# A   Supplementary Information

**Contents**

## A.1  Ethical Considerations

Because this survey involves human subjects, serious attention was given to ethical considerations such as the consent of the subjects, and mitigation of potential security or health risks for participants. In what follows, I discuss each of these topics and the measures taken to ensure the study adheres to the highest ethical standards. The survey text was also submitted to and approved by UCLA's Institutional Review Board (IRB#21-001054).

### A.1.1  Informed Consent

To ensure fully informed consent, potential participants were given the following details before the interview began:

- Researcher name and affiliation
- The topic area of the survey
- The approximate length of the survey
- The name of the firm conducting enumeration
- A telephone number in Colombia to contact for more details

Potential participants were also told they could refuse to answer questions or stop the interview at any point if they felt uncomfortable. Following the survey, respondents were debriefed. The debrief reiterated details about the sponsor and purpose of the survey, and reminded survey participants that the information provided in the survey was incomplete and a diversity of perspectives exist on the issues discussed.

### A.1.2  Respondent and Enumerator Security

Despite the 2016 peace agreement and the demobilization of the FARC, as of mid-2022 when this survey was implemented illegal armed groups continued to pose a potential security threat in many of the sampled municipalities.

Several precautions were taken to avoid exposing respondents and enumerators to potential security risks. First, the survey avoided asking about potentially sensitive topics, such as the presence or activities of local armed groups. Second, respondents were reminded that they could at any time either drop out of the survey or decline to respond to a question if they felt uncomfortable. And third, in a small number of instances where enumerators reported credible security concerns to their supervisors, they were redirected to a pre-selected list of secondary sites. These cases are documented in detail in section A.4.4.

### A.1.3  Covid-19 Measures

During the planning stages of this survey, the trajectory of the Covid-19 pandemic was highly uncertain. To avoid contributing to the spread of the virus, enumerators were instructed to follow a strict set of protocols around masking, sanitation, and social distancing.

## A.2  Sampling and Randomization

### A.2.1  Municipality Selection

The sampling unit for this study was the municipality, of which Colombia has 1122. I selected 28 municipalities using block randomization, with the goal of interviewing 50 respondents in each municipality.

### A.2.2  Region

In consultation with survey partner Cifras y Conceptos (hereafter CyC), I divided Colombian municipalities into 7 regional groupings commonly used in survey research to ensure full representation of the country's geographic diversity.

### A.2.3  Past FARC Activity

One hypothesized source of heterogeneity stems from past conflict exposure. However, because only a subset of Colombian municipalities were directly exposed to the conflict, I use blocking to ensure sufficient representation of such areas. Using data from Colombian conflict monitoring think tanks, I divided Colombian municipalities into municipalities that had experienced high or low levels of FARC activity prior to the peace agreement.

### A.2.4  Security Trajectory

Another hypothesized source of heterogeneity concerns whether local security conditions improved or deteriorated after the 2016 peace agreement. I divided municipalities into two categories based on whether homicide rates had increased or decreased in the years following the peace agreement's ratification, and chose municipalities such that half were in each category.

### A.2.5  Within-municipality Sampling

### A.2.6  Urban-Rural

Colombian municipalities typically consist of a populated core (cabecera municipal) and a rural periphery (zonas veredales/rurales). To ensure full representation of the rural population, I sampled inhabitants of the populated core and 1-2 randomly-selected zones in the rural periphery in accordance with their proportion of the municipality's total population as determined from census data. For example, in the municipality of San Pedro, Valle del Cauca, roughly 40% of the population lives in the populated core and 60% in the rural periphery, so I included 20 respondents from the populated core and 30 from a zone in the rural periphery. Hereafter, I use the term "municipality-zones" to refer to these subunits (i.e., rural or urban zone $i$ of municipality $j$).

### A.2.7  Respondent Gender

Enumerators were instructed to alternate whether they requested to speak with a male or female household member.

### A.2.8 Household and Respondent Selection

Enumerators conducted surveys using tablets. The tablets showed enumerators maps that subdivided populated areas into numbered polygons (typically rectangular). Within each polygon, enumerators were instructed to conduct an equal number of interviews on each side of the polygon. Enumerators were instructed to interview no more than one person per household. Finally, enumerators were instructed to speak with a household member over 18 years old who was a resident of the municipality (i.e. not a visitor).

## A.3 Randomization of Treatment Conditions

Within a municipality-zone, I used complete randomization to assign respondents to each of the control and treatment conditions. This randomization scheme resulted in roughly equal proportions of respondents in each treatment condition within the rural and urban parts of the municipality.

## A.4 Enumeration

### A.4.1 Timeline and Context

Enumeration occurred between June 4th and June 29th, 2022. This period coincided with Colombia's Presidential Election campaign, with a first-round election occurring on May 29th, 2022, and a runoff on June 19th, 2022.

### A.4.2 Flooding and Landslides

Seasonal flooding and the resulting landslides prevented access to one municipality Rioblanco, Tolima entirely, and the pre-selected rural zone of Guaca, Santander. Chaparral, Tolima was chosen as a substitute for Rioblanco, and enumerators were sent to a different rural zone of Guaca.

### A.4.3 Transportation

Transportation issues prevented enumeration in the municipality of Santa Rosa del Sur, Bolívar. Specifically, the poor conditions of the roads and rivers required a multi-day journey beyond what had been budgeted for. The municipality of María la Baja, Bolívar, was the designated substitute.

### A.4.4 Security Concerns

In five municipalities, security threats prevented enumerators from reaching a preselected rural zone of the municipality. In these cases, enumerators were alerted that armed groups were active in the area and would not permit access by outsiders. In each instance, enumerators were sent to a second rural location within the same municipality.

It is plausible that the five rural zones enumerators were unable to access due to armed group activity represent the conditions of the most insecure areas of the country. Even though enumerators were able to complete interviews in other parts of the municipality, the fact that they were able to do so suggests that those areas were likely more secure.

Enumerators' inability to access the most insecure rural areas affects the interpretation of the eventual results in two ways. First, this sample is not representative of Colombia's *most* insecure rural zones. If residents of such zones have distinct treatment effects from the rest of the population,

this study cannot speak to them. Second, with regards to the heterogeneous effects of security, I cannot rule out a distinct relationship at the most extreme level of insecurity.

### A.4.5 Summary of Substitutions

Table A.1: List of Substitutions and Causes

| Substitution Type | Original Location | Substitute Location | Cause |
|---|---|---|---|
| Municipality | Rioblanco, Tolima | Chaparral, Tolima | Flooding/Landslides |
| Municipality | Santa Rosa del Sur, Bolívar | María la Baja, Bolívar | Difficult Travel Conditions |
| Rural Zone | Baraya, Guaca, Santander | Tabacal, Guaca, Santander | Flooding/Landslides |
| Rural Zone | Nabusikame, Pueblo Bello, Cesar | Minas del Iracal, Pueblo Bello, Cesar | Security Conditions |
| Rural Zone | Majagua, María la Baja, Bolívar | Nueva Esperanza, María la Baja, Bolívar | Security Conditions |
| Rural Zone | Villa Paz, Puerto Lleras, Meta | Caño Rayado, Puerto Lleras, Meta | Security Conditions |
| Rural Zone | Villa Paz, Puerto Lleras, Meta | Caño Rayado, Puerto Lleras, Meta | Security Conditions |
| Rural Zone | Bocas de Mayorquín, Buenaventura, Valle | Córdoba, Buenaventura, Valle | Security Conditions |
| Rural Zone | El Caracol, Arauca, Arauca | Manhattan, Arauca, Arauca | Security Conditions |

## A.5   Outcome Questions

The first outcome measure seeks to elicit respondents' general level of confidence or optimism regarding the peace process. To operationalize this concept, I offer respondents a set of choices that best describe their level of optimism regarding the peace agreement's successful implementation. At one extreme is the statement that "the peace agreement will almost certainly not succeed, regardless of implementation," while at the other extreme is the statement that, "the peace agreement will almost certainly succeed with better implementation". The full set of options on the 4 point scale is as follows:

1. The peace agreement will almost certainly not succeed, regardless of implementation (1)
2. The peace agreement will probably not succeed, but there is a small chance of success with better implementation (2)
3. The peace agreement will probably succeed with better implementation, but there is a small chance it will not succeed (3)
4. The peace agreement will almost certainly succeed with better implementation (4)

This question wording is designed to elicit respondents' confidence or optimism in the potential success of the peace agreement if it were implemented.

To evaluate support for negotiations with armed groups, I asked in separate questions, the following:

- In the coming years, if a peace agreement is negotiated with the ELN, would you support it? *(Definitely yes, probably yes, probably no, definitely no)*

- In the coming years, if a peace agreement is negotiated with the FARC Dissidents, would you support it? *(Definitely yes, probably yes, probably no, definitely no)*

## A.6   Preregistration

A pre-analysis plan is available at: https://archive.org/details/osf-registrations-c4vy3-v1. The PAP was filed after data collection but prior to statistical analyses. Deviations from the PAP are noted in the text.

## A.7 Summary Statistics for Sample

Table A.2: Demographics by Treatment Condition

| Variable | Control Condition | Postconflict Violence Condition | Government Culpability Condition | Rebel Culpability Condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female (1,0) | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.53 | 0.53 |
| Ethnic Minority (1,0) | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.30 |
| Religious Minority (1,0) | 0.36 | 0.30 | 0.42 | 0.39 |
| Age Cohort (1-6) | 3.22 | 3.07 | 3.02 | 3.08 |
| Education Level (0-9) | 4.42 | 4.35 | 4.59 | 4.55 |
| SES Scale | -0.05 | 0.08 | 0.06 | -0.08 |
| Ideology (1-6) | 3.71 | 3.69 | 3.75 | 3.76 |
| Engagement Scale | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.09 | -0.13 |
| Municipal Homicide Rate | 34.87 | 35.83 | 35.91 | 36.17 |
| $\Delta$ Municipal Homicide Rate | -1.20 | -1.23 | -0.82 | -0.83 |

## A.8 Mechanisms

Table A.3: Relationship between Perceptions of Blame & Attitudes Towards Peace Agreements in the Control Group

|  | *Dependent variable: Peace Attitudes Index** | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Confidence in Government Implementation | −0.28 | | |
|  | (0.14) | | |
| Confidence in FARC Compliance | | 0.52 | |
|  | | (0.14) | |
| Confidence Gap | | | −0.60 |
|  | | | (0.13) |
| T-Statistic | −2.01 | 3.74 | −4.47 |
| Num. obs. | 294 | 294 | 294 |

*Notes*: This analysis is restricted to respondents in the pure control group. The dependent variable, the peace attitudes index, is a z-score composite of the three main outcomes. The independent variables are scaled. Models are estimated without control variables due to limited degrees of freedom. I use HC2 heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

## A.9   Heterogeneity

### A.9.1   Baseline Heterogeneity

Table A.4: Heterogeneity in the Control Group

|  | DV = ELN (1) | DV = Dissidents (2) | DV = Accords (3) | DV = Index (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Intercept) | 0.12 | 0.20 | 0.10 | 0.49 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.19) | (0.40) |
| Ideology (L = 1; R = 6) | −0.10 | −0.09 | −0.06 | −0.24 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.07) |
| High Political Engagement | 0.34 | 0.14 | 0.05 | 0.36 |
|  | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.27) |
| Security Trajectory Worse | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.47 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.28) |
| FARC Presence | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.10 | 0.29 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.28) |
| Num. obs. | 339 | 336 | 311 | 294 |

*Notes*: This analysis is restricted to respondents in the pure control group. The dependent variables are support for a peace agreement with the FARC, support for a peace agreement with the ELN, and confidence in the 2016 peace accord, all scaled, and the peace attitudes index, which is a z-score composite of the three main outcomes. FARC presence is a binary indicator for whether the FARC was present in the respondent's municipality when peace talks began in 2012. I create the security trajectory measure by calculating the change in municipality-level homicide rates since the peace agreement was ratified in 2016 and dividing municipalities into two groups. Ideology is measured on a six point left-right. Political engagement is a composite index composed of questions eliciting political knowledge, voting participation, and media consumption, divided into high and low (above or below the median). I use HC2 standard errors.

## A.9.2 Heterogeneous Effects for all Treatments

Figure A.1: Treatment Effects on Peace Agreement Attitudes Index versus Control by Subgroup



*Notes:* The dependent variable is the peace agreement attitudes index, which is a z-score composite of the three main outcomes. FARC presence is a binary indicator for whether the FARC was present in the respondent's municipality when peace talks began in 2012. I create the security trajectory measure by calculating the change in municipality-level homicide rates since the peace agreement was ratified in 2016 and dividing municipalities into two groups. Ideology is measured on a six point left-right scale which I divide into two groups for left and right. Political engagement is a composite index composed of questions eliciting political knowledge, voting participation, and media consumption, divided into high and low (above or below the median). I use HC2 standard errors. Bars represent 95% CIs.

Figure A.2: Treatment Effects on Peace Agreement Attitudes Index versus the Postconflict Violence Treatment by Subgroup



*Notes:* The dependent variable is the peace agreement attitudes index, which is a z-score composite of the three main outcomes. FARC presence is a binary indicator for whether the FARC was present in the respondent's municipality when peace talks began in 2012. I create the security trajectory measure by calculating the change in municipality-level homicide rates since the peace agreement was ratified in 2016 and dividing municipalities into two groups. Ideology is measured on a six point left-right scale which I divide into two groups for left and right. Political engagement is a composite index composed of questions eliciting political knowledge, voting participation, and media consumption, divided into high and low (above or below the median). Treatment effects are estimated with the Postconflict Violence treatment as the baseline rather than the pure control group. I use HC2 standard errors. Bars represent 95% CIs.

Figure A.3: Stronger Effects of Rebel Culpability Treatment for Conflict Victims



*Notes:* Models are estimated using the full set of controls, with HC2 standard errors. Bars represent 90% and 95% CIs.

## A.10 Alternative Specifications

Table A.5: Treatment Effects: Rebel Culpability Treatment vs Government Culpability Treatment

| | *Dependent Variable:* | | | |
| | 2016 Agreement | ELN | FARC Dissidents | Combined Index |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Intercept) | −0.08 | −0.07 | −0.07 | −0.16 |
| | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.14) |
| Rebel Culpability Treatment | −0.04 | −0.11 | 0.02 | −0.04 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) |
| Num. obs. | 1270 | 1339 | 1335 | 1178 |

*Notes*: The three main outcomes are scaled relative to the control group. The peace attitudes index is a z-score index of the three main outcomes. Models are estimated using the full set of controls. The reference group for estimating the treatment is the Government Culpability Treatment group instead of the pure Control group. All models use HC2 standard errors.

## A.11 Population Inference

Figure A.4: Respondent Age vs Population



*Notes:* Population age distributions come from Colombia's Census Projections for adults above 18 years old in 2022.

Figure A.5: Other Demographic Comparisons



*Notes:* Demographic distributions come from Colombia's Census Projections for adults above 18 years old in 2022.

Table A.6: Treatment Effects under Alternative Control Specifications

| | No Controls | | | | Additional Controls | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | *Dependent Variable:* | | | | |
| | 2016 Agreement | ELN | FARC Dissidents | Combined Index | 2016 Agreement | ELN | FARC Dissidents | Combined Index |
| (Intercept) | 0.00 | 0.00 | −0.00 | 0.18 | −0.00 | −0.01 | 0.00 | 0.15 |
| | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.13) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.13) |
| Postconflict Violence Treatment | −0.12 | −0.02 | −0.06 | −0.26 | −0.10 | −0.01 | −0.07 | −0.21 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) |
| Government Culpability Treatment | −0.08 | −0.06 | −0.06 | −0.34 | −0.08 | −0.05 | −0.06 | −0.30 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) |
| Rebel Culpability Treatment | −0.13 | −0.20 | −0.05 | −0.43 | −0.12 | −0.17 | −0.05 | −0.37 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.18) |
| Num. obs. | 1270 | 1339 | 1335 | 1178 | 1270 | 1339 | 1335 | 1178 |

*Notes*: The three main outcomes are scaled relative to the control group. The peace attitudes index is a z-score index of the three main outcomes. Models 1-4 are estimated with no control variables. Models 5-8 include the full set of controls, as well as controls for respondent gender, ethnicity, religion, education, socioeconomic status, and municipality-level homicide rate. All models use HC2 standard errors.

## A.12 Robustness

### A.12.1 Enumerator Effects

Table A.8: Treatment Effects with Enumerator Fixed Effects

| | *Dependent Variable:* | | | |
| | 2016 Agreement | ELN | FARC Dissidents | Combined Index |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Postconflict Violence Treatment | −0.13 | 0.02 | 0.01 | −0.12 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.21) |
| Government Culpability Treatment | −0.06 | −0.11 | −0.04 | −0.33 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.21) |
| Rebel Culpability Treatment | −0.10 | −0.21 | 0.00 | −0.40 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.21) |
| Num. obs. | 1270 | 1339 | 1335 | 1178 |

*Notes*: The three main outcomes are scaled relative to the control group. The peace attitudes index is a z-score index of the three main outcomes. Each of 103 named enumerators is assigned a fixed effect, and there is an additional fixed effect for unnamed enumerators. Models are estimated using the full set of controls, but the South and Central region effects were combined into a single South-Central effect due to model constraints. All models use HC2 standard errors.

Table A.7: Comparing Weighted and Unweighted Treatment Effects

| | Unweighted SATE | | | | Weighted PATE | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | | | *Dependent Variable:* | | | | |
| | 2016 Agreement | ELN | FARC Dissidents | Combined Index | 2016 Agreement | ELN | FARC Dissidents | Combined Index |
| (Intercept) | 0.00 | −0.01 | −0.00 | 0.15 | 0.00 | −0.02 | −0.00 | 0.13 |
| | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.13) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.14) |
| Postconflict Violence Treatment | −0.10 | −0.01 | −0.06 | −0.18 | −0.11 | −0.03 | −0.10 | −0.28 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.20) |
| Government Culpability Treatment | −0.08 | −0.06 | −0.07 | −0.32 | −0.04 | −0.02 | −0.06 | −0.22 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.21) |
| Rebel Culpability Treatment | −0.12 | −0.17 | −0.05 | −0.36 | −0.14 | −0.16 | −0.05 | −0.39 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.18) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) |
| Num. obs. | 1270 | 1339 | 1335 | 1178 | 1270 | 1339 | 1335 | 1178 |

*Notes*: The three main outcomes are scaled relative to the control group. The peace attitudes index is a z-score index of the three main outcomes. Weights for the PATE are constructed to match 2023 census projection strata for Sex, Age, and Urban/Rural area. Models are estimated using the full set of controls, with HC2 standard errors.

### A.12.2 Straightlining

 To check for evidence of respondents or enumerators straightlining, I examined answers to seven questions near the end of the survey that utilized a six-point scale. Of the 1466 respondents, only 4 respondents gave the same numeric answer (answer all ones or all sixes) on these seven questions. I conclude from this finding that straightlining was not a major problem in this survey.

### A.12.3 Attention Checks

Figure A.6: Enumerator Ratings of Respondent Attentiveness

Table A.9: Treatment Effects Dropping Inattentive Respondents

| | Drop Least Attentive | | | | Drop Somewhat Inattentive | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | | | *Dependent Variable:* | | | | |
| | 2016 Agreement | ELN | FARC Dissidents | Combined Index | 2016 Agreement | ELN | FARC Dissidents | Combined Index |
| (Intercept) | −0.00 | −0.00 | 0.01 | 0.18 | −0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.18 |
| | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.13) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.13) |
| Postconflict Violence Treatment | −0.10 | −0.01 | −0.07 | −0.20 | −0.11 | −0.04 | −0.09 | −0.23 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.18) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) |
| Government Culpability Treatment | −0.08 | −0.07 | −0.07 | −0.34 | −0.08 | −0.08 | −0.08 | −0.32 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) |
| Rebel Culpability Treatment | −0.12 | −0.18 | −0.06 | −0.40 | −0.13 | −0.18 | −0.08 | −0.41 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.18) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) |
| Num. obs. | 1262 | 1331 | 1328 | 1172 | 1185 | 1240 | 1241 | 1104 |

*Notes:* The three main outcomes are scaled relative to the control group. The peace attitudes index is a z-score index of the three main outcomes. Respondents' attentiveness was rated by enumerators on a 6 point scale (1 = very inattentive; 6 = very attentive).. Models 1–4 drop the respondents with an attention rating of 1; models 5-8 drop respondents with an attention score of 3 or lower. Models are estimated using the full set of controls, with HC2 standard errors.

### A.12.4 Missingness

Table A.10: Correlation Between Outcome Missingness and Treatment Conditions

|  | Accords DV Missing | ELN DV Missing | Dissident DV Missing | Index DV Missing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Postconflict Violence Treatment | 0.01 | −0.03 | 0.01 | −0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Government Culpability Treatment | 0.02 | −0.02 | −0.00 | −0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Rebel Culpability Treatment | 0.01 | −0.02 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Num. Missing | 127 | 196 | 131 | 288 |
| Num. obs. | 1466 | 1466 | 1466 | 1466 |

*Notes* The dependent variable in each model is a binary indicator that takes a value of 1 if the outcome of interest is missing for that observation and 0 otherwise. Models are estimated using the full set of full set of controls. I use HC2 heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

### A.12.5 Accounting for Respondents Enumerated Post-election

All 1466 respondents were enumerated during the tenure of Iván Duque. However, 241 of the 1466 respondents, or roughly 16%, were enumerated shortly after the election of his successor, but before his successor had been inaugurated. To account for the possibility that respondents enumerated after the election might have a different response to the treatments, in Figure A.7 I replicate the main analyses with a dummy variable for respondents enumerated after the election as an additional control. In Figure A.8 I replicate the main analyses dropping all respondents enumerated after the election.

Figure A.7: Main Treatment Effects with Dummy Variable for Respondents Enumerated Post Election



*Notes:* I use HC2 standard errors. Bars represent 95% CIs.

Figure A.8: Main Treatment Effects Dropping Respondents Enumerated Post Election



*Notes:* I use HC2 standard errors. Bars represent 95% CIs.

## A.13 Exploratory Analyses

### A.13.1 Alternative Measures of Conflict Intensity and Exposure

Table A.11: Heterogeneity in Control Group: Main Conflict Exposure Measures

| | *Dependent variable: Peace Attitudes Index**| | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Intercept) | 0.15 | 0.92 | 0.02 | 0.85 | −0.04 | 0.64 |
| | (0.20) | (0.53) | (0.18) | (0.51) | (0.18) | (0.52) |
| FARC Presence | 0.06 | 0.09 | | | | |
| | (0.26) | (0.27) | | | | |
| Security Trajectory Worse | | | 0.34 | 0.34 | | |
| | | | (0.26) | (0.28) | | |
| Family Displacement Victims | | | | | 0.47 | 0.45 |
| | | | | | (0.26) | (0.26) |
| Controls | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Num. obs. | 294 | 294 | 294 | 294 | 294 | 294 |

*Notes*: This analysis is restricted to respondents in the pure control group. The dependent variable, the peace attitudes index, is a z-score composite of the three main outcomes. The independent variables are binary. For models with control variables, controls include, ideology, age, urban/rural, political engagement, and region. I use HC2 heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

Table A.12: Heterogeneity in Control Group: Alternative Conflict Exposure Measures

| | Dependent variable: Peace Attitudes Index* | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| (Intercept) | −0.08 | 0.77 | −0.02 | 0.87 | 0.04 | 0.90 | −0.23 | 0.77 |
| | (0.19) | (0.52) | (0.18) | (0.51) | (0.17) | (0.53) | (0.20) | (0.50) |
| High Displacement Pre-2016 | 0.54 | 0.49 | | | | | | |
| | (0.26) | (0.28) | | | | | | |
| High Displacement Post-2016 | | | 0.44 | 0.39 | | | | |
| | | | (0.26) | (0.30) | | | | |
| High Conflict Intensity Pre-2016 | | | | | 0.32 | 0.19 | | |
| | | | | | (0.26) | (0.32) | | |
| High Conflict Intensity Post-2016 | | | | | | | 0.84 | 0.88 |
| | | | | | | | (0.26) | (0.31) |
| Controls | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Num. obs. | 294 | 294 | 294 | 294 | 294 | 294 | 294 | 294 |

*Notes*: This analysis is restricted to respondents in the pure control group. The dependent variable, the peace attitudes index, is a z-score composite of the three main outcomes. The independent variables are binary. Conflict displacement is a measure of annual conflict displacement victims per capita based on RUV data. Conflict intensity is a measure of annual victims of all conflict events per capita from the Colombian Center for Historical Memory database. For all measures, the pre-2016 period is 1985-2016, and the post-2016 period is 2017-2021. For models with control variables, controls include, ideology, age, urban/rural, political engagement, and region. I use HC2 heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

Figure A.9: Treatment Effects on Peace Agreement Index: Heterogeneity by Conflict Intensity and Displacement

### A.13.2 Alternative Outcomes

Figure A.10: Treatment Effects on Favorability Towards Prominent Rightwing and Leftwing Politicians: Heterogeneity by Respondent Ideology



*Notes:* I use HC2 standard errors. Bars represent 95% CIs. Models estimated with Lin estimator and include main set of controls excluding ideology. Respondents are divided into "right" and "left" based on their self-identification on a six-point ideology scale. The outcomes are scaled.

Figure A.11: Treatment Effects on Stigmatization of Former FARC



*Notes:* I use HC2 standard errors. Thick and thin bars represent 90% and 95% CIs. Models estimated with Lin estimator and include main set of controls. The outcome is scaled.

Table A.13: Treatment Effects on Political Outcomes

| | DV: Govt. Party Affinity (binary) | | DV: No Party Affinity (binary) | | DV: Opp. Challenger Affinity (std.) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| T: Postconflict Violence | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.03 |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| T: Government Culpability | 0.00 | 0.01 | −0.02 | −0.01 | 0.08 | 0.11 |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| T: Rebel Culpability | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.04 | −0.04 | 0.06 | 0.09 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Predicted Agreement Support | | −0.04 | | −0.16 | | 0.52 |
| | | (0.03) | | (0.04) | | (0.08) |
| Postconflict Violence × | | 0.00 | | 0.08 | | −0.18 |
| Predicted Agreement Support | | (0.04) | | (0.06) | | (0.11) |
| Government Culpability × | | −0.01 | | 0.02 | | −0.25 |
| Predicted Agreement Support | | (0.04) | | (0.05) | | (0.11) |
| Rebel Culpability × | | −0.03 | | 0.08 | | −0.28 |
| Predicted Agreement Support | | (0.04) | | (0.06) | | (0.12) |
| Controls | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | |
| Num. obs. | 1466 | 1466 | 1466 | 1466 | 1466 | 1466 |

*Notes*: The government party affinity outcome is a binary variable that takes a value of one if respondents chose one of the main parties in then-president Duque's coalition as the party that they feel closest to, and zero otherwise. The no party affinity outcome is a binary variable that takes a value of one if respondents say they feel close to no party, and zero otherwise. The opposition challenger affinity outcome is based on a six-point scale for how close respondents feel towards Gustavo Petro, the main opposition candidate in the 2022 presidential election. The measure of predicted peace support is based on the predicted values of a model that regressed the peace support index on the pretreatment covariates in the control group. For models with control variables, controls include, ideology, age, urban/rural, political engagement, and region. I use HC2 heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.