ANNEX

Support Party Strategies on Important Policy Issues: Results from Swedish Minority Governments

Melanie Müller\*

Department of Social Science, University of Kaiserslautern, Kaiserslautern, Germany

\*Corresponding author. Email: melanie.mueller@sowi.uni-kl.de

# Annex A1

Figure 1: Opposition party voting behaviour



# Annex A2

Table 1: Assignment of policy fields to committees of the Swedish Riksdag to CMP variables

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Policy field** | **CMP variables** | **Committee** |
| Foreign and Defence | per101: Foreign Special Relationships: Positiveper102: Foreign Special Relationships: Negativeper103: Anti-imperialismper104: Military: Positiveper105: Military: Negativeper106: Peaceper107: Internationalism: Positiveper108: European Community: Positiveper109: Internationalism: Negativeper110: European Community: Negative | Committee on Defence,Committee on Foreign Affairs,Committee on EU Affairs (FöU, UFöU, UU, EU) |
| Interior | per201: Freedom and Human Rightsper202: Democracyper203: Constitutionalism: Positiveper204: Constitutionalism: Negativeper301: Decentralisationper302: Centralisationper303: Governmental and Administrative Efficiencyper304: Political Corruptionper605: Law and Orderper607: Multiculturalism: Positiveper608: Multiculturalism: Negative | Committee on the Civil (CU, LU) |
| Justice | per201: Freedom and Human Rightsper202: Democracyper203: Constitutionalism: Positiveper204: Constitutionalism: Negativeper303: Governmental and Administrative Efficiencyper304: Political Corruptionper605: Law and Order | Committee on Justice (JuU) |
| Finance and Economy | per401: Free Enterpriseper402: Incentivesper403: Market Regulationper404: Economic Planningper405: Corporatismper406: Protectionism: Positiveper407: Protectionism: Negativeper408: Economic Goalsper409: Keynesian Demand Managementper410: Productivityper412: Controlled Economyper413: Nationalisationper414: Economic Orthodoxyper415: Marxist Analysis | Committee on Finance,Committee on Industry andTrade (FiU, NU) |
| Labour | per504: Welfare State Expansionper505: Welfare State Limitationper701: Labour Groups: Positiveper702: Labour Groups: Negative | Committee on the LabourMarket (AU) |
| Education | per506: Education Expansionper507: Education Limitation | Committee on Education (UbU) |
| Health  | per504: Welfare State Expansionper505: Welfare State Limitationper706: Non-economic Demographic Groups | Committee on Health andWelfare (SoU) |
| Environment and Agriculture | per416: Anti-growth Economyper501: Environmental Protectionper703: Agriculture and Farmers | Committee on Environment and Agriculture, Committee on Agriculture (MjU, JoU) |
| Social Affairs | per503: Social Justiceper603: Traditional Morality: Positiveper604: Traditional Morality: Negativeper606: Civic Mindedness: Positiveper705: Underprivileged Minority Groupsper706: Non-economic Demographic Groups | Committee on Social Insurance (SfU) |
| Constitution | per203: Constitutionalism: Positiveper204: Constitutionalism: Negative | Committee on the Constitution (KU) |
| Cultural Affairs | per502: Culture: Positive | Committee on Cultural Affairs (KrU) |
| Taxation | per402: Incentives | Committee on Taxation (SkU) |
| Transport and Communication | per411: Technology and Infrastructure: Positive | Committee on Housing,Committee on Transport andCommunication (BoU, TU) |
| Annotation: Assignment of policy fields to CMP variables is largely based on Bäck et al. (2011) and partly based on the CMP codebook |

# Annex A3

Several robustness checks have been performed to see if the reported effects are driven by certain variables, legislative periods, or poor measures. Through jackknife analysis, by leaving out one legislative period at a time when estimating the logistic regression model, it is possible to see if the findings are sensitive to including a certain period.

Overall, the findings presented in Figure 5 (based on Model 4 in Table 1) are robust with a minor cutback. The interaction effect of ideological distance to the government and party issue saliency remains stable when taking out the legislative periods Persson II, and Löfven I (see Table 2, Annex A3). When excluding the legislative periods Carlsson III/Persson I, and Persson III, the effects stay negative but turn insignificant (see Model 2, and Model 4, Table 2, Annex A3). This suggests that the results are partly driven by these periods. These results are interesting with regards to the more explicit support agreements under Persson II and especially under Persson III (see ‘contract parliamentarism’ Aylott and Bergman 2004). This indicates that, despite entering an explicit agreement, ideological distant support parties deviate from the government when issues are important. When plotting the interaction effects[[1]](#footnote-1), the effects are less clear, but the direction remains stable: Ideological distant support parties do rather not support a minority government on important issues.

Apart from this, performing further tests also speak for the robustness of the results. The model estimation shows similar results when measuring party issue saliency in different fashions. Including a dummy variable for a party’s core issues (value 1 means party issue saliency value equal or greater than the third quartile threshold) in the interaction term underlines the findings (see Model 1, Table 3, Annex A3). The alternative measurement confirms that ideological distant support parties worry greatly about their distinctiveness from the government on important issues. Since the main models are based on the running average of two elections for the party-specific issue saliency measurement, Model 2 shows the interaction term with the simpler issue saliency measurement of one election based on the CMP dataset (see Model 2, Table 3, Annex A3). The results remain the same, however, the coefficient is slightly smaller, indicating that the running average issue saliency is a better measurement when analysing voting behaviour.

The Swedish National Election Studies (SNES) dataset (Holmberg et al. 1991, 1994; Holmberg and Ekengren Oscarsson 2010; Holmberg and Statistics Sweden 2002) is included for measuring issue ownership as an alternative measurement for the party-specific issue saliency variable in the legislative periods Bildt, Carlsson III/Persson I, Persson II, Persson III, and Reinfeldt II. Löfven I was excluded because of missing data for the legislation years 2014-2018. Since the dataset does not consist of the same categories overall survey phases, numerous additional missing cases are present, negatively influencing the analysis. The interaction term between support party, ideological distance, and issue ownership is thus insignificant (see Model 3, Table 3, Annex A3).

Using the variable for electorate saliency based on the SOM dataset (University of Gothenburg, SOM Institute) as an alternative measure for party-specific issue saliency does neither support the hypothesized effects (see Model 4, Table 3, Annex A3). This can, however, also be due to the measurement of the variable. The measure has the advantage of being temporally more fine-grained compared to party issue saliency based on the CMP dataset, as electorate salience is measured every year instead of every fourth year. Yet, the SOM-variable is not party-specific, which means it cannot capture party-specific electorate values.

Recoding the dependent variable in a fashion that accounts for abstentions as indirect support towards the minority government does not change the regression results to the original model (Model 4, Table 2). This underscores the robustness of the dependent variable minority government support (see Model 1, Table 4, Annex A3).

Further testing for the effect of the electoral cycle indicates that ideological distant support parties are especially reluctant to support the minority government on core issues in election years (see Model 2, Table 4, Annex A3). However, when plotting the model, the results reveal only a few cases, indicating that ideologically distant support parties’ core issues are usually not voted upon under election years.

When using the left-right-measure from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017) as an alternative measure for the ideological distance the coefficient remains negative but turns insignificant. One explanation could be the limited data being only available from 1999 to 2014, which means that both the legislation periods Bildt and Carlsson III/Persson I are excluded in the model (Model 3, Table 4, Annex A3).

Lastly, I used Thesen’s differentiation (2016) between bloc support parties and proper support parties to account for variation within support parties. The results indicate that ideological distant bloc support parties are more likely to support the minority government on their core issues. In contrast, ideological distant proper support parties are less likely (see Model 4, Table 4, Annex A3). This suggests that only support parties involved in legislative coalitions chose to oppose the government on core issues when ideological proximity is missing. When plotting the results[[2]](#footnote-2), the wide confidence intervals suggest that no further interpretation is possible. This can also be due to excluding support parties belonging to the opposite party bloc (i.e., Center Party between 1995-1998).

Models including additional measures such as the party polarization, fragmentation, or the size of the minority government accounting for legislative period effects did not converge due to the multilevel model specification grouping among all dyads of legislative periods and opposition parties. The same applies to additional measures regarding party effects, such as the number of opposition party seats. Still, the discussed robustness tests suggest that the findings are robust and even statistically hold when excluding certain legislative periods or using alternative measures.

Table : Jackknife analysis

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** | **Model 5** |
| **Legislative period missing:** | **Main model** | **Carlsson III/ Persson I** | **Persson II** | **Persson III** | **Löfven I** |
| (Intercept) | 0.38\* | 0.29 | 0.32 | 0.45\* | 0.49\*\* |
|  | (0.15) | (0.20) | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.16) |
| Issue saliency | -2.15\*\*\* | -2.20\*\*\* | -1.94\*\*\* | -1.97\*\*\* | -2.22\*\*\* |
|  | (0.20) | (0.27) | (0.23) | (0.47) | (0.27) |
| Support party | 1.03\*\*\* | 0.88 | 0.98\*\*\* | 0.89\* | 1.01\*\*\* |
| *(ref. genuine opposition party)* | (0.15) | (0.50) | (0.16) | (0.37) | (0.17) |
| Ideological distance to government | -0.29 | -0.24 | -0.31 | -0.40 | -0.85 |
|  | (0.44) | (0.56) | (0.48) | (0.54) | (0.55) |
| Election year | -0.11\*\*\* | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* | -0.08\*\*\* | -0.11\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Economic pressure | 0.08\*\* | 0.07 | 0.06\* | 0.06\* | 0.09\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Electorate issue saliency | -0.03 | -0.17 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.11 |
|  | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.12) |
| Issue saliency\*Support party | 2.06\*\*\* | -0.56 | 2.56\*\*\* | 3.59 | 2.28\*\*\* |
|  | (0.38) | (0.57) | (0.45) | (3.60) | (0.64) |
| Issue saliency\*Ideological distance | 1.07\* | 1.37\* | 1.22\* | 1.18 | 0.02 |
|  | (0.50) | (0.65) | (0.60) | (1.50) | (0.89) |
| Support party\*Ideological distance | -0.52 | 0.80 | -0.07 | -0.08 | -0.52 |
|  | (0.48) | (2.11) | (0.52) | (1.56) | (0.55) |
| Issue saliency\*Support party\*Ideological distance | -12.66\*\*\* | -4.12 | -18.65\*\*\* | -17.34 | -12.15\*\*\* |
|  | (1.60) | (2.33) | (2.93) | (15.99) | (2.87) |
| AIC | 112361.28 | 86936.35 | 89761.74 | 90333.85 | 92833.58 |
| BIC | 112623.56 | 87191.50 | 90017.71 | 90590.01 | 93090.60 |
| Log Likelihood | -56152.64 | -43440.17 | -44852.87 | -45138.93 | -46388.79 |
| Num. obs. | 86420 | 67016 | 69002 | 69470 | 71618 |
| Num. groups: Legislation:Party | 31 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| Var: Legislation:Party (Intercept) | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.20 | 0.18 | 0.16 |
| \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05 |
|  |

Table : Alternative measures (1)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** |
| **Alternative measure:** | **Issue saliency (CMP Dummy)** | **Issue saliency (simple measure)** | **Issue Ownership (SNES)** | **Electorate saliency (SOM)** |
| (Intercept) | 0.14 | 0.32\* | 0.22 | 0.14 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.16) | (0.15) |
| Issue saliency (Dummy) | -0.09\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.04) |  |  |  |
| Support party | 1.23\*\*\* | 1.08\*\*\* | 1.53\*\*\* | 1.16\*\*\* |
|  | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.18) | (0.15) |
| Ideological distance to government | -0.23 | -0.23 | -0.69 | -0.25 |
|  | (0.46) | (0.42) | (0.54) | (0.43) |
| Election year | -0.10\*\*\* | -0.10\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* | -0.10\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Economic pressure | 0.08\*\* | 0.08\*\* | 0.05 | 0.08\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| Electorate issue saliency | 0.03 | -0.09 | 0.15 | -0.12 |
|  | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| Issue saliency (Dummy)\*Support party | -0.02 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.08) |  |  |  |
| Issue saliency (Dummy)\*Ideological distance | 0.06 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.11) |  |  |  |
| Support party\*Ideological distance | -1.30\*\* | -0.86 | -2.19\*\*\* | -1.77\*\*\* |
|  | (0.49) | (0.47) | (0.56) | (0.48) |
| Issue saliency (Dummy)\*Support party\*Ideological distance | -1.84\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.36) |  |  |  |
| Issue saliency (simple measure) |  | -1.64\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.20) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (simple measure)\*Support party |  | 1.46\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.34) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (simple measure)\*Ideological distance |  | 0.18 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.55) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (simple measure)\*Support party\*Ideological distance |  | -9.12\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (1.48) |  |  |
| Issue Ownership (SNES) |  |  | -0.17 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.16) |  |
| Issue Ownership (SNES)\*Support party |  |  | -1.13\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.29) |  |
| Issue Ownership (SNES)\*Ideological distance |  |  | -0.46 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.49) |  |
| Issue Ownership (SNES)\*Support party\*Ideological distance |  |  | 2.00 |  |
|  |  |  | (1.02) |  |
| Electorate saliency\*Support party |  |  |  | 0.41 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.25) |
| Electorate saliency\*Ideological distance |  |  |  | 0.25 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.34) |
| Electorate saliency\*Support party\*Ideological distance |  |  |  | 0.97 |
|  |  |  |  | (1.05) |
| Policy fields included | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| AIC | 112514.07 | 112416.50 | 55830.86 | 112637.00 |
| BIC | 112776.34 | 112678.78 | 56030.28 | 112889.91 |
| Log Likelihood | -56229.03 | -56180.25 | -27892.43 | -56291.50 |
| Num. obs. | 86420 | 86420 | 43066 | 86420 |
| Num. groups: Legislation:Party | 31 | 31 | 24 | 31 |
| Var: Legislation:Party (Intercept) | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.18 | 0.17 |
| \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05 |

Table : Alternative and additional measures (2)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** |
| **Alternative and additional measures** | **Dependent variable: yes and abstain support** | **Election year** | **Ideological distance (CHES)** | **Bloc vs. proper support party** |
| (Intercept) | 0.65\*\*\* | 1.00\*\*\* | 0.45\* | 0.59\*\*\* |
|  | (0.15) | (0.12) | (0.19) | (0.17) |
| Issue saliency | -2.16\*\*\* |  | -3.26\*\*\* | -1.53\*\*\* |
|  | (0.22) |  | (0.35) | (0.19) |
| Support party | 1.06\*\*\* |  | 0.93\* |  |
| *(ref. genuine opposition party)* | (0.16) |  | (0.40) |  |
| Ideological distance to government | -0.34 | 0.15 |  | -0.90 |
|  | (0.44) | (0.50) |  | (0.50) |
| Election year | -0.06\*\*\* | -0.26\*\* | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.10\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.09) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Economic pressure | 0.00 | -0.33\*\*\* | 0.07 | 0.06\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.03) |
| Electorate issue saliency | 0.19 | 0.86\*\*\* | -0.59\*\*\* | -0.03 |
|  | (0.10) | (0.15) | (0.16) | (0.10) |
| Issue saliency\*Support party | 2.01\*\*\* |  | -0.87 |  |
|  | (0.40) |  | (0.57) |  |
| Issue saliency\*Ideological distance | 1.34\* |  |  | 0.08 |
|  | (0.58) |  |  | (0.51) |
| Support party\*Ideological distance | -1.33\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.49) |  |  |  |
| Issue saliency\*Support party\*Ideological distance | -11.44\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (1.56) |  |  |  |
| Issue saliency (2) |  | 0.30\*\* |  |  |
| *(ref. Issue saliency (1))* |  | (0.10) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (3) |  | -0.23\* |  |  |
| *(ref. Issue saliency (1))* |  | (0.11) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (4) |  | 1.76 |  |  |
| *(ref. Issue saliency (1))* |  | (2.90) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (2)\*Ideological distance |  | -2.17\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.42) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (3)\*Ideological distance |  | -1.90\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.49) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (4)\*Ideological distance |  | -17.21 |  |  |
|  |  | (19.56) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (2)\*Election year |  | -0.09 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.17) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (3)\*Election year |  | 0.23 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.20) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (4)\*Election year |  | 6.88 |  |  |
|  |  | (5.56) |  |  |
| Ideological distance\*Election year |  | 0.54 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.42) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (2)\*Ideological distance\*Election year |  | 0.55 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.75) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (3)\*Ideological distance\*Election year |  | -0.20 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.93) |  |  |
| Issue saliency (4)\*Ideological distance\*Election year |  | -48.02 |  |  |
|  |  | (37.36) |  |  |
| Ideological distance (CHES) |  |  | -0.04 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.06) |  |
| Issue saliency\*Ideological distance (CHES) |  |  | 0.31\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.09) |  |
| Support party\*Ideological distance (CHES) |  |  | 0.03 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.18) |  |
| Issue saliency\*Support party\*Ideological distance (CHES) |  |  | -0.03 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.26) |  |
| Bloc support party |  |  |  | -0.91 |
|  |  |  |  | (1.83) |
| Proper support party |  |  |  | 0.59 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.45) |
| Issue saliency\*Bloc support party |  |  |  | -4.54\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (1.34) |
| Issue saliency\*Proper support party |  |  |  | -0.90\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.43) |
| Bloc support party\*Ideological distance |  |  |  | 2.45 |
|  |  |  |  | (4.47) |
| Proper support party\*Ideological distance |  |  |  | 1.50 |
|  |  |  |  | (1.68) |
| Issue saliency\*Bloc support party\*Ideological distance |  |  |  | 7.04\* |
|  |  |  |  | (3.39) |
| Issue saliency\*Proper support party\*Ideological distance |  |  |  | -3.57\* |
|  |  |  |  | (1.51) |
| Policy fields included | YES | NO | YES | YES |
| AIC | 107323.96 | 20001.84 | 77829.37 | 112413.29 |
| BIC | 107586.23 | 20149.09 | 78072.33 | 112713.03 |
| Log Likelihood | -53633.98 | -9981.92 | -38887.68 | -56174.65 |
| Num. obs. | 86420 | 17157 | 59786 | 86420 |
| Num. groups: Legislation:Party | 31 | 7 | 22 | 31 |
| Var: Legislation:Party (Intercept) | 0.16 | 0.03 | 0.12 | 0.20 |
| \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05 |
|  |

References

**Aylott N and Bergman T** (2004) Almost in Government, But Not Quite: The Swedish Greens, Bargaining Constraints and the Rise of Contract Parliamentarism. Paper presented in Panel 6, ECPR joint sessions of workshops, Uppsala, April 2004

**Bäck** **H, Debus** **M and Dumont** **P** (2011) Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies. *European Journal of Political Research* **50**, 441–478. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01980.x.

**Holmberg** **S and Ekengren Oscarsson** **H** (2010) Swedish election study 2010.

**Holmberg** **S, Gilljam** **M and Statistics Sweden** (1991) Swedish election study 1991.

**Holmberg** **S, Gilljam** **M and Statistics Sweden** (1994) Swedish election study 1994.

**Holmberg** **S and Statistics Sweden** (2002) Swedish election survey panel 1998-2002.

**Thesen** **G** (2016) Win Some, Lose None? Support Parties at the Polls and in Political Agenda-Setting. *Political Studies* **64**, 979–999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12223.

**University of Gothenburg, SOM Institute** The National SOM Survey Cumulative Dataset 1986-2017.

1. Not reported. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Not reported. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)