1 Appendix: Identifying Cases of Colonial Wars

Following Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer, I define a "colonial war" as sustained combat between a territorial state and a non-sovereign entity located outside the borders of the state that results in at least 1,000 combined fatalities over the course conflict (Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer 2003, 58-59). Within this broad category, I confine my analysis to colonial wars involving European states and great powers against non-sovereign entities located outside of Europe. I define "European states" as those states that have a COW country-code between 200 and 400, as well as the "neo-Europe" settler colonies of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Israel (cf. Fazal and Green 2014, 839). I define "great powers" using the COW definition, which means that Japan's conquests of Korea and Taiwan, as well as subsequent insurgencies, are eligible for inclusion.

To build the case list, I started with three existing datasets: the COW extra-state war dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), Arreguín-Toft's dataset on asymmetric war (2005), and Lyall and Wilson's dataset on counterinsurgency warfare (2009). Based on my definition of a colonial war, I applied the following standards to exclude cases:

- *Wars located in Europe:* I excluded cases that located in Europe such as the Cracow Revolt (COW extra-state war #332), the Garibaldi Expedition (COW extra-state war #352), and conquest of Bosnia (COW extra-state war #377).
- *Non-European or non-great power incumbents:* I excluded cases that involved non-European states such as the Ottoman conquest of the Sudan (COW extra-state war #307) and China's subjugation of Tibet (COW extra-state war #435).
- *Outgrowth of ongoing interstate wars:* I excluded cases that developed as part of an ongoing interstate war, such as the German East Africa campaign in WWI (Lyall and Wilson case #114) or the Malayan insurgency against Japanese occupation in WWII (Lyall and Wilson case #145). These are more properly thought of as interstate wars that took place in colonial settings rather than colonial wars themselves.
- *Ongoing wars:* I exclude cases that were unresolved as of 2003, such as the U.S. war in Afghanistan (COW extra-state war #481) and U.S. war in Iraq (COW extra-state war #482).

I also made three minor changes to case codings in these datasets:

- *Somaliland War* (Lyall and Wilson case #105): Lyall and Wilson group this as one case lasting from 1899 to 1920. I divide it into two cases. The first 1899 to 1904 period, which ends in a quasi-cease fire along the frontier where the "Mad Mullah" agrees to reside in neighboring Italian Somaliland and promises not to harass British outposts across the boundary. The second 1913-1920 post-war campaign, which features the use of bombing as part of Britain's post-war policy of "air control."

- *Yen Bai Uprising* (Extra-state war #452): COW extra-systemic dataset groups this as one case. I divide into two cases. The first in February 1930 is the "Yen Bai Uprising," concentrated in the north involving Vietnamese nationalist party and army mutineers. The second is the the "Nghe-Tinh Soviet Movement" which occcurs from May 1930 through September 1931 and is concentrated in Annam and involves the Vietnamese communist party and peasant protesters. Although connected in a general sense, the two uprisings take place in separate locations, involve separate actors, and are handled in slightly different ways by French authorities.

- *Indonesian independence* (Lyall and Wilson case #154): Lyall and Wilson only include Netherlands as the incumbent, but COW extra-systemic dataset has both Netherlands and Britain as incumbents (case #456) and Clodfelter and secondary sources describe significant action by both parties. So keeping with COW and making this two cases involving two different state incumbents.

In addition to these existing datasets, I drew on specialized encyclopedias on warfare (Clodfelter 2008) and colonialism (Benjamin 2006) to identify eighteen additional cases. These additional cases are:

- *Expeditions against Gulf Pirates, 1819-1821:* the British conduct two punitive expeditions against Gulf pirates between 1819 and 1821. One in Persian Gulf against Al Qasimi (in what is today the UAE). Second against Bani Bu Ali, a rebellious tribe, on coast of Oman (with help from the Sultan). Expeditions part of anti-piracy treaty making that British pushing in region in early 1820s. Neither Lyall and Wilson nor COW include, but meets the 1,000 battle deaths threshold.

- *Suppression of the Thuggee, 1829-1835:* the British during Governor General Bentick's tenure conduct a widespread anti-Thug campaign in northern India. Although more a question of crime and internal policing than war, scale of violence exceeds 1,000 battle deaths threshold and the British (most likely incorrectly) viewed the Thugs as a coherent religious movement. Neither Lyall and Wilson nor COW include, but is in Clodfelter and other encyclopedias.

- *Anglo-Sotho War, 1851-1852:* a short war involving King Moshoeshoe and the British that unfolds over two battles: Viervoet and Berea. The only question is whether the total battle deaths are enough to qualify. General Cathcart claims 500 Basuto killed at Battle of Berea alone, but this seems inflated. British lose around 300 at both Viervoet and Berea, if you include their native auxiliaries. So total between the two battles is certainly close, especially if include follow up battles between Sotho and Britain's Batlokwa allies. Neither Lyall and Wilson nor COW include, but it is in Clodfelter and other encyclopedias.

- *Khiva Campaign, 1872-1873:* four columns converge on Khanate of Khiva, some skirmishing, some village burning, Russians bombard and occupy town, then a separate column massacres large numbers of Turkomen. Inglorious and unnecessary,

but meets 1,000 battle death even if discount Russian exaggeration of Khivan casualties. Neither Lyall and Wilson nor COW include, but it is in Clodfelter and Morrison's excellent volume (2020) on Russian conquest of Central Asia.

- *Kalkadoon War, 1874-1884:* the dates of this war are somewhat arbitrary, but escalating clashes between Australian settlers, both pastoralist and miners, in Queensland. Kalkadoon band of aborigines are one of many that resist these encroachments through small scale guerrilla action. Settlers and their native police proxies respond with brutal campaign of quasi-extermination. Exact figures are hard to estimate here, but approaches 1,000 battle deaths, especially if include 1884 massacre at Battle Mountain. Neither Lyall and Wilson nor COW include, but it is in Clodfelter.

- *Sikkim War, 1888-1889:* this is a relatively minor affair, comparable in scale and character to the Anglo-Bhutanese war of 1865. The only question concerns casualties, but between Tibetans killed in their attack on Gnathong base and then British assault on Tuko La pass, combined with British casualties due to conditions (frostbite, bronchitis), seems likely that 1,000 battle deaths reached. Neither Lyall and Wilson nor COW include, but it is in Clodfelter.

- *First Matabele War, 1893-1894:* this war clearly meets the standard for battle deaths. The only reason why I can see for not including it is that it was largely fought by BSAC police and other volunteers, rather than by imperial forces. Yet Rhodes had already secured a royal charter, and commanders were in correspondence with Secretary of State for the Colonies Lord Ripon. If COW includes EIC campaigns in its extra-war dataset, then it seems like BSAC wars should be included too. Neither Lyall and Wilson nor COW include, but it is in Clodfelter and other encyclopedias.

- *Second Matabele War, 1896-1897:* this case also clearly meets the standard for battle deaths. It also is much clearly a British crown directed affair: British imperial troops are used, British officers given political and military command positions, once again Colonial Office and Cape officials are heavily involved in directing events. Neither Lyall and Wilson nor COW include, but is in Clodfelter and other encyclopedias.

- *Uganda Rebellion, 1897-1899:* this case also clearly meets the standard for battle deaths, British casualties alone almost total 1,000 plus many more for their Ugandan and Sudanese mutineer opponents. Neither Lyall and Wilson nor COW include, but it is in Clodfelter and other official histories of British overseas military operations.

- *Nupe and Ilorin, 1897-1898:* this case also clearly meets the standard for battle deaths. Only reason to not include, as with the Matabele Wars, is that it was conducted by the Royal Niger Company, not Imperial troops. But British officers present and expedition sanctioned by the British government. Neither Lyall and Wilson nor COW include, but it is in Clodfelter and other encyclopedias.

- *Second Dutch-Balinese, 1906-1908:* this case meets the standard for battle deaths. Culminates in puputans, which in Badung alone is close to a thousand killed. Neither

Lyall and Wilson nor COW include, but it is in Clodfelter and other encyclopedia entries of Dutch conquest of Indonesia.

- *Italian-Senussi War, 1911-1912:* this case is typically coded as the Italian-Turkish War in COW datasets, but Italians also clashed with Senussi tribesmen in Libya, not just with Ottoman garrisons, so I have decided to include as a colonial war.

- *Turkestan rebellion, 1916-1917:* this case is not included in Lyall and Wilson, but I am not clear why given that it is a continuation of Russia's multiple insurgencies in Central Asia. Also clearly meets the 1,000 battle death threshold given the mass deportations and deaths that were caused as a result.

- *Sandino Rebellion, 1927-1933:* Clodfelter includes this case, but it is not clear that reaches 1,000 battle death threshold. National Guard claims 1,115 Sandinista 'bandits' killed in combat, but Clodfelter describes this as an 'exaggeration' and most of the battles seem like small skirmishes. But other sources such as Schroeder (2007) suggest 'thousands' of peasants killed, so I think it is safest to include it, given that it is often cited as key U.S. interwar colonial insurgency alongside occupations of Haiti and Dominican Republic.

- *Hurs Rebellion, 1942-1943:* Clodfelter describes this case, does not give total casualty estimates, but notes Hurs committed as many as 600 murders a month, which suggests that it reaches the 1,000 battle deaths threshold over two years. Ansari in her book (1992) describes outbreak as the most significant challenge to British collaboration in what would become Pakistan, so I think it is reasonable to include.

- *Quit India Movement 1942-1944:* Coldfelter describes this case, notes that more than 1,000 people killed in unrest around Quit India movement between Gandhi's arrest in 1942 and his subsequent call for rebels to turn themselves in in 1944. Given scale of political violence in India throughout the 1920s and 1930s, one could argue that should expand timeframe, but earlier Gandhi-inspired campaigns do not seem to pass 1,000 deaths threshold.

- *Sétif Uprising, 1945:* neither Lyall and Wilson nor COW extra-state dataset include this case, but Clodfelter describes and it clearly meets the 1,000 battle deaths criteria. The only question about possible inclusion is whether this case involved enough violence 'on both sides' to count as a war, rather than straightforward massacre or politicide. Yet Thomas in his article (2011) suggests that more than one hundred Europeans were killed in the skirmishing so I include this as a colonial war.

- *Dhofar insurgency, 1963-1971:* the second part of Dhofar insurgency from 1973-1975 is included in the COW civil war dataset, yet the earlier period, before Oman becomes a recognized state in 1971, is not included. I have added it here.

The colonial war dataset contains 193 colonial states fighting in 186 colonial wars. The complete list of state participants appears in Table 1.

Table 1: State Participants in Colonial Wars, 1815-2003

War	Dates	Colonial power	Indigenous adversary	Mass Killing	Civ. Vict.
Kandhian Rebellion (Sri Lanka)	1815-1818	Britain	Kandhians	No	Yes
Allied Bombardment of Algiers	1816	Netherlands	Dey of Algiers	No	Yes
Allied Bombardment of Algiers	1816	Britain	Dey of Algiers	No	Yes
Russo-Georgian	1816-1825	Russia	Georgia	No	Yes
Liberation of Chile	1817-1818	Spain	San Martin revolutionaries	No	Yes
Liberation of New Granada	1817-1819	Spain	Bolivar revolutionaries	No	Yes
Liberation of Mexico	1817-1818	Spain	Mexican revolutionaries	Yes	Yes
Pindari War	1817-1818	Britain	Pindarias	No	No
Gulf Pirates	1819-1821	Britain	Al Qasimi Pirates	No	No
Liberation of Venezuela	1821-1822	Spain	Bolivar revolutionaries	Yes	Yes
First Anglo-Burmese War	1823-1826	Britain	Burma	No	No
First Ashanti	1824-1831	Britain	Ashanti	No	No
Liberation of Peru	1824-1825	Spain	Bolivar revolutionaries	No	Yes
Javanese War	1825-1830	Netherlands	Javanese	Yes	Yes
Bharatpuran (India)	1825-1826	Britain	Bharatpur	No	No
Russo-Persian	1826-1828	Russia	Persia	No	No
Russo-Circassian War	1829-1840	Russia	Circassians	Yes	Yes
Supression of the Thuggee	1829-1835	Britain	Thuggee bands	No	No
Spanish reconquest of Mexico	1829	Spain	Mexico	No	No
Murid War	1830-1859	Russia	Ghazi Muhammad & Shamil	No	Yes
French occuation of Algiers	1830	France	Dey of Algiers	No	Yes
Blackhawk's War	1832	USA	Sauk & Meskwakie	No	Yes
Second Seminole War	1835-1842	USA	Seminoles	No	Yes
First Anglo-Afghan	1838-1842	Britain	Afghans	No	Yes
First Anglo-Zulu	1838	Britain	Zulus	No	Yes
First Opium War	1839-1842	Britain	China	No	Yes
War of Abd el-Kader (Algeria)	1839-1847	France	Abd el-Kader	Yes	Yes
Sind War	1843	Britain	Baluchi	No	No
First Maori	1843-1846	Britain	Maoris	No	No
Gwalior Campaign	1843	Britain	Gwalior	No	No
Franco-Moroccan	1844	France	Moroccan	No	Yes
First British-Sikh	1845-1846	Britain	Sikh	No	No
War of the Axe (Cape Colony)	1846-1847	Britain	Xhosa	No	Yes
First Dutch-Bali	1848	Netherlands	Balinese	No	Yes
Second Anglo-Sikh War	1848-1849	Britain	Sikh	No	No
Chinese Pirates	1849	Britain	Chinese pirates	No	No
Mlanjeni War (Cape Colony)	1850-1853	Britain	Xhosa	No	Yes
Anglo-Sotho War	1851-1852	Britain	Sotho	No	Yes
Second Anglo-Burmese	1852-1853	Britain	Burma	No	No
Santhal Insurrection	1855-1856	Britain	Santhals	No	Yes
Yakima War	1855-1858	USA	Yakima	No	Yes
Third Seminole War	1855-1858	USA	Seminoles	No	Yes
Kabylia Uprising(Algeria)	1856-1857	France	Kabyles	No	Yes
Second Opium War	1856-1860	France	China	No	No
Second Opium War	1856-1860	Britain	China	No	Yes
Tukulor-French War	1857	France	Tukulor	No	Yes
Indian rebellion	1857-1859	Britain	Indian sepoys	Yes	Yes
Cochinchina campaign	1858-1863	France	Vietnam	No	Yes
Netherlands-Bone	1859-1860	Netherlands	Kingdom of Bone	No	Yes
Navajo War	1860-1865	USA	Navajo	No	Yes
Apache War	1860-1865	USA	Apache	No	Yes
Taranaki Wars	1860-1870	Britain	Maoris	No	Yes
First Sioux War	1862-1864	USA	Santee Sioux	No	Yes
Shimonoseki War	1863-1864	France	Choshu Daimyo	No	No
Shimonoseki War	1863-1864	Netherlands	Choshu Daimyo	No	No
Shimonoseki War	1863-1864	Britain	Choshu Daimyo	No	No
Shimonoseki War	1863-1864	USA	Choshu Daimyo	No	No
Ambela Campaign	1863-1863	Britain	"Hindustani fanatics"	No	No
Dominican Restoration	1863-1865	Spain	DR rebels	No	Yes
Russian-Kokand	1864-1865	Russia	Kokand	No	No
Anglo-Bhutanese War	1865	Britain	Bhutan	No	No
Red Cloud's War	1865-1868	USA	Lakota & Cheyenne	No	Yes

War	Dates	Colonial power	Indigenous adversary	Mass Killing	Civ. Vict.
Russian-Bukharan	1866-1866	Russia	Bukhara	No	Yes
British-Ethiopian	1867-1868	Britain	Abyssinia	No	No
Ten Years' War	1868-1878	Spain	Cuban rebels (Mambises)	Yes	Yes
Second Kabyle Uprising	1871-1872	France	Algerians(Kabylie)	No	Yes
Second Apache	1871-1872	USA	Yavapai & Tonto	No	Yes
Khiva Campaign	1872-1873	Russia	Khiva khanate	No	Yes
Second Ashanti	1873-1874	Britain	Ashanti	No	Yes
First Aceh War	1873-1904	Netherlands	Achinese	Yes	Yes
Garnier Expedition (Indochina)	1873-1881	France	Vietnam	No	No
Kalkadoon Wars	1874-1884	Australia	Kalkadoon aboriginies	No	Yes
Red River War	1874-1875	USA	Comanche	No	Yes
Kokand Rebellion	1875-1876	Russia	Kokand	No	Yes
Third Apache War	1876-1886	USA	Apaches	No	Yes
Third Sioux War	1876-1877	USA	Sioux	No	Yes
Lesser Gazavat	1877-1878	Russia	Alibek Hajji followers	No	Yes
Ngcayechibi's War	1877-1878	Britain	Gcaleka & Ngqika Xhosa	No	Yes
Russo-Turkoman War	1878-1881	Russia	Turkomans	No	Yes
Second Anglo-Afghan	1878-1880	Britain	Afghans	No	Yes
Anglo-Zulu	1879	Britain	Zulu	No	Yes
Gun War	1880-1881	Britain	Basutoland	No	Yes
First Boer War	1880-1881	Britain	Boers	No	No
Tunisian Conquest	1881-1882	France	Tunisia	No	Yes
First Anglo-Mahdi	1881-1885	Britain	Mahdist Empire	No	No
Tonkin Conquest (Indochina)	1882-1885	France	Black Flag Pirates	No	No
Franco-Merina (Madagascar)	1883-1885	France	Merina	No	Yes
Third Anglo-Burmese	1885-1896	Britain	Burma	No	Yes
Can Vuong War (Vietnam)	1885-1896	France	Phan Dinh Phung	No	Yes
Panjdeh incident (Afghanistan)	1885	Russia	Afghans	No	No
First Franco-Mandingo War	1885	France	Mandingo	No	Yes
First Italian-Ethiopian	1887	Italy	Ethiopia	No	No
Zambezi Conquest	1888	Portugal	Prazo of da Cruz	No	Yes
Sikkim War	1888-1889	Britain	Tibet	No	No
Dahomey	1889-1890	France	Dahomey-Benin	No	Yes
Second Tukulor-French War	1890-1891	France	Senagalese	No	Yes
Congo Arabs	1892	Belgium	Congo Arabs	No	Yes
Franco-Siamese	1893	France	Thai	No	No
Atebubu crisis (Ashanti)	1893 1894	Britain	Ashanti	No	No
First Melilla Campaign	1893-1894	Spain	Rif tribes	No	Yes
Italian-Mahdist War	1893-1894	Italy	Madhist Dervishes	No	No
First Matebele War	1893-1894	Britain	Lobengula's Matabele	No	Yes
Second Franco-Mandingo War	1894-1895	France	Mandingo	No	Yes
Red Shawls Revolt	1894-1895	France	Madagascans (Merina)	No	Yes
Kimberley Rebellion	1894-1897	Australia	Jandamarra (Pigeon)	No	Yes
Lombok Expedition	1894	Netherlands	Balianese	No	Yes
Portuguese-Gaza War	1895	Portugal	Gaza Empire	No	Yes
Taiwan Rebellion	1895	Japan	Black Flags	No	Yes
Cuban War of Independence	1895-1898	Spain	Cuban rebels	Yes	Yes
Fourth Anglo-Ashanti	1895-1896	Britain	Ashanti	No	No
Mazrui Rebellion	1895-1896	Britain	Mazrui in Kenya	No	Yes
Second Italian-Ethiopian	1895-1896	Italy	Ethiopians	No	No
Second Matabele War	1896-1897	Britain	Matabele and Shona	No	Yes
Mahdist War	1896 1899	Britain	Sudanese	No	Yes
Spanish-Philippine War	1896-1898	Spain	Filipino rebels	No	Yes
Northwest Frontier Campaign	1897-1898	Britain	Pashtuns	No	Yes
Benin Campaign	1897	Britain	Benin	No	Yes
Uganda rebllion	1897-1899	Britain	Ugandan chiefs	No	No
Nupe and Ilorin	1897-1898	Britain	Fulani emirates	No	Yes
Filipino Insurgency	1898-1902	USA	Filipino rebels	Yes	Yes
Hut Tax	1898	Britain	Sierra Leone	No	Yes
French Conquest of Chad	1899-1900	France	Rabih Zubayr	No	Yes
First Somaliland Rebellion	1899-1904	Britain	Diriye Guure	No	No
Second Anglo-Boer War	1899-1902	Britain	Afrikanner	No	Yes
War of the Golden Stool	1900	Britain	Ashanti	No	Yes
Bailundu Revolt	1902-1903	Portugal	Bailundu of Angola	No	Yes
Kano and Sokoto	1903	Britain	Sokoto caliphate	No	Yes
Herero and Nama Uprising	1903-1908	Germany	Herero and Nama	Yes	Yes

War	Dates	Colonial power	Indigenous adversary	Mass Killing	Civ. Vict.
Conquest of Ovambo	1904-1907	Portugal	Ovambo of Angola	No	Yes
Second Aceh War	1904-1907	Netherlands	Achenese	No	Yes
Younghusband Expedition	1904	Britain	Tibet	No	Yes
Maji-Maji Rebellion (Tanzania)	1905-1907	Germany	Maji Maji	Yes	Yes
Sokoto Uprising	1906	Britain	Mahdist rebels	No	Yes
Zulu / Bambatha Uprising	1906	Britain	Zulu	No	Yes
Second Dutch-Bali	1906-1908	Netherlands	Balianese	No	Yes
Dembos War (Angola)	1907-1910	Portugal	Demobs	No	Yes
Anti-Foreign Revolts (Morocco)	1907-1910	France	Sufi resistance leaders	No	Yes
Korean rebellion	1907-1910	Japan	Korean guerillas	No	Yes
Conquest of Wadai	1909-1911	France	Wadai sultanate (Chad)	No	Yes
Second Melilla War	1909-1910	Spain	Moroccan	No	Yes
First French-Moroccan	1911-1912	France	Fez Tribesmen	No	Yes
Italian-Senussi	1911 1912	Italy	Senussi tribesmen	No	Yes
Moro Rebellion (Philippines)	1913	USA	Moro	No	Yes
Second Somaliland Rebellion	1913-1920	Britain	Diriye Guure	No	No
Cacos revolt (Haiti)	1915-1934	USA	Cacos	No	Yes
Gavilleros revolt (DR)	1916-1924	USA	Gavilleros	No	Yes
Second Moroccan	1916-1917	France	Berber tribsman	No	Yes
Turkestan revolt	1916-1917	Russia	Turkestan rebels	Yes	Yes
North Caucasus Emirate	1918-1925	Soviet Union	Uzun Haji	No	Yes
Third Afghan	1919	Britain	Afghans	No	Yes
First British-Waziristan	1919-1920	Britain	Waziri Pashtuns	No	Yes
Syrian Resistance	1920	France	Syrians	No	No
Iraqi-British	1920-1921	Britain	Iraqi	No	Yes
Senussi (Libya)	1920-1931	Italy	Sanusi	Yes	Yes
Riffian/Rif War I (Morocco)	1921-1926	Spain	Rif tribes	No	Yes
Riffian/Rif War I (Morocco)	1921-1926	France	Rif tribes	No	Yes
Basmachi revolt	1921-1931	Soviet Union	Basmachi rebels	Yes	Yes
Moplah Rebellion	1921-1922	Britain	Mappilla rebels	No	No
Great Syrian Revolt	1925-1927	France	Syrian rebels	No	Yes
Sandino Rebellion (Nicragua)	1927-1933	USA	Sandino rebels	No	Yes
Kongo-Wara Rebellion	1928-1931	France	Gbaya people	No	Yes
Yen Bay Uprising	1930	France	Vietnamese nationalists	No	Yes
Nghe-Tinh Soviet Movement	1930-1931	France	Vietnamese communists	No	Yes
Saya San's Rebellion (Burma)	1930-1932	Britain	Galen Army	No	Yes
Arab Revolt	1936-1939	Britain	Arab rebels	No	Yes
Second British-Waziristan	1936-1938	Britain	Waziri Pashtuns	No	Yes
Chechen revolt	1940-1944	Soviet Union	Israilov/Sheripov	Yes	Yes
Hur uprising	1942-1943	Britain	Hur movement (Sind)	No	Yes
Quit India Movement	1942-1944	Britain	Indian nationalists	No	No
Indonesian Independence	1945-1946	Britain	Indonesian nationalists	No	Yes
Indonesian Independence	1945-1949	Netherlands	Indonesian nationalists	Yes	Yes
Indochinese War	1945-1954	France	Vietnamese nationalists	Yes	Yes
Shifta Insurgency (Eritrea)	1945-1952	Britain	Shifta	No	No
Zionist movement	1945-1948	Britain	Irgun and Lehi	No	No
Sétif uprising	1945	France	Algerian demonstrators	No	Yes
Malagasy Revolt(Madagascar)	1947-1948	France	Malagasy nationalists	Yes	Yes
Malaya Emergency	1950-1960	Britain	Communist rebels	No	Yes
Mau Mau Emergency	1952-1956	Britain	Mau Mau	No	Yes
Tunisian Independence	1952-1954	France	Tunisians (Habib Bourguiba)	No	Yes
Moroccan Independence	1953-1956	France	Moroccan	No	No
Algerian independence	1954-1962	France	Algerians	Yes	Yes
Cyprus Emergency	1954-1959	Britain	EOKA	No	No
Cameroon Insurgency	1955-1960	France	Nationalist rebels	Yes	Yes
Rwandan Independence	1956-1962	Belgium	Rwandan rebels	No	No
Angola-Portugal	196-1975	Portugal	Angola	Yes	Yes
Mozambique	1962-1975	Portugal	Frelimo	Yes	Yes
Guinea Bissau	1962-1974	Portugal	GB Rebels (PAIGC)	No	Yes
Aden Emergency	1963-1967	Britain	FLOSY, NLF	No	Yes
Dhofar insurgency	1963-1971	Britain	DLF, PFLOAG, NDFLOAG	No	Yes
Namibia war of independence	1966-1989	South Africa	SWAPO	No	Yes
Afghanistan	1980-1989	Soviet Union	Mujahedeen	Yes	Yes
First Intifada	1987-1993	Israel	Palestinian groups	No	Yes
Second Intifada	2000-2003	Israel	Palestinian groups	No	Yes

2 Appendix: Coding "Civilian Harm"

My main dependent variable of interest is "civilian harm." To facilitate comparisons with existing studies, especially those of Downes (2008), Morrow (2014), and Valentino (2004), I collected data around three groups of wartime practices:

- *Civilian victimization:* Downes defines civilian victimization as "a military strategy chosen by political or military elites that targets and kills noncombatants intentionally or which fails to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants and thus kills large numbers of the latter" (2008, 13). Downes considers civilian victimization to have occurred "when belligerents make widespread, repeated, and systematic use of any of the following tools: massacre, starvation, indiscriminate bombardment, or forced relocation" (2008, 19). In addition to these tools, colonial powers also employed tactics of village burning, in which the homes or dwellings of indigenous peoples were destroyed. Colonial powers also made use of collective punishments such as collective fines, trade embargoes, or curfews, which did not distinguish between combatants and civilians and often imposed significant pains and suffering on the latter. There is the risk that considering these tools stretches the concept of "civilian victimization" beyond what Downes intended. Yet in practice, most colonial powers that chose to target civilians did so in multiple ways, using the tools of collective punishments alongside starvation tactics and indiscriminate bombardment, for example. I code civilian victimization as "1" if colonial powers made use of any of these tools in a widespread, repeated, and systematic fashion and "0" otherwise.

- *Brutality:* I catalog the degree of brutality employed by the colonial state across four issue-areas: (1) its treatment of civilians, (2) its treatment of prisoners, (3) its use of "inhumane" weapons, and (4) its use of aerial bombardment. Following Morrow and Jo (2004), who undertake a similar coding exercise for interstate wars, I score the colonial state's methods on a four-point ordinal scale ranging from: (1) no brutality reported, (2) only minor cases of brutality, (3) major cases of brutality occur, but the state makes some attempt to minimize harm, and (4) major cases of brutality occur frequently and without constraint. For treatment of civilians, I record whether the colonial state engaged in the shelling of population centers, village burning, food control or destruction, collective punishments (e.g. fines, embargoes, curfews), forced resettlement (e.g. detention camps or model villages), indiscriminate massacres, systematic looting, and widespread sexual violence. For treatment of prisoners, I observe whether the colonial state employed mass arrests, summary executions, show trials, torture, deportation, forced labor, and the mutilation and display of dead bodies. For inhumane weapons, I note whether the colonial state used weapons that were considered inhumane by contemporaries, including chemical weapons, expanding "dum dum" bullets, and napalm and other defoliants. For aerial bombardment, I look for examples where the colonial state used fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft to directly target civilians, their homes, or their food supplies. I only code the aerial bombardment variable for colonial wars that took place after

1909, the date that the first military aircraft entered into service.

It is important to note, however, that my coding departs from Morrow and Jo in two important respects. First, they consider a wider range of wartime behavior than I do, including a state's adherence to armistices or flags of truce, a state's respect for cultural property, a state's conduct on the high seas, and a state's use of declarations of war (see Morrow 2014, 148-149). I do not consider all of these issue areas, because they either have no direct analog in colonial wars or were not relevant to most colonial conflicts. Second, Morrow and Jo code their dependent variable primarily in terms of "compliance" with existing treaties related to the laws of war. This term does not quite fit for colonial wars, however, because the laws of war were in their infancy in the period when many colonial wars were fought viz. the nineteenth century, and because colonial powers went to great lengths to exempt colonial conflicts from falling under international humanitarian law (see Koskenniemi 2001; Anghie 2004; Kinsella 2011; and Fazal and Greene 2014.) So my coding does not reflect "compliance" with existing treaties, but rather the magnitude and frequency of the brutality that colonial states engaged in on the battlefield.

- *Mass killing:* Valentino defines mass killing as "the intentional killing of a massive number of noncombatants" (2004, 10). He goes on to define a massive number of dead as "at least fifty thousand intentional deaths over the course of five or fewer years" (2004, 10-11). As Valentino acknowledges, there are downsides to this definition: it establishes a fairly arbitrary threshold of death for mass killing, it makes it more likely that larger populations will be the site of mass killing than smaller populations, and it can be difficult to establish accurate counts of the dead in complex wartime environments.

  This last point is particular relevant to colonial wars, given that colonial powers would often exaggerate the battlefield deaths they imposed on their adversaries, trumping up indecisive skirmishes into decisive victories, while simultaneously downplaying or ignoring the suffering of civilians (see Belich 1986). Imperial historians can compensate for these biases by using demographic data to generate estimates of "excess deaths" in a given conflict, but the quality of colonial record population records are varied, populations estimates can have large margins of error, and estimates of excess deaths do not necessarily reflect intentional policies of mass killing (see Blacker 2007). Yet rather than introduce an alternative definition or metric for mass killing, I follow Valentino and code a colonial war "1" when there is clear and consistent evidence of more than 50,000 noncombatant deaths and "0" otherwise.

When coding individual cases, I engaged in a four step process:

- *General histories:* I would first consult the relevant encyclopedias and general country histories to get a sense of the timing and sequence of a particular colonial war. In some cases, these sources would mention that atrocities or brutalities had taken place, but the details provided in general histories varied considerable: the 1857

sepoy rebellion is much more extensively covered than the 1825 Siege of Bharatpur, for example.

- *Specialized works:* I would then scour specialized works in the fields of imperial history and military history for further details on specific conflicts.

- *Primary documents:* to the extent they are accessible, I would also consult published primary sources, primarily memoirs of colonial officials and military commanders. I would also consult the relevant *Parliamentary Papers*, official military publications, regimental and unit histories, if available.

- *Subaltern sources:* perhaps of most importance, I would attempt to find sources that described the conflict from the colonized point of view. For older conflicts, this typically consisted of oral or pictographic accounts collected by anthropologists or other observers, sources which can be biased in their own way but can still be useful. For more recent conflicts, this can include memoirs, recorded interviews, or newspaper accounts that include quotes from participants. When these perspectives were not available, I endeavored to "read against the grain," as Guha suggests (1994), to identify potential silences or elisions in colonial sources.

2.1 Sample coding of 1906 Zulu Rebellion

To illustrate the standards I used when translating secondary and primary source material into variable scores, consider the case of the 1906 Zulu Rebellion, also known as the "Bambatha Uprising," "Natal Rebellion," "Poll Tax War," or *"impi yamakhanda"* (War of the Heads). My coding of this case was based on the following source base:

- *Secondary sources:* the 1906 Zulu rebellion is not as well covered as other colonial wars in southern Africa, whether the 1879 Zulu War or 1899 South African War. Most encyclopedias contain only brief entries related to the uprising with few details. Key specialized words on the rebellion include Marks (1970a, 1970b, 1986), Guy (2005, 2006), Thompson (2003, 2007, 2008, 2014, 2016), and Coghlan (2005). Useful studies of the political, economic, and social conditions in Natal and Zululand at the time of the rebellion include Lambert (1995), Carton (2000), Redding (2000, 2006), and Mahoney (2012).

- *Primary sources:* first hand accounts of the rebellion can be found in Bosman (1907), a captain in the Natal militia, and Stuart (1913), an intelligence officer in the Natal militia. These sources are rich with details but obviously biased in a pro-settler direction. Official correspondence related to the rebellion can be found in the *Parliamentary Papers*, "Native Disturbances in Natal," multiple volumes. References to the rebellion also appear in various letters included in the Smuts Papers, vol. XI, published by Cambridge University Press.

- *Subaltern sources:* unfortunately, few sources capture the rebellion from the Zulu perspective. James Stuart, a militia intelligence officer fluent in Zulu, did collect

oral testimonies from his sources in Zululand, some of which touch on events in and around the rebellion. These testimonies were collected in the *James Stuart Archive* series, published by KwaZulu-Natal Press, various dates. Various Zulu witnesses also testified during trial of King Dinuzulu, who was accused of backing the rebellion. But this testimony took place in context of colonial legal proceedings and thus is not entirely reliable.

Using this source base, I generated a short summary of the case and collected evidence regarding various battlefield practices.

- *Case narrative:* following Marks (1970a, 1970b), the Zulu rebellion unfolded in three distinct stages. The first phase began in February 1906, when various African chiefdoms in Natal refused to pay a newly imposed "poll tax" (head tax). The Natal government responded by declaring martial law and dispatched multiple militia columns to intimidate recalcitrant chiefdoms into compliance. The fighting during this phase was one-sided and largely involved colonial forces burning crops and kraals and confiscating cattle. The second phase of the rebellion began in April 1906, when Bambatha, a minor chief who had been deposed by the government, clashed with colonial police. He subsequently fled into Zululand, where he convinced vairous chiefs to rally to his cause. The fighting during this second phase was primarily guerrilla in character, with rebellious chiefs concealing themselves in the Nkandla forrest and harassing militia columns. This phase ended when Bambatha was killed in the "battle" of Mome Gorge in early June. The final phase of the rebellion began in late June 1906 when various chiefdoms in the Mapumulo division in Natal took up arms against the government. Fighting in this phase was also primarily guerrilla in character, involving government sweeps and rebel harassment, and came to an end in July when rebel forces were routed at the "battle" of Izinsimba.

- *Coding civilian victimization:* the evidence that British officials chose a strategy that targeted civilians is undeniable in this case. Colonial militia forces routinely burned villages, destroyed foodstuffs, and seized livestock as part of a deliberate strategy of starving rebellious chiefdoms into submission. These practices were widespread and systemic across all three phases of the rebellion. Marks characterizes the first phase of the rebellion in this way: "for nearly two months the troops had marched through locations, burning crops and kraals, confiscating cattle, deposing and imprisoning chiefs" (1970a, 200). Laband and Thompson describe the second phase in Nkandla as one in which colonial forces would "scour the countryside, burning the rebels' homes, seizing their livestock, and destroying their food stores" (2009, 70). Thompson estimates that in this phase of the rebellion alone: "the number of homesteads destroyed was 753...4,727 cattle and 3,087 sheep and goats were seized" (2007, 121). During the third phase in Maphumulo, Guy reports that militia forces "had no compunction in shooting, looting and burning homes, scattering noncombatants before them" (2005, 106). All told, the British burnt more than 7,000 huts and made 30,000 people homeless in Maphumulo in this phase (Guy 2006, 170.)

There is also no doubt that this was a deliberate strategy endorsed and embraced by British political and military elites. McKenzie, commander of militia forces during the rebellion, was clear on this point: "It is absolutely impossible to starve these people out by sitting quietly on the hills and allowing them to collect provisions everywhere at night, therefore it is absolutely necessary to operate against them and destroy all kraals and provisions" (Thompson 2007, 110). Stuart, in his semi-official history of the rebellion, echoed this account: "McKenzie realized the impossibility of starving the rebels out 'by sitting quietly on the hills and allowing them to collect provisions everywhere at night.' He considered it necessary to operate at once, and to begin by destroying all their kraals and supplies" (1913, 237). The *Times of Natal* dispensed with the euphemisms when it bluntly characterized the government's strategy as "'walloping the nigger'" (Marks 1970a, 189). Thus, I code this case "1" for civilian victimization.

- *Coding colonial brutality:* there is significant evidence of mistreatment of civilians in this case. As already noted, colonial militias routinely burned villages, destroyed food, and looted livestock. The cumulative impact of these strategies is that civilians were driven from their homes, into the bush, often with insufficient food. During the second phase of the rebellion around the Nkandla forrest, women and children would routinely emerge in search of shelter or food, and as Thompson reports, colonial militias would force them back into the bush (2007, 111). In the last phase of the rebellion in Maphumulo, Guy reports how colonial militias "moved up and down the Mvoti valley killing those who got in their path, and looting then burning homesteads" (2006, 159). He quotes an American missionary who described the "'burned and desolated district...the highways strewn with the unburied, putrefying carcases of the slain'" (2006, 162). Thus, I code this case as "4" for treatment of civilians, consistent with evidence of major cases of brutality that occurred frequently and without constraint.

  There is also significant evidence of the mistreatment of prisoners in this case. Collectively, the evidence suggests that British forces rarely took prisoners on the battlefield. At the "battle" of Mome Gorge, Coghlan reports rumors that "colonial forces offered amnesty to wounded warriors and others who had gone into hiding if they surrendered, only to kill them in cold blood when they complied. Several colonial participants in the 'debauch of blood' were reportedly sickened at the extent of the killing" (2005, 34). At the "battle" of Izinsimba Gorge, Guy describes how the colonial militia "got artillery and machine-guns into position before dawn and closed off the escape routes...the soldiers then entered the groge. They took no prisoners" (2006, 164). Marks narrates the story of a group of Africans who were found hiding, were brought into a militia camp, and then executed (1970a, 235). While colonial sources are silent on these questions, Stuart, in his semi-official history, goes out of his way to try to justify the lopsided numbers of Africans killed at Mome Gorge: "Two peoples are at war; one must defeat the other, and the best way is to do so in a thorough-going way. Nothing...is so effective and lesson-serving

as wholesale slaughter" (1913, 312). Rebels who were taken prisoner by colonial forces were often mistreated. In the first phase of the rebellion, twelve men were executed by firing squad after a hurried courts martial, having been convicted of instigating the anti-tax movement. By the end of the rebellion, some 4,700 prisoners were sentenced to be flogged, including some 700 severely (Marks 1970a, 239). The Zulu king Dinuzulu was also arrested, tried on trumped up charges of aiding and abetting the uprising, and deported to St. Helena, along with twenty-five other "ringleaders" of the rebellion (King 1997, 107). When Bambatha's body was discovered in Mome Gorge, the British severed his head and displayed it around militia camps. Thus, I code this case "4" for mistreatment of prisoners, consistent with evidence of major cases of brutality that occurred frequently and without constraint.

There is also persuasive evidence that the colonial forces used "inhumane" weapons to suppress the rebellion, in particular so-called "dum dum bullets." Marks reports that at the start of the rebellion the head of the Natal militia "immediate stepped up the order of Mark V [expanding] ammunition"; militia commanders cited its "greater stopping power when fighting 'members of savage races who it must be remembered are not creatures of nerves'" as a reason for the purchase (Marks 1970a, 185). Letters from militia members likewise confirm that dum dum bullets were used. One officer in the Natal Carbineers wrote that he was "'quite prepared to entertain 2,000 or 3,000 black skins to dum-dum bullets if they look for the sensation'" (Coghlan 2005, 38). Thus, I code this case "4" for the use of inhumane weapons, for widespread adoption of dum dum bullets, which were used frequently and without constraint.

- *Coding mass killing:* despite the indiscriminate and brutal nature of British battlefield practices in this case, there is no evidence that it rises to the level of mass killing. Colonial sources site multiple competing estimates of total deaths in the war: militia reports suggested around 2,300 Africans were killed in the rebellion, while reports from magistrates suggested around 1,400 Africans were killed (Stuart 1913, 406). Marks reports 24 whites killed during the rebellion compared to "some three to four thousand" Africans (1970a, 237). None of these estimates is close to Valentino's threshold of 50,000 deaths. Thus, I code this case "0" for mass killing.

3 Appendix: Coding the Independent Variables

My main explanatory variables relate to the strategic, normative, and institutional characteristics of individual colonial wars. I coded them using the following rubric:

- *Wartime strategy:* my first explanatory variable concerns the strategies indigenous adversaries employ in colonial wars. I began by separating colonial wars into three categories: (1) "conventional" colonial wars, or wars fought between relatively organized armies typically involving large set piece battles or sieges. Examples of conventional colonial wars include the 1845 Anglo-Sikh War, the 1863 Shimonoseki

campaign, the 1878 Russo-Turkoman War, and the 1887 Italian-Ethiopian War; (2) "guerrilla" colonial wars, or wars fought by relatively small bands of fighters who avoid large piece battles or sieges in favor of ambushes, surprise attacks, small skirmishes, harassment of supply lines, and related methods of evasion and harassment. Examples of guerrilla colonial wars include the 1895 Cuban war of Independence, the 1898 "Hut Tax" war in Sierra Leone, the 1913 Moro Rebellion in the Philippines, and the 1952 Mau Mau Emergency; and (3) "hybrid" colonial wars, or wars where the protagonists employ a mixture of conventional and guerrilla tactics in different regions or over the course of the conflict. Examples of hybrid wars include the 1877 Ngcayecibi War, the 1895 Portugese-Gaza War, and the 1919 Afghan War, all of which fixed a mix of sieges, set piece battles, and guerrilla action. To facilitate comparison with existing studies (notably Downes 2008), I used this coding to create a dichotomous variable that was coded "1" for guerrilla colonial wars and "0" for all other kinds of colonial wars.

- *Combatant identity:* my second explanatory variable concerns the racial identities of indigenous adversaries in colonial wars. Because race is a socially constructed concept whose meaning is constantly changing, coding this variable can be fraught (Freeman, Kim, and Lake 2022, 76-77; Freeman 2023, 29-30). Race can also take on multifaceted meanings in colonial settings. Officials in British Indian believed themselves to be superior to their colonial subjects, yet simultaneously drew distinctions distinctions between martial versus non-martial races, high caste versus low caste groups, and so on (Metcalf 1995). British military officers perceived their Afrikaner opponents in the South African War to be white, but also denigrated them as "backward" and "corrupt" (Miller 2013). To simplify matters, I follow theorists such as DuBois and Fanon and focus on the overriding importance of the "color line" in colonial settings (DuBois 1925; Fanon 2004; Fanon 2008). Yet even this can be difficult in certain cases. Although leaders of the 1863 Dominican Revolution were largely white or creole, because the peasant population that supported them consisted "mainly of blacks," the armed struggle soon took on characteristics of a "'racial war' against a white supremacist power that preserved slavery" (Torres-Saillant 1998, 131).

  There is no commonly accepted cross-national time-series dataset that codes racial perceptions. The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Ethnic Dimensions (ED) dataset, however, does code sub-national groups based on their "socially constructed racial markers," which they derive from the groups origin from one of seven world regions (Vogt et al. 2015, 1340). Freeman has used the EPR-ED data to construct a cross-national coding of white-majority countries in her study of U.S. status of forces agreements (Freeman 2023, 24.) The one downside of using the EPR-ED for my purposes is that its dataset only covers the period 1946-2007. Yet at the same time, the EPR-ED codings reflect the assumption that race became relevant "in the context of European colonization...and the related process of racial classification" (Vogt et al. 2015, 1340). I make the assumption that the racial codings found in

the EPR-ED dataset, therefore, are generally valid across the timeframe of my study.

Using the EPR-ED data on individual groups, I separate colonial wars into two categories: (1) "racialized" colonial wars, where colonial powers perceive their adversaries to be racial inferiors. More often than not, this involves white colonizers perceiving their adversaries as "non-white" and thus "backward," "inferior," or "savage" to varying degrees. Examples of clearly racialized colonial wars include the 1829 Supression of the Thuggee, the 1860 Maori War, and the 1876 Sioux War; and (2) "non-racialized" colonial wars, where colonial powers perceive their adversaries to be racial equals. This does not mean that colonial powers did not denigrate these adversaries in other ways in these wars, only that their assessments were not driven primarily by race. Examples of "non-racialized" colonial wars include the 1829 Spanish reconquest of Mexico, the 1880 Boer war, and the 1945 Zionist insurgency. I code combatant identity "1" for racialized colonial wars, and "0" for non-racialized colonial wars.

- *Settler colonies:* my third and fourth explanatory variables concern the structure of the colonial state. The first codes whether a colony is a settler colony. Despite the rich literature on settler colonialism, there is no commonly accepted definition of what constitutes a "settler colony." There are always a smattering individuals from the metropole present in colonial settings, whether soldiers, traders, explorers, or missionaries. What makes settler colonies unique is that these individuals settle in large numbers on a somewhat permanent basis, and thus can shape the political, economic, and social character of the colonial state. Scholars have also drawn distinctions between different varieties of settler colonialism, including "old world" settler colonies of Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Australia, where settlers outnumber indigenous peoples, and "twentieth century" settler colonies such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Mozambique, Algeria, and Korea where settlers remain minorities (Elkins and Pedersen 2005, 2-3).

  The most comprehensive data on settler influence comes from Easterly and Levine, who code the share of European population in a given colony during its formative years of colonization (2016, 235). Easterly and Levine's data only covers European settler movements, so I supplement it with other sources for non-European colonial powers such as Japan (see Hechter, Matesan, and Hale 2009; Uchida 2014). There is no agreed upon threshold of what settler population share is sufficient to qualify as a "settler colony," some studies have used 5 percent, others 2.5 percent (compare Paine 2019a, 214; Paine 2019b, 16). I opt for a more capacious standard of at least a 0.5 percent settler share of the population during the formative years of colonization, given there are cases such as Zimbabwe where relatively small initial settler populations nevertheless come to exercise disproportionate political and economic influence. I then separate colonial wars into two categories: (1) "settler" colonial wars, where colonial powers do the majority of the fighting in colonies where settlers are present; and (2) "nonsettler" colonial wars, where colonial powers do the major-

ity of fighting in colonies where settlers are absent. Examples of colonial wars fought in settler colonies include the 1856 Kabylia uprising in Algeria, the 1893 Matabele War in Rhodesia, and the 1966 Namibian War of Independence.

- *Indirect rule colonies:* my second variable relates to the structure of the colonial state codes whether the remaining non-settler colonies are governed by indirect rule. Despite a vast literature on different forms of colonial rule, we do not have clear consistent cross-colonial measures of indirect versus direct rule. Scholars have used various indicators—such as the proportion of court cases handled by native courts, the relative density of colonial road networks, or the survival rate of pre-colonial political dynasties—as proxies for state capacity and governance style, yet these indicators are not available for all empires, colonies, or time periods (Lange 2009, 47-49; Herbst 2000, 84-87; Müller-Crepon 2020, 717-718.) Further complicating matters is the fact that different regions within a colony can have different forms of rule. British India featured a mix of direct and indirect rule, depending on whether a territory was ruled by a native prince or used a particular system of revenue collection, although scholars disagree how best to capture these differences (Iyer 2010; Verghese 2016; Mukherjee 2021). The consensus of this literature is that the distinction between direct and indirect rule is an oversimplification (Naseemullah and Staniland 2014; Wilkinson 2017). It is more more accurate to talk about varieties of indirect rule or gradations in the extent to which the colonial state relies on pre-colonial institutions.

  Acknowledging the risk of oversimplification, I consider indirect rule colonies to be those where colonial officials are heavily dependent on indigenous institutions or intermediaries. For British colonies, I draw on Lange's data and consider colonies where more than half of court cases are handled by customary courts to constitute indirect rule (Lange 2009, 48). Thus, colonial wars fought in Ghana, Nigeria, and Sudan are coded to have taken place in indirect rule colonies; while those fought in Myanmar (Burma) and Malaysia (Malaya) are coded to have take place in direct rule colonies. For colonial wars fought in British India, I determined whether fighting took primarily in areas ruled directly by British administrators or indirectly through Indian rules. Thus, the 1815 Kandhian Rebellion and the 1857 Sepoy Rebellion are coded as having taken place in direct rule colonies, while the 1897 Northwest Frontier Campaign, which took place across the administrative boundary in the so-called "tribal territories," is coded as having taken place in an indirect rule colony. For non-British colonies, I relied on administrative histories of individual colonies to assess the extent to which colonial civil servants were reliant on indigenous institutions or intermediaries. Given the comparative intensity of French colonial administration in Indochina compared with West Africa (Jerez 2020; Cogneau, Dupraz, and Mesplé-Somps 2021), for example, colonial wars in the former, such as the 1885 Can Vuong War, are coded as having taken place in direct rule colonies, while those in the latter, such as the 1885 and 1894 wars against Samory Touré in the western Sudan, are coded as having taken place in indirect rule colonies.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Colonial Wars Dataset

	Mean	**Std. Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**	***N***
Civilian victimization	0.756	0.43	0	1	193
Wartime strategy	0.466	0.5	0	1	193
Combatant identity	0.891	0.312	0	1	193
Settler colonialism	0.415	0.494	0	1	193
Indirect rule colonialism	0.420	0.494	0	1	193
War aims	0.497	0.501	0	1	193
International law	0.605	0.412	0	1	193
Regime type	0.472	0.5	0	1	193
Military professionalism	5.163	1.718	2.242	10.92	191
State capabilities	0.125	0.097	0.002	0.337	193
War duration	2.754	0.642	0	4.05	193

In addition to these explanatory variables, I consider six control variables. I derived these variables from the existing literature on wartime civilian harm (Valentino 2004. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004. Valentino, Huth and Croco 2006; Morrow 2007; Downes 2006; Downes 2008. Morrow 2014. Fazal 2018).

- *War aims:* various scholars argue that states that have more ambitious war ams, such as "complete territorial conquest or regime change," are more likely to target civilians (Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006, 355). War aims in colonial wars are harder to classify as either limited or ambitious, in part because all colonial wars are wars of territorial conquest to one degree or another. Instead, I focus on the distinction between offensive colonial wars designed to conquer new territories and reactive defensive wars fought to suppress anti-colonial insurrections, expecting the former to be harder on civilians than the latter (Betz 2012, 136). The resulting variable is coded "1" for campaigns of colonial conquest and "0" for campaigns of colonial pacification. Examples of "offensive" colonial wars include the 1897 Benin Campaign, the 1911 Italian-Senussi War, and the 1980 Soviet War in Afghanistan. Examples of "defensive" colonial wars include the 1894 Red Shawls Revolt, the 1913 Moro Rebellion, and the 1950 Malaya Emergency.

- *International law:* many contend that states that sign on to international legal covenants related to the laws of war will be less likely to harm civilians in wartime (Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006; Morrow 2014; Fazal 2018). I code a state's international legal commitments as the percentage of the currently operative treaties on the laws of war that a state has signed and ratified in a given year. These treaties include the Declaration of Paris (1856), Geneva Convention (1864), Convention of St. Petersburg (1868), the three conventions and three declarations of the first Hague Conference (1899), the fourteen conventions of the second Hague Conference (1907), the Geneva Protocol (1925), the two protocols of the Geneva Convention (1929), the four protocols of the Geneva Convention (1949), and the two additional protocols of the Geneva conventions (1979). Data for signatures and ratification

comes from the International Committee of the Red Cross website.[1] An example of a state with significant international legal commitments would be Belgium, which fought 1956 War of Rwandan Independence having ratified 92 percent of the operative IHL treaties; an example of a state with minimal commitments would be Spain, who fought the 1893 Melilla Campaign having ratified only 33 percent of operative IHL treaties.

- *Regime type:* democratic values of "tolerance, nonviolence, and respect for legal constraints" are likewise assumed to constrain democratic states from targeting civilians (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Downes 2008). I code a state as democratic if was a consolidated democracy, which is defined as scoring 7 or higher on the Polity IV index. Democratic incumbents include Britain in the 1896 Sudanese Campaign and France in the 1909 Conquest of Wadai; non-democratic incumbents include Italy in the 1893 Mahdist War and Portugal in the 1962 Mozambique national liberation war.

- *Military professionalism:* a number of scholars have focused on how certain organizational cultures or institutional practices within military organizations can encourage civilian harm (Hull 2005; Hoover Green 2018; Manekin 2020.) To capture these dynamics, I include a variable that measures a state's military professionalism, expecting professional militaries to be better able to control units on the battlefield and prevent indiscriminate violence. Following Toronto, I use a state's military expenditure per soldier as a proxy for the degree of military professionalism (2017, 859). An example of a state with relatively low military professionalism is Russia in the 1872 Khiva campaign (3.4); one with relatively high military professionalism is Britain in the 1963 Aden emergency (9.4).

- *State capabilities:* previous studies argue that states that possess abundant military power should have a greater capacity to target civilians (Downes 2006, 171-172). I code state capabilities using the COW composite index of national capabilities, which reports a state's share of the total military capabilities in the international system in a given year. Example of a state with relatively few capabilities is the Netherlands in the 1906 Bali campaign (0.7% share); one with relatively abundant capabilities is Britain in the 1816 Bombardment of Algiers (33.7% share).

- *War duration:* longer conflicts can generate more opportunities and incentives for states to target civilians. I code the duration of a conflict as the natural log of the number of days between the outbreak and end of hostilities. The shortest colonial war in the dataset is the 1843 Gwalior Campaign, which lasted a single day; the longest colonial war in the dataset is the 1873 Conquest of Aceh, which lasted more than thirty-one years.

A summary of both the core explanatory and control variables can be found in Table 2. None of these control variables are strongly correlated with one another, with the

[1] See https://ihl-databases.icrc.org.

exception of military professionalism and regime type, which are moderately positively correlated (r=0.49).

4 Appendix: Additional Discussion of Main Models

I report a truncated version of my primary findings in Table 2 in the original paper (see p. 28). The full regression tables, including the coefficients for the control variables, are reported in Table 3. Model 14 includes only my core explanatory variables. Model 15 adds the control variables. Model 16 includes the controls plus colonial power fixed effects. Model 17 includes the controls plus region fixed effects. Model 18 considers the controls and both colonial power and region fixed effects.

The results for the three core explanatory variables are discussed at length in the original paper (see pp. 27-36). Three core findings stand out. First, the coefficients for wartime strategy are positive and statistically significant at the $p<0.01$ level across all five models, providing strong support for Hypothesis 1. Second, the coefficients for combatant identity are positive and statistically significant at the $p<0.05$ level across four of the five models, providing mixed but positive support for Hypothesis 2. The only model where the combatant identity variable does not achieve statistical significance at conventional levels is Model 1, which is the basic model that does not include the control variables. My suspicion is that this is due to the fact that the association between combatant identity and civilian victimization is sensitive to the inclusion of the control for a state's war aims. In particular, colonial powers targeted civilians of racially similar groups in 33 percent of wars of colonial annexation, compared to 89 percent of wars of colonial rebellion. Colonial powers appear less likely to fight white groups in annexationist colonial wars, and less likely to abuse white civilians when they do so. Third, the coefficients for both settler and indirect rule colonies are positive and statistically significant at the $p<0.01$ and $p<0.05$ levels respectively across all five models, providing consistent support for Hypothesis 3.

Turning to the results for the control variables, the only coefficient that consistently achieves some level of statistical significance at conventional levels is the one for a colonial power's war aims. Colonial powers appear more likely to target civilians in colonial rebellions than they are in annexationist wars. This finding contradicts Downes finding that "wars of annexation" tend to be harder on civilians (Downes 2008, 50-51), although there are persuasive reasons to assume that role of war aims is much different in colonial settings. First, states often view anti-colonial rebellions as existential threats, because they worry that unrest in one colonial dependency might spillover to another (Nexon and Wright 2007, 261-263). Second, rebellions can take colonial powers by surprise and encourage them to use extreme violence to compensate for a lack of resources, to cover for intelligence failures, or to restore their prestige (Butt 2019, 263). Third, colonial wars are subject to selection effects. While colonial powers could select themselves into relatively favorable wars of conquest in the nineteenth century, they had less political flexibility to respond to colonial rebellions in the twentieth century (MacDonald 2013, 268-270).

Table 3: Correlates of Civilian Victimization in Colonial Wars (Full Results)

	Model 9	**Model 10**	**Model 11**	**Model 12**	**Model 13**
Wartime strategy	2.231***	2.055***	2.149**	1.969**	2.045**
	(0.50)	(0.51)	(0.71)	(0.67)	(0.73)
Combatant identity	1.079	1.997*	2.508**	2.358*	3.530*
	(0.84)	(0.82)	(0.96)	(0.99)	(1.38)
Settler colonies	2.961***	2.941***	3.172***	2.812***	3.241**
	(0.67)	(0.70)	(0.83)	(0.76)	(1.00)
indirect rule colonies	1.414**	1.575**	1.582**	1.562*	1.540*
	(0.51)	(0.53)	(0.61)	(0.62)	(0.70)
War Aims	.	-1.207*	-1.078+	-1.112+	-0.950
	.	(0.54)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.59)
International Law	.	0.210	0.533	0.330	0.535
	.	(0.52)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.59)
Regime Type	.	0.094	0.070	0.114	0.106
	.	(0.41)	(0.81)	(0.53)	(0.90)
Military Professionalism	.	-0.297+	-0.209	-0.250	-0.151
	.	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.22)
State Capabilities	.	-3.550+	-0.426	-3.297	-0.150
	.	(1.99)	(5.60)	(2.28)	(5.79)
War Length	.	0.253	0.251	0.137	0.183
	.	(0.38)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Constant	-2.152	-1.111	.	.	.
	(0.95)	(1.35)	.	.	.
Control variables included	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Colonial power fixed effects included	no	no	yes	no	yes
Region fixed effects included	no	no	no	yes	yes
Pseudo R^2	0.2529	0.2973	0.2704	0.2764	0.2852
Number of observations	193	191	176	188	176

Notes: $^{\dagger}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Forced into a binary choice of either "fight or flight," colonial powers that chose to crack down on nationalist movements often did so using harsh methods (Thomas 2014, 1-10). A deeper comparison of the battlefield dynamics and political calculations between wars of colonial annexation and rebellion is a fruitful topic for future research.

In terms of substantive significance, the original paper calculated the predicted probabilities of civilian victimization for each of the primary explanatory variables using the results of Model 2, holding dichotomous variables at their modal values and continuous variables at the mean values. These results were presented in Figure 2 in the original paper (see p.29).

- For wartime strategy, this meant comparing the predicted probability of civilian victimization during a colonial war fought using either conventional or guerrilla methods against an adversary of a different race, in an indirect rule colony, in a war of annexation, by a non-democratic colonial power. The predicted probability that a colonial power fitting this description would target civilians was 79 percent

Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Cumulative Shifts in Core Explanatory Variables



Note: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

for conventional wars (63 percent to 95 percent 95% CI) compared to 97 percent for guerrilla wars (92 percent to 100 percent 95% CI).

- For combatant identity, this meant comparing the predicted probability of civilian victimization during a colonial war fought against either a racialized or non-racialized opponent in an indirect rule colony, in a war of annexation, by a non-democratic colonial power, in a war fought along conventional lines. The predicted probability that a colonial power under these circumstances would target civilians was 33 percent in the case of non-racialized adversaries (30 percent to 69 percent 95% CI) compared to 79 percent in the case of racialized adversaries (63 percent to 95 percent 95% CI).

- For colonial institutions, this meant comparing the predicted probability of civilian victimization during a colonial war fought either in a settler colony or an indirect rule colony against an adversary of a different race, in a war of annexation, by a non-democratic colonial power, in a war fought along conventional lines. The predicted probability that a colonial power under these circumstances would target civilians was 81 percent for settler colonies (63 percent to 99 percent 95% CI) compared to 19 percent for non-settler colonies (13 percent to 36 percent 95% CI), and 53 percent for indirect rule colonies (31 percent to 74 percent 95% CI) compared to 19 percent for non-indirect rule colonies (1 percent to 36 percent 95% CI).

It is worth noting that the reported confidence intervals for these marginal effects are quite

large, in part because the number of cases in the dataset is relatively small and in part because for certain core explanatory variables the data skews heavily in favor of a particular value (the vast majority of colonial wars, for example, are fought against racialized adversaries). The cumulative impact of the primary explanatory variables together, however, suggests that particular colonial wars are indeed primed for civilian harm. Figure 1, for example, compares two colonial wars. The case on the left refers to a colonial power that is fighting against a racialized adversary, who uses guerrilla methods, in a settler colony. The case on the right refers to a colonial power that is fighting a non-racialized adversary, who is fighting on conventional lines, in a direct rule colony. In the former case, predicted probability of civilian victimization is 97 percent (93 percent to 100 percent 95% CI). In the latter, it is 45 percent (8 percent to 82 percent 95% CI).

5 Appendix: Robustness Checks

In addition to the main models, I also conducted a series of sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of the results. These included:

- *Alternative codings:* it is also possible that the particular way that I coded key independent variables might be driving the results. To explore whether this is the case, I considered a variety of alternative ways of operationalizing key variables:
  - **Wartime strategy:** in the original analysis, I used a dichotomous measure of wartime strategy that separated colonial wars into guerrilla and non-guerrilla types. As an alternative, I separated colonial wars into three categories: "guerrilla wars", "conventional wars", and "hybrid wars". I then reran the models with dummy variables for the first two kinds of warfare, which leaves hybrid wars as the excluded baseline. Table 4, Model 14 reports these results. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the coefficients for both the conventional and guerrilla colonial war variables are significant and pointing in the predicted directions. Guerrilla colonial wars are associated with 12 percentage point increase, while conventional wars are associated with 37 percentage point decrease, in the predicted probability of civilian victimization relative to hybrid conflicts, holding all other variables at their means. Consistent with Hypotheses 2-3, the coefficients for combatant identity and the structure of the colonial state remain significant and in the predicted directions.
  - **Military professionalism:** in the original analysis, I followed Toronto and used a state's military expenditure per soldier as a proxy for military professionalism. I considered two alternative ways of operationalizing this variable. First, I used Toronto's measure of the number of national military academies in a given state (2017, 860), on the assumption that states with a more robust system of professional military education will be more professional. Second, I used Asal, Conrad, and Toronto's measure of whether a state had a volunteer or conscription military (2017, 1465), on the assumption that states with

Table 4: Robustness Checks: Alternative Codings

	Model 14	**Model 15**	**Model 16**	**Model 17**	**Model 18**
Wartime strategy	.	1.723***	1.686***	2.056***	2.035***
	.	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.52)
Conventional wars	-1.726**	.	.	.	.
	(0.60)		.	.	.
Guerrilla wars	1.515**	.	.	.	.
	(0.57)	.	.	.	.
Combatant identity	1.906*	2.094*	1.792*	2.005*	1.948*
	(0.76)	(0.92)	(0.89)	(0.82)	(0.85)
Settler colonies	2.734***	3.023***	3.031***	2.915***	2.887***
	(0.73)	(0.70)	(0.71)	(0.72)	(0.70)
Indirect rule colonies	1.344*	1.357**	1.482**	1.570**	1.536**
	(0.58)	(0.52)	(0.55)	(0.53)	(0.55)
War aims	-0.659	-0.988^{+}	-1.016^{+}	-1.212*	-1.119*
	(0.60)	(0.51)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.53)
International law	0.253	0.433	0.147	0.266	.
	(0.58)	(0.54)	(0.80)	(0.52)	.
Regime type	-0.185	0.085	-0.220	.	0.123
	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.47)	.	(0.40)
Military professionalism	-0.241	.	.	-0.269^{+}	-0.346^{+}
	(0.17)	.	.	(0.16)	(0.20)
State capabilities	-2.731	-2.782	-3.313	-3.564^{+}	-3.571^{+}
	(2.13)	(2.05)	(2.06)	(1.96)	(2.01)
War duration	-0.080	0.212	0.204	0.248	0.276
	(0.42)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.38)
Military education	.	-0.344	.	.	.
	.	(0.25)		.	.
Conscription	.	.	0.044	.	.
	.	.	(1.01)	.	.
Liberal democracy (v-dem)	.	.	.	-0.315	.
	.	.	.	(1.59)	.
International law (dichotomous)	.	.	.	.	0.305
	.	.	.	.	(0.61)
Constant	0.175	-1.790	-2.138	-1.115	-0.848
	(1.43)	(1.20)	(1.24)	(1.42)	(1.40)
Pesudo R^2	0.3453	0.2964	0.2878	0.2973	0.2975
Number of observations	191	193	193	191	191

Notes: $^{\dagger}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

volunteer militaries will be more professional than those that rely on the use or threat of force to induct individuals into their militaries. Table 4, Models 15 and 16 report the results of including these alternative measures. The core findings remain unchanged, and neither of the coefficients for the military education or conscription variables are significant.

– **Democracy:** in the original analysis, I used a dichotomous measure for the colonial power's regime type based on the Polity IV index. As an alternative, I used the Varieties of Democracy's "liberal democracy index", which codes states on an interval from 0 to 1 based on the "extent to which liberal democ-

racy [is] achieved" (Coppedge et al. 2021, 44). Table 4, Model 17 reports the results when this alternative measure of democracy is used. The core findings remain unchanged, and the coefficient for the alternative measure of democracy is not significant at conventional levels.

  - **International law:** in the original analysis, I used continuous measure for a state's international legal obligations based on the percentage of operative treaties relative to the laws of war it had signed and ratified in a given country year. As an alternative, I followed Valentino, Huth, and Croco (2006, 360-361) and generated a dichotomous variable recording whether a state had ratified Convention II of the 1899 Hague Conference from 1899 to 1906, Convention IV of the 1907 Hague Conference from 1907 to 1948, and the Fourth Geneva Convention from 1948 to 2003. Table 4, Model 18 reports the results when this alternative measure of international law is used. The core findings remain the same, and the coefficient for the alternative measure of international law is not significant at conventional levels.

- *Biases in the sample:* it is possible that there are certain biases in the sample of colonial wars that might also be driving the results. I consider three in particular:

  - **British incumbency:** cases of colonial war involving Britain as the incumbent colonial power are overrepresented in the sample. Of the 193 cases of colonial wars, Britain was the incumbent in 76 cases (39 percent). It might be that there is a distinct "British way of colonial warfare" that could be shaping aggregate patterns of civilian victimization (see Beckett 2007; French 2011). When I added a dummy variable for British incumbents (see Table 5, Model 19), however, the core findings remain unchanged.
  - **Overseas empires:** the original dataset mixes together colonial wars fought in overseas "saltwater" empires by incumbents such as Britain, Portugal and France, with those fought in contiguous "land" empires by incumbents such as the United States, Australia, and Russia. Yet scholars have posited that the character of overseas empires are distinctive (Abernathy 2000, 6-12. Moytl 2001, 13-14. Burbank and Cooper 2010, 18-19). When I added a dummy variable for colonial wars fought "overseas" in non-contiguous territories (see Table 5, Model 20), however, the core findings remain unchanged.
  - **Distance:** along the same lines, it might be the case that empires that fight further from home are more likely to target civilians than those who are operating closer to home in more familiar environments. To explore this possibility, I coded a variable that measured the natural log of the distance (in kilometers) from the metropole's capital city to the location where the first incidents of large scale violence broke out in a particular colonial war. When I added the control for distance (see Table 5 Model 21), however, the core findings remain unchanged. Moreover, interaction terms between distance and the wartime

Table 5: Robustness Checks: Sample Issues

	Model 19	**Model 20**	**Model 21**
Wartime strategy	2.023***	2.159***	2.016***
	(0.51)	(0.55)	(0.51)
Combatant identity	1.925*	2.148*	1.987*
	(0.81)	(0.85)	(0.83)
Settler colonies	2.893***	3.306***	2.885***
	(0.71)	(0.86)	(0.71)
Indirect rule colonies	1.577**	1.617**	1.538**
	(0.53)	(0.55)	(0.55)
War aims	-1.251*	-1.186*	-1.231*
	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.54)
International law	0.267	0.201	0.235
	(0.54)	(0.51)	(0.53)
Regime type	0.163	-0.002	0.090
	(0.38)	(0.43)	(0.41)
Military professionalism	-0.274	-0.267	-0.302$^+$
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)
State capabilities	-2.097	-3.757$^+$	-3.445$^+$
	(2.53)	(2.03)	(2.02)
War duration	0.222	0.276	0.273
	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.37)
U.K. dummy variable	-0.373	.	.
	(0.55)	.	.
Overseas dummy variable	.	0.953	.
	.	(0.97)	.
Distance	.	.	-0.100
	.	.	(0.35)
Constant	-1.113	-2.392	-0.235
	(1.34)	(2.17)	(3.54)
Pesudo R^2	0.2989	0.3026	0.2977
Number of observations	191	191	191

Notes: $^\dagger p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

strategy and combatant identity variables did not achieve statistical significance.

- *Alternative modeling choices*: it is possible that my results are driven by the inclusion of different explanatory or control variables. To explore whether the particular choice of controls is driving the results, I considered a variety of alternative models:

  – **Models with individual explanatory variables:** it is possible that the inclusion of all three sets of explanatory variables together might be driving the results. To explore this possibility, I considered individual models for each of my main sets of explanatory variables alongside with the full slate of control variables. Table 6 reports these results. The coefficients for both wartime strategy (Model 22) and setter and indirect rule colonies (Model 24) achieve statistical significance when considered in isolation. The coefficient for combat-

Table 6: Robustness Checks: Alternative Modeling Choices

	Model 22	**Model 23**	**Model 24**	**Model 25**	**Model 26**
Wartime strategy	1.935***	.	.	1.646**	1.676**
	(0.46)	.	.	(0.52)	(0.51)
Combatant identity	.	0.965	.	1.791*	1.818*
		(0.69)	.	(0.87)	(0.87)
Settler colonies	.	.	2.468***	3.037***	3.017***
	.	.	(0.57)	(0.71)	(0.71)
Indirect rule colonies	.	.	1.291*	1.476**	1.489**
	.	.	(0.53)	(0.55)	(0.54)
War aims	-0.568	-1.255**	-1.320**	-0.969$^+$	-0.982$^+$
	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.51)	(0.50)
International Law	0.116	-0.120	0.126	.	.
	(0.43)	(0.38)	(0.48)	.	.
Regime type	0.038	0.037	0.124	.	-0.168
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.38)	.	(0.39)
Military professionalism	-0.314*	-0.145	-0.037	.	.
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	.	.
State capabilities	-5.206**	-6.558***	-3.160$^+$	-3.385$^+$	-3.541$^+$
	(1.91)	(1.89)	(1.89)	(1.93)	(1.97)
War duration	0.256	0.588$^+$	0.549	0.210	0.225
	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Constant	2.362	1.116	-0.432	-2.137	-2.100
	(0.99)	(1.01)	(1.20)	(1.27)	(1.26)
Pseudo R^2	0.1861	0.1378	0.2170	0.2866	0.2873
Number of observations	191	191	191	193	193

Notes: $^\dagger p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

ant identity, however, does not achieve statistical significance when considered in isolation (Model 23). There are a number of potential explanations for this result. The first is that the combatant identity variable is more sensitive to modeling choices, as noted above in relation to the inclusion of the control for war aims, due to the relative few cases of non-racialized colonial wars. The second is that the inclusion of the colonial institutions variables might be controlling for an important feature of non-racialized colonial wars. In particular, the vast majority of conflicts involving non-racialized opponents (82 percent) take place in settler colonies. Colonial powers are also more prone to target civilians when dealing with non-racialized opponents in settler colonies (88 percent) versus other institutional settings (50 percent). It is possible that the association of combatant identity with civilian harm depends it part on the institutional setting in which it takes place.

– **Models with smaller groups of controls:** it is also possible that the inclusion of different sets of control variables might produce different results. To explore this possibility, I considered a simplified model that included only strategic variables (war aims, state capabilities, and war duration). I also considered a simplified model that included these strategic variables and regime type, a model that most closely resembles the main models described in Downes

(2008) and Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004). The coefficients for wartime strategy, combatant identity, and colonial institutions remained statistically significant across both the basic strategic model (Model 25) and the basic strategic model plus regime type (Model 26). This suggests that the results in the main models are not being driven by multicolinearity between some of the covariates that are highly correlated with one another, such as regime type and military professionalism.

6 Appendix: Temporal Robustness Checks

I also consider whether patterns of civilian victimization in colonial wars are shaped by temporal changes in the character of warfare and/or the nature of colonial rule. For example, Lyall and Wilson argue that the character of insurgency warfare shifted around 1917 as militaries shifted from "foraging" to more "mechanized" armies (2009). In a similar vein, MacDonald argues that colonial warfare underwent a shift in the early twentieth century as the material and normative structure of the international system became more hostile to colonial rule (2013). Scholars have likewise debated when colonial empires began to "decline" in the twentieth century, with some citing the traumas of the First World War and others citing the importance of norms of "self-determination" following the Second World War (compare Philpott 2001; Crawford 2002; Spruyt 2005). When I add temporal dummy variables for the post-1917 and post-1945 periods, however, the findings are unchanged. See Models 6 and 7 in Table 3 in the original paper (p. 37).

It remains possible, however, that the magnitude of the correlates of civilian victimization in colonial wars shifts over time. To explore this possibility, I added a series of interaction terms into the model for each of the temporal dummy variables and each of the covariates:

- *Post-1945 interaction terms*: I ran a series of models interacting the post-1945 dummy variable with the variables for military strategy, combatant identity, the presence of settlers, indirect rule, war aims, international law, regime type, military professionalism, and state capabilities. *None* of these interaction terms achieved statistical significance, which suggests that the correlates of civilian victimization are the same in the pre-1945 and post-1945 periods. This result is surprising, given how many authors cite the Second World War as the pivotal turning point in the history of colonial rule (Philpott 2001; Spruyt 2005; Lawrence 2013). There are a number of explanations for these results. One is empirical: while the traumas of the Second World War upended the economic and political foundations of empire, they may have had less of a direct impact on the battlefield behaviors and practices of the imperial powers. In his survey of the development of counterinsurgency warfare, for example, Marshall observes that "there is little that is truly 'new' in COIN doctrine after 1900" (2010, 249), which suggest some degree of continuity in how colonial wars were fought. Wagner likewise argues that while "the language changed over

Table 7: Robustness Checks: Temporal Controls and Interactions Terms

	Model 27	**Model 28**	**Model 29**
Wartime strategy	3.370***	1.986***	2.211***
	(1.01)	(0.58)	(0.59)
Combatant identity	1.870*	2.165**	1.813*
	(0.79)	(0.75)	(0.82)
Settler colonies	3.027***	2.916***	3.001***
	(0.72)	(0.72)	(0.71)
Indirect rule colonies	1.552**	1.275*	1.306*
	(0.54)	(0.56)	(0.56)
War aims	-1.151*	-1823**	-1.214*
	(0.56)	(0.69)	(0.59)
International law	0.174	0.255	0.023
	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.54)
Democracy	-0.131	-0.096	-0.469
	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.48)
Military professionalism	0.223	0.254	0.907+
	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.47)
State capabilities	-4.980*	-5.713**	-6.083**
	(2.20)	(2.19)	(2.28)
War duration	0.153	0.274	0.288
	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.39)
Strategy * Post-1917	-3.078*	.	.
	(1.39)	.	.
War aims * Post-1917	.	2.80*	.
	.	(1.34)	.
Mil. Prof. * Post-1917	.	.	-1.397*
	.	.	(3.70)
Constant	-2.746+	-2.572	-5.264*
	(1.59)	(1.75)	(2.14)
Pesudo R^2	0.3275	0.3236	0.3237
Number of observations	191	191	191

Notes: $^{\dagger}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

time, as Callwell's 'small wars' became Gwynn's 'imperial policing', followed after the Second World War by 'counterinsurgency'...the principle remained largely the same and the rule of colonial difference never lost its purchase" (Wagner 2018, 230).

Yet there are also methodological explanations for the lack of a clear finding. To begin with, there are relatively few cases of colonial war in the post-1945 period, and thus models with the temporal interaction terms may have not had enough power to identify statistically significant variations across the two periods. Moreover, it might be that the more important shifts in practices of colonial warfare took place earlier, after the First World War. Indeed, many authors, including Jeffrey (1984), Ferris (1989), Mockaitis (1990), Moreman (1996), and others stress the interwar period as the key turning point in the refinement of doctrines and practices of colonial warfare. It was also during this period that colonial powers such as Britain began to experiment with new techniques, such as the use of airpower and doctrines of

"air control", as ways to manage imperial conflicts on the cheap (Omissi 1991).

- *Post-1917 interaction terms*: to explore this alternative, I ran a series of models interacting the post-1917 dummy variable with the variables for military strategy, combatant identity, the presence of settlers, indirect rule, war aims, international law, regime type, military professionalism, and state capabilities. Six of these interaction terms did not achieve statistical significance, which again suggest a surprising degree of continuity in the correlates of civilian victimization from the pre-1917 to the post-1917 period. Once again, it is possible that this continuity is due to the fact that the technologies and tactics associated with "small wars" evolved much more slowly than in other domains of warfare (Rid 2010). It is also possible that interwar colonial powers went to great lengths to shield colonial wars from parallel developments in interstate warfare, arguing, for example, that the evolving norms related to the "laws of war" simply did not apply to colonial battlefields (Kinsella 2011). Colonial powers likewise sought to exploit their privileged positions within international institutions, such as the League of Nations, to argue that the maintenance of large colonial empires was perfectly compatible with evolving norms around human rights and racial equality (Lake and Reynolds 2008; Pedersen 2015). Whether because of the inherent features of colonial battlefields or because of active measures taken by colonial powers, the dynamics of colonial wars may have been much more durable and consistent over time.

  This overall picture of continuity is complicated, however, by the fact that *three* of the remaining interaction terms did achieve statistical significance, including one of my primary explanatory variables (military strategy), as well as two control variables (war aims and military professionalism). I report the results of temporal interaction terms in Table 7, Models 27 to 29. Interaction terms can be difficult to interpret, so I plot the predicted probability of civilian victimization in colonial wars for each of the statistically significant interactions in Figure 2, and consider each in turn:

  - **Guerrilla war interaction term**: while the association between guerrilla wars and civilian victimization is positive and significant for both periods, the magnitude of the relationship declines (see Figure 2a): the predicted probability of civilian victimization was 12 percentage points higher for guerrilla wars during the nineteenth century (increasing from 85 percent [71 to 99 95% CI] to 97 percent [93 to 100 95% CI]), compared to just 5 percentage points higher for guerrilla wars during the twentieth century (increasing from 77 percent [39 to 100 95% CI] to 82 percent [53 to 100 95% CI]), holding dichotomous variables at their modal values and continuous variables at their means. There are two potential explanations for this decrease. The first is that guerrilla tactics became the predominant way in which colonial wars were fought in the twentieth century, accounting for 84 percent of all colonial wars after 1917, which may have decreased the importance of wartime strategy relative to other covariates

Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Temporal Interaction Terms



Note: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

during this period. The second is that the theory of doctrinal stagnation in colonial wars, alluded to earlier, is incorrect. Rather, twentieth-century colonial militaries were able to refine their doctrines of "imperial policing" in ways that enhanced their ability to fight guerrilla wars without resorting to civilian victimization (Mockaitis 2012). This does not mean that guerrilla wars were easier on colonial forces. Indeed, the brutality of many post-1917 counterinsurgency campaigns suggests that guerrilla conflicts continued to pose profound challenges for metropolitan militaries despite these doctrinal shifts (French 2012). Yet it is possible that the growing emphasis on "minimum force" and "winning hearts and minds" in many twentieth century militaries limited civilian victimization to a certain degree.

– **War aims interaction term**: the interaction for war aims is equally fascinating: while colonial rebellions were more likely to feature civilian victimization in the pre-1917 period, offensive wars of colonial conquest were more likely to do so in the post-1917 period (see Figure 2b). Once again, I suspect that this result is driven by shifts in the relative frequency of colonial rebellions compared to colonial conquests. While 60 percent of cases in the pre-1917 period were offensive wars of colonial conquest, this decreased to just 13 percent in the post-1917 period. Most of the offensive wars undertaken in this period involved the chaotic and bloody extension of colonial rule into the Middle East by the mandate powers following the First World War. I suspect that the relative infrequency of post-1917 offensive wars, combined with the fact that the few that were fought tended to be relatively brutal, contributed to this particular finding.

– **Military professionalism interaction term:** the pattern for military professionalism is also notable. While military professionalism is associated with a decrease in the probability of civilian victimization in the post-1917, the converse appears true for the pre-1917 period (see Figure 2c). This suggests an important caveat to the role of military professionalism. It may well be the case that in periods where harsh tactics were considered to be a normal and natural part of colonial war, that military professionalism contributed to civilian harm because more professionalized militaries were simply more adept at cracking down in harsh and indiscriminate ways (Hull 2003; 2005). It was only in the twentieth century, when colonial militaries started to develop doctrines that emphasized the avoidance of civilian harm, that strong professional norms helped limit civilian victimization (Pimlott 1988; Johnson 2015). Taken together with the guerrilla war finding, the overall picture is that twentieth-century militaries still struggled to fight guerrilla opponents using "clean" methods, but that more professionalized militaries appear to have been moderately more successful at avoiding abuses. This is clearly an important topic that merits future research.

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