**Table A1.** Breakdown of All Interventions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ­ | **DELETE VS. AMEND INTERVENTIONS** | **AMEND ONLY INTENT** |
|  | **Total1** | **% All Ints.** | **# Delete2** | **# Amend** | **% Delete** | **% All D eletes** | **Pro-EU** | **Pro-State** | **% Pro-EU** | **% All Pro-EU** | **% All Pro-State** |
| ***MEMBER STATES*** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Austria | 8 | 4.5 | 5 | 3 | 62.5 | 13.5 | 2 | 1 | 66.7 | 2.6 | 3.0 |
| Belgium | 19 | 10.7 | 1 | 18 | 5.3 | 2.7 | 18 | 0 | 100.0 | 23.4 | 0.0 |
| Denmark | 7 | 3.9 | 0 | 7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1 | 3 | 25.0 | 1.3 | 9.1 |
| Finland | 11 | 6.2 | 1 | 10 | 9.1 | 2.7 | 3 | 7 | 30.0 | 3.9 | 21.2 |
| France | 12 | 6.7 | 0 | 12 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11 | 1 | 91.7 | 14.3 | 3.0 |
| Germany | 7 | 3.9 | 3 | 4 | 42.9 | 8.1 | 4 | 0 | 100.0 | 5.2 | 0.0 |
| Greece | 3 | 1.7 | 3 | 0 | 100.0 | 8.1 | 0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Ireland | 4 | 2.2 | 1 | 3 | 25.0 | 2.7 | 1 | 1 | 50.0 | 1.3 | 3.0 |
| Italy | 12 | 6.7 | 1 | 11 | 8.3 | 2.7 | 4 | 4 | 50.0 | 5.2 | 12.1 |
| Luxembourg | 7 | 3.9 | 4 | 3 | 57.1 | 10.8 | 2 | 0 | 100.0 | 2.6 | 0.0 |
| Netherlands | 9 | 5.1 | 5 | 4 | 55.6 | 13.5 | 3 | 0 | 100.0 | 3.9 | 0.0 |
| Portugal | 8 | 4.5 | 2 | 6 | 25.0 | 5.4 | 4 | 2 | 66.7 | 5.2 | 6.1 |
| Spain | 5 | 2.8 | 2 | 3 | 40.0 | 5.4 | 3 | 0 | 100.0 | 3.9 | 0.0 |
| Sweden | 5 | 2.8 | 0 | 5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4 | 0 | 100.0 | 5.2 | 0.0 |
| UK | 16 | 9.0 | 0 | 16 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4 | 8 | 33.3 | 5.2 | 24.2 |
| ***Subtotal*** | **133** | **74.7** | **28** | **105** | **-** | **75.7** | **64** | **27** | **-** | **83.1** | **81.8** |
| ***CANDIDATE STATES*** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bulgaria | 2 | 0.7 | 1 | 1 | 50.0 | 2.7 | 0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Cyprus | 4 | 1.5 | 1 | 3 | 25.0 | 2.7 | 1 | 0 | 100.0 | 1.3 | 0.0 |
| Czech Rep. | 4 | 1.5 | 2 | 2 | 50.0 | 5.4 | 1 | 1 | 50.0 | 1.3 | 3.0 |
| Estonia | 4 | 1.5 | 0 | 4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2 | 1 | 66.7 | 2.6 | 3.0 |
| Hungary | 4 | 1.5 | 1 | 3 | 25.0 | 2.7 | 2 | 0 | 100.0 | 2.6 | 0.0 |
| Latvia | 5 | 1.9 | 2 | 3 | 40.0 | 5.4 | 1 | 1 | 50.0 | 1.3 | 3.0 |
| Lithuania | 4 | 1.5 | 0 | 4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Malta | 2 | 0.7 | 2 | 0 | 100.0 | 5.4 | 0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Poland | 3 | 1.1 | 0 | 3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3 | 0 | 100.0 | 3.9 | 0.0 |
| Romania | 3 | 1.1 | 0 | 3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 | 1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 |
| Slovakia | 2 | 0.7 | 0 | 2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1 | 1 | 50.0 | 1.3 | 3.0 |
| Slovenia | 4 | 1.5 | 0 | 4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1 | 0 | 100.0 | 1.3 | 0.0 |
| Turkey | 4 | 1.5 | 0 | 4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1 | 1 | 50.0 | 1.3 | 3.0 |
| ***Subtotal*** | **13** | **25.3** | **9** | **36** | **-** | **24.3** | **13** | **6** | **-** | **16.9** | **18.2** |
| **TOTAL** | **178** | **100** | **37** | **141** | **-** | **100** | **77** | **33** | **-** | **100** | **100** |
|  |
| ***PARTISAN POSITION3*** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left | 9 | 5.1 | 5 | 4 | 55.6 | 13.5 | 2 | 1 | 66.7 | 2.6 | 3.0 |
| Center Left | 52 | 29.2 | 5 | 47 | 9.6 | 13.5 | 28 | 8 | 77.8 | 36.4 | 24.2 |
| Centrist | 12 | 6.7 | 1 | 11 | 8.3 | 2.7 | 5 | 1 | 83.3 | 6.5 | 3.0 |
| Center Right | 82 | 46.1 | 23 | 59 | 28.0 | 62.2 | 36 | 13 | 73.5 | 46.8 | 39.4 |
| Right | 15 | 8.4 | 2 | 13 | 13.3 | 5.4 | 4 | 6 | 40.0 | 5.2 | 18.2 |
| Non Partisan | 8 | 4.5 | 1 | 7 | 12.5 | 2.7 | 2 | 4 | 33.3 | 2.6 | 12.1 |
| **TOTAL** | **178** | **100** | **37** | **141** | **-** | **100** | **77** | **33** | **-** | **100** | **100** |
|  |
| ***INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION*** |  |  |  |  |  |
| European Commission | 1 | 0.6 | 0 | 1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1 | 0 | 100.0 | 1.3 | 0.0 |
| European Parliament | 47 | 26.4 | 5 | 42 | 10.6 | 13.5 | 24 | 13 | 64.9 | 31.2 | 39.4 |
| National Government | 37 | 20.8 | 10 | 27 | 27.0 | 27.0 | 11 | 11 | 50.0 | 14.3 | 33.3 |
| National Parliament | 93 | 52.2 | 22 | 71 | 23.7 | 59.5 | 41 | 9 | 82.0 | 53.2 | 27.3 |
| **TOTAL** | **178** | **100** | **37** | **141** | **-** | **100** | **77** | **33** | **-** | **100** | **100** |

Notes: **1**Does not count duplicate deletion amendments from single delegates. **2**Unique delegates only. **3** Illustrative purposes. Coded by European Parliamentary affiliation for member states. Authors’ own designations for accession states based on multiple sources.

**Table A2.** Detail ofPro-EU Amendments

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| CLAUSE | PROPOSAL | # PROPOSERS | PROPOSERS (INSTITUTION - STATE) |
| Full Article | Delete entire article | 32 | Member Govts. - PT/NL/AT/DE/LUAccession Govt. - LVMember Parls. - GR/NL/ES/ITAccession Parls. - HU/CY/MT/CZ/BU/LVMEPs - IE/BE/DE/AT/NLUnattached Representative - Finland |
|  | Specify conditions whereby a state may leave | 1 | National Govt. - PL |
|  | Add Council expulsion clause | 20 | Member Govt. - LUMember Parls. - SE/FI/NL/DEAccession Parls. - HU/TR/SI/CY/LV/EE/CZMEPs - IT/PT/FI/DE/NL/AT/FR |
| 1 – Basic Exit Rights | Withdrawal only when unable to ratify Treaty/Constitution amendment. | 8 | Member Govts. - FR/BEMember Parl. - BEMEPs - FR/BE |
| Include 'and the procedure and conditions set out in this Article.' | 20 | Member Govt. - LUMember Parls. - SE/FI/NL/DEAccession Parls. - HU/TR/SI/CY/LV/EE/CZMEPs - IT/PT/FI/DE/NL/AT/FR |
| Include 'withdrawal/suspension of membership for two years' | 1 | Member Parl - IT |
| No re-entry for 5 years | 2 | Accession Parl - HU |
| 2 – Notification/Institutions | Extend exiting MS non-participation to all EU institutions | 1 | National Parl - SE |
| Adds option to revoke A50 notice, and also reinforces that states remain subject to EU rules until departure | 1 | MEP - DE |
| Withdrawing states will be responsible for any damage caused to the Union. | 11 | Member Parl - FR |
| 3 – Duration/Timing | Remove 2 year membership expiry limit. | 1 | Member Govts. - FR/BEMember Parl. - BE/FR/FIMEPs - BE/DE |
| If no agreement after 2 years, ECJ rules. | 1 | Member Parl - FR |
| No re-entry for 20 years | 2 | MEP - FR |
| Empower Commission/EP to take control to instruct Council if no agreement after 2 years. | 8 | MEPs - FR/IT |

**Table A3.** Detail ofPro-State Amendments

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| CLAUSE | PROPOSAL | # PROPOSERS | PROPOSERS (INSTITUTION - STATE) |
| 2 – Notification/Institutions | Encourage maintenance of trading links. | 2 | Member Parl - FI |
| Unanimity over QMV for final decision | 1 | Accession Govt - SI |
| Limits exiting state Council exclusion to exit negotiations (participation allowed in other matters) | 2 | MEPs - FR/IT |
|  |  | 2 | MEPs - UK |
|  | 4 | Member Govt. - IEAccession Govt. - TRMember Parls. - FI |
|  | 3 | Member Govt - ITMember Parl - UKMEP - DK |
| Two-thirds over QMV for final decision | 2 | Member Parl - UKMEP - DK |
| EP only consulted over withdrawal, does not need to give consent. | 1 | MEP - PT |
| 3 – Duration/Timing | Reduce 2 year membership expiry limit to 1 year. | 3 | Member Parl - UKAccession Parl - HUMEP - DK |
| Allow MS to specify leaving date, otherwise 2 years. | 1 | MEP - PT |
| Delete entire clause | 1 | Accession Govt - SI |

**Table A4.** Vocalness - April 2003 Convention Plenary



**Note**: By vocalness, we mean how vocal delegations were, by comparing the number of people who issued amendments or spoke to the ratio of delegates who were sent to the convention. Analysis is compiled using different ratios: by national delegations, by institutions and by political affiliation. The most vocal countries were the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the UK, followed by Portugal and Finland. The least vocal countries were Bulgaria, Denmark, Malta, Poland and Slovakia. We performed a simple t-test to see if Eastern Europeans and Western European are different, and we find no significant difference: i.e. those with most interest in A50 according to Huysmans (2019) are not more vocal to defend A50 that those who are supposed to defend it.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Article 46 (02/04/2003, proposed by the Praesidium)** | **Article 59 (18/07/2003 (adopted by consensus by the European Convention)** | **Article I-60 (18/06/2004, adopted by the European Council)** | **Article 50 (effective 1 December 2009–present (TFEU))** |
| **1** | Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. | Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.  | Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. | Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. |
| **2** | A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the Council of its intention. Once that notification has been given, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament. The withdrawing State shall not participate in the Council’s discussions or decisions concerning it. | A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention; **the European Council shall examine that notification. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council**, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the **consent** of the European Parliament. **The representative of** the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in Council or European Council discussions or decisions concerning it.  | A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention~~; the European Council shall examine that notification~~. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated **in accordance with Article III-325(3)**. It shall be concluded by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. ~~The representative of the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in Council or European Council discussions or decisions concerning it.~~ | A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with **Article ~~III-325(3)~~ 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**. It shall be concluded **on behalf of the Union** by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. |
| **3** | This Constitution shall cease to apply to the State in question as from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or failing that two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2. | This Constitution shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, **unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, decides to extend this period.**  | The Constitution shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, **unanimously** decides to extend this period. | The ~~Constitution~~ **Treaties** shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. |
| **4** |  |  | **For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in European decisions concerning it. A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 72% of the members of the Council, representing the participating Member States, comprising at least 65 % of the population of these States.** | For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. A qualified majority shall be defined ~~as at least 72% of the members of the Council, representing the participating Member States, comprising at least 65 % of the population of these States~~ **in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.** |
| **5** |  | **If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to re-join, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 57.** | If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article ~~57~~ I-58. | If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article ~~I-58~~ **49**. |

**Table A5.** Evolution of the EU Exit Clause

Note: **Bold** type indicates additions from previous version, ~~strikethrough~~ indicates removal.