Online Appendices for "Muzzling the Media?
Explaining Popular Support for Media Restrictions in Africa"

Appendix A: Afrobarometer Media Freedom Measure

The media freedom measure was drawn from a question in Afrobarometer (Round 8) asking respondents which of the following statements they agreed with most:

> A: "The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control."
>
> B: "The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it disapproves of."

Responses were re-coded as follows: Strongly B (0), Somewhat B (1), Neither A nor B (2), Somewhat A (3), and Strongly A (4).

Trust in the president and support for media freedom are negatively and significantly correlated in three of the four focus countries (Côte d'Ivoire: b=-.12, p<.001; Kenya: b=-.07, p<.001; Uganda: b=-.14, p<.001). The two are negatively correlated in Nigeria, but not significantly so (b=-.03, p=.32).

Trust in the ruling party and support for media freedom are negatively and significantly correlated in all four focus countries: (Côte d'Ivoire: b=-.12, p<.001; Kenya: b=-.10, p<.001; Nigeria: b=-.05, p=.06; Uganda: b=-.17, p<.001).

Trust in the opposition and support for media freedom are not significantly correlated in Côte d'Ivoire (b=.00, p=.97) or Kenya (b=.02, p=.23), while they are positively and significantly correlated in Uganda (b=.13, p<.001). Surprisingly, they are negatively and significantly correlated in Nigeria (b=-.05, p=.04).

Appendix B: Vignette English-Language Wordings

I'd like to ask you a few questions about government regulations of the media.

Some people think government should not regulate the media much, arguing that freedom of the press is essential. Others argue that, in certain circumstances, it is necessary to regulate the press, to achieve certain good outcomes.

I am going to read you four scenarios. After I read each, I will ask you what you think the government response should be.

Here's the first scenario: Imagine a radio station in your country.

[*Order of attributes varies for each individual. For example, an individual might hear the attributes in the order of ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, or CBA. For a given individual, the order of the attributes will not change across items. So an individual who hears the first item with attributes in the order of BCA will hear the other three items with attributes in the order of BCA.*]

[Levels of attributes assigned at random, with equal probability.]

[Attribute A] It receives its funding primarily from [2 levels: FOREIGN or DOMESTIC] sources.

[Attribute B] [3 levels: THE PRESIDENT or AN OPPOSITION PARTY or AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY] has made accusations against the station.

[Attribute C] The station has been accused of [6 levels: SPREADING MISINFORMATION ABOUT PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES LIKE COVID-19 or SPREADING LIES ABOUT CERTAIN POLITICAL CANDIDATES' PRIVATE LIVES or USING HATE SPEECH AGAINST MEMBERS OF CERTAIN ETHNIC GROUPS or MAKING ARGUMENTS TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR CERTAIN ARMED GROUPS or BEING BIASED IN FAVOR OF ONE POLITICAL PARTY or NOT PAYING ITS TAXES]

What do you think the government should do in this situation?

A) Nothing

B) Issue a written warning to the station

C) Fine the station

D) Shut down the station for a temporary period

E) Shut down the station permanently

[Repeats three additional times per respondent]

Appendix C: Survey Methodology

Surveys were carried out via Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) in all four focus countries. This approach was utilized due to ongoing concerns about COVID-19, as CATI reduced face-to-face interactions between interviewers and subjects, and reduced interviewers' needs to travel. To encourage participation and compensate respondents for their time, all participants were remunerated with air time transfers of 2000 FCFA (~$3.49 US) in Côte d'Ivoire, 200 KSh (~$1.70 US) in Kenya, ₦700 (~$1.70 US) in Nigeria, and 6000 USh (~$1.70 US) in Uganda.

Original survey questions were written in English, with subsequent translations made into Dioula and French in Côte d'Ivoire; Kiswahili in Kenya; Hausa, Ibgo, Pidgin, and Yoruba in Nigeria; and Alur, Ateso, Japadhola, Luganda, Lugbara, Luo, Lusoga, N'Karamojong, Runaynkole, and Runyoro in Uganda.

Although many of the phone databases used for sampling included owners' ages, interviewers still asked about age as part of the initial screening process. Only individuals who identified as being at least 18 years old were eligible to take the survey. In addition, all individuals had to complete an informed consent process before participating.

In Nigeria, surveyors used random digit dialing (RDD) from the research partner's database, which contains over 70 million active phone numbers. The dataset included information on owners' gender, age, and residence, all of which were used to draw a representative sample, using targets derived from the latest population census. In Côte d'Ivoire, we purchased lists of phone numbers from the three major mobile service providers (i.e. Moov, MTN, and Orange) and used RDD from those lists. Targets per provider were determined by market share. In Kenya, the research partner had a list of phone numbers from other research projects and used this database to create a representative sample, stratifying by county, gender, and urban/rural residence. In Uganda, the researcher randomly selected phone numbers obtained through the Afrobarometer research project, with set targets to achieve geographic and gender representativeness.

Research partners did not standardize reporting on number of calls attempted and calls answered. For example, in Côte d'Ivoire, the research partner reported that 9,240 calls were attempted with a 13% completion rate; the partner did not distinguish reasons for failures (e.g. out-of-service numbers, non-pickups, hangups, and refusals). In Uganda, the research partner reports that calls yielded 1350 answers, of which 91% yielded completed surveys; the partner did not report the number of out-of-service numbers or non-pickups, but the number was relatively low due to the pre-verified nature of the call list.

Protocols required all partners to meet minimum standards regarding quality control. This included team leaders assigning all telephone numbers to be called and conducting daily follow-ups with all interviewers regarding completed, refused, and rescheduled interviews. Only team leaders could reject a number as inaccessible after attempts had been exhausted. Team leaders monitored reported lengths of interviews to check for potential discrepancies. Finally, all partners completed random call backs for back-checking purposes.

However, research partners did differ somewhat on certain relevant policies, given differences in in-house practices and COVID-related context. For example, in Uganda, interviewers' voices—but not interviewees'—were recorded, for later review by supervisors. In Uganda, COVID-19 protocols required interviewers and other survey staff to live at the call center during the research period. This also allowed project managers to more closely monitor interviewer

activities, which enhanced quality control. All partners uploaded their results to a centralized server operated by Hatchile Consult, who regularly monitored for quality assurance.

Appendix D: Individual-Level Controls

As specified in the pre-registered analysis plan, all models included individual-level controls for gender, lived poverty, education, age, trust in the president, trust in the opposition, and identification with the ethnicity of the president. English-language question wordings for those variables were as follows:

Gender: "What is your gender?"

Lived Poverty: "Over the last six months, how many times would you or a member of your household have had to go without basic necessities that you needed, like food, drinkable water, or medicine? Would you say you have never faced that, faced it once or twice, faced it several times, or have always faced it?" *0=Never, 1=Once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Always*

Trust Government & Opposition: "How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? Not at all, just a little, somewhat, or a lot?" "The president" "The opposition" *0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot*

Education: "What is the highest level of education that you have achieved?"
0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal school only or Koranic schooling only, 2=Some primary school, 3=Completed primary school, 4=Some secondary school, 5=Completed secondary school, 6=Certificate or diploma from polytechnic, 7=Some university, 8=Completed university, 9=Post-university

Ethnicity: "What is your ethnic identity?"
Models included a control for membership in a "dominant" group (i.e. the president's ethnic group). As identified in the pre-registered analysis plan, these groups included Mandé du Nord (Côte d'Ivoire), Kikuyu (Kenya), Fulani (Nigeria), and Banyankole (Uganda).

Age: "How old are you?"

Descriptive Statistics for Individual-Level Controls

Variable	*N*	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Sex (1=Female)	4975	.47	.50	0	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1200	.50	.50	0	1
Kenya	1222	.50	.50	0	1
Nigeria	1353	.39	.49	0	1
Uganda	1200	.50	.50	0	1
Lived Poverty	4969	1.10	.97	0	3
Côte d'Ivoire	1200	.84	.93	0	3
Kenya	1221	1.15	.99	0	3
Nigeria	1348	1.25	1.06	0	3
Uganda	1200	1.14	.82	0	3
Age	4975	37.65	13.59	18	99
Côte d'Ivoire	1200	31.85	10.73	18	86
Kenya	1222	40.26	14.78	18	90
Nigeria	1353	41.40	14.02	18	99
Uganda	1200	36.56	12.22	18	77
Education	4945	4.63	2.19	0	9
Côte d'Ivoire	1199	4.07	2.27	0	9
Kenya	1217	4.27	1.86	0	9
Nigeria	1332	6.09	2.01	0	9
Uganda	1197	3.92	1.81	0	9
Trust President	4734	1.72	1.12	0	3
Côte d'Ivoire	1163	1.75	1.00	0	3
Kenya	1187	1.85	1.06	0	3
Nigeria	1229	1.21	1.20	0	3
Uganda	1155	2.10	1.02	0	3
Trust Opposition	4627	1.09	1.01	0	3
Côte d'Ivoire	1165	1.15	.88	0	3
Kenya	1142	1.16	1.04	0	3
Nigeria	1171	.85	1.04	0	3
Uganda	1149	1.21	1.03	0	3
Non-Coethnic of Pres	4940	.78	.42	0	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1200	.71	.45	0	1
Kenya	1222	.80	.40	0	1
Nigeria	1321	.71	.45	0	1
Uganda	1197	.89	.31	0	1

Appendix E: Estimated Marginal Means (Pooled Sample)



Appendix F: Estimated Marginal Means (Country Sub-Groups)



Appendix G: Estimated Marginal Means (Partisan Trust Groups)

Trust in President (Dichotomized)



Trust in Opposition (Dichotomized)



Appendix H: Support for Sanctions on Hypothetical Radio Station, Strong Partisans Only

Moving beyond the pre-registered plan, I also run models on those who trust the president and distrust the opposition (*n*=1486) and on those who trust the opposition and distrust the president (*n*=445). Among the former, accusations by the opposition decrease punishment severity, while accusations by the president do not yield results distinguishable from accusations made by an independent agency. Among those who trust the opposition and distrust the president, accuser cues have no statistically significant effect.



Note: Including individual-level controls (not reported). Standard errors clustered by subject.

Appendix I: Support for Sanctions on Hypothetical Radio Station, Strongest Partisans Only

I find null results for all accuser cues among those with the most polarized views (i.e. highest trust in president & lowest in opposition, and highest trust in opposition & lowest in president). However, these groups are considerably smaller (*n*=574 and *n*=89, respectively).



Note: Including individual-level controls (not reported). Standard errors clustered by subject.

Appendix J: Support for Sanctions on Hypothetical Radio Station, by Ethnic Grouping



Note: Including individual-level controls (not reported). Standard errors clustered by subject.

Estimated Marginal Means



To test the underlying assumption of lower perceived vulnerability by presidential coethnics, I drew on a variable in Round 8 of the Afrobarometer, in which individuals self-reported frequency of discrimination by "other people" (0-3, with higher values indicating more discrimination). In Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Uganda, coethnics of the president reported significantly *lower* levels of victimization than others did (Côte d'Ivoire: .24 vs. .41, $p<.001$; Kenya: .43 vs. .56, $p=.007$; Uganda: .29 vs. .61, $p<.001$). In Nigeria, Fulani reported less discrimination than others, but the difference was not statistically significant (.45 vs. .57, $p=.20$).

Appendix K: ACMEs, Without Controls



Note: Standard errors clustered by subject.

All findings from the main model are robust to this specification.

Country Sub-Groups



Note: Standard errors clustered by subject.

All findings from the main model are robust to this specification, with the exception that lies about candidates (Côte d'Ivoire) is now significantly different from the baseline at 95%.

Appendix L: OLS



Note: Including individual-level controls (not reported). Standard errors clustered by subject.

All findings from the main model are robust to this specification, with the exception that hate speech is now significantly different from the baseline at 95%.

Country Sub-Groups



Note: Including individual-level controls (not reported). Standard errors clustered by subject.

All findings from the main model are robust to this specification, with the exceptions that hate speech is no longer significantly different from the baseline at 95% in Nigeria or Uganda.

Appendix M: Focus-Group Discussion Details

All focus group participants were at least 18 years old. In-country research partners made determinations of research sites and target populations (e.g. whether groups would include practitioners from media and civil society, or whether they would be comprised of community members, generally). All participants were remunerated, with rates varying by country.

Country	Date	Location	Participants
Côte d'Ivoire	7 Nov 2021	Yopougon, Abidjan	11 (mixed gender, from community)
	7 Nov 2021	Cocody, Abidjan	10 (mixed gender, from community)
	8 Nov 2021	Abobo, Abidjan	11 (mixed gender, from community)
Kenya	15 Dec 2021	Mathare Sub-County (Urban), Nairobi	15 (mixed gender, CSO representatives)
	15 Dec 2021	Mathare Sub-County (Urban), Nairobi	15 (mixed gender, CSO representatives)
	20 Dec 2021	Maanza Village (Rural), Machakos County	15 (mixed gender, from community)
	21 Dec 2021	Rangau Village (Rural), Kajiado County	15 (mixed gender, from community)
Nigeria	17 Nov 2021	Lagos	8 (mixed gender, media practitioners)
	18 Nov 2021	Lagos	9 (women only, media practitioners)
	19 Nov 2021	Abuja	11 (mixed gender, CSO representatives)
Uganda	13 Nov 2021	Kashekure, Nyaruhandagazi I & II Villages (rural), Bugamba Sub-County, Rwampara District	13 (mixed gender, from community)
	15 Nov 2021	Mpondwe Village LC1 (rural), Kamengo Sub-Country, Mpigi District	12 (mixed gender, from community)
	15 Nov 2021	Kyengera Town Council (urban), Kampala District	15 (mixed gender, from community)

Appendix N: Commitment to Democracy

To measure commitment to democracy, I first create an index of rejection of alternatives to democracy by drawing on three variables from Afrobarometer Round 8: rejection of one-man rule, one-party rule, and military rule. All variables are recoded on a 0-4 scale, with higher values indicating stronger rejection of the authoritarian alternative. The rejection index is created by averaging across the three variables. Next, I draw on another Afrobarometer question on support for democracy. I standardize this variable on a 0-4 scale, as well, with higher values indicating greater support for democracy. Finally, I create a single variable measuring commitment to democracy by averaging across the rejection index and support for democracy variable.

I examine five dependent variables: 1) general support for media's right to publish versus government's right to limit content, and support for government censorship of 2) false information, 3) hate speech, 4) content it disapproves of, and 5) content criticizing the president. All variables are recoded with 5-point scales, with higher values indicating greater support for media freedoms.

To estimate the relationship between commitment to democracy and these variables of interest, I conduct a series of ordered logistic regressions. All regressions include controls for urban residence, education, age, gender, and Afrobarometer's Lived Poverty index, as well as country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by enumeration area. Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals are reported below.

Relationships Between Commitment to Democracy & Support for Media Restrictions