

# The Rhetoric of Emulation: Debating Emigrant Enfranchisement in Canada

## Supplemental Appendix

### Coding the Rhetoric of Diffusion

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# 1. Concept Glossary

Definitions for the core diffusion mechanisms are taken from Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2013. "Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas and Policies." In *Handbook of international Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons. Thousand Oaks: SAGE, Second Edition, 453-477.

**Coercion:** "international organizations and powerful countries can pressure states to adopt certain policies. The typical mechanism is conditionality: in order to access certain resources, national governments must comply with given policy requirements." (461)

**Competition:** "the process whereby policy makers anticipate or react to the behavior of other countries in order to attract or retain economic resources." (462)

**Learning:** "the process whereby policy makers use the experience of other countries to estimate the likely consequences of policy change." (463)

**Emulation:** "the process whereby policies diffuse because of their normative and socially constructed properties instead of their objective characteristics." (466)

## 2. Coding Overview

- Observations constitute instances of speech or text about the international context in reference to an emigrant voting topic.
- Each document in the sample contains a distinct set of observations (or no observations, depending on the document's content). The subdivision of documents is defined in the records of the *Frank v. Attorney General* case.
- Each observation has the same international referent (e.g. country, group of countries) and topic (e.g. temporal restrictions on emigrant voting rights). Observations are distinct to each document (e.g. "Affidavit of Jean-Pierre Kingsley, sworn May 11, 2012").
- Topics may be adjacent to emigrant voting, where the topic is mentioned when advancing an argument about emigrant voting.
  - Example of adjacent issue: MP Patrick Boyer "There is also a proposal that Canadians living abroad be able to vote...It is worth pausing to record that Canada has the highest rate of eligible voters on its voters' list of any of the democracies." (*Debates of the House of Commons*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, 33<sup>rd</sup> Parliament, 36 Elizabeth II [1988])
- The international referent may be one country (e.g. "United Kingdom"), multiple countries ("New Zealand and Australia") or refer broadly to a grouping of countries ("Western democracies"). We code new observations when a new international referent appears.
  - Note: we code as one observation instances where the individual units within a grouping are mentioned in a discussion about a grouping. For example, a discussion of Westminster countries that details emigrant voting rules in United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand is treated as one observation.
- Observations may incorporate text or speech by one actor or multiple actors. If, in the context of a document, Actor 2 discusses the same international referent and topic mentioned earlier by Actor 1, we code as one observation. If Actor 2 discusses a different international referent or covers a different topic, we code this as a novel observation.
- Observations have no set length in terms of word or sentence count. The observation starts at the first mention of the distinct international referent-topic. An observation may span pages or it may span a sentence fragment.
- Each variable is coded independently and is not dependent on the value of another variable. It is possible for an observation to be coded as an instance of "coercion" (v1\_coercion = 1) and "learning" (v3\_learning = 1) if the observed instance of rhetoric meets the criteria for both variables.

### 3. Variables

#### **v1 coercion**

Does the observation mention an external actor using material threats or incentives to influence Canada's emigrant voting policy?

Possible values:

- 0 = no
- 1 = yes

Coding criteria:

- If the observation does include a mention of an external actor using material threats or incentives to influence Canada's emigrant voting policy, a no (0) is coded.
- If the observation included mention of an external actor using material threats or incentives to influence Canada's emigrant voting policy, a yes (1) is coded.

#### **v2 competition**

Does the observation mention a competition between or among actors for material benefits that might influence Canada's emigrant voting policy?

Possible values:

- 0 = no
- 1 = yes

Coding criteria:

- If the observation does not include mention of a competition between or among actors for material benefits that might influence Canada's emigrant voting policy, a no (0) is coded.
- If the observation includes mention of a competition between or among actors for material benefits that might influence Canada's emigrant voting policy, a yes (1) is coded.

### **v3 learning**

Does the observation contain mention of the consequences of emigrant voting in a country or set of countries?

Possible values:

- 0 = no
- 1 = yes

Coding criteria:

- If the observation does not include mention of the consequences of emigrant voting in a country or set of countries, a no (0) is coded.
- If the observation includes mention of the consequences of emigrant voting in a country or set of countries, a yes (1) is coded.

### **v4 emulation**

Does the observation contain mention of a standard of emigrant voting practices in a country or set of countries?

Possible values:

- 0 = no
- 1 = yes

Coding criteria:

- If the observation does not include mention of a standard of emigrant voting practices in a country or set of countries, a no (0) is coded.
- If the observation includes mention of a standard of emigrant voting practices in a country or set of countries, a yes (1) is coded.

## 4. Coding Procedures and Results

We identify 90 distinct observations. Due to budgetary and time limitation, coding was completed by the authors. In our consolidation and reporting of results, we only code “1” where both authors answered “yes” in their independent coding process. Intercooder reliability differs by variable. Results appear below:

Variable name	% observations [# observations]	Intercooder agreement
v1_coercion	0% [0]	100%
v2_competition	0% [0]	96%
v3_learning	11% [10]	85%
v4_emulation	86% [77]	90%

Substantive areas of divergence:

- v2\_competition: One coder answered “yes” (coded as 1) observations where international examples of emigrant voting were discussed in a broader context of global competition for human and financial capital. All such observations were found in Exhibits filed by expert witness Don De Voretz. Disagreement of interpretation may have led to an undercount of the competition mechanism.
- v3\_learning: One coder answered “yes” (coded as 1) for all observations where emigrant voter turnout in a foreign country was mentioned, while the second coder only answered “yes” where actors appeared to make a cause-and-effect claim. Disagreement of interpretation may have led to an undercount of the learning mechanism.
- v4\_emulation: when assessing voter turnout discussions, one coder answered “yes” (coded as 1) for emulation as well, while the other only answered “yes” where a discussion of standards existed apart from the voter turnout information.