Appendix for "Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Chinese Public Support for War"

This supplementary appendix presents additional empirical results and the survey instrument, which due to space constraints are omitted from the main text of the paper.

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A Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: **Descriptive Statistics of the Survey Sample**

Sociodemographic Variables		Study 1 $N = 4,008$	Study 2 $N = 3,193$	China Internet Census (April 2020)
Gender	Female	48.6%	47.3%	47.3%
	Male	51.0%	51.1%	52.7%
Region	East	26.3%	26.2%	31.1%
	South & Central	37.4%	30.7%	28.2%
	North & Northeast	22.9%	27.2%	22.2%
	West	13.1%	14.2%	18.5%
Age	≤ 29	43.9%	38.4%	48.4%
	30-39	32.1%	40.9%	23.5%
	≥ 40	22.0%	18.9%	28.1%
Education	$\leq$ Junior high	5.2%	1.1%	56.1%
	Senior high	25.4%	16.1%	23.8%
	3-year college	32.2%	43.8%	10.5%
	$\geq$ 4-year college	36.9%	37.5%	9.7%

Note: Data about Chinese Internet users are from *The 45th Statistical Report of Internet Development in China*, issued by China Internet Network Information Center in April 2020.

Table A2: **Balance Checks (Study 1)**

	Control Group	Invasion	Economic Measures	Military Measures	Lack Military Measures	F-test p-value
Age Group	2.72	2.81	2.78	2.73	2.75	0.49
Female	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.50	0.51	0.61
Education	3.03	3.04	2.98	3.02	2.98	0.56
Party Member	0.16	0.17	0.14	0.17	0.14	0.31
Pol Interests	3.61	3.58	3.50	3.52	3.61	0.21
Ideology	3.81	3.81	3.78	3.73	3.86	0.05
Nationalism	4.46	4.42	4.46	4.38	4.42	0.25
Social Media	3.76	3.73	3.75	3.69	3.67	0.31
Foreign Links	0.84	0.85	0.77	0.81	0.82	0.33
N	798	804	804	801	801	

Note: For each pretreatment variable, the table presents the mean value by treatment condition. In addition, for each pretreatment variable, the last column presents the p-value for the null hypothesis of equality in means across treatment conditions. Age Group is measured on a five-point scale.

Table A3: **Balance Checks (Study 2)**

	Control Group	Invasion	Economic Measures	Military Measures	F-test p-value
Age Group	4.18	4.18	4.20	4.07	0.32
Female	0.47	0.47	0.48	0.50	0.79
Education	3.20	3.23	3.21	3.14	0.09
Income	3.60	3.55	3.57	3.50	0.23
Party Member	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.35
Political Interests	3.52	3.50	3.51	3.51	0.97
Ideology	3.65	3.72	3.66	3.73	0.17
Nationalism	4.02	4.05	4.05	4.06	0.81
Social Media Usage	3.59	3.61	3.61	3.60	0.97
Foreign Links	0.82	0.86	0.86	0.82	0.55
N	782	779	819	813	

Note: For each pretreatment variable, the table presents the mean value by treatment condition. In addition, for each pretreatment variable, the last column presents the p-value for the null hypothesis of equality in means across treatment conditions. Age Group is measured on an eight-point scale.

B Hypotheses Testing

B.1 Main Hypotheses

- **Hypothesis 1:** Chinese respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine will express **higher** support for their government's use of military force in international affairs.

- **Hypothesis 2:** Chinese respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Western economic measures against Russia will express **lower** support for their government's use of military force in international affairs, compared with information about the Russian invasion only **(H2a)**, and compared with no information about Russian invasion **(H2b)**.

  - **Hypothesis 2':** Chinese respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Western economic measures against Russia will express **higher** support for their government's use of military force in international affairs, compared with information about the Russian invasion only **(H2'a)**, and compared with no information about Russian invasion **(H2'b)**.

- **Hypothesis 3:** Chinese respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Western military measures against Russia will express **lower** support for their government's use of military force in international affairs, compared with information about the Russian invasion only **(H3a)**, and compared with no information about Russian invasion **(H3b)**.

  - **Hypothesis 3':** Chinese respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Western military measures against Russia will express **higher** support for their government's use of military force in international affairs, compared with information about the Russian invasion only **(H3'a)**, and compared with no information about Russian invasion **(H3'b)**.

- **Hypothesis 4:** Chinese respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and lack of Western military measures against Russia will express **higher** support for their government's use of military force in international affairs, compared with information about the Russian invasion only **(H4a)**, and compared with no information about Russian invasion **(H4b)**.

Figure 1 in the main text presents the results for hypothesis: H1, H2b, H3b, H4b. Figure 3 in the main text presents the results for hypothesis: H2a, H3a, H4a.

- According to Figure 1, the results strongly support H1. Respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine express significantly higher support for the use of military force in general and against Taiwan in particular.
- According to Figures 1 and 3, the results provide some support for H2'b and H2a. Information about Western measures seems to partially offset the effect of the Russian invasion, but its deterrence effects are weak. Respondents are still more likely to support invading Taiwan than the control group.
- According to Figures 1 and 3, the results strongly support H3a. Respondents exposed to information about Western military measures express significantly lower support for the use of military force in general and against Taiwan in particular, compared with those who are only exposed to information about the Russian invasion. The effect of Western military measures seems to completely offset the effect of the Russian invasion.
- According to Figures 1 and 3, the results provide some support for H4b but go against H4a. Information about the lack of Western military measures seems to increase support for the use of force in general. However, instead of further increasing support compared with information about the Russian invasion only, it reduces support for invading Taiwan. Perhaps, the information still primes the respondents about the potential military capability of the Western countries.

B.2 Robustness Checks

Figures B1 and B2 repeat the analyses in Figures 1 and 3, but control for pretreament covariates. Both outcome variables are measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. For each outcome, the plot presents the coefficient from an OLS regression (with its 95% confidence interval) representing the difference-in-means (Average Treatment Effect) between each treatment condition and the control group. Pretreatment covariates included in the regressions are Age group, Gender, Education, Party Member, Political Interest, Ideology, Nationalism, Social Media, and Foreign links.

Figure B3 displays our complete set of findings for various potential strategies concerning the unification of Taiwan. These include unification via war, military coercion, economic sanctions, and maintaining the status quo. Additionally, we present the treatment effects to examine the support for Taiwan's independence.

Figure B1: **The Effect of Each Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force (left) and Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan (right), Controlling for Pretreatment Covariates**. Note: Both outcome variables are measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent higher support. For each outcome, the plot presents the coefficient from an OLS regression (with its 95% confidence interval) representing the difference-in-means (Average Treatment Effect) between each treatment condition and the control group. Pre-treatment covariates included in the regressions are Age group, Gender, Education, Party Member, Political Interest, Ideology, Nationalism, Social Media, and Foreign links.



Figure B2: **The Effect of Each Treatment Condition vis-à-vis the Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force (left) and on the Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan (right), controlling for Pretreatment Covariates**. Note: Both outcome variables are measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. For each outcome, the plot presents the coefficient from an OLS regression (with its 95% confidence interval) representing the difference in means between each treatment condition and the invasion group. Pre-treatment covariates included in the regressions are Age group, Gender, Education, Party Member, Political Interest, Ideology, Nationalism, Social Media, and Foreign links.



Figure B3: **The Effect of Each Treatment Condition on Different Approaches for Taiwan's Unification**. Note: All outcome variables are measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent higher support. For each outcome, the plot presents the coefficient from an OLS regression (with its 95% confidence interval) representing the difference-in-means between each treatment condition and the control group.



B.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects & Weighted Sample

Figure B4 presents the heterogeneous treatment effects of the invasion treatment in Study 1. As the figure shows, there are no marked differences in the effect of the invasion treatment across subsets determined by pre-treatment covariates.

Figure B4: **The Heterogeneous Treatment Effect of the Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force (left) and Against Taiwan (right) in Study 1**.



Figure B5 displays the heterogeneous treatment effects observed in Study 2. The results highlight notable variations in treatment effects among respondents categorized as having low nationalism and high nationalism. This finding suggests that one year and four months into the Russian invasion, distinct groups of Chinese citizens began to form diverse interpretations of the conflict. It is conceivable that individuals with stronger nationalist sentiments were more inclined to align with the Russian narrative and exhibit a more hawkish stance. Conversely, those with lower levels of nationalism may have been more inclined to adopt the Western perspective, resulting in diminished support for military intervention. Because the vast majority (76.8%) are high in nationalism, the overall treatment effects are still positive.

Figure B5: **The Heterogeneous Treatment Effect of the Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force (left) and Against Taiwan (right) in Study 2.**



Tables B1 and B2 present the OLS regression results using the weighted samples. Like many other online surveys in China, the sample in both surveys may not be representative (Huang, 2018; Pan and Xu, 2020). To address this concern, and as described in the pre-analysis plan, we weigh the survey sample such that they resemble the Chinese Internet population. As indicated in Tables B1 and B2, the principal results remain the same using the weighted models.

However, the findings from Study 2 (Columns 3 and 4 of Table B2) reveal an interesting contrast between the unweighted and weighted models. Unlike the unweighted models, the respondents in the Military Measures group demonstrate a significant increase in their likelihood to support the use of force against Taiwan when the weighted model is employed. This discrepancy raises doubts regarding the effectiveness of Western military measures in countering the heightened aggression stimulated by the Russian invasion.

Table B1: **Treatment Effects on Support for the Use of Force and Invading Taiwan, Weighted Sample, with and without Pre-Treatment Covariates (Study 1)**

Outcome Variables	Support for the Use of Force		Use of Force Against Taiwan	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment Groups				
Invasion	0.171***	0.118**	0.200***	0.170***
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Economic Measures	0.036	0.001	0.112**	0.102*
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Military Measures	−0.063	−0.064	0.022	0.043
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.053)
Lack of Military Measures	0.076	0.051	0.033	0.022
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Pre-Treatment Covariates				
Female		−0.051		−0.135***
		(0.034)		(0.034)
Age Group		0.154***		0.135***
		(0.014)		(0.015)
Education		0.034*		0.021
		(0.019)		(0.019)
Party Member		0.133***		0.150***
		(0.048)		(0.049)
Political Interest		0.055***		0.048***
		(0.015)		(0.015)
Ideology		0.172***		0.183***
		(0.019)		(0.020)
Nationalism		0.114***		0.055**
		(0.023)		(0.023)
Social Media Usage		−0.045***		−0.037**
		(0.017)		(0.017)
Foreign		−0.096***		−0.089***
		(0.021)		(0.021)
Constant	3.298***	2.725***	3.265***	2.494***
	(0.038)	(0.143)	(0.038)	(0.147)
Weighted	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3,955	3,746	3,989	3,778
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.100	0.004	0.083

Notes: Dependent variables are indicated in column headings and are measured on a five-point scale. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table B2: **Treatment Effects on Support for the Use of Force and Invading Taiwan, Weighted Sample, with and without Pre-Treatment Covariates (Study 2)**

Outcome Variables	Support for the Use of Force		Use of Force Against Taiwan	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment Groups				
Invasion	0.076*	0.062	0.192***	0.177***
	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Economic Measures	0.001	0.015	0.139***	0.144***
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Military Measures	0.029	0.010	0.091**	0.087*
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Pre-Treatment Covariates				
Female		−0.115***		−0.038
		(0.031)		(0.033)
Age Group		0.011		0.005
		(0.009)		(0.010)
Education		0.017		0.062***
		(0.021)		(0.022)
Party Member		0.003		−0.076
		(0.049)		(0.051)
Political Interest		0.064***		0.007
		(0.016)		(0.017)
Ideology		0.264***		0.251***
		(0.017)		(0.018)
Nationalism		0.134***		0.127***
		(0.018)		(0.019)
Social Media Usage		−0.026		−0.036**
		(0.017)		(0.017)
Foreign Link		−0.040**		−0.002
		(0.019)		(0.019)
Constant	3.573***	1.921***	3.553***	2.033***
	(0.032)	(0.132)	(0.033)	(0.139)
Weighted	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3,190	3,074	3,190	3,074
Adjusted R^2	0.0002	0.128	0.005	0.100

Notes: Dependent variables are indicated in column headings and are measured on a five-point scale. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Finally, as described in the main text (see Table 1), Table B3, presents a summary of our main findings using a more conservative correction for multiple hypothesis testing (Bonferroni's).

	Experiment 1		Experiment 2	
	Support for the Use of Force:		Support for the Use of Force:	
	In General	Against Taiwan	In General	Against Taiwan
Panel A: Treatment Effects (Baseline Control Group):				
Invasion	0.17	0.21	0.08	0.18
p-value	[0.0008]	[0.0001]	[0.07]	[0.0002]
adjusted *p*-value	[0.0008]	[0.0001]	[1.00]	[0.0003]
Economic Measures	0.08	0.13	-0.01	0.10
p-value	[0.15]	[0.02]	[0.78]	[0.03]
adjusted *p*-value	[1.00]	[0.19]	[1.00]	[0.42]
Military Measures	-0.03	0.03	0.06	0.07
p-value	[0.62]	[0.57]	[0.21]	[0.14]
adjusted *p*-value	[1.00]	[1.00]	[1.00]	[1.00]
Baseline Support	3.35	3.30	3.57	3.58
N	3207		3193	
Panel B: Treatment Effects (Baseline Invasion Group):				
Economic Measures	-0.10	-0.08	-0.10	-0.07
p-value	[0.06]	[0.13]	[0.04]	[0.11]
adjusted *p*-value	[0.59]	[1.00]	[0.58]	[1.00]
Military Measures	-0.20	-0.18	-0.03	-0.11
p-value	[0.0001]	[0.0010]	[0.55]	[0.02]
adjusted *p*-value	[0.0001]	[0.0048]	[1.00]	[0.31]
Baseline Support	3.53	3.50	3.66	3.75
N	2409		2411	

Table B3: Summary of Main Results (Bonferroni Correction). Across experiments, the outcome variables are measured on five-point scales; higher values represent more support. For each outcome, the table presents the coefficient from OLS regressions representing the difference in means between each treatment condition and the baseline group. We present *p*-values and adjusted *p*-values in brackets. The adjusted *p*-values have been corrected to control the family-wise error rate (Bonferroni's correction) across all hypotheses for each study.

B.4 Mechanism Hypotheses

The figures in this section report the results of causal mediation analysis (with multiple mediators). We adopt the framework of VanderWeele and Vansteelandt (2014) and Yu, Fan and Wu (2014) which allows for the presence of multiple mediators per treatment condition. As noted in the main text, the indirect effect of the invasion treatment through all the mediators accounts for almost 75% of the total effect of the invasion treatment on both outcomes. The remaining 25% is explained by the direct effect of the invasion treatment on both outcomes. A similar pattern is observed for all other treatment conditions.

Figure B6: **The Direct and Indirect Effect of Each Treatment Condition on the Support for the Use of Force**. Treatments: Panel A. Invasion, Panel B. Economic Measures, Panel C. Military Measures, and Panel D. Lack of Military Measures. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the direct and indirect effects (via all mediators) of each treatment condition on the outcome. For each quantity of interest, the plot also presents its 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (500 bootstrap samples).



Figure B7: **Mediation Analysis for Support for the Use of Force by Treatment Condition**. Treatments: Panel A. Invasion, Panel B. Economic Measures, Panel C. Military Measures, and Panel D. Lack of Military Measures. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the indirect effects (by each mediator) and their corresponding 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (500 bootstrap samples).



Figure B8: **The Direct and Indirect Effect of Each Treatment Condition on the Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan**. Treatments: Panel A. Invasion, Panel B. Economic Measures, Panel C. Military Measures, and Panel D. Lack of Military Measures. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the direct and indirect effects (via all mediators) of each treatment condition on the outcome. For each quantity of interest, the plot also presents its 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (500 bootstrap samples).



Figure B9: **Mediation Analysis for Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan by Treatment Condition**. Treatments: Panel A. Invasion, Panel B. Economic Measures, Panel C. Military Measures, and Panel D. Lack of Military Measures. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the indirect effects (by mediators) and their corresponding 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (500 bootstrap samples).



According to the figures, perceived morality, feasibility of peaceful resolutions, and perceived likelihood of success have significant causal mediation effects on the support for the use of force, when focusing on the Invasion and Lack of Military Measures treatments. In contrast, perceived economic costs, perceived military costs, and perceived threats have a null effect. The feasibility of peaceful resolutions seems to have the strongest indirect effect, implying that respondents exposed to information about the Russian invasion might perceive

peaceful resolution of disputes less feasible, which subsequently leads to higher support for the use of force.

Finally, note that examining the role of each mediator at a time using the methods proposed by Imai et al. (2011), reveals similar patterns to our analysis examining the role of multiple mediators concurrently (see Figures B10 and B13).

Figure B10: **Mediation Analysis (Experiment 1): One Mediator at a time (Imai et al., 2011). The Direct (ADE) and Indirect Effect (ACME) of Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force**. Each panel represents the mediator of interest. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the direct and indirect effects (for each mediator at a time) of the invasion treatment on the outcome. For each quantity of interest, the plot also presents its 95% confidence intervals.



Figure B11: **Mediation Analysis (Experiment 2): One Mediator at a time (Imai et al., 2011). The Direct (ADE) and Indirect Effect (ACME) of Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force**. Each panel represents the mediator of interest. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the direct and indirect effects (for each mediator at a time) of the invasion treatment on the outcome. For each quantity of interest, the plot also presents its 95% confidence intervals.



Figure B12: **Mediation Analysis (Experiment 1): One Mediator at a time (Imai et al., 2011). The Direct (ADE) and Indirect Effect (ACME) of Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan**. Each panel represents the mediator of interest. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the direct and indirect effects (for each mediator at a time) of the invasion treatment on the outcome. For each quantity of interest, the plot also presents its 95% confidence intervals.



Figure B13: **Mediation Analysis (Experiment 2): One Mediator at a time (Imai et al., 2011). The Direct (ADE) and Indirect Effect (ACME) of Invasion Treatment on the Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan**. Each panel represents the mediator of interest. The outcome variable is measured on a five-point scale; higher values represent more support. The plot presents the direct and indirect effects (for each mediator at a time) of the invasion treatment on the outcome. For each quantity of interest, the plot also presents its 95% confidence intervals.



C Festival Excerpts as Control Vignettes

When crafting the vignettes used in our experiments, we tried to preserve experimental realism by controlling the priming of state media and resorted to real news excerpts as our source material. In addition, for our festival vignettes, we intentionally refrained from selecting news excerpts using language that could elicit emotions related to the Russian invasion or the use of military force. Despite our conscientious efforts, it is possible that when discussing traditional Chinese festivals, some participants in the control groups may still experience emotions that could influence their evaluation of the use of force. To clarify, under such circumstances, the control group can be viewed as a "feel-good" treatment condition, serving as a point of reference distinct from a more neutral control group (e.g., a blank control or a more neutral vignette). Nevertheless, while our experimental designs do not allow for *direct* comparisons between our control group and more neutral control group (a limitation we acknowledge in the main text, see the last paragraph of Section 4.1), our findings in this appendix indicate the following:

- In Appendix C.1, by employing a stratification framework for causal inference, we explore the possibility of categorizing our control group respondents into those subjected to the "feel-good" treatment condition and those for whom the festival vignette serves as a more neutral stimulus. We show that as long as the proportion of "feel-good" individuals is not too large (more than half), our main findings are likely to be driven by individuals for whom a festival vignette acts as a neutral message (see Table C1).
- In Appendix C.2, when we include in our regression analyses covariates that have been shown to correlate with positive emotions, and under assumptions that we formalize below, we find evidence consistent with the notion that any potential bias coming from our festival vignettes on respondents' support for the use of force in general and Taiwan, in particular, does not appear to be large (see Table C2).

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the evidence presented below, although non-conclusive due to our inability to observe respondents whose emotions are positively impacted by the festival vignettes, is aimed at comprehending the potential bias originating from a "feel-good" baseline.

C.1 Sensitivity Analyses Under Stratification

In a regression context, consider the following equation:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \tau T_i + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i represents the outcome we are interested in, which could be either support for the use of force in general or against Taiwan; $T_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is a binary indicator, that equals 1 if individual i was exposed to e.g., the invasion treatment, and 0 if they were exposed to a festival vignette; and $X_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is another binary indicator, that equals 1 if exposure to a "feel-good" message affects individual i's emotions, and equals 0 if such exposure does not (i.e., a neutral reaction). As demonstrated by Angrist (1998), using a stratification framework for causal inference and under conditional unconfoundeness (i.e., $\{Y_i(1), Y_i(0)\} \perp\!\!\!\perp T_i|X_i$), we can express τ as:

$$\tau = \phi \times \tau_1 + (1 - \phi) \times \tau_0$$

Where $\tau_j = \mathbb{E}(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|X_i = j)$ for $j \in \{0, 1\}$ denotes the treatment effect for those individuals with $X_i = j$, and $\phi \in [0, 1]$ is convex weight proportional to the proportion of individuals with $X_i = 1$. In simpler terms, the estimated treatment effect $\widehat{\tau}$ from a regression of Y on T and X is a weighted average of the treatment effect for individuals influenced by the exposure to a "feel-good" message (τ_1) and the treatment effect for those who are not affected by such exposure (τ_0). In practice, only those with $T_i = 0$ are exposed to the "feel-good" message, therefore we assume that $\mathbb{E}(Y_i|T_i = 1, X_i = 1) = \mathbb{E}(Y_i|T_i = 1, X_i = 0)$ i.e., no "feel-good" reaction after being exposed to the invasion treatment.

Now, note that we can write $\tau_0 = \dfrac{\tau - \phi\tau_1}{1 - \phi}$ and let's consider a scenario where the treatment effect of those affected by the festival vignette is larger or equal to the effect we can recover from the regression, i.e., $\tau_1 \geq \tau$. Using this information, we can ask the following question: for a given value of ϕ and τ, how large does τ_1 need to be for τ_0 to be zero? Table C1 illustrates that when $\phi \leq 0.50$, τ_1 must be at least twice as large (if not larger) than τ for τ_0 to be non-positive. Given the small magnitude of our estimates of τ and the relatively large support for the use of force in our experiments, achieving such a large value for τ_1 appears unlikely. However, when ϕ is large, we recognize that τ is just a reflection of τ_1 i.e., the treatment effect for those respondents for which being exposed to positive information evokes "feel-good" emotions. In other words, as long as the proportion of "feel-good" individuals is not too large (more than half), our main findings are likely to be driven by individuals for whom a festival vignette acts as a neutral message.

A caveat of the approach outlined above is that we do not observe X. Consequently, the numbers presented in Table C1 are just illustrative. Next, we conduct an empirical evaluation of the robustness of our conclusions in a scenario where we cannot observe X but can try to approximate via pre-treatment covariates.

Panel A: Results based on the Findings of Experiment 1

Outcome:		
Support for the Use of Force in General		
	$\phi = 0.90$	$\tau_1 =$ **0.188**
$\tau = 0.17$	$\phi = 0.50$	$\tau_1 =$ **0.340**
	$\phi = 0.10$	$\tau_1 =$ **1.700**
Outcome:		
Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan		
	$\phi = 0.90$	$\tau_1 =$ **0.233**
$\tau = 0.21$	$\phi = 0.50$	$\tau_1 =$ **0.420**
	$\phi = 0.10$	$\tau_1 =$ **2.100**

Panel B: Results based on the Findings of Experiment 2

Outcome:		
Support for the Use of Force in General		
	$\phi = 0.90$	$\tau_1 =$ **0.088**
$\tau = 0.08$	$\phi = 0.50$	$\tau_1 =$ **0.160**
	$\phi = 0.10$	$\tau_1 =$ **0.800**
Outcome:		
Support for the Use of Force Against Taiwan		
	$\phi = 0.90$	$\tau_1 =$ **0.200**
$\tau = 0.18$	$\phi = 0.50$	$\tau_1 =$ **0.360**
	$\phi = 0.10$	$\tau_1 =$ **1.800**

Table C1: How Large Does τ_1 needs to be for τ_0 be approximately zero? Values for τ are set equal to invasion treatment effects found in our two experiments when the festival vignettes are set as the baseline comparison. As noted above ϕ represents the share of individuals for which the festival vignettes act as a "feel-good" treatment, and τ_j for $j \in \{0, 1\}$ denotes the treatment effect for those individuals with $X_i = j$. To find the value of τ_1 for which $\tau_0 = 0$, we fix $\tau_0 = 0$ and the values of τ and ϕ as specified in the first two columns of the table.

C.2 A Proxy Variable Approach to Examine the Robustness of the Main Findings

Consider the following regression equation:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \tau T_i + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

In this equation, Y, T, and X have the same definitions discussed above. As noted above, to obtain an unbiased estimate of τ (which represents a weighted average of treatment effects for different groups defined by X), it is necessary to assume that $\{Y_i(1), Y_i(0)\} \perp\!\!\!\perp T_i|X_i$. However, in our setting, X is not observed. Hence, in practice, it is feasible to estimate the parameters of the following regression:

$$Y_i = \theta + \beta T_i + \upsilon_i$$

However, our estimate of β would be different from τ due to omitted variable bias by not including X in our regression. Imagine that we estimate the following regression instead:

$$Y_i = \rho + \delta T_i + \zeta^\top \mathbf{Z}_i + \epsilon_i$$

Where vector $\mathbf{Z}_i$ represents an additional set of covariates. The question becomes: under what conditions does $\delta = \tau$? A necessary condition is that $\mathbb{E}(Y|T, X) = \mathbb{E}(Y|T, X, \mathbf{Z})$. In simple words, when we control for X then $\mathbf{Z}$ is redundant. In addition, we need that X is a linear function of $\mathbf{Z}$ i.e, $X_i = \Omega^\top \mathbf{Z}_i + \upsilon_i$ (see Wooldridge 2010). Under such assumptions, $\mathbf{Z}$ represents a set of covariates highly predictive of X (proxy variables for $\mathbf{Z}$), and $\tau = \delta$ (in expectation).

Now, let's examine the comparison between our estimate for the treatment effect in a regression of Y on T with the treatment effect estimate from a regression of Y on T and $\mathbf{Z}$. If $\tau = \phi \times \tau_1 + (1 - \phi) \times \tau_0$; $\mathbb{E}(Y_i|T_i = 1, X_i = 1) = \mathbb{E}(Y_i|T_i = 1, X_i = 0)$; $\tau_1 > \tau_0$; and we find that that $\beta > \delta = \tau$, then it could be the case that to recover an unbiased estimate of τ, we have that $1 - \phi$ (the proportion of individuals for whom $X_i = 0$) is large, leading to τ_0 to dominate the magnitude of τ.

As discussed above, the assumption that $\mathbb{E}(Y_i|T_i = 1, X_i = 1) = \mathbb{E}(Y_i|T_i = 1, X_i = 0)$ implies that exposure to the invasion treatment dampens the potential response to a "feel-good" message. As a result, the assumption $\tau_1 > \tau_0$ seems reasonable as it means that the festival vignettes evoke emotions that lower baseline support for the use of force among those in the control group and for whom $X_i = 1$. Finally, the proxy variable assumptions would require that our additional covariates effectively predict which respondents will (or will not) react to the festival vignettes like a neutral control group.

Table C2 presents the results from a comparison of treatment effects derived from regressions without the inclusion of pre-treatment covariates (Panel A), with the inclusion of pre-treatment covariates that authors such as Bottan and Perez-Truglia (2011) have argued to predict positive emotions (Panel B), and with the inclusion of our complete set of pre-treatment covariates (Panel C). Our findings suggest that when pre-treatment covariates are

included in the regressions, the estimated treatment effects are slightly smaller compared to those obtained from regressions without covariates. Given the assumptions outlined above, if our pre-treatment covariates are good predictors of X, this result supports the notion that our treatment effect estimates are influenced by the treatment effect in individuals for whom the festival vignettes have a similar impact as a neutral control group. Alternatively, these findings could indicate that $\mathbb{E}(Y_i|T_i = 0, X_i = 1) \approx \mathbb{E}(Y_i|T_i = 0, X_i = 0)$, which implies that $\tau_1 \approx \tau_0$. Given the subtle increase induced by our treatment vignettes on the support for the use of force, it is also possible that there is not a marked treatment heterogeneity across values of X.

Finally, it is important to underscore that the aforementioned evidence, rather than conclusive, is oriented toward comprehending the nature of the potential bias stemming from the inclusion of a "feel-good" group. Further research is needed to meticulously assess the substantive merit of neutrality (or its absence) within control vignettes or control conditions more generally.

	Experiment 1		Experiment 2	
	Support for the Use of Force:		Support for the Use of Force:	
	In General	Against Taiwan	In General	Against Taiwan
Panel A: Treatment Effects (No pre-treatment covariates included):				
Invasion	0.17	0.21	0.08	0.18
p-value	[0.0008]	[0.0001]	[0.07]	[0.0002]
Economic Measures	0.08	0.13	-0.01	0.10
p-value	[0.15]	[0.02]	[0.78]	[0.03]
Military Measures	-0.03	0.03	0.06	0.07
p-value	[0.62]	[0.57]	[0.21]	[0.14]
Panel B: Treatment Effects (Controlling for Age, Education, Gender, and Income):				
Invasion	0.16	0.17	0.08	0.17
p-value	[0.0015]	[0.0012]	[0.09]	[0.0003]
Economic Measures	0.05	0.11	-0.02	0.09
p-value	[0.32]	[0.04]	[0.60]	[0.04]
Military Measures	0.00	0.04	0.06	0.07
p-value	[0.93]	[0.48]	[0.17]	[0.16]
Panel C: Treatment Effects (Controlling for all pre-treatment covariates):				
Invasion	0.14	0.18	0.07	0.16
p-value	[0.0046]	[0.0008]	[0.11]	[0.0006]
Economic Measures	0.05	0.13	-0.02	0.09
p-value	[0.34]	[0.01]	[0.63]	[0.04]
Military Measures	0.01	0.07	0.04	0.05
p-value	[0.84]	[0.17]	[0.39]	[0.25]

Table C2: Regressions results with and without pre-treatment covariates. Across experiments, the outcome variables are measured on five-point scales; higher values represent more support. For each outcome, the table presents the coefficient from OLS regressions representing the difference in means between each treatment condition and the baseline group. For each outcome and experiment, we present *p*-values in brackets. Pre-treatment covariates are Age group, Gender, Education, Income, Party Member, Political Interest, Ideology, Nationalism, Social Media, Foreign links, and region

D Treatment

D.1 Study 1

Invasion Treatment

新华社北京2月25日电　俄罗斯总统普京24日宣布在乌克兰发起特别军事行动。

直到目前为止，俄乌双方仍在乌克兰境内进行战斗。双方政府仍未就如何结束军事冲突和乌克兰政治地位问题达成共识。

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, February 25. Russian President Putin announced the launch of a special military operation in Ukraine on the 24th.

As of today, the Russian and Ukrainian armies have continued to clash in Ukraine. The two governments have yet to reach an agreement on how to end the military conflict and a consensus on Ukraine's political status.

Economic Measures Treatment

新华社北京2月25日电　俄罗斯总统普京24日宣布在乌克兰发起特别军事行动。

直到目前为止，俄乌双方仍在乌克兰境内进行战斗。双方政府仍未就如何结束军事冲突和乌克兰政治地位问题达成共识。

新华社华盛顿2月27日电　美国等西方国家26日发布联合声明，将部分俄罗斯银行排除在环球银行间金融通信协会（SWIFT）支付系统之外，并对俄罗斯央行实施限制措施。专家认为，这是"核武级"的金融制裁。这意味着俄罗斯银行将无法与境外银行进行交易，使俄对外贸易变得更加麻烦。同时，针对俄央行的限制性措施将导致其相关资产"陷入瘫痪"，极大削弱宏观调控能力。

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, February 25. Russian President Putin announced the launch of a special military operation in Ukraine on the 24th.

As of today, the Russian and Ukrainian armies have continued to clash in Ukraine. The two governments have yet to reach an agreement on how to end the military conflict and a consensus on Ukraine's political status.

Xinhua News Agency, Washington, February 27. The United States and other Western countries issued a joint statement on the 26th, excluding some Russian banks from The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication

(SWIFT) payment system, and imposing restrictions on the Russian central bank. Experts believe that this is a "nuclear-level" financial sanction. This means that Russian banks will not be able to conduct transactions with foreign banks, making Russian foreign trade more troublesome. At the same time, the restrictive measures against the Central Bank of Russia will cause its related assets to be "paralyzed," greatly weakening the ability of macro-control.

Military Measures Treatment

新华社北京2月25日电　俄罗斯总统普京24日宣布在乌克兰发起特别军事行动。

直到目前为止，俄乌双方仍在乌克兰境内进行战斗。双方政府仍未就如何结束军事冲突和乌克兰政治地位问题达成共识。

新华社布鲁塞尔2月28日电　北约秘书长斯托尔滕贝格2月28日表示，北约正在向乌克兰提供数以万计的防空导弹、反坦克武器及其他援助。美国等北约各国已经批准向乌克兰运送军事装备，包括标枪导弹和防空导弹等关键武器。他还表示，北约正在向联盟东部地区、在北约成员国领土上增加兵力部署。乌克兰总统泽连斯基27日说，乌克兰正在为来自国外的志愿者组建"外国志愿军"。

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, February 25. Russian President Putin announced the launch of a special military operation in Ukraine on the 24th.

As of today, the Russian and Ukrainian armies have continued to clash in Ukraine. The two governments have yet to reach an agreement on how to end the military conflict and a consensus on Ukraine's political status.

Xinhua News Agency, Brussels, February 28　NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg said on the 28th that NATO is providing tens of thousands of anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank weapons, and other assistance to Ukraine. NATO countries, such as the US, have approved sending military equipment to Ukraine, including key weapons such as Javelin missiles and anti-aircraft missiles. He also said that NATO is increasing the deployment of troops to the eastern region of the alliance and on the territory of NATO member states. Ukrainian President Zelensky said on the 27th that Ukraine is forming a "foreign volunteer army" for volunteers from abroad.

Lack of Military Measures Treatment

新华社北京2月25日电　俄罗斯总统普京24日宣布在乌克兰发起特别军事行动。

直到目前为止，俄乌双方仍在乌克兰境内进行战斗。双方政府仍未就如何结束军事冲突和乌克兰政治地位问题达成共识。

当地时间2月24日，美国总统拜登第一时间在其演讲中斩钉截铁地表示，“我们的部队绝不会派到乌克兰境内作战”。与此同时，北约秘书长斯托尔滕贝格也同样毫不含糊地表示，北约“不会采取任何直接军事行动支援乌克兰”。乌克兰总统泽连斯基批评西方已经完全抛弃了乌克兰，称乌克兰正“孤军作战”。“谁愿意与我们并肩战斗？我没有看见任何人。所有人都在害怕。”

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, February 25. Russian President Putin announced the launch of a special military operation in Ukraine on the 24th.

As of today, the Russian and Ukrainian armies have continued to clash in Ukraine. The two governments have yet to reach an agreement on how to end the military conflict and a consensus on Ukraine's political status.

February 24, local time, U.S. President Biden categorically stated that "our troops will never be sent to fight in Ukraine." At the same time, NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg also unequivocally said that NATO "will not take any direct military action to support Ukraine." Ukrainian President Zelensky criticizes the West for having completely abandoned Ukraine, saying that Ukraine is "fighting alone." "Who wants to fight with us? I don't see anyone. Everyone is scared."

Control (Lantern Festival)

新华社2月18日电　星月当空万烛烧，人间天上两元宵。岁岁年年，今又元宵。元宵节，又称“上元节”。在这人月两圆的时刻，神州大地处处花灯竞放，无数家庭欢愉相聚。还有许多人早已回到工作岗位，心怀梦想再出发，前行的脚步充满力量。

Xinhua News Agency, February 18th The star and moon are in the sky and ten thousand candles are burning. Year in and year out, this day is the Lantern Festival, also known as the "Shangyuan Festival". At this time when the moon is full, lanterns are displayed everywhere in the land of China, and countless families gather happily. Meanwhile, many people have already returned to work, set off with dreams in their hearts, and move forward with strength.

D.2 Study 2: Text

Invasion Treatment

新华社北京5月17日电
俄乌冲突局势近日一系列动态引人关注。除了战事继续胶着，俄乌境内目标频频受到对方打击。在乌克兰，当地时间16日凌晨，新华社记者在首都基辅听到密集爆炸声。乌方官员说，俄罗斯当天对基辅实施了异常密集的空袭，乌防空系统正在拦截目标。俄国防部发言人科纳申科夫16日说，当天凌晨，俄军使用高精度武器对乌境内军事设施进行集中打击，包括乌武装部队部署点及西方援乌武器和弹药储存地。

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, May 17th.
A series of recent developments in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine have garnered significant attention. In addition to the ongoing stalemate in the war, both Russia and Ukraine regularly experienced targeted attacks by the opposing side. In Ukraine, in the early hours of the 16th local time, reporters from Xinhua News Agency heard dense explosions in the capital Kyiv. Ukrainian officials said that Russia carried out an exceptionally intensive air strike on Kyiv that day, and the Ukrainian air defense system was intercepting the target.

[Insert Figure 1]

Economic Measures Treatment

新华社北京5月17日电
俄乌冲突局势近日一系列动态引人关注。除了战事继续胶着，俄乌境内目标频频受到对方打击。在乌克兰，当地时间16日凌晨，新华社记者在首都基辅听到密集爆炸声。乌方官员说，俄罗斯当天对基辅实施了异常密集的空袭，乌防空系统正在拦截目标。

自普京总统去年2月下令军队进入乌克兰以来，美国为首的西方国家对俄罗斯发起极限制裁，试图从经济上击垮俄罗斯。大量西方公司撤出俄市场。西方国家还对莫斯科的能源出口实施了大量制裁。最重要的是禁止俄罗斯原油通过海运进入欧盟，而且禁止俄罗斯柴油等精炼油进入欧盟，导致俄罗斯石油收入同比下降43%。俄罗斯联邦国家统计局2月20日公布的初步统计数据显示，2022年俄罗斯国内生产总值（GDP）下降2.1%。

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, May 17th.
A series of recent developments in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine have

garnered significant attention. In addition to the ongoing stalemate in the war, both Russia and Ukraine regularly experienced targeted attacks by the opposing side. In Ukraine, in the early hours of the 16th local time, reporters from Xinhua News Agency heard dense explosions in the capital Kyiv. Ukrainian officials said that Russia carried out an exceptionally intensive air strike on Kyiv that day, and the Ukrainian air defense system was intercepting the target.

Since President Putin ordered troops into Ukraine in February last year, the United States and the West are imposing extreme sanctions on Russia, trying to destroy Russia economically. Many Western companies withdrew from the Russian market. Western countries have also imposed a raft of sanctions on Moscow's energy exports. The most important thing is to prohibit Russian crude oil from entering the EU by sea and to prohibit refined oil such as Russian diesel from entering the EU, resulting in a 43% year-on-year decline in Russian oil revenue. According to preliminary statistics released by the State Statistics Office of the Russian Federation on February 20, Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) dropped by 2.1% in 2022.

[Insert Figure 2]

Military Measures Treatment

新华社北京5月17日电
俄乌冲突局势近日一系列动态引人关注。除了战事继续胶着，俄乌境内目标频频受到对方打击。在乌克兰，当地时间16日凌晨，新华社记者在首都基辅听到密集爆炸声。乌方官员说，俄罗斯当天对基辅实施了异常密集的空袭，乌防空系统正在拦截目标。

据新华社四月报道，在美国主导下，北约持续向乌输送武器装备，提供人员培训与情报支持。自拜登政府上台以来，美国承诺向乌克兰提供的军事援助总额已达300亿美元。近日，乌克兰总统泽连斯基刚刚结束了对意大利、德国、法国和英国等国访问，并收获总额27亿欧元的一揽子军事援助，包括数十辆装甲车，数百枚防空导弹和数百架新型远程攻击型无人机。据报道，泽连斯基称乌方打算创建一个"跨国战机联盟"，旨在培训乌飞行员驾驶西方先进战机。

Xinhua News Agency reporters Zhang Yuan, Liu Jian, Liu Yifang
It has been more than a year since Russia launched a special military operation against Ukraine. This year, the battlefield situation experienced many shocks and changes. Recently, both Russia and Ukraine are actively improving their military strength, and the war is still a stalemate.

As reported by Xinhua in April, under the leadership of the United States, NATO continues to deliver weapons and equipment to Ukraine, providing personnel training and intelligence support. Since the Biden administration came to power, the total amount of military aid pledged by the United States to Ukraine has reached 30 billion U.S. dollars. Recently, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has just concluded his visit to Italy, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, and received a package of military aid totaling 2.7 billion euros, including dozens of armored vehicles, hundreds of anti-aircraft missiles, and several Hundreds of new long-range attack drones. According to reports, Zelensky said that Ukraine intends to create a "transnational fighter alliance" aimed at training Ukrainian pilots to fly advanced Western fighter jets.

[Insert Figure 3]

Control (Sericulture Festival)

新华社5月19日电
陌上夏日桑甚美，大美肥西蚕业兴。5月13日，“和美铭传乐游肥西”2023第四届肥西蚕桑文化旅游节在肥西县铭传乡启幕。本届肥西蚕桑文化旅游节以“和美铭传乐游肥西”为主题，多维度解读肥西蚕桑文化精神内涵，推出系列“线上+线下”文化体验活动，诚邀八方游客探寻大美肥西、品味蚕桑文化、打卡铭传故里。

Xinhua News Agency, May 19th
Summer mulberries are beautiful on Moshang, and the silkworm industry is flourishing in Feixi. On May 13, the 4th Feixi Sericulture Culture and Tourism Festival kicked off in Mingchuan Township, Feixi County. The theme of this year's Feixi Sericulture Culture and Tourism Festival is "Traveling in Feixi in Harmony", interpreting the spiritual connotation of Feixi sericulture culture in multiple dimensions, launching a series of "online + offline" cultural experience activities, and sincerely invites tourists from all over the world to explore the beautiful Feixi, enjoying the sericulture culture in its hometown.

D.3 Study 2: Figures

Figure C14: Russian Invasion

Figure C15: Western Military Aid

Figure C16: Western Economic Measures

Figure C17: Cultural Festivals

E Measurement

E.1 Dependent Variables (Study 1)

- *Military Strength:* In general, China should rely more on military strength to achieve its foreign policy goals.
  总的来说，中国应该更多依靠军事力量来实现外交目标。
- *Taiwan:* If peaceful reunification cannot be achieved within three years, then Taiwan should be reunified by force.
  如果在三年内无法实现和平统一，那么应该武力统一台湾。

E.2 Dependent Variables (Study 2)

- *Military Strength:* In general, China should rely more on military strength to achieve its foreign policy goals.
  总的来说，中国应该更多依靠军事力量来实现外交目标。
- *Taiwan 1:* China should rely more on its military strength to reunify Taiwan
  中国应该更多依靠军事力量来实现统一台湾。
- *Taiwan 2:* Which of the following potential policies toward Taiwan do you find acceptable or unacceptable in the next five years, or are you unsure?

  [The order of the following policies is randomized]

  在未来的五年里，以下可能的大陆对台政策中，哪些是您可以接受的？哪些不能？

  - Launching the unification war to take back Taiwan entirely.
    一鼓作气，彻底武力收复台湾
  - Initiating limited military campaigns on the outskirt of Taiwan and taking back its offshore islands such as Kinmen and Matsu, coercing Taiwanese authorities to accept unification.
    实施台湾外围战役，如收复金门、妈祖，逼迫台湾当局接受统一
  - Imposing economic sanctions, and even cutting off economic and personnel exchanges, to facilitate unification.
    对台湾实施经济制裁，甚至断绝和台湾的经贸、人员往来，用经济手段促进统一
  - Maintaining the status quo and continuing to increase economic and military power so that Taiwan would eventually seek unification with

the mainland.
维持现状，持续发展经济军事实力，台湾迟早会主动寻求统一

– Keeping their separate political systems, with unification not necessarily being the end game.
两岸可以各自为政，不一定非要统一

E.3 Mechanism Variables

- *Perceived Economic Costs:* Involving in any large-scale military conflicts in the near future will have severe negative impacts on China's economic development.
在近期内中国参与任何大规模军事冲突都会对中国的经济发展带来严重的负面影响。

- *Perceived Military Costs:* Involving in any large-scale military conflicts in the near future will result in severe casualties and significantly increase military spending.
在近期内中国参与任何大规模军事冲突都会导致严重的人员伤亡和沉重的军费开支负担。

- *Perceived Likelihood of Success:* As long as the People's Liberation Army takes military action, it will surely achieve its military goals, maintaining territorial integrity and realizing the reunification of the motherland.
只要解放军采取武力行动，就一定能实现军事目标，维护领土完整和实现祖国统一。

- *Perceived Threat:* Maintaining the status quo on territorial sovereignty disputes such as Taiwan, Diaoyu Islands, the South China Sea, and the Sino-Indian border, will create great threats to China's national security in the long run.
对于类似台湾问题、钓鱼岛问题、南海问题和中印边界问题等领土主权争端，长期维持现状将对中国的国家安全造成重大威胁。

- *Perceived Morality:* A military operation on the ground of territorial unity and integrity is completely moral, even though it may cause many civilian casualties.
即使会造成许多平民伤亡，以维护祖国统一和领土完整的名义对外发动军事行动也是完全道德的。

- *Perceived US Influence:* In recent years, the US's power and influence in

international affairs have been declining.
近年来，美国在国际事务中的影响力正在降低。

- *Alternative Peaceful Resolutions:* It is impossible to resolve territorial sovereignty disputes such as Taiwan, Diaoyu Islands, the South China Sea, and the Sino-Indian border by peaceful means.
类似台湾问题、钓鱼岛问题、南海问题和中印边界问题等领土主权争端问题是不可能以和平的方式解决的。

E.4 Additional Mechanism Variables in Study 2

- *Perceived Legality:* A preemptive military operation, even on the ground of territorial unity and integrity, will be an act of aggression that violates international law.
即使是以领土完整和统一的名义，先发制人的军事行动也将是一种违反国际法的侵略行为。

- *Peaceful Image:* Being involved in any large-scale military conflicts in the near future will harm China's image as a peace-loving nation.
在近期内中国参与任何大规模军事冲突都会损害中国爱好和平的国际形象。

- *Perceived Threat 2:* The United States and other Western countries are the major threats to China's peace and prosperity.
美国和其他西方国家是中国和平与繁荣的主要威胁。

E.5 Control Variables

As described above, we include two different sets of pre-treatment covariates: demographic covariates and predisposition covariates. Demographic covariates include *education*, *age*, *gender*, and *region*. These demographic covariates are widely used in experiments across different contexts. Predisposition covariates include *party membership*, *nationalism*, *political interests*, *ideology*, *social media usage*, *foreign connection*.

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