**Online Appendix**

for ‘Cabinet Reshuffles and Prime-Ministerial Performance in Central and Eastern Europe’

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# **Appendix**

## ***Table A1:*** Indicators and survey items of prime-ministerial performance.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Sub-dimensions** | **Indicators** | **Survey Items** |
| ***Delegated tasks: Running state affairs*** | | |
| Settling cabinet conflicts (**0.77**) | Prevailing in  PM-minister conflicts | (1) Looking back at the strongest conflicts between [prime minister] and ministers of [her/his] cabinet, how successful was [she/he] in resolving these conflicts in [her/his] favor? |
|  | Mediating inter- ministerial conflicts | (2) Now think of the strongest conflicts between ministers where [prime minister] did not take sides. How successful was [prime minister] in mediating these conflicts between two or more ministers? |
| Directing domestic affairs 1 (Shaping government policies) (**0.59**) | Enacting preferred policies for societal concerns | (3) Thinking of the predominant policy concerns during [her/his] term, to what extent was [prime minister] successful in enacting [her/his] preferred policies? |
|  | Averting non- preferred policies | (4) When reacting to policy proposals of the ministers, how successful was [prime minister] in blocking proposals [she/he] opposed? |
| Directing domestic affairs 2 (Managing exogenous crises) (**0.87**) | Strategizing crises  response | (5) In responding to major exogenous shocks (e.g. natural disasters, economic breakdowns, terrorist attacks), how successful was [prime minister] in developing a strategy to cope with them? |
|  | Responding to crises in appropriate time | (6) In responding to these exogenous shocks, how successful was [prime minister] in reaching decisions in appropriate time? |
| Securing national interests abroad (**0.72**) | Securing national  interests towards other countries | (7) How successful was [prime minister] in securing the national interests of [country] at that time in bilateral relations with other countries? |
|  | Securing national  interests towards  European Union | (8) How successful was [prime minister] in securing the national interests with the institutions of the European Union? |
| ***Accountability tasks: Maintaining support of principals*** | | |
| Maintaining support of parliamentary majority (**single indicator**) | Maintaining support for government policy | (9) Turning to prime ministers’ relationship with parliament: How successful was [prime minister] in securing support of parliament for government policies throughout the term? |
| Maintaining support of own party (**0.76**) | Maintaining support of party elites | (10) How successful was [prime minister] in securing support of the leadership of [her/his] party? |
|  | Maintaining support of party base | (11) And how successful was [prime minister] in securing support of the base of [her/his] party? |

## ***Figure A1:*** Marginal effects plot of reshuffles of PM party and coalition partner ministers (based on Model 2).



*Annotations*: Grey shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.

## ***Figure A2:*** Linear prediction of reshuffles of ministers belonging and not belonging to PM’s party over whole value range of independent variable (based on Model 2).



*Annotations*: Grey shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals. The grey bars indicate distribution of the independent variable (histograms).

## ***Figure A3:*** Marginal effects plot of reshuffles of ministers belonging and not belonging to PM’s party over whole value range of independent variable (based on Model 2).



*Annotations*: Grey shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals. The grey bars indicate distribution of the independent variable (histograms).

## ***Table A2:*** Robustness checks for Model 1 (T1.1 to T1.9).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | T 1.1 | T 1.2 | T 1.3 | T 1.4 | T 1.5 | T 1.6 | T 1.7 | T 1.8 | T 1.9 |
|  | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Explanatory variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Overall reshuffles | -0.391\*\* | -0.348\*\* | -0.367\*\* | -0.313\* | -0.322\* | -0.309\* | -0.307\* | -0.348\* | -0.286\* |
|  | (0.133) | (0.133) | (0.127) | (0.131) | (0.129) | (0.130) | (0.131) | (0.141) | (0.128) |
| Overall reshuffles (sq) | 0.032\*\* | 0.039\*\*\* | 0.042\*\*\* | 0.035\*\* | 0.036\*\* | 0.035\*\* | 0.036\*\* | 0.038\*\* | 0.031\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.011) |
| Reshuffles in core | 0.264 | 0.219 | 0.167 | 0.217 | 0.216 | 0.189 | 0.212 | 0.245 | 0.146 |
| portfolios | (0.205) | (0.207) | (0.219) | (0.206) | (0.206) | (0.215) | (0.203) | (0.214) | (0.208) |
| Reshuffles in core | -0.024 | -0.062 | -0.012 | -0.039 | -0.042 | -0.032 | -0.041 | -0.049 | -0.009 |
| portfolios (sq) | (0.078) | (0.085) | (0.094) | (0.084) | (0.085) | (0.086) | (0.083) | (0.085) | (0.085) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Active reshuffles | 0.132 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.185) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Active reshuffles (sq) | 0.042 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.068) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reshuffles with change in |  | -0.185 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party affiliation to PM party |  | (0.595) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reshuffles with change in |  | 0.645 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party affiliation to PM party (sq) |  | (0.681) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Overall reshuffles at | 0.052 | 0.072+ | 0.063 | 0.067 | 0.067 | 0.066 | 0.058 | 0.073+ | 0.052 |
| same day | (0.040) | (0.042) | (0.042) | (0.043) | (0.042) | (0.042) | (0.043) | (0.042) | (0.042) |
| Absence of reshuffles |  |  | 0.214 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.222) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Single party cabinet | -0.048 | -0.024 | -0.003 |  | -0.012 | 0.028 | -0.017 | 0.027 | -0.004 |
|  | (0.183) | (0.188) | (0.201) |  | (0.198) | (0.196) | (0.189) | (0.216) | (0.195) |
| Number of coalition parties |  |  |  | -0.044 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.040) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Majority cabinet |  |  |  |  | 0.017 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.121) |  |  |  |  |
| Surplus coalition |  |  |  |  |  | 0.133 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.128) |  |  |  |
| Post-electoral cabinet |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.104 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.091) |  |  |
| Ideological range of |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |  |
| cabinet parties |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.003) |  |
| PM appointment & | 0.120 | 0.124 | 0.154 | 0.153 | 0.142 | 0.115 | 0.147 | 0.145 | 0.187+ |
| dismissal power | (0.104) | (0.104) | (0.107) | (0.099) | (0.112) | (0.117) | (0.107) | (0.112) | (0.097) |
| PM = party leader |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.324\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.128) |
| Number of ministers | -0.013 | -0.017 | -0.010 | -0.007 | -0.013 | -0.012 | -0.011 | -0.013 | -0.008 |
| in cabinet | (0.020) | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.019) |
| Constant | 2.033\*\* | 2.113\*\* | 1.684\* | 1.862\*\* | 1.911\*\* | 1.980\*\* | 1.785\*\* | 1.877\*\* | 1.374\* |
|  | (0.630) | (0.666) | (0.672) | (0.633) | (0.684) | (0.693) | (0.666) | (0.684) | (0.629) |
| Observations | 2509 | 2509 | 2509 | 2466 | 2509 | 2487 | 2509 | 2469 | 2509 |
| *R*2 | 0.085 | 0.077 | 0.073 | 0.073 | 0.069 | 0.073 | 0.073 | 0.071 | 0.095 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.077 | 0.069 | 0.065 | 0.066 | 0.061 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.063 | 0.087 |

*Annotations:* With + p < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. Standard errors are clustered at the cabinet level. Country- and period-fixed effects are omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification.

## ***Table A3:*** Robustness checks for Model 2 (T 2.1 to 2.11).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | T 2.1 | T 2.2 | T 2.3 | T 2.4 | T 2.5 | T 2.6 | T 2.7 | T 2.8 | T 2.9 | T 2.10 | T 2.11 |
|  | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Explanatory variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reshuffles of PM party | 0.016 | 0.041 | 0.034 | 0.049 | 0.100 | 0.063 | 0.072 | 0.070 | 0.061 | 0.066 | -0.045 |
| ministers | (0.131) | (0.120) | (0.123) | (0.120) | (0.118) | (0.124) | (0.121) | (0.121) | (0.120) | (0.120) | (0.122) |
| Reshuffles of PM party | -0.057+ | -0.055\* | -0.058+ | -0.058\* | -0.071\* | -0.061\* | -0.063\* | -0.059\* | -0.065\* | -0.067\* | -0.034 |
| ministers (sq) | (0.029) | (0.027) | (0.030) | (0.027) | (0.029) | (0.028) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.030) |
| Reshuffles of coalition | -0.657\*\*\* | -0.656\*\*\* | -0.653\*\*\* | -0.629\*\*\* | -0.573\*\* | -0.613\*\*\* | -0.633\*\*\* | -0.612\*\*\* | -0.633\*\*\* | -0.629\*\* | -0.546\*\* |
| partner ministers | (0.185) | (0.176) | (0.165) | (0.172) | (0.183) | (0.171) | (0.174) | (0.172) | (0.176) | (0.230) | (0.164) |
| Reshuffles of coalition | 0.227\* | 0.221\*\*\* | 0.225\*\*\* | 0.223\*\*\* | 0.194\*\*\* | 0.219\*\*\* | 0.220\*\*\* | 0.222\*\*\* | 0.221\*\*\* | 0.213\*\*\* | 0.199\*\*\* |
| partner ministers (sq) | (0.090) | (0.055) | (0.051) | (0.055) | (0.053) | (0.054) | (0.052) | (0.054) | (0.054) | (0.063) | (0.058) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Active reshuffles | 0.205 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.215) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Active reshuffles (sq) | -0.052 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.109) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reshuffles with change in |  | -0.590 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party affiliation to PM party |  | (0.593) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reshuffles with change in |  | 0.989 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party affiliation to PM party (sq) |  | (0.680) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reshuffles of independent |  |  | -0.056 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ministers |  |  | (0.154) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reshuffles of independent |  |  | 0.059 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ministers (sq) |  |  | (0.049) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Overall reshuffles at | 0.042 | 0.060 | 0.057 | 0.049 | 0.054 | 0.051 | 0.054 | 0.044 | 0.056 | 0.057 | 0.046 |
| same day | (0.037) | (0.038) | (0.039) | (0.039) | (0.038) | (0.038) | (0.038) | (0.038) | (0.038) | (0.038) | (0.036) |
| Absence of reshuffles |  |  |  | 0.077 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.203) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Single party cabinet | -0.199 | -0.193 | -0.198 | -0.193 |  | -0.181 | -0.137 | -0.193 | -0.147 | -0.141 | -0.171 |
|  | (0.191) | (0.193) | (0.196) | (0.195) |  | (0.197) | (0.196) | (0.189) | (0.215) | (0.219) | (0.201) |
| Number of coalition parties |  |  |  |  | -0.011 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.041) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Majority cabinet |  |  |  |  |  | 0.028 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.109) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Surplus coalition |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.157 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.124) |  |  |  |  |
| Post-electoral cabinet |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.098 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.090) |  |  |  |
| Ideological range of |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.002 | 0.002 |  |
| cabinet parties |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.003) | (0.003) |  |
| Ideological range # reshuf- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.004 |  |
| fles of col. partner |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.009) |  |
| Ideological range # reshuf- |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.003 |  |
| fles of col. partner (sq) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.004) |  |
| PM appointment & | 0.083 | 0.093 | 0.110 | 0.092 | 0.077 | 0.083 | 0.062 | 0.091 | 0.082 | 0.083 | 0.126 |
| dismissal power | (0.097) | (0.094) | (0.096) | (0.094) | (0.091) | (0.097) | (0.100) | (0.095) | (0.098) | (0.098) | (0.084) |
| PM = party leader |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.303\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.123) |
| Number of ministers | -0.013 | -0.016 | -0.008 | -0.009 | -0.004 | -0.010 | -0.008 | -0.008 | -0.011 | -0.010 | -0.009 |
| in cabinet | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.018) |
| Constant | 2.119\*\*\* | 2.172\*\*\* | 1.980\*\* | 2.005\*\* | 1.974\*\* | 2.102\*\*\* | 2.101\*\* | 1.969\*\* | 2.098\*\*\* | 2.064\*\* | 1.691\*\* |
|  | (0.613) | (0.610) | (0.597) | (0.623) | (0.609) | (0.616) | (0.633) | (0.627) | (0.621) | (0.622) | (0.567) |
| Observations | 2509 | 2509 | 2509 | 2509 | 2466 | 2509 | 2487 | 2509 | 2469 | 2469 | 2509 |
| *R*2 | 0.110 | 0.111 | 0.112 | 0.107 | 0.106 | 0.106 | 0.111 | 0.109 | 0.109 | 0.110 | 0.126 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.102 | 0.103 | 0.104 | 0.099 | 0.099 | 0.099 | 0.104 | 0.102 | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.119 |

*Annotations:* With + p < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. Standard errors are clustered at the cabinet level. Country- and period-fixed effects are omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification.

## ***Table A4:*** Robustness checks for Model 1 (T 1.10 to 1.16).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | T 1.10 | T 1.11 | T 1.12 | T 1.13 | T 1.14 | T 1.15 | T 1.16 |
|  | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Explanatory variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Overall reshuffles | -0.302\* | -0.302\* | -0.318\* | -0.317\* | -0.321\* | -0.352\*\* | -0.299\* |
|  | (0.124) | (0.124) | (0.129) | (0.130) | (0.132) | (0.127) | (0.133) |
| Overall reshuffles (sq) | 0.034\*\* | 0.034\*\* | 0.036\*\* | 0.036\*\* | 0.037\*\* | 0.038\*\*\* | 0.034\*\* |
|  | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Reshuffles in core | 0.170 | 0.170 | 0.219 | 0.211 | 0.249 | 0.242 | 0.113 |
| portfolios | (0.198) | (0.198) | (0.205) | (0.210) | (0.252) | (0.203) | (0.215) |
| Reshuffles in core | -0.034 | -0.034 | -0.043 | -0.038 | -0.052 | -0.035 | -0.007 |
| portfolios (sq) | (0.085) | (0.085) | (0.084) | (0.089) | (0.141) | (0.081) | (0.089) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Overall reshuffles at | 0.069 | 0.069 | 0.063 | 0.066 | 0.070 | 0.067 | 0.058 |
| same day | (0.042) | (0.042) | (0.043) | (0.043) | (0.046) | (0.042) | (0.038) |
| Single party cabinet | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.013 | -0.005 | -0.009 |  | -0.133 |
|  | (0.191) | (0.191) | (0.201) | (0.199) | (0.202) |  | (0.228) |
| PM appointment & |  |  | 0.163 | 0.144 | 0.227 | 0.160 | 0.123 |
| dismissal power |  |  | (0.117) | (0.110) | (0.153) | (0.111) | (0.127) |
| President appointment & | 0.250 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| dismissal power | (0.287) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Parliament dismissal |  | 0.250 |  |  |  |  |  |
| power |  | (0.287) |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP change year before |  |  | -0.004 |  |  |  |  |
| investiture |  |  | (0.007) |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate year |  |  |  | 0.003 |  |  |  |
| before investiture |  |  |  | (0.015) |  |  |  |
| Inflation rate year before |  |  |  |  | 0.001 |  |  |
| investiture |  |  |  |  | (0.000) |  |  |
| Number of ministers | -0.013 | -0.013 | -0.012 | -0.013 | -0.007 | -0.008 | -0.004 |
| in cabinet | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.020) |
| Constant | 2.611\*\*\* | 2.611\*\*\* | 1.859\* | 1.911\*\* | 1.339 | 1.668\* | 2.063\*\* |
|  | (0.454) | (0.454) | (0.733) | (0.730) | (0.919) | (0.683) | (0.699) |
| Observations | 2509 | 2509 | 2469 | 2469 | 2437 | 2551 | 2345 |
| *R*2 | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.068 | 0.067 | 0.072 | 0.076 | 0.064 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.060 | 0.059 | 0.064 | 0.069 | 0.056 |

*Annotations:* With + p < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. Standard errors are clustered at the cabinet level. Country- and period-fixed effects are omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification.

## ***Table A5:*** Robustness checks for Model 1 (T 2.12 to 2.18).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | T 2.12 | T 2.13 | T 2.14 | T 2.15 | T 2.16 | T 2.17 | T 2.18 |
|  | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Explanatory variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reshuffles of PM party | 0.056 | 0.056 | 0.067 | 0.068 | 0.095 | 0.165 | 0.041 |
| ministers | (0.119) | (0.119) | (0.121) | (0.120) | (0.118) | (0.124) | (0.121) |
| Reshuffles of PM party | -0.061\* | -0.061\* | -0.062\* | -0.062\* | -0.065\* | -0.078\* | -0.054\* |
| ministers (sq) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.026) | (0.030) | (0.026) |
| Reshuffles of coalition | -0.607\*\*\* | -0.607\*\*\* | -0.612\*\*\* | -0.611\*\*\* | -0.648\*\*\* | -0.449\*\* | -0.570\*\* |
| partner ministers | (0.169) | (0.169) | (0.174) | (0.173) | (0.172) | (0.171) | (0.173) |
| Reshuffles of coalition | 0.220\*\*\* | 0.220\*\*\* | 0.218\*\*\* | 0.218\*\*\* | 0.227\*\*\* | 0.172\*\*\* | 0.216\*\*\* |
| partner ministers (sq) | (0.054) | (0.054) | (0.055) | (0.055) | (0.055) | (0.048) | (0.050) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Overall reshuffles at | 0.053 | 0.053 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.057 | 0.021 | 0.040 |
| same day | (0.038) | (0.038) | (0.039) | (0.038) | (0.040) | (0.040) | (0.035) |
| Single party cabinet | -0.181 | -0.181 | -0.174 | -0.174 | -0.187 |  | -0.333 |
|  | (0.190) | (0.190) | (0.199) | (0.199) | (0.199) |  | (0.216) |
| PM appointment & |  |  | 0.086 | 0.088 | 0.117 | 0.089 | 0.060 |
| dismissal power |  |  | (0.109) | (0.096) | (0.151) | (0.097) | (0.104) |
| President appointment & | 0.252 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| dismissal power | (0.261) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Parliament dismissal |  | 0.252 |  |  |  |  |  |
| power |  | (0.261) |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP change year before |  |  | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |
| investiture |  |  | (0.007) |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate year |  |  |  | 0.002 |  |  |  |
| before investiture |  |  |  | (0.014) |  |  |  |
| Inflation rate year before |  |  |  |  | 0.000 |  |  |
| investiture |  |  |  |  | (0.000) |  |  |
| Number of ministers | -0.010 | -0.010 | -0.010 | -0.010 | -0.004 | -0.004 | -0.003 |
| in cabinet | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.019) |
| Constant | 2.525\*\*\* | 2.525\*\*\* | 2.162\*\* | 2.125\*\* | 1.828\* | 1.800\*\* | 2.312\*\*\* |
|  | (0.424) | (0.424) | (0.691) | (0.682) | (0.899) | (0.637) | (0.596) |
| Observations | 2509 | 2509 | 2469 | 2469 | 2437 | 2551 | 2345 |
| *R*2 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.105 | 0.105 | 0.112 | 0.094 | 0.101 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.097 | 0.098 | 0.104 | 0.087 | 0.093 |

*Annotations:* With + p < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. Standard errors are clustered at the cabinet level. Country- and period-fixed effects are omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification.

## ***Table A6:*** Linear regression of different types of reshuffles on sub-dimensions of prime-ministerial performance (reshuffles of PM party ministers and coalition partner ministers).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Conflict | Policy | Crisis | International | Party | Parliament |
|  | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Explanatory variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reshuffles of PM party | -0.018 | 0.075 | 0.515 | 0.207 | 0.101 | -0.078 |
| ministers | (0.150) | (0.122) | (0.289) | (0.106) | (0.183) | (0.143) |
| Reshuffles of PM party | -0.043 | -0.064\* | -0.244\*\* | -0.079\*\*\* | -0.089\* | -0.028 |
| ministers (sq) | (0.034) | (0.027) | (0.089) | (0.022) | (0.039) | (0.033) |
| Reshuffles of coalition | -0.706\*\* | -0.597\*\*\* | -0.581 | -0.334 | -0.558\* | -0.828\*\*\* |
| partner ministers | (0.214) | (0.170) | (0.292) | (0.176) | (0.252) | (0.200) |
| Reshuffles of coalition | 0.237\*\*\* | 0.220\*\*\* | 0.225\* | 0.126\* | 0.205\*\* | 0.273\*\*\* |
| partner ministers (sq) | (0.063) | (0.055) | (0.084) | (0.050) | (0.077) | (0.062) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Overall reshuffles at same day | 0.083 | 0.060 | 0.055 | 0.018 | 0.011 | 0.109\*\* |
|  | (0.043) | (0.038) | (0.072) | (0.037) | (0.053) | (0.041) |
| Single party cabinet | -0.089 | -0.146 | -0.477 | -0.271 | -0.293 | -0.098 |
|  | (0.227) | (0.202) | (0.340) | (0.152) | (0.248) | (0.229) |
| PM appointment & | 0.192 | 0.059 | 0.457 | 0.006 | -0.003 | 0.156 |
| dismissal power | (0.121) | (0.104) | (0.339) | (0.072) | (0.141) | (0.119) |
| Number of ministers in | -0.024 | -0.014 | -0.021 | 0.011 | -0.007 | -0.001 |
| cabinet | (0.024) | (0.021) | (0.035) | (0.017) | (0.027) | (0.023) |
| Constant | 1.663\* | 2.425\*\*\* | 0.009 | 2.009\*\*\* | 2.926\*\*\* | 1.477\* |
|  | (0.766) | (0.638) | (2.061) | (0.546) | (0.807) | (0.724) |
| Observations | 2398 | 2465 | 925 | 2440 | 2412 | 2468 |
| *R*2 | 0.080 | 0.071 | 0.120 | 0.140 | 0.089 | 0.088 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.072 | 0.064 | 0.101 | 0.133 | 0.082 | 0.081 |

*Annotations:* With \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. Standard errors are clustered at the cabinet level. Country- and period-fixed effects are omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification.

## ***Table A7:*** Linear regression of different types of reshuffles on sub-dimensions of prime-ministerial performance (reshuffles of PM party ministers and coalition partner ministers; robustness check including the number of reshuffles actively enforced by the PM).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Conflict | Policy | Crisis | International | Party | Parliament |
|  | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Explanatory variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reshuffles of PM party | -0.048 | 0.026 | 1.091\*\*\* | 0.177 | 0.026 | -0.078 |
| ministers | (0.165) | (0.133) | (0.263) | (0.115) | (0.187) | (0.157) |
| Reshuffles of PM party | -0.042 | -0.061\* | -0.408\*\*\* | -0.075\*\* | -0.079\* | -0.032 |
| ministers (sq) | (0.036) | (0.028) | (0.080) | (0.023) | (0.040) | (0.035) |
| Reshuffles of coalition | -0.775\*\*\* | -0.662\*\*\* | -1.722\*\*\* | -0.333 | -0.550\* | -0.899\*\*\* |
| partner ministers | (0.229) | (0.182) | (0.367) | (0.199) | (0.274) | (0.222) |
| Reshuffles of coalition | 0.268\* | 0.240\*\* | 1.070\*\*\* | 0.109 | 0.157 | 0.323\*\* |
| partner ministers (sq) | (0.107) | (0.087) | (0.174) | (0.080) | (0.142) | (0.109) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reshuffles actively en- | 0.285 | 0.308 | 0.711 | 0.040 | 0.076 | 0.250 |
| forced by the PM | (0.250) | (0.222) | (0.480) | (0.180) | (0.298) | (0.262) |
| Reshuffles actively en- | -0.095 | -0.089 | -0.947\*\*\* | 0.010 | 0.037 | -0.109 |
| forced by the PM (sq) | (0.131) | (0.108) | (0.199) | (0.087) | (0.164) | (0.136) |
| Overall reshuffles at | 0.069 | 0.045 | 0.144\* | 0.016 | 0.006 | 0.097\* |
| same day | (0.044) | (0.037) | (0.057) | (0.036) | (0.051) | (0.041) |
| Single party cabinet | -0.100 | -0.157 | -0.533 | -0.267 | -0.282 | -0.115 |
|  | (0.220) | (0.198) | (0.321) | (0.152) | (0.248) | (0.227) |
| PM appointment & | 0.186 | 0.051 | 0.588\* | 0.004 | -0.008 | 0.151 |
| dismissal power | (0.121) | (0.106) | (0.286) | (0.073) | (0.141) | (0.122) |
| Number of ministers in | -0.029 | -0.019 | -0.052 | 0.011 | -0.007 | -0.006 |
| cabinet | (0.024) | (0.021) | (0.026) | (0.017) | (0.028) | (0.023) |
| Constant | 1.704\* | 2.477\*\*\* | -0.468 | 2.009\*\*\* | 2.919\*\*\* | 1.534\* |
|  | (0.767) | (0.644) | (1.684) | (0.545) | (0.801) | (0.752) |
| Observations | 2398 | 2465 | 925 | 2440 | 2412 | 2468 |
| *R*2 | 0.084 | 0.078 | 0.200 | 0.141 | 0.093 | 0.091 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.076 | 0.069 | 0.180 | 0.133 | 0.084 | 0.083 |

*Annotations:* With \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. Standard errors are clustered at the cabinet level. Country- and period-fixed effects are omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification.

## ***Table A8:*** Linear regression of different types of reshuffles on sub-dimensions of prime-ministerial performance (reshuffles of PM party ministers and coalition partner ministers; robustness check including dismissal powers of parliament).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Conflict | Policy | Crisis | International | Party | Parliament |
|  | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) | b/ (SE) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Explanatory variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reshuffles of PM party | -0.019 | 0.075 | 0.350 | 0.207 | 0.101 | -0.082 |
| ministers | (0.149) | (0.122) | (0.255) | (0.106) | (0.183) | (0.141) |
| Reshuffles of PM party | -0.045 | -0.065\* | -0.211\* | -0.079\*\*\* | -0.089\* | -0.029 |
| ministers (sq) | (0.033) | (0.027) | (0.087) | (0.022) | (0.040) | (0.033) |
| Reshuffles of coalition | -0.686\*\* | -0.591\*\*\* | -0.670\* | -0.334 | -0.558\* | -0.813\*\*\* |
| partner ministers | (0.214) | (0.166) | (0.322) | (0.175) | (0.251) | (0.197) |
| Reshuffles of coalition | 0.238\*\*\* | 0.221\*\*\* | 0.267\*\* | 0.126\* | 0.205\*\* | 0.274\*\*\* |
| partner ministers (sq) | (0.063) | (0.055) | (0.092) | (0.050) | (0.077) | (0.062) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Overall reshuffles at | 0.083 | 0.060 | 0.054 | 0.018 | 0.011 | 0.109\*\* |
| same day | (0.044) | (0.038) | (0.070) | (0.037) | (0.053) | (0.041) |
| Single party cabinet | -0.060 | -0.138 | -0.479 | -0.270 | -0.294 | -0.077 |
|  | (0.224) | (0.197) | (0.347) | (0.150) | (0.243) | (0.228) |
| Parliament dismissal | 0.153 | -0.008 | -0.359 | 0.358 | 0.204 | 0.298 |
| power | (0.307) | (0.287) | (0.438) | (0.236) | (0.330) | (0.268) |
| Number of ministers in | -0.025 | -0.015 | -0.029 | 0.011 | -0.007 | -0.002 |
| cabinet | (0.024) | (0.021) | (0.033) | (0.017) | (0.027) | (0.023) |
| Constant | 2.621\*\*\* | 2.721\*\*\* | 2.637\*\*\* | 2.038\*\*\* | 2.909\*\*\* | 2.265\*\*\* |
|  | (0.507) | (0.471) | (0.682) | (0.386) | (0.561) | (0.497) |
| Observations | 2398 | 2465 | 925 | 2440 | 2412 | 2468 |
| *R*2 | 0.075 | 0.071 | 0.112 | 0.140 | 0.089 | 0.085 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.067 | 0.064 | 0.094 | 0.133 | 0.082 | 0.078 |

*Annotations:* With \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. Standard errors are clustered at the cabinet level. Country- and period-fixed effects are omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification.