

*Years:* 1789-2021

### **3.4.3.21 HOG year of death (A) (v2exdeathog)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* In what year did the head of government die?

*Responses:*

Date — year only

*Scale:* Interval

*Source(s):* worldstatesman.org.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### **3.4.3.22 HOG party affiliation (A) (v2expothog)**

*Project Manager(s):* Nils Düpont

*Question:* What is the name of the political party to which the head of government belongs?

*Responses:*

Text.

*Source(s):* Leaders Global (Düpont, Döring, and Bederke 2021), Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke et al. 2021); worldstatesmen.org

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

## **3.4.4 Regime**

### **Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)**

This survey pertains to the political regime, and asks questions about the support groups the regime relies on to stay in power and key opposition groups. "A support group is a group of individuals who are supportive of the existing regime, and, if it were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power. A key opposition group is defined as a group of individuals (mobilized or not) who both want to and who could, under favorable circumstances, be able to remove the existing political regime." A political regime can be defined as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power.

If it is evident that formal and informal rules correspond (i.e. the formal rules are followed), then the formal rules define the regime. In these cases, we observe the formal rules (e.g. the constitution) to observe the regime. If, on the other hand, the formal rules do not correspond with the informal rules, such as in most dictatorships, then the regime is defined by the informal coalition of actors that select and sustain leaders, along with the informal rules they administer. In these cases, we must look to the de facto ruling elites and their established practice to observe the regime (e.g., the military junta in a military regime).

Thus a regime is typically characterized by it determining who selects policies, and often also how these policies are typically selected. A regime change presupposes a substantial change in the formal and/or informal rules by which a country is governed.

Examples of regimes might include the Second French Republic, the Communist regime in post-WWII Poland, the current Saudi monarchic regime in Saudi Arabia and the post-WWII democratic regime in Austria. Sometimes, regime changes are related to government or leadership changes (such as the change in Zaire/DR Congo from the regime under Mobutu to the current regime under Kabila), but government or leadership changes do not necessarily bring regime changes (such as in post-election government changes in democracies or with the institutionalized changes to prime ministers and presidents in current China). Sometimes, regime changes can also take place without leadership changes (for instance when military juntas and leaders institutionalize one-party rule, or when there is substantial political liberalization e.g. by opening up for multi-party elections but where the former autocrat continues in power for some time).

#### 3.4.4.1 Regime information (A\*) (v2reginfo)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

*Question:* What is the regime name as well as start and end dates of this regime?

*Clarification:* The information on this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the identity of the regime, which is given a suggestive name, and its start and end dates have already been entered. We are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded information. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regime.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.2 Regime end type (A\*) (v2regendtype)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

*Question:* Could you specify the type of process that you consider the most important in leading to the end of the regime?

*Clarification:* The information on this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that what is considered the most important process that eventually ended the relevant regime has already been entered. We are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded information. This means that the information has already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regime.

*Responses:*

- 0: A military coup d'état.
- 1: A coup d'état conducted by other groups than the military.
- 2: A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader.
- 3: Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d'état)
- 4: Natural death of the sitting leader
- 5: Loss in civil war.
- 6: Loss in inter-state war.
- 7: Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war)
- 8: Popular uprising.
- 9: Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by sitting regime leaders
- 10: Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization/democratization)

- 11: Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1–10
- 12: Other process than those specified by categories 1–11.
- 13: The regime still exists

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 3.4.4.3 Regime end type, multiple selection version (A) (v2regendtypems)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

*Question:* Could you specify the types of processes (one or more) that led to the end of the regime?

*Responses:*

- 0: A military coup d'état. [v2regendtypems\_0]
- 1: A coup d'état conducted by other groups than the military. [v2regendtypems\_1]
- 2: A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader. [v2regendtypems\_2]
- 3: Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d'état). [v2regendtypems\_3]
- 4: Natural death of the sitting leader. [v2regendtypems\_4]
- 5: Loss in civil war. [v2regendtypems\_5]
- 6: Loss in inter-state war. [v2regendtypems\_6]
- 7: Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war). [v2regendtypems\_7]
- 8: Popular uprising. [v2regendtypems\_8]
- 9: Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by sitting regime leaders. [v2regendtypems\_9]
- 10: Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization/democratization). [v2regendtypems\_10]
- 11: Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1-10. [v2regendtypems\_11]
- 12: Other process than those specified by categories 1-11. [v2regendtypems\_12]
- 13: The regime still exists. [v2regendtypems\_13]

*Scale:* Nominal

*Answer-type:* Multiple selection

*Source(s):* Encyclopedia Britannica; Wikipedia; various region- and country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 3.4.4.4 Regime interregnum (A) (v2regint)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

*Question:* Does there exist an identifiable political regime?

*Clarification:* This question is used to identify so-called interregnum periods, where no political regime is in control over the entity. Different types of political situations can lead to periods of time under which there is no identifiable political regime, one example being a civil war in which none of the parties have clear control over political bodies and processes in the country. However, the interregnum coding is employed conservatively, meaning that partial control

over political bodies and processes in fairly large parts of the country (which is often the case also during civil wars) is sufficient for a 0 score.

Please note that the expert coded (C) questions on support and opposition groups in the regime survey are only coded when v2regint=1.

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* Encyclopedia Britannica; Wikipedia; various region- and country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Djue, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.5 Regime ID (D) (v2regidnr)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* What is the unique identifier number given to the current regime?

*Clarification:* This numeric regime identifier consists, first, of the country's V-Dem country code and, second, of a regime numeric counter that has at least two digits (hence the first regime identified for a country would be assigned 01).

*Scale:* Nominal

*Source(s):* v2reginfo

*Data release:* 12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Djue, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.6 Regime duration (D) (v2regdur)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* How many days have passed since the current regime started?

*Clarification:* The variable pertains to the regime coded under v2reginfo, and is measured in number of calendar days.

*Scale:* Interval

*Source(s):* v2reginfo

*Data release:* 12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Djue, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.7 Regime support groups (C) (v2regsupgroups)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Which groups does the current political regime rely on in order to maintain power?  
(Check all that apply.)

*Clarification:* Consider which group(s) is supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regsupgroups\_0]
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regsupgroups\_1]
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regsupgroups\_2]
- 3: Business elites. [v2regsupgroups\_3]
- 4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regsupgroups\_4]
- 5: The military. [v2regsupgroups\_5]
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regsupgroups\_6]
- 7: A religious group(s). [v2regsupgroups\_7]
- 8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regsupgroups\_8]
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regsupgroups\_9]
- 10: Urban middle classes. [v2regsupgroups\_10]
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regsupgroups\_11]
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regsupgroups\_12]
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regsupgroups\_13]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.8 Regime most important support group (C) (v2regimpgroup)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Which (one) group does the current political regime rely on most strongly in order to maintain power?

*Clarification:* Choose the group that, if it were to retract its support to the regime, would most endanger the regime (most strongly increase the chance that it loses power).

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups

with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.9 Regime support groups size (C) (v2regsupgroupsize)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In total, how large is the percentage share of the domestic adult (18+) population that belongs to the political regime's supporting groups?

*Clarification:* You should consider the sum of all the groups (excepting foreign governments and colonial powers) entered in v2regsupgroups. Hence, your answer should take into account the total size of the/those groups that are supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power. Regarding the issue of overlapping identities, and one individual potentially belonging to more than one groups: Individuals should only be "counted" once; thus if the two relevant supporting groups are (4) civil servants, which total about 5%, and all of them belong to a particular ethnic group (6) also coded as a relevant, the overall total size of the supporting groups is still 5% (presuming that no other members of that ethnic group are essential for the regime staying in power).

*Responses:*

0: Extremely small

(About 1 percent of the population or less; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — a handful of higher-rank military officers, or by only a royal council and a few hundred landowners)

1: Very small

(Between 1 percent and 5 percent of the population; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — higher ranking civil servants and the military, or by moderately sized business and agrarian elites)

2: Small

(Between 5 percent and 15 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — relatively small ethnic groups, or by urban elites and the urban middle classes in predominantly rural societies)

3: Moderate

(Between 15 percent and 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — moderately sized ethnic groups, by rural middle classes in rural societies, or by urban middle classes in urban societies)

4: Large

(More than 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — large ethnic groups (and then not only the elites/leaders of such groups), or by rural working classes in rural societies.)

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.10 Regime support location (C) (v2regsuploc)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* In which geographic area do the support groups for the current political regime mainly reside?

*Responses:*

- 0: Abroad.
- 1: In the capital.
- 2: In urban areas outside the capital.
- 3: In rural areas.
- 4: The groups are not concentrated in any particular area.

*Scale:* Nominal

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories receive the value 4.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.11 Regime opposition groups (C) (v2regoppgroups)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Which groups include noteworthy opposition actors – that is, individuals (mobilized or not) who both want to and who could, under favorable circumstances, be able to remove the existing political regime?(Check all that apply.)

*Clarification:* Consider which group(s) include a significant share of individuals who both oppose the regime and pose a non-negligible threat to the regime (either mobilized or dormant). In other words, these individuals must both want to see the regime removed and, at least under hypothetical “favorable conditions”, be capable of removing the regime. Groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; opposition groups also include individuals who oppose the regime without taking particular actions, at the moment. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regoppgroups\_0]
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regoppgroups\_1]
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regoppgroups\_2]
- 3: Business elites. [v2regoppgroups\_3]
- 4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regoppgroups\_4]
- 5: The military. [v2regoppgroups\_5]
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regoppgroups\_6]
- 7: A religious group(s). [v2regoppgroups\_7]
- 8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regoppgroups\_8]
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regoppgroups\_9]
- 10: Urban middle classes. [v2regoppgroups\_10]
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regoppgroups\_11]
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regoppgroups\_12]
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regoppgroups\_13]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.



*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.12 Explicit and active regime opposition groups (C) (v2regoppgroupsact)

*Project Manager(s):* Sirianne Dahlum, Tore Wig

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Which (if any) groups include a significant share of individuals who explicitly and actively mobilize against the regime in a particular year? (Check all that apply.)

*Clarification:* Consider which group(s) include a significant share of individuals who engage in active and explicit opposition to the regime to promote its removal. These actors make explicit statements of dissent from the regime, publicly voice their preference for regime change, and may possibly engage in other actions intended to further the removal of the regime such as anti-regime demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts, strikes, the formation of anti-system parties, acts of sabotage, or armed rebellion. Please note that only years when anti-regime speech or activity occurs should be coded. In years when groups probably oppose the regime, but are not engaged in any explicit acts of opposition, the group should not be selected. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regoppgroupsact\_0]
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regoppgroupsact\_1]
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regoppgroupsact\_2]
- 3: Business elites. [v2regoppgroupsact\_3]
- 4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regoppgroupsact\_4]
- 5: The military. [v2regoppgroupsact\_5]
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regoppgroupsact\_6]
- 7: A religious group(s). [v2regoppgroupsact\_7]
- 8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regoppgroupsact\_8]
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regoppgroupsact\_9]
- 10: Urban middle classes. [v2regoppgroupsact\_10]
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regoppgroupsact\_11]
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regoppgroupsact\_12]
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regoppgroupsact\_13]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.13 Regime most important opposition group (C) (v2regimpoppgroup)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen



*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Which (one) group constitutes the greatest threat to the current regime?

*Clarification:* Choose the one group (among those you registered as opposition groups under the v2regoppgroups question) that is the most dangerous threat to the regime in a given year. That is, the group that could most strongly increase the chance that the regime loses power. The importance/danger associated with an opposition group will be affected both by its level of hostility towards the regime and its power resources/how capable it is of removing the regime should it try to do so. We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regoppgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.14 Regime opposition groups size (C) (v2regoppgroupssize)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In total, how large is the share of the domestic adult (18+) population that are noteworthy opposition actors to the current political regime?

*Clarification:* Consider the sum total of all the groups (excepting foreign governments and colonial powers) entered in v2regoppgroups. Hence, your answer should take into account the total size/number of the actors that oppose the regime and pose a threat to the regime maintaining power.

We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year.

Regarding the issue of individuals potentially belonging to more than one "opposition group": Individuals should only be "counted" once for the purpose of this question. For example, if the two relevant opposition groups are (4) civil servants, which total about 5% of the population, and all of them belong to a particular ethnic group (6) also coded as a relevant, the overall total size of the opposition groups is still 5% (presuming that there are no other members of that ethnic group who oppose the regime).

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are

essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely small (About 1 percent of the population or less)
- 1: Very small (Between 1 percent and 5 percent of the population)
- 2: Small (Between 5 percent and 15 percent)
- 3: Moderate (Between 15 percent and 30 percent)
- 4: Large (More than 30 percent)

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 3.4.4.15 Regime opposition location (C) (v2regopploc)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* In which geographic area do groups opposing the current political regime mainly reside?

*Clarification:* You should consider the groups entered in v2regoppgroups, hence groups that both want to see the regime removed and (at least under “favorable conditions”) are capable of removing the regime. We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

*Responses:*

- 0: Abroad.
- 1: In the capital.
- 2: In urban areas outside the capital.
- 3: In rural areas.
- 4: The groups are not concentrated in any particular area.

*Scale:* Nominal

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories receive the value 4.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.16 Strongest pro-regime preferences (C) (v2regproreg)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \* \_nr

*Question:* Which (one) group has the strongest pro-regime preferences, irrespective of the group's resources and capabilities for affecting the regime's hold on power?

*Clarification:* Consider only the pro-regime preferences of individuals in this group, and do not take into consideration the abilities of this group to actually affect regime survival. Hence, the group with the strongest pro-regime preferences need not be the most important support group.

One way to think about what pro-/anti-regime preferences means is: what would individuals hypothetically (honestly) answer if asked in a survey: "On a scale from 0-10, how pleased are you with the current political regime, with 10 indicating the strongest support." Select the group with the highest average score in this hypothetical survey.

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.17 Strongest anti-regime preferences (C) (v2regantireg)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \* \_nr

*Question:* Which (one) group has the strongest anti-regime preferences/antipathy against the current regime, irrespective of the group's resources and capabilities for affecting the regime's hold on power?

*Clarification:* Consider only the anti-regime preferences of the actors in this group, and do not take into consideration the abilities of this group to actually affect regime survival and change. Hence, the group with the strongest anti-regime preferences need not be the most important opposition group. Both capable and incapable political actors may have strong anti-regime preferences and want to see the regime removed from power. We also remind that the group needs not be currently mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; individuals may strongly resent a regime, without taking particular actions, in a given

year.

One way to think about what pro-/anti-regime preferences mean, independently of ability to affect regime survival is: what would individuals hypothetically (honestly) answer if asked in a survey: “On a scale from 0-10, how pleased are you with the current political regime”.

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regoppgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.18 Most powerful group in affecting regime duration and change (C) (v2regpower)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Irrespective of its stance toward the regime (pro-, anti-, or neutral), which one group is the most important for affecting the current regime’s chances of staying in power?

*Clarification:* Here we ask you to disregard group preferences, and only consider a group’s resources and capabilities vis-a-vis affecting regime survival. In other words, do not consider whether this group is pro-regime, anti-regime, or neutral to the regime. Take only into consideration the capabilities of this group to affect regime survival, if key members of the group were to hypothetically mobilize the group in an effort to remove the regime. Politically neutral, as well as pro- and anti-regime groups, may have ample resources and be capable of organizing coordinated action. As a result, all three types of groups may have great influence over regime survival and change.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).

- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.