    a) favorable views of the transgressor …
    b) support for state-to-state cooperation with the transgressor …

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[4] Note: we conceive of sincerity as a "mediator of mediators", in that it affects the values of the trust (reassurance) and values mediators.

c) willingness to transact privately with the transgressor …
>>…is *smaller* if a transgressor has transitioned to democracy than when it remains a nondemocracy.

The logic regarding the interaction between regime type and apology is less clear for the Weakness dependent variable. We therefore plan an exploratory analysis:

>Q1: (*Regime type and Weakness)*: We will calculate the effect of an apology on perceived weakness of the sender when the sender is a democracy vs a nondemocracy, to see which (if any) is larger.

Although it is not our main focus, our research design also allows us to assess the effect of *democratization* on a state's image.

>H4 (*Democratization*): Whether or not the transgressor apologizes, democratization improves …
>>a) favorable views of the transgressor
>>b) support for state-to-state cooperation with the transgressor and
>>c) willingness to transact privately with the transgressor.

Finally, we will carry out an exploratory analysis to estimate how the effect of a transition to democracy compares to the effect of an apology. We do not develop a clear directional hypothesis, but we plan to estimate this comparison as it is interesting in its own right:

>Q2 (*Effect of Apology vs. Effect of Democratization*): For each of our four DVs, we will calculate the effect of an apology when there is no transition to democracy and compare it to the effect of a transition to democracy when there is no apology, to see which is larger.

Step 2: Does the target's response moderate the effect of the apology?

We next explore how the target's response to the apology influences third-party perceptions. Our goal is to examine whether a transgressor can reap international benefits from apologizing even if the apology fails to satisfy the target and we want to gain insight into the extent to which the target's response affects perceptions of sender weakness. We test two related hypotheses about how the *target's response* influences the effect of the apology. The first hypothesis contrasts the effect of an apology that is accepted by the target with one that is rejected, while the second hypothesis contrasts a rejected apology with no apology. Thus, for the first test, we contrast different treatment conditions in our *long apology*- scenario and, for the second test, we contrast particular treatment conditions in the *long apology*- scenario with the *no apology*- scenario. For both comparisons, we focus on apologies that experience no domestic backlash in the sender state so that we can examine the effect of rejection by the target when there is no additional information about a lack of genuine remorse from within the sender state. We test both hypotheses separately for democratic and for nondemocratic senders.

>H5 (*Target Rejection, Conditional on Apology*): Relative to the target accepting the apology, the target rejecting the apology …
>>a) decreases favorable views of the transgressor.
>>b) decreases support for state-to-state cooperation with the transgressor.
>>c) decreases willingness to transact privately with the transgressor.
>>d) increases perceptions of weakness of the transgressor.

>H6 (*Target Rejection, Compared to No Apology*): Relative to no apology, a rejected apology ….
>>a) increases favorable views of the transgressor.

b) increases support for state-to-state cooperation with the transgressor.
c) increases willingness to transact privately with the transgressor.
d) increases perceptions of weakness of the transgressor.

We will also examine how the target's response affects perceptions of threat, acceptable values, sincerity, and face loss. We will conduct analysis of the mediators both in the comparison of rejected apologies versus accepted ones and the comparison of rejected apologies versus no apology.

M5i (*Reassurance mechanism*): A rejected apology increases perceptions of threat relative to an accepted apology.

M5ii (*Reassurance mechanism*): A rejected apology decreases perceptions of threat relative to no apology.

M6i (*Values mechanism*): A rejected apology decreases perceptions of values relative to an accepted apology.

M6ii (*Values mechanism*): A rejected apology increases perceptions of values relative to no apology.

M7i (*Sincerity Mechanism*): A rejected apology decreases perceptions of sincerity relative to an accepted apology.

M7ii (*Sincerity Mechanism*): A rejected apology increases perceptions of sincerity relative to no apology.

M8i (*Face loss mechanism*): A rejected apology lowers perceptions of status relative to an accepted apology.

M8ii (*Face loss mechanism*): A rejected apology lowers perceptions of status relative to no apology.

Step 3: Does backlash in the sender country moderate the effect of the apology?

Next, we evaluate whether transgressors can improve their international reputation by apologizing even when the apology provokes domestic backlash in their own country. Domestic backlash indicates that certain domestic audiences do not share their government's foreign policy goals and values, suggesting that the apology itself or policies associated with it may be rescinded at a later point. We first focus on the case where the target accepts the apology to see whether there are international costs to domestic backlash in the sender state even when the apology is well-received in the target state. We then examine the case where the target rejects the apology and thus both the domestic response in the sender and in the target are unfavorable.

We test two related hypotheses about how *sender backlash* influences the effect of the apology. The first hypothesis contrasts backlash to no backlash, conditional on an apology. The second contrasts an apology with backlash to no apology. Thus, to test the first hypothesis, we contrast different treatment conditions in our *long apology-* scenario and, to test the second hypothesis, we contrast particular treatment conditions in the *long apology-* scenario with the *no apology-* scenario. We test both of our hypotheses separately for each combination of regime type and target acceptance, in case the effects differ by regime type or by the target's behavior (though we do not have clear directional hypotheses about those differences). We will report all combinations.

H7 (Sender Backlash, Conditional on Apology): Relative to an apology without sender backlash, an apology with sender domestic backlash…
   i)   decreases favorable views of the transgressor.
   ii)   decreases support for state-to-state cooperation with the transgressor.
   iii)   decreases willingness to transact privately with the transgressor.

H8 (Sender Backlash, Compared to No Apology): Relative to no apology, an apology with sender backlash …
   i)   increases favorable views of the transgressor.
   ii)   increases support for state-to-state cooperation with the transgressor.
   iii)   Increases willingness to transact privately with the transgressor.

We also again explore mechanisms to help explain why these effects might exist. We test these mechanisms separately for each combination of regime type and target acceptance and will report all combinations.

M9i (*Reassurance mechanism*): An apology with backlash increases perceptions of threat relative to an apology without backlash.

M9ii (*Reassurance mechanism*): An apology with backlash decreases perceptions of threat relative to no apology.

M10i (*Values mechanism*): An apology with backlash decreases perceptions of values relative to an apology without backlash.

M10i (*Values mechanism*): An apology with backlash increases perceptions of values relative to no apology.

M11i (*Sincerity mechanism*): An apology with backlash decreases perceptions of sincerity relative to an apology without backlash.

M11ii (*Sincerity mechanism*): An apology with backlash increases perceptions of sincerity relative to no apology.

Finally, we examine the case in which the domestic backlash in the sender can be seen as having caused the rejection by the target to see whether such a "failed" apology can still have a beneficial international effect. Here we look at two comparisons: 1) a rejected apology with sender backlash versus an accepted apology without sender backlash and 2) a rejected apology with sender backlash versus no apology. We test these hypotheses separately for democratic and for nondemocratic senders.

H9 (Sender Backlash & Target Rejection, Compared to No Sender Backlash & Target Acceptance): Relative to an apology without sender backlash that is accepted by the target, an apology with sender backlash that is rejected by the target …
   i)   decreases favorable views of the transgressor.
   ii)   decreases support for state-to-state cooperation with the transgressor.
   iii)   decreases willingness to transact privately with the transgressor.

H10 (Sender Backlash & Target Rejection, Compared to No Apology): Relative to no apology, an apology with sender backlash that is rejected by the target ….
   i)   increases favorable views of the transgressor.

ii)   increases support for state-to-state cooperation with the transgressor.

iii)   increases willingness to transact privately with the transgressor.

Subgroup analyses:

In addition to testing these hypotheses in our sample as a whole, we will carry out analyses to see whether the effects are different among "elitelike" subjects. We will create a series of elitelike subsamples (see below) and calculate treatment effects in each of these subsamples. We will examine whether the treatment effects for elites and non-elites differ for H1-H10 and Q1-2. We define "differing" as meaning that the core substantive conclusion would change if we examined the elitelike subset rather than the main (whole-sample) analysis for that hypothesis.

We will also conduct exploratory analyses to see whether the effects of apologies are larger vs. smaller for particular political/demographic subgroups. We do not have specific expectations in mind, but rather will explore how the treatment effects differ by …
- party identification (R/D/I)
- hawkishness
- view of Russia
- gender.

3. Survey instrument / research design

Outline

We plan to test all of the above hypotheses within the context of the same survey experiment. The survey experiment centers on a real historical transgression involving an illegal invasion and mass atrocities (Russia's invasion of Ukraine). Our experiment then presents a hypothetical scenario, set in the future, in which the president of the violator country (State A - Russia) either apologizes for the transgression to the victim (State B - Ukraine) or does not apologize.

Treatments

We will randomly vary the following key features of the experiment:

1) *Regime type*: whether State A experienced a regime change since the transgression and is now a democracy or whether it experienced no regime change and continues to be a nondemocracy.

2) *Apology*: whether state A apologizes to state B or not.

3) *Long vs Short Apology:* whether the apology vignette includes information about the reaction of the target and domestic actors in the sender.

In vignettes measuring "long" apologies, we further vary:

4) *Sender Backlash*: whether there is domestic backlash against the apology in the sender of the apology (State A). We provide information on responses to the apology by both elites and the public.

5) *Target Reception*: whether the target of the apology (State B) accepts or rejects the apology offered by state A.

After respondents read about the scenario, we will ask them several questions about a) how favorably they view State A, b) whether they would support state-to-state cooperation with State A, c) whether they would privately transact with State A by buying products from State A, and d) whether they perceive State A as weak. We will then ask them whether they agree or disagree with a series of statements designed to capture mechanisms.

Randomization scheme:

The following table shows the combinations of treatments we will administer.

Table A-1: Treatment Combinations

Cell #	Democ	Apol	Backlash	Accept	Shorthand	Target N
1	No	No	-	-	No apol, nondem	387
2	No	Yes	-	-	Short apol, nondem	387
3	No	Yes	No	Yes	Long apol A, nondem	387
4	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Long apol B, nondem	387
5	No	Yes	No	No	Long apol C, nondem	387
6	No	Yes	Yes	No	Long apol D, nondem	387
7	Yes	No	-	-	No apol, dem	387
8	Yes	Yes	-	-	Short apol, dem	387
9	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Long apol A, dem	387
10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Long apol B, dem	387
11	Yes	Yes	No	No	Long apol C, dem	387
12	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Long apol D, dem	387

Sample Size and Recruitment

We will collect enough responses to be powered to detect a 10-point difference in our dichotomous dependent variables (scaled to be 0 or 100) comparing across any two cells. We calculate that we achieve this power with approximately 387 subjects per cell.

Before conducting our analyses, we will screen respondents for attentiveness. Our attached survey instrument includes three pretreatment attention checks. If respondents fail any one of these we will not include their responses in any of our analyses.

We will recruit a diverse sample of U.S. adults using Lucid. For the Lucid sample, based on experience, we anticipate that approximately 30%-40% of respondents will not meet our criteria for pretreatment attention checks. We will therefore order enough responses on Lucid to yield approximately 387 attentive subjects per cell (i.e. we will place an order for 4,644 subjects). If we end up yielding a slightly larger number of responses from our order, we will analyze all of the observations we received rather than throwing data away.

4. Details of analysis

Dependent Variables:

Our study has four DVs: a) favorable views of, b) support for state-to-state cooperation with, c) willingness to transact privately with, and c) perceptions of weakness of the sender. Here we describe how we code each:

Favorable Views: We ask respondents whether they "have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable view of Russia." Our preferred dependent variable is a dummy variable, *Favorability*, that is coded 100 if respondents have a favorable or somewhat favorable view of Russia, and 0 otherwise. This allows us to interpret treatment effects as the change in percent of respondents who have a favorable view of Russia. To check robustness, we will code favorability on a scale with the values 0, 33.33, 66.67, and 100, and report this in an appendix.

Support for State-to-State Cooperation: We ask respondents whether "the U.S. should increase, decrease, or not change its level of cooperation with Russia." We will create a dummy variable, *International Cooperation*, coded 100 if respondents want to increase cooperation with Russia, and 0 if respondents want to leave cooperation unchanged or decrease cooperation with Russia. To check robustness, we will code cooperation on a scale with values 0, 50, and 100, and report analyses of this variable in an appendix.

Support for Private Transactions: We ask respondents whether they would "avoid buying products that [they knew] had been made in Russia?" We will create a dummy variable, *Private Transactions*, that is coded 100 if respondents say they would definitely or probably not avoid buying Russian products, and 0 if they would definitely or probably avoid buying Russian products. To check robustness, we will code private transaction on a scale with the values 0, 33.33, 66.67, and 100, and report this in an appendix.

Perceptions of Sender Weakness: We ask respondents whether they agree or disagree that "Russia is a force to be reckoned with." We will create a dummy variable, *Weakness*, that is coded 100 if respondents disagree strongly or somewhat with the statement, and 0 otherwise. To check robustness, we will code weakness on a scale with values 0, 25, 50, 75, and 100, and report analyses of this variable in an appendix.

Mediators:

We examine four mechanisms. Three of the mechanisms, reassurance, moral values, and sincerity, might explain the beneficial effect of apologies. The third mechanism, face loss, potentially explains why apologies may be perceived as demonstrating weakness.

Reassurance: We ask respondents whether they agree that "Russia represents a threat to international peace and stability." We create a dummy variable, *Threat*, that is coded 100 if respondents strongly or somewhat agree that Russia represents a threat, and 0 otherwise. For robustness, we also code this variable on a 0-100 scale, to report in an appendix.

Moral Values: We ask respondents how much confidence they have "that Russia would generally 'do the right thing' in world affairs." We create a dummy variable, *Moral*, that is coded 100 if respondents say they have a lot of or some confidence, and 0 otherwise. For robustness, we also code this variable on a 0-100 scale, to report in an appendix.

Sincerity: We ask respondents whether the agree that "Russia feels that its invasion of Ukraine was wrong." We create a dummy variable, *Sincere*, that is coded 100 if respondents strongly or somewhat agree that Russia feels the invasion was wrong, and 0 otherwise. For robustness, we also code this variable on a 0-100 scale, to report in an appendix.

Face Loss: We ask respondents whether they agree or disagree that "Russia has a lot of status internationally." We create a dummy variable, *Status*, that is coded 100 if respondents strongly or somewhat agree, and 0 otherwise. For robustness, we also code this variable on a 0-100 scale, to report in an appendix.

Elites:

We identify five elitelike traits:
- Male: individuals who identify as male.
- High Income: individuals whose income is above the median income in the sample as a whole
- Highly Educated: individuals with a college degree.
- Prime Age: individuals between 40 and 65 years of age.
- High Political Interest: individuals who say they follow what's going on in government and public affairs some or most of the time.

We create six elitelike subsets based on different combinations of demographic and attitudinal traits that characterize policymaking elites:
- Elite 1: Male & High Income & High Educated & Prime Age
- Elite 2: High Income & Highly Educated & Prime Age
- Elite 3: High Income & Highly Educate & Prime Age & High Political Interest
- Elite 4: Highly Educated & Prime Age & High Political Interest
- Elite 5: Highly Educated & High Political Interest
- Elite 6: High Political Interest

Hypothesis Testing:

H1a (Favorability), H1b (State-to-State Cooperation), H1c (Private Transaction), H1d (Weakness):
> For each DV, we compare the value of the DV when the transgressor apologizes and no information about sender backlash and target response is revealed (i.e. the short apology treatment) to the value of the DV when the transgressor does not apologize (i.e. the no apology treatment). We include interaction terms between regime type and the apology treatment to test these hypotheses separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
> For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 2) > (Cell 1)
> For democratic sender: (Cell 8) > (Cell 7)

M1i (Reassurance):
> We compare the value of *Threat* when the transgressor offers an apology and no information about sender backlash and target response is revealed (i.e. the short apology treatment) to the value of *Threat* when the transgressor does not apologize (i.e. the no apology treatment). We include interaction terms between regime type and the apology treatment to test these hypotheses separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
> For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 2) < (Cell 1)
> For democratic sender: (Cell 8) < (Cell 7)

M1ii (Reassurance):

For the Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transaction DVs, we examine whether *Threat* is negatively correlated with the DV, controlling for the covariates mentioned below. We include interaction terms between regime type and the apology treatment to test these hypotheses separately for democracies and nondemocracies, within the sample of all subjects who received either the short or no-apology treatments, i.e. we will regress the relevant DV on the covariates, indicators for the apology treatment, democracy treatment, and interaction between them, and the *Threat* mediator.[5]

M2i (Values):

We compare the value of *Moral* when the transgressor offers an apology and no information about sender backlash and target response is revealed (i.e. the short apology treatment) to the value of *Moral* when the transgressor does not apologize (i.e. the no apology treatment). We include interaction terms between regime type and the apology treatment to test these hypotheses separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 2) > (Cell 1)
For democratic sender: (Cell 8) > (Cell 7)

M2ii (Values):

For the Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transaction DVs, we examine whether *Moral* is positively correlated with the DV, controlling for the covariates mentioned below. We include interaction terms between regime type and the apology treatment to test these hypotheses separately for democracies and nondemocracies, within the sample of all subjects who received either the short or no-apology treatments, i.e. we will regress the relevant DV on the covariates, indicators for the apology treatment, democracy treatment, and interaction between them, and the *Values* mediator.

M3i (Sincerity):

We compare the value of *Sincere* when the transgressor offers an apology and no information about sender backlash and target response is revealed (i.e. the short apology treatment) to the value of *Sincere* when the transgressor does not apologize (i.e. the no apology treatment). We include interaction terms between regime type and the apology treatment to test these hypotheses separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 2) > (Cell 1)
For democratic sender: (Cell 8) > (Cell 7)

M3ii (Sincerity):

For the Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transaction DVs, as well as the Threat and Moral mediators, we examine whether *Sincere* is positively correlated with the DV/mediator, controlling for the covariates mentioned below. We include interaction terms between regime type and the apology treatment to test these hypotheses separately for democracies and nondemocracies, within the sample of all subjects who received either the short or no-apology treatments, i.e. we will regress the relevant DV/mediator on the covariates, indicators for the apology treatment, democracy treatment, and interaction between them, and the *Sincere* mediator.

M4i (*Face Loss*):

We compare the value of *Status* when the transgressor offers an apology and no information about sender backlash and target response is revealed (i.e. the short apology treatment) to the

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[5] For this and other tests of the effect of a mediator on a dependent variable, we will use the binary version of the mediator for simplicity.

value of *Status* when the transgressor does not apologize (i.e. the no apology treatment). We include interaction terms between regime type and the apology treatment to test these hypotheses separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.

For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 2) < (Cell 1)

For democratic sender: (Cell 8) < (Cell 7)

M4ii (*Face Loss mechanism*):

We examine whether *Status* is negatively correlated with the *Weakness* DV, controlling for the covariates mentioned below. We include interaction terms between regime type and the apology treatment to test these hypotheses separately for democracies and nondemocracies, within the sample of all subjects who received either the short or no-apology treatments, i.e. we will regress the relevant DV/mediator on the covariates, indicators for the apology treatment, democracy treatment, and interaction between them, and the *Status* mediator.

H2 (Dem—Stronger Apology):

For the Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transaction DVs, we compare the effect of an apology without information about sender backlash and target response (i.e. the short apology treatment) to the no apology treatment when the sender is democratic versus when it is nondemocratic.

(Cell 8 – Cell 7) > (Cell 2 – Cell 1)

H3 (Dem—Weaker Apology):

For the Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transaction DVs, we compare the effect of an apology without information about sender backlash and target response (i.e. the short apology treatment) to the no apology treatment when the sender is democratic versus when it is nondemocratic.

(Cell 8 – Cell 7) < (Cell 2 – Cell 1)

Q1 (Regime type and Weakness): We will calculate whether short apologies increase perceptions of weakness more when the sender is a democracy vs a nondemocracy.

Compare (Cell 2 – Cell 1) to (Cell 8 – Cell 7).

H4 (Democratization):

For the Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transaction DVs, we compare the value of the DV when the transgressor transitions compared to when it does not transition. We will only look at scenarios in which the transgressor did not offer an apology.

(Cell 7) > (Cell 1)

Q2 (Effect of Apology vs Effect of Democratization):

For each of our four DVs, we compare the effect of a short apology without a transition to democracy to the effect of a transition to democracy without an apology.

Compare (Cell 2 – Cell 1) to (Cell 7 – Cell 1)

H5 (Target Rejection, Conditional on Apology):

For each DV, we compare the value of the DV when the transgressor apologizes and the target rejects the apology to the value of the DV when the transgressor apologizes and the target accepts the apology. Our comparison only focuses on cases in which there was no sender backlash. We include interaction terms between regime type and the relevant treatment to test these hypotheses separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.

For nondemocratic sender for the Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transaction DVs: (Cell 5) < (Cell 3)

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For nondemocratic sender for the Weakness DV: (Cell 5) > (Cell 3)
For democratic sender for the Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transaction DVs: (Cell 11) < (Cell 9)
For democratic sender for Weakness DV: (Cell 11) > (Cell 9)

H6 (Target Rejection, Compared to No Apology):

For each DV, we compare the value of the DV when the transgressor apologizes and the target rejects the apology to the value of the DV when the transgressor does not apologize. Our comparison only focuses on cases in which there was no sender domestic backlash. We include interaction terms between regime type and the relevant treatment to test these hypotheses separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 5) > (Cell 1)
For democratic sender: (Cell 11) > (Cell 7)

M5i (Reassurance, Target Rejection Conditional on Apology):

We compare the value of *Threat* when the transgressor apologizes and the target rejects the apology to the value of *Threat* when the transgressor apologizes and the target accepts the apology. Our comparison only focuses on cases in which there was no sender backlash. We include interaction terms between regime type and the relevant treatment to test this hypothesis separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 5) > (Cell 3)
For democratic sender: (Cell 11) > (Cell 9)

M5ii (Reassurance, Target Rejection Compared to No Apology):

We compare the value of *Threat* when the transgressor apologizes and the target rejects the apology to the value of *Threat* when the transgressor does not apologize. Our comparison only focuses on cases in which there was no sender backlash. We include interaction terms between regime type and the relevant treatment to test these hypotheses separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 5) < (Cell 1)
For democratic sender: (Cell 11) < (Cell 7)

M6i (Values, Target Rejection Conditional on Apology):

We compare the value of *Moral* when the transgressor apologizes and the target rejects the apology to the value of *Moral* when the transgressor apologizes and the target accepts the apology. Our comparison only focuses on cases in which there was no sender backlash. We include interaction terms between regime type and the relevant treatment to test these hypotheses separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 5) < (Cell 3)
For democratic sender: (Cell 11) < (Cell 9)

M6ii (Values, Target Rejection Compared to No Apology):

We compare the value of *Moral* when the transgressor apologizes and the target rejects the apology to the value of *Moral* when the transgressor does not apologize. Our comparison only focuses on cases in which there was no sender backlash. We include interaction terms between regime type and the relevant treatment to test this hypothesis separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 5) > (Cell 1)
For democratic sender: (Cell 11) > (Cell 7)

M7i (Sincerity, Target Rejection Conditional on Apology):
We compare the value of *Sincere* when the transgressor apologizes and the target rejects the apology to the value of *Sincere* when the transgressor apologizes and the target accepts the apology. Our comparison only focuses on cases in which there was no sender backlash. We include interaction terms between regime type and the relevant treatment to test this hypothesis separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 5) < (Cell 3)
For democratic sender: (Cell 11) < (Cell 9)

M7ii (Sincerity, Target Rejection Compared to No Apology):
We compare the value of *Sincere* when the transgressor apologizes and the target rejects the apology to the value of *Sincere* when the transgressor does not apologize. Our comparison only focuses on cases in which there was no sender backlash. We include interaction terms between regime type and the relevant treatment to test this hypothesis separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 5) > (Cell 1)
For democratic sender: (Cell 11) > (Cell 7)

M8i (Face Loss, Target Rejection Conditional on Apology):
We compare the value of *Status* when the transgressor apologizes and the target rejects the apology to the value of *Status* when the transgressor apologizes and the target accepts the apology. Our comparison only focuses on cases in which there was no sender backlash. We include interaction terms between regime type and the relevant treatment to test this hypothesis separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 5) < (Cell 3)
For democratic sender: (Cell 11) < (Cell 9)

M8ii (Face Loss, Target Rejection Compared to No Apology):
We compare the value of *Status* when the transgressor apologizes and the target rejects the apology to the value of *Status* when the transgressor does not apologize. Our comparison only focuses on cases in which there was no sender backlash. We include interaction terms between regime type and the relevant treatment to test this hypothesis separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
For nondemocratic sender: (Cell 5) < (Cell 1)
For democratic sender: (Cell 11) < (Cell 7)

H7 (Backlash, Conditional on Apology):
For the Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transaction DVs, we compare the value of the DV when the transgressor apologizes and there is backlash to the value of the DV when the transgressor apologizes and there is no backlash. We carry out this comparison separately for each target reaction, with interaction terms to isolate the effects for each regime type.
For nondemocratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 4) < (Cell 3)
For nondemocratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 6) < (Cell 5)
For democratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 10) < (Cell 9)
For democratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 12) < (Cell 11)

H8 (Backlash, Compared to No Apology):
For the Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transaction DVs, we compare the value of the DV when the transgressor apologizes and there is backlash to the value of the DV

when the transgressor does not apologize. We carry out this comparison separately for each target reaction, with interaction terms to isolate the effects for each regime type.

For nondemocratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 4) > (Cell 1)
For nondemocratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 6) > (Cell 1)
For democratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 10) > (Cell 7)
For democratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 12 > (Cell 7)

M9i (Reassurance, Sender Backlash Conditional on Apology):
We compare the value of *Threat* when the transgressor apologizes and there is sender backlash to the value of *Threat* when the transgressor apologizes and there is no sender backlash. We carry out this comparison separately for each target reaction, with interaction terms to isolate the effects for each regime type.

For nondemocratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 4) > (Cell 3)
For nondemocratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 6) > (Cell 5)
For democratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 10) > (Cell 9)
For democratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 12 > (Cell 11)

M9ii (Reassurance, Sender Backlash Compared to No Apology):
We compare the value of *Threat* when the transgressor apologizes and there is sender backlash to the value of *Threat* when the transgressor does not apologize. We carry out this comparison separately for each target reaction, with interaction terms to isolate the effects for each regime type.

For nondemocratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 4) < (Cell 1)
For nondemocratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 6) < (Cell 1)
For democratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 10) < (Cell 7)
For democratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 12 < (Cell 7)

M10i (Values, Sender Backlash Conditional on Apology):
We compare the value of *Moral* when the transgressor apologizes and there is sender backlash to the value of *Moral* when the transgressor apologizes and there is no sender backlash. We carry out this comparison separately for each target reaction, with interaction terms to isolate the effects for each regime type.

For nondemocratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 4) < (Cell 3)
For nondemocratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 6) < (Cell 5)
For democratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 10) < (Cell 9)
For democratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 12 < (Cell 11)

M10ii (Values, Sender Backlash Compared to No Apology):
We compare the value of *Moral* when the transgressor apologizes and there is sender backlash to the value of *Moral* when the transgressor does not apologize. We carry out this comparison separately for each target reaction, with interaction terms to isolate the effects for each regime type.

For nondemocratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 4) > (Cell 1)
For nondemocratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 6) > (Cell 1)
For democratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 10) > (Cell 7)
For democratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 12 > (Cell 7)

M11i (Sincerity, Sender Backlash Conditional on Apology):
We compare the value of *Sincere* when the transgressor apologizes and there is sender backlash to the value of *Sincere* when the transgressor apologizes and there is no sender backlash.

For nondemocratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 4) < (Cell 3)

For nondemocratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 6) < (Cell 5)
For democratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 10) < (Cell 9)
For democratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 12 < (Cell 11)

M11ii (Sincerity, Sender Backlash Compared to No Apology):
We compare the value of *Sincere* when the transgressor apologizes and there is sender backlash to the value of *Sincere* when the transgressor does not apologize. We carry out this comparison separately for each target reaction, with interaction terms to isolate the effects for each regime type.
For nondemocratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 4) > (Cell 1)
For nondemocratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 6) > (Cell 1)
For democratic senders, target accepts: (Cell 10) > (Cell 7)
For democratic senders, target rejects: (Cell 12 > (Cell 7)

H9 (Sender Backlash & Target Rejection, Compared to No Sender Backlash & Target Acceptance):
For the Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transaction DVs, we compare the value of the DV when the transgressor apologizes, there is sender domestic backlash, and the target rejects the apology to the value of the DV when the sender apologizes, there is no sender domestic backlash, and the apology is accepted. We include interaction terms to test this hypothesis separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
For nondemocratic senders: (Cell 6) < (Cell 3)
For democratic senders: (Cell 12) < (Cell 9)

H10 (Sender Backlash & Target Rejection, Compared to No Apology):
For the Favorability, State-to-State Cooperation, and Private Transaction DVs, we compare the value of the DV when the transgressor apologizes, there is sender domestic backlash, and the target rejects the apology to the value of the DV when the transgressor does not apologize. We include interaction terms to test this hypothesis separately for democratic and nondemocratic senders.
For nondemocratic senders: (Cell 6) > (Cell 1)
For democratic senders: (Cell 12) > (Cell 7)

Elite Subset Analysis:
We calculate treatment effects for H1-10 and Q1-Q2 in each of the six elite subsamples and compare these estimates to treatment effects calculated in the sample as a whole. We will mark all instances in which the substantive conclusion would differ if one studied the elite subsample rather than the sample as a whole.

All tests use OLS regression. For all of our analyses, we will estimate simple bivariate analyses and we will carry out additional analyses that include relevant controls to correct for potential imbalance: political ideology, party ID, sex, age, race, education, political interest, political activism, religiosity, hawkishness, international trust, perception of Russia. (Note: we will not control for these covariates in the elite subset analyses). We will not include survey weights. We will consider our hypotheses to be falsified if they fail to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance in a two-tailed test (p<.05).

Document A-2: Preanalysis Plan for Study 2

1. Overview

Below we outline our plans to collect and analyze new data for a follow-up study that builds on the original study we preregistered on September 26, 2022.

2. Background

We have collected and analyzed the data from the experiment outlined in the pre-analysis plan listed above. We found strong support for our hypotheses about the beneficial international effect of apologies. We found no support for the idea that apologies are interpreted as signaling weakness of the apologizer. We now plan to carry out a new survey to further probe both of these results. Doing so requires a) specifying an additional control condition and b) adding different questions about perceptions of weakness. For additional exploratory analysis, we will also c) add questions to help us assess the cross-national generalizability of our results.

a) New Control

Regarding the beneficial effects of the apology, we want to examine if our findings hold when we specify our control—the non-apology condition— differently than in our original study. In our original study, we told respondents that the Russian president "does not apologize" and "does not comment on the invasion of Ukraine at all." We now plan to re-run our survey using two control conditions. First, we specify a new non-apology control condition that does not specifically say that the Russian president "did not apologize", but rather implies this by stating that he did not comment on the invasion. Second, we include a control condition similar to the one of our original study. We will keep the apology treatment the same as in our first study.

b) Weakness Hypothesis

Counter to our expectations, we found that a Russian apology did not lead American respondents to infer weakness on behalf of Russia. We tested this hypothesis by asking whether respondents agree or disagree that "Russia is a force to be reckoned with." We will replace this question with a more direct question of whether respondents think of Russia as a "weak country".

Additionally, we will add a second question to get at *why* respondents may view Russia as weak, i.e. a second mechanism for the weakness result. So far, we have asked whether respondents think Russia "has a lot of status internationally". We will now also ask whether respondents believe that "Russia has a lot of military power".

We thus add two expectations to be tested:

M5i (*Material Power mechanism*): An apology lowers perceptions of military power relative to no apology.

M5ii (*Material Power mechanism*): Perceptions of military power decrease perceptions of weakness of the transgressor.

c) Generalizability to other third-party states

Our sample consists of U.S.-based respondents. One might ask whether findings in this sample generalize to other countries and populations. To address this question, it is beneficial to measure potential moderators that might vary across countries (see below).

3.   Follow-up Study

In summary, we plan to field a follow-up experiment with three changes compared to the experiment described in our PAP from September 26, 2022.

   a) We will include two non-apology conditions: both conditions will state that the Russian President gives a speech and that he doesn't comment on the invasion; one condition will further explicitly say that he does not apologize.
   b) We will include a different measure for our "weakness" hypothesis and add an additional hypothesis and measure for a second mechanism.
   c) We will ask about several moderators, described below.

We will randomize *regime type* (democracy vs. nondemocracy) and *apology* (apology vs. explicit non-apology vs. no-mention non-apology).[6] Sample size per cell and recruitment will be the same. Given that we will have 6 combinations of our 2 treatments, we will place an order for 6 x 387 = 2,322 subjects and will include all completed responses in our sample.

We will test hypotheses H1a-d, H2a-c, H3a-c, H4a-c, M1i, M2i, M3i, and M4i as described in our original pre-analysis plan and additionally test M5i and M5ii. We will test all of these hypotheses twice, with both the original explicit no-apology condition as the reference category (to see whether we reproduce our initial findings) and also with the "no-mention non-apology" as the reference category, to see whether apologies shift beliefs even when observers do not explicitly call attention to the lack of apology.

For our new measure of *Weakness,* we will create a dummy variable coded 100 if respondents agree strongly or somewhat with the statement that Russia is a "weak country", and 0 otherwise.

We will create a dummy variable, *MilPower*, that is coded 100 if respondents strongly or somewhat agree, and 0 otherwise.

Otherwise, we will analyze the data using the same operationalizations and analysis protocols as in our original pre-analysis plan. However, for reasons of space, and given that our original study did not find that minor changes in operationalization were consequential, we will report only the "main" tests of these hypotheses (binary DVs and no controls) rather than the many robustness checks outlined in the original preanalysis plan.

We will also explore whether the effects of apologies are larger vs. smaller for the following political/demographic subgroups:

   • Male- vs non-male-identifying (measured with gender question)
   • Age 40 and older vs under 40 (measured with age question)
   • High and low on right-wing attitudes (measured with left/right spectrum question)
   • See Russia as friendly vs unfriendly (measured with pretreatment Russia question)
   • High vs low on authoritarian disposition (measure with authoritarianism question)
   • High vs low on commitment to democratic norms (measured with democratic norms questions)

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[6] Unlike in our previous study, we will not randomize *long vs. short apology*. Our focus is on short apologies only; respondents will not be told about the victim's response or the presence or absence of backlash in the sender.

We will consider voters "high" if they are at or above the median value of a measure for the entire U.S. sample we gather, and low otherwise. We will infer that if the effects are larger (smaller) for some subgroups, then countries that have larger concentrations of those subgroups in their politically-relevant populations would also have larger (smaller) political consequences of apologies. We will carry out the analyses the same way as our main tests, differentiating by regime type, while acknowledging that this means that our tests may not be sufficiently powered to detect subtle moderation effects.

Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics

Per our preanalysis plan for Study 1, we placed an order with Lucid for 4,644 respondents but used all completed responses delivered by Lucid (N=4,955). Per our preanalysis plan for Study 2, we placed an order with Lucid for 2,322 respondents but used all completed responses delivered by Lucid (N=2,852).

Table B-1: Control Variables (Study 1)

Control Variable	Mean (Std. Dev.)
Conservativism (1-7 scale)	3.93 (1.70)
Political Ideology (1-10 scale)	4.78 (3.29)
Male (0,1 dummy)	0.47 (0.50)
Age	45.94 (17.17)
White (0,1 dummy)	0.71 (0.45)
College (0,1 dummy)	0.35 (0.48)
Political Interest (0-1 scale)	0.64 (0.33)
Political Participation (0-1 scale)	0.10 (0.18)
Religiosity (0-1 scale)	0.61 (0.37)
Hawkishness (0-1 scale)	0.46 (0.29)
International Trust (0-1 scale)	0.27 (0.27)
Russia Enemy (0,1 dummy)	0.69 (0.46)

Note: We only preregistered analysis with control variables for Study 1.

Table B-2: Elitelike Sample Components and Subgroups

	Study 1	Study 2
Components of Elitelike Samples		
Male	2,336 (47.1%)	NA
High Income	2,447 (49.4%)	NA
Highly Educated	1,721 (34.7%)	NA
Prime Age	2,125 (42.9 %)	NA
High Political Interest	3,444 (69.5%)	NA
Subgroups		
Party ID (Rep, Dem, Ind)	1,732 (35%), 2,199 (44.4%), 1,024 (20.7%)	NA
Hawk vs. Doves	1,436 (29%), 2,013 (40.6%)	NA
Russia Enemy vs. Not Enemy	3,423 (69.1%), 1,532 (30.9%)	2,009 (70.4 %), 843 (29.6%)
Men vs. Women/Nonbinary	2,336 (47.1%), 2,619 (52.9%)	1,395 (48.9%), 1,457 (51.1%)
Prime Age vs. Below	NA	1,786 (62.6%), 1,066 (37.4%)
High vs. Low Rightwing Attitudes	NA	2,095 (26.4%), 757 (73.5%)
High vs. Low Authoritarian	NA	1,473 (51.7%), 1,379 (48.4%)
High vs. Low Democratic Norms	NA	1,549 (54.3%), 1,303 (45.7%)

Note: Number of observations with these characteristics, with sample percentages in parentheses. NA denotes statistics that we did not preregister for the respective study.

Appendix C: Supporting Tables for Main Analysis

This appendix shows results tables for the main analyses presented in the paper, as well as preregistered robustness checks. The tables are organized first by which analysis they pertain to (Part 1: Effect of Apologizing; Part 2: Effect of Victim Response; Part 3: Effect of Sender Backlash) and then by study (Study 1, Study 2), and finally by DV. Note the differences between Study 1 and Study 2 per preregistration: a) Parts 2-3 are only part of Study 1, b) we did not preregister robustness checks for Study 2, and 3) we used a different measure of weakness in Study 2. We make one addition to our preregistration: for the results for Part 1, we show additional analyses of our binary DV using logit, which we did not preregister but may be of interest to readers as a robustness check. The results do not change.

A full discussion of findings can be found in the manuscript. Here we present underlying tables. The bottom of each table shows our hypotheses tests (i.e. calculates the differences between relevant treatment conditions).

Table C-1 (Part 1, Study 1): Apologies and Level of Favorability (H1a)

	(1) Main: OLS, Binary DV, no controls	(2) Robust #1: OLS, Binary DV, controls	(3) Robust # 2: OLS, Scale DV, no controls	(4) Robust# 3: OLS, Scale DV, controls	(5) Robust# 4: Logit, Binary DV, no controls	(6) Robust# 5: Logit, Binary DV, controls
Apology	43.56***	43.45***	26.88***	26.89***	1.891***	2.001***
	(3.097)	(3.036)	(1.952)	(1.882)	(0.156)	(0.162)
Democracy	28.11***	27.73***	18.79***	18.92***	1.244***	1.306***
	(3.133)	(3.079)	(1.975)	(1.909)	(0.153)	(0.160)
Apology X Democracy	-12.88***	-10.71**	-8.388***	-7.222***	-0.417*	-0.336
	(4.417)	(4.330)	(2.784)	(2.685)	(0.227)	(0.233)
Conservative		1.510*		0.873*		0.0807*
		(0.818)		(0.508)		(0.0435)
Party ID		-1.179***		-0.597**		-0.0638***
		(0.415)		(0.257)		(0.0219)
Male		3.152		3.381**		0.179
		(2.202)		(1.365)		(0.116)
Age		0.0263		-0.0760*		0.00114
		(0.0684)		(0.0424)		(0.00358)
White		5.387**		4.262***		0.292**
		(2.571)		(1.594)		(0.135)
College		5.369**		2.989**		0.285**
		(2.326)		(1.442)		(0.123)
Political interest		12.43***		8.381***		0.654***
		(3.737)		(2.317)		(0.196)
Political activism		-0.914		8.822**		-0.0230
		(6.157)		(3.818)		(0.330)
Religiosity		1.289		1.482		0.0835
		(3.116)		(1.932)		(0.163)
Hawkishness		-10.45***		-5.089**		-0.567***
		(3.824)		(2.371)		(0.202)
International trust		16.59***		13.98***		0.871***
		(4.079)		(2.529)		(0.216)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Russia enemy		-11.82***		-8.744***		-0.626***
		(2.517)		(1.561)		(0.135)
Constant	23.56***	14.45***	30.49***	24.80***	-1.177***	-1.723***
	(2.244)	(5.252)	(1.414)	(3.257)	(0.118)	(0.280)
Observations	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651
R-squared	0.186	0.229	0.184	0.253		
Quantities of Interest						
A. Apol effect in nondem (H1a)	43.56***	43.45***	26.88***	26.89***	0.44***	0.43***
B. Apol effect in dem (H1a)	30.69***	32.74***	18.49***	19.67***	0.31***	0.32***
C. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2a, H3a)	-12.88***	-10.71**	-8.39***	-7.22***	-0.13***	-0.11**
D. Regime transition effect (H4a)	28.11***	27.73***	18.79***	18.92***	0.28***	0.28***
E. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2)	15.45***	15.72***	8.08***	7.97***	0.15***	0.16***

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Quantities of interest from OLS expressed as estimated percentages. Quantities of interest for logit expressed in terms of predicted probabilities. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table C-2 (Part 1, Study 1): Apologies and Level of Cooperation (H1b)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Main: OLS, Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: OLS, Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: OLS, Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: OLS, Scale DV, controls	Robust# 4: Logit, Binary DV, no controls	Robust# 5: Logit, Binary DV, controls
Apology	15.40***	15.52***	20.92***	20.89***	0.921***	1.003***
	(3.055)	(2.949)	(2.310)	(2.249)	(0.176)	(0.183)
Democracy	12.61***	13.50***	15.03***	15.22***	0.784***	0.880***
	(3.091)	(2.991)	(2.338)	(2.281)	(0.179)	(0.188)
Apology X Democracy	2.730	-0.624	-5.391	0.0866	-0.123	-0.0354
	(4.357)	(0.795)	(3.295)	(0.606)	(0.231)	(0.0437)
Conservative		-0.559		-0.345		-0.0284
		(0.403)		(0.307)		(0.0226)
Party ID		9.763***		5.629***		0.539***
		(2.139)		(1.631)		(0.119)
Male		-0.102		0.0284		-0.00549
		(0.0665)		(0.0507)		(0.00370)
Age		4.117*		2.575		0.208
		(2.498)		(1.904)		(0.139)
White		8.232***		5.006***		0.431***
		(2.260)		(1.723)		(0.124)
College		17.03***		10.56***		0.977***
		(3.630)		(2.768)		(0.212)
Political interest		9.892*		5.227		0.448
		(5.981)		(4.560)		(0.317)
Political activism		2.973		-0.418		0.142

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(3.027)		(2.308)		(0.169)	
Religiosity	-10.23***		-8.105***		-0.547***	
	(3.714)		(2.832)		(0.208)	
Hawkishness	14.50***		14.49***		0.780***	
	(3.962)		(3.021)		(0.224)	
International trust	-5.871**		-6.697***		-0.306**	
	(2.445)		(1.864)		(0.136)	
Russia enemy	4.054		28.22***		-2.505***	
	(5.102)		(3.890)		(0.304)	
Constant	14.54***	1,651	37.47***	1,651	-1.771***	1,651
	(2.214)	0.133	(1.674)	0.156	(0.142)	
Observations	1,651	15.52***	1,651	20.89***	1,651	1.003***
R-squared	0.055	(2.949)	0.096	(2.249)		(0.183)

Quantities of Interest

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Apol effect in nondem (H1b)	15.40***	15.52***	20.92***	20.88***	0.15***	0.15***
B. Apol effect in dem (H1b)	18.13***	19.99***	15.53***	16.90***	0.18***	0.20***
C. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2b, H3b)	2.73	4.48	-5.39	-3.99	0.03	0.05
D. Regime transition effect (H4b)	12.61***	13.50***	15.03***	15.22***	0.13***	0.13***
E. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2)	2.79	2.20	5.89**	5.67**	0.03	0.02

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Quantities of interest from OLS expressed as estimated percentages. Quantities of interest for logit expressed in terms of predicted probabilities. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C-3 (Part 1, Study 1): Apologies and Level of Willingness to Buy (H1c)

	(1) Main: OLS, Binary DV, no controls	(2) Robust #1: OLS, Binary DV, controls	(3) Robust # 2: OLS, Scale DV, no controls	(4) Robust# 3: OLS, Scale DV, controls	(5) Robust# 4: Logit, Binary DV, no controls	(6) Robust# 5: Logit, Binary DV, controls
Apology	23.86***	23.31***	16.71***	16.25***	1.174***	1.192***
	(3.230)	(3.190)	(1.951)	(1.924)	(0.161)	(0.164)
Democracy	18.12***	17.06***	12.15***	11.48***	0.933***	0.918***
	(3.268)	(3.235)	(1.974)	(1.951)	(0.164)	(0.167)
Apology X Democracy	-1.189	0.124	-1.625	-0.939	-0.249	-0.189
	(4.607)	(4.550)	(2.783)	(2.744)	(0.216)	(0.221)
Conservative		-0.153		0.250		-0.00818
		(0.860)		(0.519)		(0.0413)
Party ID		0.123		0.169		0.00665
		(0.436)		(0.263)		(0.0209)
Male		2.905		1.582		0.141
		(2.313)		(1.395)		(0.110)
Age		-0.00557		-0.0286		-0.000255
		(0.0719)		(0.0434)		(0.00343)
White		4.862*		2.127		0.227*
		(2.702)		(1.629)		(0.129)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
College		4.687*		1.981		0.233**
		(2.444)		(1.474)		(0.116)
Political interest		-5.248		-4.424*		-0.257
		(3.926)		(2.368)		(0.186)
Political activism		-18.41***		-7.589*		-0.920***
		(6.469)		(3.902)		(0.324)
Religiosity		-15.33***		-10.50***		-0.713***
		(3.274)		(1.975)		(0.155)
Hawkishness		-4.371		-2.943		-0.210
		(4.018)		(2.423)		(0.192)
International trust		3.848		2.674		0.199
		(4.286)		(2.585)		(0.205)
Russia enemy		-9.616***		-5.722***		-0.450***
		(2.645)		(1.595)		(0.125)
Constant	18.55***	35.24***	26.90***	38.59***	-1.480***	-0.756***
	(2.340)	(5.518)	(1.414)	(3.328)	(0.129)	(0.267)
Observations	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651
R-squared	0.085	0.121	0.103	0.141		
Quantities of Interest						
A. Apol effect in nondem (H1c)	23.86***	23.31***	16.71***	16.25***	0.24***	0.23***
B. Apol effect in dem (H1c)	22.67***	23.44***	15.09***	15.31***	0.23***	0.23***
C. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2c, H3c)	-1.89	0.12	-1.63	-0.94	-0.01	-0.00
D. Regime transition effect (H4c)	18.12***	17.06***	12.15***	11.48***	0.18***	0.17***
E. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2)	5.74*	6.25*	4.57**	4.77**	0.06	0.06

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Quantities of interest from OLS expressed as estimated percentages. Quantities of interest for logit expressed in terms of predicted probabilities. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C-4 (Part 1, Study 1): Apologies and Level of Weakness (H1d)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Main: OLS, Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: OLS, Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: OLS, Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: OLS, Scale DV, controls	Robust# 4: Logit, Binary DV, no controls	Robust# 5: Logit, Binary DV, controls
Apology	-1.719	-1.621	3.237*	3.009*	-0.121	-0.118
	(2.603)	(2.579)	(1.852)	(1.786)	(0.183)	(0.187)
Democracy	-1.140	-0.428	2.325	2.458	-0.0791	-0.0433
	(2.634)	(2.616)	(1.874)	(1.812)	(0.184)	(0.189)
Apology X Democracy	1.949	1.056	-0.332	-1.129	0.137	0.0915
	(3.713)	(3.679)	(2.641)	(2.548)	(0.262)	(0.267)
Conservative		-0.355		-0.198		-0.0311
		(0.695)		(0.482)		(0.0512)
Party ID		-0.0392		0.0206		-0.00131
		(0.352)		(0.244)		(0.0257)

Male		-0.476		-2.017		-0.0408
		(1.871)		(1.295)		(0.137)
Age		-0.291***		-0.223***		-0.0214***
		(0.0582)		(0.0403)		(0.00436)
White		-0.160		-1.026		-0.0217
		(2.184)		(1.513)		(0.156)
College		-1.886		-3.189**		-0.137
		(1.976)		(1.369)		(0.147)
Political interest		-4.943		-10.83***		-0.349
		(3.175)		(2.199)		(0.225)
Political activism		-5.894		-8.028**		-0.550
		(5.231)		(3.622)		(0.425)
Religiosity		-0.358		-4.981***		-0.0339
		(2.647)		(1.833)		(0.190)
Hawkishness		7.152**		4.635**		0.544**
		(3.249)		(2.250)		(0.237)
International trust		-7.288**		-7.906***		-0.534**
		(3.465)		(2.400)		(0.249)
Russia enemy		7.351***		2.924**		0.540***
		(2.139)		(1.481)		(0.162)
Constant	18.05***	31.35***	36.84***	59.62***	-1.513***	-0.591*
	(1.886)	(4.462)	(1.342)	(3.090)	(0.130)	(0.321)
Observations	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651
R-squared	0.000	0.033	0.005	0.088		

Quantities of Interest

A. Apol effect in nondem (H1d)	-1.72	-1.62	3.24*	3.01*	-0.02	-0.02
B. Apol effect in dem (H1d)	0.23	-0.57	2.90	1.88	0.002	-0.004
C. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2d, H3d)	1.95	1.06	-0.33	-1.13	0.02	0.01
D. Regime transition effect (H4d)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
E. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2)	-0.58	-1.19	0.91	0.55	-0.01	-0.01

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Quantities of interest from OLS expressed as estimated percentages. Quantities of interest for logit expressed in terms of predicted probabilities. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C-5 (Part 1, Study 2): Apologies and Level of All DVs (H1a-d)

	(1) Favorability	(2) Cooperation	(3) Buy	(4) Weakness
No mention	10.70***	5.386*	0.340	-3.239
	(3.076)	(2.977)	(3.175)	(2.364)
Apology	34.05***	19.22***	22.64***	-9.011***
	(2.993)	(2.896)	(3.088)	(2.300)
Democracy	30.67***	18.04***	18.22***	-8.404***
	(3.057)	(2.958)	(3.154)	(2.349)
No Mention X Democracy	0.227	5.233	10.75**	2.376

	(4.337)	(4.197)	(4.475)	(3.333)
Apology X Democracy	-11.49***	-1.702	-5.444	4.577
	(4.259)	(4.122)	(4.395)	(3.273)
Constant	21.98***	14.44***	31.25***	22.63***
	(2.170)	(2.100)	(2.239)	(1.667)
Observations	2,852	2,852	2,852	2,852
R-squared	0.128	0.068	0.071	0.014
Quantities of Interest				
A1. Apol effect in nondem (H1a-d) (No mention)	23.35***	13.8***	22.30***	-5.77**
A2. Apol effect in nondem (H1a-d) (Explicit)	34.05***	19.22***	22.64***	-9.01***
B1. Apol effect in dem (H1a-d) (No mention)	11.63***	6.90**	6.11*	-3.57
B2. Apol effect in dem (H1a-d) (Explicit)	22.55***	17.52***	17.20***	-4.43*
C1. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2a-c, H3a-c, Q1) (No mention)	-11.72***	-6.94*	-16.19***	2.20
C2. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2a-c, H3a-c, Q1) (Explicit)	-11.49***	-1.70	-5.44	4.58
D1. Regime transition effect (H4a) (No mention)	30.90***	23.28***	28.97***	NA
D2. Regime transition effect (H4a-d) (Explicit)	30.67***	18.04***	18.22***	NA
E1. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (No mention)	-7.55**	-9.45***	-6.67**	0.26
E2. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (Explicit)	3.38	1.17	4.42	-0.61

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table C-6 (Part 2, Study 1): Target Response and Favorability (H5a, H6a)

	(1) Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	(2) Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	(3) Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	(4) Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls
Rejected Apology	37.62***	37.57***	22.83***	22.98***
	(3.134)	(3.093)	(1.909)	(1.853)
Accepted Apology	51.04***	51.89***	32.97***	33.84***
	(3.201)	(3.162)	(1.950)	(1.894)
Democracy	28.11***	27.92***	18.79***	18.86***
	(3.109)	(3.071)	(1.894)	(1.840)
Rejected Apology X Democracy	-18.05***	-17.69***	-13.21***	-13.18***
	(4.364)	(4.311)	(2.659)	(2.583)
Accepted Apology X Democracy	-16.72***	-17.44***	-12.36***	-13.34***
	(4.443)	(4.387)	(2.707)	(2.628)
Conservative		0.827		0.489
		(0.683)		(0.409)
Party ID		-0.555		-0.378*
		(0.349)		(0.209)
Male		2.160		2.487**
		(1.807)		(1.083)
Age		0.0725		-0.0194

		(0.0579)		(0.0347)
White		3.973*		2.099*
		(2.096)		(1.256)
College		3.373*		1.944*
		(1.903)		(1.140)
Political interest		13.37***		10.51***
		(2.998)		(1.796)
Political activism		3.720		8.149***
		(5.246)		(3.143)
Religiosity		3.317		4.300***
		(2.546)		(1.525)
Hawkishness		-12.42***		-9.169***
		(3.237)		(1.940)
International trust		11.76***		8.996***
		(3.351)		(2.007)
Russia enemy		-6.769***		-6.253***
		(2.069)		(1.239)
Constant	23.56***	10.62**	30.49***	23.60***
	(2.227)	(4.477)	(1.357)	(2.682)
Observations	2,452	2,452	2,452	2,452
R-squared	0.167	0.198	0.174	0.231
Quantities of Interest				
F. Acc'd apol– rej'd apol in nondem (H5a)	13.42***	14.33***	10.14***	10.86***
G. Rej'd apol– no apol in nondem (H6a)	37.62***	37.57***	22.83***	22.98***
H. Acc'd apol– rej'd apol in dem (H5a)	14.76***	14.58***	10.98***	10.70***
I. Rej'd apol– no apol in dem (H6a)	19.57***	19.88***	9.62***	9.80***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table C-7 (Part 2, Study 1): Target Response and Cooperation (H5b, H6b)

	(1) Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	(2) Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	(3) Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	(4) Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls
Rejected Apology	10.03***	11.22***	16.22***	16.45***
	(3.173)	(3.051)	(2.278)	(2.217)
Accepted Apology	19.69***	21.93***	25.23***	26.35***
	(3.241)	(3.119)	(2.328)	(2.266)
Democracy	12.61***	13.61***	15.03***	15.19***
	(3.148)	(3.029)	(2.261)	(2.201)
Rejected Apology X Democracy	-1.560	-2.621	-5.589*	-5.564*
	(4.419)	(4.252)	(3.173)	(3.090)
Accepted Apology X Democracy	1.961	-0.436	-6.597**	-7.634**
	(4.498)	(4.328)	(3.230)	(3.145)
Conservative		0.261		0.578
		(0.673)		(0.489)
Party ID		-0.528		-0.286
		(0.344)		(0.250)

Male		6.820***		3.162**
		(1.783)		(1.296)
Age		-0.160***		-0.00436
		(0.0571)		(0.0415)
White		3.149		1.737
		(2.067)		(1.502)
College		8.631***		5.813***
		(1.877)		(1.364)
Political interest		24.55***		14.47***
		(2.957)		(2.149)
Political activism		14.09***		8.999**
		(5.175)		(3.761)
Religiosity		5.764**		1.177
		(2.512)		(1.825)
Hawkishness		-8.003**		-7.096***
		(3.193)		(2.321)
International trust		11.40***		9.678***
		(3.305)		(2.402)
Russia enemy		-0.850		-3.625**
		(2.040)		(1.483)
Constant	14.54***	-5.747	37.47***	23.81***
	(2.255)	(4.416)	(1.619)	(3.209)
Observations	2,452	2,452	2,452	2,452
R-squared	0.053	0.135	0.098	0.156

Quantities of Interest

F. Acc'd apol– rej'd apol in nondem (H5b)	9.65***	10.72***	9.02***	9.90***
G. Rej'd apol– no apol in nondem (H6b)	10.03***	11.22***	16.22***	16.45***
H. Acc'd apol– rej'd apol in dem (H5b)	13.18***	12.90***	8.01***	7.43***
I. Rej'd apol– no apol in dem (H6b)	8.47***	8.59***	10.63***	10.88***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table C-8 (Part 2, Study 1): Target Response and Buy (H5c, H6c)

	(1) Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	(2) Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	(3) Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	(4) Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls
Rejected Apology	16.59***	15.83***	13.15***	12.51***
	(3.353)	(3.345)	(1.980)	(1.971)
Accepted Apology	30.38***	29.02***	20.43***	19.58***
	(3.425)	(3.419)	(2.023)	(2.015)
Democracy	18.12***	17.07***	12.15***	11.39***
	(3.327)	(3.321)	(1.965)	(1.957)
Rejected Apology X Democracy	-5.767	-4.385	-4.860*	-3.722
	(4.669)	(4.662)	(2.757)	(2.747)
Accepted Apology X Democracy	-8.838*	-6.874	-4.804*	-3.642
	(4.753)	(4.745)	(2.807)	(2.795)
Conservative		0.191		0.593

		(0.738)		(0.435)
Party ID		0.340		0.296
		(0.378)		(0.222)
Male		1.087		-0.361
		(1.955)		(1.152)
Age		0.0468		-0.0167
		(0.0626)		(0.0369)
White		-0.00549		-0.563
		(2.266)		(1.335)
College		4.592**		3.119**
		(2.058)		(1.213)
Political interest		-2.578		-1.023
		(3.242)		(1.910)
Political activism		-13.54**		-6.369*
		(5.674)		(3.343)
Religiosity		-12.39***		-8.903***
		(2.754)		(1.622)
Hawkishness		-4.535		-1.772
		(3.501)		(2.063)
International trust		-2.723		-0.578
		(3.623)		(2.135)
Russia enemy		-3.808*		-2.813**
		(2.237)		(1.318)
Constant	18.55***	28.71***	26.90***	33.62***
	(2.382)	(4.841)	(1.407)	(2.852)
Observations	2,452	2,452	2,452	2,452
R-squared	0.065	0.081	0.087	0.107
Quantities of Interest				
F. Acc'd apol– rej'd apol in nondem (H5c)	13.80***	13.19***	7.28***	7.07***
G. Rej'd apol– no apol in nondem (H6c)	16.59***	15.83***	13.15***	12.51***
H. Acc'd apol– rej'd apol in dem (H5c)	10.72***	10.70***	7.33***	7.16***
I. Rej'd apol– no apol in dem (H6c)	10.82***	11.44***	8.29***	8.78***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C-9 (Part 2, Study 1): Target Response and Weakness (H5d, H6d)

	(1) Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	(2) Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	(3) Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	(4) Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls
Rejected Apology	-2.320	-1.727	1.917	1.915
	(2.581)	(2.561)	(1.826)	(1.765)
Accepted Apology	-4.676*	-4.819*	0.858	-0.188
	(2.636)	(2.617)	(1.866)	(1.804)
Democracy	-1.140	-0.421	2.325	2.443
	(2.561)	(2.542)	(1.812)	(1.752)
Rejected Apology X Democracy	1.397	0.278	-0.787	-1.053

	(3.594)	(3.569)	(2.544)	(2.460)
Accepted Apology X Democracy	3.230	2.929	0.434	1.271
	(3.659)	(3.632)	(2.590)	(2.503)
Conservative		-0.588		-1.365***
		(0.565)		(0.389)
Party ID		0.200		0.617***
		(0.289)		(0.199)
Male		-0.251		-2.144**
		(1.496)		(1.031)
Age		-0.243***		-0.142***
		(0.0479)		(0.0330)
White		-2.095		-2.786**
		(1.735)		(1.196)
College		-3.783**		-3.729***
		(1.576)		(1.086)
Political interest		2.101		-7.776***
		(2.482)		(1.711)
Political activism		-5.697		-11.46***
		(4.343)		(2.994)
Religiosity		-1.249		-4.471***
		(2.108)		(1.453)
Hawkishness		8.730***		6.049***
		(2.680)		(1.847)
International trust		-7.318***		-8.104***
		(2.774)		(1.912)
Russia enemy		6.333***		2.950**
		(1.712)		(1.180)
Constant	18.05***	26.88***	36.84***	56.69***
	(1.834)	(3.706)	(1.298)	(2.554)
Observations	2,452	2,452	2,452	2,452
R-squared	0.001	0.029	0.003	0.080

Quantities of Interest

F. Acc'd apol– rej'd apol in nondem (H5d)	-2.36	-3.09	-1.06	-2.10
G. Rej'd apol– no apol in nondem (H6d)	-2.32	-1.73	1.92	1.91
H. Acc'd apol– rej'd apol in dem (H5d)	-0.52	-0.44	0.16	0.22
I. Rej'd apol– no apol in dem (H6d)	-0.92	-1.45	1.13	0.86

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C-10 (Part 3, Study 1): Sender Backlash (BL) and Favorability (H7a, H8a)

	Victim Accepts Apology				Victim Rejects Apology			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls	Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls
Backlash (BL)	42.28***	42.82***	25.70***	26.08***	25.73***	26.83***	16.17***	17.03***
	(3.054)	(3.014)	(1.889)	(1.832)	(3.316)	(3.263)	(1.944)	(1.880)
No Backlash	51.04***	51.81***	32.97***	33.78***	37.62***	37.45***	22.83***	22.98***
	(3.109)	(3.068)	(1.922)	(1.865)	(3.342)	(3.283)	(1.959)	(1.892)
Democracy	28.11***	28.10***	18.79***	18.85***	28.11***	28.02***	18.79***	18.99***
	(3.020)	(2.979)	(1.867)	(1.811)	(3.316)	(3.260)	(1.944)	(1.878)
Backlash X Democracy	-12.55***	-13.36***	-8.733***	-9.434***	-11.17**	-12.25***	-8.413***	-9.569***
	(4.290)	(4.229)	(2.652)	(2.571)	(4.625)	(4.549)	(2.711)	(2.621)
No Backlash X Democracy	-16.72***	-17.46***	-12.36***	-13.25***	-18.05***	-17.64***	-13.21***	-13.23***
	(4.314)	(4.256)	(2.668)	(2.587)	(4.654)	(4.576)	(2.728)	(2.637)
Conservative		-0.106		0.248		0.788		0.389
		(0.670)		(0.407)		(0.714)		(0.412)
Party ID		-0.434		-0.258		-0.356		-0.316
		(0.343)		(0.209)		(0.364)		(0.210)
Male		0.939		1.892*		4.794**		3.816***
		(1.786)		(1.086)		(1.885)		(1.086)
Age		0.0304		-0.0221		0.136**		0.00321
		(0.0563)		(0.0342)		(0.0605)		(0.0349)
White		1.437		0.237		2.782		2.276*
		(2.054)		(1.249)		(2.182)		(1.258)
College		3.886**		3.196***		2.186		0.867
		(1.863)		(1.132)		(1.995)		(1.149)
Political interest		12.94***		10.46***		9.483***		6.689***
		(2.932)		(1.782)		(3.160)		(1.821)
Political activism		3.017		9.115***		11.00**		12.38***
		(5.045)		(3.067)		(5.351)		(3.083)
Religiosity		5.697**		3.964**		3.966		3.666**
		(2.551)		(1.550)		(2.637)		(1.520)
Hawkishness		-11.87***		-7.459***		-13.25***		-7.985***

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		(3.137)		(1.907)		(3.389)		(1.953)
International trust		10.96***		8.723***		19.31***		13.46***
		(3.298)		(2.005)		(3.542)		(2.041)
Russia enemy		-7.625***		-6.768***		-8.899***		-7.701***
		(1.990)		(1.210)		(2.162)		(1.246)
Constant	23.56***	17.28***	30.49***	25.09***	23.56***	8.106*	30.49***	23.89***
	(2.162)	(4.390)	(1.337)	(2.669)	(2.375)	(4.694)	(1.392)	(2.705)
Observations	2,411	2,411	2,411	2,411	2,531	2,531	2,531	2,531
R-squared	0.194	0.226	0.197	0.255	0.095	0.137	0.100	0.171
Quantities of Interest								
J. BL – no BL in nondem (H7a)	-8.76***	-9.00***	-7.27***	-7.70***	-11.89***	-10.61***	-6.65***	-5.95***
K. BL – no apology in nondem (H8a)	42.28***	42.82***	25.70***	26.08***	25.73***	26.83***	16.17***	17.03***
L. BL – no BL in dem (H7a)	-4.60	-4.90	-3.63*	-3.88**	-5.01	-5.23*	-1.86	-2.29
M. BL – no apology in dem (H8a)	29.72***	29.45***	16.97***	16.65***	14.55***	14.58***	7.76***	7.46***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In our PAP, we refer to H7-8a as H7-8i.

Table C-11 (Part 3, Study 1): Sender Backlash (BL) and Cooperation (H7b, H8b)

	Victim Accepts Apology				Victim Rejects Apology			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls	Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls
Backlash (BL)	12.40***	13.97***	19.76***	20.63***	8.797***	10.71***	13.48***	14.61***
	(3.211)	(3.086)	(2.282)	(2.214)	(3.054)	(2.942)	(2.323)	(2.262)
No Backlash	19.69***	21.72***	25.23***	26.42***	10.03***	11.32***	16.22***	16.48***
	(3.269)	(3.141)	(2.323)	(2.253)	(3.078)	(2.961)	(2.341)	(2.276)
Democracy	12.61***	13.46***	15.03***	15.23***	12.61***	13.49***	15.03***	15.19***
	(3.175)	(3.050)	(2.256)	(2.188)	(3.054)	(2.939)	(2.323)	(2.260)
Backlash X Democracy	0.659	-0.822	-7.003**	-7.710**	-3.278	-5.916	-6.923**	-8.269***
	(4.510)	(4.330)	(3.205)	(3.107)	(4.259)	(4.103)	(3.240)	(3.154)
No Backlash X Democracy	1.961	0.0362	-6.597**	-7.580**	-1.560	-2.678	-5.589*	-5.597*
	(4.536)	(4.358)	(3.223)	(3.127)	(4.287)	(4.126)	(3.261)	(3.172)
Conservative		-0.469		-0.116		0.315		0.570

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		(0.686)		(0.492)		(0.644)		(0.495)
Party ID		-0.238		-0.00303		-1.247***		-0.587**
		(0.351)		(0.252)		(0.329)		(0.253)
Male		5.433***		3.370**		9.384***		4.939***
		(1.829)		(1.312)		(1.699)		(1.307)
Age		-0.166***		-0.0428		-0.129**		0.0261
		(0.0576)		(0.0413)		(0.0546)		(0.0420)
White		5.814***		3.889**		3.210		1.855
		(2.103)		(1.509)		(1.968)		(1.513)
College		9.622***		7.157***		7.473***		4.939***
		(1.907)		(1.368)		(1.799)		(1.383)
Political interest		27.85***		16.19***		16.74***		10.67***
		(3.002)		(2.154)		(2.850)		(2.191)
Political activism		9.358*		5.578		14.98***		10.82***
		(5.166)		(3.706)		(4.825)		(3.710)
Religiosity		3.169		0.631		8.664***		2.796
		(2.611)		(1.874)		(2.378)		(1.828)
Hawkishness		-7.476**		-5.558**		-5.355*		-4.888**
		(3.212)		(2.304)		(3.056)		(2.350)
International trust		10.43***		9.148***		9.625***		11.63***
		(3.377)		(2.423)		(3.194)		(2.456)
Russia enemy		-2.618		-3.711**		-7.285***		-7.494***
		(2.038)		(1.462)		(1.949)		(1.499)
Constant	14.54***	-4.356	37.47***	23.83***	14.54***	2.114	37.47***	25.64***
	(2.274)	(4.495)	(1.616)	(3.225)	(2.187)	(4.233)	(1.664)	(3.255)
Observations	2,411	2,411	2,411	2,411	2,531	2,531	2,531	2,531
R-squared	0.055	0.139	0.101	0.166	0.024	0.107	0.054	0.117

Quantities of Interest

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
J. BL – no BL in nondem (H7b)	-7.29**	-7.75**	-5.47**	-5.79**	-1.23	-0.61	-2.73	-1.86
K. BL – no apology in nondem (H8b)	12.40***	13.97***	19.76***	20.63***	8.80***	10.71***	13.48***	14.61***
L. BL – no BL in dem (H7b)	-8.59***	-8.61***	-5.87***	-5.92***	-2.95	-3.85	-4.07*	-4.54**
M. BL – no apology in dem (H8b)	13.06***	13.15***	12.76***	12.92***	5.52*	4.80*	6.56***	6.34***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. In our PAP, we refer to H7-8b as H7-8ii.

Table C-12 (Part 3, Study 1): Sender Backlash (BL) and Buy (H7c, H8c)

	Victim Accepts Apology				Victim Rejects Apology			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls	Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls
Backlash (BL)	21.85***	21.85***	16.16***	15.96***	13.36***	11.07***	10.16***	8.754***
	(3.378)	(3.383)	(2.013)	(2.009)	(3.298)	(3.256)	(1.958)	(1.931)
No Backlash	30.38***	29.56***	20.43***	19.77***	16.59***	15.78***	13.15***	12.54***
	(3.439)	(3.443)	(2.049)	(2.045)	(3.323)	(3.277)	(1.973)	(1.943)
Dem	18.12***	17.50***	12.15***	11.53***	18.12***	16.95***	12.15***	11.33***
	(3.340)	(3.343)	(1.990)	(1.986)	(3.298)	(3.253)	(1.958)	(1.929)
Backlash X Dem	-5.666	-5.220	-6.240**	-5.748**	-4.611	-2.318	-3.498	-2.077
	(4.745)	(4.746)	(2.827)	(2.819)	(4.599)	(4.541)	(2.730)	(2.692)
No Backlash X Dem	-8.838*	-7.526	-4.804*	-3.842	-5.767	-4.118	-4.860*	-3.620
	(4.772)	(4.777)	(2.843)	(2.838)	(4.628)	(4.567)	(2.748)	(2.708)
Conservative		-0.336		0.313		0.316		0.452
		(0.752)		(0.447)		(0.713)		(0.423)
Party ID		0.0419		0.0854		0.285		0.258
		(0.385)		(0.229)		(0.364)		(0.216)
Male		1.703		0.613		4.305**		2.129*
		(2.005)		(1.191)		(1.881)		(1.115)
Age		0.0353		-0.00144		0.0290		-0.00240
		(0.0632)		(0.0375)		(0.0604)		(0.0358)
White		-0.261		-1.138		2.088		0.885
		(2.305)		(1.369)		(2.178)		(1.292)
College		6.205***		4.379***		4.567**		3.104***
		(2.090)		(1.242)		(1.991)		(1.180)
Political interest		-2.173		-1.023		-10.13***		-6.142***
		(3.290)		(1.955)		(3.154)		(1.870)
Political activism		-10.38*		-6.577*		-12.27**		-4.764
		(5.662)		(3.363)		(5.340)		(3.166)
Religiosity		-6.889**		-6.357***		-17.00***		-9.983***
		(2.862)		(1.700)		(2.632)		(1.561)
Hawkishness		-5.153		-2.233		1.108		-0.155
		(3.520)		(2.091)		(3.382)		(2.005)

International trust		-0.497		0.819		0.534		1.234
		(3.701)		(2.199)		(3.535)		(2.096)
Russia enemy		-3.614		-3.426***		-8.599***		-6.114***
		(2.234)		(1.327)		(2.158)		(1.279)
Constant	18.55***	27.29***	26.90***	33.10***	18.55***	33.73***	26.90***	36.34***
	(2.392)	(4.927)	(1.425)	(2.927)	(2.362)	(4.685)	(1.402)	(2.778)
Observations	2,411	2,411	2,411	2,411	2,531	2,531	2,531	2,531
R-squared	0.069	0.079	0.088	0.103	0.039	0.077	0.053	0.092
Quantities of Interest								
J. BL – no BL in nondem (H7c)	-8.53**	-7.71**	-4.27**	-3.81*	-3.23	-4.72	-2.99	-3.78**
K. BL – no apology in nondem (H8c)	21.85***	21.85***	16.16***	15.96***	13.36***	11.07***	10.16***	8.75***
L. BL – no BL in dem (H7c)	-5.36	-5.40	-5.70***	-5.71***	-2.07	-2.92	-1.62	-2.24
M. BL – no apology in dem (H8c)	16.19***	16.63***	9.92***	10.22***	8.75***	8.75***	6.66***	6.68***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In our PAP, we refer to H7-8c as H7-8iii.

Appendix D: Mechanisms

For Study 1, we preregistered two sets of analyses regarding mechanisms: a) the effect of the apology on each of four mediators (Threat, Values, Sincerity, Status) and b) the correlations of the mediators with the DVs. For Study 2, we preregistered analyses for a) the effect of apologies on Military Power and b) the correlation of Military Power and Weakness. Per PAP, we present results for robustness checks only for Study 1. We organize the tables first by analysis (Parts 1-3), then by the experiment (Study 1, Study 2), and then by DV.

For Part 1 (effect of apologizing) in Study 1, we find consistent statistically significant and substantively strong support for an apology reducing perceptions of threat (M1i), increasing perceptions of value (M2i), and increasing perceptions of sincerity (M3i) (Tables D-1, D-2, D-3). We further find the expected correlations between these mediators and the three DVs associated with image repair, supporting M1ii, M2ii, and M3ii (Tables D-5, D-6, D-7). By contrast, we do not find that an apology lowers status perceptions (M4i) (Table D-4). Indeed, when told that Russia apologized about 10% *more* respondents attributed high status to Russia (p<.01). The relationship between perceptions of status and Weakness is statistically significant and negative as expected (M4ii) (Table D-8).

Turning to Study 2, we find that, for a nondemocratic Russia, an apology significantly reduces the percentage of respondents who perceive it as a threat, irrespective of which control condition is used. An apology also reduces threat perceptions of a democratic Russia relative to the "explicit no-apology" but not compared to the "no mention" control. By contrast, we find that an apology increases perceptions of values and sincerity for both regime types irrespective of control condition. We thus find somewhat mixed results concerning M1i, while M2i and M3i are supported. In Study 2, we also continue to see the pattern (counter to M4i) that apologies might increase rather than decrease perceptions of status, though the results here are less consistent. We find no support for our added hypotheses (M5Fi) that an apology lowers perceptions of military power. Furthermore, counter to M5Fii, military power is not associated with Weakness as measured by the statement "Russia is weak." (Table D-9 and D-10.)

For Part 2 (fielded for Study 1 only), we find strong support for M5i-ii: for both regime types, perceptions of threat are greater if the victim rejects the apology than accepts it but perceptions of threat with a rejected apology are smaller than when no apology is offered (Table D-11). Support for M6i is mixed: we only find that perceptions of good values are lower when an apology is rejected than accepted for democracies but not for nondemocracies. By contrast, for both regime types, more respondents perceived Russia to have good moral values when it apologized and the apology was rejected than when it did not apologize at all, supporting M6ii (Table D-12). The pattern for sincerity is the same, with support for M7i mixed while M7ii is supported (Table D-13). Finally, for both regime types, we find no support for M8i that an apology is associated with status loss. Findings for M8ii are also unsupportive. For a democracy, we find no difference in status perceptions of a rejected vs. no apology and, for a nondemocracy, we find a statistically significant positive effect opposite to our expectation (Table D-14).

Finally, for Part 3, again fielded only for Study 1, we follow our PAP and examine the effect of sender backlash separately in cases where the target accepted or rejected the apology. Regarding threat, we find mixed support for the idea that backlash increases threat perception relative to an apology without backlash (M9i). This pattern exists for both regime types when the victim accepts the apology, but not when the victim rejects it. We do, however, find clear support across regime types and victim reactions that an apology with backlash results in lower threat perceptions compared to no apology (M9ii) (D-15). The findings for the values mediator are also mixed (Table D-16). There is little evidence for M10i that apologies with backlash reduce perceptions of moral values, compared to apologies without backlash. There may be such an effect for democracies when the victim accepts but not for any of the three other possible scenarios. However, there is strong evidence in favor of M10ii across regime type and victim

response: perception of good moral values is significantly higher when a country's apology engenders domestic backlash than when the country doesn't apologize. Finally, we find strong support for M11i-ii: across regime types and victim response, an apology with backlash is seen as less sincere than an apology without but as more sincere than no apology at all (D-17).

In sum, we find strong evidence that apologies reduce perceptions of threat, increase perceptions of value, and increase perceptions of sincerity relative to no apology. We do not find evidence that an apology is associated with a loss of status or perception of diminished military power.

Table D-1 (Part 1, Study 1): Apologies and Threat (M1i)

	(1) Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	(2) Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	(3) Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	(4) Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls
Apology	-18.79***	-18.57***	-12.21***	-12.27***
	(3.318)	(3.245)	(1.842)	(1.817)
Democracy	-15.81***	-15.10***	-11.56***	-11.32***
	(3.357)	(3.292)	(1.864)	(1.843)
Apology X Democracy	-2.773	-2.506	-0.953	-0.773
	(4.733)	(4.629)	(2.627)	(2.592)
Conservative		1.141		0.108
		(0.875)		(0.490)
Party ID		-0.626		-0.220
		(0.443)		(0.248)
Male		-2.699		-2.788**
		(2.354)		(1.318)
Age		-0.0748		-0.0374
		(0.0732)		(0.0410)
White		-1.100		-1.269
		(2.749)		(1.539)
College		0.838		-0.629
		(2.487)		(1.392)
Political interest		22.52***		12.55***
		(3.995)		(2.237)
Political activism		9.422		2.988
		(6.582)		(3.686)
Religiosity		15.04***		6.685***
		(3.331)		(1.865)
Hawkishness		-2.281		-2.536
		(4.088)		(2.289)
International trust		-6.176		-4.051*
		(4.361)		(2.442)
Russia enemy		8.993***		1.711
		(2.691)		(1.507)
Constant	73.43***	48.26***	76.38***	69.59***
	(2.404)	(5.615)	(1.335)	(3.144)
Observations	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651
R-squared	0.068	0.122	0.094	0.130

Quantities of Interest

A. Apology effect in nondem (M1i)	-18.79***	-18.56***	-12.21***	-12.27***
B. Apology effect in dem (M1i)	-21.56***	-21.07***	-13.16***	-13.04***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-2 (Part 1, Study 1): Apologies and Values (M2i)

	(1) Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	(2) Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	(3) Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	(4) Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls
Apology	23.67***	23.42***	18.83***	18.79***
	(3.211)	(3.047)	(1.907)	(1.781)
Democracy	9.687***	9.934***	10.72***	11.04***
	(3.249)	(3.091)	(1.930)	(1.807)
Apology X Democracy	6.965	8.895**	-2.057	-1.259
	(4.580)	(4.346)	(2.720)	(2.541)
Conservative		1.396*		0.613
		(0.821)		(0.480)
Party ID		-1.176***		-0.523**
		(0.416)		(0.243)
Male		7.632***		4.079***
		(2.210)		(1.292)
Age		-0.297***		-0.211***
		(0.0687)		(0.0402)
White		5.515**		3.659**
		(2.581)		(1.509)
College		2.948		0.624
		(2.335)		(1.365)
Political interest		10.50***		3.669*
		(3.751)		(2.193)
Political activism		11.89*		12.50***
		(6.180)		(3.613)
Religiosity		7.167**		5.615***
		(3.127)		(1.829)
Hawkishness		-11.41***		-4.857**
		(3.838)		(2.244)
International trust		23.13***		16.60***
		(4.094)		(2.394)
Russia enemy		-18.20***		-11.81***
		(2.526)		(1.477)
Constant	20.55***	24.64***	26.90***	30.48***
	(2.326)	(5.271)	(1.382)	(3.082)
Observations	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651
R-squared	0.094	0.196	0.116	0.240
Quantities of Interest				
A. Apology effect in nondem (M2i)	23.67***	23.42***	18.83***	18.79***
B. Apology effect in dem (M2i)	30.63***	32.32***	16.77***	17.54***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-3 (Part 1, Study 1): Apologies and Sincerity (M3i)

	(1) Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	(2) Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	(3) Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	(4) Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls
Apology	38.51***	38.57***	34.77***	34.62***
	(3.100)	(3.049)	(2.081)	(2.039)
Democracy	-0.138	0.638	5.786***	5.990***
	(3.137)	(3.093)	(2.106)	(2.068)
Apology X Democracy	6.572	7.619*	-1.250	-0.654
	(4.422)	(4.350)	(2.969)	(2.908)
Conservative		1.565*		0.486
		(0.822)		(0.550)
Party ID		-1.132***		-0.407
		(0.417)		(0.278)
Male		2.410		3.189**
		(2.212)		(1.479)
Age		-0.179***		-0.111**
		(0.0688)		(0.0460)
White		1.695		-0.411
		(2.583)		(1.727)
College		2.701		1.228
		(2.337)		(1.562)
Political interest		11.12***		0.532
		(3.754)		(2.510)
Political activism		11.36*		10.99***
		(6.184)		(4.135)
Religiosity		10.57***		6.596***
		(3.130)		(2.093)
Hawkishness		-8.653**		-6.843***
		(3.841)		(2.568)
International trust		13.60***		9.038***
		(4.097)		(2.739)
Russia enemy		-0.781		-6.386***
		(2.528)		(1.690)
Constant	21.80***	11.30**	30.70***	33.66***
	(2.246)	(5.276)	(1.508)	(3.527)
Observations	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651
R-squared	0.179	0.217	0.246	0.287
Quantities of Interest				
A. Apology effect in nondem (M3i)	38.51***	38.57***	34.77***	34.62***
B. Apology effect in dem (M3i)	45.09***	46.19***	33.52***	33.96***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-4 (Part 1, Study 1): Apologies and Status (M4i)

	(1) Main Model: Binary DV,	(2) Robust #1: Binary DV,	(3) Robust # 2: Scale DV,	(4) Robust# 3: Scale DV,

	no controls	controls	no controls	controls
Apology	9.846***	9.307***	8.092***	7.683***
	(3.381)	(3.260)	(1.904)	(1.821)
Democracy	9.336***	10.02***	8.177***	8.397***
	(3.421)	(3.306)	(1.927)	(1.847)
Apology X Democracy	0.917	2.412	-1.045	-0.228
	(4.823)	(4.649)	(2.716)	(2.597)
Conservative		0.295		-0.0592
		(0.879)		(0.491)
Party ID		0.186		0.00137
		(0.445)		(0.249)
Male		4.594*		2.548*
		(2.364)		(1.321)
Age		-0.474***		-0.316***
		(0.0735)		(0.0411)
White		0.149		1.687
		(2.761)		(1.542)
College		7.418***		2.819**
		(2.498)		(1.395)
Political interest		20.18***		5.086**
		(4.012)		(2.241)
Political activism		18.99***		8.378**
		(6.611)		(3.693)
Religiosity		8.947***		4.804**
		(3.346)		(1.869)
Hawkishness		-6.323		-5.854**
		(4.106)		(2.293)
International trust		12.00***		7.267***
		(4.380)		(2.446)
Russia enemy		-7.515***		-8.312***
		(2.703)		(1.510)
Constant	32.33***	31.09***	47.18***	57.82***
	(2.450)	(5.639)	(1.380)	(3.150)
Observations	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651
R-squared	0.020	0.102	0.035	0.131
Quantities of Interest				
A. Apology effect in nondem (M4i)	9.85***	9.31***	8.09***	7.68***
B. Apology effect in dem (M4i)	10.76***	11.72***	7.05***	7.46***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-5 (Part 1, Study 1): Effect of Threat on Favorability, Cooperation, and Buy (M1iia-c)

	(1) Favorability Binary DV	(2) Favorability Scale DV	(3) Cooperation Binary DV	(4) Cooperation Scale DV	(5) Buy Binary DV	(6) Buy Scale DV
Threat	-0.140***	-0.0913***	-0.118***	-0.128***	-0.296***	-0.187***
	(0.0229)	(0.0142)	(0.0223)	(0.0168)	(0.0232)	(0.0139)
Apology	40.85***	25.19***	13.32***	18.51***	17.82***	12.77***
	(3.032)	(1.878)	(2.954)	(2.233)	(3.073)	(1.844)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democracy	25.62***	17.54***	11.72***	13.29***	12.60***	8.655***
	(3.065)	(1.898)	(2.986)	(2.257)	(3.106)	(1.864)
Apology X Democracy	-11.07***	-7.451***	4.180	-4.307	-0.617	-1.409
	(4.283)	(2.653)	(4.172)	(3.153)	(4.341)	(2.604)
Conservative	1.670**	0.977*	-0.489	0.233	0.185	0.464
	(0.810)	(0.502)	(0.789)	(0.596)	(0.821)	(0.493)
Party ID	-1.266***	-0.654**	-0.633	-0.425	-0.0625	0.0513
	(0.410)	(0.254)	(0.400)	(0.302)	(0.416)	(0.250)
Male	2.774	3.135**	9.445***	5.283***	2.107	1.076
	(2.178)	(1.349)	(2.122)	(1.604)	(2.208)	(1.325)
Age	0.0159	-0.0828**	-0.111*	0.0189	-0.0277	-0.0426
	(0.0677)	(0.0419)	(0.0660)	(0.0499)	(0.0686)	(0.0412)
White	5.233**	4.162***	3.987	2.435	4.537*	1.921
	(2.543)	(1.575)	(2.477)	(1.872)	(2.577)	(1.546)
College	5.486**	3.066**	8.331***	5.113***	4.935**	2.138
	(2.301)	(1.425)	(2.241)	(1.694)	(2.332)	(1.399)
Political interest	15.58***	10.44***	19.69***	13.45***	1.412	-0.204
	(3.731)	(2.311)	(3.635)	(2.747)	(3.782)	(2.269)
Political activism	0.404	9.682**	11.00*	6.432	-15.63**	-5.823
	(6.093)	(3.774)	(5.936)	(4.486)	(6.175)	(3.705)
Religiosity	3.394	2.855	4.750	1.505	-10.88***	-7.683***
	(3.101)	(1.920)	(3.021)	(2.283)	(3.143)	(1.886)
Hawkishness	-10.77***	-5.297**	-10.50***	-8.397***	-5.046	-3.370
	(3.782)	(2.342)	(3.684)	(2.785)	(3.833)	(2.300)
International trust	15.72***	13.41***	13.77***	13.70***	2.022	1.517
	(4.037)	(2.500)	(3.932)	(2.972)	(4.091)	(2.455)
Russia enemy	-10.56***	-7.923***	-4.809**	-5.546***	-6.956***	-4.037***
	(2.498)	(1.547)	(2.433)	(1.839)	(2.532)	(1.519)
Constant	21.20***	29.21***	9.755*	34.39***	49.52***	47.63***
	(5.310)	(3.289)	(5.173)	(3.910)	(5.382)	(3.229)
Observations	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651
R-squared	0.246	0.271	0.147	0.185	0.201	0.227

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-6 (Part 1, Study 1): Effect of Values on Favorability, Cooperation, and Buy (M2iia-c)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Favorability	Favorability	Cooperation	Cooperation	Buy	Buy
	Binary DV	Scale DV	Binary DV	Scale DV	Binary DV	Scale DV
Values	0.377***	0.242***	0.333***	0.266***	0.315***	0.180***
	(0.0228)	(0.0141)	(0.0225)	(0.0170)	(0.0247)	(0.0150)
Apology	34.63***	21.22***	7.717***	14.65***	15.93***	12.04***
	(2.862)	(1.764)	(2.819)	(2.135)	(3.097)	(1.878)
Democracy	23.99***	16.51***	10.19***	12.58***	13.93***	9.698***
	(2.860)	(1.763)	(2.818)	(2.134)	(3.096)	(1.877)
Apology X Democracy	-14.06***	-9.373***	1.514	-6.355**	-2.679	-2.539
	(4.015)	(2.475)	(3.956)	(2.996)	(4.346)	(2.635)
Conservative	0.984	0.535	-1.089	-0.285	-0.593	-0.00133
	(0.759)	(0.468)	(0.747)	(0.566)	(0.821)	(0.498)
Party ID	-0.736*	-0.313	-0.167	-0.0317	0.493	0.380

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(0.385)	(0.237)	(0.379)	(0.287)	(0.417)	(0.253)
Male	0.278	1.536	7.222***	3.597**	0.500	0.210
	(2.046)	(1.261)	(2.016)	(1.527)	(2.215)	(1.343)
Age	0.138**	-0.00409	-0.00306	0.108**	0.0881	0.0249
	(0.0637)	(0.0393)	(0.0628)	(0.0476)	(0.0690)	(0.0418)
White	3.310	2.929**	2.281	1.107	3.124	1.136
	(2.384)	(1.470)	(2.349)	(1.779)	(2.581)	(1.565)
College	4.259**	2.276*	7.250***	4.221***	3.758	1.451
	(2.155)	(1.328)	(2.123)	(1.608)	(2.333)	(1.414)
Political interest	8.476**	5.841***	13.53***	7.768***	-8.558**	-6.313***
	(3.469)	(2.138)	(3.418)	(2.588)	(3.754)	(2.276)
Political activism	-5.392	5.948*	5.933	2.062	-22.16***	-9.727***
	(5.708)	(3.518)	(5.624)	(4.259)	(6.178)	(3.746)
Religiosity	-1.411	-0.250	0.587	-2.326	-17.59***	-11.79***
	(2.890)	(1.781)	(2.848)	(2.157)	(3.128)	(1.897)
Hawkishness	-6.147*	-2.329	-6.432*	-5.067*	-0.775	-0.890
	(3.550)	(2.188)	(3.498)	(2.649)	(3.843)	(2.330)
International trust	7.876**	8.386***	6.802*	8.332***	-3.438	-1.485
	(3.814)	(2.351)	(3.758)	(2.846)	(4.128)	(2.503)
Russia enemy	-4.963**	-4.342***	0.192	-1.850	-3.879	-2.448
	(2.368)	(1.459)	(2.333)	(1.767)	(2.563)	(1.554)
Constant	5.169	18.84***	-4.153	21.66***	27.48***	34.16***
	(4.896)	(3.018)	(4.824)	(3.653)	(5.299)	(3.213)
Observations	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651
R-squared	0.339	0.367	0.235	0.266	0.201	0.210

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-7 (Part 1, Study 1): Effect of Sincerity on Favorability, Cooperation, and Buy (M3iia-c)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Favorability	Favorability	Cooperation	Cooperation	Buy	Buy
	Binary DV	Scale DV	Binary DV	Scale DV	Binary DV	Scale DV
Sincerity	0.299***	0.202***	0.257***	0.187***	0.131***	0.0752***
	(0.0235)	(0.0144)	(0.0231)	(0.0176)	(0.0257)	(0.0155)
Apology	31.93***	19.08***	5.610*	13.67***	18.25***	13.35***
	(3.035)	(1.864)	(2.980)	(2.280)	(3.317)	(2.002)
Democracy	27.54***	18.79***	13.34***	15.10***	16.98***	11.44***
	(2.938)	(1.804)	(2.885)	(2.207)	(3.211)	(1.938)
Apology X Democracy	-12.99***	-8.764***	2.519	-5.412*	-0.877	-1.512
	(4.136)	(2.540)	(4.060)	(3.106)	(4.519)	(2.728)
Conservative	1.043	0.556	-1.026	-0.206	-0.358	0.132
	(0.782)	(0.480)	(0.768)	(0.587)	(0.854)	(0.516)
Party ID	-0.841**	-0.368	-0.268	-0.133	0.271	0.254
	(0.397)	(0.244)	(0.389)	(0.298)	(0.433)	(0.262)
Male	2.432	2.893**	9.144***	5.178***	2.589	1.401
	(2.102)	(1.291)	(2.063)	(1.579)	(2.297)	(1.386)
Age	0.0798	-0.0398	-0.0561	0.0619	0.0179	-0.0152
	(0.0654)	(0.0402)	(0.0643)	(0.0492)	(0.0715)	(0.0432)
White	4.881**	3.919***	3.682	2.258	4.639*	2.000
	(2.454)	(1.507)	(2.409)	(1.843)	(2.681)	(1.619)
College	4.562**	2.443*	7.538***	4.500***	4.332*	1.778

	(2.220)	(1.364)	(2.180)	(1.668)	(2.426)	(1.465)
Political interest	9.111**	6.130***	14.17***	8.484***	-6.709*	-5.260**
	(3.575)	(2.196)	(3.510)	(2.685)	(3.907)	(2.358)
Political activism	-4.307	6.524*	6.974	3.102	-19.91***	-8.443**
	(5.881)	(3.612)	(5.774)	(4.417)	(6.426)	(3.879)
Religiosity	-1.868	-0.656	0.258	-2.395	-16.72***	-11.30***
	(2.984)	(1.832)	(2.929)	(2.241)	(3.260)	(1.968)
Hawkishness	-7.861**	-3.338	-8.011**	-6.487**	-3.235	-2.292
	(3.654)	(2.244)	(3.588)	(2.745)	(3.993)	(2.410)
International trust	12.53***	11.23***	11.01***	11.95***	2.063	1.652
	(3.905)	(2.398)	(3.834)	(2.933)	(4.267)	(2.576)
Russia enemy	-11.59***	-8.586***	-5.670**	-6.551***	-9.513***	-5.664***
	(2.402)	(1.475)	(2.358)	(1.804)	(2.625)	(1.584)
Constant	11.08**	22.52***	1.152	26.11***	33.76***	37.74***
	(5.019)	(3.082)	(4.927)	(3.769)	(5.484)	(3.310)
Observations	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651	1,651
R-squared	0.298	0.333	0.194	0.211	0.135	0.153

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table D-8 (Part 1, Study 1): Effect of Status on Weakness (M4ii)

	(1) Weakness Binary DV	(2) Weakness Scale DV
Status	-0.0957***	-0.137***
	(0.0194)	(0.0131)
Apology	-0.730	4.282**
	(2.567)	(1.734)
Democracy	0.531	3.828**
	(2.605)	(1.760)
Apology X Democracy	1.287	-0.799
	(3.653)	(2.468)
Conservative	-0.327	-0.158
	(0.690)	(0.466)
Party ID	-0.0213	0.0460
	(0.350)	(0.236)
Male	-0.0366	-1.389
	(1.860)	(1.256)
Age	-0.337***	-0.287***
	(0.0585)	(0.0395)
White	-0.146	-1.005
	(2.169)	(1.465)
College	-1.176	-2.175
	(1.968)	(1.329)
Political interest	-3.011	-8.067***
	(3.177)	(2.146)
Political activism	-4.076	-5.432
	(5.207)	(3.518)
Religiosity	0.498	-3.758**
	(2.634)	(1.780)
Hawkishness	6.546**	3.770*

	(3.228)	(2.181)
International trust	-6.140*	-6.265***
	(3.449)	(2.330)
Russia enemy	6.631***	1.896
	(2.128)	(1.438)
Constant	34.32***	63.87***
	(4.472)	(3.021)
Observations	1,651	1,651
R-squared	0.047	0.144

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-9 (Part 1, Study 2): Apologies and Threat (M1i), Values (M2i), Sincerity (M3i), Status (M4i), and Military Power (M5Fi)

	(1) Threat	(2) Values	(3) Sincerity	(4) Status	(5) Military Power
No mention	-2.163	6.529**	3.697	0.612	-4.386
	(3.201)	(3.102)	(2.903)	(3.233)	(3.286)
Apology	-18.62***	25.93***	42.67***	6.206**	-3.826
	(3.114)	(3.018)	(2.824)	(3.145)	(3.196)
Democracy	-20.02***	19.88***	0.349	3.071	-6.372*
	(3.180)	(3.082)	(2.885)	(3.212)	(3.265)
No Mention X Democracy	-3.678	5.917	5.221	4.506	0.845
	(4.512)	(4.373)	(4.093)	(4.557)	(4.632)
Apology X Democracy	9.928**	-5.837	2.797	3.058	4.537
	(4.432)	(4.295)	(4.019)	(4.476)	(4.549)
Constant	61.42***	19.40***	19.40***	36.21***	57.33***
	(2.257)	(2.188)	(2.047)	(2.280)	(2.317)
Observations	2,852	2,852	2,852	2,852	2,852
R-squared	0.048	0.080	0.167	0.008	0.003
Quantities of Interest					
A1. Apol effect in nondem (No mention)	-16.46***	19.40***	38.97***	5.59*	0.56
A2. Apol effect in nondem (Explicit)	-18.62***	25.93***	42.67***	6.21**	-3.83
B1. Apol effect in dem (No mention)	-2.85	7.65**	36.54***	4.15	4.25
B2. Apol effect in dem (Explicit)	-8.69***	20.10***	45.46***	9.26***	0.71

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-10 (Part 1, Study 2): Effect of Military Power on Weakness (M5Fii)

	(1) Weakness Binary DV
Military Power	-0.0167
	(0.0133)
Apology	-7.565***
	(1.937)

Democracy	-7.810***
	(1.638)
Apology X Democracy	3.468
	(2.768)
Conservative	0.629
	(0.527)
Party ID	-0.690***
	(0.257)
Male	6.798***
	(1.358)
Age	-0.239***
	(0.0441)
White	-0.311
	(1.578)
College	1.043
	(1.454)
Political interest	5.918***
	(2.216)
Political activism	19.06***
	(4.208)
Religiosity	7.180***
	(1.902)
Hawkishness	-0.331
	(2.429)
International trust	1.412
	(2.513)
Russia enemy	0.623
	(1.555)
Constant	20.66***
	(3.167)
Observations	2,849
R-squared	0.059

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-11 (Part 2, Study 1): Victim's Response and Threat (M5i, M5ii)

	(1) Main Model: Binary, no controls	(2) Robust #1: Binary, controls	(3) Robust # 2: Scale, no controls	(4) Robust# 3: Scale, controls
Rejected Apology	-17.66***	-16.43***	-10.04***	-9.477***
	(3.425)	(3.372)	(1.862)	(1.845)
Accepted Apology	-25.04***	-23.24***	-15.88***	-15.19***
	(3.499)	(3.447)	(1.902)	(1.886)
Democracy	-15.81***	-14.60***	-11.56***	-11.01***
	(3.399)	(3.348)	(1.848)	(1.832)
Rejected Apology X Democracy	7.301	5.540	4.122	3.276
	(4.770)	(4.700)	(2.594)	(2.572)
Accepted Apology X Democracy	2.926	0.601	3.357	2.379
	(4.856)	(4.783)	(2.640)	(2.618)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conservative		0.720		0.514
		(0.744)		(0.407)
Party ID		-0.544		-0.383*
		(0.381)		(0.208)
Male		-0.720		-0.0274
		(1.971)		(1.078)
Age		-0.194***		-0.103***
		(0.0631)		(0.0345)
White		1.178		-0.409
		(2.285)		(1.250)
College		-1.455		-0.964
		(2.075)		(1.136)
Political interest		18.87***		8.385***
		(3.269)		(1.789)
Political activism		18.92***		7.739**
		(5.720)		(3.130)
Religiosity		12.90***		5.841***
		(2.776)		(1.519)
Hawkishness		-3.497		-2.301
		(3.530)		(1.932)
International trust		-2.262		-2.032
		(3.653)		(1.999)
Russia enemy		6.870***		3.271***
		(2.255)		(1.234)
Constant	73.43***	56.70***	76.38***	70.80***
	(2.434)	(4.881)	(1.323)	(2.671)
Observations	2,452	2,452	2,452	2,452
R-squared	0.054	0.094	0.073	0.101

Quantities of Interest

F. Rejected apol– accepted apol in nondem (M5i)	7.38**	6.81**	5.86***	5.72***
G. Rejected apol– no apol in nondem (M5ii)	-17.66***	-16.43***	-10.04***	-9.48***
H. Rejected apol– accepted apol in dem (M5i)	11.75***	11.75***	6.61***	6.61***
I. Rejected apol– no apol in dem (M5ii)	-10.36***	-10.89***	-5.92***	-6.20***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table D-12 (Part 2, Study 1): Victim's Response and Values (M6i, M6ii)

	(1) Main Model: Binary, no controls	(2) Robust #1: Binary, controls	(3) Robust # 2: Scale, no controls	(4) Robust# 3: Scale, controls
Rejected Apology	20.48***	20.66***	16.83***	16.89***
	(3.338)	(3.213)	(1.916)	(1.801)
Accepted Apology	24.64***	26.42***	20.87***	22.05***
	(3.410)	(3.284)	(1.957)	(1.841)
Democracy	9.687***	10.09***	10.72***	10.84***
	(3.312)	(3.190)	(1.901)	(1.788)
Rejected Apology X Democracy	-2.545	-2.404	-5.594**	-5.283**

	(4.649)	(4.478)	(2.669)	(2.510)
Accepted Apology X Democracy	9.619**	7.150	-1.806	-3.474
	(4.732)	(4.557)	(2.717)	(2.554)
Conservative		0.417		0.792**
		(0.709)		(0.397)
Party ID		-0.499		-0.472**
		(0.363)		(0.203)
Male		6.810***		3.306***
		(1.877)		(1.052)
Age		-0.199***		-0.158***
		(0.0601)		(0.0337)
White		0.643		0.900
		(2.177)		(1.220)
College		3.223		1.712
		(1.977)		(1.108)
Political interest		14.94***		8.058***
		(3.114)		(1.746)
Political activism		5.298		8.078***
		(5.450)		(3.055)
Religiosity		7.407***		7.347***
		(2.645)		(1.482)
Hawkishness		-4.840		-6.434***
		(3.363)		(1.885)
International trust		26.28***		16.40***
		(3.480)		(1.951)
Russia enemy		-14.41***		-10.65***
		(2.149)		(1.204)
Constant	20.55***	15.63***	26.90***	25.69***
	(2.372)	(4.650)	(1.362)	(2.606)
Observations	2,452	2,452	2,452	2,452
R-squared	0.079	0.157	0.107	0.221

Quantities of Interest				
F. Rej'd apol– acc'd apol in nondem (M6i)	-4.16	-5.75*	-4.04**	-5.15***
G. Rej'd apol– no apol in nondem (M6ii)	20.48***	20.66***	16.83***	16.89***
H. Rej'd apol– acc'd apol in dem (M6i)	-16.32***	-15.31***	-7.83***	-6.96***
I. Rej'd apol– no apol in dem (M6ii)	17.94***	18.26***	11.24***	11.61***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-13 (Part 2, Study 1*): Victim's Response and Sincerity (M7i, M7ii)

	(1) Main Model: Binary, no controls	(2) Robust #1: Binary, controls	(3) Robust # 2: Scale, no controls	(4) Robust# 3: Scale, controls
Rejected Apology	39.62***	39.91***	33.73***	33.68***
	(3.216)	(3.173)	(2.092)	(2.062)
Accepted Apology	42.90***	44.57***	37.75***	38.64***
	(3.285)	(3.244)	(2.138)	(2.107)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democracy	-0.138	0.518	5.786***	5.941***
	(3.191)	(3.150)	(2.076)	(2.047)
Rejected Apology X Democracy	1.498	1.042	-3.497	-3.339
	(4.478)	(4.423)	(2.914)	(2.873)
Accepted Apology X Democracy	5.963	3.816	-2.194	-3.486
	(4.559)	(4.501)	(2.967)	(2.924)
Conservative		0.714		0.620
		(0.700)		(0.455)
Party ID		-0.456		-0.264
		(0.358)		(0.233)
Male		0.536		1.142
		(1.854)		(1.205)
Age		-0.0419		-0.0517
		(0.0594)		(0.0386)
White		0.944		-0.590
		(2.150)		(1.397)
College		1.641		0.529
		(1.953)		(1.269)
Political interest		15.50***		4.862**
		(3.076)		(1.998)
Political activism		7.899		7.398**
		(5.383)		(3.497)
Religiosity		6.559**		5.183***
		(2.612)		(1.697)
Hawkishness		-7.785**		-5.301**
		(3.321)		(2.158)
International trust		17.03***		12.38***
		(3.437)		(2.233)
Russia enemy		-0.503		-4.956***
		(2.122)		(1.379)
Constant	21.80***	5.511	30.70***	26.92***
	(2.285)	(4.593)	(1.487)	(2.984)
Observations	2,452	2,452	2,452	2,452
R-squared	0.169	0.200	0.234	0.265

Quantities of Interest

F. Rej'd apol– acc'd apol in nondem (M7i)	-3.28	-4.66	-4.01*	-4.96**
G. Rej'd apol– no apol in nondem (M7ii)	39.62***	39.91***	33.73***	33.68***
H. Rej'd apol– acc'd apol in dem (M7i)	-7.75**	-7.43**	-5.32***	-4.81**
I. Rej'd apol– no apol in dem (M7ii)	41.12***	40.96***	30.24***	30.34***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-14 (Part 2, Study 1): Victim's Response and Status (M8i, M8ii)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Main Model: Binary, no controls	Robust #1: Binary, controls	Robust # 2: Scale, no controls	Robust# 3: Scale, controls
Rejected Apology	9.438***	10.36***	9.699***	9.921***
	(3.470)	(3.358)	(1.873)	(1.799)

Accepted Apology	14.46***	16.74***	11.78***	12.58***
	(3.545)	(3.433)	(1.913)	(1.839)
Democracy	9.336***	10.00***	8.177***	8.282***
	(3.443)	(3.334)	(1.858)	(1.786)
Rejected Apology X Democracy	-6.356	-6.701	-7.180***	-6.965***
	(4.832)	(4.681)	(2.608)	(2.508)
Accepted Apology X Democracy	-6.852	-9.685**	-5.902**	-7.141***
	(4.919)	(4.764)	(2.655)	(2.552)
Conservative		0.996		0.662*
		(0.741)		(0.397)
Party ID		-0.470		-0.288
		(0.379)		(0.203)
Male		3.857**		1.952*
		(1.963)		(1.052)
Age		-0.389***		-0.261***
		(0.0628)		(0.0337)
White		4.022*		1.024
		(2.276)		(1.219)
College		5.489***		1.802
		(2.067)		(1.107)
Political interest		20.19***		7.025***
		(3.255)		(1.744)
Political activism		16.41***		5.440*
		(5.697)		(3.052)
Religiosity		13.56***		6.673***
		(2.765)		(1.481)
Hawkishness		-5.559		-5.005***
		(3.515)		(1.883)
International trust		12.87***		8.395***
		(3.638)		(1.949)
Russia enemy		-7.134***		-7.426***
		(2.246)		(1.203)
Constant	32.33***	22.24***	47.18***	51.56***
	(2.466)	(4.861)	(1.331)	(2.604)
Observations	2,452	2,452	2,452	2,452
R-squared	0.012	0.085	0.027	0.112

Quantities of Interest				
F. Rej'd apol– acc'd apol in nondem (M8i)	-5.02	-6.38*	-2.08	-2.66
G. Rej'd apol– no apol in nondem (M8ii)	9.44***	10.36***	9.70***	9.92***
H. Rej'd apol– acc'd apol in dem (M8i)	-4.53	-3.39	-3.36*	-2.48
I. Rej'd apol– no apol in dem (M8ii)	3.08	3.66	2.52	2.96*

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-15 (Part 3, Study 1): Sender Backlash (BL) and Threat (M9i, M9ii)

	Victim Accepts Apology				Victim Rejects Apology			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls	Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls
Backlash (BL)	-16.83***	-16.23***	-10.79***	-10.64***	-14.15***	-11.16***	-9.236***	-7.916***
	(3.430)	(3.389)	(1.867)	(1.853)	(3.416)	(3.350)	(1.820)	(1.799)
No Backlash	-25.04***	-23.40***	-15.88***	-15.23***	-17.66***	-16.56***	-10.04***	-9.562***
	(3.491)	(3.449)	(1.900)	(1.886)	(3.443)	(3.371)	(1.834)	(1.810)
Democracy	-15.81***	-14.74***	-11.56***	-11.10***	-15.81***	-14.52***	-11.56***	-10.94***
	(3.391)	(3.349)	(1.846)	(1.831)	(3.416)	(3.347)	(1.820)	(1.797)
Backlash X Democracy	2.382	1.498	3.787	3.447	5.075	2.309	5.208**	3.969
	(4.818)	(4.755)	(2.622)	(2.600)	(4.764)	(4.671)	(2.539)	(2.509)
No Backlash X Democracy	2.926	0.832	3.357	2.490	7.301	5.608	4.122	3.266
	(4.845)	(4.785)	(2.637)	(2.616)	(4.795)	(4.698)	(2.555)	(2.523)
Conservative		1.049		0.505		0.274		0.333
		(0.753)		(0.412)		(0.733)		(0.394)
Party ID		-0.586		-0.290		-0.255		-0.307
		(0.386)		(0.211)		(0.374)		(0.201)
Male		-0.241		-0.0460		-5.049***		-3.069***
		(2.009)		(1.098)		(1.935)		(1.039)
Age		-0.109*		-0.0785**		-0.185***		-0.0823**
		(0.0633)		(0.0346)		(0.0622)		(0.0334)
White		-2.037		-1.196		3.447		0.223
		(2.310)		(1.263)		(2.241)		(1.203)
College		0.954		0.218		-0.905		-0.990
		(2.094)		(1.145)		(2.048)		(1.100)
Political interest		12.96***		6.088***		24.00***		10.31***
		(3.296)		(1.802)		(3.244)		(1.742)
Political activism		16.38***		8.830***		12.76**		6.205**
		(5.672)		(3.101)		(5.493)		(2.950)
Religiosity		12.50***		6.379***		9.639***		3.829***
		(2.868)		(1.568)		(2.708)		(1.454)
Hawkishness		-1.593		-1.756		-4.872		-1.784

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		(3.527)		(1.928)		(3.479)		(1.869)
International trust		-2.438		-3.318		1.316		-0.812
		(3.708)		(2.027)		(3.637)		(1.953)
Russia enemy		10.32***		3.984***		9.851***		4.920***
		(2.238)		(1.223)		(2.219)		(1.192)
Constant	73.43***	54.10***	76.38***	70.08***	73.43***	53.73***	76.38***	69.55***
	(2.429)	(4.936)	(1.322)	(2.699)	(2.446)	(4.820)	(1.304)	(2.588)
Observations	2,411	2,411	2,411	2,411	2,531	2,531	2,531	2,531
R-squared	0.059	0.094	0.075	0.102	0.030	0.081	0.043	0.079
Quantities of Interest								
J. BL – no BL in nondem (M9i)	8.21**	7.17**	5.09***	4.59**	3.51	5.39	0.80	1.65
K. BL – no apol in nondem (M9ii)	-16.83***	-16.23***	-10.79***	-10.64***	-14.15***	-11.16***	-9.24***	-7.92***
L. BL – no BL in dem (M9i)	7.67**	7.83**	5.52***	5.54***	1.29	2.09	1.89	2.35
M. BL– no apol in dem (M9ii)	-14.44***	-14.74***	-7.01***	-7.20***	-9.07***	-8.85***	-4.03**	-3.95**

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-16 (Part 3, Study 1): Sender Backlash (BL) and Values (M10i, M10ii)

	Victim Accepts Apology				Victim Rejects Apology			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls	Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls
Backlash (BL)	19.85***	20.32***	15.99***	16.15***	15.88***	16.51***	14.77***	15.35***
	(3.341)	(3.223)	(1.935)	(1.826)	(3.321)	(3.168)	(1.934)	(1.794)
No Backlash	24.64***	26.00***	20.87***	21.82***	20.48***	21.02***	16.83***	17.17***
	(3.400)	(3.280)	(1.970)	(1.858)	(3.347)	(3.187)	(1.949)	(1.806)
Democracy	9.687***	9.938***	10.72***	10.73***	9.687***	10.16***	10.72***	11.06***
	(3.303)	(3.185)	(1.913)	(1.804)	(3.321)	(3.165)	(1.934)	(1.793)
Backlash X Democracy	6.490	5.214	-1.419	-2.101	0.193	-1.564	-5.479**	-6.729***
	(4.692)	(4.522)	(2.718)	(2.562)	(4.632)	(4.417)	(2.697)	(2.502)
No Backlash X Democracy	9.619**	7.677*	-1.806	-3.204	-2.545	-2.752	-5.594**	-5.618**
	(4.719)	(4.551)	(2.733)	(2.578)	(4.662)	(4.442)	(2.714)	(2.517)
Conservative		-0.381		0.353		0.781		0.573

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		(0.716)		(0.406)		(0.693)		(0.393)
Party ID		-0.0392		-0.155		-0.874**		-0.578***
		(0.367)		(0.208)		(0.354)		(0.200)
Male		4.763**		2.060*		10.04***		5.252***
		(1.910)		(1.082)		(1.830)		(1.036)
Age		-0.191***		-0.162***		-0.274***		-0.190***
		(0.0602)		(0.0341)		(0.0588)		(0.0333)
White		-1.212		0.0631		0.919		1.304
		(2.196)		(1.244)		(2.119)		(1.200)
College		2.676		1.486		1.911		1.183
		(1.992)		(1.128)		(1.937)		(1.097)
Political interest		13.10***		7.062***		12.68***		5.975***
		(3.135)		(1.776)		(3.068)		(1.738)
Political activism		12.36**		9.755***		12.92**		12.78***
		(5.395)		(3.056)		(5.195)		(2.943)
Religiosity		5.882**		5.983***		8.659***		7.420***
		(2.727)		(1.545)		(2.560)		(1.450)
Hawkishness		-5.300		-5.745***		-4.615		-3.841**
		(3.354)		(1.900)		(3.290)		(1.864)
International trust		21.18***		14.89***		21.07***		16.04***
		(3.527)		(1.998)		(3.439)		(1.948)
Russia enemy		-17.16***		-12.01***		-17.57***		-12.33***
		(2.128)		(1.206)		(2.099)		(1.189)
Constant	20.55***	23.83***	26.90***	29.86***	20.55***	21.58***	26.90***	28.26***
	(2.365)	(4.694)	(1.370)	(2.659)	(2.379)	(4.557)	(1.385)	(2.582)
Observations	2,411	2,411	2,411	2,411	2,531	2,531	2,531	2,531
R-squared	0.091	0.166	0.115	0.223	0.038	0.138	0.063	0.205
Quantities of Interest								
J. BL – no BL in nondem (M10i)	-4.79	-5.68*	-4.88**	-5.67***	-4.60	-4.51	-2.07	-1.82
K. BL – no apol in nondem (M10ii)	19.85***	20.32***	15.99***	16.15***	15.88***	16.51***	14.77***	15.35***
L. BL – no BL in dem (M10i)	-7.92**	-8.14**	-4.49**	-4.57**	-1.86	-3.32	-1.95	-2.93*
M. BL – no apol in dem (M10ii)	26.34***	25.53***	14.57***	14.05***	16.07***	14.95***	9.29***	8.62***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D-17 (Part 3, Study 1): Sender Backlash (BL) and Sincerity (M11i, M11ii)

	Victim Accepts Apology				Victim Rejects Apology			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls	Main Model: Binary DV, no controls	Robust #1: Binary DV, controls	Robust # 2: Scale DV, no controls	Robust# 3: Scale DV, controls
Backlash (BL)	30.56***	31.57***	28.77***	29.03***	23.43***	24.76***	24.89***	25.10***
	(3.248)	(3.193)	(2.132)	(2.096)	(3.274)	(3.238)	(2.114)	(2.079)
No Backlash	42.90***	44.81***	37.75***	38.66***	39.62***	40.24***	33.73***	33.96***
	(3.306)	(3.250)	(2.170)	(2.134)	(3.300)	(3.258)	(2.130)	(2.092)
Democracy	-0.138	0.912	5.786***	6.111***	-0.138	0.543	5.786***	6.034***
	(3.211)	(3.156)	(2.108)	(2.072)	(3.274)	(3.235)	(2.114)	(2.077)
Backlash X Democracy	7.818*	6.054	-1.243	-2.036	5.012	3.414	-2.042	-2.717
	(4.562)	(4.480)	(2.994)	(2.942)	(4.566)	(4.515)	(2.948)	(2.899)
No Backlash X Democracy	5.963	3.443	-2.194	-3.571	1.498	0.815	-3.497	-3.596
	(4.588)	(4.509)	(3.011)	(2.961)	(4.596)	(4.541)	(2.967)	(2.916)
Conservative		0.423		0.287		1.080		0.396
		(0.710)		(0.466)		(0.709)		(0.455)
Party ID		-0.517		-0.196		-0.659*		-0.256
		(0.364)		(0.239)		(0.362)		(0.232)
Male		0.0481		1.567		5.717***		4.689***
		(1.892)		(1.243)		(1.870)		(1.201)
Age		-0.140**		-0.0999**		-0.135**		-0.119***
		(0.0596)		(0.0391)		(0.0601)		(0.0386)
White		-0.505		-1.812		1.791		0.0447
		(2.176)		(1.429)		(2.166)		(1.391)
College		1.669		0.674		0.100		-0.546
		(1.973)		(1.296)		(1.980)		(1.271)
Political interest		17.45***		4.652**		11.19***		1.801
		(3.106)		(2.039)		(3.136)		(2.013)
Political activism		17.33***		11.34***		4.681		5.116
		(5.345)		(3.509)		(5.310)		(3.409)
Religiosity		7.422***		5.142***		10.97***		7.591***
		(2.702)		(1.774)		(2.617)		(1.680)
Hawkishness		-4.641		-3.943*		-8.923***		-4.889**
		(3.323)		(2.182)		(3.363)		(2.159)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
International trust		14.67***		10.49***		14.17***		10.13***
		(3.494)		(2.294)		(3.516)		(2.257)
Russia enemy		-1.504		-5.516***		-0.389		-5.260***
		(2.108)		(1.384)		(2.145)		(1.377)
Constant	21.80***	9.648**	30.70***	30.73***	21.80***	8.472*	30.70***	30.47***
	(2.300)	(4.651)	(1.509)	(3.054)	(2.345)	(4.659)	(1.514)	(2.991)
Observations	2,411	2,411	2,411	2,411	2,531	2,531	2,531	2,531
R-squared	0.157	0.197	0.218	0.254	0.112	0.145	0.169	0.208
Quantities of Interest								
J. BL – no BL in nondem (M11i)	-12.34***	-13.25***	-8.97***	-9.63***	-16.19***	-15.48***	-8.84***	-8.86***
K. BL – no apol in nondem (M11ii)	30.56***	31.57***	28.77***	29.03***	23.43***	24.76***	24.89***	25.10***
L. BL – no BL in dem (M11i)	-10.48***	-10.64***	-8.02***	-8.09***	-12.67***	-12.88***	-7.38***	-7.98***
M. BL – no apol in dem (M11ii)	38.38***	37.62***	27.53***	26.99***	28.45***	28.17***	22.85***	22.39***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Appendix E: Regime Type

In our PAP, we formulated conflicting hypotheses about whether the image repair effect of an apology is larger for a democracy (H2) or a nondemocracy (H3) and proposed to test whether perceptions of weakness would be larger for either regime type (Q1). We further formulated H4, which predicts a positive image effect of democratization, and we proposed to compare the image repair effect of an apology to that of democratization (Q2). Due to space constraints, we mention these findings in the paper but reserve the more detailed discussion for this section of the appendix. Our discussion here is supported by the tables presented in Appendix C.

A. Stronger Effect in Democracy (H2) or Nondemocracy (H3)?

For Study 1, we find that apologies have a statistically significant larger effect on Favorability for a nondemocracy than a democracy (support for H3a and falsification of H2a; Table C-1, Quantity C). We find no evidence that the effect of an apology on Cooperation or Buy differs based on regime type, falsifying H2-3b and H2-3c (Tables C-2 and C-3, Quantity C). We further find no regime type moderation effect on Weakness (Table C-4, Quantity C).

In Study 2, we also find evidence in support of H3a (and against H2a): irrespective of control condition, the effect of an apology on Favorability is greater for a nondemocracy than a democracy. H2-3b are again rejected. The evidence on H2-3c is mixed: the effect of the apology on Buy is greater for democracies than nondemocracies but only if it is compared to an explicit no-apology (See Table C-5, Quantities C1 and C2).

Overall, we find do not find evidence that regime type systematically moderates the effect of an apology.

B. Image Repair Effect of Regime Transition (H4)?

We consistently find that a democratic transition has a large, positive, and statistically significant effect on favorability (28 pts in Study 1 and 31 pts in Study 2), support for interstate cooperation (13pts in Study 1 and >18pts in Study 2), and willingness to buy Russian products (18 pts in Study 1 and >18pts in Study 2) (See Tables C-1, C-2, and C-3 Quantity D and C-5 Quantities D1 and D2).

Our findings thus provide clear support for H4a-c.

C. Image Repair Effect of an Apology Relative to a Democratic Transition (Q2)?

To assess the relative effects of apologies versus democratic transitions, we compare the effect of an apology without a democratic transition to the effect of a democratic transition without an apology. For Study 1, we find that apologies have statistically larger effects than democratic transitions for Favorability (Table C-1, Quantity E) but not for Cooperation (Table C-2, Quantity E), Buy (Table C-3, Quantity E), or Weakness (Table C-4, Quantity E). By contrast, in Study 2 there is evidence that the effect of the regime transition is significantly larger than that of the apology for Favorability, Cooperation, and Buy but only when the effect of the apology is calculated against the "no mention" baseline (Table C-5, Quantities E1 and E2). There is no difference for Weakness.

Overall, we do not find systematic evidence that the effect of an apology is greater than that of democratization or vice versa. Both effects are large.

Appendix F: Additional Preregistered Hypotheses

Our PAP for Study 1 proposes to examine the case in which sender backlash can be seen as having caused target rejection to explore whether such a doubly failed apology can still be beneficial. For space reasons, we limit results tables to our preregistration's preferred specification. The replication file contains code for relevant robustness checks.

As predicted by H9, relative to an apology that is accepted and faces no domestic backlash, an apology that is rejected and experiences backlash leads to significantly lower favorability, willingness to support interstate cooperation, and willingness to buy goods from the sender. This is the case for both regime types (Quantities P and Q). Yet, in line with H10, for both regime types, a rejected apology with backlash is more beneficial than not apologizing at all, though the effect is attenuated for the Cooperation DV (Quantities Q and O).

Table F-1: Rejected Apology w/ Domestic Backlash and Levels of Favorability (H9a, H10a), Cooperation (H9b, H10b), and Buy (H9c, H10c)

	(1) Favorability	(2) Cooperation	(3) Buy
Rejected apology w/ backlash	25.73***	8.797***	13.36***
	(3.154)	(3.127)	(3.312)
Accepted apology w/ no backlash	51.04***	19.69***	30.38***
	(3.247)	(3.219)	(3.410)
Democracy	28.11***	12.61***	18.12***
	(3.154)	(3.127)	(3.312)
Rejected apology w/ backlash X Democracy	-11.17**	-3.278	-4.611
	(4.399)	(4.361)	(4.619)
Accepted apology w/ no backlash X Democracy	-16.72***	1.961	-8.838*
	(4.507)	(4.467)	(4.732)
Constant	23.56***	14.54***	18.55***
	(2.259)	(2.239)	(2.372)
Observations	2,474	2,474	2,474
R-squared	0.163	0.052	0.067
Quantities of Interest			
N. Rejected apology w/ backlash– accepted apology w/ no backlash in nondem (H9)	-25.31***	-10.89***	-17.03***
O. Rejected apology w/ backlash– no apology in nondem (H10)	25.73***	8.80***	13.36***
P. Rejected apology w/ backlash– accepted apology w/ no backlash in dem (H9)	-19.77***	-16.13***	-12.80***
Q. Rejected apology w/ backlash– no apology in dem (H10)	14.55***	5.52*	8.75***

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix G: Elites

Per our PAP (Study 1), we carried out analyses to see whether our conclusions hold in elitelike samples. We identify five elitelike traits: 1) Male: male-identifying, 2) High Income: income > sample median income, 3) Highly Educated: >=college degree, 4) Prime Age: 40-65 years, 5) High Political Interest: follow what's going on in government and public affairs some or most of the time. We create six elitelike subsets based on different combinations of these traits:

- Elite 1: Male & High Income & High Educated & Prime Age
- Elite 2: High Income & Highly Educated & Prime Age
- Elite 3: High Income & Highly Educate & Prime Age & High Political Interest
- Elite 4: Highly Educated & Prime Age & High Political Interest
- Elite 5: Highly Educated & High Political Interest
- Elite 6: High Political Interest

Using each sample, we tested H1-H10 and Q1-2. For space reasons, we only display results for the main quantities of interest, but the replication materials include code for the full models.

We note that some of our elitelike samples are very small (<200 respondents) and that thus our study is not adequately powered to derive strong conclusions about our hypotheses for all of these subsamples. We thus caution against over-interpretation.

Regarding the effect of apologizing (Part 1), we find that, across all six elitelike samples, an apology increased Favorability (H1a) and Buy (H1c) but had no effect on Weakness (H1d) (Table G-1, Quantities A and B). Apologizing also increased Cooperation if Russia was nondemocratic; the effect is positive but not consistently significant for a democratic Russia (H1c). Furthermore, we do not see a clear difference in apology effect sizes across regime type (Quantity C), suggesting neither H2 nor H3 are supported, but we do find a strong beneficial effect of democratization on Favorability, Cooperation, and Buy (H4, Quantity D). There is no consistent evidence that either the apology or the regime transition has a stronger effect (Quantity E).

Regarding the victim's response (Part 2), across elitelike samples, there is mostly consistent evidence that a rejected apology by a nondemocracy has positive image effects compared to no apology (Quantity G), but there is little evidence of such an effect for a democracy (Quantity I), only partially supporting H5a-c. Furthermore, elitelike subjects do not appear to view an accepted apology as clearly better than a rejected one (Quantities F and H), raising doubts about H5a-c among elites.

Finally, results regarding sender backlash (Part 3) are weak. There is some evidence, in the case of target acceptance, that a rejected apology increases Favorability, Cooperation, and Buy compared to no apology, but the effect is not statistically significant in all subsamples (Quantities K and M). We don't see this pattern when respondents learn that Ukraine rejects the apology, so H8 is only partially supported. Counter to H7, we don't see benefits of an apology without backlash compared to one with (Quantities J and L).

Overall, our results suggest that the main effects of apologies (Part 1) among elitelike samples resemble those of the broader public, but elites may be less sensitive to additional information provided by the target response and sender domestic backlash.

Table G-1 (Study 1): The Effect of Apologies, Victim Response, and Sender Backlash in Six Elitelike Samples

	Full Sample	Elite 1	Elite 2	Elite 3	Elite 4	Elite 5	Elite 6
PART 1: EFFECT OF AN APOLOGY							
Favorability							
A. Apol effect in nondem (H1a)	43.56***	54.04***	58.90***	60.18***	48.61***	45.51***	41.87***
B. Apol effect in dem (H1a)	30.69***	31.68**	41.11***	36.91***	36.43***	30.74***	33.23***
C. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2a, H3a)	-12.88***	-22.36***	-17.79	-23.67	-12.18	-14.77*	-8.64*
D. Regime transition effect (H4a)	28.11***	33.50***	34.97***	41.85***	38.49***	37.76***	31.40***
E. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2)	15.45***	20.54*	23.93***	18.33*	10.12	7.75	10.47***
Cooperation							
A. Apol effect in nondem (H1b)	15.40***	42.65***	32.20***	34.82***	28.94***	19.01***	17.35***
B. Apol effect in dem (H1b)	18.13***	3.23	12.22	10.00	10.71	20.19***	14.54***
C. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2b, H3b)	2.73	-39.42**	-19.98	-24.82	-18.22	1.18	-2.82
D. Regime transition effect (H4b)	12.61***	55.99***	35.62***	39.66***	31.61***	26.04***	15.86***
E. Non dem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2)	2.79	-13.34	-3.42	-4.84	-2.68	-7.04	1.49
Buy							
A. Apol effect in nondem (H1c)	23.86***	42.24***	31.45***	31.37**	24.54***	26.28***	25.70***
B. Apol effect in dem (H1c)	22.67***	30.17**	29.26***	33.36***	37.50***	30.47***	22.88***
C. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2c, H3c)	-1.19	-12.06	-2.19	2.00	12.96	4.19	-2.83
D. Regime transition effect (H4c)	18.12***	30.54**	26.03**	24.84**	20.97**	25.82***	21.40***
E. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2)	5.74*	11.69	5.41	6.52	3.57	0.45	4.30
Weakness							
A. Apol effect in nondem (H1d)	-1.72	12.63	4.00	-0.67	1.39	2.54	0.40
B. Apol effect in dem (H1d)	0.23	9.05	7.41	5.18	-1.07	2.10	1.02

C. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (Q1)	1.95	-3.58	3.41	5.85	-2.46	-0.44	0.62
E. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2)	-0.58	13.94*	3.56	2.86	0.00	2.90	-1.79
Observations	*1,651*	*89*	*157*	*129*	*193*	*472*	*1,170*
PART 2: EFFECT OF TARGET RESPONSE (No Sender Backlash)							
Favorability							
F. Accepted apol– rejected apol in nondem (H5a)	13.42***	8.57	7.04	12.64	13.78*	17.08***	13.53***
G. Rejected apol– no apol in nondem (H6a)	37.62***	42.86***	4.93***	52.97***	50.36***	44.17***	38.76***
H. Accepted apol– rejected apol in dem (H5a)	14.76***	-2.47	4.58	13.74	15.57*	13.32**	17.27***
I. Rejected apol– no apol in dem (H6a)	19.57***	22.55*	22.22**	15.27	14.29*	15.93***	18.05***
Cooperation							
F. Accepted apol– rejected apol in nondem (H5b)	9.65***	-5.57	4.44	9.54	6.09	10.01	13.16***
G. Rejected apol– no apol in nondem (H6b)	10.03***	44.05***	24.51**	25.83**	22.28**	22.68***	10.86***
H. Accepted apol– rejected apol in dem (H5b)	13.18***	-0.82	8.24	15.93	23.80**	27.76***	18.13***
I. Rejected apol– no apol in dem (H6b)	8.47***	-3.98	2.22	-6.41	-7.97	-0.62	7.63**
Buy							
F. Accepted apol– rejected apol in nondem (H5c)	13.80***	8.71	15.56	18.78*	13.20	21.53***	15.60***
G. Rejected apol– no apol in nondem (H6c)	16.59***	25.00*	18.63*	15.99	19.30**	18.66***	16.77***
H. Accepted apol– rejected apol in dem (H5c)	10.72***	22.25*	14.38	15.93	18.00**	19.76***	18.23***
I. Rejected apol– no apol in dem (H6c)	10.82***	-6.37	3.70	4.95	12.23	6.59	10.15***
Weakness							
F. Accepted apol– rejected apol in nondem (H5d)	-2.36	4.86	2.96	4.38	0.73	2.79	-2.53
G. Rejected apol– no apol in nondem (H6d)	-2.32	2.38	5.99	2.42	1.79	-2.31	-0.64
H. Accepted apol– rejected apol in dem (H5d)	-0.52	6.87	-3.53	-8.24	-7.84	0.61	-0.68
I. Rejected apol– no apol in dem (H6d)	-0.92	0.40	4.07	8.57	2.88	-0.82	1.98
Observations	*2,452*	*157*	*283*	*236*	*321*	*692*	*1,714*
PART 3: EFFECT OF SENDER BACKLASH (BL)							

	Target Accepts						
Favorability							
J. BL – no BL in nondem (H7a)	-8.76***	-11.82	-3.76	-17.34*	-17.32**	-14.50**	-11.22***
K. BL – no apol in nondem (H8a)	42.28***	39.61***	51.20***	48.28***	46.83***	46.76***	41.07***
L. BL – no BL in dem (H7a)	-4.60	7.51	0.98	0.14	-1.44	-1.09	-7.41**
M. BL – no apol in dem (H8a)	29.72***	27.59**	27.78***	29.14***	28.42***	28.16***	27.92***
Cooperation							
J. BL – no BL in nondem (H7b)	-7.21**	-16.18	-4.44	-7.78	-2.71	-9.29	-9.61**
K. BL – no apol in nondem (H8b)	12.40***	22.29	24.51**	27.59**	25.66***	23.40***	14.41***
L. BL – no BL in dem (H7b)	-8.59***	-2.09	-7.29	-3.64	0.78	-9.81	-11.59***
M. BL – no apol in dem (H8b)	13.06***	-6.90	3.17	5.88	16.61*	17.33***	14.17***
Buy							
J. BL – no BL in nondem (H7c)	-8.53**	-2.55	-0.17	-3.74	-0.22	-7.81	-10.18**
K. BL – no apol in nondem (H8c)	21.85***	31.17**	34.01***	31.03**	32.28***	32.38***	22.19***
L. BL – no BL in dem (H7c)	-5.36	1.35	-8.82	-6.58	-5.46	-8.97	-10.37***
M. BL – no apol in dem (H8c)	16.19***	17.24	9.26	14.30	24.77***	17.38***	18.02***
Observations	*2,411*	*154*	*265*	*213*	*295*	*657*	*1,673*
	Target Rejects						
Favorability							
J. BL – no BL in nondem (H7a)	-11.89***	-35.43***	-28.52***	-41.18***	-39.25***	-25.47***	-15.89***
K. BL – no apol in nondem (H8a)	25.73***	7.43	19.41*	11.79	11.11	18.70***	22.88***
L. BL – no BL in dem (H7a)	-5.01	-8.86	3.07	9.36	3.57	-5.41	-1.79
M. BL – no apol in dem (H8a)	14.55***	13.69	25.30***	24.63**	17.86**	10.53*	16.27***
Cooperation							
J. BL – no BL in nondem (H7b)	-1.24	-29.57**	-8.33	-20.04*	-20.43**	-13.57**	-1.62
K. BL – no apol in nondem (H8b)	8.80***	14.48	16.18	5.78	1.85	9.11	9.24**
L. BL – no BL in dem (H7b)	-2.95	-3.96	2.27	7.57	11.54	5.13	-2.23
M. BL – no apol in dem (H8b)	5.52*	-7.94	4.49	1.16	3.57	4.51	5.39
Buy							
J. BL – no BL in nondem (H7c)	-3.23	-15.29	-5.83	-7.21	-9.34	-8.78	-5.91

K. BL – no apol in nondem (H8c)	13.36***	9.71	12.79	8.79	9.95	9.87	10.86***
L. BL – no BL in dem (H7c)	-2.07	6.99	2.36	5.25	3.85	0.93	-3.03
M. BL – no apol in dem (H8c)	8.75***	0.63	6.07	10.20	16.07*	7.52	7.13*
Observations	*2,531*	*162*	*274*	*233*	*328*	*722*	*1,755*

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix H: Subgroup Analysis and Generalizability

For both studies, we preregistered exploratory subgroup analyses about the effects of apologies (Part 1). In Study 1, we analyzed the effects of apologies by subgroups based on party, hawkishness, views of Russia, and gender. In Study 2, we added additional questions specifically designed to assess the generalizability of our findings to non-U.S. contexts (Bassan-Nygate et al. 2024). For space reasons, we display results only for the main quantities of interest, but replication files include code for the full models.

In Study 1 (Table H-1), we find that, across subsamples, with very few exceptions (specifically for the Cooperation DV), apologies significantly increase Favorability, Cooperation, and Buy for both regime types and have no effect on Weakness (Quantities A and B). As before, H1a-c thus receive support, but not H1d.

In Study 2 (Table H-2), we similarly find that apologies almost always increase Favorability across subsamples and we never find that apologies increase perceptions of Weakness; if anything, apologies occasionally reduce perceptions of weakness. The effects for Cooperation and Buy generally reflect our main findings across subsamples, though the benefits of apologies are sometimes muted in some subgroups when the apology is compared to the "no mention"-condition and/or when Russia was described as a democracy (Quantities A1-2 and B1-2).

Of particular interest in Tables H-1 and H-2 are our findings about how subgroups with different views of Russia respond to being told that Russia apologized vs. not. Across both studies, we see that those who do not view Russia as an enemy respond mostly similarly to those who do, though the effects of apologies are not statistically significant at conventional levels for each DV and treatment combination, perhaps due to sample sizes. We conclude from these findings that apologies tend to improve views of Russia not only among subjects who see Russia as an enemy, but also among those with more favorable views toward Russia. This pattern provides initial evidence that the effects of apologies could prove potent even in countries with closer ties to Russia.

To further explore this issue, Study 2 measured three additional variables that could differ across countries: levels of authoritarianism, rightwing attitudes, and commitment to democratic norms (Table H-3). The findings show that apologies have potent effects even among subjects who score high on authoritarianism and rightwing attitudes and low on commitment to democratic norms. There is also no evidence that those who view Russia as friendly, have rightwing or authoritarian attitudes, or show low commitment to democratic norms view apologies as signaling weakness. Thus, these findings suggest that apologies might have beneficial effects even in countries in which citizens differ from typical US respondents on these dimensions.

Table H-1 (Study 1): Subgroup Effects of Apology by Party, Hawkishness, Views of Russia, and Gender

	Full Sample	PARTY ID.			HAWKISHNESS		RUSSIA VIEWS		GENDER	
		Rep.	Dem.	Indep.	Hawk	Dove	Russia Enemy	Russia Not Enemy	Men	Women/ nonbinary
PART 1: EFFECT OF AN APOLOGY										
Favorability										
A. Apol effect in nondem (H1a)	43.56***	45.67***	40.85***	47.22***	50.34***	39.07***	46.65***	33.93***	37.55***	49.09***
B. Apol effect in dem (H1a)	30.69***	33.87***	27.10***	33.59***	28.40***	27.66***	34.44***	22.61***	27.63***	33.41***
C. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2a, H3a)	-12.88***	-11.80	-13.75**	-13.64	-21.94***	-11.42*	-12.21**	-11.31	-9.93	-15.69***
D. Regime transition effect (H4a)	28.11***	27.64***	31.25***	23.59***	26.83***	29.52***	33.28***	12.62**	28.21***	28.37***
E. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2)	15.45***	18.04***	9.60**	23.63***	23.51***	9.55**	13.38***	21.31***	9.35**	20.72***
Cooperation										
A. Apol effect in nondem (H1b)	15.40***	20.87***	13.42***	10.79	13.57**	17.85***	18.33***	7.28	19.24***	12.24***
B. Apol effect in dem (H1b)	18.13***	15.67***	20.50***	20.01***	12.93**	24.82***	21.12***	11.82**	14.21***	21.82***
C. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2b, H3b)	2.73	-5.21	7.08	9.22	-0.64	6.97	2.79	4.54	-5.04	9.58*
D. Regime transition effect (H4b)	12.61***	14.84***	12.78***	10.53	13.38**	12.20**	13.57***	8.52	17.95***	8.30**
E. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2)	2.79	6.03	0.65	0.26	0.19	5.65	4.76	-1.24	1.30	3.94
Buy										
A. Apol effect in nondem (H1c)	23.86***	20.84***	23.56***	30.24***	21.38***	28.38***	24.81***	20.36***	23.51***	24.23***
B. Apol effect in dem (H1c)	22.67***	25.75***	15.65***	32.12***	19.86***	25.87***	21.96***	24.40***	15.99***	28.27***
C. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2c, H3c)	-1.19	4.91	-7.91	1.89	-1.53	-2.51	-2.85	4.04	-7.53	4.04
D. Regime transition effect (H4c)	18.12***	11.08**	25.53***	13.10*	16.53***	18.81***	21.14***	9.16	21.55***	15.27***
E. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2)	5.74*	9.76*	-1.98	17.14**	4.86	9.57*	3.67	11.20*	1.97	8.96**

Weakness										
A. Apol effect in nondem (H1d)	-1.72	-2.16	1.98	-10.90*	-8.04	2.53	-0.62	-4.23	-3.64	0.03
B. Apol effect in dem (H1d)	0.23	3.69	2.63	-12.40**	8.39	-1.42	2.61	-5.10	0.78	-0.27
C. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (Q1)	1.95	5.85	0.65	-1.50	16.43**	-3.95	3.23	-0.87	4.42	-0.30
E. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2)	-0.58	-1.80	3.55	-8.68	-5.49	2.64	1.13	-4.86	-0.45	-0.68
Observations	*1,651*	*594*	*751*	*306*	*482*	*678*	*1,159*	*492*	*766*	*885*

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table H-2 (Study 2): Subgroup Effects of Apology by Gender, Age, and Views of Russia

	Full Sample	Gender		Age		Views of Russia	
		Male	Female/ Nonbinary	>=40yrs	< 40yrs	Russia Enemy	Russia Not Enemy
PART 1: EFFECT OF AN APOLOGY							
Favorability							
A1. Apol effect in nondem (H1a) (No mention)	23.35***	20.51***	25.98***	27.66***	16.49***	28.67***	10.07*
A2. Apol effect in nondem (H1a) (Explicit no)	34.05***	32.59***	34.80***	38.00***	27.21***	37.68***	26.36***
B1. Apol effect in dem (H1a) (No mention)	11.63***	12.01***	11.40***	10.37***	13.96***	12.03***	10.57*
B2. Apol effect in dem (H1a) (Explicit no)	22.55***	22.01***	23.01***	20.20***	24.48***	21.79***	24.06***
C1. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2a, H3a) (No mention)	-11.72***	-8.50	-14.58**	-17.29***	-2.53	-16.65***	0.50
C2. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2a, H3a) (Explicit no)	-11.49***	-10.58*	-11.79**	-17.80***	-1.73	-15.89***	-2.30
D1. Regime transition effect (H4a) (No mention)	30.90***	26.88***	34.30***	36.68***	21.10***	37.17***	15.34***
D2. Regime transition effect (H4a) (Explicit no)	30.67***	28.96***	31.60***	37.19***	20.30***	36.41***	18.15***
E1. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (No mention)	-7.55**	-6.36	-8.41**	-9.02**	-4.61	-8.50**	-5.28
E2. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (Explicit no)	3.38	3.63	3.20	0.81	6.90	1.27	8.21
Cooperation							

A1. Apol effect in nondem (H1b) (No mention)	13.8***	13.37***	14.19***	12.67***	15.98***	14.90***	11.32**
A2. Apol effect in nondem (H1b) (Explicit no)	19.22***	18.56***	18.75***	19.46***	18.61***	21.88***	13.14**
B1. Apol effect in dem (H1b) (No mention)	6.90**	6.40	7.84**	6.12*	8.35*	7.90**	2.05
B2. Apol effect in dem (H1b) (Explicit no)	17.52***	15.15***	19.67***	16.01***	19.19***	19.46***	10.27*
C1. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2b, H3b) (No mention)	-6.94*	-6.97	-6.35	-6.55	-7.62	-7.00	-9.28
C2. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2b, H3b) (Explicit no)	-1.70	-3.41	0.92	-3.45	0.58	-2.41	-2.87
D1. Regime transition effect (H4b) (No mention)	23.28***	20.51***	25.10***	27.24***	16.38***	26.57***	15.81***
D2. Regime transition effect (H4b) (Explicit no)	18.04***	16.95***	17.83***	24.15***	8.18*	21.98***	9.41*
E1. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (No mention)	-9.45***	-7.14*	-10.91***	-14.57***	-0.40	-11.67***	-4.89
E2. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (Explicit no)	1.17	1.61	0.91	-4.69	10.43**	-0.10	3.73
Buy							
A1. Apol effect in nondem (H1c) (No mention)	22.30***	25.07***	19.70***	19.72***	27.02***	24.89***	15.53***
A2. Apol effect in nondem (H1c) (Explicit no)	22.64***	22.76***	22.41***	24.96***	18.14***	23.86***	20.72***
B1. Apol effect in dem (H1c) (No mention)	6.11*	6.14	6.04	10.18***	-1.13	7.29**	1.48
B2. Apol effect in dem (H1c) (Explicit no)	17.20***	13.80***	20.50***	20.24***	10.85**	20.76***	7.14
C1. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2c, H3c) (No mention)	-16.19***	-18.93***	-13.66**	-9.54*	-28.15***	-17.60***	-14.05*
C2. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2c, H3c) (Explicit no)	-5.44	-8.96	-1.91	-4.72	-7.30	-3.10	-13.58
D1. Regime transition effect (H4c) (No mention)	28.97***	30.52***	27.58***	33.06***	22.12***	37.47***	8.35
D2. Regime transition effect (H4c) (Explicit no)	18.22***	20.55***	15.82***	28.24***	1.27	22.97***	7.88
E1. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (No mention)	-6.70**	-5.45	-7.88*	-13.34***	4.89	-12.57***	7.18
E2. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (Explicit no)	4.42	2.21	6.59	-3.28	16.87***	0.89	12.84**
Weakness							
A1. Apol effect in nondem (H1d) (No mention)	-5.77**	-8.37**	-3.36	-6.09**	-4.56	-6.59**	-3.81
A2. Apol effect in nondem (H1d) (Explicit no)	-9.01***	-14.18***	-5.29*	-11.64***	-4.66	-11.54***	-3.36
B1. Apol effect in dem (H1d) (No mention)	-3.57	-0.23	-6.80**	-4.22	-2.46	-4.83*	0.22

B2. Apol effect in dem (H1d) (Explicit no)	-4.43*	-4.44	-4.60	-4.10	-4.14	-6.95**	2.16
C1. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2d, H3d) (No mention)	2.20	8.14	-3.44	1.87	2.10	1.75	4.02
C2. Apol effect in dem – apol effect in nondem (H2d, H3d) (Explicit no)	4.58	9.74*	0.69	7.54**	0.52	4.59	5.52
D1. Regime transition effect (H4d) (No mention)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
D2. Regime transition effect (H4d) (Explicit no)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
E1. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (No mention)	0.26	1.65	-0.83	-1.13	2.32	-0.02	0.95
E2. Nondem apol effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (Explicit no)	-0.61	-2.57	1.36	-1.00	0.64	-2.14	2.89
Observations	*2,852*	*1,395*	*1,457*	*1,786*	*1,066*	*2,009*	*843*

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table H-3 (Study 2): Subgroup Effects of Apology by Political Ideology, Authoritarianism, and Democratic Norms

		Authoritarianism		Rightwing Attitudes		Commitment to Democratic Norms	
	Full Sample	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Favorability							
A1. Apology effect in nondem (H1a) (No mention)	23.35***	26.63***	20.13***	33.07***	19.36***	14.72***	30.68***
A2. Apology effect in nondem (H1a) (Explicit no)	34.05***	35.42***	32.76***	44.01***	30.30***	28.80***	38.77***
B1. Apology effect in dem (H1a) (No mention)	11.63***	11.67***	12.34***	14.17**	10.87***	17.75***	8.11**
B2. Apology effect in dem (H1a) (Explicit no)	22.55***	29.60***	16.83***	26.70***	21.12***	19.25***	26.12***
C1. Apology effect in dem – apology effect in nondem (H2a, H3a) (No mention)	-11.72***	-14.96**	-7.79	-18.90**	-8.49*	3.02	-22.57***
C2. Apology effect in dem – apology effect in nondem (H2a, H3a) (Explicit no)	-11.49***	-5.82	-15.93***	-17.31**	-9.18*	-9.54	-12.64**
D1. Regime transition effect (H4a) (No mention)	30.90***	34.59***	27.04***	39.46***	27.48***	13.55***	44.16***
D2. Regime transition effect (H4a) (Explicit no)	30.67***	25.45***	35.18***	37.87***	28.16***	26.12***	34.24***
E1. Nondem apology effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (No mention)	-7.55**	-7.96*	-6.91	-6.39	-8.12**	1.18	-13.48***
E2. Nondem apology effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (Explicit no)	3.38	9.97**	-2.42	6.15	2.14	2.68	4.53

Cooperation							
A1. Apology effect in nondem (H1b) (No mention)	13.8***	18.04***	9.97**	18.65***	11.87***	6.75	20.85***
A2. Apology effect in nondem (H1b) (Explicit no)	19.22***	24.63***	14.05***	23.29***	17.65***	12.28***	26.13***
B1. Apology effect in dem (H1b) (No mention)	6.90**	16.50***	-0.60	12.03**	5.32	10.05**	6.61
B2. Apology effect in dem (H1b) (Explicit no)	17.52***	26.54***	10.47***	19.63***	16.56***	10.97***	24.48***
C1. Apology effect in dem – apology effect in nondem (H2b, H3b) (No mention)	-6.94*	-1.54	-10.57*	-6.62	-6.55	3.31	-14.22**
C2. Apology effect in dem – apology effect in nondem (H2b, H3b) (Explicit no)	-1.70	1.90	-3.58	-3.66	-1.10	-1.30	-1.65
D1. Regime transition effect (H4b) (No mention)	23.28***	22.21***	24.43***	30.32***	20.61***	9.25**	34.00***
D2. Regime transition effect (H4b) (Explicit no)	18.04***	18.77***	17.44***	27.36***	15.15***	13.86***	21.43***
E1. Nondem apology effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (No mention)	-9.45***	-4.18	-14.47***	-11.67**	-8.74**	-2.50	-13.15***
E2. Nondem apology effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (Explicit no)	1.17	5.87	-3.39	-4.07	2.50	-1.59	4.70
Buy							
A1. Apology effect in nondem (H1c) (No mention)	22.30***	24.55***	20.40***	27.54***	20.13***	23.43***	21.39***
A2. Apology effect in nondem (H1c) (Explicit no)	22.64***	22.80***	22.58***	34.34***	18.36***	21.42***	23.51***
B1. Apology effect in dem (H1c) (No mention)	6.11*	6.04	7.76*	5.89	6.41*	11.71**	3.49
B2. Apology effect in dem (H1c) (Explicit no)	17.20***	23.45***	12.29***	24.54***	14.72***	16.77***	18.82***
C1. Apology effect in dem – apology effect in nondem (H2c, H3c) (No mention)	-16.19***	-18.52***	12.64**	-21.64***	-13.72***	-11.72*	-17.90***
C2. Apology effect in dem – apology effect in nondem (H2c, H3c) (Explicit no)	-5.44	0.66	-10.28*	-9.80	-3.65	-4.65	-4.69
D1. Regime transition effect (H4c) (No mention)	28.97***	33.34***	24.54***	41.16***	24.35***	16.11***	38.79***
D2. Regime transition effect (H4c) (Explicit no)	18.22***	14.16***	22.18***	29.32***	14.27***	9.04*	25.58***
E1. Nondem apology effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (No mention)	-6.70**	-8.78**	-4.14	-13.63**	-4.22	7.32	-17.41***
E2. Nondem apology effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (Explicit no)	4.42	8.63*	0.39	5.02	4.09	12.38***	-2.07
Weakness							
A1. Apology effect in nondem (H1d) (No mention)	-5.77**	-5.36*	-6.22*	-3.31	-6.77**	-8.78**	-4.11
A2. Apology effect in nondem (H1d) (Explicit no)	-9.01***	-8.29***	-9.72***	-11.76***	-8.07***	-6.77*	-11.37***

B1. Apology effect in dem (H1d) (No mention)	-3.57	-4.43	-3.59	-6.38	-2.69	-3.23	-5.03*
B2. Apology effect in dem (H1d) (Explicit no)	-4.43*	-7.39**	-2.15	-6.93	-3.53	-1.38	-7.82***
C1. Apology effect in dem – apology effect in nondem (H2d, H3d) (No mention)	2.20	0.93	2.63	-3.07	4.08	5.56	-0.92
C2. Apology effect in dem – apology effect in nondem (H2d, H3d) (Explicit no)	4.58	0.90	7.57	4.83	4.54	5.39	3.54
D1. Regime transition effect (H4d) (No mention)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
D2. Regime transition effect (H4d) (Explicit no)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
E1. Nondem apology effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (No mention(	0.26	2.95	-2.54	3.69	-1.03	-2.56	1.77
E2. Nondem apology effect – regime transition effect (Q2) (Explicit no)	-0.61	-0.01	-1.10	3.14	-1.87	-0.72	-1.03
Observations	*2,852*	*1,379*	*1,473*	*757*	*2,095*	*1,303*	*1,549*

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Appendix I: Survey Questionnaire

Document I-1: Study 1 Survey Questionnaire

ideo7 In general, do you think of yourself as . . .
Extremely liberal (1) Liberal (2) Slightly liberal (3) Moderate, middle of the road (4) Slightly conservative (5) Conservative (6) Extremely conservative (7)

enemy_russia Please say whether you consider Russia an ally of the United States, friendly, but not an ally, unfriendly, or an enemy of the United States.
Ally (1) Friendly, but not an ally (2) Unfriendly (3) Enemy (4) No opinion (5)

[next page]

[Order of items is randomized.]

attn Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement.

	Agree strongly (1)	Agree somewhat (2)	Neither agree nor disagree (3)	Disagree somewhat (4)	Disagree strongly (5)
2 + 2 = 5 (attn_1)	○	○	○	○	○
The use of military force only makes problems worse. (hawk5)	○	○	○	○	○
Please click the "neither agree nor disagree" response. (attn_2)	○	○	○	○	○
The year 1910 came before the year 1920. (attn_3)	○	○	○	○	○
Generally speaking, the U.S. can trust other nations. (trust)	○	○	○	○	○

[next page]

As you may know, earlier this year, Russia illegally invaded Ukraine. Russian forces have killed many innocent civilians over the last few months.

We are now going to describe a <u>hypothetical</u> situation involving this conflict that could occur <u>in the future</u>. Some parts of the description may seem important to you; other parts may seem unimportant.

Do you agree to read the details very carefully, and then give your most thoughtful answers?
Yes (1) No (2)

[next page]

Here is the situation. It involves Russia and Ukraine in the future, in the year 2025:

In 2025, Russia and Ukraine make a peace deal giving autonomy to areas in eastern Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine reach the deal after a long military stalemate, and both sides are satisfied with it. As part of the deal, Russia withdraws all of its forces from Ukraine.

We need to be sure you are reading carefully. Please answer the following question.

mck_rel_1 What happens in 2025?
    Russia and Ukraine make a deal giving autonomy to areas in eastern Ukraine, and Russia withdraws all of its forces from Ukraine. (1) Russia and Ukraine participate in a ping-pong tournament. (2) No information given. (3)

[next page]

Here is some more information about Russia in the future:

In the years after the withdrawal, Russia [remains a nondemocracy. There are no free and fair elections, human and civil rights are not guaranteed, and there is no freedom of the press. / transitions to democracy. Russia begins to hold free and fair elections, protect human and civil rights, and guarantee the freedom of the press.]

In 2030, a new Russian leader, Andrei Petrov, comes to power. In his first few months in office, President Petrov does not make any major changes to Russia's domestic or foreign policy. Russia remains a [nondemocracy / democracy].

[manipulation check questions omitted for brevity]

[next page]

Here is what happens later in 2030:

Soon after coming to power, President Petrov participates in a summit of European leaders.

During the summit, President Petrov makes a speech about Russia's relations with the West. During the speech, he [does not apologize for Russia's illegal 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the atrocities Russian soldiers committed. He does not comment on the invasion at all. / apologizes for Russia's illegal 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the atrocities Russian soldiers committed. President Petrov says: "Russia deeply regrets the atrocities Russia committed when it illegally invaded Ukraine. The invasion should never have happened. Russia offers its most sincere apology to the Ukrainian people."]

President Petrov ends his speech by calling for more cooperative relations between Russia and the West.

[manipulation check questions omitted for brevity]

[next page]

[Shown only for subjects in the "long" apology conditions.]

Here is how Russians respond:

Opposition parties in Russia [praise / criticize] the apology. Opinion polls also show that the majority of Russians [approve / disapprove] of the apology.

[manipulation check questions omitted for brevity]

[next page]

<u>*[Shown only for subjects in the "long" apology conditions.]*</u>

Here is how Ukraine responds:

The Ukrainian president [accepts / rejects] the Russian apology. The Ukrainian president says: ["We welcome Russia's apology for the illegal invasion and the atrocities that Russian forces committed." / "This apology is not sufficient. Russian forces should not have illegally invaded our country and committed atrocities. Russia has yet to atone for its crimes."]

[manipulation check questions omitted for brevity]

[next page]

[We provide a summary of the scenario at the top of the page. Omitted here for brevity.]

dv1_fav1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable view of <u>Russia</u>?
    Very favorable (1) Somewhat favorable (2) Somewhat unfavorable (3) Very unfavorable (4)

dv1_weak_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Russia is a force to be reckoned with."
    Agree strongly (1) Agree somewhat (2) Neither agree nor disagree (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree strongly (5)

<u>*[next page]*</u>

[We provide a summary of the scenario at the top of the page. Question order is randomized.]

dv2_coop_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you say that the U.S. should increase, decrease, or not change its level of cooperation with <u>Russia</u>?
    Increase its level of cooperation (1) Not change its level of cooperation (2) Decrease its level of cooperation (3)

dv3_products_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you <u>avoid buying products</u> that you knew had been made in Russia?
    Would definitely avoid buying (1) Would probably avoid buying (2) Would probably not avoid buying (3) Would definitely not avoid buying (4)

[next page]

[We provide a summary of the scenario at the top of the page. Question order is randomized, with exception of the Ukraine question that always appears last.]

mech_threat_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you agree or disagree that Russia represents a threat to international peace and stability?
 Agree strongly (1) Agree somewhat (2) Neither agree nor disagree (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree strongly (5)

mech_values_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, how much confidence would you have that Russia would <u>generally</u> "do the right thing" in world affairs?
 A lot of confidence (1) Some confidence (2) Not too much confidence (3) No confidence at all (4)

mech_status_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, how much would you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Russia has a lot of status internationally."
 Agree strongly (1) Agree somewhat (2) Neither agree nor disagree (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree strongly (5)

mech_sincere_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you agree or disagree that Russia feels that its invasion of Ukraine was wrong?
 Agree strongly (1) Agree somewhat (2) Neither agree nor disagree (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree strongly (5)

dv2_Ukr_fav_1 SIf events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable view of <u>Ukraine</u>?
 Very favorable (1) Somewhat favorable (2) Somewhat unfavorable (3) Very unfavorable (4)

[next page]

Now we would like to ask a few questions about <u>you</u>.

newsint Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs...?
 Most of the time (1) Some of the time (2) Only now and then (3) Hardly at all (4)
 Don't know (5)

voted18 Did you vote in the congressional election in November 2018?
 No (1) I usually vote, but did not in 2018 (2) I am not sure (3) Yes. I definitely voted. (4)

voted20 Did you vote in the presidential election in November 2020?
 No (1) I usually vote, but did not in 2020 (2) I am not sure (3) Yes. I definitely voted. (4)

[next page]

particip During the past year did you ... (Please check all that apply)
 Attend local political meetings (such as school board or city council) (1)
 Put up a political sign (such as a lawn sign or a bumper sticker) (2)
 Work for a candidate or campaign (3)
 Donate money to a candidate, campaign, or political organization (4)
 Donate blood (5)
 None of these (6)

relig_impt How important is religion in your life?
   Very important (1) Somewhat important (2) Not too important (3) Not at all important (4)

[next page]

comments Do you have any comments about the survey so far?

Document I-2: Study 2 Survey Questionnaire

ideo7 In general, do you think of yourself as . . .
   Extremely liberal (1) Liberal (2) Slightly liberal (3) Moderate, middle of the road (4) Slightly
   conservative (5) Conservative (6) Extremely conservative (7)

attn_5 Please select the word that starts with the third letter of the alphabet.
   President (1) Congress (2) Senate (3) Judiciary (4) Voters (5)

enemy_russia Please say whether you consider Russia an ally of the United States, friendly, but not an
ally, unfriendly, or an enemy of the United States.
   Ally (1) Friendly, but not an ally (2) Unfriendly (3) Enemy (4) No opinion (5)

attn_6 Which of the following is a type of fruit?
   Strawberry (1) Location (2) Theorist (3) Soprano (4) Projection (5) Goalkeeper (6) Microphone
   (7)

[next page]

[Order of items is randomized.]

attn Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement.

	Agree strongly (1)	Agree somewhat (2)	Neither agree nor disagree (3)	Disagree somewhat (4)	Disagree strongly (5)
2 + 2 = 5 (attn_1)	○	○	○	○	○
The use of military force only makes problems worse. (hawk5)	○	○	○	○	○
Please click the "neither agree nor disagree" response. (attn_2)	○	○	○	○	○
The year 1910 came before the year 1920. (attn_3)	○	○	○	○	○
Generally speaking, the U.S. can trust other nations. (trust)	○	○	○	○	○

[next page]

[Order of items is randomized.]

demnorms For each of the items below, please choose the response that is closest to your view.

	Agree strongly (1)	Agree somewhat (2)	Neither agree nor disagree (3)	Disagree somewhat (4)	Disagree strongly (5)
I do not mind a politician's methods if he or she manages to get the right things done. (demnorms _1)	○	○	○	○	○
When the country is in great danger, it is often necessary for political leaders to act boldly, even if this means overstepping the usual processes of government decision-making. (demnorms _2)	○	○	○	○	○
People should be allowed to vote even if they are badly misinformed on basic facts about politics. (demnorms _3)	○	○	○	○	○
People who hate my way of life should still have a chance to talk in a public forum. (demnorms _4)	○	○	○	○	○
Most dogs have six legs. (attn_4)	○	○	○	○	○

[next page]

left right In politics people often talk of "left" and "right". On a scale of 1 (left) and 10 (right), where would you classify your own political views?

1 (left) (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 10 (right) (10)

[next page]

[Order of items is randomized.]

auth Please indicate the level of your agreement with the statements below:

	Agree strongly (2)	Agree somewhat (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Disagree somewhat (5)	Disagree strongly (6)
It's great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority. (1)	○	○	○	○	○
What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
God's laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late. (3)	○	○	○	○	○
There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. (7)	○	○	○	○	○
Our society does NOT need tougher government and stricter laws. (5)	○	○	○	○	○
The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down harder on troublemakers, if we are going preserve law and order. (6)	○	○	○	○	○

[next page]

preface As you may know, Russia illegally invaded Ukraine in 2022. The two countries remain at war. Russian forces have committed atrocities against many innocent civilians.   We are now going to

describe a <u>hypothetical</u> situation involving this conflict that could occur <u>in the future</u>. Some parts of the description may seem important to you; other parts may seem unimportant.

Do you agree to read the details very carefully, and then give your most thoughtful answers?
      Yes (1) No (2)

[next page]

scen1_1 Here is the situation. It involves Russia and Ukraine in the future, in the year 2025:

In 2025, Russia and Ukraine make a peace deal giving autonomy to areas in eastern Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine reach the deal after a long military stalemate, and both sides are satisfied with it. As part of the deal, Russia withdraws all of its forces from Ukraine and the new autonomous areas in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine also withdraws its forces from the new autonomous areas.

We need to be sure you are reading carefully. Please answer the following question.

mck_rel_1 What happens in 2025?
      Russia and Ukraine make a deal giving autonomy to areas in eastern Ukraine. Russia withdraws all of its forces from Ukraine and the new autonomous areas in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine also withdraws its forces from the new autonomous areas. (1) Russia and Ukraine participate in a ping-pong tournament. (2) Russia wins the Eurovision Song Festival. (4) No information given. (3)

[next page]

scen2_1 Here is some more information about Russia in the future:

In [the years after the withdrawal, Russia remains a nondemocracy. There are no free and fair elections, human and civil rights are not guaranteed, and there is no / early 2030, Russia transitions to democracy. Russia begins to hold free and fair elections, protect human and civil rights, and guarantee the] freedom of the press.

[In 2030 / Later that year], a new Russian leader, Andrei Petrov, comes to power. In his first few months in office, President Petrov does not make any major changes to Russia's domestic or foreign policy. Russia remains a [nondemocracy / democracy].

[manipulation check question omitted for brevity]

[next page]

scen3_1 Here is what happens later in 2030:

Soon after coming to power, President Petrov participates in a summit of world leaders. It is the first international summit Russia has attended since Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine and the atrocities Russia committed there. Each leader at the summit is given 10 minutes to make a televised speech.

President Petrov [gives an official government apology for Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. He says: "Russia deeply regrets the atrocities Russia committed when it illegally invaded Ukraine. The invasion should never have happened. Russia offers its most sincere apology to the Ukrainian people." President Petrov then discusses global challenges associated with artificial intelligence. / discusses global challenges associated with artificial intelligence. He does not comment on the Ukraine war. / discusses

global challenges associated with artificial intelligence. He does not apologize for Russia's illegal 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the atrocities Russian soldiers committed. He does not comment on the invasion at all.] He ends his speech by calling for more cooperative relations between Russia and the West.

[manipulation check question omitted for brevity]

[next page]

[We provide a summary of the scenario at the top of the page. Omitted here for brevity.]

dv1_fav1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable view of <u>Russia</u>?
　　Very favorable (1) Somewhat favorable (2) Somewhat unfavorable (3) Very unfavorable (4)

dv1_weak_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Russia is a weak country."
　　Agree strongly (1) Agree somewhat (2) Neither agree nor disagree (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree strongly (5)

dv2_coop_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you say that the U.S. should increase, decrease, or not change its level of cooperation with <u>Russia</u>?
　　Increase its level of cooperation (1) Not change its level of cooperation (2) Decrease its level of cooperation (3)

dv3_products_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you <u>avoid buying products</u> that you knew had been made in Russia?
　　Would definitely avoid buying (1) Would probably avoid buying (2) Would probably not avoid buying (3) Would definitely not avoid buying (4)

[next page]

[We provide a summary of the scenario at the top of the page. Question order is randomized, with exception of the Ukraine question that always appears last.]

mech_threat_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you agree or disagree that Russia represents a threat to international peace and stability?
　　Agree strongly (1) Agree somewhat (2) Neither agree nor disagree (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree strongly (5)

mech_values_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, how much confidence would you have that Russia would <u>generally</u> "do the right thing" in world affairs?
　　A lot of confidence (1) Some confidence (2) Not too much confidence (3) No confidence at all (4)

mech_status_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, how much would you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Russia has a lot of status internationally."
　　Agree strongly (1) Agree somewhat (2) Neither agree nor disagree (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree strongly (5)

mech_mil If events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Russia has a lot of military power."
    Agree strongly (1) Agree somewhat (2) Neither agree nor disagree (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree strongly (5)

mech_sincere_1 If events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you agree or disagree that Russia feels that its invasion of Ukraine was wrong?
    Agree strongly (1) Agree somewhat (2) Neither agree nor disagree (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree strongly (5)

dv2_Ukr_fav_1 SIf events in 2030 happened just as we described, would you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable view of Ukraine?
    Very favorable (1) Somewhat favorable (2) Somewhat unfavorable (3) Very unfavorable (4)

[next page]

Q769 We have just a couple of final questions about the situation you read about. Given space constraints, the scenario was not specific about every detail that could potentially be relevant. We are interested in what assumptions you might have made about the situation, even when a detail was not mentioned. Please let us know whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.

assume-apol Based on the scenario, I assumed that Russia had *previously* offered a public apology for its invasion of Ukraine, prior to the summit described here.
    Agree strongly (1) Agree somewhat (2) Neither agree nor disagree (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree strongly (5)

assume-contrit Based on the scenario, I assumed that Russia had *previously* demonstrated remorse for its invasion of Ukraine, prior to the summit described here.
    Agree strongly (1) Agree somewhat (2) Neither agree nor disagree (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree strongly (5)

[next page]

Now we would like to ask a few questions about you.

[The concluding demographic questions are the same as for Study 1.]

Appendix J: Case Discussion of Japan's 1995 World War II Apology

Prime Minister Murayama was the first of Japan's leaders to explicitly acknowledge Japan's responsibility for crimes committed during World War II and to use the word "apology" (Wudunn 1995). Murayama said that "through its colonial rule and aggression, [Japan] caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations" and he expressed "deep remorse" and "heartfelt apology" (Engert 2016, 250). Unlike previous Japanese statements, Murayama's thus meets our criteria for an apology.

While a majority of the Japanese public supported apologizing, Murayama's statement elicited fierce backlash among conservative politicians (Berger 2012, 182-183). The apology also elicited skepticism from its key targets, China and South Korea. China viewed the statement "positive[ly]" but noted that the sentiment it expressed is not shared by everyone in Japan (Associated Press Worldstream 8/16/1995). South Korea's president said "that although he was not satisfied with Japan's apology for its World War II actions, it still showed 'significant progress' (Associated Press Worldstream 8/16/1995)." The combination of significant backlash in the sender and the target's lukewarm reception suggests that the third-party image repair effects might be relatively muted in this case.

The apology nonetheless received a favorable international response, with "significant attention from the international press" (Yamazaki 2005, 100) and the term "heartfelt apology" repeated in "global headlines" (Mosher 2019, 64). *Time Magazine* reported "Finally, an apology" and the "*U.S. News and World Report* gushed, 'Tomiichi Murayama has ended five decades of collective amnesia with the strongest official acknowledgment of wrongdoing yet: an unambiguous apology'" (Yamazaki 2006, 108). The White House also responded positively, with its spokesperson "welcome[ing] the prime minister's statement, delivered in the spirit of the close bilateral relations that we hope point us to a future of cooperation and progress" (cited in Edwards 2005, 330).

Given the relative scarcity of polling at the time, we found no polling data that would allow us to assess the reactions of U.S. (or other) publics. We instead rely more heavily on secondary and news sources about the broader international response. Edwards (2005, 330) writes that "by Murayama issuing this important address, he put Japan on the path to taking a greater role […] in regional and international affairs." Edwards (2005, 330) cites the *Boston Globe*: the apology allowed Japan to free "an arm out of the cultural and historiographic straitjacket that has kept it from assuming a greater leadership position in Asia." The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* (8/26/1995) wrote that "as a result of the apology, Japan's moral standing, particularly among its neighbors, will be greatly strengthened, putting the country in a better position to play its part in the future of Asian affairs." Indeed, the apology may have helped gain Filipino support for a greater international role for Japan. The Filipino president emphasized "the need to keep Japan as a key political player in our part of the world" (United Press International 8/21/1995).

In sum, the reception of Japan's 1995 World War II apology— like Germany's 1951 Holocaust apology discussed in the manuscript— echoes our experimental results. Murayama's apology was well-received by the international community and softened attitudes toward Japan, producing a real-world benefit. This is true despite the fact that there was significant domestic backlash against the apology in Japan and that the primary targets of the apology (China and South Korea) responded with skepticism. Here, as in the German apology case, we also found no evidence that the country was branded as weak for showing contrition.

We note an important difference that emerges between the German and Japanese apology cases: in the latter case, the longer-term beneficial impact of the apology was cut short by repeated undermining comments and actions of Japanese officials in subsequent years. Thus, unlike Germany, Japan is

perceived as not having dealt well with its past and has not been able to benefit from a restored image in the same way as Germany.

Citations:

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Engert, Stefan. 2016. Japan-China and the two Koreas: the apologia syndrome. In: *Apology and Reconciliation in International Relations: the Importance of Being Sorry* (Christopher Daase, Stefan Engert, Michel Andre-Horelt, Judith Renner, and Renate Strassner eds). London: Routledge.
Mosher, David M. 2019. A Preliminary Study of the History of Japanese Apologies for World War II. Bul. Hijiyama Univ. No.26. Available at https://hijiyama-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_uri&item_id=48&file_id=22&file_no=1&nc_session=j7mf9hmpj6rs7hm4hmlc76mso5%20target= (Accessed August 18, 2023).
Wudunn, Sheryl. 1995. August 13-19: Japanese Remorse; Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama Says "Owabi" at Last. New York Times (August 20, 1995).
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