

Supplementary Material for: The Backlash Against Civil Society Participation in International Organizations: The Case of Human Rights Complaints Mechanisms

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A Exemplary UNSP communication

Excerpt from a UNSP communication sent by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders and the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association to the Russian government on August 13, 2021 (Reference: AL-RUS 9/2021):³⁵

We have the honour to address you in our capacities as Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders and Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 43/16 and 41/12.

In this connection, we would like to bring to the attention of your Excellency's Government information we have received concerning the alleged harassment and criminal prosecution of human rights defender Mr. Semyon Simonov, which appear to be related to his legitimate human rights activities.

Mr. Semyon Simonov is a human rights defender and the head of the Southern Human Rights Centre. The organisation works in the Krasnodar region to provide free legal assistance on human rights violations, raise awareness of human rights, conduct monitoring, and spread information on human rights violations.

[...]

Without wishing to prejudge the accuracy of the information received, we wish to express concern as to the alleged harassment and criminal prosecution of human rights defender Mr. Semyon Simonov, who appears to have been targeted for his legitimate human rights work and the exercise of his right to freedom of association.

A further concern is expressed at the alleged designation of the Southern Human Rights Centre as a "foreign agent" and the administrative fines imposed on the organisation and Mr. Semyon Simonov for failure to comply with the requirements of the Foreign Agent Law and for the inability to pay the organisation's hefty fine.

[...]

As it is our responsibility, under the mandates provided to us by the Human Rights Council, to seek to clarify all cases brought to our attention, we would be grateful for your observations on the following matters:

1. Please provide any additional information and comments you may have on the above-mentioned allegations.
2. Please provide information on the considerations and justifications involved in designating the Southern Human Rights Centre as a "foreign agent" under the Foreign Agent Law, along with information on how this is compatible with the

³⁵The full communication can be retrieved at <https://tinyurl.com/59v6hbsj>.

Russian Federation's obligations under international human rights law.

3. Please provide information on the legal and factual basis of the criminal sentence against Mr. Semyon Simonov and administrative fines imposed on him and the Southern Human Rights Centre, along with information on how these are compatible with the Russian Federation's obligations under international human rights law.
4. Please provide information on why Mr. Simonov's trial was closed to the public and why recording or broadcasting of the trial was not permitted, along with information on how this is compatible with the Russian Federation's obligations under international human rights law.
5. Please provide information on the considerations and justifications involved in imposing the travel ban on Mr. Semyon Simonov, along with information on how this is compatible with the Russian Federation's obligations under international human rights law.
6. Please provide information on the considerations and justifications involved in including Mr. Semyon Simonov in the database of "persons under special monitoring", along with information on how this is compatible with the Russian Federation's obligations under international human rights law.
7. Please provide information on how the implementation and interpretation of the provisions contained in the Foreign Agent Law are in line with the Russian Federation's obligations under international human rights law.
8. Please indicate the measures adopted to ensure that human rights defenders and organisations are able to carry out their legitimate work in the Russian Federation in a safe and enabling environment without fear of persecution, violence, harassment or reprisal of any sort.

We would appreciate receiving a response within 60 days. Passed this delay, this communication and any response received from your Excellency's Government will be made public via the communications reporting website. They will also subsequently be made available in the usual report to be presented to the Human Rights Council.

[...]

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.

Mary Lawlor Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders
Miriam Estrada-Castillo Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Clement Nyaletsossi Voule Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful
assembly and of association

B Overview of Thematic UNSP

- Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent
- Independent Expert on the enjoyment of human rights by persons with albinism
- Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
- Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change
- Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights
- Special Rapporteur on the right to development
- Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities
- Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances
- Special Rapporteur on the right to education
- Special Rapporteur on the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment
- Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
- Special Rapporteur on the right to food
- Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association
- Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health
- Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context
- Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders
- Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers
- Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples
- Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons
- Independent expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order
- Independent Expert on human rights and international solidarity
- Special Rapporteur on the elimination of discrimination against persons affected by leprosy (Hansen's disease) and their family members
- Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination
- Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants
- Special Rapporteur on minority issues
- Independent Expert on the enjoyment of all human rights by older persons

- Working Group on the rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas
- Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights
- Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy
- Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance
- Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief
- Special Rapporteur on the sale, sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children
- Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity
- Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
- Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
- Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes
- Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence
- Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights
- Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls, its causes and consequences
- Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation
- Working Group on discrimination against women and girls

C Cross-country analysis

C.1 Distribution of dependent variables




Figure A.1: Country averages of CSO repression (V-Dem), 2011–2022




Figure A.2: Country averages of reprisal for UN cooperation (original data), 2011–2022

C.2 Main results

C.2.1 Repression against CSOs

Table A.1: Repression of CSOs and UNSP communications

	Dependent variable: Repression of CSOs (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
UNSP communications (lag 1 yr)	0.107*** (0.025)	0.035*** (0.007)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.009* (0.004)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			-0.104 [†] (0.059)	0.006 (0.013)	-0.105 [†] (0.058)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			-0.018 (0.060)	0.084* (0.038)	0.016 (0.068)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			-0.469*** (0.044)	-0.192*** (0.039)	-0.429*** (0.049)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			-0.221*** (0.050)	-0.067** (0.025)	-0.202*** (0.053)
Logged GDP per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.096 (0.081)	-0.018*** (0.005)	0.040 (0.084)
Repression of CSOs (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.708*** (0.059)	
UNSP country visits (lag 1 yr)					0.009 (0.010)
UNSP communications (lag 1 yr, instr.)					0.095** (0.033)
Constant	-1.244*** (0.116)				
Number of observations	2063	2063	2063	2063	2063
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic					28.285
R ²	0.095	0.911	0.949		0.934
Adjusted R ²	0.095	0.903	0.944		0.928

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

[†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.2.2 Reprisals for cooperation with UN

Table A.2: Reprisal for cooperation with UN and UNSP communications

	DV: Reprisal against UN collaborators (original data)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
UNSP communications (lag 1 yr)	0.011** (0.004)	0.011** (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)	0.018*** (0.003)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			-0.072 [†] (0.040)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.072 (0.045)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			-0.011 (0.039)	0.045 (0.031)	0.020 (0.046)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			-0.068** (0.022)	-0.031*** (0.009)	-0.030 (0.025)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			-0.044* (0.022)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.026 (0.022)
Logged GDP per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.033 (0.061)	0.006** (0.002)	-0.018 (0.060)
Reprisal for cooperation with UN (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.217*** (0.051)	
UNSP country visits (lag 1 yr)					0.020 [†] (0.011)
UNSP communications (lag 1 yr, instr.)					0.082*** (0.020)
Number of observations	2063	2063	2063	2063	2063
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic					28.285
R ²	0.353	0.353	0.374		0.139
Adjusted R ²	0.294	0.294	0.316		0.058

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. [†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.3 Alternative model specifications

Table A.3: Repression of CSOs and UNSP communications

	DV: Repression of CSOs (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
UNSP communications (lag 1 yr)	0.107*** (0.025)	0.035*** (0.007)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.005 [†] (0.003)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			-0.149 [†] (0.077)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.147* (0.074)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			0.051 (0.059)	0.057 (0.038)	0.072 (0.064)
Polyarchy (lag 1 yr)			-4.551*** (0.575)	-0.903*** (0.250)	-4.374*** (0.575)
Logged population size (lag 1 yr)			0.819** (0.294)	0.018** (0.006)	0.683* (0.300)
Fariss HR scores			-0.062 (0.063)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.031 (0.067)
Repression of CSOs (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.824*** (0.048)	
UNSP country visits (lag 1 yr)					-0.006 (0.012)
UNSP communications (lag 1 yr, instr.)					0.078* (0.033)
Constant	-1.244*** (0.116)				
Number of observations	2063	2063	1718	1718	1718
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic					21.261
R ²	0.095	0.911	0.952		0.942
Adjusted R ²	0.095	0.903	0.946		0.936

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

[†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A.4: Reprisal for cooperation with UN and UNSP communications

	DV: Reprisal against UN collaborators (original data)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
UNSP communications (lag 1 yr)	0.011** (0.004)	0.011** (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			−0.058 (0.037)	0.017 [†] (0.009)	−0.051 (0.041)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			−0.057 (0.045)	−0.014 (0.023)	−0.042 (0.047)
Polyarchy (lag 1 yr)			−0.645*** (0.172)	−0.250*** (0.062)	−0.503** (0.156)
Logged population size (lag 1 yr)			0.714*** (0.158)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.523*** (0.156)
Fariss HR score			−0.080** (0.027)	−0.008 (0.010)	−0.057 [†] (0.029)
Reprisal for cooperation with UN (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.180** (0.058)	
UNSP country visits (lag 1 yr)					0.022* (0.011)
UNSP communications (lag 1 yr, instr.)					0.055** (0.017)
Number of observations	2063	2063	1718	1718	1718
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic					21.261
R ²	0.353	0.353	0.386		0.284
Adjusted R ²	0.294	0.294	0.315		0.201

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. [†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.4 Binary measure of UNSP communications

Table A.5: Repression of CSOs and occurrence of at least one UNSP communication

	DV: Repression of CSOs (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
UNSP communications binary (lag 1 yr)	0.937*** (0.109)	0.146*** (0.030)	0.051* (0.022)	0.033 (0.020)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			-0.101 [†] (0.059)	0.004 (0.013)	-0.083 (0.059)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			-0.026 (0.059)	0.092* (0.039)	-0.029 (0.058)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			-0.474*** (0.044)	-0.182*** (0.039)	-0.446*** (0.048)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			-0.224*** (0.050)	-0.052* (0.023)	-0.209*** (0.052)
Logged GDP per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.099 (0.082)	-0.015** (0.005)	0.032 (0.085)
Repression of CSOs (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.737*** (0.057)	
UNSP country visits (lag 1 yr)					0.011 (0.010)
UNSP communications binary (lag 1 yr, instr.)					0.439** (0.152)
Constant	-1.549*** (0.107)				
Number of observations	2063	2063	2063	2063	2063
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic					7.502
R ²	0.095	0.910	0.948		0.938
Adjusted R ²	0.095	0.902	0.943		0.932

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

[†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A.6: Reprisal for cooperation with UN and occurrence of at least one UNSP communication

	DV: Reprisal against UN collaborators (original data)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
UNSP communications binary (lag 1 yr)	0.168*** (0.020)	0.056*** (0.014)	0.039** (0.014)	0.029** (0.011)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			−0.071 [†] (0.040)	−0.006 (0.007)	−0.053 (0.041)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			−0.015 (0.039)	0.074* (0.034)	−0.019 (0.042)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			−0.069** (0.022)	−0.043*** (0.011)	−0.045* (0.022)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			−0.045* (0.021)	−0.007 (0.010)	−0.032 (0.022)
Logged GDP per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.032 (0.061)	0.010*** (0.002)	−0.024 (0.061)
Reprisal for cooperation with UN (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.248*** (0.053)	
UNSP country visits (lag 1 yr)					0.022* (0.010)
UNSP communications binary (lag 1 yr, instr.)					0.375*** (0.087)
Constant	0.023*** (0.006)				
Number of observations	2063	2063	2063	2063	2063
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic					7.502
R ²	0.057	0.351	0.373		0.236
Adjusted R ²	0.057	0.292	0.315		0.164

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. [†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.5 Physical integrity rights-focused UNSP communications

Table A.7: Repression of CSOs and UNSP communications regarding physical integrity rights

	DV: Repression of CSOs (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
UNSP communications on phys. integr (lag 1 yr)	0.161*** (0.031)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.026*** (0.005)	0.012* (0.005)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			-0.103 [†] (0.059)	0.009 (0.014)	-0.101 [†] (0.059)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			-0.013 (0.060)	0.092* (0.039)	0.043 (0.073)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			-0.471*** (0.044)	-0.189*** (0.039)	-0.441*** (0.047)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			-0.222*** (0.050)	-0.063* (0.025)	-0.209*** (0.052)
Logged GDP per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.088 (0.080)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.0002 (0.083)
Repression of CSOs (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.718*** (0.059)	
UNSP country visits (lag 1 yr)					0.011 (0.011)
UNSP communications on phys. integr (lag 1 yr, instr.)					0.138** (0.049)
Constant	-1.210*** (0.108)				
Number of observations	2063	2063	2063	2063	2063
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic					25.903
R ²	0.109	0.911	0.949		0.933
Adjusted R ²	0.109	0.903	0.944		0.927

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. [†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A.8: Reprisal for cooperation with UN and UNSP communications regarding physical integrity rights

	DV: Reprisal against UN collaborators (original data)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
UNSP communications on phys. integr (lag 1 yr)	0.042*** (0.007)	0.016** (0.006)	0.013* (0.006)	0.026*** (0.005)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			−0.072 [†] (0.040)	−0.002 (0.006)	−0.069 (0.048)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			−0.008 (0.039)	0.038 (0.031)	0.044 (0.045)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			−0.068** (0.022)	−0.033*** (0.009)	−0.040 [†] (0.023)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			−0.045* (0.022)	−0.013 (0.008)	−0.032 (0.022)
Logged GDP per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.029 (0.061)	0.008*** (0.002)	−0.054 (0.071)
Reprisal for cooperation with UN (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.209*** (0.050)	
UNSP country visits (lag 1 yr)					0.022 [†] (0.011)
UNSP communications on phys. integr (lag 1 yr, instr.)					0.120*** (0.032)
Constant	0.062*** (0.011)				
Number of observations	2063	2063	2063	2063	2063
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic					25.903
R ²	0.139	0.353	0.375		0.111
Adjusted R ²	0.138	0.294	0.317		0.027

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. [†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.6 Allegation letters

Table A.9: Repression of CSOs and UNSP allegation letters

	DV: Repression of CSOs (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Allegation letters (lag 1 yr)	0.121** (0.040)	0.052*** (0.009)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.010 [†] (0.006)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			−0.095 (0.059)	0.005 (0.013)	−0.074 (0.057)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			−0.012 (0.060)	0.090* (0.040)	0.026 (0.064)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			−0.467*** (0.044)	−0.194*** (0.039)	−0.440*** (0.047)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			−0.220*** (0.050)	−0.068** (0.025)	−0.206*** (0.053)
Logged gdp per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.092 (0.080)	−0.017*** (0.005)	0.050 (0.080)
Repression of CSOs (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.708*** (0.059)	
UNSP country visits (lag 1 yr)					0.006 (0.010)
Allegation letters (lag 1 yr, instr.)					0.086** (0.030)
Constant	−1.142*** (0.118)				
Number of observations	2063	2063	2063	2063	2063
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic					15.057
R ²	0.043	0.912	0.949		0.944
Adjusted R ²	0.043	0.904	0.944		0.938

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. [†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A.10: Reprisal for cooperation with UN and UNSP allegation letters

	DV: Reprisal against UN collaborators (original data)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Allegation letters (lag 1 yr)	0.039*** (0.008)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.013** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.006)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			-0.068 [†] (0.039)	0.0005 (0.007)	-0.045 (0.039)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			-0.006 (0.040)	0.070* (0.033)	0.029 (0.044)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			-0.066** (0.022)	-0.037*** (0.010)	-0.040 [†] (0.022)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			-0.043* (0.021)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.029 (0.020)
Logged gdp per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.030 (0.060)	0.008*** (0.002)	-0.010 (0.055)
Reprisal for cooperation with UN (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.234*** (0.051)	
UNSP country visits (lag 1 yr)					0.017 [†] (0.010)
Allegation letters (lag 1 yr, instr.)					0.074*** (0.017)
Constant	0.069*** (0.013)				
Number of observations	2063	2063	2063	2063	2063
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic					15.057
R ²	0.082	0.356	0.376		0.287
Adjusted R ²	0.082	0.297	0.317		0.219

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. [†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.7 UNSP communications not on human rights defenders

Table A.11: Repression of CSOs and UNSP communications not regarding human rights defenders

	Dependent variable: Repression of CSOs (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
UNSP communications not on hr defenders (lag 1 yr)	0.094* (0.045)	0.029** (0.009)	0.012* (0.005)	0.007 (0.004)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			-0.102† (0.059)	0.006 (0.013)	-0.086 (0.059)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			-0.021 (0.060)	0.095* (0.039)	0.033 (0.070)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			-0.476*** (0.044)	-0.192*** (0.038)	-0.455*** (0.048)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			-0.223*** (0.050)	-0.061* (0.024)	-0.196*** (0.057)
Logged GDP per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.106 (0.082)	-0.015*** (0.005)	0.081 (0.080)
Repression of CSOs (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.721*** (0.057)	
UNSP country visits (lag 1 yr)					0.013 (0.011)
UNSP communications not on hr defenders (lag 1 yr, instr.)					0.131** (0.049)
Constant	-1.096*** (0.120)				
Number of observations	2063	2063	2063	2063	2063
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic					21.422
R ²	0.032	0.910	0.948		0.931
Adjusted R ²	0.031	0.901	0.943		0.924

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

†p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A.12: Reprisal for cooperation with UN and UNSP communications not regarding human rights defenders

	Dependent variable: Reprisal against UN collaborators (original data)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
UNSP communications not on hr defenders (lag 1 yr)	0.028** (0.009)	0.003 (0.005)	−0.00001 (0.006)	0.011* (0.005)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			−0.072 [†] (0.040)	−0.005 (0.007)	−0.055 (0.045)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			−0.015 (0.039)	0.067 [†] (0.035)	0.035 (0.047)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			−0.072** (0.023)	−0.041*** (0.010)	−0.052* (0.024)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			−0.046* (0.022)	−0.010 (0.010)	−0.021 (0.025)
Logged GDP per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.039 (0.061)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.017 (0.058)
Reprisal for cooperation with UN (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.249*** (0.053)	
UNSP country visits (lag 1 yr)					0.024* (0.011)
UNSP communications not on hr defenders (lag 1 yr, instr.)					0.115*** (0.030)
Constant	0.086*** (0.015)				
Number of observations	2063	2063	2063	2063	2063
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic					21.422
R ²	0.053	0.348	0.371		0.075
Adjusted R ²	0.053	0.288	0.312		−0.012

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

[†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.8 Heterogeneous effects

To explore potential heterogeneous effects across regime types, we split our country sample into two groups based on the median of the *polyarchy*-measure provided by V-Dem. We re-ran our most-demanding cross-country models, i.e., the dynamic panel and instrumental variables models, for both the subset of states above the median (more democratic states) and the subset of states below the median (more autocratic states).

Table A.13: Repression of CSOs and UNSP communications in sub-samples

	DV: Repression of CSOs (original data)			
	(1) Polyarchy \geq Median	(2) Polyarchy \geq Median	(3) Polyarchy<Median	(4) Polyarchy<Median
Communications (lag 1 yr)	0.011 [†] (0.005)		0.015*** (0.004)	
Communications (lag 1 yr, instr.)		0.179* (0.071)		0.059 [†] (0.032)
Number of observations	1035	1035	1028	1028
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	Yes	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic	NA	24.23	NA	20.938

Notes: The model in columns 2 and 4 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in columns 1. and 3 are estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the models in column 1 and 3 is instrumented with deeper lags. In all models, we control for education, conflict, media freedom, judicial independence, and logged GDP per capita, all lagged one year. In the models in columns 2 and 4, we additional control for UNSP country visits. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

[†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A.14: Reprisal for cooperation with UN and UNSP communications in sub-samples

	DV: Reprisal (original data)			
	(1) Polyarchy \geq Median	(2) Polyarchy \geq Median	(3) Polyarchy<Median	(4) Polyarchy<Median
Communications (lag 1 yr)	0.004 [†] (0.002)		0.028*** (0.005)	
Communications (lag 1 yr, instr.)		0.048* (0.021)		0.094** (0.029)
Number of observations	1035	1035	1028	1028
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	Yes	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic	NA	24.23	NA	20.938

Notes: The model in columns 2 and 4 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in columns 1. and 3 are estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the models in column 1 and 3 is instrumented with deeper lags. In all models, we control for education, conflict, media freedom, judicial independence, and logged GDP per capita, all lagged one year. In the models in columns 2 and 4, we additional control for UNSP country visits. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

[†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Tables A.13 and A.14 present the results of these subset analyses for repression of CSOs and reprisal for cooperation with UN human rights bodies, respectively. The evidence suggests that the repressive backlash in response to UNSP communications is not limited to autocratic regimes. In contrast, the effect of UNSP communications on both outcomes remains positive and statistically significant when the sample is restricted to country-years with values above the median of the *polyarchy*-measure. This is a notable finding, which highlights that democracies may restrict civic space in response to complaint-driven shaming. Note that V-Dem’s repression measure captures not only physical repression but also more subtle means of obstructing the work of CSOs.³⁶ It is plausible that democracies may resort to such subtle instruments to target CSOs in light of complaint-driven shaming.

In addition to these subset analyses, we also tested for an interaction between UNSP communications and the *polyarchy*-measure (see Table A.15 & A.16). While the interaction between communications and *polyarchy*-scores is not consistently significant in the model of CSO repression, we find a negative and statistically significant interaction effect in the model of reprisals against UN collaborators. Given that such reprisals are a particularly severe form of human rights abuse, it is plausible that they are more likely to occur in states with lower levels of democracy. Note, however, that we also find a positive and statistically significant effect of UNSP communications on reprisals against UN collaborators for the subset of states above the median of the *polyarchy* measure. Overall, the evidence suggests that UNSP communications can provoke a repressive backlash in both autocratic and democratic contexts.

³⁶The V-Dem codebook specifically highlights that ‘minor legal harassment’ constitutes a case of ‘moderate’ CSO repression (see Coppedge et al. 2023).

Table A.15: Repression of CSOs and UNSP communications

	DV: Repression of CSOs (V-Dem)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
UNSP communications (lag 1 yr)	0.043** (0.016)	0.046*** (0.013)	0.032*** (0.009)	0.010* (0.005)
Polyarchy (1 yr lag)	-4.842*** (0.197)	-3.781*** (0.491)	-1.423*** (0.315)	-0.332 [†] (0.184)
Education (lag 1 yr)			-0.094 (0.058)	-0.002 (0.011)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			0.014 (0.060)	0.080* (0.035)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			-0.405*** (0.043)	-0.122*** (0.027)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			-0.178*** (0.048)	-0.038* (0.019)
Logged GDP per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.103 (0.077)	0.003 (0.008)
CSO repression (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.760*** (0.053)
UNSP communications * Polyarchy	-0.010 (0.033)	-0.044* (0.021)	-0.035* (0.017)	-0.009 (0.008)
Constant	1.512*** (0.138)			
Number of observations	2063	2063	2063	2063
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2 and 3 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. In the models in columns 3 and 4, we control for education, conflict, media freedom, judicial independence, and logged GDP per capita, all lagged one year. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. [†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A.16: Reprisal against UN collaborators and UNSP communications

	DV: Reprisal (original data)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
UNSP communications (lag 1 yr)	0.042*** (0.007)	0.027*** (0.008)	0.025** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.006)
Polyarchy (1 yr lag)	-0.240*** (0.046)	-0.524** (0.163)	-0.104 (0.144)	0.005 (0.082)
Education (lag 1 yr)			-0.074 [†] (0.039)	-0.001 (0.006)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			-0.006 (0.038)	0.050 (0.032)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			-0.057** (0.021)	-0.025* (0.010)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			-0.040 [†] (0.023)	-0.004 (0.009)
Logged GDP per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.032 (0.059)	0.005 (0.006)
Reprisal for cooperation with UN (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.215*** (0.048)
UNSP communications * Polyarchy	-0.039** (0.012)	-0.039** (0.014)	-0.039** (0.014)	-0.037*** (0.010)
Constant	0.191*** (0.034)			
Number of observations	2063	2063	2063	2063
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2 and 3 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. In the models in columns 3 and 4, we control for education, conflict, media freedom, judicial independence, and logged GDP per capita, all lagged one year. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. [†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.9 Justification of time-varying controls

We control for a variety of time-varying factors that might confound the relationship between UNSP communications and CSO repression. We control for ppp-adjusted and logged GDP per capita (The World Bank 2022) as evidence suggests that socioeconomic factors shape both representation in the UNSP complaints mechanism (Steinert 2024) and levels of repression (Carey 2010). Since awareness of international complaints mechanisms is a function of levels of education (Daniel et al. 2016), we include a measure of educational equality taken from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2023). This variable is expected to correlate with repression since educated individuals are more likely to overcome collective action problems and to engage in organized protests (Dahlum and Wig 2019).

Individuals are more likely to file complaints to the UNSP if domestic remedies are weak or unavailable. We use a measure of high court independence taken from V-Dem to account for the quality of domestic remedies (Coppedge et al. 2023). The level of judicial independence is also closely related to repression as governments frequently apply legal restrictions to silence CSOs as well as repression more generally (Chaudhry 2022; Smidt et al. 2021). We further use a measure of censorship taken from V-Dem as the media might play an important role in rising awareness of the UN Special Procedure complaints mechanism and censorship also correlates with repression (Chang and Lin 2020). Finally, we account for ongoing armed conflicts with data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Davies et al. 2023; Gleditsch et al. 2002). We tested for multicollinearity. All control variables have a Variance Inflation Factor below the critical threshold value of 5 (average VIF = 2.13).³⁷

³⁷We present alternative model specifications in Appendix C.3 with a different set of control variables, including the logged population size based on a measure taken from the The World Bank (2022) and Fariss (2014) human rights scores.

C.10 New measure of reprisals for cooperation with the UN

Human Rights Council (HRC) resolution 12/2 calls upon the Secretary-General to present an annual report to the Council containing a comprehensive review and examination regarding reported acts of retaliation against individuals for their collaboration with UN in the realm of human rights (UNSG 2023). The report includes allegations of reprisals related to cooperation with the HRC and its subsidiary bodies such as the UNSP, the human rights treaty bodies, the OHCHR and its field presences, the human rights component of peace operations, and other parts of the secretariat or specialized agencies working in the field of human rights (ibid.). The OHCHR encourages the continuous submission of information for inclusion in the Secretary-General's annual report.

For the coding of our reprisal measure, we retrieved these publicly available reports for each year that is covered by our empirical analyses. To code our binary variable of UN reprisals, we used information from the section “summary of cases” that is available in each report. This section lists all states in alphabetical order where at least one case of state reprisal for cooperation with the UN was reported.

We think it is unlikely that misreporting and, specifically, under-reporting of reprisals affects the results of our analyses. First, while the inclusion of individual names in these reports is made on the basis of the principles of ‘do no harm’ and informed consent, this should not affect the validity of this measure on the level of states. If these conditions are not fulfilled, the accused states are still included in the reports with more general information, such as the human rights section where the reprisals occurred. In some cases where the country names are included the report specifically states “names and further details of individuals have been withheld for fear of further reprisals” (e.g., UNSG 2022, p. 10). Hence, we deem it unlikely that a perceived risk of further reprisals leads to under-reporting in the annual reports on reprisals for cooperation with the UN.

We hand-coded two different versions of the measure of state reprisals for cooperation with the UN. First, we created a binary indicator coded as one for each year a given

country is included in the “summary of cases” section of the report. Second, we created a binary variable coded as one for each year in which at least one reprisal case occurred in a country as reported in the “summary of cases” section (in most cases, the year prior to the inclusion in the report). For our empirical analysis, we use the latter variable given that this measure is not affected by lagged reporting but indicates the actual year in which repression occurred.

To illustrate the type of cases that are captured by this measure of state reprisals, we provide some examples from the “Annual report on reprisals for cooperation with the UN” from 2021 (UNSG 2021):

- *Belarus*: Several human rights defenders and civil society organizations who regularly share information and testimony with the United Nations were reportedly targeted, including through raids, arbitrary arrests and criminal charges, in the preparation of the report of the High Commissioner issued in February 2021. Harassment and the criminalization of the Human Rights Centre, Viasna, reportedly intensified.
- *Cambodia*: Some 30 activists who gathered to submit a petition to OHCHR at its office in Phnom Penh were reportedly surveilled and harassed. The Spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights raised the arrest of human rights defenders, including Ms. Eng Malai, detained by plain-clothes officials after leaving the OHCHR office in Phnom Penh.

C.11 Previous repression and contemporaneous communications

Table A.17: Models of UNSP communications as function of CSO repression and reprisal

	DV: Number of UNSP communications	
	(1)	(2)
Repression against CSOs (lag 1 yr)	0.170 (0.219)	
Reprisals against UN collaborators (lag 1 yr)		−0.349 (0.286)
Education (lag 1 yr)	0.535 (0.342)	0.480 (0.346)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)	0.211 (0.363)	0.212 (0.363)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)	−2.590 [†] (1.353)	−3.425* (1.391)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)	−3.024* (1.195)	−2.687* (1.153)
Logged GDP per capita (lag 1 yr)	−0.013 (0.232)	−0.074 (0.235)
Number of observations	1718	1718
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No
R ²	0.791	0.791
Adjusted R ²	0.767	0.767

Notes: The models in columns 1 and 2 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. [†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

D CSO survey and cross-CSO analysis

D.1 Main results

Table A.18: Reported CSO-government relations and UNSP communications

	DV: Self-reported relation with government (original survey)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post-communication years	−0.180 (0.201)	−0.479** (0.136)	−0.498** (0.122)	−0.024 (0.075)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			0.116 (0.257)	0.046 (0.038)	0.125 (0.240)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			−0.135 (0.090)	−0.069 (0.050)	−0.124 (0.092)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			0.373* (0.122)	0.054 (0.041)	0.295* (0.120)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			0.009 (0.149)	0.014 (0.035)	0.002 (0.149)
Logged GDP per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.663 (0.403)	−0.017** (0.005)	0.933† (0.475)
Years since first communication			0.038 (0.027)	0.011 (0.009)	0.093† (0.049)
Relation with government (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.810*** (0.052)	
UNSP country visits					−0.034† (0.017)
Post-communication (instr.)					−1.106* (0.372)
Constant	−0.345* (0.157)				
Number of observations	724	724	724	724	724
CSO fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic	NA	NA	NA	NA	16.853

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

†p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

D.2 Subset analysis for CSOs that reported complaint

Table A.19: Reported CSO-government relations and UNSP communications

	DV: Self-reported relation with government (original survey)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post-communication years	-0.415 [†] (0.218)	-0.678** (0.160)	-0.612** (0.164)	-0.081 (0.089)	
Education (lag 1 yr)			0.023 (0.288)	0.066 (0.046)	0.021 (0.236)
Conflict (lag 1 yr)			-0.122 (0.076)	0.006 (0.049)	-0.035 (0.075)
Freedom of media (lag 1 yr)			0.345* (0.155)	0.048 (0.044)	0.206 (0.158)
Judicial independence (lag 1 yr)			-0.091 (0.139)	0.006 (0.043)	-0.059 (0.156)
GDP per capita (lag 1 yr)			0.695 (0.494)	-0.025*** (0.006)	0.999 [†] (0.531)
Years since first communication			0.022 (0.036)	0.011 (0.011)	0.106 (0.070)
CSO-reported repression (lag 1 yr, instr.)				0.795*** (0.064)	
UNSP country visits					-0.051 [†] (0.027)
Post-communication (instr.)					-1.471* (0.518)
Constant	-0.507** (0.174)				
Number of observations	458	458	458	458	458
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes	No
First stage F-statistic	NA	NA	NA	NA	15.583

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. [†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

D.3 Additional analyses without CSO fixed effects

Table A.20: Reported CSO-government relations and UNSP communications

	DV: Self-reported relation with government			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Years_since_first_mentioned	0.092* (0.041)	0.092* (0.042)	0.093 [†] (0.047)	0.094 [†] (0.047)
Human_rights_CSO		-0.268 (0.337)		-0.267 (0.338)
English_website		-0.269 (0.330)		-0.174 (0.412)
Constant	-1.275*** (0.327)	-1.019* (0.383)	-2.481* (0.937)	-2.485* (0.948)
Number of observations	63	63	63	63
Country fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
CSO-specific controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The models are estimated with ordinary least squares regression.. Model 2 and 4 control for whether CSOs are primarily dedicated to human rights, and whether they have an English website.

[†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

D.4 CSO survey questionnaire

Q1: Which organization do you work for?

Q2: Since when do you work for this organization?

Q3: What is your position in the organization?

- Head of organization
- Head of section within the organization
- Administrative assistant
- Other employee without leadership function
- Prefer not to say
- Other

Q4: How would you evaluate the relationship of your organization to the government in the following years?

	Very Positive	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Very Negative
2009	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2010	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2011	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2012	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2013	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2014	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2015	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2016	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2017	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2018	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2019	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2020	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2021	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2022	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2023	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Q5: Your organization has been mentioned in a Communication to your government by the UN Special Procedures, do you know about it?

- Yes

- No
- Prefer not to say

Q6: Do you know whether your organization has filed a complaint with the UN Special Procedures?

- Yes
- No
- Prefer not to say
- I don't know

Q7: Do you know in which year(s) your organization filed complaints to the UN Special Procedures?

Q8: Has the relationship between your organization and the government changed as a result of filing complaints to the UN Special Procedures?

- Much improved
- Improved
- Not changed
- Worsened
- Much worsened

Q9: Has government behavior toward society changed after your organization filed complaints to the UN Special Procedures?

- Became much more repressive
- Became somewhat more repressive
- Stayed the same
- Became somewhat more accommodating
- Became much more accommodating

D.5 Distribution dependent variable




Figure A.3: Self-reported CSO-government relations (original survey), 2010–2022

E Media analysis

E.1 CSOs from India included in the media analysis

Adivasi Moolvasi Adhikar Manch, All India Forum for Right to Education (AIFRTE), All India Union of Forest Working People (AIUFWP), All Manipur Working Journalist Union, Amnesty International India, Andhra Pradesh Kula Nirmulana Porata Samiti (Committee for Caste Annihilation), Anti-POSCO People's Movement, Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD), Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum-Asia), Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP), Bagaicha (Social Center), Banglar Manabadhikar Suraksha Mancha (MASUM), Bhagat Singh Chhatra Ekta Manch (BSCEM), Centre for Promotion of Social Concerns (CPSC), Centre for Social Development, Citizens for Human Rights Movement (CHRM), Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), Civil Society Women's Organization (CSWO), Committee for Release of Political Prisoners (CRPP), Committee on Human Rights (COHR), Dodhichi, Extrajudicial Execution Victims Families Association (EEVFAM), Farmers Struggle Committee (Kishan Sangharsh Samiti), Greenpeace India, Human Rights Alert (HRA), Human Rights Law Network, Indian Association of People's Lawyers (IAPL), Indian Solidarity Committee (INSOCO), Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), Jagdalpur Legal Aid Group (JagLAG), Jagrit Adivasi Dalit Sangathan (JADS), Jail Bandi Rihai Committee, Jamia Coordination Committee (JCC), Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS), Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar Association, Kabir Kala Manch (KKM), Krishak Mukti Sangram Samity (KMSS), Kurdish Red Crescent, Lawyers Collective (LC), Maitree Women's Network, Makkal Kalai Ilakkiya Kazhagam (People's Art and Literary Association), Muktiyadi Yuva Sanghatna (MYS), Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), National Alliance of People's Movements (NAPM), National Dalit Movement for Justice (NCDHR), National Dalit Movement for Justice (NDMJ), Pathu Rubai Nottu, Peoples Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMANE), Peoples Vigilance Committee on Human Rights (PVCHR), People's Movement Against Displacement, People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR), People's Watch, Pinjra Tod, Protection of Democratic Rights (CPDR), Revolutionary Democratic Front (RDF), Sabrang Trust, Social Action Development Organization (SADO), South Asian Community Centre for Education and Research (SACCER), Tamil Nadu Environment Protection Committee, Telangana Democratic Front (TDF), Telangana Vidyarthi Vedika (Telangana Students Forum), UNICEF, Udai, United against Hate, Veerapuram New Colony Housing Welfare Association, Vistapan Virodhi Janvikash Andolan (VVJA), Women Struggle Committee (Sangharsh Samiti), Women against Sexual Violence and State Repression (WSS), Women's Alliance for Security Leadership (WASL).

E.2 Distribution of dependent variable




Figure A.4: Media-reported repression of specific Indian CSOs mentioned in UNSP communications, 2010–2022

E.3 Full table

Table A.21: Media-reported CSO repression and UNSP communications

	Dependent variable: Media-reported repression			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-communication	0.151*** (0.042)	0.182*** (0.041)	0.262*** (0.054)	0.178*** (0.051)
Count years post-treatment			-0.033*** (0.008)	-0.024*** (0.006)
Harassment of journalists			-0.089 [†] (0.045)	-0.065 [†] (0.035)
English homepage			-0.049 (0.063)	-0.043 (0.050)
Facebook page			0.077 (0.081)	0.072 (0.068)
Twitter page			0.069 (0.051)	0.047 (0.054)
Human rights NGO			0.104 [†] (0.054)	0.085* (0.037)
Media-reported CSO repression (lag 1 yr)				0.241*** (0.061)
Constant	0.138*** (0.027)		0.027 (0.060)	
Number of observations	908	908	908	908
CSO fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, and 3 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. In the models in columns 3 and 4, we control for the harassment of journalists on the country-level, whether a CSO is primarily dedicated to human rights, whether it has an English homepage and appearances on Facebook and Twitter, and the number of years since the first communication targeting the CSO. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. [†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

E.4 Robustness test on monthly level

Table A.22: Media-reported CSO repression and UNSP communications

	Dependent variable: Media-reported repression			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-communication	0.151*** (0.042)	0.182*** (0.041)	0.262*** (0.054)	0.178*** (0.051)
Count years post-treatment			-0.033*** (0.008)	-0.024*** (0.006)
Harassment of journalists			-0.089 [†] (0.045)	-0.065 [†] (0.035)
English homepage			-0.049 (0.063)	-0.043 (0.050)
Facebook page			0.077 (0.081)	0.072 (0.068)
Twitter page			0.069 (0.051)	0.047 (0.054)
Human rights NGO			0.104 [†] (0.054)	0.085* (0.037)
Media-reported CSO repression (lag 1 yr)				0.241*** (0.061)
Constant	0.138*** (0.027)		0.027 (0.060)	
Number of observations	908	908	908	908
CSO fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Lagged depend. var.	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: The models in columns 1, 2, and 3 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, while the model in column 4 is estimated using generalized methods of moments. The lagged dependent variable in the model in column 4 is instrumented with deeper lags. In the models in columns 3 and 4, we control for the harassment of journalists on the country-level, whether a CSO is primarily dedicated to human rights, whether it has an English homepage and appearances on Facebook and Twitter, and the number of years since the first communication targeting the CSO. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. [†]p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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