**Appendix for**

**“Elections and Immigration Policy in Autocracy: Evidence from Russia and Kazakhstan”**

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# Alternative Explanations

In this section, I turn to alternative explanations (the state of the economy, business interests, xenophobia, far-right political opposition, and state capacity) and argue that electoral competition better explains the divergence between Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s immigration policies.

## The State of the Economy

One plausible explanation is that the state of their national economies accounts for the difference in their immigration policies. It is possible that Kazakhstan was in a better economic situation than Russia, and thus, did not need to politicize immigration or impose immigration restrictions. Both countries’ economies depend heavily on oil and natural gas exports. The stellar growth of state income from natural resource exports helped Putin and Nazarbayev stay in power by enabling them to dole out patronage, boost the economy, and sustain a high level of popular support (Gustafson 2012; Ostrowski 2010; Schatz 2009). Yet, it is noteworthy that, compared to other major oil-producing countries, neither are resource-rich enough to lavish services on their citizens without taxing them (Fish 2005). According to World Bank data, in 2012, the total shares of GDP of natural resources rents in Russia, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait were 15%, 23.4%, 49.7%, and 54.8% respectively. As such, it is possible that the fiscal constraints generated by the economic situation could have an impact on the politics of immigration. The analysis in this section, however, shows that their national economies provide a limited explanation for the differences in their immigration policies.

Figure A 1 GDP growth rates in Russia and Kazakhstan (1996-2019)

(Source: World Bank)

Figure A 2 Unemployment rates in Russia and Kazakhstan (1996-2019)  
(Source: World Bank)

Figure A 1 and Figure A 2 show the two countries’ GDP growth and unemployment rates between 1996 and 2019. Based on this comparison, one could argue that Russia imposed greater immigrant restrictions because its economy suffered more severe recessions than Kazakhstan. Figure A1 shows a drastic decrease in growth rates in Russia compared to Kazakhstan. Russia’s GDP growth rate has plunged in recent years, down to negative 3.7 % in 2015. Kazakhstan’s economy also shrank, but to a lesser degree. In 2015, Kazakhstan’s growth rate was positive 1.2 %. Unlike Russia, Kazakhstan has not had a negative growth rate since 2000.

Nonetheless, the national economic explanation has two shortcomings. First, Russia and Kazakhstan’s economic growth has shown a very similar trend. Being highly dependent on oil and gas exports, they both experienced an economic boom up to the mid-2000s and then an economic bust since the late 2000s, due to the falling the oil prices. Despite these similarities, their immigration policies diverged significantly, especially since the 2010s. Second, the deepest economic crises in Russia did not accompany migrant restrictions. Since the 2000s, the Russian economy has experienced two severe crises, first in the 2008 global financial crisis, and then in 2014 as a result of low oil prices and sanctions by the West following the annexation of Crimea. These two crises would be the most likely cases for the national economic explanation; however, during these periods, the Russian government did not increase immigration restrictions comparable to those in the early 2010s. This different timing suggests the limitation of economic explanations.

Unemployment and labour competition cannot account for the differences between Kazakhstan and Russia either. As Figure A 2 shows, the two countries displayed similar levels of unemployment. More importantly, both countries have low labour competition between immigrants and locals. Local experts point out that Russian citizens barely face labour competition with immigrants. One migration expert said, ‘I have never seen research results or newspaper articles showing that migrants compete with Russians in the labour market, even in economic recessions’ (Interviewee 70). He added, ‘This might be related to a characteristic of the Russian economy. When Russia’s economy slows down, it tends to lower its wages, not the number of jobs.’ Having attended numerous meetings of the Public Council in the Federal Migration Service, one representative of a Moscow-based migrant rights group said, ‘Government officials are aware that Russia needs migrants economically and demographically’ (Interviewee 18).

Kazakhstan’s situation is no different. In interviews, Kazakhstani government officials emphasized that Kazakhs do not compete with immigrants, since migrant workers take jobs that are deemed low status and low paid, and are not sought by Kazakhs (Interviewee 63; Interviewee 81). One representative of a migrant rights group stated that Kazakhs view migrants as ‘second-rate’ (*vtorogo sorta*), and there is no sense of competition (Interviewee 28). The high degree of ethnic job segregation (such as Uzbeks in construction and Tajiks in the dried fruits trade) also lessens competition between immigrants and natives (Interviewee 81). All in all, the examination of economic factors shows that the explanation based on the state of the economy has limitation.

## Business Interests

An alternative explanation is the relative roles of pro-immigration lobbying by business interests. One could argue that Kazakhstan’s businesses have greater political influence than their Russian counterparts, and thus, their lobbying accounts for the open immigration policy. Previous studies, however, suggest that business interests in both countries have weak influence on policy-making (Duvanova 2013; Howard 2003; Markus 2015; Traub-Merz and Gerasimova 2018). My interview evidence corroborates such findings: business interests in both countries are not powerful enough to cause a policy change; thus, they are not the main driver of immigration policy. Nonetheless, businesses benefit from lax enforcement policy, which has allowed them to exploit cheap foreign labour.

Studies have shown that businesses do not have the leverage to make a policy change in Kazakhstan. Despite the growing numbers of business associations and memberships, Kazakhstani business associations have ‘shrinking institutional opportunities for lobbying’, because political power is concentrated strongly in the presidential administration (Duvanova 2013: 83). Duvanova (2013: 83) points out that business associations do participate in high-profile advisory bodies, but the government’s ‘favouritism’ towards business associations ended in the 1990s. Accordingly, business associations focus on providing services to their members, such as legal consulting and connecting business partners, instead of functioning as channels for lobbying (Duvanova 2013: 84). The results of my interviews concurred with her findings. A former government official and current employee of an energy company in Kazakhstan pointed out that big businesses in Kazakhstan try to solve problems on their own, rather than by engaging in collective actions like lobbying (Interviewee 14). A leading political analyst and former government official said business associations had a serious relationship with the government until the 2000s, but are now placed under the government, and there is no more symbiosis between the government and businesses (Interviewee 12).

The findings from my interviews in Kazakhstan show that the government cooperates with businesses but refuses pro-immigration proposals by businesses. High-ranking government officials emphasized that the government has a good, cooperative relationship with businesses, and always works on legislation in consultation with them. One government official in the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Protection said, ‘We have formed a good tradition of mutual cooperation with enterprises, even including foreign firms. Working groups [on legislation] are required to include business associations and representatives of big enterprises. If they propose changes, and if they seem right to us, we adopt them’ (Interviewee 74). Regarding business lobbying, a government official in the Ministry of National Economy also clarified, ‘We should not call it [business lobbying] a pressure (*davlenie*). We [the government] are open and listen to proposals’ (Interviewee 75).

Businesses’ preferences, however, do not typically translate into policies, which suggests they do not exert substantial influence on policy-making. Businesses in Kazakhstan have lobbied for a liberal low-skilled admission policy. In my interview, the same government official in the Ministry of National Economy pointed out that businesses in Kazakhstan continually propose lifting restrictions on low-skilled migration: ‘There were proposals for simplifying procedures for low-skilled immigrants who work for companies. … Businesses kept proposing a change in various forms ... but the government is not taking it’ (Interviewee 75). As mentioned in the article, under the current system, businesses cannot officially hire low-skilled immigrants other than as seasonal workers in agriculture. The gap between business preferences and the actual policy suggests that businesses are not influential actors in migration policy-making in Kazakhstan, in contrast to the government officials’ claim.

Nevertheless, Kazakh businesses have not suffered from a migration policy that does not regulate migration. For instance, large construction companies—major employers of the foreign workforce—hire undocumented immigrants through sub-contractors (Interviewee 7; Interviewee 11). In an interview, a representative of a major foreign construction company in Kazakhstan said that they did not have information about the workers who were recruited by their sub-contractors (Interviewee 7). According to the representative, the company faced no legal or administrative difficulties in employing such workers. Agricultural firms also hire immigrant workers by circumventing official policies. The quota for seasonal workers (between 2000 and 3000 per year) is not always fully used, since agricultural firms recruit immigrants without official permission (Interviewee 65).

Business interests in Russia seem to be in a similar situation. Observers of Russian migration politics have noted that businesses lobbied for the adoption of the permit (*patent*) system for all low-skilled migrants, which was implemented in 2015. According to a representative of a Moscow-based migrant rights group, ‘after the adoption of the permit (*patent*) system in 2010 for migrants who worked for individuals (*fizicheskoe litso*) in non-commercial activities, businesses rioted and demanded that the permit system also include migrant workers employed in legal entities (*yuridicheskoe litso*)’ (Interviewee 29). From the perspective of businesses, the new permit system is indeed a liberal migration policy, which was well-received by big business associations and medium and small businesses (Interviewee 1; ‘Ekonomike Moskvy ne obojtis’ bez trudovyx migrantov [The economy of Moscow cannot be managed without labor migrants]’ 2015).

Russian business interests, however, seem to have played a small role in the adoption of a tougher admission and enforcement policy in the early 2010s. The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE)—the only business association that defended Khodorkovsky in the Yukos affairs—is one of the largest business associations in the country and has the most successful lobbying history (Duvanova 2013: 66). This strong defender of business interests did not oppose the adoption of restrictive measures in the 2010s, including the adoption of language, history, and law exams and the expansion of the legal bases for expelling migrants. In an interview with the author, one official of the RUIE said, ‘We did not oppose the adoption of [language, history, and law] exams. Anyway, migrants need to know the language, integrate into Russian society, and understand what their Russian employers say to them’ (Interviewee 1). Regarding the widened legal bases for expulsion and the subsequent increase in the number of expelled migrants, the official said, ‘Expulsion is the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)’s question. RUIE does not have the right to oppose it. We did not actively react to this law.’ The official further added, ‘We don’t experience a labour shortage yet. We still have enough migrant workers’ (Interviewee 1).

Other business associations reacted similarly to the stricter enforcement policy. The director of Opora Druzhba, an association of medium- and small-sized businesses, welcomed the government’s enforcement policy in a conference (‘Rossii nuzhno obnulit’sia i deportirovat’ vsekh migrantov [Russia needs to nullify and deport all migrants]’ 2013). In my interview, the director of the Commission on Migration Policy of one of the major business associations spoke highly of the Russian authorities’ strict migrant policy and criticized business associations such as Opora Russia for supporting an open migration policy (Interviewee 5).

The fact that Russian businesses did not oppose tougher immigrant restrictions counters the conventional wisdom that businesses advocate a liberal immigration policy. It is possible that they *could not* disagree, considering the repressive political environment. Still, it is noteworthy that the newly adopted immigration policy in Russia added more requirements for migrants while decreasing requirements for businesses. A former government official who currently works for one major business association said, ‘For businesses, the change [recent immigration restrictions] does not matter. All these new requirements, passing exams and paying work permit fees, must be fulfilled by migrants before they apply for jobs’ (Interviewee 2). This interview suggests that businesses have few preferences concerning restrictions imposed on the migrants’ side. In addition, during my interviews, representatives of business associations expressed their belief that migrants would come to Russia notwithstanding the federal law. In countries like Russia, where the rule of law is weak, businesses expect that migrants will continue to come and work, through informal routes and corrupt officials, regardless of changes in legislation. Thus, presumably, businesses would lack a strong interest in influencing migration policies. The analysis in this section suggests that business interests were not the primary actors in immigration policy-making in Russia and Kazakhstan.

## Xenophobia

Arguably, variations in the levels of xenophobia in Russia and Kazakhstan form a different context for the politics of migration. As mentioned in the article, non-Slavic migrants in Russia suffer from xenophobia and hate crimes, while those in Kazakhstan are relatively free from such racial violence and stigmatization. Yet, the levels of xenophobia seem to provide a limited explanation for the varying immigration policies in two respects. First, far from Kazakhstan’s much-touted interethnic harmony, research shows that Russia and Kazakhstan are not remarkably different in terms of xenophobia, and ethnic clashes continue to occur in Kazakhstan. Table A 1 is data from the World Values Survey (WVS) (Wave 6, 2010-14) that compares responses related to the levels of xenophobia. The numbers in the table are percentages; I also include other post-Soviet countries for reference. The data demonstrates that the levels of hostility towards immigrants in Kazakhstan is no different from Russia, and there are other post-Soviet countries that are more open to immigrants than Kazakhstan is.

Table A 1 Public Attitude towards Immigrants in Russia and Kazakhstan

(Source: World Values Survey, Wave 6, 2010-14)

Notes: the numbers in the table are percentage.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Question1:  On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours?  Immigrant/foreign workers | | | | | | |
|  | Kazakhstan | Russia | Azerbaijan | Armenia | Belarus | Estonia |
| Mentioned | 27.8 | 32.2 | 40.6 | 18.4 | 33.4 | 37.5 |
| Not mentioned | 72.2 | 67.5 | 59.4 | 81.6 | 66.6 | 62.5 |
| Missing/Inapplicable/Inappropriate response | 0 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| (N) | 1502 | 2500 | 1002 | 1100 | 1535 | 1533 |
|  | Georgia | Ukraine | Uzbekistan | Kyrgyzstan |
| Mentioned | 32.8 | 19.3 | 12.3 | 30.7 |
| Not mentioned | 67.2 | 80.7 | 87.7 | 69.3 |
| Missing/Inapplicable/Inappropriate response | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| (N) | 1202 | 1500 | 1500 | 1500 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Question2:  Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statements?  “When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants.” | | | | | | |
|  | Kazakhstan | Russia | Azerbaijan | Armenia | Belarus | Estonia |
| Agree | 77.2 | 72.8 | 86 | 82.2 | 64.8 | 77.7 |
| Neither | 15.4 | 15.6 | 12.3 | 9.1 | 18 | 12 |
| Disagree | 7.4 | 10.1 | 1.7 | 8.8 | 12.7 | 9.1 |
| No answer | 0 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 0.8 | 0.1 |
| Don´t know | 0 | 1.3 | 0 | 0 | 3.7 | 1.1 |
| (N) | 1502 | 2500 | 1002 | 1100 | 1535 | 1533 |
|  | Georgia | Ukraine | Uzbekistan | Kyrgyzstan |
| Agree | 83.4 | 73.8 | 43.9 | 54.4 |
| Neither | 9.1 | 13.3 | 20.5 | 33.1 |
| Disagree | 7.1 | 10.3 | 31.5 | 12.4 |
| No answer | 0 | 1 | 4.1 | 0.1 |
| Don´t know | 0.4 | 1.6 | 0 | 0 |
| (N) | 1202 | 1500 | 1500 | 1500 |

In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that ethnic violence continues to occur in Kazakhstan. Table A 2 shows ethnic clashes between Kazakhs and other ethnic groups, based on the author’s search for media reports. It is not an exhaustive list of ethnic violence in the country because of the government’s censorship of this matter. In some incidents, there were casualties, and the local authorities even blockaded districts. Most hostilities occurred between Kazakhs and other local ethnic groups, such as Uzbeks, Tajiks, Uighurs, Chechens, and Lezgins, who had migrated to Kazakhstan during the Soviet period and became Kazakhstani citizens. The only reported clash involving foreign citizens was the conflict between Turkish migrant workers and Kazakhs in Aktau in 2006. Although most clashes were between Kazakhs and other local ethnic groups, these instances suggest that Kazakhs do harbour animosity towards other ethnic groups.

Table A 2 Ethnic Clashes in Kazakhstan (Between Kazakhs and Others)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Date | Location | Ethnic Groups |
| October 1992[[1]](#endnote-1) | Ust-Kamenogorsk Oblast | Chechens |
| August  2006[[2]](#endnote-2) | Aktau, Mangystau Oblast | Chechens, Lezgins, and Azeris (Anti-Caucasus campaign) |
| October 2006[[3]](#endnote-3) | Tengis, Zhylyoiskoi raion, Atyrauskaya Oblast | Turkish migrants |
| November 2006[[4]](#endnote-4) | Shelek, Almatinskaya Oblast | Uighurs |
| March 2007[[5]](#endnote-5) | Malovodnoe, Almatinskaya Oblast | Chechens |
| November 2007[[6]](#endnote-6) | Mayatas, Toleibiinskii raion, Yuzhno-Kazakhstanakaya Oblast | Kurds |
| August 2014[[7]](#endnote-7) | Karamurt, Sairamskii raion, Yuzhno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast | Uzbeks |
| February 2015[[8]](#endnote-8) | Yntymak and Bostandyk, Saryagashskii raion, Yuzhno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast | Tajiks |
| February 2016[[9]](#endnote-9) | Buryl, Zhamblskaya Oblast | Turks |
| July  2016[[10]](#endnote-10) | Saifullino, Maktaaral’skii raion, Vostochno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast | Tajiks |

Second, xenophobia has both theoretical and empirical shortcomings in explaining the timing of increased immigration restrictions in Russia. Theoretically, it is questionable whether xenophobia is an independent, autonomous cause of immigration restrictions. Studies have demonstrated that xenophobia can be instigated by other factors, such as use of anti-migrant rhetoric by the media and politicians (Hopkins 2010; Posner 2004). Many Russian experts have also attributed the rise of xenophobia in Russian society to the widespread use of anti-immigrant rhetoric by the authorities and a restrictive migration policy (Interviewee 72; Interviewee 61). Considering the significant roles of external factors in shaping and influencing xenophobia, the level of xenophobia, by itself, seems to offer a limited explanation for immigrant restrictions.

Empirically, the trend in the level of xenophobia does not correspond well with the changes in immigrant restrictions in Russia. Figure A 3 shows survey results conducted regularly by the Levada Center, with a 95% confidence interval (Levada Center 2011: 183, 2014: 143, 2016: 186).[[11]](#endnote-11) The survey question asks, ‘What should the Russian government’s policy be like towards migrants?’ This figure shows that the level of xenophobia is correlated with migrant restrictions to some extent. 70% of the population said they opted for a restrictive immigration policy in August 2012. Subsequently, more than 70% of the respondents showed a preference for tightening immigration, up until August 2014.

Figure A 3 Russians’ Preference Regarding Migration Policy

It is uncertain, however, whether the ruling regime adopted migration policy because of xenophobia in Russian society. Figure A 3 demonstrates that the high level of xenophobia *coincided* with the restrictive migration policy, but did not *precede* it. As I demonstrated in the article, a restrictive turn in immigration policy began in early 2012 when, during his presidential campaign in January, President Putin promised to enact a tougher immigration policy. Yet, the figure shows that the levels of xenophobia were lower in August and November 2011, as compared to the following years. Similar patterns are discernible in other Levada surveys, such as on the opinion on migrants and the idea of ‘Russia for Russians’ (Levada Center 2019: 130–134): hostility against migrants heightened *after* increased immigration restrictions. While public opinion and xenophobia are likely to influence immigration policy, they have limitation in accounting for policy changes.

## Far-Right Political Opposition

Another plausible explanation for immigration restrictions invokes the roles of the far right. Putin faced strong anti-immigrant opposition, notably from the prominent critic Alexei Navalny and far-right nationalists, whereas Nazarbayev did not face such influential political opposition. Far-right political opposition admittedly matters and provides a broad context for immigration policy-making processes. Nevertheless, a close analysis shows that it still falls short as an explanation for tight immigration policies, and the electoral competition argument can complement it.

The literature suggests two mechanisms through which the far-right can increase immigrant restrictions (Givens and Luedtke 2005; Golder 2016; Wong 2015). First, far-right parties can adopt and implement anti-immigrant policies by participating in the government. Because the political right supports anti-migrant policies, an increase in their presence in the parliament or the government can result in restrictive migration policies. Second, far-right parties have an agenda-setting impact (Messina 2007: 55). By placing anti-migrant policies on the political agenda, far-right parties can incentivize other parties—for instance, right-of-centre parties—to adopt those policies. To quote Minkenberg (2017: 134–5), the major effect of the radical right is ‘the radicalization of parts of the mainstream, instead of a mainstreaming or taming of the radical right.’ Focusing on these two mechanisms, I will examine the role of far-right parties in Russia.

My analysis shows that the first mechanism does not hold in Russia: far-right parties’ participation in government did not increase to a great extent in the early 2010s. Table A 3 shows the electoral performance of far-right political parties as compared to United Russia, the dominant party. Far-right political parties include the Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation (LDPR), Rodina (Motherland), and various small political parties. I exclude the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) because it is debatable whether it can be defined as far-right (Ishiyama 1996; March 2002).

Table A 3 Vote Shares: United Russia vs Far-Right Parties, 2003-2018 (in percent) (Source:Arnold and Umland 2018: 586, Central Electoral Commission, http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru, accessed August 2, 2022)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Election  Type | Year | United Russia | LDPR | Rodina | Other[[12]](#endnote-12) |
| legislative | 2003 | 37.6 | 11.5 | 9.0 | 1.9 |
| presidential | 2004 | 71.3 | 2 | 4.1 |  |
| legislative | 2007 | 64.3 | 8.14 |  | 0.89 |
| presidential | 2008 | 70.3 | 9.3 |  |  |
| legislative | 2011 | 49.3 | 11.67 |  | 0.97 |
| presidential | 2012 | 63.6 | 6.22 |  |  |
| legislative | 2016 | 54.2 | 13.15 | 1.50 | 0.59 |
| presidential | 2018 | 76.7 | 5.71 |  |  |

Table A 3 demonstrates that the share of votes for far-right parties in Russia increased slightly (by about 3.61%) in the legislative election in 2011 compared to 2007. In the 2012 presidential election, the share of votes for far-right parties decreased. More importantly, with an increasingly government-manipulated political system and decreasing autonomy of political parties in Russia (Arnold and Umland 2018: 585), the far-right parties’ influence on policy-making processes has diminished. Thus, the presence of the far-right in the government seems to fail to account for the anti-immigrant policies in the early 2010s.

The second mechanism, the agenda-setting role of the far right, has implications for immigrant restrictions in Russia. In addition to the aforementioned far-right political parties, several so-called ‘non-systemic (*nesistemnyi*)’ far-right political organizations have been active in Russia. Non-systemic organizations denote activists, organizations, and networks that have been excluded from the official public sphere, such as parliaments and state institutions (Arnold and Umland 2018). Radical right non-systemic organizations in Russia have targeted migrants since the 2000s (Laruelle 2010), and they are numerous and fragmented: National-Bolshevik Party (*National-Bol’shevistskaia Partiia*), Russian Image (*Russkii Obraz*), BORN (*BoevaIa Organizatsiia Russkikh Natsionalistov*), Movement Against Illegal Immigration (*Dvizhenie Protiv Nelegal’noi Immigratsii: DPNI*), Slavic Union (*Slavianskii Soiuz*), Russian Social Movement (*Rosskoe Obshchestvennoe Dvizhenie: ROD*), and so on. Many leaders of these organizations played a crucial role in the protests against Putin in 2011-12 (Arnold and Umland 2018). As mentioned in the article, Putin’s influential opponent, Alexei Navalny, endorsed nationalist campaigns and rhetoric, such as illegal migration control and ‘Stop Feeding the Caucasus’, which called for the suspension of federal subsidies for Chechnya and North Caucasus (Laruelle 2014).

Arguably, such far-right organizations and political opposition placed migration on the political agenda and helped the government increase immigrant restrictions (Laruelle 2010; Tipaldou and Uba 2014). A drawback of this explanation, however, is that it cannot account for the *timing* of the adoption of anti-immigration policies. These far-right, anti-immigrant organizations had already thrived in the 2000s. In light of the popularity of the Russian March, a nationalist demonstration, and the number of acts of ethnic violence committed by skinheads (Arnold and Umland 2018), radical right organizations seemed more influential in the 2000s than in the 2010s. Yet the ruling regime did not significantly increase immigrant restrictions in the 2000s. Thus, the agenda-setting power of the far right fails to give a sufficient explanation for this timing. While the far right’s power to influence the agenda is an important factor, the electoral competition argument can complement it by suggesting *when* it can exercise influence on policy-making processes.

## State Capacity

Finally, it is possible the Kazakhstani government simply does not have the capability to change and execute immigration policies. State capacity matters, but still provides only a limited explanation; during the time frame of the study’s focus, Russia and Kazakhstan did not differ much in their state capacity. In measuring state capacity, I will utilize ‘government effectiveness’[[13]](#endnote-13) from the World Governance Indicators and infant mortality rates, which are illustrated in Table A 4 and Table A 5. In terms of government effectiveness, both countries show poor performance, and their difference falls within the margin of error. Russia’s infant mortality was lower than that of Kazakhstan, but these indicators converged in the mid-2010s. These measures suggest state capacity does not vary much between Russia and Kazakhstan.

Table A 4 Government Effectiveness (Percentile Ranking) [[14]](#endnote-14)

(Source: World Governance Indicators)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 | 2018 |
| Russia | 43.7 | 39.7 | 41.2 | 48.5 | 44.7 | 53.4 |
| Kazakhstan | 39.8 | 40.2 | 40.3 | 53.4 | 50.9 | 54.3 |

Table A 5 Infant Mortality (Per 1,000 Live Births)

(Source: World Bank)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 | 2018 |
| Russia | 9.7 | 8.9 | 8.4 | 8.1 | 6.9 | 5 |
| Kazakhstan | 22.1 | 18.2 | 14.6 | 13.1 | 9.7 | 9 |

More importantly, previous studies on other policy areas suggest that Kazakhstan authorities are competent to make policy changes when they intend to do so. For instance, in explaining Kazakhstan’s success and Russia’s failure to make social policy reforms, Maltseva (2012: ii) shows that Kazakhstan’s key state actors had ‘the capacity to frame the problem and form an effective policy coalition that could further the reform agenda’, which was lacking among the Russian authorities. In an interview with the media in 2013, Akhmed Muradov, a member of Majilis (the Lower House) and the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, said, ‘I think Kazakhstan does not have experience in fighting illegal migration. Now, our country has just started to formulate an approach to this problem. … *When our authorities want to, they are and will be able to control migrants* [emphasis added]’ (NUR.KZ 2013). Considering these pieces of evidence, state capacity on its own does not appear to explain the policy differences between the two countries. The important question is how the state allocates its attention and resources among various policy issues within its state capacity.

# List of Interviewees

Table A 6. List of Interviewees

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Date** | **Place** | **Interviewee** |
| 1 | 31-Jan-17 | Moscow | Business Organization Representative |
| 2 | 22-Jun-17 | Moscow | Business Organization Representative |
| 3 | 26-Jun-17 | Moscow | Business Organization Representative |
| 4 | 27-Jun-17 | Moscow | Business Organization Representative |
| 5 | 15-Apr-16 | Moscow | Business Organization Representative |
| 6 | 21-Feb-17 | Online | City Government Official |
| 7 | 26-Oct-16 | Astana | Construction Company |
| 8 | 11-Jan-17 | Moscow | Former FMS Official |
| 9 | 27-Jul-15 | Moscow | Former FMS Official |
| 10 | 28-Mar-16 | Moscow | Former FMS Official |
| 11 | 23-Jun-16 | Astana | Former Government Employee |
| 12 | 8-Sep-16 | Almaty | Former Government Official |
| 13 | 9-Sep-16 | Almaty | Former Government Official |
| 14 | 25-Oct-16 | Astana | Former Government Official |
| 15 | 20-Dec-16 | Moscow | Former Government Official |
| 16 | 29-Jul-15 | Moscow | Head of NGO |
| 17 | 12-Aug-15 | Moscow | Head of NGO |
| 18 | 13-Aug-15 | Moscow | Head of NGO |
| 19 | 18-Aug-15 | Moscow | Head of NGO |
| 20 | 18-Aug-15 | Moscow | Head of NGO |
| 21 | 14-Mar-16 | Moscow | Head of NGO |
| 22 | 30-Mar-16 | Moscow | Head of NGO |
| 23 | 19-May-16 | Moscow | Head of NGO |
| 24 | 13-Jun-16 | Almaty | Head of NGO |
| 25 | 22-Jun-16 | Astana | Head of NGO |
| 26 | 22-Jun-16 | Astana | Head of NGO |
| 27 | 30-Jun-16 | Shymkent | Head of NGO |
| 28 | 10-Oct-16 | Shymkent | Head of NGO |
| 29 | 25-Jan-17 | Moscow | Head of NGO |
| 30 | 11-Jun-16 | Almaty | Legal Consultant |
| 31 | 10-May-16 | Moscow | Migrant Kazakhstan, male |
| 32 | 13-Apr-16 | Moscow | Migrant Kyrgyzstan, female |
| 33 | 16-Jun-16 | Almaty | Migrant Kyrgyzstan, female |
| 34 | 16-Jun-16 | Almaty | Migrant Kyrgyzstan, female |
| 35 | 15-Jun-16 | Almaty | Migrant Kyrgyzstan, male |
| 36 | 16-Jun-16 | Almaty | Migrant Kyrgyzstan, male |
| 37 | 16-Jun-16 | Almaty | Migrant Kyrgyzstan, male |
| 38 | 30-Jun-17 | Moscow | Migrant Moldova, female |
| 39 | 18-Mar-16 | Moscow | Migrant Tajikistan, male |
| 40 | 18-Mar-16 | Moscow | Migrant Uzbekistan, male |
| 41 | 14-Jun-16 | Almaty | Migrant Uzbekistan, male |
| 42 | 14-Jun-16 | Almaty | Migrant Uzbekistan, male |
| 43 | 26-Oct-16 | Astana | Migrant, Armenia, male |
| 44 | 26-Oct-16 | Astana | Migrant, Kyrgyzstan, male |
| 45 | 8-Oct-16 | Zhetisay | Migrant, Tajikistan, male |
| 46 | 7-Oct-16 | Zhetisay | Migrant, Uzbekistan, female |
| 47 | 7-Oct-16 | Zhetisay | Migrant, Uzbekistan, male |
| 48 | 10-Nov-16 | Moscow | Migrant, Uzbekistan, male |
| 49 | 23-Jun-16 | Astana | Migration Police |
| 50 | 21-Jul-15 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 51 | 24-Jul-15 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 52 | 30-Jul-15 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 53 | 4-Aug-15 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 54 | 5-Aug-15 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 55 | 5-Aug-15 | Online | Migration Researcher |
| 56 | 10-Mar-16 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 57 | 17-Mar-16 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 58 | 17-Mar-16 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 59 | 31-Mar-16 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 60 | 12-May-16 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 61 | 19-May-16 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 62 | 26-May-16 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 63 | 10-Jun-16 | Almaty | Migration Researcher |
| 64 | 11-Jun-16 | Almaty | Migration Researcher |
| 65 | 28-Jun-16 | Astana | Migration Researcher |
| 66 | 13-Oct-16 | Online | Migration Researcher |
| 67 | 29-Oct-16 | Almaty | Migration Researcher |
| 68 | 29-Nov-16 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 69 | 14-Dec-16 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 70 | 17-Jan-17 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 71 | 17-Jan-17 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 72 | 27-Jan-17 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 73 | 31-Jan-17 | Moscow | Migration Researcher |
| 74 | 20-Oct-16 | Astana | Ministry Official |
| 75 | 28-Oct-16 | Astana | Ministry Official |
| 76 | 30-Nov-16 | Moscow | NGO Employee |
| 77 | 6-Dec-16 | Moscow | NGO Employee |
| 78 | 18-Jan-17 | Moscow | Parliamentarian |
| 79 | 25-Jan-17 | Moscow | Parliamentarian |
| 80 | 1-Sep-16 | Almaty | Political Science Researcher |
| 81 | 7-Sep-16 | Almaty | Political Science Researcher |
| 82 | 7-Sep-16 | Almaty | Political Science Researcher |
| 83 | 13-Sep-16 | Almaty | Political Science Researcher |
| 84 | 6-Oct-16 | Almaty | Political Science Researcher |
| 85 | 5-Dec-16 | Moscow | Political Science Researcher |
| 86 | 5-Dec-16 | Online | Political Science Researcher |
| 87 | 14-Dec-16 | Moscow | Political Science Researcher |
| 88 | 28-Dec-16 | Moscow | Political Science Researcher |
| 89 | 23-Jun-16 | Astana | Professional lawyer for Migrants |
| 90 | 14-Aug-15 | Moscow | Professional Lawyer for Migrants |
| 91 | 13-Sep-16 | Almaty | Professional lawyer for Migrants |
| 92 | 10-Oct-16 | Shymkent | Professional lawyer for Migrants |
| 93 | 27-Jun-16 | Astana | Researcher |
| 94 | 8-Sep-16 | Almaty | Researcher |
| 95 | 27-Oct-16 | Astana | Researcher |
| 96 | 28-Jun-16 | Astana | Sociology Researcher |
| 97 | 6-Sep-16 | Almaty | Sociology Researcher |
| 98 | 12-Sep-16 | Almaty | Sociology Researcher |

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11. The number of survey respondents was 1,600 in all surveys except August 2010, November 2011, and March 2015, which included 800 respondents. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Other parties include the Party of the Rebirth of Russia-Russia Party of Life (Partiia Vozrozhdeniia Rossii-Rossiiskaia Partiia Zhizni: PVR-RPZh) and the Patriots of Russia (Patrioty Rossii) [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Government effectiveness ‘captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies’ (World Bank n.d.). [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Data represent percentile ranking of country on Government Effective indicators (100% indicates that the country rates higher than any other; 0% indicates that the country rates lower than any other). [↑](#endnote-ref-14)