**ONLINE APPENDIX**

**Defending the Status Quo or Seeking Change? Electoral Outcomes, Affective Polarisation, and Support for Referendums**

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**Appendix A. Details on the data**

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| ***Table A.1*** Countries and respondents |
| **Country** | **N** |
| Belgium (FL) | 1,066 |
| Belgium (WAL) | 1,100 |
| Czech Republic | 1,985 |
| Denmark | 1,384 |
| Finland | 1,316 |
| France | 1,119 |
| Germany | 1,251 |
| Greece | 1,223 |
| Ireland | 1,259 |
| Netherlands | 1,288 |
| Poland | 1,284 |
| Spain | 1,276 |
| United Kingdom | 1,216 |

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| ***Table A.2*** Summary statistics |
|   | N | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|  Referendum support | 16,767 | 3.882 | 0.854 | 1 | 5 |
|  Electoral loser | 14,802 | 0.586 | 0.493 | 0 | 1 |
|  Affective Polarisation | 16,767 | 2.049 | 1.112 | 0 | 4.993 |
|  Political interest | 16,767 | 3.057 | 0.795 | 1 | 4 |
|  Left-right | 16,767 | 5.377 | 2.362 | 0 | 10 |
|  Political efficacy | 16,767 | 2.262 | 0.892 | 1 | 4 |
|  Gender | 16,767 | 0.535 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
|  Age | 16,767 | 3.659 | 1.580 | 1 | 7 |
|  Education | 16,767 | 4.192 | 1.585 | 1 | 6 |
|  Employment | 16,767 | 1.549 | 0.608 | 0 | 2 |
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**Appendix B. Robustness tests**

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| ***Table B.1*** Fixed-effects ordered logit models  |
|  | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| Electoral loser | 0.496\*\*\* | (0.030) | 0.502\*\*\* | (0.031) | -0.006 | (0.064) |
| Affective Polarization | -0.072\*\*\* | (0.014) | -0.060\*\*\* | (0.015) | -0.195\*\*\* | (0.022) |
| Loser\*Affective Polarisation |  |  |  |  | 0.237\*\*\* | (0.028) |
| Political interest |  |  | 0.242\*\*\* | (0.022) | 0.242\*\*\* | (0.022) |
| Left-right placement |  |  | 0.012 | (0.007) | 0.015\* | (0.007) |
| Internal political efficacy |  |  | 0.138\*\*\* | (0.019) | 0.139\*\*\* | (0.019) |
| Male |  |  | -0.039 | (0.030) | -0.036 | (0.030) |
| Age |  |  | 0.051\*\*\* | (0.010) | 0.051\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Education |  |  | -0.080\*\*\* | (0.010) | -0.080\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Labour status (ref: unemployed) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Not in labour force |  |  | -0.058 | (0.073) | -0.064 | (0.073) |
|  Employed |  |  | 0.084 | (0.070) | 0.080 | (0.069) |
| cut1 | -4.513\*\*\* | (0.088) | -3.648\*\*\* | (0.157) | -3.946\*\*\* | (0.160) |
| cut2 | -3.837\*\*\* | (0.068) | -2.970\*\*\* | (0.147) | -3.268\*\*\* | (0.150) |
| cut3 | -2.835\*\*\* | (0.050) | -1.962\*\*\* | (0.140) | -2.258\*\*\* | (0.143) |
| cut4 | -2.143\*\*\* | (0.044) | -1.264\*\*\* | (0.138) | -1.559\*\*\* | (0.142) |
| cut5 | -1.160\*\*\* | (0.040) | -0.262 | (0.137) | -0.555\*\*\* | (0.141) |
| cut6 | -0.379\*\*\* | (0.039) | 0.543\*\*\* | (0.137) | 0.253 | (0.141) |
| cut7 | 0.753\*\*\* | (0.039) | 1.720\*\*\* | (0.138) | 1.435\*\*\* | (0.142) |
| cut8 | 1.712\*\*\* | (0.040) | 2.709\*\*\* | (0.140) | 2.426\*\*\* | (0.143) |
| N | 14,802 |  | 14,802 |  | 14,802 |  |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects are not displayed.\*p<0.05, \*\*p< 0.01, \*\*\*p< 0.001.  |

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| ***Table B.2*** Fixed-effects linear regression models controlling for SWD |
|  | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| Electoral loser | 0.235\*\*\* | (0.014) | 0.154\*\*\* | (0.015) | 0.011 | (0.030) |
| Affective Polarisation | -0.046\*\*\* | (0.007) | -0.042\*\*\* | (0.007) | -0.080\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Loser\*Affective Polarisation |  |  |  |  | 0.067\*\*\* | (0.013) |
| Political interest |  |  | 0.116\*\*\* | (0.010) | 0.114\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Left-right placement |  |  | 0.013\*\*\* | (0.003) | 0.013\*\*\* | (0.003) |
| Internal political efficacy |  |  | 0.095\*\*\* | (0.008) | 0.094\*\*\* | (0.008) |
| Male |  |  | -0.026 | (0.014) | -0.025 | (0.014) |
| Age |  |  | 0.021\*\*\* | (0.005) | 0.021\*\*\* | (0.005) |
| Education |  |  | -0.036\*\*\* | (0.005) | -0.036\*\*\* | (0.005) |
| Labour status (ref: unemployed) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Not in labour force |  |  | -0.006 | (0.033) | -0.008 | (0.033) |
|  Employed |  |  | 0.062 | (0.031) | 0.060 | (0.031) |
| SWD |  |  | -0.062\*\*\* | (0.003) | -0.060\*\*\* | (0.003) |
| Constant | 3.842\*\*\* | (0.018) | 3.608\*\*\* | (0.063) | 3.688\*\*\* | (0.064) |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.023 |  | 0.096 |  | 0.098 |  |
| N | 14,802 |  | 14,711 |  | 14,711 |  |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects are not displayed. \*p<0.05, \*\*p< 0.01, \*\*\*p< 0.001. |

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| ***Table B.3*** T-tests for first dependent variable |
| **Country** | **Mean electoral losers** | **Mean electoral winners** | **Difference** | **p-value** |
| Belgium (WAL) | 4.180 | 3.843 | **0.337** | 0.000 |
| Belgium (FL) | 4.101 | 3.977 | **0.124** | 0.028 |
| Czech Republic | 4.012 | 3.711 | **0.301** | 0.000 |
| Denmark | 4.036 | 3.822 | **0.214** | 0.000 |
| Finland | 3.926 | 3.789 | **0.137** | 0.013 |
| France | 4.046 | 3.693 | **0.354** | 0.000 |
| Germany | 4.106 | 3.828 | **0.278** | 0.000 |
| Greece | 4.104 | 3.842 | **0.261** | 0.000 |
| Ireland | 4.029 | 3.900 | **0.128** | 0.014 |
| Netherlands | 3.997 | 3.562 | **0.435** | 0.000 |
| Poland | 4.356 | 4.018 | **0.338** | 0.000 |
| Spain | 4.117 | 4.064 | **0.053** | 0.183 |
| UK | 3.810 | 3.768 | **0.041** | 0.244 |
| The p-values are based on a one-tailed t-test. Differences in bold are in the hypothesised direction. Dependent variable: *When collecting a sufficient number of signatures, citizens can force the government to hold a referendum on a policy issue* (1-5).  |

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| ***Table B.4*** T-tests for second dependent variable |
| **Country** | **Mean electoral losers** | **Mean electoral winners** | **Difference** | **p-value** |
| Belgium (WAL) | 3.884 | 3.559 | **0.325** | 0.000 |
| Belgium (FL) | 3.854 | 3.700 | **0.154** | 0.012 |
| Czech Republic | 3.679 | 3.158 | **0.521** | 0.000 |
| Denmark | 3.948 | 3.773 | **0.176** | 0.002 |
| Finland | 3.880 | 3.729 | **0.151** | 0.005 |
| France | 3.964 | 3.507 | **0.457** | 0.000 |
| Germany | 3.769 | 3.503 | **0.266** | 0.000 |
| Greece | 3.993 | 3.736 | **0.257** | 0.000 |
| Ireland | 4.258 | 4.131 | **0.127** | 0.004 |
| Netherlands | 3.644 | 3.104 | **0.540** | 0.000 |
| Poland | 4.144 | 3.969 | **0.175** | 0.001 |
| Spain | 4.012 | 4.026 | -0.014 | 0.595 |
| UK | 3.828 | 3.759 | **0.069** | 0.135 |
| The p-values are based on a one-tailed t-test. Differences in bold are in the hypothesised direction. Dependent variable: *It is important for democracy that citizens have the final say on political issues by voting in referendums* (1-5).  |

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| ***Table B.5*** Fixed-effects linear regression models separated by dependent variable  |
|  |  | DV 1 |  |  | DV 2 |  |
|  | M1 | M2 | M3 | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| Electoral loser | 0.225\*\*\* | 0.222\*\*\* | 0.020 | 0.245\*\*\* | 0.241\*\*\* | -0.015 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.035) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.035) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Affective Polarisation | -0.027\*\*\* | -0.029\*\*\* | -0.082\*\*\* | -0.066\*\*\* | -0.049\*\*\* | -0.116\*\*\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.012) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.012) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Loser\*Affective Polarisation |  |  | 0.093\*\*\* |  |  | 0.117\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.015) |  |  | (0.015) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political interest |  | 0.092\*\*\* | 0.091\*\*\* |  | 0.093\*\*\* | 0.092\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.011) | (0.011) |  | (0.012) | (0.012) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left-right placement |  | -0.001 | -0.000 |  | 0.006 | 0.007\* |
|  |  | (0.004) | (0.004) |  | (0.004) | (0.004) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Internal political efficacy |  | 0.061\*\*\* | 0.061\*\*\* |  | 0.095\*\*\* | 0.095\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.010) | (0.010) |  | (0.010) | (0.010) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male |  | -0.020 | -0.018 |  | -0.039\* | -0.036\* |
|  |  | (0.016) | (0.016) |  | (0.016) | (0.016) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age |  | 0.022\*\*\* | 0.022\*\*\* |  | 0.016\*\* | 0.015\*\* |
|  |  | (0.005) | (0.005) |  | (0.006) | (0.006) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education |  | -0.031\*\*\* | -0.031\*\*\* |  | -0.043\*\*\* | -0.042\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.005) | (0.005) |  | (0.005) | (0.005) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Labour status (ref: unemployed) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Not in labour force |  | 0.008 | 0.006 |  | -0.049 | -0.051 |
|  |  | (0.039) | (0.039) |  | (0.038) | (0.038) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Employed |  | 0.049 | 0.047 |  | 0.035 | 0.032 |
|  |  | (0.037) | (0.037) |  | (0.037) | (0.036) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 3.891\*\*\* | 3.591\*\*\* | 3.710\*\*\* | 3.794\*\*\* | 3.323\*\*\* | 3.474\*\*\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.073) | (0.075) | (0.021) | (0.075) | (0.076) |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.015 | 0.037 | 0.039 | 0.021 | 0.082 | 0.086 |
| N | 14,802 | 14,802 | 14,802 | 14,802 | 14,802 | 14,802 |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects are not displayed. \*p<0.05, \*\*p< 0.01, \*\*\*p< 0.001. DV 1: *When collecting a sufficient numbers of signatures, citizens can force the government to hold a referendum on a policy issue* (1-5). DV 2: *It is important for democracy that citizens have a final say on political issues by voting in referendums* (1-5). |

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| ***Table B.6*** Fixed-effects linear regression models controlling for PRR vote |
|  | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| Electoral loser | 0.235\*\*\* | (0.014) | 0.203\*\*\* | (0.015) | -0.021 | (0.030) |
| Affective Polarisation | -0.046\*\*\* | (0.007) | -0.044\*\*\* | (0.007) | -0.103\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Loser\*Affective Polarisation |  |  |  |  | 0.103\*\*\* | (0.013) |
| Political interest |  |  | 0.095\*\*\* | (0.010) | 0.094\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Left-right placement |  |  | -0.006 | (0.003) | -0.005 | (0.003) |
| Internal political efficacy |  |  | 0.079\*\*\* | (0.008) | 0.079\*\*\* | (0.008) |
| Male |  |  | -0.033\* | (0.014) | -0.031\* | (0.014) |
| Age |  |  | 0.019\*\*\* | (0.005) | 0.019\*\*\* | (0.005) |
| Education |  |  | -0.034\*\*\* | (0.005) | -0.034\*\*\* | (0.005) |
| Labour status (ref: unemployed) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Not in labour force |  |  | -0.015 | (0.033) | -0.018 | (0.033) |
|  Employed |  |  | 0.044 | (0.031) | 0.042 | (0.031) |
| Voted Populist Radical Right |  |  | 0.204\*\*\* | (0.021) | 0.201\*\*\* | (0.020) |
| Constant | 3.842\*\*\* | (0.018) | 3.496\*\*\* | (0.063) | 3.628\*\*\* | (0.065) |
| R2 | 0.023 |  | 0.075 |  | 0.079 |  |
| N | 14,802 |  | 14,802 |  | 14,802 |  |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects are not displayed. \*p<0.05, \*\*p< 0.01, \*\*\*p< 0.001. |

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| ***Table B.7*** Fixed-effects linear regression models with abstainers coded as electoral losers |
|  | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| Electoral losers | 0.217\*\*\* | (0.014) | 0.220\*\*\* | (0.014) | -0.019 | (0.028) |
| Affective Polarisation | -0.035\*\*\* | (0.006) | -0.031\*\*\* | (0.006) | -0.101\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Loser\*Affective Polarisation |  |  |  |  | 0.111\*\*\* | (0.012) |
| Political interest |  |  | 0.097\*\*\* | (0.009) | 0.093\*\*\* | (0.009) |
| Left-right placement |  |  | 0.002 | (0.003) | 0.003 | (0.003) |
| Internal political efficacy |  |  | 0.068\*\*\* | (0.008) | 0.067\*\*\* | (0.008) |
| Male |  |  | -0.026\* | (0.013) | -0.025 | (0.013) |
| Age |  |  | 0.024\*\*\* | (0.004) | 0.024\*\*\* | (0.004) |
| Education |  |  | -0.038\*\*\* | (0.004) | -0.038\*\*\* | (0.004) |
| Labour status (ref: unemployed) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Not in labour force |  |  | 0.001 | (0.029) | -0.003 | (0.029) |
|  Employed |  |  | 0.071\* | (0.028) | 0.066\* | (0.027) |
| Constant | 3.816\*\*\* | (0.017) | 3.406\*\*\* | (0.057) | 3.578\*\*\* | (0.060) |
| R2 | 0.019 |  | 0.064 |  | 0.068 |  |
| N | 16,767 |  | 16,767 |  | 16,767 |  |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects are not displayed. \*p<0.05, \*\*p< 0.01, \*\*\*p< 0.001. |

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| ***Table B.8*** Fixed-effects linear regression models controlling for structural electoral losers |
|  | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| Electoral loser | 0.235\*\*\* | (0.014) | 0.215\*\*\* | (0.015) | -0.025 | (0.030) |
| Affective Polarisation | -0.046\*\*\* | (0.007) | -0.037\*\*\* | (0.007) | -0.099\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Loser\*Affective Polarisation |  |  |  |  | 0.109\*\*\* | (0.013) |
| Political interest |  |  | 0.092\*\*\* | (0.010) | 0.091\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Left-right placement |  |  | 0.004 | (0.003) | 0.005 | (0.003) |
| Internal political efficacy |  |  | 0.079\*\*\* | (0.008) | 0.079\*\*\* | (0.008) |
| Male |  |  | -0.031\* | (0.014) | -0.029\* | (0.014) |
| Age |  |  | 0.021\*\*\* | (0.005) | 0.021\*\*\* | (0.005) |
| Education |  |  | -0.036\*\*\* | (0.005) | -0.036\*\*\* | (0.005) |
| Labour status (ref: unemployed) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Not in labour force |  |  | -0.019 | (0.033) | -0.021 | (0.033) |
|  Employed |  |  | 0.044 | (0.032) | 0.042 | (0.031) |
| Structural electoral loser |  |  | 0.082\*\*\* | (0.016) | 0.090\*\*\* | (0.016) |
| Constant | 3.842\*\*\* | (0.018) | 3.372\*\*\* | (0.066) | 3.504\*\*\* | (0.067) |
| R2 | 0.023 |  | 0.071 |  | 0.075 |  |
| N | 14,802 |  | 14,802 |  | 14,802 |  |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects are not displayed. \*p<0.05, \*\*p< 0.01, \*\*\*p< 0.001. |

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| ***Table B.9*** Fixed-effects linear regression models controlling for party size |
|  | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| Electoral loser | 0.235\*\*\* | (0.014) | 0.215\*\*\* | (0.017) | -0.035 | (0.032) |
| Affective Polarisation | -0.046\*\*\* | (0.007) | -0.035\*\*\* | (0.007) | -0.096\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Loser\*Affective Polarisation |  |  |  |  | 0.110\*\*\* | (0.013) |
| Political interest |  |  | 0.092\*\*\* | (0.010) | 0.091\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Left-right placement |  |  | 0.003 | (0.003) | 0.005 | (0.003) |
| Internal political efficacy |  |  | 0.078\*\*\* | (0.008) | 0.079\*\*\* | (0.008) |
| Male |  |  | -0.030\* | (0.014) | -0.028\* | (0.014) |
| Age |  |  | 0.020\*\*\* | (0.005) | 0.020\*\*\* | (0.005) |
| Education |  |  | -0.037\*\*\* | (0.005) | -0.037\*\*\* | (0.005) |
| Labour status (ref: unemployed) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Not in labour force |  |  | -0.020 | (0.033) | -0.022 | (0.033) |
|  Employed |  |  | 0.043 | (0.032) | 0.041 | (0.031) |
| Party size |  |  | -0.125\* | (0.061) | -0.196\*\* | (0.061) |
| Constant | 3.842\*\*\* | (0.018) | 3.472\*\*\* | (0.064) | 3.623\*\*\* | (0.065) |
| R2 | 0.023 |  | 0.070 |  | 0.074 |  |
| N | 14,802 |  | 14,802 |  | 14,802 |  |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects are not displayed. \*p<0.05, \*\*p< 0.01, \*\*\*p< 0.001. |

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| ***Table B.10*** Fixed-effects linear regression models controlling for SWD, populist radical right vote, structural electoral losers, and party size |
|  | M1 | M2 | M3 |
| Electoral loser | 0.235\*\*\* | (0.014) | 0.124\*\*\* | (0.017) | -0.035 | (0.032) |
| Affective Polarisation | -0.046\*\*\* | (0.007) | -0.044\*\*\* | (0.007) | -0.083\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Loser\*Affective Polarisation |  |  |  |  | 0.071\*\*\* | (0.013) |
| Political interest |  |  | 0.116\*\*\* | (0.010) | 0.114\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Left-right placement |  |  | 0.007\* | (0.003) | 0.008\* | (0.003) |
| Internal political efficacy |  |  | 0.095\*\*\* | (0.008) | 0.095\*\*\* | (0.008) |
| Male |  |  | -0.030\* | (0.014) | -0.029\* | (0.014) |
| Age |  |  | 0.022\*\*\* | (0.005) | 0.022\*\*\* | (0.005) |
| Education |  |  | -0.033\*\*\* | (0.005) | -0.033\*\*\* | (0.005) |
| Labour status (ref: unemployed) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Not in labour force |  |  | -0.002 | (0.033) | -0.004 | (0.033) |
|  Employed |  |  | 0.064\* | (0.031) | 0.062\* | (0.031) |
| SWD |  |  | -0.059\*\*\* | (0.003) | -0.056\*\*\* | (0.003) |
| Voted Populist Radical Right |  |  | 0.157\*\*\* | (0.020) | 0.157\*\*\* | (0.020) |
| Structural electoral loser |  |  | 0.040\* | (0.017) | 0.043\* | (0.017) |
| Party size |  |  | -0.031 | (0.064) | -0.076 | (0.064) |
| Constant | 3.842\*\*\* | (0.018) | 3.594\*\*\* | (0.067) | 3.682\*\*\* | (0.068) |
| R2 | 0.023 |  | 0.100 |  | 0.102 |  |
| N | 14,802 |  | 14,711 |  | 14,711 |  |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects are not displayed. \*p<0.05, \*\*p< 0.01, \*\*\*p< 0.001. |

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| ***Table B.11*** Fixed-effects linear regression models splitting electoral winners between junior and largest coalition partner |
|  | M1 |  | M2 |  | M3 |  |
| Coalition voter (ref: electoral loser) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Junior coalition partner | -0.244\*\*\* | (0.019) | -0.195\*\*\* | (0.020) | 0.051 | (0.040) |
|  Largest coalition partner | -0.228\*\*\* | (0.017) | -0.257\*\*\* | (0.017) | -0.044 | (0.036) |
| Affective Polarisation | -0.047\*\*\* | (0.007) | -0.038\*\*\* | (0.007) | 0.006 | (0.009) |
| Junior coalition partner\*Affective Polarisation |  |  |  |  | -0.117\*\*\* | (0.019) |
| Largest coalition partner\*Affective Polarisation |  |  |  |  | -0.096\*\*\* | (0.015) |
| Political interest |  |  | 0.092\*\*\* | (0.010) | 0.092\*\*\* | (0.010) |
| Left-right placement |  |  | 0.003 | (0.003) | 0.004 | (0.003) |
| Internal political efficacy |  |  | 0.078\*\*\* | (0.008) | 0.078\*\*\* | (0.008) |
| Male |  |  | -0.029\* | (0.014) | -0.027 | (0.014) |
| Age |  |  | 0.019\*\*\* | (0.005) | 0.019\*\*\* | (0.005) |
| Education |  |  | -0.038\*\*\* | (0.005) | -0.037\*\*\* | (0.005) |
| Employment status (ref: unemployed) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Not in labour force |  |  | -0.021 | (0.033) | -0.023 | (0.033) |
|  Employed |  |  | 0.043 | (0.032) | 0.040 | (0.031) |
| Constant | 4.078\*\*\* | (0.015) | 3.673\*\*\* | (0.063) | 3.587\*\*\* | (0.064) |
| R2 | 0.023 |  | 0.070 |  | 0.074 |  |
| N | 14,802 |  | 14,802 |  | 14,802 |  |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects are not displayed. \*p<0.05, \*\*p< 0.01, \*\*\*p< 0.001. |

***Graph B.12*** Jackknife tests excluding one country at a time, results for electoral losers



***Graph B.13*** Jackknife tests excluding one country at a time, results for interaction effect

***Graph B.14*** Regressions for each country, results for electoral losers

***Graph B.15*** Regressions for each country, results for interaction effect