

# Online Appendix to the Manuscript “The Democracy I Like”

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## A Survey description

We calculated quotas based on the Eurostat 2011 population and housing census (see <https://ec.europa.eu/CensusHub2/>), the only comparative source for both countries we were aware of. Table A.1 shows the quotas and the sample distribution. We slightly over-sampled male respondents over 49 both in Germany and in Poland.

Table A.1: Cross-quotas set and met

Country	Group	Our sample (in %)	Eurostat 2011 (in %)
DE	M 18-29	4.7	8.62
DE	M 30-49	11.5	17.17
DE	M 50 and older	30.9	22.51
DE	F 18-29	8.0	8.37
DE	F 30-49	17.4	16.88
DE	F 50 and older	26.5	26.45
PL	M 18-29	6.5	11.51
PL	M 30-49	13.1	17.25
PL	M 50 and older	25.4	19.00
PL	F 18-29	13.7	11.07
PL	F 30-49	17.1	16.89
PL	F 50 and older	23.1	24.28

*Notes:* Percentages are based on the total population aged 18 or older. We do not show three other responses (“neither male or female”, or “prefer not to answer”) since there is no census data available for these categories. In total, these categories were chosen by 2 per cent (N=13) of our respondents.

We additionally show levels of educational attainment in the Eurostat 11 (Table A.2) and in our data (Table A.3). Be aware that the categories are not fully comparable between the two surveys, because we did not choose levels of education based on the 1997 ISCED categories when we designed the questionnaires.<sup>12</sup> We have adjusted the labels for our data to reflect the position of the respective educational attainment in the ISCED categories.<sup>13</sup> Despite problems with comparability, the Tables show that we are under-sampling the least educated. Moreover, those with a PhD (see “Second state

<sup>12</sup>They rarely mirror the education schemes that are used by the national population to assess levels of education.

<sup>13</sup>For example, the German “Hauptschulabschluss” and “Realschulabschluss” are two distinctly qualifying diplomas, but are both subsumed under the “lower secondary education”.

tertiary education” in Table A.2), and those with a non-PhD university degree or a comparable degree (see “First state tertiary education” in Table A.2) are over-sampled in our Polish data. Taking into account that our data has been gathered nine years after the Eurostat data, the higher levels of education in our data might also reflect an increase in the level of education in both countries.

Table A.2: Levels of educational attainment in the Eurostat 2011 census data

	Germany (in %)	Poland (in %)
No education	0	0.93
Primary education	5.94	14.39
Lower secondary education	14.42	4.35
Upper secondary education	39.99	44.98
Post secondary, non tertiary education	4.48	2.31
First state tertiary education	20.54	14.80
Second state tertiary education	1.141	0.41
Not applicable	13.49	15.20
Unknown	0	2.63

Table A.3: Levels of educational attainment in our data

Education	Germany (N)	Germany (in %)	Poland (N)	Poland (in %)
0 - No education	7	0.88	4	0.57
1 - Primary education	4	0.50	11	1.57
2 - Lower secondary	68	8.50	20	2.86
3 - Medium secondary	176	22.00	131	18.71
4 - A-levels / upper secondary	247	30.88	212	30.29
5 - University degree or master craftsman exam	126	15.75	266	38.00
6 - PhD	9	1.13	7	1.00
NA	1	0.125	0	0

Finally, we compare the level of satisfaction with how democracy works in the ESS waves 6 and 10 (see Figure A.1) with the levels in our data (see Figure A.2). Be aware that we used a 7-point scale, while the ESS used an 11-point scale. In terms of the level of satisfaction with how democracy works, our own data resembles the ESS wave 10 data, with German citizens being on average much more satisfied than Polish citizens. For Germany, medium high values are most common in both the ESS waves and our data. For Poland, the ESS data suggests and strong decrease in satisfaction over time. Both in our data and in the ESS wave 10, the lowest values are the most often chosen ones. We therefore conclude that our sample resembles the ESS – a high quality and often-used sample – regarding the distribution of satisfaction with how democracy works. Overall, the data does not reveal any issues with over-sampling that should warrant against deriving any conclusions for the general population

based on our data.

Figure A.1: The distribution of satisfaction with how democracy works in the ESS waves 6 and 10





Figure A.2: The distribution of satisfaction with how democracy works in our data



## B Experimental design

### B.1 Complete experimental design

Table B.1: Vignette experiment

Attribute	Attribute levels
Government plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ban demonstrations against government plans</li> <li>- limit the power of courts to overturn unconstitutional government decisions</li> <li>- also implement reforms for which there is no majority support in the population</li> </ul>
Goal of plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to implement its laws more efficiently</li> <li>- to maintain public order in [COUNTRY]</li> <li>- to reduce the influence of foreign decision-makers on [COUNTRY]'s policy</li> </ul>
Criticism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- undemocratic</li> <li>- a restriction of civil rights</li> <li>- a restriction of freedom</li> <li>- <i>No critique mentioned</i></li> </ul>
Actor opposing plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the European Parliament</li> <li>- some members of the government itself</li> <li>- [COUNTRY] opposition parties</li> <li>- the [COUNTRY] constitutional court</li> <li>- the [COUNTRY] press</li> <li>- <i>No actor mentioned</i></li> </ul>

## B.2 German experimental design

### Example text for the experiment, German master

Stellen Sie sich vor, dass in Deutschland eine Regierung an die Macht gekommen ist, für die Sie gestimmt haben und deren Politik Sie unterstützen. Sie erhalten nun Informationen über ein neues Projekt dieser Regierung. *Bitte bedenken Sie, dass auch zukünftige Regierungen von dem Projekt dieser Regierung profitieren könnten.*

Die Regierung hat vor, **Demonstrationen gegen die Regierung zu verbieten** (type of proposal), **um die Einflussnahme ausländischer Entscheidungsträger auf die deutsche Politik zu verringern** (goal of proposal). **Das Projekt der Regierung wurde als undemokratisch bezeichnet** (critique). **Das Europäische Parlament hat das Projekt kritisiert** (actor).

Table B.2: Vignette experiment, German master

Attribute	Attribute levels
Type of proposal	<i>anti-democratic</i> : Demonstrationen gegen die Regierung zu verbieten <i>anti-liberal</i> : die Macht von Gerichten einzuschränken, verfassungswidrige Entscheidungen der Regierung aufzuheben <i>anti-majoritarian</i> : auch Reformen umzusetzen, für die es keine Mehrheit in der Bevölkerung gibt
Goal of proposal	um die effiziente Umsetzung ihrer Gesetze nicht zu gefährden um die öffentliche Ordnung in Deutschland aufrecht zu erhalten um die Einflussnahme ausländischer Entscheidungsträger auf die deutsche Politik zu verringern
Critique	undemokratisch & Bürgerrechtseinschränkung Freiheitseinschränkung <i>No critique mentioned</i>
Actor	Das Europäische Parlament hat Einige Mitglieder der Regierung selbst haben Die deutschen Oppositionsparteien haben Das deutsche Verfassungsgericht hat Die deutsche Presse hat <i>No actor mentioned</i>

### B.3 Polish experimental design

#### Example text for the experiment, Polish translation

Proszę sobie wyobrazić, że w Polsce do władzy doszedł rząd, na którego Pan(i) głosował(a) i którego politykę Pan(i) popiera. Otrzyma teraz Pan(i) informacje o nowym projekcie tego rządu. *Proszę pamiętać, że przyszłe rządy również mogłyby skorzystać z projektu tego rządu.*

Rząd planuje **zabronić demonstracji przeciwko projektom rządowym**, (type of proposal), **żeby zmniejszyć wpływ zagranicznych decydentów na polską politykę** (goal of proposal). **Projekt rządu był opisany jako niedemokratyczny** (critique). **Parlament Europejski skrytykował ten projekt** (actor).

Table B.3: Vignette experiment, Polish translation

Attribute	Attribute levels
Type of proposal	<i>anti-democratic</i> : zabronić demonstracji przeciwko projektom rządowym <i>anti-liberal</i> : ograniczyć uprawnienia sądów do uchylania niekonstytucyjnych decyzji rządu <i>anti-majoritarian</i> : wdrożyć także reformy, dla których nie ma poparcia większości społeczeństwa
Goal of proposal	żeby zapobiec zagrożeniom skutecznej realizacji ich reform żeby nie zagrażać porządkowi publicznemu w Polsce żeby zmniejszyć wpływ zagranicznych decydentów na polską politykę
Critique	niedemokratyczny ograniczenie praw obywatelskich ograniczenie wolności <i>No critique mentioned</i>
Actor	Parlament Europejski Niektórzy członkowie rządu Polskie partie opozycyjne Polski Trybunał Konstytucyjny Polska prasa <i>No actor mentioned</i>

## C Perceived importance of institutions

How important do you think it is for democracy in general, ... | Wie wichtig ist es aus Ihrer Sicht für die Demokratie im Allgemeinen, dass... | Na ile, Pani/Pana zdaniem, dla demokracji generalnie ważne jest to,...<sup>14</sup>

- Concept 1: ... that the people have the final say on the most important political issues? | ... dass das Volk bei den wichtigsten politischen Sachfragen das letzte Wort hat? | ... żeby ludzie mieli ostatnie słowo na temat najważniejszych kwestii politycznych
- Concept 2: ... that the government also implements reforms for which there is no majority support in the population? | ... dass die Regierung auch Reformen umsetzt, für die es keine Mehrheit in der Bevölkerung gibt? | ... żeby rząd wdrażał również reformy, dla których nie ma poparcia większości społeczeństwa?
- Concept 3: ... that the courts are able to stop the government acting beyond its authority? | ... dass die Gerichte die Regierung daran hindern können, ihre Befugnisse zu überschreiten? | ... żeby sądy mogły powstrzymać rząd od działań wykraczających poza jego kompetencje.
- Concept 4: ... that the power of courts to overturn unconstitutional governments decisions is limited? | ... dass die Macht von Gerichten, verfassungswidrige Entscheidungen der Regierung aufzuheben, eingeschränkt ist? | ... żeby uprawnienia sądów do uchylania niekonstytucyjnych decyzji rządu były ograniczone?
- Concept 5: ... that citizens can participate in demonstrations if they do not support the government's plans? | ... dass Bürger an Demonstrationen teilnehmen können, wenn sie die Pläne der Regierung nicht unterstützen? | ... żeby obywatele mogli uczestniczyć w demonstracjach, jeśli nie popierają projektów rządu?
- Concept 6: ... that the government prohibits demonstrations against government plans? | ... dass die Regierung Demonstrationen gegen Regierungsvorhaben verbietet? | ... żeby rząd zabraniał demonstracji przeciwko rządowym projektom?
- Concept 7: ... that opposition parties are free to criticize the government? | ... dass Oppositionsparteien das Recht haben, Kritik an der Regierung zu üben? | ... żeby partie opozycyjne miały możliwość krytykowania rządu?

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<sup>14</sup>The order of the response categories was randomized.

- Concept 8: ... that the media are free to criticize the government? | ... dass die Medien das Recht haben, Kritik an der Regierung zu üben? | ... żeby media miały możliwość krytykowania rządu?
- Concept 9: ... that the rights of minority groups are protected? | ... dass die Rechte von Minderheiten geschützt werden? | ... żeby chronione były prawa mniejszości?
- Concept 10: ... that the government protects all citizens against poverty? | ... dass die Regierung alle Bürger vor Armut schützt? | ... żeby rząd chronił wszystkich obywateli przed ubóstwem?


Figure C.1: Bi-variate correlations for the perceived importance of different institutions for democracy



Notes: Figure created with the r package corrplot. Strength of correlation depicted in circles (upper half) and in numbers (lower half). Significance levels: \*\*\* $p <= 0.001$ , \*\* $p <= 0.01$ , \* $p <= 0.05$ .




Figure C.2: Categorization of respondents as proposed in the main text, by country



Notes: Respondents are assigned each of the categories if they score higher than 4 on each of the relevant institutions. Respondents can and are assigned multiple categories at the same time. Connected dots below the bar plot show these multiple assignments to categories.

Figure C.3: Alternative categorization of respondents




*Notes:* In contrast to Figure C.2, we alleviate the cut-off points for the categories and assign respondents the respective category if they score, on average, higher than 4 on all the relevant institutions. Authoritarians score 4 or lower on the institutions important for electoral democracy.

## D Experimental design assumptions

Table D.1: ANOVA for outcome measures between the three different vignettes, averaging across all attributes and attribute levels


CN	Outcome		Df	Sum Sq	Mean Sq	F value	Pr(>F)
DE	Vote	Vignette	2	28.39	14.20	4.19	0.02
DE	Vote	Residuals	1870	6333.27	3.39	NA	NA
DE	Defend	Vignette	2	18.18	9.09	2.81	0.06
DE	Defend	Residuals	1870	6060.13	3.24	NA	NA
DE	Demonstrate	Vignette	2	2.34	1.17	0.27	0.77
DE	Demonstrate	Residuals	1870	8166.38	4.37	NA	NA
PL	Vote	Vignette	2	38.69	19.35	4.92	0.01
PL	Vote	Residuals	1931	7598.77	3.94	NA	NA
PL	Defend	Vignette	2	31.21	15.60	4.34	0.01
PL	Defend	Residuals	1931	6951.93	3.60	NA	NA
PL	Demonstrate	Vignette	2	2.33	1.16	0.24	0.79
PL	Demonstrate	Residuals	1931	9250.64	4.79	NA	NA

Figure D.1: AMCEs across vignettes by outcome type, outcome measure and country, separately shown for each outcome question (OQ): defending the proposal among acquaintances, demonstrating against the proposal and voting again for the government



## E Full results of the experiment


Figure E.1: MMs for all attributes and attribute levels of the experimental design by country, full results, separately shown for each outcome question (OQ): defending the proposal among acquaintances, demonstrating against the proposal and voting again for the government



Notes: Figure created with the r packages cregg and ggplot2.

## F Factor analysis

Figure F.1: Eigenvalues for different number of factors included in the factor analysis - Germany



Notes: Factor analysis based on weighted least squares. Figure created with the r packages psych and GPArotation.

Table F.1: Factor loadings and model performance for chosen factor analysis model

Loadings	WLS1	WLS2	WLS 3
The people have last say		0.440	
Reforms against majority interests			0.505
Courts restrict gov	0.701		
Courts restricted			0.516
Citizens can participate in demonstrations	0.726		
Gov can ban demonstrations			0.753
Opposition parties have right to criticize gov	0.903		
Media has right to criticize the gov	0.793		
Protection of minority rights	0.371	0.413	
Protection against poverty		0.719	
SS loadings	2.735	0.934	1.095
Proportion Var	0.273	0.093	0.109
Cumulative Var	0.273	0.367	0.476

Notes: Only factor loadings shown larger than 0.3.

## G Robustness tests

### G.1 Results by country

Figure G.1: MMs for seeing infringements on different democratic institutions by country, separately shown for each outcome question (OQ): defending the proposal among acquaintances, demonstrating against the proposal and voting again for the government




Figure G.2: Importance attributed to each institution under study by country





Figure G.3: MMs for seeing infringements on democracy by importance attributed to the institution under threat by country, separately shown for each outcome question (OQ): defending the proposal among acquaintances, demonstrating against the proposal and voting again for the government



## G.2 Analysing only first vignette

Figure G.4: Replication of Figure 2; MMs for seeing different types of democratic backsliding by country, only vignette 1, separately shown for each outcome question (OQ): defending the proposal among acquaintances, demonstrating against the proposal and voting again for the government






Figure G.5: MMs for seeing infringements on democracy by importance attributed to the democratic institutions under threat, only vignette 1, separately shown for each outcome question (OQ): defending the proposal among acquaintances, demonstrating against the proposal and voting again for the government





Figure G.6: Satisfaction with how democracy works and tolerance for democratic backsliding, only vignette 1, separately shown for each country and outcome question (OQ): defending the proposal among acquaintances, demonstrating against the proposal and voting again for the government



### G.3 By different government proposals

Figure G.7: MMs for seeing infringements on democracy by importance attributed to the institution under threat by government proposal, separately shown for each outcome question (OQ): defending the proposal among acquaintances, demonstrating against the proposal and voting again for the government





Figure G.8: Satisfaction with how democracy works and tolerance for democratic backsliding by government proposal, separately shown for each outcome question (OQ): defending the proposal among acquaintances, demonstrating against the proposal and voting again for the government



### G.4 Regression analysis for three factors (compare with Table 3)

Table G.1: Linear regression models of tolerance for democratic backsliding on factors scores for democratic, authoritarian and “focus on people” factors, including country and vignette fixed effects

Infringements on: Outcome:	Liberal democracy		Majoritarian democracy		Electoral democracy	
	Defend	Demonstrate	Defend	Demonstrate	Defend	Demonstrate
Liberal democratic factor	-0.67*** (0.09)	0.85*** (0.11)	-0.33** (0.10)	0.67*** (0.10)	-0.54*** (0.09)	0.75*** (0.11)
Authoritarian factor	0.58*** (0.07)	-0.24** (0.08)	0.55*** (0.07)	-0.24** (0.08)	0.64*** (0.07)	-0.26** (0.08)
Focus on people factor	0.15 (0.10)	-0.22 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.12)	0.07 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.12)
Poland (vs. Germany)	0.09 (0.10)	0.11 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.10)	0.30** (0.11)	-0.08 (0.10)	0.31** (0.12)
Vignette 2 (vs. 1)	-0.16 (0.12)	0.02 (0.14)	-0.28* (0.12)	0.22 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.14)
Vignette 3 (vs. 1)	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.42*** (0.12)	0.13 (0.14)	-0.22 (0.11)	0.13 (0.14)
Constant	2.81*** (0.10)	4.01*** (0.12)	3.41*** (0.10)	3.47*** (0.11)	2.84*** (0.09)	3.90*** (0.12)
N	1,268	1,268	1,271	1,271	1,268	1,268
R <sup>2</sup>	0.184	0.119	0.123	0.107	0.187	0.123
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.180	0.115	0.119	0.102	0.183	0.119
F-stat	51.96***	35.21***	29.94***	29.49***	48.53***	33.45***

Notes: \*\*\*p<0.001, \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05

### G.5 Regression analysis without fixed effects (compare with Table 3)

Table G.2: Linear regression models of tolerance for democratic backsliding on respondents' scores for liberal democratic and authoritarian factors, including clustered standard errors for respondents

Infringements on: Outcome:	Liberal democracy		Majoritarian democracy		Electoral democracy	
	Defend	Demonstrate	Defend	Demonstrate	Defend	Demonstrate
Liberal democratic factor	-0.56*** (0.05)	0.68*** (0.05)	-0.35*** (0.06)	0.60*** (0.06)	-0.49*** (0.06)	0.69*** (0.06)
Authoritarian factor	0.60*** (0.06)	-0.29*** (0.07)	0.55*** (0.06)	-0.28*** (0.07)	0.66*** (0.06)	-0.31*** (0.08)
Constant	2.76*** (0.05)	4.04*** (0.06)	3.11*** (0.05)	3.74*** (0.06)	2.69*** (0.05)	4.07*** (0.06)
N	1,268	1,268	1,271	1,271	1,268	1,268
R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.18	0.12
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.18	0.12
F Statistic	139.22***	83.14***	80.03***	69.72***	142.27***	83.45***
						126.44***

Notes: \*\*\*p<0.001, \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05

## **H Pre-registration**

### **H.1 Pre-registered hypotheses**

We pre-registered the following hypotheses:


- H1: The more important citizens deem specific aspects of democracy, the less likely they are to tolerate democratic backsliding that restricts these aspects of democracy.
- H2: Citizens with a purely liberal understanding of democracy are more likely to acquiesce to restrictions of majoritarian democracy than to acquiesce to any other restrictions of democracy.
- H3: Citizens with a purely majoritarian understanding of democracy are more likely to acquiesce to restrictions of liberal democracy than to acquiesce to any other restrictions of democracy.
- H4: Citizens with a purely majoritarian and citizens with a purely liberal conception of democracy are equally likely to speak out against restrictions of basic democratic rights.
- H5: Citizens are more likely to tolerate restrictions of aspects of democracy they deem to be important if they are dissatisfied with the status quo of democracy in their country.
- H6: Citizens are less likely to differentiate between restrictions of democracy if they are dissatisfied with the status quo of democracy in their country.

### **H.2 Results missing from the main analysis**

We show results for Hypotheses 2 through 4 here which have not been shown in the main analysis for different reasons. Figure H.1 shows MMs for three different groups of respondents: those with purely majoritarian understandings of democracy, those with purely liberal understandings of democracy and those fitting in neither category. Although there is some evidence that liberal democrats are most likely to punish governments for infringements on liberal democracy, and that majoritarians do not differentiate between infringements on liberal and majoritarian democracy, we do not find convincing support for the assumption that there are many citizens that fall into either of the categories (see Section C of the Online Appendix), nor are the results presented here very convincing. We therefore do not find support for Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4.

We do not show results for Hypotheses 5 and 6 since groups are too small to be meaningfully analyzed (see Section C of the Online Appendix). There are only 59 German and 83 Polish (39 and 75)

Figure H.1: MMs depicting responses to the government proposals by three groups of respondents: majoritarians, liberals and respondents fitting in neither category, separately shown for each outcome question (OQ): defending the proposal among acquaintances, demonstrating against the proposal and voting again for the government



respondents with purely liberal (purely majoritarian) understandings of democracy in our sample, and splitting these groups again into satisfied and dissatisfied respondents would decrease the groups size again, substantially.