**Supplementary Appendix**

**Table A1: Latinobarometer Sample Country and Year Coverage**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country | Year Span | Number of  Surveys | Years missing  or excluded |
| Argentina | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Bolivia | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Brazil | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Chile | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Colombia | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Costa Rica | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Dominican Republic | 2004-2016 | 10 | 2001-2003 |
| Ecuador | 2001-2006 | 6 | 2007-2016 |
| El Salvador | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Guatemala | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Honduras | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Mexico | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Nicaragua | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Panama | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Paraguay | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Peru | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Uruguay | 2001-2016 | 13 |  |
| Venezuela | 2001-2005 | 5 | 2006-2017 |

The sample excludes countries with a Polity IV score below 6 in a given year (non-democracies). Latinobarometer surveys were not conducted in 2012 or 2014.

**Table A2 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Obs. | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
| Age | 211,470 | 39.28 | 16.22 | 16 | 99 |
| Female | 211,470 | 0.51 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 211,470 | 2.18 | 0.94 | 1 | 4 |
| Wealth | 202,050 | 5.46 | 2.85 | 1 | 10 |
| SES | 211,464 | 3.29 | 0.91 | 1 | 5 |
| Ideology | 211,470 | 2.65 | 1.13 | 1 | 4 |
| Religion | 207,878 | 1.55 | 0.97 | 1 | 4 |
| Country | 211,470 | 9.17 | 5.26 | 1 | 18 |
| Year | 211,470 | 2,007.12 | 4.54 | 2,001 | 2,016 |
| Democratic values | 194,736 | 2.39 | 0.82 | 1 | 3 |
| Democratic satisfaction | 201,653 | 2.24 | 0.87 | 1 | 4 |
| Sociotropic econ. eval. | 210,224 | -0.43 | 0.92 | -2 | 2 |
| Egotropic econ. eval. | 177,315 | 0.02 | 0.8 | -2 | 2 |
| Corruption exposure | 211,470 | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0 | 1 |
| Presidential approval | 180,972 | 0.51 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Experience with courts | 16,641 | 0.24 | 0.57 | 0 | 2 |
| Disrespect for group rights | 15,335 | 3.02 | 0.56 | 1 | 4 |
| Interpersonal trust | 206,014 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| Life satisfaction | 193,042 | 2.98 | 0.84 | 1 | 4 |
| Political interest | 124,768 | 1.99 | 0.96 | 1 | 4 |
| Victim of crime | 210,311 | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Trust in police | 209,761 | -0.27 | 0.99 | -1.5 | 1.5 |
| News consumption | 158,619 | 2.94 | 1.85 | 0 | 7 |
| Corruption Perception Index | 210,910 | 0.63 | 0.14 | 0.25 | 0.84 |
| Polity IV | 211,470 | 8.21 | 1.1 | 6 | 10 |
| GDP per capita | 211,470 | 6.15 | 3.42 | 1.32 | 14.89 |
| v2cltrnslw | 211,470 | 0.71 | 0.94 | -0.98 | 2.8 |
| v2x\_rule | 211,470 | 0.58 | 0.23 | 0.1 | 0.98 |
| v2xcl\_acjst | 211,470 | 0.62 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.97 |

**Table A3: Source and Measurement info for Country-level variables**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Source | Description |
| GDP Growth | CEPAL | Annual rate of growth of Total Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at constant prices |
| GDP per capita | CEPAL | Total Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at constant prices in dollars |
| Gini coefficient (income) | World Income Inequality Database | Drawn from dataset comprised of UN, SEDLAC, and World Bank sources. We rely on per capita measures due to better temporal/country coverage. Where multiple coefficients are reported, we prefer the “higher quality” data source; we prefer more geographic coverage to less within countries. Our dataset pulls from all three data sources to maximize year and country coverage. December 2019 version. |
| Unemployment | CEPAL | Average annual rate of unemployment |
| Inflation | CEPAL | Annual growth rate of the consumer prices index: December to December |
| Poverty | CEPAL | Population living in extreme poverty and poverty. Where total rates are missing (due to rural poverty missing) urban poverty is substituted. |
| Corruption Perception Index | Transparency International | Aggregate score of country experts’ and business people’s perceptions of public sector corruption. |
| Polity IV | V-Dem | (e\_polity2) Standardized polity IV score for time-series analysis. Range from -10 (strong autocracy) to +10 (strong democracy). Values below 6 indicate anocracies or autocracies. |
| Rule of Law | V-Dem | (v2x\_rule) To what extent are laws transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions of government officials comply with the law? |
| Access to Justice | V-Dem | (v2xcl\_acjst) Do citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice? |
| Legal Transparency | V-Dem | (v2cltrnslw) Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner? Clarification: This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land. |
| Presidential Power | V-Dem | (v2xnp\_pres) To what extent is the regime characterized by presidentialism? Presidentialism means the "systemic concentration of political power in the hands of  one individual who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision making tasks" (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 63). It relates closely to V-Dem’s index of Horizontal Accountability (v2x\_horacc) but focuses more specifically on the extent to which the President is free from constraints by other institutions or actors. |
| Horizontal Accountability | V-Dem | (v2x\_horacc) To what extent is the ideal of horizontal government accountability achieved? Horizontal accountability concerns the power of state institutions to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning officials and punishing improper behavior. This form of accountability ensures checks between institutions and prevents the abuse of power. The key agents in horizontal government accountability are: the legislature; the judiciary; and  specific oversight agencies such as ombudsmen, prosecutor and comptroller generals. |

\*All V-Dem data come from Version 9, April 2019.

**Table A4 Random Intercept Estimates of Institutional Performance Conditional on Respondent Education**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (9) | | (10) | | (11) | | (12) | |
| Primary x CPI | 0.056 | (0.047) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Secondary x CPI | -0.005 | (0.047) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| University x CPI | -0.248 | (0.062)\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Primary x Rule of law |  |  | -0.031 | (0.026) |  |  |  |  |
| Secondary x Rule of law |  |  | 0.032 | (0.028) |  |  |  |  |
| University x Rule of law |  |  | 0.208 | (0.040)\* |  |  |  |  |
| Primary x Access to justice |  |  |  |  | -0.008 | (0.029) |  |  |
| Secondary x Access to justice |  |  |  |  | 0.084 | (0.032)\* |  |  |
| University x Access to justice |  |  |  |  | 0.245 | (0.046)\* |  |  |
| Primary x Legal transparency |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.006 | (0.006) |
| Secondary x Legal transparency |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.002 | (0.007) |
| University x Legal transparency |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.049 | (0.010)\* |
| CPI | -0.237 | (0.273) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rule of law |  |  | 0.008 | (0.167) |  |  |  |  |
| Access to justice |  |  |  |  | 0.163 | (0.191) |  |  |
| Legal transparency |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.006 | (0.036) |
| GDP per capita | -0.006 | (0.010) | -0.002 | (0.009) | -0.004 | (0.009) | -0.001 | (0.009) |
| Polity IV | 0.029 | (0.027) | 0.033 | (0.028) | 0.020 | (0.029) | 0.035 | (0.027) |
| Primary | -0.054 | (0.031)+ | 0.001 | (0.016) | -0.011 | (0.018) | -0.014 | (0.008)+ |
| Secondary | -0.004 | (0.031) | -0.026 | (0.017) | -0.059 | (0.020)\* | -0.008 | (0.008) |
| University | 0.162 | (0.040)\* | -0.120 | (0.026)\* | -0.146 | (0.031)\* | -0.029 | (0.012)\* |
| Corruption exposure | -0.030 | (0.006)\* | -0.030 | (0.006)\* | -0.030 | (0.006)\* | -0.030 | (0.006)\* |
| Age | -0.002 | (0.000)\* | -0.002 | (0.000)\* | -0.002 | (0.000)\* | -0.002 | (0.000)\* |
| Female | 0.004 | (0.005) | 0.003 | (0.005) | 0.003 | (0.005) | 0.003 | (0.005) |
| Wealth | -0.004 | (0.001)\* | -0.004 | (0.001)\* | -0.004 | (0.001)\* | -0.004 | (0.001)\* |
| SES | 0.002 | (0.003) | 0.002 | (0.003) | 0.003 | (0.003) | 0.003 | (0.003) |
| Left Ideology | 0.081 | (0.007)\* | 0.081 | (0.007)\* | 0.081 | (0.007)\* | 0.081 | (0.007)\* |
| Center Ideology | 0.070 | (0.007)\* | 0.070 | (0.007)\* | 0.070 | (0.007)\* | 0.070 | (0.007)\* |
| Right Ideology | 0.121 | (0.007)\* | 0.121 | (0.007)\* | 0.121 | (0.007)\* | 0.121 | (0.007)\* |
| Evangelical | 0.004 | (0.007) | 0.004 | (0.007) | 0.004 | (0.007) | 0.004 | (0.007) |
| Other Religion | -0.009 | (0.011) | -0.009 | (0.011) | -0.010 | (0.011) | -0.010 | (0.011) |
| No Religion | -0.033 | (0.008)\* | -0.034 | (0.008)\* | -0.034 | (0.008)\* | -0.033 | (0.008)\* |
| Autocracy Justifiable | 0.028 | (0.007)\* | 0.028 | (0.007)\* | 0.028 | (0.007)\* | 0.028 | (0.007)\* |
| Democracy Preferable | 0.023 | (0.006)\* | 0.023 | (0.006)\* | 0.023 | (0.006)\* | 0.023 | (0.006)\* |
| Democratic satisfaction | 0.122 | (0.003)\* | 0.122 | (0.003)\* | 0.121 | (0.003)\* | 0.122 | (0.003)\* |
| Sociotropic econ. eval. | 0.074 | (0.003)\* | 0.074 | (0.003)\* | 0.074 | (0.003)\* | 0.074 | (0.003)\* |
| Egocentric econ. eval. | 0.037 | (0.003)\* | 0.037 | (0.003)\* | 0.037 | (0.003)\* | 0.037 | (0.003)\* |
| Trust in police | 0.290 | (0.002)\* | 0.290 | (0.002)\* | 0.290 | (0.002)\* | 0.290 | (0.002)\* |
| Presidential approval | 0.148 | (0.005)\* | 0.148 | (0.005)\* | 0.147 | (0.005)\* | 0.148 | (0.005)\* |
| Constant | -0.734 | (0.324)\* | -0.944 | (0.202)\* | -0.925 | (0.199)\* | -0.959 | (0.207)\* |
| Country-year variance | -1.910 | (0.193)\* | -1.926 | (0.193)\* | -1.958 | (0.192)\* | -1.928 | (0.194)\* |
| Year variance | -1.982 | (0.063)\* | -1.978 | (0.063)\* | -1.977 | (0.062)\* | -1.978 | (0.063)\* |
| Individual variance | -0.234 | (0.002)\* | -0.234 | (0.002)\* | -0.234 | (0.002)\* | -0.234 | (0.002)\* |
| Observations | 126,860 | | 126,860 | | 126,860 | | 126,860 | |
| Chi-squared | 26099.9 | | 26111.7 | | 26112.8 | | 26106.8 | |
| Model p-value | 0.00 | | 0.00 | | 0.00 | | 0.00 | |
| Model df | 27 | | 27 | | 27 | | 27 | |

**Partisan and Ideological Alignments with President**

It is possible that individuals are more likely to trust state institutions if they belong to the president’s party or are ideologically aligned with the president. The question, in other words, is whether there is an effect of these alignments above and beyond the effects of partisanship or ideological self-placement. To test this, we constructed a time-series dataset of Latin American presidents from 1995-2017, comprised of the individual holding office *at the time the survey was fielded*. This latter point is critical because question wording refers to the individual president at the time the question was posed. In the large majority of cases this poses no consistency issues, however in instances of presidential instability producing a rapid succession of presidents, we are careful to ensure our dataset includes the individual occupying the presidency during the relevant dates.

To code co-partisanship, we match the president’s party to the respondent’s self-identified partisan membership when the respondent claims one. Due to an apparent error in the partisanship codes reported in the 2009 and 2010 Latinobarometer waves, these years are excluded from the copartisanship analysis. Independent and “outsider” presidents with no formal party are coded as independents, and respondents in this country-year instances are all coded as non-copartisans. Because partisanship is not as widespread in Latin America as in other contexts, we code missing and NA/NR responses as a baseline so as not to inadvertently bias the sample. The resulting variable contains four categories: (1) NA/NR, (2) None/other, (3) Non-copartisan, and (4) Copartisan. NA/NR responses are missing responses. Null/none/other responses are explicit statements of non-partisanship.

To code co-ideology, we rely on Baker and Greene’s (2011) dataset of election results and party ideology, which relies on a four-step algorithm for assigning ideology scores to presidential candidates (see citations below for more information). To match presidential ideology scores with respondent ideology, we recategorize Baker and Greene’s continuous measures into left, center, and right. Independent, non-partisan, technocratic or ambiguous presidents are coded as centrists: Eduardo Rodriguez Veltze of Bolivia (2005), Fabian Alarcón of Ecuador (1997), Roberto Micheletti of Honduras (2009), and Valentin Paniagua of Peru (2001). We code three additional presidents as conservative: Ramiro de Leon Carpio (1995-96), Federico Franco of Paraguay (2013), and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski of Peru (2017). The resulting co-ideology variable is coded for whether respondents (1) report no ideology, (2) report a left, center, or right ideology that is *not* shared by the president (non-coideologue), or (3) report a left, center, or right ideology that is shared by the president (co-ideologue).

One final note: the separation of non-ideologues from ideologues in the coding of both the ideology and co-ideology variables makes these collinear, preventing us from including both variables in some model specifications. Results below are therefore reported on the full sample and on a sample that includes only ideologues.

In drawing on Baker and Greene’s dataset, we relied on the following sources:

* Baker, Andy, and Kenneth F. Greene. 2011. “The Latin American Left’s Mandate: Free-Market Policies and Issue Voting in New Democracies.” *World Politics* 63(1): 43-77.
* Coppedge, Michael. 1998. “The Dynamic Diversity of Latin American Party Systems.” *Party Politics* 4, no. 4 (October): 547-568.
* Lodola, German, and Rosario Queirolo. 2005. “Ideological Classification of Latin American Political Parties.” Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh.
* Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2009. *From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
* Wiesehomeier, Nina, and Kenneth Benoit. 2009. “Presidents, Parties, and Policy Competition.” *Journal of Politics* 71, no. 4, 1435-1447

**Table A5 Effects of Partisan Alignment with President on Judicial Trust**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Copartisanship | + Approval of President | + Respondent Ideology |
| Null/None/Other | -0.109\* | -0.109\* | -0.104\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.013) | (0.013) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Non-copartisan | 0.006 | 0.012 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.023) | (0.024) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Copartisan | 0.044 | 0.009 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.027) | (0.026) | (0.027) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Presidential approval |  | 0.123\* | 0.122\* |
|  |  | (0.017) | (0.017) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Left Ideology |  |  | 0.068\* |
|  |  |  | (0.012) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Center Ideology |  |  | 0.070\* |
|  |  |  | (0.016) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Right Ideology |  |  | 0.118\* |
|  |  |  | (0.017) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Autocracy Justifiable | 0.008 | 0.004 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Democracy Preferable | -0.004 | -0.015 | -0.014 |
|  | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Democratic satisfaction | 0.130\* | 0.126\* | 0.124\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Sociotropic econ. eval. | 0.081\* | 0.079\* | 0.079\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Egocentric econ. eval. | 0.033\* | 0.035\* | 0.033\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.002\* | -0.002\* | -0.002\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Female | -0.014 | -0.011 | -0.007 |
|  | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Primary | -0.025\* | -0.018+ | -0.019+ |
|  | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Secondary | -0.005 | 0.005 | 0.003 |
|  | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) |
|  |  |  |  |
| University | 0.019 | 0.021 | 0.017 |
|  | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.028) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Wealth | -0.003+ | -0.004 | -0.004 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Socioeconomic status | -0.001 | -0.003 | -0.004 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Evangelical | 0.001 | -0.002 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.011) | (0.014) | (0.014) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Other Religion | 0.002 | 0.015 | 0.018 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.017) | (0.017) |
|  |  |  |  |
| No Religion | -0.032 | -0.034 | -0.029 |
|  | (0.021) | (0.022) | (0.021) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Trust in police | 0.312\* | 0.274\* | 0.272\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Exposure to corruption | 0.009 | 0.006 | 0.004 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Victim of crime | -0.013 | -0.014 | -0.015 |
|  | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Interpersonal trust | 0.088\* | 0.083\* | 0.081\* |
|  | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.009) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Life satisfaction | 0.012 | 0.013+ | 0.012 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.008) |
|  |  |  |  |
| News consumption | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.002 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -0.504\* | -0.849\* | -0.898\* |
|  | (0.069) | (0.081) | (0.080) |
| Observations | 73662 | 56712 | 56712 |
| *R*2 | 0.246 | 0.241 | 0.242 |

Standard errors in parentheses. + *p* < .1, \* *p* < .05. The baseline category of the co-partisanship variables is “NA/NR.” 2009 and 2010 survey waves are excluded from sample due to apparent coding error in raw data. All models include country and year fixed effects.

**Table A6 Effects of Ideological Alignment with President on Judicial Trust**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | Excluding Non-Ideologues | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | Co-ideology | + Presidential Approval | Co-ideology | + Respondent  Ideology | + Presidential  Approval |
| Non-co-ideologue | 0.100\* | 0.103\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.012) | (0.015) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Co-ideologue | 0.113\* | 0.111\* | 0.012 | 0.009 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Center Ideology |  |  |  | -0.005 | -0.010 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.014) | (0.015) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Right Ideology |  |  |  | 0.051\* | 0.049\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.018) | (0.018) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Presidential approval |  | 0.127\* |  |  | 0.121\* |
|  |  | (0.015) |  |  | (0.015) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Autocracy Justifiable | 0.014 | 0.015 | 0.012 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.016) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democracy Preferable | 0.008 | 0.001 | 0.006 | 0.006 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democratic satisfaction | 0.130\* | 0.122\* | 0.129\* | 0.127\* | 0.121\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sociotropic econ. eval. | 0.077\* | 0.070\* | 0.079\* | 0.079\* | 0.072\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Egocentric econ. eval. | 0.033\* | 0.034\* | 0.035\* | 0.035\* | 0.036\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.002\* | -0.002\* | -0.002\* | -0.002\* | -0.002\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | -0.001 | 0.002 | -0.006 | -0.006 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.009) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Primary | -0.024\* | -0.019 | -0.032\* | -0.031\* | -0.025\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.011) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Secondary | -0.006 | 0.003 | -0.015 | -0.012 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.019) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| University | 0.015 | 0.017 | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.008 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.026) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wealth | -0.006\* | -0.007\* | -0.006\* | -0.005\* | -0.006\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Socioeconomic status | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Evangelical | 0.005 | 0.002 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.007 |
|  | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.013) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other Religion | -0.015 | -0.005 | -0.019 | -0.018 | -0.014 |
|  | (0.014) | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.018) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No Religion | -0.034 | -0.032 | -0.027 | -0.022 | -0.018 |
|  | (0.020) | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.020) | (0.017) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trust in police | 0.317\* | 0.288\* | 0.316\* | 0.315\* | 0.285\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.010) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Exposure to corruption | -0.009 | -0.012 | -0.011 | -0.010 | -0.012 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.015) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Victim of crime | -0.020\* | -0.021\* | -0.021\* | -0.021\* | -0.023\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.009) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interpersonal trust | 0.090\* | 0.086\* | 0.088\* | 0.088\* | 0.085\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.010) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Life satisfaction | 0.013\* | 0.014\* | 0.010 | 0.009 | 0.010 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| News consumption | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.003) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -0.605\* | -0.912\* | -0.488\* | -0.506\* | -0.798\* |
|  | (0.065) | (0.074) | (0.076) | (0.073) | (0.085) |
| Observations | 100308 | 81486 | 80878 | 80878 | 66067 |
| *R*2 | 0.243 | 0.239 | 0.237 | 0.238 | 0.233 |

Standard errors in parentheses. + *p* < .1, \* *p* < .05. Baseline category for co-ideology is “no ideology” in models 1 and 2 and “non-coideologue” in models 3-5. All models include country and year fixed effects.

**Figure A1 Average Partial Effects of High School Education (vs. < Primary) by Level of Institutional Performance**

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**Figure A2 Average Partial Effects of Primary Education (vs. < Primary) by Level of Institutional Performance**

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