

**Choosing Women:**  
**Elite Preferences and women's underrepresentation**  
**in the candidate selection process**  
**Online Appendix**

Malu A. C. Gatto\* & Marco Radojevic<sup>†</sup>

# Contents

<b>A</b>	<b>Research Ethics</b>	<b>3</b>
A.1	Participant Information and Consent Sheet . . . . .	4
<b>B</b>	<b>Case selection and women’s political representation</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>C</b>	<b>Response rate</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>D</b>	<b>Party leaders’ average candidate preferences, full sample</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>E</b>	<b>H1: Analyses by country</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>H1: Analyses by parties with and without gender quotas</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>G</b>	<b>Does addressing underrepresentation compromise party elites’ broader candidate preferences?</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>H</b>	<b>H2: Analyses by country</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>I</b>	<b>H2: Analyses by parties with and without gender quotas</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>J</b>	<b>H3: Analyses by country</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>K</b>	<b>H3: Analyses by parties with and without gender quotas</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>L</b>	<b>Full estimates of results reported in Figures 1-3 (main text)</b>	<b>24</b>

## **A Research Ethics**

The data collection and data management for this project followed all ethical protocols and research standards of the University of Zurich and was approved by the University's Ethics Committee (19.4.11) prior to data collection. Specifically:

- The population of interest is party leaders. The names and contact information for all members of the population were gathered from public sources online (i.e., political party websites).
- Given that our population of interest consists of members of the political elite, participation in the study was not compensated. Participants were explicitly informed that their participation was voluntary and that they could leave at any point in the survey.
- Participants were only able to take part in the survey after reading the information sheet and providing their explicit consent. The information sheet (see Appendix A1) informed potential participants that the survey was conducted as part of an academic study and outlined the uses of the data.
- Data were collected anonymously and participants cannot be identified.
- The project did not involve deception. In the instructions offered prior to the conjoint experiment, participants were explicitly told the profiles they would see were of fictitious candidates.
- The project did not intervene in political processes.

## A.1 Participant Information and Consent Sheet

This survey is part of a study led by the Department of Political Science at the University of Zurich. The Principal Investigator responsible for this study is Marco Radojevic. The aim of this survey is to better understand how political parties represent voters. You were selected as a participant in this study because you play an important role in your party.

The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Zurich (19.4.11). For any questions about the research project, please contact Marco Radojevic (e-mail: radojevic@ipz.uzh.ch), doctoral candidate/research assistant at the Department of Political Science. Before proceeding, please read the declaration of consent below.

In agreeing to participate, I understand the following conditions:

- Participation is voluntary.
- I can end the survey at any time and without giving any reason.
- All data will be collected anonymously and no information that could identify my participation in this study will be made public.
- My answers will be saved and will become part of a dataset used for analyses in scientific studies.
- The results of this study will be published in scientific journals and presented at scientific conferences. Your information will be kept anonymous and will not be disclosed.
- If I decide not to participate, the survey will end immediately.

If you have read and understood the declaration of consent, please select one of the options below to indicate whether you agree to take part in this survey.

- I agree to take part in the survey.
- I do not agree to participate in the survey.

## B Case selection and women's political representation




Figure 1: Predicted vs. Actual Share of Women in Parliament Based on Ruedin (2012)

Note: Compiled by authors with code from Gilardi (2015).




Figure 2: Gender Composition of State-Level Party Executives by Party

Note: Compiled by authors. Black dots indicate the share of women in the national parliamentary faction of each party, at the parliamentary term during which the data on party leaders was gathered (Austria: 2019-2024; Germany: 2017-2021; Switzerland 2015-2019). Data on the gender composition of party executives was gathered in September-October 2019.

## C Response rate

s

As shown in Table 1, response rates vary across different subgroups of the sample. While younger and older party elites completed the survey to similar degrees, response rates varied more substantially across other pre-treatment covariates.


Women party leaders were more likely to complete the survey than the men party leaders who were contacted. Across all three countries, response rates also vary by party. Right-wing populist party leaders (FPOE, AfD, SVP) were less likely to complete the survey than party leaders from other parties.

Table 1: Response Rates by Selected Pre-Treatment Covariates

		Contacted	Responses	Response Rate
Total		4206	1389	33.0
Gender	Man	2754	865	31.4
	Woman	1451	524	36.1
Country	Austria	688	219	31.8
	Germany	1629	385	23.6
	Switzerland	1889	785	41.5
Age	Under 40	1080	361	33.4
	40 and Older	2448	845	34.5
Parties AT	FPOE	91	26	28.5
	GREENS	94	49	52.1
	NEOS	119	40	33.6
	OEVP	82	29	35.3
	SPOE	301	75	24.9
Parties GER	AfD	130	18	13.8
	CDU / CSU	366	45	12.2
	FDP	345	95	27.5
	GREENS	151	57	37.7
	LEFT	289	113	39.1
	SPD	352	57	16.1
Parties CH	BDP	88	33	37.5
	CVP	302	130	43.9
	FDP	356	161	45.2
	GLP	222	78	35.1
	GPS	219	111	50.7
	SP	321	150	46.7
	SVP	377	122	32.23

## D Party leaders' average candidate preferences, full sample


Figure 3: Party leaders' preferences on candidate characteristics (MM)



Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with the full sample of party leaders (N = 1,389). The figure displays respondents' preferences towards different levels of aspirant attributes.

## E H1: Analyses by country

Figure 4: The impact of underrepresentation on the selection of women aspirants (MM) - Austria, Germany, and Switzerland




Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with sub-samples (Austria = 219; Germany = 385; Switzerland = 785). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information about women's representation in candidate lists.



## F H1: Analyses by parties with and without gender quotas

Figure 5: The impact of underrepresentation on the selection of women aspirants (MM) - parties with and without gender quotas



Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with with sub-samples (No Quota = 859; Quota = 530). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information about women's representation in candidate lists.

## **G Does addressing underrepresentation compromise party elites' broader candidate preferences?**

Figure 6 shows party elites' preferences for attributes associated with electability for each level of our prime of women's underrepresentation, and Figure 7 summarises their preferences towards factors associated with party loyalty. As shown by the overlapping confidence intervals of all four attributes across different levels of our prime, selectors do not compromise on their preferences towards electability and party loyalty to accommodate more women and address underrepresentation.

As reported in Figure 6, party leaders do not have clear preferences regarding aspirants' levels of educational attainment: having a university degree or a PhD does not place one aspirant at an advantage over another aspirant with a high school diploma. Varying information about the levels of women's underrepresentation in party lists also does not affect these preferences in any way<sup>1</sup>.


By contrast, political experience does matter: an aspirant with experience in the national legislature enjoys a significant advantage over aspirants who only have experience in the local council at all levels of our prime. In our survey, party elites' selected candidates for national elections, so these results are consistent with our expectation that party selectors tend to give preference to incumbents. However, as indicated by overlapping confidence intervals at different levels of our prime (see Figure 6), party elites also do not seem to compromise on their preferences towards aspirants' political experience in order to accommodate women.

When choosing between aspirants, selectors also take ideological alignment into account: as shown in Figure 7, misalignment with a respondent's ideology gives aspirants a significant disadvantage in candidate selection processes; nonetheless, these effects are indistinguishable from one another at different primed levels of women's underrepresentation. This indicates, for example, that a woman aspirant whose ideological placement deviates from that of the respondent will be punished during selection regardless of the level of women's representation on the party list.

---


<sup>1</sup>The only exception is the positive and statistically significant effect of holding a university degree over a high

Figure 6: The impact of underrepresentation on electability attributes: education and political experience (MM)



Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with the full sample of party leaders (N = 1,389). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information on women's representation in candidate lists. Interpreting the effect of the prime on respondents' preferences requires evaluating whether or not confidence intervals overlap vertically (that is, across levels of the prime).

Figure 7: The impact of underrepresentation on party loyalty attributes: ideology and policy issue (MM)



Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with the full sample of party leaders (N = 1,389). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information on women's representation in candidate lists. Interpreting the effect of the prime on respondents' preferences requires evaluating whether or not confidence intervals overlap vertically (that is, across levels of the prime).

Finally, as illustrated in Figure 7, certain policy issues are, on average, more likely than others to increase the chances of an aspirant being selected. In general, party elites tend to value aspirants who prioritise taxation, energy policy, and welfare over those whose focus issue areas are gender equality, immigration, and law and order. Although some of these policy areas become more or less significant at different levels of the prime, confidence intervals for each area overlap across all levels of our prime. Again, this indicates that selectors' preferences on policy issues are stable and not affected by levels of women's underrepresentation.


Substantively, the analyses displayed in Figures 6 and 7 show that party elites do not deviate from their preferences towards indicators of electability or partisan ideological congruence in order to address women's underrepresentation.

---

school diploma when women are primed to be 40% and 20% of party lists.


## H H2: Analyses by country

Figure 8: The impact of underrepresentation on the selection of women aspirants, by party leaders' ideology (MM) - Austria




Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with within-country sub-samples (Left = 102; Center = 95; Right = 22). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information about women's representation in candidate lists.

Figure 9: The impact of underrepresentation on the selection of women aspirants, by party leaders' ideology (MM)  
 - Germany



Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with within-country sub-samples (Left = 189; Center = 175; Right = 21). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information about women's representation in candidate lists.

Figure 10: The impact of underrepresentation on the selection of women aspirants, by party leaders' ideology (MM) - Switzerland




Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with within-country sub-samples (Left = 272; Center = 299; Right = 214). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information about women's representation in candidate lists.




## I H2: Analyses by parties with and without gender quotas

Figure 11: The impact of underrepresentation on the selection of women aspirants, by party leaders' ideology (MM) - parties with gender quotas



Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with sub-samples (Left = 432; Center = 95). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information about women's representation in candidate lists. Plot for right-wing leaders is not displayed as only 3 respondents in parties that have a quota consider themselves to be ideologically on the right.


Figure 12: The impact of underrepresentation on the selection of women aspirants, by party leaders' ideology (MM) - parties without gender quotas



Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with sub-samples (Left = 254; Center = 474; Right = 131). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information about women's representation in candidate lists.


## J H3: Analyses by country

Figure 13: The impact of underrepresentation on the selection of women aspirants, by party leaders' gender (MM) - Austria




Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with within-country sub-samples (Men = 145; Women = 74). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information about women's representation in candidate lists.

Figure 14: The impact of underrepresentation on the selection of women aspirants, by party leaders' gender (MM) - Germany



Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with within-country sub-samples (Men = 220; Women = 165). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information about women's representation in candidate lists.


Figure 15: The impact of underrepresentation on the selection of women aspirants, by party leaders' gender (MM) - Switzerland



Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with within-country sub-samples (Men = 500; Women = 285). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information about women's representation in candidate lists.


### K H3: Analyses by parties with and without gender quotas

Figure 16: The impact of underrepresentation on the selection of women aspirants, by party leaders' gender (MM) - parties with gender quotas



Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with sub-samples (Men = 289; Women = 241). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information about women's representation in candidate lists.

Figure 17: The impact of underrepresentation on the selection of women aspirants, by party leaders' gender (MM) - parties without gender quotas



Note: Compiled by authors. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent. Estimates correspond to MM effects with sub-samples (Men = 576; Women = 283). The figure displays respondents' preferences for men and women aspirants at different levels of primed information about women's representation in candidate lists.

## **L Full estimates of results reported in Figures 1-3 (main text)**

See below.



## References

Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2015. Frauen auf den Nationalratslisten: Untervertreten, aber auf guten Plätzen. In *DeFacto*.

**URL:** <https://www.defacto.expert/2015/10/02/listenplatz-frauen/>

Ruedin, Didier. 2012. "The representation of women in national parliaments: A cross-national comparison." *European Sociological Review* 28(1):96–109.