**Religious Institutions’ Stances Towards Autocratization in the Post-Third Wave Period *Published in Government and Opposition***

**By Dina Osama Lotfy**

**Appendix**

**Table A1: 52 Cases Witnessed Autocratic Acts Related to Regime Survival**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Term limit amendment attempts**  **(38 cases)** | **Military takeover attempts**  **(14 cases)** |
| **Latin America**  Bolivia 2017, Colombia 2010, Dominican Rep. 2019, Ecuador 2008, Honduras 2009/ 2015, Nicaragua 2011/2016, Paraguay 2017, and Venezuela 2007/2009.  **Middle East & Sub-Saharan Africa**  Algeria 2019, Benin 2015, Burkina Faso 2014, Burundi 2015/2018, Chad 2018, Comoros 2018, Congo Republic 2015, Democratic Republic of Congo 2016, Egypt 2019, Guinea 2020, Ivory Coast 2020, Malawi 2004, Niger 2009, Nigeria 2006, Rwanda 2015, Senegal 2012, Togo 2019, Uganda 2017, and Zambia 2001.  **Post-communist region**  Azerbaijan 2016, Belarus 2004/2020, Russia 2020, Tajikistan 2016, Uzbekistan 2007.  **Asia**  Philippines 1998 | **Latin America**  Honduras 2009 and Venezuela2002.  **Middle East & Sub Saharan Africa**  Burkina Faso 2015, Central African Rep 2013, Egypt 2013, Gambia 1994, Guinea 2021, Guinea-Bissau 2003, Mali 2012/2020.  **Asia-Pacific Region**  Fiji 2000/2006, Philippines 2006, and Thailand 2014 |

**Table A2: Logit Models for Opposing Regime Survival**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| % dominant religion | .384 |  | 2.38 | 7.228 |  |
|  | (1.485) |  | (1.818) | (4.487) |  |
| Religious regulation |  | -5.474\*\*\* | -6.261\*\*\* | 3.278 |  |
|  |  | (2.03) | (2.156) | (7.755) |  |
| Interaction term |  |  |  | -12.747 | -4.336\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (10.392) | (1.837) |
| Historical pro-democratizing role | 2.026\*\*\* | 2.287\*\*\* | 2.277\*\*\* | 2.383\*\*\* | 2.253\*\*\* |
|  | (.716) | (.847) | (.851) | (.872) | (.807) |
| Ruler’s religion | -1.793\* | -1.271 | -1.643 | -1.719 | -1.161 |
|  | (1.004) | (.991) | (1.06) | (1.085) | (1.006) |
| GDP per capita | -.086 | -.098 | -.066 | -.051 | -.097 |
|  | (.126) | (.143) | (.152) | (.151) | (.134) |
| Government favouritism | .5 | .949 | .902 | 1.245 | .849 |
|  | (.625) | (.721) | (.721) | (.84) | (.691) |
| \_cons | -.016 | 1.054 | .11 | -4.045 | .239 |
|  | (1.617) | (1.495) | (1.689) | (3.793) | (1.449) |
| Observations | 52 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 52 |
| Pseudo R2 | .181 | .338 | .365 | .388 | .288 |
| *Standard errors are in parentheses* | | | | | |
| *\*\*\* p<.01, \*\* p<.05, \* p<.1* | | | | | |
|  | | | | | |

**Table A3: Linear Probability Models for Opposing Regime Survival**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Religious monopoly | -.816\*\*\* | -.788\*\*\* | -.443 |
|  | (.257) | (.274) | (.362) |
| Historical pro-democratizing role | .348\*\*\* | .377\*\*\* | .222 |
|  | (.115) | (.117) | (.134) |
| Ruler’s religion |  | -.174 | -.182 |
|  |  | (.149) | (.144) |
| GDP per Capita |  | -.016 | -.017 |
|  |  | (.023) | (.024) |
| Government favouritism |  | .138 | .117 |
|  |  | (.114) | (.115) |
| Religious families: |  |  |  |
| Islamic |  |  | -.333\* |
|  |  |  | (.184) |
| Protestant |  |  | -.395\*\* |
|  |  |  | (.188) |
| other |  |  | -.425 |
|  |  |  | (.268) |
| \_cons | .699\*\*\* | .552\*\* | .789\*\*\* |
|  | (.113) | (.249) | (.269) |
| Observations | 52 | 52 | 52 |
| R-squared | .29 | .331 | .421 |
| *Standard errors are in parentheses* | | | |
| *\*\*\* p<.01, \*\* p<.05, \* p<.1* | | | |
|  | | | |

**Table A4: Logit Models for Opposing Regime Survival**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Religious monopoly[[1]](#footnote-1) | -5.651\*\* | -5.476\*\* | -3.038 |
|  | (2.258) | (2.675) | (2.91) |
| Historical pro-democratizing role | 2.09\*\*\* | 2.248\*\*\* | 1.848\* |
|  | (.759) | (.789) | (.988) |
| Ruler’s religion |  | -1.069 | -1.833 |
|  |  | (1.006) | (1.262) |
| GDP per Capita |  | -.06 | -.17 |
|  |  | (.134) | (.172) |
| Government favouritism |  | .642 | .608 |
|  |  | (.7) | (.727) |
| Religious families: |  |  |  |
| Islamic |  |  | -3.059\*\* |
|  |  |  | (1.374) |
| Protestant |  |  | -3.211\*\* |
|  |  |  | (1.459) |
| Other |  |  | -2.525 |
|  |  |  | (1.774) |
| \_cons | .476 | -.027 | 2.954 |
|  | (.484) | (1.489) | (2.013) |
| Observations | 52 | 52 | 52 |
| Pseudo R2 | .262 | .29 | .424 |
| *Standard errors are in parentheses* | | | |
| *\*\*\* p<.01, \*\* p<.05, \* p<.1* | | | |
|  | | | |

**Table A5: Logit Models for Opposing Regime Survival**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Religious monopoly[[2]](#footnote-2) | -4.893\*\* | -9.239\*\* | -6.752 |
|  | (2.071) | (3.688) | (4.582) |
| Historical pro-democratizing role | 1.818\*\*\* | 2.408\*\*\* | 2.149\*\* |
|  | (.706) | (.882) | (1.075) |
| Government favouritism |  | 2.134\*\* | 1.804 |
|  |  | (.969) | (1.185) |
| Ruler’s Religion |  | -1.457 | -2.19\* |
|  |  | (1.027) | (1.25) |
| GDP per Capita |  | -.058 | -.174 |
|  |  | (.142) | (.176) |
| Religious families: |  |  |  |
| Islamic |  |  | -2.85\*\* |
|  |  |  | (1.409) |
| Protestant |  |  | -3.429\*\* |
|  |  |  | (1.548) |
| Other |  |  | -1.977 |
|  |  |  | (1.926) |
| \_cons | .332 | -2.676 | .8 |
|  | (.467) | (1.884) | (2.707) |
| Observations | 52 | 52 | 52 |
| Pseudo R2 | .211 | .324 | .446 |
| *Standard errors are in parentheses* | | | |
| *\*\*\* p<.01, \*\* p<.05, \* p<.1* | | | |
|  | | | |

**Table A6: Factor Change Coefficients for Model 1**

logit (N=52): Factor change in odds   
 Odds of: 1 vs 0

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | b | z | P>z | e^b | e^bStdX | SDofX |
| Religious monopoly | -4.309 | **-2.689** | **0.007** | 0.013 | **0.380** | **0.225** |
| Historical pro-democratizing role | 1.976 | 2.652 | 0.008 | 7.213 | 2.704 | 0.503 |
| constant | 1.020 | 1.712 | 0.087 | . | . | . |
|  | | | | | | |

b = raw coefficient  
 z = z-score for test of b=0

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| P> | z | = | p-value | for | z-test |

e^b = exp(b) = factor change in odds for unit increase in X  
 e^bStdX = exp(b\*SD of X) = change in odds for SD increase in X  
 SDofX = standard deviation of X

**Table A7: Factor Change Coefficients for Model 2**

logit (N=52): Factor change in odds   
 Odds of: 1 vs 0

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | b | z | P>z | e^b | e^bStdX | SDofX |
| Religious monopoly | -4.336 | **-2.360** | **0.018** | 0.013 | **0.377** | **0.225** |
| Historical pro-democratizing role | 2.252 | 2.792 | 0.005 | 9.512 | 3.108 | 0.503 |
| Government favouritism | 0.849 | 1.228 | 0.219 | 2.336 | 1.588 | 0.545 |
| Ruler’s Religion | -1.161 | -1.154 | 0.249 | 0.313 | 0.610 | 0.425 |
| GDP per capita | -0.097 | -0.723 | 0.470 | 0.907 | 0.778 | 2.587 |
| constant | 0.239 | 0.165 | 0.869 | . | . | . |
|  | | | | | | |

b = raw coefficient  
 z = z-score for test of b=0

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| P> | z | = | p-value | for | z-test |


e^b = exp(b) = factor change in odds for unit increase in X  
 e^bStdX = exp(b\*SD of X) = change in odds for SD increase in X  
 SDofX = standard deviation of X

**Table A8: Discrete Change for the Historical Pro-Democratizing Role at the Lowest and Highest Degrees of Religious Monopoly**


|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Discrete change | lincom | pvalue | 84%Lower limit | 84%Upper limit |
| DC for the historical pro-democratizing role at the **lowest degree** of Religious monopoly | 0.292 | 0.016 | 0.122 | 0.462 |
| DC for the historical pro-democratizing role at the **highest degree** of Religious monopoly | 0.280 | 0.195 | -0.024 | 0.584 |

**Figure A1: The Correlation between Dominant Religion’s Size and Religious regulation**


**(Covariation= 0.02)**




**Figure A2: The Correlation between Religious Monopoly and Discrimination Against religious minorities**




**Figure A3: The Correlation between Government Favouritism and Discrimination Against religious minorities**




**Figure A4: Simple Slope Analysis for the Interaction between Dominant Religions’ Size and Religious Regulation, Using Model 4 in Table A2**



**Figure A5: Johnson-Neyman plot for the Interaction between Dominant Religions’ Size and Religious Regulation, Using Model 4 in Table A2**



**Figure A6: The Density of Protestant Institutions’ Stances by Religious Monopoly Score and Historical Pro-Democratizing Role**



1. Religious regulation variable, one of the components of religious monopoly, is taken here from Religion and State’s project, Round 3. (Fox, J. (2019, February 10). The Religion and State Project, Main Dataset and Societal Module, Round 3). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. I changed the religious regulation variable, one of the components of religious monopoly, with discrimination against minority composite variable that is taken here from Religion and State’s project, Round 3. (Fox, J. (2019, February 10). The Religion and State Project, Main Dataset and Societal Module, Round 3). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)