**The Electoral Appeal of Symbolic Class Signalling Through Cultural Consumption**

# Supplementary Material

# Full question wordings and screenshots of the conjoint experiment

**Full question wordings:**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **English translation** | **German (original)** |
| Which gender do you identify with?ManWomanOther | Mit welchem Geschlecht identifizieren Sie sich?MannFrauAnderes |
| What is the highest level of education you have completed?Primary schoolSecondary school, middle school, and high school, without vocational training10th grade, pre-apprenticeship, financial year, vocational preparation class, bridging coursesTechnical secondary schools (3 years, FMS certificate, vocational baccalaureate), diploma secondary schools (DMS), commercial school, high schoolVocational training 3-4 years (Federal Certificate of Proficiency) in training companies or vocational schoolsMaster's diploma, Federal Certificate of Proficiency, and other specialist examinationsDiploma or post-diploma from a higher technical college, university of applied sciences (FH), university of education (PH)BachelorMaster, LicentiateDoctorate, PhD | Welches ist Ihre höchste abgeschlossene Ausbildung?PrimarschuleSekundar-, Real- und Oberschule, ohne Berufslehre10. Schuljahr, Vorlehre, Haushaltsjahr, Berufsvorbereitungsklasse, BrückenangeboteFachmittelschulen (3 Jahre, FMS-Ausweis, Fachmaturität), Diplommittelschulen (DMS), Handelsschule, GymnasiumBerufslehre 3-4 Jahre (Eidg. Fähigkeitszeugnis) in Lehrbetriebe oder in BerufsfachschuleMeisterdiplom, Eidg. Fachausweis und weitere FachprüfungenDiplom oder Nachdiplom einer höheren Fachschule, Fachhochschule (FH), Pädagogische Hochschule (PH)Bachelor Master, LizenziatDoktorat, PhD |
| There are people who, for one reason or another, do not vote. What about you? Did you vote in the last National and Council of States elections in October 2019?Yes[all others: screened out] | Es gibt Leute, die aus dem einen oder anderen Grund nicht wählen oder stimmen gehen. Wie ist das bei Ihnen? Haben Sie an den letzten National- und Ständeratswahlen vom Oktober 2019 Ihre Stimme abgegeben?Ja[all others: screened out] |
| Which party did you vote for back then?Swiss People's Party (SVP)Social Democratic Party (SP)FDP. The LiberalsGreen Party (GPS)Christian Democratic People's Party (CVP) (today: The Centre)Green Liberals (GLP)Civil Democratic Party (BDP)Evangelical People's Party of Switzerland (EVP)Federal Democratic Union (EDU)Lega dei TicinesiParty of Labor/solidaritéSOther party(Blank vote)(Don't know) | Welcher Partei haben Sie damals Ihre Stimme gegeben?Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)Sozialdemokratische Partei (SP)FDP. Die LiberalenGrüne Partei (GPS)Christlich-demokratische Volkspartei (CVP) (heute: die Mitte)Grünliberale (GLP)Bürgerlich-demokratische Partei (BDP)Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz (EVP)Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union (EDU)Lega dei TicinesiPartei der Arbeit/solidaritéSAndere Partei(Leere Stimmabgabe)(Weiss nicht) |
| Is there a particular political party that is closer to you than all the other parties?[same answer categories as above] | Gibt es eine bestimmte politische Partei, die Ihnen näher steht als alle übrigen Parteien?[gleiche Antwortkategorien wie oben] |
| Please take into account the income of all members of your household in the next question. If you add up the income from all sources, what is your household's total net income per month?Less than CHF 3,300 per monthCHF 3,300 to less than CHF 4,300 per monthCHF 4,300 to less than CHF 5,300 per monthCHF 5,300 to less than CHF 6,400 per monthCHF 6,400 to less than CHF 7,500 per monthCHF 7,500 to less than CHF 8,700 per monthCHF 8,700 to less than CHF 10,100 per monthCHF 10,100 to less than CHF 12,000 per monthCHF 12,000 to less than CHF 15,300 per monthCHF 15,300 or more per month(Don't know) | Bitte berücksichtigen Sie bei der nächsten Frage das Einkommen sämtlicher Mitglieder Ihres Haushaltes. Wenn Sie das Einkommen aus allen Quellen zusammenzählen, wie hoch ist das gesamte Nettoeinkommen Ihres Haushaltes pro Monat?Weniger als CHF 3'300 pro MonatCHF 3'300 bis weniger als CHF 4'300 pro MonatCHF 4'300 bis weniger als CHF 5'300 pro MonatCHF 5'300 bis weniger als CHF 6'400 pro MonatCHF 6'400 bis weniger als CHF 7'500 pro MonatCHF 7'500 bis weniger als CHF 8'700 pro MonatCHF 8'700 bis weniger als CHF 10'100 pro MonatCHF 10'100 bis weniger als CHF 12'000 pro MonatCHF 12'000 bis weniger als CHF 15'300 pro MonatCHF 15'300 oder mehr pro Monat(Weiss nicht) |
| Which term best describes your current (or past) job?(open text field)[coded into ISCO-08 based on Swiss occupational nomenclature CH-ISCO-19, <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/arbeit-erwerb/nomenclaturen/ch-isco-19.html>, then coded into working-class occupations using the Oesch class scheme] | Welche Bezeichnung beschreibt Ihren aktuellen (oder vergangenen) Beruf am besten? (offenes Textfeld)[coded into ISCO-08 based on Schweizer Berufsnomenklatur CH-ISCO-19, <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/arbeit-erwerb/nomenclaturen/ch-isco-19.html>, then coded into working-class occupations using the Oesch class scheme] |
| There are people who tend to be at the top of our society and people who tend to be at the bottom. Here you can see a scale from top to bottom. Where do you currently see yourself on this scale?10 - At the top of our society9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 -0 - At the bottom of our society(Don't know) | Es gibt Menschen, die in unserer Gesellschaft eher oben stehen, und Menschen, die eher unten stehen. Hier sehen Sie eine Skala von oben nach unten. Wo sehen Sie sich momentan auf dieser Skala?10 - Oben in unserer Gesellschaft9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 -0 - Unten in unserer Gesellschaft(Weiss nicht) |
| Election of the PARTY chairmanThe PARTY is preparing for the 2023 election campaign. Please imagine that there are new elections for the party leadership before the election. We will present several hypothetical scenarios in which two politicians stand for the election.Please read the profiles of the two candidates and answer the three questions below.Candidate for the PARTY chairmanship:ATTR\_GENDER• Is a man• Is a womanATTR\_EDUCATION• Has a university degree• Has a vocational degreeATTR\_ECONPOS• Positions himself/herself more on the left [SVP: moderate] wing of the party on economic and social policy• Positions himself/herself more on the right wing of the party on economic and social policyATTR\_CULTPOS• Positions himself/herself more on the left [SVP: moderate] wing of the party on societal issues (e.g., migration, equality)• Positions himself/herself more on the right wing of the party on societal issues (e.g., migration, equality)ATTR\_ORIGIN• Grew up in a wealthy family as the [son/daughter] of a lawyer and a doctor• Grew up in a teacher family as the [son/daughter] of a primary school teacher and a primary school teacher• Grew up in a working-class family as the [son/daughter] of a construction worker and a supermarket employeeATTR\_CULTCON• Enjoys listening to classical music with a glass of wine in his/her spare time• Enjoys going to drink a beer in their favourite pub in his/her spare time• Enjoys meeting friends in his/her spare timeHow likely is it that you will vote for the PARTY in the upcoming national elections if candidate 2 becomes party president?[Slider from 0 per cent to 100 per cent](Don’t know)If you had to decide, which party president would you prefer?Candidate 1Candidate 2(Don't know) | Wahl des PARTY-VorsitzesDie PARTY bereitet sich auf den Wahlkampf 2023 vor. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass vor den Wahlen noch die Neuwahl des Parteipräsidiums der PARTY anstehen. Wir stellen Ihnen nun mehrere hypothetische Szenarien vor, in welchem sich jeweils zwei Politiker[innen] zur Wahl stellen. Bitte lesen sie die Profile der zwei Kandidierenden und beantworten sie die drei untenstehenden Fragen.Kandidat(in) für den PARTY-Vorsitz:ATTR\_GENDER• Ist ein Mann• Ist eine FrauATTR\_EDUCATION• Besitzt einen Universitätsabschluss• Besitzt einen LehrabschlussATTR\_ECONPOS• Positioniert sich in der Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik eher am linken [SVP: gemässigten] Rand der Partei• Positioniert sich in der Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik eher am rechten Rand der ParteiATTR\_CULTPOS• Positioniert sich bei gesellschaftspolitischen Fragen (u.a. Zuwanderung, Gleichstellung) eher am linken [SVP: gemässigten] Rand der Partei• Positioniert sich bei gesellschaftspolitischen Fragen (u.a. Zuwanderung, Gleichstellung) eher am rechten Rand der ParteiATTR\_ORIGIN• Ist aufgewachsen in wohlhabenden Verhältnissen als [Sohn / Tochter] eines Anwalts und einer Ärztin• Ist aufgewachsen in einer Lehrerfamilie als [Sohn / Tochter] eines Primarlehrers und einer Primarlehrerin• Ist aufgewachsen in einer Arbeiterfamilie als [Sohn / Tochter] eines Bauarbeiters und einer SupermarktangestelltenATTR\_CULTCON• Hört in der Freizeit gerne klassische Musik bei einem Glas Wein• Geht in der Freizeit gerne ein Bier in der Lieblingsbeiz trinken• Trifft in der Freizeit gerne FreundeWie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass Sie in den kommenden Nationalratswahlen die PARTY wählen, wenn Kandidat[in] 2 Parteipräsident[in] wird?[Slider von 0 per cent bis 100 per cent](Weiss nicht)Wenn Sie sich entscheiden müssten, welchen Parteipräsident[in] würden Sie bevorzugen?Kandidat[in] 1Kandidat[in] 2(Weiss nicht) |

**Screenshots of the conjoint:**













# B. Underlying regression models

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | Coef. | SE | Coef. | SE |
| Woman *(ref: man)* | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.01 | -0.02 | 0.02 |
| Non-tertiary education *(ref: tertiary)* | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.06\*\* | 0.02 |
| Middle-class origin *(ref: upper-class)* | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| Working-class origin *(ref: upper-class)* | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Economic right-wing attitudes *(ref: left-wing)* | -0.02+ | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| Cultural right-wing attitudes *(ref: left-wing)* | -0.03\*\* | 0.01 | 0.03+ | 0.02 |
| ‘Meeting friends’ cultural consumption *(ref: upper-class)* | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.09\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Working-class cultural consumption *(ref: upper-class)* | 0.04\*\* | 0.01 | 0.10\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Social democrat/SP voter *(ref: SVP)* |  |  | 0.15\*\*\* | 0.04 |
| Liberal/FDP voter *(ref: SVP)* |  |  | -0.05 | 0.04 |
| Green/GPS voter *(ref: SVP)* |  |  | 0.19\*\*\* | 0.05 |
| Christian democrat/Mitte voter *(ref: SVP)* |  |  | -0.03 | 0.05 |
| Green liberal/GLP voter *(ref: SVP)* |  |  | 0.03 | 0.05 |
| Woman × SP voter |  |  | 0.09\*\* | 0.03 |
| Woman × FDP voter |  |  | 0.10\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Woman × GPS voter |  |  | 0.14\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Woman × Mitte voter |  |  | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Woman × GLP voter |  |  | 0.14\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Non-tertiary education × SP voter |  |  | -0.08\*\* | 0.03 |
| Non-tertiary education × FDP voter |  |  | -0.07\* | 0.03 |
| Non-tertiary education × GPS voter |  |  | -0.07\* | 0.03 |
| Non-tertiary education × Mitte voter |  |  | -0.03 | 0.03 |
| Non-tertiary education × GLP voter |  |  | -0.17\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Econ. right-wing × SP voter |  |  | -0.12\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Econ. right-wing × FDP voter |  |  | 0.06\* | 0.03 |
| Econ. right-wing × GPS voter |  |  | -0.15\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Econ. right-wing × Mitte voter |  |  | 0.01 | 0.03 |
| Econ. right-wing × GLP voter |  |  | 0.02 | 0.04 |
| Cult. right-wing × SP voter |  |  | -0.15\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Cult. right-wing × FDP voter |  |  | 0.00 | 0.03 |
| Cult. right-wing × GPS voter |  |  | -0.16\*\*\* | 0.04 |
| Cult. right-wing × Mitte voter |  |  | -0.03 | 0.03 |
| Cult. right-wing × GLP voter |  |  | -0.13\*\* | 0.04 |
| Middle-class origin × SP voter |  |  | 0.08\* | 0.03 |
| Middle-class origin × FDP voter |  |  | 0.05 | 0.03 |
| Middle-class origin × GPS voter |  |  | 0.01 | 0.04 |
| Middle-class origin × Mitte voter |  |  | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| Middle-class origin × GLP voter |  |  | 0.15\*\*\* | 0.04 |
| Working-class origin × SP voter |  |  | -0.03 | 0.03 |
| Working-class origin × FDP voter |  |  | 0.00 | 0.04 |
| Working-class origin × GPS voter |  |  | -0.09\* | 0.04 |
| Working-class origin × Mitte voter |  |  | 0.00 | 0.04 |
| Working-class origin × GLP voter |  |  | 0.10\* | 0.04 |
| ‘Meeting friends’ cult. cons. × SP voter |  |  | -0.00 | 0.03 |
| ‘Meeting friends’ cult. cons. × FDP voter |  |  | 0.01 | 0.04 |
| ‘Meeting friends’ cult. cons. × GPS voter |  |  | -0.07 | 0.04 |
| ‘Meeting friends’ cult. cons. × Mitte voter |  |  | 0.00 | 0.04 |
| ‘Meeting friends’ cult. cons. × GLP voter |  |  | -0.05 | 0.04 |
| Working-class cult. cons. × SP voter |  |  | -0.09\* | 0.03 |
| Working-class cult. cons. × FDP voter |  |  | -0.05 | 0.04 |
| Working-class cult. cons. × GPS voter |  |  | -0.10\* | 0.04 |
| Working-class cult. cons. × Mitte voter |  |  | -0.06+ | 0.04 |
| Working-class cult. cons. × GLP voter |  |  | -0.11\*\* | 0.04 |
| Constant | 0.39\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.34\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| R2 | 0.02 |  | 0.04 |  |
| *N* | 12,712 |  | 12,712 |  |

+ *p*<0.1; \* *p*<0.05; \*\* *p*<0.01; \*\*\* *p*<0.001

# C. Robustness tests: Average marginal component effects (AMCE)

### Figure C1. Average marginal component effect (AMCE) of beer attribute, by party



***Note*:** Conjoint estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals. AMCEs estimated from Model 2 in Appendix B.

### Figure C2. Average marginal component effect (AMCE) of beer attribute, conditional on other candidate attributes (interaction models), by party



***Note*:** Conjoint estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals. AMCEs estimated from interaction models (the first two rows are based on a model interacting cultural consumption with candidate gender attribute, the next two rows are based on a model interacting cultural consumption with candidate education attribute, and so on).

# D. Alternative dependent variable (party vote probability)

In this appendix, we present extended results with party vote probability as the alternative dependent variable (that is, the probability of voting for the respondents’ preferred party if candidate 1 or candidate 2, respectively, becomes party leader). The probability is measured on a scale from 0 per cent to 100 per cent, thus respondents were not forced to choose between the two candidates but could for instance indicate a 100 per cent party vote probability for both candidates, even if they like one candidate more than another but are still sure to vote for the party again. By focusing on party vote probability, we may therefore be able to better predict whether the respondent’s preferences towards a candidate’s cultural consumption attribute bear potential for changes in voting behaviour. While the measure provides us information about whether the respondents would vote for the party again, it does not tell us anything about which alternative option the respondents would choose instead. Nevertheless, we gain some valuable insights from looking into this alternative dependent variable.

First, we find very similar patterns as with our main dependent variable (party leader choice): Radical right voters clearly stand out with the highest party vote probabilities for candidates claiming to enjoy drinking beer (working-class cultural consumption). Second, the AMCEs comparing the effects of the beer attribute relative to the classical music/wine attribute are slightly less clear-cut than in the main analysis with the choice variable. We show that this reflects an extraordinarily high degree of partisan loyalty among radical right voters, who are willing to vote for the party even if a candidate who enjoys classical music and wine becomes party leader. Third, when looking at vote switching, we show that the beer attribute still decreases the likelihood of vote switching among radical right voters (vote likelihood lower than 50 per cent, or alternatively 33 per cent), and depending on which threshold we look at, also among some other parties.

Before we discuss the results in detail, we would like to note that this type of non-binary outcome variable has not yet been methodologically validated in the conjoint literature. Most conjoint experiments in political science use forced-choice questions on the discrete choice between candidates as the dependent variable, e.g. Carnes and Lupu (2016, 836), Vivyan and Wagner (2016, 87), Eggers et al. (2018, 322), Teele et al. (2018, 530), Horiuchi et al. (2020, 82), Dai and Kustov (2024, 851), or Hjortskov and Andersen (2024, 4). The external validity of the discrete choice questions has also been demonstrated with an interpretation as the effect of candidate attributes on vote shares in an election (Bansak et al. 2023). By contrast, only a few single studies implement non-binary scales or thermometers as the outcome variable; for example, a 1-7 feelings towards the candidate scale by Vivyan et al. (2020: 5) or a 0-100 candidate competence scale by Kirkland and Coppock (2018, 580). Abramson et al. (2022: 1009) are ‘unaware of a microfoundation of choice behavior when responses take a range of values’. Due to this lack of validation, the findings with our alternative dependent variable and the implications for vote switching should be seen as tentative compared to the much more established discrete choice dependent variable in the main manuscript.

Despite this caveat, the results in Figure D1 show the familiar patterns for the cases where a candidate who enjoys drinking beer becomes party leader (black triangles). The party vote probability in such a scenario is 63.5 per cent for the SVP, while it is below 60 per cent for all other parties (FDP: 57 per cent, Mitte: 55 per cent, SP: 57 per cent, GLP: 57 per cent, GPS: 59 per cent). The differences between the SVP and all other parties are statistically significant at the 95 per cent level. These figures refer to the model without any control variables (upper panel of Figure D1). The party differences are even clearer when our models include socio-demographic control variables (gender, education, income, subjective social status, and social class) and attitudinal control variables (left-right placement, support for redistribution, immigration attitudes, and trust). In these models, shown in the lower panel of Figure D1, SVP voters have 66.3 per cent party vote probability for candidates with the beer attribute, while all other parties are below 60 per cent (differences all statistically significant at the 99 per cent level).

### Figure D1: Conjoint results with continuous vote probability as dependent variable

Without control variables

**

With control variables



*Note*: Conjoint estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals.

At the same time, Figure D1 shows that the results based on the AMCEs comparing working-class and upper-class cultural consumption candidates are less clear-cut than the AMCEs using our main dependent variable. We find that SVP voters are more likely to vote for their party if a candidate with the beer attribute rather than the classical music/wine attribute becomes party leader, but the AMCE is only statistically significant in the model with control variables (p<0.05). The main reason for the lack of statistical significance is that party vote probability among SVP voters is very high, even for candidates enjoying classical music and wine (61.9 per cent in the model without control variables, 63.4 per cent in the model with control variables, see the grey circles in Figure D1). This high vote probability is surprising given that SVP voters were strongly opposed to choosing candidates with upper-class cultural consumption as party leaders (see main document, Figure 2). However, according to our results, SVP voters remain loyal in voting for their party even if an unpreferred candidate becomes its leader. Thus, the two variables are not measuring the same thing: we found a strong anti-elite bias for party leader choice, but not for the probability of voting for the party. Yet despite these differences for the classical music/wine attribute (upper-class cultural consumption), the patterns for the beer attribute (working-class cultural consumption) remain the same as in the main analysis. This is also confirmed by the fact that drinking beer is not associated with a higher vote probability among all the other (non-SVP) parties, and the ACME of working-class cultural consumption is not statistically significant among any of them.

## The probability of vote switching and implications for electoral support

We also use party vote probability, our alternative dependent variable, to explore the implications for electoral support and electoral potentials *across parties*, addressing the concern that our main DV is limited to comparisons of candidate profiles *within parties*.

Specifically, we create two estimates for the *probability of vote switching*, using binary variables with two different thresholds: (1) Vote switching probability=1 if a respondent has party vote probability below 50 per cent, and 0 otherwise. (2) Vote switching probability=1 if a respondent has party vote probability at 33 per cent or below, and 0 otherwise. We interpret these binary variables as proxies for the potential to switch to another party or to abstain (that is, indicating voters that are unlikely or highly unlikely to stay with the party they voted for previously).

The results in Figure D2 show that once again, SVP voters stand out: for candidates with the beer attribute (black triangles), SVP voters are least likely to switch party compared to all the other parties (SVP: 26 per cent vs. other parties: >30 per cent in the model without control variables, and SVP: 23 per cent vs. other parties: >30 per cent in the model with control variables). These patterns are confirmed and even more pronounced in Figure D3 with the 33 per cent threshold (this threshold indicates that voters are highly unlikely to stay with their party).

The AMCEs comparing the classical music/wine and the beer attributes in Figures D2 and D3 also show that the beer attribute has clear negative effects on the vote switching probability among SVP voters (the effect is significant at the 0.05 level in three out of the four models). Hence, even if SVP voters are overall quite loyal, working-class cultural consumption helps to reduce the remaining risk of vote switching. Interestingly, the AMCE is also negative among voters of the liberal party FDP (however, significant only in the 33 per cent-threshold models) and the Christian-democratic Mitte and the social-democratic SP (but never significant). This is in line with the findings of our main analysis, where we show that the other parties’ voters punish candidates with upper-class cultural consumption but neither reward nor punish working-class cultural consumption (Figure 2, Figure C1 for ACME). While this finding does not directly refer to the ability of parties to attract new voters from other parties, it adds to the evidence in our paper that working-class cultural consumption strengthens the electoral support first and foremost for radical right parties, but that there is at least some potential electoral sympathy for this type of symbolic class signalling among other voters. As we discuss in our conclusion, further research is needed to explore whether it might thus be a potential strategy for mainstream parties as well.

### Figure D2. Probability of vote switching (50 per cent threshold)

Without control variables



With control variables



*Note*: Conjoint estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals.

### Figure D3. Probability of vote switching (33 per cent threshold)

Without control variables



With control variables



***Note*:** Conjoint estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals.

**References**

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# E. Effects of all candidate attributes by party

### Figure E1. Effect of candidate’s gender on party leader choice probability



***Note*:** Conjoint estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals. Based on Model 2 in Appendix B. Marginal means are predicted from the interaction between candidate gender and voters’ party.

### Figure E2. Effect of candidate’s education on party leader choice probability



***Note*:** Conjoint estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals. Based on Model 2 in Appendix B. Marginal means are predicted from the interaction between candidate education and voters’ party.

### Figure E3. Effect of candidate’s class origin on party leader choice probability



***Note*:** Conjoint estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals. Based on Model 2 in Appendix B. Marginal means predicted from the interaction between candidate class origin and voters’ party.

### Figure E4. Effect of candidate’s attitudes on economic issues (within party) on party leader choice probability



***Note*:** Conjoint estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals. Based on Model 2 in Appendix B. Marginal means predicted from the interaction between candidate attitudes on economic issues and voters’ party.

### Figure E5. Effect of candidate’s attitudes on cultural issues (within party) on party leader choice probability

 

***Note*:** Conjoint estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals. Based on Model 2 in Appendix B. Marginal means predicted from the interaction between candidate attitudes on cultural issues and voters’ party.

### Figure E6. Effect of candidate’s cultural consumption on party leader choice probability

 

***Note*:** Conjoint estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals. Based on Model 2 in Appendix B. Marginal means predicted from the interaction between candidate cultural consumption and voters’ party.

# F. Interaction between cultural consumption and class origin attributes

### Figure F1. Marginal effect of beer attribute (AMCE), by party and candidate’s class origin

 

***Note*:** Conjoint estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals. AMCEs are estimated from a model interacting with cultural consumption with candidate class origin.

# G. Socioeconomic composition of party electorates

### Figure G1. Share of tertiary-educated voters by party in our sample



***Note*:** Bars represent a 95 per cent confidence interval.

### Figure G2. Share of working-class voters (production and service workers) by party in our sample



***Note*:** Bars represent a 95 per cent confidence interval.

### Figure G3. Average equivalised household income decile by party in our sample



***Note*:** Bars represent a 95 per cent confidence interval.

### Figure G4. Average subjective social status by party in our sample



***Note*:** Bars represent a 95 per cent confidence interval.

### Figure G5. Share of women by party in our sample



***Note*:** Bars represent a 95 per cent confidence interval.

# H. Effects of working-class cultural consumption, by party and immigration attitudes

### Figure H1. Effects of beer attribute by party, for subsamples of voters with pro-/anti-immigration attitudes

 

***Note*:** Conjoint estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals. Immigration attitudes are measured with an additive index composed of three items, each measured on a 0-10 scale, with higher values indicating more pro-immigration attitudes: ‘Immigrants good for the economy’, ‘Immigrants good for cultural life in Switzerland’, and ‘Life better or worse due to immigration?’. The index was rescaled to range from 0-10. We defined ‘pro-immigration attitudes’ as values above 5 on this index, and ‘anti-immigration attitudes’ when respondents have value 5 or lower on the index.