# Online Appendix

# Party Behavior and the Gender Voting Gap

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## Contents



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# 1 Descriptive statistics of main variables

## 1.1 V-Party indicator of gender labor equality

Figure A1: Parties' support for gender labor equality




In the figure from the top, left-wing parties are colored in red. In the figure from the bottom, each point represents a party in an election year. Dots were jittered to improve visualization. Source: V-Party.

Figure A2: Left-wing parties' support for gender labor equality in Western Europe by country




LOESS curves. Source: V-Party.

Figure A2 displays parties' positions on gender labor equality by country across time. We see that there is important variation in that indicator, both between countries, and within countries across time. The joint analysis of Figure 1 and A2 provides important insights into the association between women's labor force participation, parties' positions on gender labor equality, and the gender voting gap. We see, for example, countries like Spain, where FLFP rates were on the rise between the 1990s and the 2010s, yet the gap remained static. Figure A2 reveals that Spanish left-wing parties' support for gender labor equality was weak during those years, which helps us understand the lack of variation in the gender voting gap. Conversely, in the United Kingdom, where FLFP rates were relatively high and stable, it was only in the 2010s —when the Labour Party became a strong advocate for gender labor equality— that the gender voting gap emerged.[1] Figure A3 plots the quartiles of the distribution of this variable for the observations in the sample, ranging from -0.597 to 3.024, with a median of 2.432.

[1]For instance, in the subsection "Fairness at Work", the Labour Party's 2010 manifesto stated: "New legislation and the Equality and Human Rights Commission will ensure that people are not held back at work because of their gender, age, disability, race and religious or sexual orientation. The new Equality Act will be enforced, promoting fairness across our society."

Figure A3: Quartiles of left-wing parties' support for gender labor equality in Western Europe




Source: V-Party.

### 1.1.1 Questionnaire design

To generate the gender labor equality position of each party (variable **v2pawomlab**), V-Dem asks experts "*To what extent does this party support the equal participation of women in the labor market?*" The survey clarifies that "*Measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market include -but are not limited to -legal provisions on equal treatment and pay, parental leave and financial support for childcare*." (Coppedge et al. 2022, p.28) Experts are presented with 4 response categories listed below.

"*0: Strongly opposes. This party strongly opposes all or almost all types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.*

*1: Opposes. This party opposes most types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.*

*2: Ambiguous/No position. This party has no clear policy with regard to measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.*

*3: Supports. This party supports most types of measures that support the equal participation of women in the labor market.*

*4: Strongly supports. This party strongly supports all or almost all types of measures that's support the equal participation of women in the labor market."*

### 1.1.2 Benefits over similar measures

V-Party is a collaboration of more than 700 experts who assessed many different features about most parties in many countries starting in 1970 (Coppedge et al. 2022). The **v2pawomlab** indicator is estimated through Item Response Theory (IRT) models, which have the benefit of accounting and adjusting for differences in how experts apply ordinal scales, as well as variation in rater reliability (Pemstein et al. 2022).

When it comes to answering my research question, the V-Party indicator has important advantages over similar measures such as the Comparative Manifesto Project's "welfare state expansion" (per504) indicator used in other research (Volkens et al. 2020a). According to the CMP codebook, per504 refers to "*Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social service or social security scheme. This includes, for example, government funding of: Health care, Child care, Elder care and pensions, Social housing*." (Volkens et al. 2020b, p.18) As it follows from its description, this indicator defines welfare in a very ample way that does not deal with the dimension of welfare that is theoretically relevant to the voting gap. Figure A4 plots the correlation between these V-Party and CMP indicators. It becomes clear from the figure that parties' programmatic emphasis on welfare, as defined by CMP, is different than their support for gender labor equality (correlation = 0.15). Thus, parties with similar scores on per504 can differ substantially when it comes to their support for gender labor equality policies.

Figure A4: Correlation between CMP and VParty indicators



## 1.2 Female-to-male party voter ratio (F/M)

Figure A5: Distribution of F/M




Figure A5 plots the distribution of $F/M$ **(A)** and $log(F/M)$ **(B)**. We see that taking the logarithm of the ratio improves the skewness of its distribution, allowing for better inferences.

## 1.3 Female labor force participation rate (FLFP)

Figure A6: Distribution of $\text{FLFP}_{t-1}$



Figure A6 plots the distribution of $FLFP_{t-1}$ together with dotted vertical lines indicating the deciles of the distribution. We see that the distribution is left-skewed, meaning that most of the observations in the data are concentrated in higher values of FLFP. The grey area represents the range from the minimum value of FLFP to an FLFP of 46.3, the threshold at which the estimated effect of gender labor equality becomes positive.

# 2 Modeling Strategy

As mentioned in the body of the text, I test my hypotheses using linear mixed-effects models with random intercepts for country-years (i.e., elections) and parties. In line with previous research, these models assume that the gap is a consequence of changes in country-level variables over time. I add random intercepts for parties to capture variation in the gap due to unobserved characteristics of each party. The residual variance from my models captures the variation in the gap due to characteristics of parties in specific elections. Given the structure of my data (105 country-years with an average of 2.4 parties each; and 64 parties with an average of nearly 4 country-years each), a random-effects strategy produces estimates less biased and less sample dependent than a fixed-effects approach (Clark and Linzer 2015) at least to the extent that there is no unmeasured confounding, which I address by carefully selecting control variables.

## 2.1 Control Variables

As mentioned in the body of the paper, I control for the OECD's measure of the divorce rate, which is the number of divorces during a given year per 1000 people (OECD 2023). Given the generally unequal income gender distribution between marriage partners, divorce tends to make women relatively poorer than men (Dehdari et al. 2022). This both boosts women's support for left-wing parties more than men's (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, 2006; Edlund, Haider and Pande 2005; Edlund and Pande 2002) and women's likelihood of joining the workforce (Thielemans and Mortelmans 2022). An increase in divorce rates can also push left-wing parties to advocate for welfare expansion since it is known that they tend to overrepresent the interests of the poorer voters (Schakel and Burgoon 2022). I lag this variable one year.

I also control for the percentage of the population that adheres to christianity at the time of the election, extracted from the World Religion Dataset (WRD) (Maoz and Henderson 2019). Evidence points to the fact that religiosity and labor force participation are negatively correlated for women (De Vaus and McAllister

1987). In parallel, since Western women tended to be more religious than men and stronger supporters of Christian Democratic parties (Dogan 1967; Lipset 1960; Duverger 1955), the weakening of the religion cleavage that started in the second half of the 20$^{th}$ century could have eroded church-party linkages and contributed to the shift in women's vote choice (Shorrocks 2018; Emmenegger and Manow 2014; Dalton and Flanagan 1985).

At the party level, I control for two confounders of the relation between party positions and the gender voting gap: the share of women in the parliament party, and the presence of a female party leader, both variables borrowed from Weeks et al. (2022), and lagged one election year. It is known that female politicians of the same party can enhance women's interest in politics (Reingold and Harrell 2010), which is a strong predictor of women's likelihood of voting (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010). Female politicians can also affect party platforms. As the percentage of women in the parliamentary party increases, parties' manifestos shift to the left and address a greater diversity of issues (Greene and O'Brien 2016). Women's presence in parliament is also associated with the adoption and expansion of work-family policies (Kittilson 2008; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Bonoli and Reber 2010). Another confounder of the relation between party positions and the gender voting gap is the gender of party leaders. On the one hand, women's presence in party leadership positions leads to a greater programmatic emphasis on social justice (Kittilson 2011); on the other hand, party leaders' gender can affect women's vote choice (Ferland 2022; Banducci and Karp 2000).

# 3 Robustness

## 3.1 Models adding country random-effects

Table A1 displays the models from the body of the paper adding country random intercepts. These models allow for country-years (i.e., elections) to be nested in countries. When adding another level of random effects to a model, it is important to control for covariates at that level that can confound the relation of interest between explanatory variables and outcome. One potential country-level confounder of the relation between FLFP and parties' positions on gender labor equality is the proportionality of a country's electoral system. More proportional electoral systems tend to mobilize women, reducing gender inequality in turnout (Teele 2022; Skorge 2021); whereas disproportionality can decrease women's engagement with politics (Kittilson

and Schwindt-Bayer 2010). In parallel, the proportionality of an electoral system could incentivize parties to take less centrist positions (Blais and Bodet 2006). I measure proportionality using Weeks et al. (2022) tree-point scale where 1 means Single Member District Plurality, 2 equals Modified Proportional Representation, and 3 means Proportional Representation. We see that results remain unchanged.

Table A1: Models with random effects for country

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ | 0.011* (0.004) | 0.004 (0.006) | −0.024* (0.010) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ × Gender labor equality position | | | 0.016*** (0.005) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.079 (0.051) | −0.721** (0.242) |
| % Women in parliament $party_{t-1}$ | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.0003 (0.002) |
| Female $leader_{t-1}$ | | 0.043 (0.057) | 0.038 (0.055) |
| Divorce $rate_{t-1}$ | −0.040 (0.045) | −0.012 (0.049) | 0.057 (0.051) |
| % Christians in population | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.005 (0.003) |
| Proportionality of ES | 0.030 (0.073) | 0.084 (0.084) | 0.100 (0.079) |
| Constant | −0.276 (0.371) | −0.274 (0.405) | 1.057 (0.552) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country | 0.001 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.036 | 0.029 | 0.024 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.063 | 0.051 | 0.049 |
| N countries | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| N country-years | 98 | 96 | 96 |
| N parties | 60 | 41 | 41 |
| N observations | 225 | 170 | 170 |
| Log Likelihood | −40.090 | −11.576 | −6.112 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 98.180 | 47.152 | 38.223 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 128.925 | 84.782 | 78.989 |

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

## 3.2 Models controlling for right-wing parties' behavior

Table A2 replicates Table 1 controlling for three features of the non-left-wing party with the highest score in gender labor equality in each election: the share of women in their parliamentary delegation, the presence of a female party leader, and the extent to which they advocate for gender labor equality. We see that results remain unchanged.

Table A2: Models controlling for right-wing parties' (RWP) behavior

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ | 0.013** (0.004) | 0.004 (0.006) | −0.026* (0.011) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ × Gender labor equality position | | | 0.017** (0.005) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.087 (0.055) | −0.753** (0.264) |
| Female $leader_{t-1}$ | | 0.029 (0.058) | 0.026 (0.057) |
| % Women in parliament $party_{t-1}$ | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.0003 (0.002) |
| Gender labor equality position RWP | | 0.004 (0.027) | 0.011 (0.026) |
| % Women in parliament $party_{t-1}$ RWP | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.002) |
| Female $leader_{t-1}$ RWP | | 0.058 (0.068) | 0.046 (0.066) |
| Divorce $rate_{t-1}$ | −0.043 (0.042) | −0.022 (0.055) | 0.044 (0.057) |
| % Christians in population | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.003) |
| Constant | −0.253 (0.340) | −0.109 (0.416) | 1.366* (0.608) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.039 | 0.034 | 0.03 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.06 | 0.053 | 0.051 |
| N country-years | 105 | 85 | 85 |
| N parties | 64 | 42 | 42 |
| N observations | 248 | 163 | 163 |
| Log Likelihood | −39.400 | −16.053 | −10.971 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 92.800 | 58.107 | 49.942 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 117.394 | 98.326 | 93.254 |

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

## 3.3 Models controlling for the share of the rural population

Teele (2023) has recently pointed to the fact that the shape of the gender voting gap varies according to the electoral environment in which ballots were cast (urban vs. rural regions). To account for the possible confounding effect of rural domicile, I re-run my models controlling for the share of the rural population in a country. Results remain unchanged and consistent with the author, the share of the rural population is negatively associated with the gender voting gap. It is worth mentioning that the share of the rural population is only a proxy for the construct pointed out by the author, and future research should develop more fine-grained measures.

Table A3: Models controlling for the share of the rural population

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ | $0.013^{***}$ (0.004) | 0.006 (0.005) | $-0.021^{*}$ (0.010) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ × Gender labor equality position | | | $0.015^{**}$ (0.005) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.078 (0.049) | $-0.687^{**}$ (0.244) |
| % Women in parliament $party_{t-1}$ | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.0004 (0.002) |
| $Female\ leader_{t-1}$ | | 0.030 (0.053) | 0.029 (0.052) |
| $Divorce\ rate_{t-1}$ | −0.075 (0.043) | −0.030 (0.048) | 0.038 (0.051) |
| % Christians in population | 0.00003 (0.003) | −0.002 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.003) |
| % Rural population | $-0.008^{**}$ (0.003) | −0.004 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.003) |
| Constant | −0.297 (0.326) | −0.120 (0.378) | $1.171^{*}$ (0.546) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.033 | 0.031 | 0.028 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.048 |
| N country-years | 105 | 103 | 103 |
| N parties | 64 | 43 | 43 |
| N observations | 248 | 184 | 184 |
| Log Likelihood | −35.730 | −10.987 | −6.034 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 87.461 | 43.974 | 36.068 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 115.568 | 79.338 | 74.648 |

$^{*}$p<0.05; $^{**}$p<0.01; $^{***}$p<0.001

## 3.4 Models excluding outliers

As seen in Figure A2, most of the left-wing parties in the sample score more than 0.5 in the gender labor equality indicator. However, three cases in the sample score lower: the Italian Democratic Party on the Left in 1994 and 1996, and the Italian Green Federation in 2006. To assess the robustness of the results, I reestimated my models without these observations. As models 1-3 in Table A4 show, the results are robust to excluding these cases. Model 4 and Figure A7 further exclude from the remaining sample those left-wing parties with a female-to-male voter ratio that falls outside the range of 0.326 to 1.936, which represents two standard deviations above and below the mean. The results are robust to excluding these outliers as well.

Table A4: Models excluding gender labor equality and $F/M$ outliers

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ | 0.013** (0.004) | 0.006 (0.005) | −0.020 (0.011) | −0.011 (0.009) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ × Gender labor equality position | | | 0.014** (0.005) | 0.010* (0.004) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.110* (0.050) | −0.625* (0.278) | −0.443 (0.227) |
| % Women in parliament $party_{t-1}$ | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.0005 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.001) |
| $Female\ leader_{t-1}$ | | 0.034 (0.053) | 0.032 (0.052) | 0.033 (0.040) |
| $Divorce\ rate_{t-1}$ | −0.039 (0.042) | −0.011 (0.047) | 0.045 (0.050) | 0.034 (0.038) |
| % Christians in population | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.002) |
| Constant | −0.305 (0.344) | −0.238 (0.381) | 1.070 (0.614) | 0.669 (0.487) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.039 | 0.03 | 0.028 | 0.027 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.048 | 0.024 |
| N country-years | 104 | 101 | 101 | 101 |
| N parties | 64 | 42 | 42 | 42 |
| N observations | 245 | 181 | 181 | 173 |
| Log Likelihood | −38.813 | −10.779 | −7.243 | 42.747 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 91.627 | 41.558 | 36.486 | −63.494 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 116.136 | 73.543 | 71.669 | −28.808 |

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Figure A7: Marginal effect of FLFP across different levels of parties' support for gender labor equality excluding all outliers (Table A4, Model 4)




Estimated coefficients based on Model 3, with 95% confidence intervals. Source: CSES, ESS, EES, ILO, and V-Party.

## 3.5 Models with alternative lag structures

The rationale for using one-year lags for the FLFP and divorce rates is to capture the most recent data available before an election. This approach aims to reflect the state of women's involvement in the labor force and the country's divorce rate at the time of the election. Employing a lagged measure for the FLFP rate is particularly important to avoid the potential influence of policies enacted by governments formed post-election. For instance, if an election occurs early in the year, the FLFP rate for that year might reflect the impact of labor policies implemented by the new government, leading to a biased representation of women's labor force involvement at the time of the election, which is the focus of my analysis. To ensure the robustness of my findings, I conducted four additional analyses using the FLFP rate without lags (Table A5), both the FLFP rate and the divorce rate without lags (Table A6), the FLFP rate with two lags (Table A7), and the FLFP and divorce rate with two lags (Table A8). Results remain unchanged.

Table A5: Models without lags for FLFP

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| FLFP | 0.013** (0.004) | 0.005 (0.006) | −0.023* (0.010) |
| FLFP × Gender labor equality position | | | 0.016*** (0.005) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.084 (0.049) | −0.748** (0.250) |
| % Women in parliament party$_{t-1}$ | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.0004 (0.002) |
| Female leader$_{t-1}$ | | 0.034 (0.053) | 0.032 (0.052) |
| Divorce rate$_{t-1}$ | −0.046 (0.042) | −0.020 (0.047) | 0.049 (0.050) |
| % Christians in population | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.003) |
| Constant | −0.295 (0.343) | −0.112 (0.389) | 1.242* (0.550) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.039 | 0.033 | 0.028 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.048 |
| N country-years | 105 | 103 | 103 |
| N parties | 64 | 43 | 43 |
| N observations | 248 | 184 | 184 |
| Log Likelihood | −39.029 | −11.566 | −6.053 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 92.059 | 43.133 | 34.106 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 116.653 | 75.282 | 69.470 |

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A6: Models without lags for FLFP and divorce rate

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| FLFP | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.007 (0.006) | −0.020* (0.010) |
| FLFP × Gender labor equality position | | | 0.015*** (0.005) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.071 (0.048) | −0.717** (0.240) |
| % Women in parliament party$_{t-1}$ | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.0002 (0.002) |
| Female leader$_{t-1}$ | | 0.010 (0.053) | 0.013 (0.051) |
| Divorce rate | −0.037 (0.042) | −0.026 (0.049) | 0.038 (0.051) |
| % Christians in population | −0.004 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.003) |
| Constant | −0.202 (0.347) | −0.150 (0.384) | 1.105* (0.528) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.044 | 0.036 | 0.03 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.058 | 0.047 | 0.045 |
| N country-years | 107 | 105 | 105 |
| N parties | 64 | 43 | 43 |
| N observations | 252 | 187 | 187 |
| Log Likelihood | −39.666 | −8.253 | −2.891 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 93.333 | 36.506 | 27.782 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 118.039 | 68.817 | 63.324 |

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A7: Models with two lags for FLFP

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| $FLFP_{t-2}$ | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.005 (0.005) | −0.022* (0.010) |
| $FLFP_{t-2}$ × Gender labor equality position | | | 0.015** (0.005) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.086 (0.049) | −0.673** (0.243) |
| % Women in parliament $party_{t-1}$ | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.002) |
| $Female\ leader_{t-1}$ | | 0.034 (0.054) | 0.032 (0.052) |
| $Divorce\ rate_{t-1}$ | −0.039 (0.042) | −0.019 (0.048) | 0.049 (0.051) |
| % Christians in population | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.003) |
| Constant | −0.243 (0.338) | −0.083 (0.381) | 1.185* (0.543) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.038 | 0.033 | 0.028 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.061 | 0.05 | 0.049 |
| N country-years | 103 | 101 | 101 |
| N parties | 64 | 43 | 43 |
| N observations | 244 | 182 | 182 |
| Log Likelihood | −40.451 | −12.623 | −7.714 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 94.903 | 45.245 | 37.427 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 119.383 | 77.285 | 72.671 |

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A8: Models with two lags for FLFP and divorce rate

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| $FLFP_{t-2}$ | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.005 (0.005) | −0.021* (0.010) |
| $FLFP_{t-2}$ × Gender labor equality position | | | 0.015** (0.005) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.087 (0.049) | −0.663** (0.245) |
| % Women in parliament $party_{t-1}$ | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.0005 (0.002) |
| $Female\ leader_{t-1}$ | | 0.035 (0.054) | 0.033 (0.052) |
| $Divorce\ rate_{t-2}$ | −0.042 (0.042) | −0.029 (0.048) | 0.042 (0.051) |
| % Christians in population | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.003) |
| Constant | −0.235 (0.339) | −0.083 (0.381) | 1.160* (0.545) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.038 | 0.033 | 0.028 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.061 | 0.05 | 0.049 |
| N country-years | 103 | 101 | 101 |
| N parties | 64 | 43 | 43 |
| N observations | 244 | 182 | 182 |
| Log Likelihood | −40.389 | −12.520 | −7.842 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 94.779 | 45.041 | 37.684 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 119.259 | 77.081 | 72.928 |

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

In my main models, the gender of the party leader is lagged to give female leaders sufficient time to influence parties, an approach adopted by previous research on gender and party platforms (e.g., O'Brien 2018; Kittilson 2011). However, the gender of the party leader at the moment of the election could also be a confounder in my model. To evaluate this, I conducted additional robustness tests using a non-lagged indicator of the presence of a female party leader. As we can see from Table A9, results remain unchanged.

Table A9: Models without lags for female leader

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| $\text{FLFP}_{t-1}$ | 0.013** (0.004) | 0.006 (0.006) | −0.020* (0.010) |
| $\text{FLFP}_{t-1}$ × Gender labor equality position | | | 0.015** (0.005) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.039 (0.052) | −0.712** (0.243) |
| % Women in parliament $\text{party}_{t-1}$ | | 0.0005 (0.002) | 0.00001 (0.002) |
| Female leader | | 0.130* (0.051) | 0.128** (0.049) |
| $\text{Divorce rate}_{t-1}$ | −0.043 (0.042) | 0.028 (0.046) | 0.086 (0.048) |
| % Christians in population | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.001 (0.003) | −0.002 (0.003) |
| Constant | −0.253 (0.340) | −0.395 (0.374) | 0.868 (0.535) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.039 | 0.031 | 0.026 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.029 |
| N country-years | 105 | 78 | 78 |
| N parties | 64 | 36 | 36 |
| N observations | 248 | 136 | 136 |
| Log Likelihood | −39.400 | 18.938 | 23.668 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 92.800 | −17.877 | −25.336 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 117.394 | 11.250 | 6.703 |

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

## 3.6 Models controlling for economic hardship and socio-economic status

An important question refers to the effect of the state of the economy and an individual's economic position on the gender voting gap. Evidence from studies on public opinion has shown that women are more supportive of social spending and redistribution than men in contexts characterized by low welfare provision (Shorrocks and Grasso 2020). As Shorrocks and Grasso argue, this happens because, in those contexts, there are unmet demands from women for more social spending. Austerity policies can also have a stronger impact on young women's vote choice due to the economic background of this group of voters and the particular challenges they face in the labor market (Sanders and Shorrocks 2019). Related to this point Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef and Lin (2004) showed that gender differences in partisanhip increased in the United States as the economy deteriorated, and percentage of economically vulnerable, single women increased.

To assess the role of economic hardship and an individual's socio-economic status, I proceeded in two steps. First, I re-estimated my models, including two control variables: the inflation rate (consumer price index measured on an annual basis) extracted form the OECD *Consumer prices* dataset; and the percentage of a country's gross domestic product (GDP) used for public social expenditures (Old age, Survivors, Incapacity-related benefits, Health, Family, Active labor market programs, Unemployment, Housing, and Other social policy areas), also from the OECD. I controlled for these variables measured at the elecion year, as well as one-year lagged. Second, I took an individual-level approach by estimating conditional logistic regressions of vote choice, controlling for various socio-economic status indicators.

### 3.6.1 Aggregate-level models

To start with a visual example, Figure A8 plots, for each country, the inflation rates and the share of the GDP allocated to public social expenditures. Despite the dataset starts after 1985 and does not allow us to analyze the pre-oil-shock context, we can see that the 1980s were years marked by high inflation and low social spending, at least relative to the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s.

Figure A8: Trends in inflation and social spending




Table A10: Models controlling for inflation

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ | 0.014** (0.004) | 0.007 (0.005) | −0.019 (0.010) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ × Gender labor equality position | | | 0.014** (0.005) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.083 (0.049) | −0.638** (0.246) |
| % Women in parliament $party_{t-1}$ | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.002) |
| $Female\ leader_{t-1}$ | | 0.032 (0.053) | 0.031 (0.051) |
| $Divorce\ rate_{t-1}$ | −0.038 (0.042) | −0.009 (0.046) | 0.051 (0.049) |
| % Christians in population | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.005 (0.003) |
| CPI | 0.010 (0.010) | 0.022* (0.011) | 0.017 (0.011) |
| Constant | −0.303 (0.345) | −0.213 (0.383) | 1.018 (0.556) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.04 | 0.032 | 0.028 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.059 | 0.048 | 0.047 |
| N country-years | 105 | 103 | 103 |
| N parties | 64 | 43 | 43 |
| N observations | 248 | 184 | 184 |
| Log Likelihood | −38.854 | −9.541 | −5.235 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 93.707 | 41.082 | 34.469 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 121.815 | 76.446 | 73.048 |

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A11: Models controlling for lagged inflation

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ | 0.015*** (0.004) | 0.007 (0.006) | −0.019 (0.010) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ × Gender labor equality position | | | 0.014** (0.005) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.078 (0.049) | −0.638** (0.247) |
| % Women in parliament $party_{t-1}$ | | 0.002 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.002) |
| $Female\ leader_{t-1}$ | | 0.035 (0.053) | 0.033 (0.051) |
| $Divorce\ rate_{t-1}$ | −0.035 (0.042) | −0.008 (0.046) | 0.052 (0.049) |
| % Christians in population | −0.004 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.003) | −0.005 (0.003) |
| $CPI_{t-1}$ | 0.019* (0.009) | 0.021* (0.010) | 0.016 (0.010) |
| Constant | −0.350 (0.349) | −0.180 (0.383) | 1.036 (0.556) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.042 | 0.033 | 0.029 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.058 | 0.048 | 0.047 |
| N country-years | 105 | 103 | 103 |
| N parties | 64 | 43 | 43 |
| N observations | 248 | 184 | 184 |
| Log Likelihood | −37.303 | −9.431 | −5.195 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 90.606 | 40.862 | 34.390 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 118.714 | 76.226 | 72.969 |

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A12: Models controlling for social spending

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ | 0.013** (0.004) | 0.006 (0.006) | −0.022* (0.010) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ × Gender labor equality position | | | 0.016*** (0.005) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.083 (0.049) | −0.709** (0.243) |
| % Women in parliament $party_{t-1}$ | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.0004 (0.002) |
| $Female\ leader_{t-1}$ | | 0.035 (0.053) | 0.035 (0.052) |
| $Divorce\ rate_{t-1}$ | −0.042 (0.043) | −0.025 (0.048) | 0.040 (0.051) |
| % Christians in population | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.003) |
| % GDP social | −0.001 (0.006) | 0.003 (0.006) | 0.005 (0.006) |
| Constant | −0.229 (0.405) | −0.207 (0.432) | 1.064 (0.569) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.039 | 0.032 | 0.027 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.048 |
| N country-years | 105 | 103 | 103 |
| N parties | 64 | 43 | 43 |
| N observations | 248 | 184 | 184 |
| Log Likelihood | −39.394 | −11.457 | −6.170 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 94.788 | 44.914 | 36.339 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 122.896 | 80.278 | 74.918 |

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A13: Models controlling for lagged social spending

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.006 (0.006) | −0.022* (0.010) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ × Gender labor equality position | | | 0.016*** (0.005) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.083 (0.049) | −0.710** (0.243) |
| % Women in parliament $party_{t-1}$ | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.0003 (0.002) |
| $Female\ leader_{t-1}$ | | 0.035 (0.053) | 0.035 (0.052) |
| $Divorce\ rate_{t-1}$ | −0.039 (0.043) | −0.025 (0.048) | 0.041 (0.051) |
| % Christians in population | −0.004 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.003) |
| % GDP $social_{t-1}$ | −0.002 (0.006) | 0.003 (0.006) | 0.005 (0.006) |
| Constant | −0.164 (0.404) | −0.205 (0.436) | 1.061 (0.570) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.039 | 0.032 | 0.027 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.048 |
| N country-years | 105 | 103 | 103 |
| N parties | 64 | 43 | 43 |
| N observations | 248 | 184 | 184 |
| Log Likelihood | −39.326 | −11.473 | −6.183 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 94.652 | 44.946 | 36.366 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 122.760 | 80.310 | 74.946 |

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

### 3.6.2 Individual-level models

To assess the role of economic hardship at the individual level, as well as other factors related to socio-economic status, I utilized individual-level public opinion data from CSES (1996-2019). Testing my argument with individual-level data requires a model that accounts for variables at both the individual level (e.g., labor force participation, income) and the party level (e.g., parties' support for gender labor equality). Following the most common approach in the literature on multiparty competition, I estimated conditional logistic regressions of vote choice (Alvarez and Nagler 1998).

To estimate these models, the data has to be reshaped into a respondent-party dataset, with each individual entering the dataset as many times as there are parties in the election. Following my previous approach, I included only voters of the largest party from each family. The primary variable of interest is a party's support for gender labor equality. At the party level, I controlled for the same two potential confounders: the lagged share of women in the party, and the lagged indicator of female leadership. At the individual level, I controlled for age, education (measured using a 0-4 scale, where 0 means that the respondent did not finish primary, and 4 means a bachelor's degree or higher), income quintile, Christianity, and divorce status.

Given my specific interest in the impact of party behavior on the vote choice of working women, I divided the data into four groups (non-working women, working women, non-working men, and working men) and estimated separate regressions for each. Following CSES and conventional criteria, workers are defined as individuals who are in the labor force, which includes employed and unemployed. Citizens not in the labor force include students, retired, "homemakers", and disabled. Because CSES does not provide separate categories for the very few respondents on temporary job leave (such as those on maternity or sick leave), I treat these respondents as non-working, serving as a harder test for my argument.

In such conditional logistic models, coefficients for choice-level (i.e., party-level) variables represent overall effect, whereas those for individual-level variables (i.e., survey-respondents) should be interpreted relative to a reference category (i.e., a choice), which is omitted from the model to enable the estimation of those coefficients. I chose social democratic parties as the reference category to ensure comparability across countries. It is worth emphasizing that these models not only serve as robustness tests by testing the argument of the paper with individual-level data, but also expand the scope of the argument by including parties from right-wing families (i.e., Liberal, Christian Democratic, Conservative, and Nationalist). Due to the high non-response rate of the religiosity question in CSES, and the fact that answers to this question are unavailable for Denmark (1998, 2001, 2007), Ireland (2011), Norway (1997, 2001, 2005, 2009), and Sweden (1998, 2002, 2006, 2014), leading to a %20 drop in my sample-size, I also estimate models without controlling for Christianity.

Tables A14 and A15 display the results. Results in Table A14 align with the paper's argument: gender labor equality has a positive and statistically significant effect on working women's vote choice, but not on working men's. Moreover, we see a different effect compared to non-working women, for which the coefficient of gender labor equality is negative. Table A15 controls for Christianity, which comes at the cost of dropping virtually all the observations from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Results for non-working women and non-working men remain similar: these groups are less likely to vote for parties that have gender-egalitarian policies in the labor market, with a larger negative effect for the case of men. Despite results for working women losing statistical significance, we still see a positive sign in the gender labor equality coefficient for this group, whereas for men it is negative.

Table A14: Conditional logistic regressions of vote choice without controlling for religiosity

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Vote choice (Ref = Social Democratic party) | | | |
| | Non-Working Women | Working Women | Non-Working Men | Working Men |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Gender labor equality position | −0.036** (0.014) | 0.027* (0.012) | −0.036* (0.015) | 0.004 (0.010) |
| % Women in parliament party$_{t-1}$ | 0.003** (0.001) | 0.003** (0.001) | 0.001 (0.001) | 0.00002 (0.001) |
| Female leader$_{t-1}$ | 0.158*** (0.034) | 0.126*** (0.028) | 0.123*** (0.037) | 0.105*** (0.027) |
| Education: ECO | 0.534*** (0.049) | 0.612*** (0.039) | 0.574*** (0.063) | 0.551*** (0.040) |
| Education: SOC | 0.323*** (0.038) | 0.291*** (0.030) | 0.186*** (0.042) | 0.173*** (0.029) |
| Education: LIB | 0.327*** (0.035) | 0.175*** (0.029) | 0.288*** (0.036) | 0.314*** (0.025) |
| Education: CHR | 0.075** (0.026) | −0.023 (0.022) | 0.074** (0.028) | 0.052* (0.020) |
| Education: CON | 0.048 (0.026) | −0.016 (0.022) | 0.148*** (0.028) | 0.087*** (0.020) |
| Education: NAT | −0.037 (0.040) | −0.387*** (0.034) | −0.070 (0.038) | −0.256*** (0.028) |
| Age: ECO | −0.026*** (0.002) | −0.016*** (0.003) | −0.031*** (0.003) | −0.021*** (0.003) |
| Age: SOC | −0.017*** (0.002) | −0.005 (0.003) | −0.013*** (0.002) | −0.003 (0.003) |
| Age: LIB | 0.004 (0.002) | −0.005 (0.003) | −0.002 (0.002) | −0.010*** (0.002) |
| Age: CHR | 0.015*** (0.002) | 0.0004 (0.002) | 0.010*** (0.002) | −0.003 (0.002) |
| Age: CON | 0.016*** (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) |
| Age: NAT | 0.005* (0.002) | −0.011*** (0.003) | 0.003 (0.002) | −0.010*** (0.002) |
| Income: ECO | 0.069 (0.037) | −0.040 (0.027) | 0.001 (0.045) | −0.076** (0.029) |
| Income: SOC | −0.224*** (0.039) | −0.194*** (0.026) | −0.140*** (0.041) | −0.220*** (0.027) |
| Income: LIB | 0.104*** (0.029) | 0.158*** (0.025) | 0.164*** (0.029) | 0.143*** (0.022) |
| Income: CHR | 0.144*** (0.023) | 0.097*** (0.019) | 0.125*** (0.025) | 0.052** (0.018) |
| Income: CON | 0.235*** (0.024) | 0.189*** (0.021) | 0.200*** (0.026) | 0.167*** (0.020) |
| Income: NAT | 0.015 (0.034) | −0.105*** (0.027) | 0.008 (0.030) | −0.107*** (0.022) |
| Divorced: ECO | 0.175 (0.184) | 0.144 (0.118) | −0.066 (0.267) | −0.197 (0.164) |
| Divorced: SOC | 0.467** (0.151) | −0.013 (0.111) | −0.022 (0.201) | −0.087 (0.143) |
| Divorced: LIB | −0.410** (0.159) | −0.191 (0.116) | −0.265 (0.177) | −0.072 (0.111) |
| Divorced: CHR | −0.594*** (0.123) | −0.296*** (0.089) | −0.461** (0.149) | −0.406*** (0.103) |
| Divorced: CON | −0.151 (0.111) | −0.032 (0.086) | −0.197 (0.135) | −0.186 (0.101) |
| Divorced: NAT | 0.210 (0.137) | −0.046 (0.113) | 0.181 (0.143) | 0.026 (0.111) |
| Intercept: ECO | −1.278*** (0.207) | −1.811*** (0.193) | −1.264*** (0.241) | −1.458*** (0.187) |
| Intercept: SOC | −0.250 (0.179) | −0.634*** (0.162) | −0.335 (0.193) | −0.442** (0.154) |
| Intercept: LIB | −1.882*** (0.171) | −1.490*** (0.163) | −1.663*** (0.171) | −1.375*** (0.131) |
| Intercept: CHR | −1.576*** (0.135) | −0.622*** (0.126) | −1.513*** (0.149) | −0.560*** (0.111) |
| Intercept: CON | −1.654*** (0.136) | −0.864*** (0.127) | −1.033*** (0.146) | −0.844*** (0.112) |
| Intercept: NAT | −0.736*** (0.193) | 1.361*** (0.179) | −0.330 (0.177) | 1.402*** (0.139) |
| Observations | 12,257 | 16,778 | 10,189 | 19,730 |
| $R^2$ | 0.268 | 0.242 | 0.257 | 0.257 |
| Log Likelihood | −15,184.380 | −22,229.680 | −12,905.900 | −26,057.370 |
| LR Test (df = 33) | 11,113.870*** | 14,170.870*** | 8,920.427*** | 17,989.320*** |

*Note: Data from CSES* *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A15: Conditional logistic regressions of vote choice

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Vote choice (Ref = Social Democratic party) | | | |
| | Non-Working Women | Working Women | Non-Working Men | Working Men |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Gender labor equality position | −0.068*** (0.015) | 0.011 (0.013) | −0.076*** (0.016) | −0.012 (0.012) |
| % Women in parliament party$_{t-1}$ | 0.004** (0.001) | 0.003* (0.001) | 0.003 (0.001) | −0.0002 (0.001) |
| Female leader$_{t-1}$ | 0.219*** (0.039) | 0.225*** (0.033) | 0.216*** (0.042) | 0.198*** (0.032) |
| Education: ECO | 0.567*** (0.053) | 0.625*** (0.043) | 0.596*** (0.068) | 0.535*** (0.045) |
| Education: SOC | 0.359*** (0.045) | 0.313*** (0.038) | 0.157** (0.049) | 0.095** (0.035) |
| Education: LIB | 0.368*** (0.039) | 0.170*** (0.033) | 0.273*** (0.040) | 0.355*** (0.028) |
| Education: CHR | 0.122*** (0.029) | 0.026 (0.024) | 0.091** (0.030) | 0.087*** (0.023) |
| Education: CON | 0.144*** (0.029) | 0.015 (0.026) | 0.192*** (0.033) | 0.099*** (0.025) |
| Education: NAT | 0.022 (0.044) | −0.373*** (0.038) | −0.060 (0.042) | −0.236*** (0.031) |
| Age: ECO | −0.025*** (0.003) | −0.015*** (0.003) | −0.031*** (0.003) | −0.023*** (0.003) |
| Age: SOC | −0.009*** (0.003) | −0.008* (0.004) | −0.008** (0.003) | −0.008* (0.003) |
| Age: LIB | 0.00004 (0.002) | −0.004 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.002) | −0.011*** (0.003) |
| Age: CHR | 0.013*** (0.002) | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.007*** (0.002) | −0.006** (0.002) |
| Age: CON | 0.016*** (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) | 0.004 (0.002) | 0.007** (0.002) |
| Age: NAT | 0.004 (0.002) | −0.011*** (0.003) | 0.003 (0.002) | −0.011*** (0.003) |
| Income: ECO | 0.084* (0.039) | −0.021 (0.029) | −0.032 (0.048) | −0.041 (0.032) |
| Income: SOC | −0.274*** (0.047) | −0.249*** (0.033) | −0.136** (0.048) | −0.227*** (0.033) |
| Income: LIB | 0.099** (0.032) | 0.185*** (0.028) | 0.180*** (0.032) | 0.168*** (0.024) |
| Income: CHR | 0.135*** (0.025) | 0.133*** (0.022) | 0.122*** (0.027) | 0.091*** (0.020) |
| Income: CON | 0.207*** (0.028) | 0.162*** (0.025) | 0.151*** (0.030) | 0.202*** (0.024) |
| Income: NAT | −0.027 (0.037) | −0.094** (0.030) | −0.001 (0.033) | −0.104*** (0.024) |
| Divorced: ECO | 0.281 (0.189) | 0.097 (0.126) | 0.054 (0.271) | −0.091 (0.171) |
| Divorced: SOC | 0.589*** (0.169) | −0.099 (0.142) | −0.025 (0.239) | 0.078 (0.172) |
| Divorced: LIB | −0.294 (0.170) | −0.232 (0.132) | −0.283 (0.199) | −0.164 (0.127) |
| Divorced: CHR | −0.521*** (0.134) | −0.253** (0.096) | −0.353* (0.161) | −0.299** (0.110) |
| Divorced: CON | −0.135 (0.122) | −0.178 (0.099) | −0.272 (0.154) | −0.261* (0.121) |
| Divorced: NAT | 0.174 (0.148) | −0.048 (0.122) | 0.160 (0.157) | 0.003 (0.122) |
| Christian: ECO | −0.055 (0.106) | 0.030 (0.075) | −0.153 (0.132) | −0.305*** (0.079) |
| Christian: SOC | −0.402*** (0.110) | −0.286*** (0.083) | −0.355** (0.118) | −0.366*** (0.081) |
| Christian: LIB | 0.398*** (0.090) | 0.141 (0.073) | 0.137 (0.090) | 0.121* (0.060) |
| Christian: CHR | 1.093*** (0.080) | 0.832*** (0.064) | 1.004*** (0.085) | 0.849*** (0.058) |
| Christian: CON | 0.731*** (0.086) | 0.421*** (0.066) | 0.525*** (0.087) | 0.741*** (0.062) |
| Christian: NAT | 0.101 (0.101) | 0.237** (0.085) | −0.004 (0.095) | 0.256*** (0.068) |
| Intercept: ECO | −1.483*** (0.234) | −1.925*** (0.220) | −1.198*** (0.271) | −1.267*** (0.210) |
| Intercept: SOC | −0.331 (0.230) | −0.318 (0.213) | −0.238 (0.244) | 0.211 (0.194) |
| Intercept: LIB | −2.116*** (0.195) | −1.739*** (0.189) | −1.738*** (0.194) | −1.608*** (0.152) |
| Intercept: CHR | −2.462*** (0.166) | −1.431*** (0.152) | −2.182*** (0.177) | −1.176*** (0.133) |
| Intercept: CON | −2.261*** (0.168) | −1.036*** (0.157) | −1.433*** (0.184) | −1.623*** (0.145) |
| Intercept: NAT | −0.831*** (0.219) | 1.201*** (0.209) | −0.399* (0.203) | 1.239*** (0.165) |
| Observations | 10,585 | 13,340 | 8,608 | 15,640 |
| $R^2$ | 0.295 | 0.276 | 0.285 | 0.295 |
| Log Likelihood | −12,534.870 | −16,825.350 | −10,451.060 | −19,641.680 |
| LR Test (df = 39) | 10,472.430*** | 12,808.560*** | 8,348.909*** | 16,454.120*** |

*Note: Data from CSES* *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

## 3.7 Models controlling for parties' incumbency status

Incumbency status is an important element for voting decisions, especially when assessing the impact of a country's economy on citizens' vote choice. To address this point, I control for an indicator of a party's presence in government at the moment of the election provided by the CSES dataset. We see that the interaction effect is significant ($p < 0.1$), though the effect size decreases due to sample size.

Table A16: Models controlling for incumbency status

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $log(F/M)$ party voter ratio | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ | $0.017^{**}$ (0.005) | 0.010 (0.008) | −0.015 (0.015) |
| $FLFP_{t-1}$ × Gender labor equality position | | | $0.013^{+}$ (0.007) |
| Gender labor equality position | | 0.105 (0.061) | −0.527 (0.350) |
| % Women in parliament $party_{t-1}$ | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.0001 (0.002) |
| $Female\ leader_{t-1}$ | | −0.001 (0.069) | 0.002 (0.068) |
| $Divorce\ rate_{t-1}$ | −0.014 (0.054) | −0.028 (0.065) | 0.026 (0.071) |
| % Christians in population | −0.002 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.004) | −0.004 (0.004) |
| Incumbent party | 0.013 (0.053) | 0.038 (0.058) | 0.042 (0.057) |
| Constant | −0.670 (0.413) | −0.335 (0.496) | 0.847 (0.812) |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ party | 0.035 | 0.042 | 0.04 |
| $\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual | 0.065 | 0.057 | 0.056 |
| N country-years | 63 | 61 | 61 |
| N parties | 53 | 37 | 37 |
| N observations | 156 | 117 | 117 |
| Log Likelihood | −30.900 | −19.264 | −17.615 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 77.800 | 60.528 | 59.230 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 102.199 | 90.912 | 92.376 |

*Note: Data from CSES* $^{+}$p<0.1; $^{*}$p<0.05; $^{**}$p<0.01; $^{***}$p<0.001

## 3.8 Models controlling for gender values

Part of my argument is that women in the workforce should exhibit more egalitarian gender role attitudes, an association that has already been documented by empirical research on this topic (e.g., Rindfuss, Brewster and Kavee 1996; Togeby 1994; Andersen and Cook 1985). However, a test of this argument is still relevant for robustness purposes. To address this point, I used data from the ESS waves 4 and 5 (corresponding to the years 2008 and 2010 respectively), which include responses to two questions that illuminate this issue. These data encompass all the countries in my previous analysis except for Italy, and have consistent measures of respondents' household income. The ESS asks:

"*Using this card, please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements*:

1) *A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family*;

2) *When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women."*

Respondents are provided with a 1 to 5 agree-disagree scale, where 1 means "Agree strongly" and 5 means "Disagree strongly."

I proceeded in two steps. First, I estimated OLS regressions of these two gender values variables on respondents' gender, which I interacted with an indicator of labor force participation provided by the ESS, measuring whether the respondent has engaged in paid work in the last 7 days. I controlled for age, income, education, Christianity, and whether the respondent is divorced (Table A17). The models include fixed effects for the country-survey round to account for the unobservables of each election. They show that working women tend to hold more egalitarian gender role attitudes than non-working women, which aligns with previous research.

Next, I estimated conditional logistic regressions of vote choice. First, I estimated models without controlling for the gender values (Table A18). Following that, I estimated models controlling for each of these two indicators (Tables A19 and A20).

Table A18 displays the baseline model for non-working women and men, as well as for working women and men. We see that the coefficient for gender labor equality is positive and statistically significant for all cases, but its magnitude is the highest for working women, which aligns with previous research and with

the paper's argument about the role of party behavior on the gender voting gap. Tables A19 and A20 add robustness to those results by controlling for voters' gender values without altering results. Importantly, we see that the effect of these attitudes on vote choice works as expected. For example, Table A19 shows that voters holding more egalitarian gender norms are less likely to vote for Christian Democratic, Conservative, and Nationalist parties than for Social Democratic parties (i.e., the baseline).

Table A17: Work and gender values, higher values mean more disagreement with the statement

| | *Dependent variable:* | |
|---|---|---|
| | "A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family" | "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women" |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Woman | 0.031 (0.016) | 0.114*** (0.015) |
| Labor force participation | 0.070*** (0.017) | 0.016 (0.016) |
| Woman × Labor force participation | 0.080*** (0.022) | 0.161*** (0.021) |
| Age | −0.007*** (0.0003) | −0.013*** (0.0003) |
| Income | 0.022*** (0.002) | 0.039*** (0.002) |
| Education | 0.122*** (0.005) | 0.175*** (0.005) |
| Divorced | 0.173*** (0.020) | 0.213*** (0.019) |
| Christian | −0.237*** (0.012) | −0.123*** (0.011) |
| Constant | 3.232*** (0.048) | 3.600*** (0.045) |
| Country-ESS round FE | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 41,423 | 41,515 |
| $R^2$ | 0.131 | 0.187 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.130 | 0.187 |
| *Note: Data from ESS waves 4 and 5* | | *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 |

Table A18: Conditional logistic regressions of vote choice (ESS waves 4 and 5)

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Vote choice (Ref = Social Democratic party) | | | |
| | Nonworking Women | Working Women | Nonworking Men | Working Men |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Gender labor equality position | 0.084*** (0.025) | 0.154*** (0.025) | 0.102*** (0.029) | 0.084*** (0.023) |
| % Women in parliament party$_{t-1}$ | −0.014*** (0.003) | −0.0005 (0.002) | −0.014*** (0.003) | −0.008*** (0.002) |
| Female leader$_{t-1}$ | 0.497*** (0.058) | 0.297*** (0.048) | 0.423*** (0.063) | 0.379*** (0.044) |
| Education: ECO | 0.619*** (0.111) | 0.593*** (0.080) | 0.388** (0.123) | 0.524*** (0.087) |
| Education: SOC | 0.155 (0.082) | 0.193*** (0.055) | 0.151 (0.082) | 0.160** (0.057) |
| Education: LIB | 0.204** (0.069) | 0.093 (0.058) | 0.091 (0.075) | 0.026 (0.050) |
| Education: CHR | 0.139*** (0.039) | −0.020 (0.038) | 0.161*** (0.044) | 0.036 (0.036) |
| Education: CON | 0.141*** (0.039) | 0.038 (0.036) | 0.155*** (0.044) | −0.026 (0.034) |
| Education: NAT | −0.309** (0.103) | −0.572*** (0.082) | −0.193* (0.089) | −0.298*** (0.066) |
| Age: ECO | −0.026*** (0.007) | −0.005 (0.007) | −0.026*** (0.008) | −0.024** (0.008) |
| Age: SOC | −0.023*** (0.005) | 0.001 (0.006) | −0.026*** (0.005) | −0.013* (0.005) |
| Age: LIB | 0.002 (0.005) | −0.005 (0.006) | −0.015** (0.005) | −0.017*** (0.005) |
| Age: CHR | 0.012*** (0.002) | 0.006 (0.004) | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.005 (0.003) |
| Age: CON | 0.014*** (0.003) | 0.016*** (0.004) | 0.004 (0.003) | −0.006 (0.003) |
| Age: NAT | −0.011* (0.006) | −0.032*** (0.008) | −0.019*** (0.005) | −0.018** (0.006) |
| Income: ECO | −0.131** (0.049) | −0.062 (0.035) | 0.050 (0.054) | −0.188*** (0.037) |
| Income: SOC | −0.054 (0.036) | −0.086** (0.026) | −0.085* (0.038) | −0.096*** (0.028) |
| Income: LIB | 0.140*** (0.030) | 0.106*** (0.028) | 0.093** (0.033) | 0.102*** (0.025) |
| Income: CHR | 0.032 (0.017) | 0.037* (0.017) | 0.023 (0.020) | 0.058*** (0.017) |
| Income: CON | 0.094*** (0.019) | 0.087*** (0.018) | 0.121*** (0.021) | 0.156*** (0.017) |
| Income: NAT | −0.006 (0.042) | −0.084* (0.037) | −0.050 (0.041) | −0.017 (0.031) |
| Divorced: ECO | −0.639 (0.443) | −0.057 (0.247) | 0.481 (0.455) | −0.288 (0.368) |
| Divorced: SOC | 0.881*** (0.230) | 0.374* (0.176) | 0.792** (0.270) | −0.051 (0.252) |
| Divorced: LIB | 0.155 (0.248) | 0.101 (0.205) | 0.270 (0.297) | −0.055 (0.207) |
| Divorced: CHR | −0.402* (0.168) | 0.013 (0.138) | −0.035 (0.203) | −0.445** (0.168) |
| Divorced: CON | 0.221 (0.155) | 0.305* (0.128) | −0.507* (0.212) | −0.111 (0.150) |
| Divorced: NAT | 0.582* (0.285) | 0.438 (0.255) | 0.370 (0.308) | 0.464 (0.239) |
| Christian: ECO | −0.106 (0.272) | −0.236 (0.165) | 0.263 (0.314) | −0.550** (0.209) |
| Christian: SOC | −0.549** (0.175) | −0.751*** (0.128) | −0.497** (0.186) | −0.996*** (0.143) |
| Christian: LIB | −0.235 (0.156) | −0.124 (0.125) | 0.114 (0.169) | −0.358** (0.115) |
| Christian: CHR | 0.780*** (0.098) | 0.714*** (0.088) | 1.067*** (0.106) | 0.676*** (0.080) |
| Christian: CON | 0.554*** (0.100) | 0.535*** (0.084) | 0.819*** (0.106) | 0.399*** (0.078) |
| Christian: NAT | 0.239 (0.204) | 0.295 (0.176) | 0.255 (0.190) | 0.434** (0.141) |
| Intercept: ECO | −1.162* (0.481) | −2.262*** (0.453) | −1.694** (0.581) | −0.446 (0.452) |
| Intercept: SOC | −0.734* (0.368) | −1.114*** (0.331) | −0.013 (0.361) | −0.377 (0.304) |
| Intercept: LIB | −2.514*** (0.372) | −1.736*** (0.358) | −1.143** (0.371) | −0.771** (0.279) |
| Intercept: CHR | −1.896*** (0.218) | −0.943*** (0.244) | −1.165*** (0.241) | −0.819*** (0.203) |
| Intercept: CON | −2.229*** (0.237) | −1.734*** (0.242) | −1.728*** (0.261) | −0.853*** (0.204) |
| Intercept: NAT | −0.025 (0.463) | 2.437*** (0.471) | 1.026* (0.421) | 0.837* (0.340) |
| Observations | 4,691 | 5,139 | 3,609 | 5,827 |
| $R^2$ | 0.395 | 0.395 | 0.399 | 0.395 |
| Log Likelihood | −4,302.079 | −5,129.503 | −3,374.423 | −5,856.109 |
| LR Test (df = 39) | 5,625.790*** | 6,702.213*** | 4,485.069*** | 7,644.464*** |

*Note: Data from ESS waves 4 and 5* *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A19: Models controlling for gender values (ESS waves 4 and 5). Higher values of "Disagreement to cut down job" mean more egalitarian gender norms

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Vote choice (Ref = Social Democratic party) | | | |
| | Nonworking Women | Working Women | Nonworking Men | Working Men |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Gender labor equality position | 0.078** (0.025) | 0.159*** (0.025) | 0.098*** (0.030) | 0.087*** (0.023) |
| % Women in parliament party$_{t-1}$ | −0.013*** (0.003) | 0.001 (0.002) | −0.014*** (0.003) | −0.006** (0.002) |
| Female leader$_{t-1}$ | 0.479*** (0.059) | 0.274*** (0.048) | 0.396*** (0.063) | 0.349*** (0.045) |
| Disagreement to cut down job: ECO | −0.0001 (0.109) | 0.019 (0.074) | 0.047 (0.136) | 0.074 (0.090) |
| Disagreement to cut down job: SOC | 0.167* (0.076) | 0.276*** (0.061) | 0.268** (0.085) | 0.172** (0.065) |
| Disagreement to cut down job: LIB | −0.057 (0.064) | −0.087 (0.055) | 0.066 (0.078) | −0.059 (0.052) |
| Disagreement to cut down job: CHR | −0.205*** (0.035) | −0.153*** (0.037) | −0.132** (0.046) | −0.218*** (0.036) |
| Disagreement to cut down job: CON | −0.189*** (0.039) | −0.148*** (0.037) | −0.166*** (0.048) | −0.231*** (0.038) |
| Disagreement to cut down job: NAT | −0.191* (0.080) | −0.160* (0.078) | −0.224** (0.083) | −0.399*** (0.069) |
| Education: ECO | 0.612*** (0.112) | 0.595*** (0.081) | 0.368** (0.124) | 0.518*** (0.087) |
| Education: SOC | 0.110 (0.083) | 0.172** (0.055) | 0.075 (0.084) | 0.132* (0.057) |
| Education: LIB | 0.214** (0.069) | 0.109 (0.059) | 0.100 (0.075) | 0.030 (0.050) |
| Education: CHR | 0.170*** (0.040) | 0.003 (0.039) | 0.166*** (0.044) | 0.051 (0.036) |
| Education: CON | 0.156*** (0.039) | 0.053 (0.037) | 0.176*** (0.045) | −0.010 (0.035) |
| Education: NAT | −0.281** (0.104) | −0.548*** (0.084) | −0.196* (0.090) | −0.270*** (0.067) |
| Age: ECO | −0.026*** (0.007) | −0.005 (0.007) | −0.026** (0.008) | −0.025** (0.008) |
| Age: SOC | −0.022*** (0.005) | −0.0002 (0.006) | −0.024*** (0.005) | −0.014** (0.005) |
| Age: LIB | 0.002 (0.005) | −0.005 (0.006) | −0.015** (0.005) | −0.017*** (0.005) |
| Age: CHR | 0.011*** (0.003) | 0.005 (0.004) | −0.004 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.003) |
| Age: CON | 0.012*** (0.003) | 0.015*** (0.004) | 0.002 (0.003) | −0.008* (0.003) |
| Age: NAT | −0.012* (0.006) | −0.032*** (0.008) | −0.022*** (0.005) | −0.020*** (0.006) |
| Income: ECO | −0.133** (0.049) | −0.070* (0.035) | 0.043 (0.055) | −0.194*** (0.038) |
| Income: SOC | −0.061 (0.036) | −0.109*** (0.026) | −0.091* (0.038) | −0.105*** (0.027) |
| Income: LIB | 0.140*** (0.031) | 0.107*** (0.028) | 0.084* (0.033) | 0.102*** (0.025) |
| Income: CHR | 0.035* (0.018) | 0.044* (0.018) | 0.026 (0.020) | 0.061*** (0.017) |
| Income: CON | 0.099*** (0.019) | 0.094*** (0.018) | 0.114*** (0.021) | 0.171*** (0.018) |
| Income: NAT | −0.012 (0.042) | −0.083* (0.038) | −0.046 (0.042) | −0.004 (0.032) |
| Divorced: ECO | −0.651 (0.444) | −0.063 (0.248) | 0.471 (0.456) | −0.280 (0.369) |
| Divorced: SOC | 0.858*** (0.229) | 0.243 (0.178) | 0.741** (0.270) | −0.072 (0.250) |
| Divorced: LIB | 0.153 (0.248) | 0.103 (0.205) | 0.256 (0.299) | −0.064 (0.207) |
| Divorced: CHR | −0.407* (0.171) | 0.031 (0.139) | −0.072 (0.206) | −0.476** (0.170) |
| Divorced: CON | 0.303 (0.157) | 0.358** (0.129) | −0.536* (0.214) | −0.127 (0.151) |
| Divorced: NAT | 0.595* (0.287) | 0.463 (0.255) | 0.387 (0.312) | 0.355 (0.244) |
| Christian: ECO | −0.124 (0.274) | −0.237 (0.166) | 0.224 (0.315) | −0.568** (0.209) |
| Christian: SOC | −0.428* (0.179) | −0.629*** (0.127) | −0.389* (0.191) | −0.954*** (0.143) |
| Christian: LIB | −0.267 (0.157) | −0.160 (0.127) | 0.097 (0.171) | −0.376** (0.114) |
| Christian: CHR | 0.706*** (0.100) | 0.646*** (0.089) | 1.019*** (0.108) | 0.588*** (0.081) |
| Christian: CON | 0.542*** (0.102) | 0.506*** (0.085) | 0.737*** (0.108) | 0.333*** (0.079) |
| Christian: NAT | 0.178 (0.207) | 0.243 (0.178) | 0.212 (0.193) | 0.392** (0.143) |
| Intercept: ECO | −1.138 (0.610) | −2.287*** (0.507) | −1.773* (0.766) | −0.630 (0.539) |
| Intercept: SOC | −1.255** (0.446) | −1.920*** (0.377) | −0.821 (0.469) | −0.832* (0.363) |
| Intercept: LIB | −2.335*** (0.424) | −1.456*** (0.392) | −1.298** (0.460) | −0.560 (0.321) |
| Intercept: CHR | −1.293*** (0.242) | −0.480 (0.267) | −0.725* (0.288) | −0.148 (0.230) |
| Intercept: CON | −1.647*** (0.270) | −1.265*** (0.269) | −1.102*** (0.313) | −0.112 (0.238) |
| Intercept: NAT | 0.646 (0.545) | 2.995*** (0.527) | 1.929*** (0.524) | 2.174*** (0.417) |
| Observations | 4,657 | 5,131 | 3,559 | 5,808 |
| $R^2$ | 0.400 | 0.398 | 0.402 | 0.399 |
| Log Likelihood | −4,242.444 | −5,092.730 | −3,317.800 | −5,795.452 |
| LR Test (df = 45) | 5,646.730*** | 6,741.897*** | 4,464.203*** | 7,705.190*** |

*Note: Data from ESS waves 4 and 5* *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A20: Models controlling for gender values (ESS waves 4 and 5). Higher values of "Disagreement with men right to jobs" mean more egalitarian gender norms

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Vote choice (Ref = Social Democratic party) | | | |
| | Nonworking Women | Working Women | Nonworking Men | Working Men |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Gender labor equality position | 0.073** (0.025) | 0.153*** (0.025) | 0.097** (0.030) | 0.074** (0.023) |
| % Women in parliament party$_{t-1}$ | −0.015*** (0.003) | 0.0001 (0.002) | −0.014*** (0.003) | −0.007** (0.002) |
| Female leader$_{t-1}$ | 0.499*** (0.059) | 0.313*** (0.048) | 0.409*** (0.063) | 0.388*** (0.045) |
| Disagreement with men right to jobs: ECO | 0.236 (0.149) | 0.118 (0.119) | 0.326 (0.175) | 0.362** (0.130) |
| Disagreement with men right to jobs: SOC | 0.062 (0.081) | 0.238** (0.088) | 0.144 (0.088) | 0.103 (0.073) |
| Disagreement with men right to jobs: LIB | 0.149 (0.077) | 0.021 (0.078) | 0.175* (0.085) | 0.074 (0.066) |
| Disagreement with men right to jobs: CHR | −0.204*** (0.035) | −0.169*** (0.045) | −0.069 (0.043) | −0.185*** (0.040) |
| Disagreement with men right to jobs: CON | −0.044 (0.039) | −0.086 (0.054) | −0.028 (0.049) | −0.049 (0.046) |
| Disagreement with men right to jobs: NAT | −0.153 (0.083) | −0.230* (0.095) | −0.028 (0.091) | −0.278*** (0.079) |
| Education: ECO | 0.586*** (0.113) | 0.577*** (0.081) | 0.337** (0.124) | 0.476*** (0.088) |
| Education: SOC | 0.145 (0.083) | 0.157** (0.056) | 0.116 (0.084) | 0.136* (0.058) |
| Education: LIB | 0.184** (0.070) | 0.090 (0.059) | 0.065 (0.075) | 0.017 (0.051) |
| Education: CHR | 0.195*** (0.041) | 0.015 (0.040) | 0.173*** (0.044) | 0.062 (0.037) |
| Education: CON | 0.148*** (0.039) | 0.048 (0.037) | 0.151*** (0.045) | −0.020 (0.035) |
| Education: NAT | −0.277** (0.105) | −0.539*** (0.083) | −0.194* (0.090) | −0.262*** (0.067) |
| Age: ECO | −0.023*** (0.007) | −0.005 (0.007) | −0.023** (0.008) | −0.022** (0.008) |
| Age: SOC | −0.022*** (0.005) | 0.001 (0.006) | −0.025*** (0.005) | −0.013* (0.005) |
| Age: LIB | 0.003 (0.005) | −0.005 (0.006) | −0.013** (0.005) | −0.016*** (0.005) |
| Age: CHR | 0.009*** (0.003) | 0.003 (0.004) | −0.005 (0.003) | −0.006 (0.003) |
| Age: CON | 0.013*** (0.003) | 0.015*** (0.004) | 0.004 (0.003) | −0.007* (0.003) |
| Age: NAT | −0.013* (0.006) | −0.033*** (0.008) | −0.019*** (0.005) | −0.020*** (0.006) |
| Income: ECO | −0.131** (0.049) | −0.065 (0.035) | 0.040 (0.054) | −0.196*** (0.038) |
| Income: SOC | −0.055 (0.036) | −0.086** (0.026) | −0.086* (0.038) | −0.098*** (0.028) |
| Income: LIB | 0.129*** (0.031) | 0.105*** (0.028) | 0.087** (0.033) | 0.099*** (0.025) |
| Income: CHR | 0.042* (0.018) | 0.041* (0.017) | 0.027 (0.020) | 0.067*** (0.017) |
| Income: CON | 0.097*** (0.019) | 0.090*** (0.018) | 0.121*** (0.021) | 0.157*** (0.017) |
| Income: NAT | −0.009 (0.042) | −0.079* (0.038) | −0.051 (0.042) | −0.004 (0.032) |
| Divorced: ECO | −0.681 (0.443) | −0.056 (0.248) | 0.463 (0.457) | −0.261 (0.369) |
| Divorced: SOC | 0.864*** (0.230) | 0.365* (0.177) | 0.704* (0.275) | −0.046 (0.251) |
| Divorced: LIB | 0.124 (0.248) | 0.105 (0.205) | 0.286 (0.295) | −0.088 (0.209) |
| Divorced: CHR | −0.341* (0.170) | 0.056 (0.140) | −0.024 (0.204) | −0.422* (0.169) |
| Divorced: CON | 0.242 (0.156) | 0.335** (0.128) | −0.516* (0.213) | −0.123 (0.150) |
| Divorced: NAT | 0.623* (0.287) | 0.475 (0.256) | 0.353 (0.308) | 0.401 (0.243) |
| Christian: ECO | −0.082 (0.272) | −0.217 (0.166) | 0.293 (0.316) | −0.514* (0.209) |
| Christian: SOC | −0.512** (0.178) | −0.673*** (0.129) | −0.448* (0.190) | −0.947*** (0.145) |
| Christian: LIB | −0.199 (0.157) | −0.121 (0.126) | 0.155 (0.169) | −0.357** (0.114) |
| Christian: CHR | 0.721*** (0.100) | 0.669*** (0.089) | 1.038*** (0.108) | 0.653*** (0.081) |
| Christian: CON | 0.540*** (0.100) | 0.522*** (0.085) | 0.781*** (0.107) | 0.386*** (0.078) |
| Christian: NAT | 0.196 (0.206) | 0.282 (0.178) | 0.254 (0.190) | 0.452** (0.143) |
| Intercept: ECO | −2.260** (0.846) | −2.765*** (0.680) | −3.047** (0.980) | −1.930** (0.713) |
| Intercept: SOC | −1.014* (0.504) | −2.148*** (0.501) | −0.519 (0.506) | −0.760 (0.408) |
| Intercept: LIB | −3.145*** (0.502) | −1.814*** (0.479) | −1.832*** (0.515) | −1.086** (0.380) |
| Intercept: CHR | −1.150*** (0.254) | −0.255 (0.301) | −0.857** (0.292) | −0.189 (0.244) |
| Intercept: CON | −2.082*** (0.292) | −1.360*** (0.341) | −1.598*** (0.328) | −0.658* (0.274) |
| Intercept: NAT | 0.619 (0.584) | 3.356*** (0.614) | 1.161* (0.571) | 1.865*** (0.466) |
| Observations | 4,660 | 5,129 | 3,576 | 5,817 |
| $R^2$ | 0.399 | 0.397 | 0.399 | 0.397 |
| Log Likelihood | −4,251.997 | −5,105.533 | −3,348.488 | −5,827.246 |
| LR Test (df = 45) | 5,639.927*** | 6,717.026*** | 4,445.607*** | 7,670.066*** |

*Note: Data from ESS waves 4 and 5* *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

## 3.9 Analyses by occupation group

Neither women nor men citizens are homogeneous groups, and while my evidence supports the idea that working women tend to vote for the left more than men, we would expect to find differences in terms of the magnitude of such effects for working-class women and those in the middle and upper class. The reason for this claim stems both from the role of resources, as well as from party behavior. Although working would create an incentive for women to prefer policies that increase their resources and outside options due to the strong inequalities women face in households and the labor market, those policies do not necessarily look the same across individuals from different social classes. For instance, working-class women might be more supportive of elements such as public investment in childcare, whereas middle-class women could be more interested in policies of equal pay, and upper-class women in policies such as corporate board quotas. All three policies increase women's outside marriage options, but we would not expect them to be equally appealing to citizens of different social strata. Equally important, men from different social strata might react differently to parties' support for these policies, particularly if they perceive women's inclusion as a zero-sum game. Crucially, left-wing parties may differ in their support for these different policies. In this manuscript, I have applied a general measure of gender labor equality. However, to fully understand class differences in the gender voting gap, a deeper analysis of the specific policies within the gender labor equality category is required.

To explore this point further, I utilized CSES data to estimate conditional logistic regressions of vote choice among different groups of working women and men across occupational categories. Following the standard approach in class literature, I categorized individuals according to Oesch (2006)'s class scheme. This analysis focuses on Production workers (e.g., machine operators, textile workers), Service workers (e.g., sales workers), Clerk workers (e.g., bookkeepers, cashier workers), Technical workers (e.g., engineers), Socio-cultural workers (e.g., university and higher education teachers), and Managerial workers (e.g., lawyers, finance managers). Models were estimated separately for women (Table A21) and men (Table A22).

As shown in Table A21, the estimated coefficient for parties' support for gender labor equality varies across different groups of women workers: it is negative for production, service, and clerk workers.

Moreover, its effect is statistically significant for women working in the production sector. In contrast, a positive and statistically significant coefficient is observed for technical, socio-cultural, and managerial workers, indicating that these groups are more inclined to vote for parties that advocate for gender equality in the labor market. Table A22 presents the results for male workers, highlighting two noteworthy points. First, the evidence suggests that men are less affected than women by parties' positions on gender labor equality. This is evidenced by the absence of a statistically significant relationship between this variable and the voting choices of production, service, clerk, and technical male workers, who collectively represent more than 60% of the male population in the sample. Second, men in managerial positions are less supportive of parties that advocate for gender labor equality, a stark contrast to the pattern observed among women managers.

These findings indicate that the advocacy of gender equality in the labor market by political parties has a differential impact on women and men, and among these groups, on workers in various sectors. This underscores the need for further research into how voters' gender, class, and party preferences interact, and the implications of these interactions for the gender voting gap.

Table A21: Conditional logistic regressions of women's vote choice by occupation group

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Vote choice (Ref = Social Democratic party) | | | | | |
| | Production | Service | Clerk | Technical | Socio-Cultural | Manager |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Gender labor equality position | −0.177** (0.058) | −0.052 (0.030) | −0.009 (0.036) | 0.202** (0.062) | 0.085** (0.030) | 0.062* (0.031) |
| % Women in parliament party$_{t-1}$ | 0.014** (0.005) | 0.005* (0.002) | 0.006 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.004) | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.002) |
| Female leader$_{t-1}$ | 0.602*** (0.145) | 0.262*** (0.077) | 0.243** (0.094) | 0.302* (0.146) | 0.090 (0.071) | 0.073 (0.076) |
| Education: ECO | 1.305*** (0.248) | 0.650*** (0.124) | 0.536*** (0.156) | 0.759*** (0.190) | 0.471*** (0.092) | 0.504*** (0.099) |
| Education: SOC | 0.282 (0.203) | 0.477*** (0.097) | 0.185 (0.120) | −0.033 (0.223) | 0.231 (0.131) | 0.343** (0.115) |
| Education: LIB | 0.397* (0.196) | 0.220* (0.098) | 0.118 (0.099) | 0.259 (0.142) | 0.058 (0.087) | 0.249*** (0.070) |
| Education: CHR | 0.367** (0.118) | 0.286*** (0.069) | 0.061 (0.074) | 0.019 (0.114) | −0.118 (0.062) | −0.090 (0.056) |
| Education: CON | 0.429*** (0.126) | 0.220** (0.073) | −0.041 (0.089) | 0.071 (0.138) | −0.052 (0.090) | −0.086 (0.064) |
| Education: NAT | 0.253 (0.181) | −0.031 (0.093) | −0.174 (0.118) | −0.600** (0.205) | −0.343** (0.110) | −0.345*** (0.099) |
| Age: ECO | −0.069*** (0.019) | −0.016 (0.009) | −0.042*** (0.011) | −0.019 (0.013) | −0.004 (0.006) | −0.011 (0.008) |
| Age: SOC | −0.021 (0.016) | −0.018* (0.008) | −0.012 (0.011) | −0.058** (0.019) | −0.004 (0.008) | 0.006 (0.010) |
| Age: LIB | 0.032 (0.018) | 0.00004 (0.008) | −0.010 (0.008) | −0.032* (0.014) | −0.009 (0.007) | −0.008 (0.007) |
| Age: CHR | 0.017 (0.009) | 0.006 (0.005) | 0.002 (0.006) | −0.019 (0.011) | −0.006 (0.005) | −0.006 (0.006) |
| Age: CON | −0.017 (0.009) | −0.011* (0.005) | 0.008 (0.007) | −0.008 (0.013) | 0.007 (0.007) | 0.012 (0.006) |
| Age: NAT | −0.004 (0.013) | −0.013* (0.006) | −0.006 (0.009) | −0.027 (0.020) | −0.015 (0.009) | −0.007 (0.009) |
| Income: ECO | −0.005 (0.168) | −0.061 (0.085) | −0.168 (0.102) | −0.076 (0.107) | 0.038 (0.052) | 0.016 (0.064) |
| Income: SOC | −0.092 (0.158) | −0.243** (0.082) | −0.314** (0.097) | −0.207 (0.144) | −0.167* (0.069) | −0.272*** (0.079) |
| Income: LIB | 0.204 (0.141) | 0.330*** (0.073) | 0.073 (0.074) | 0.201 (0.121) | 0.096 (0.064) | 0.235*** (0.060) |
| Income: CHR | 0.033 (0.083) | 0.219*** (0.052) | 0.038 (0.057) | 0.227* (0.097) | 0.150** (0.048) | 0.136** (0.049) |
| Income: CON | −0.108 (0.096) | 0.242*** (0.057) | 0.163* (0.071) | 0.188 (0.119) | 0.126 (0.066) | 0.135* (0.061) |
| Income: NAT | −0.233 (0.128) | −0.014 (0.062) | 0.069 (0.086) | −0.039 (0.172) | −0.095 (0.078) | −0.050 (0.076) |
| Divorced: ECO | 1.118 (0.629) | 0.160 (0.351) | 0.228 (0.419) | −0.322 (0.568) | −0.053 (0.219) | 0.277 (0.258) |
| Divorced: SOC | −0.261 (0.569) | 0.066 (0.335) | −0.108 (0.419) | −0.474 (0.944) | −0.148 (0.313) | −0.402 (0.377) |
| Divorced: LIB | −1.097 (0.817) | 0.164 (0.326) | −0.009 (0.316) | −1.664 (0.990) | −0.173 (0.293) | −0.111 (0.262) |
| Divorced: CHR | −1.095** (0.413) | 0.004 (0.211) | −0.192 (0.249) | −0.087 (0.455) | −0.184 (0.216) | −0.214 (0.209) |
| Divorced: CON | −1.484*** (0.428) | 0.195 (0.205) | 0.369 (0.291) | −0.367 (0.506) | −0.364 (0.266) | −0.435 (0.236) |
| Divorced: NAT | −0.053 (0.470) | 0.208 (0.240) | −0.368 (0.391) | −0.806 (0.971) | 0.048 (0.298) | 0.218 (0.304) |
| Christian: ECO | −0.682 (0.414) | 0.397 (0.227) | −0.100 (0.258) | 0.159 (0.281) | 0.213 (0.131) | −0.076 (0.156) |
| Christian: SOC | −0.863* (0.433) | −0.761*** (0.199) | −0.133 (0.238) | −0.261 (0.376) | −0.162 (0.169) | 0.290 (0.202) |
| Christian: LIB | 0.107 (0.410) | 0.027 (0.190) | 0.017 (0.183) | −0.565 (0.293) | 0.258 (0.163) | 0.469** (0.146) |
| Christian: CHR | 0.291 (0.253) | 0.512*** (0.151) | 1.130*** (0.179) | 0.782** (0.280) | 1.003*** (0.139) | 1.016*** (0.133) |
| Christian: CON | −0.303 (0.299) | 0.526** (0.163) | 0.668** (0.212) | 0.338 (0.297) | 1.202*** (0.180) | 0.646*** (0.151) |
| Christian: NAT | −0.281 (0.353) | 0.019 (0.167) | 0.018 (0.243) | 0.920 (0.560) | 0.348 (0.208) | 0.773*** (0.215) |
| Intercept: ECO | −1.322 (1.062) | −2.255*** (0.569) | −0.323 (0.725) | −2.023* (0.950) | −2.092*** (0.460) | −1.783*** (0.517) |
| Intercept: SOC | 0.293 (1.001) | 0.107 (0.476) | 0.335 (0.658) | 2.654* (1.226) | −0.520 (0.617) | −1.404* (0.647) |
| Intercept: LIB | −4.227*** (1.000) | −2.482*** (0.469) | −0.650 (0.490) | −0.106 (0.815) | −1.179* (0.479) | −2.011*** (0.433) |
| Intercept: CHR | −2.247*** (0.569) | −2.355*** (0.353) | −1.374** (0.420) | −0.530 (0.744) | −0.852* (0.375) | −0.769* (0.368) |
| Intercept: CON | 0.438 (0.579) | −1.415*** (0.343) | −1.280** (0.480) | −0.443 (0.904) | −1.451** (0.498) | −0.891* (0.425) |
| Intercept: NAT | 0.441 (0.832) | 0.680 (0.408) | 0.329 (0.618) | 2.068 (1.253) | 0.933 (0.601) | 0.420 (0.608) |
| Observations | 850 | 2,630 | 1,818 | 709 | 2,722 | 2,591 |
| $R^2$ | 0.340 | 0.284 | 0.292 | 0.300 | 0.238 | 0.254 |
| Log Likelihood | −924.098 | −3,202.746 | −2,198.233 | −883.734 | −3,605.801 | −3,392.130 |
| LR Test (df = 39) | 951.224*** | 2,544.181*** | 1,813.226*** | 759.073*** | 2,251.126*** | 2,314.454*** |

*Note: Data from CSES* *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A22: Conditional logistic regressions of men's vote choice by occupation group

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Vote choice (Ref = Social Democratic party) | | | | | |
| | Production | Service | Clerk | Technical | Socio-Cultural | Manager |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Gender labor equality position | 0.016 (0.023) | −0.065 (0.043) | 0.013 (0.051) | −0.023 (0.031) | 0.148*** (0.043) | −0.060* (0.024) |
| % Women in parliament party$_{t-1}$ | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.008* (0.003) | 0.002 (0.005) | 0.004 (0.002) | −0.007* (0.003) | 0.003 (0.002) |
| Female leader$_{t-1}$ | 0.333*** (0.064) | 0.148 (0.123) | −0.048 (0.151) | 0.170* (0.082) | 0.096 (0.107) | 0.143* (0.067) |
| Education: ECO | 0.413*** (0.121) | 0.365 (0.189) | 0.552** (0.203) | 0.563*** (0.109) | 0.380** (0.142) | 0.498*** (0.103) |
| Education: SOC | 0.256** (0.086) | 0.143 (0.115) | −0.023 (0.163) | 0.125 (0.123) | 0.183 (0.174) | −0.177* (0.089) |
| Education: LIB | 0.369*** (0.073) | 0.435** (0.133) | 0.279* (0.141) | 0.434*** (0.079) | 0.301* (0.152) | 0.311*** (0.054) |
| Education: CHR | 0.216*** (0.053) | 0.297** (0.095) | 0.201 (0.104) | 0.170* (0.069) | 0.011 (0.103) | 0.030 (0.049) |
| Education: CON | 0.173* (0.067) | 0.220* (0.091) | 0.220 (0.141) | 0.217** (0.084) | 0.249 (0.137) | −0.052 (0.055) |
| Education: NAT | 0.260*** (0.072) | −0.149 (0.119) | 0.168 (0.162) | −0.062 (0.093) | −0.317* (0.145) | −0.357*** (0.073) |
| Age: ECO | −0.024** (0.008) | −0.041** (0.014) | −0.029* (0.015) | −0.023** (0.008) | −0.022* (0.009) | −0.022** (0.007) |
| Age: SOC | 0.001 (0.007) | −0.018 (0.010) | −0.014 (0.014) | −0.032** (0.011) | −0.018 (0.013) | −0.001 (0.008) |
| Age: LIB | −0.020*** (0.006) | −0.001 (0.010) | −0.018 (0.012) | −0.015* (0.007) | −0.024* (0.011) | −0.006 (0.005) |
| Age: CHR | −0.006 (0.004) | −0.007 (0.008) | −0.011 (0.009) | −0.013* (0.006) | −0.021** (0.008) | 0.0003 (0.005) |
| Age: CON | 0.003 (0.004) | 0.006 (0.007) | 0.005 (0.011) | −0.011 (0.008) | 0.016 (0.011) | 0.007 (0.005) |
| Age: NAT | −0.017*** (0.005) | −0.015 (0.009) | −0.003 (0.012) | −0.007 (0.008) | 0.003 (0.012) | −0.006 (0.006) |
| Income: ECO | −0.023 (0.083) | −0.095 (0.131) | 0.078 (0.151) | −0.107 (0.075) | −0.042 (0.081) | −0.109 (0.067) |
| Income: SOC | −0.009 (0.069) | −0.112 (0.101) | −0.121 (0.149) | −0.257** (0.096) | −0.466*** (0.108) | −0.312*** (0.072) |
| Income: LIB | 0.035 (0.054) | 0.047 (0.100) | 0.346** (0.119) | 0.094 (0.064) | 0.238* (0.103) | 0.161*** (0.046) |
| Income: CHR | −0.002 (0.039) | 0.045 (0.077) | 0.111 (0.090) | 0.081 (0.060) | 0.192* (0.077) | 0.163*** (0.044) |
| Income: CON | 0.139** (0.048) | 0.184* (0.076) | 0.259* (0.127) | 0.168* (0.079) | 0.084 (0.107) | 0.205*** (0.056) |
| Income: NAT | −0.066 (0.048) | 0.002 (0.082) | −0.130 (0.123) | −0.160* (0.071) | −0.090 (0.102) | 0.063 (0.060) |
| Divorced: ECO | 0.132 (0.379) | 0.380 (0.661) | −0.095 (0.900) | −0.114 (0.408) | −0.253 (0.441) | −0.093 (0.339) |
| Divorced: SOC | 0.194 (0.344) | 0.531 (0.521) | 0.888 (0.599) | −1.318 (0.906) | −0.647 (0.604) | −0.074 (0.404) |
| Divorced: LIB | −0.852* (0.343) | −0.489 (0.584) | −0.414 (0.802) | −0.448 (0.356) | 0.279 (0.439) | −0.035 (0.221) |
| Divorced: CHR | −0.631** (0.211) | 0.042 (0.358) | −0.919 (0.625) | −0.241 (0.311) | −0.752 (0.453) | −0.225 (0.224) |
| Divorced: CON | −0.597* (0.238) | −0.100 (0.404) | 0.093 (0.597) | 0.160 (0.388) | −0.071 (0.609) | 0.142 (0.257) |
| Divorced: NAT | −0.194 (0.234) | 0.286 (0.401) | 0.033 (0.614) | 0.376 (0.319) | 0.222 (0.450) | 0.169 (0.263) |
| Christian: ECO | −0.483* (0.204) | −0.083 (0.339) | −0.345 (0.357) | −0.022 (0.172) | 0.036 (0.194) | −0.407* (0.162) |
| Christian: SOC | −0.314 (0.165) | −0.002 (0.257) | −0.544 (0.328) | 0.017 (0.234) | −0.437 (0.251) | −0.376* (0.187) |
| Christian: LIB | −0.027 (0.135) | 0.144 (0.255) | −0.359 (0.278) | 0.248 (0.145) | 0.615** (0.232) | 0.068 (0.108) |
| Christian: CHR | 0.559*** (0.108) | 1.007*** (0.226) | 0.945*** (0.255) | 1.216*** (0.154) | 1.406*** (0.219) | 0.874*** (0.113) |
| Christian: CON | 0.794*** (0.135) | 0.728*** (0.208) | 1.326*** (0.317) | 1.001*** (0.180) | 1.121*** (0.271) | 0.936*** (0.134) |
| Christian: NAT | 0.111 (0.130) | 0.159 (0.225) | 0.242 (0.315) | 0.300 (0.179) | 0.170 (0.257) | 0.309* (0.152) |
| Intercept: ECO | −1.250* (0.524) | −0.160 (0.871) | −1.332 (0.957) | −1.026* (0.516) | −0.789 (0.656) | −0.982 (0.504) |
| Intercept: SOC | −1.150** (0.419) | 0.271 (0.614) | 0.202 (0.861) | 1.174 (0.686) | 1.177 (0.846) | 1.029* (0.511) |
| Intercept: LIB | −0.718* (0.334) | −1.758** (0.660) | −1.691* (0.747) | −1.446*** (0.419) | −2.042** (0.742) | −1.357*** (0.313) |
| Intercept: CHR | −0.784** (0.257) | −1.528** (0.525) | −1.525** (0.580) | −1.470*** (0.400) | −1.128* (0.549) | −1.545*** (0.309) |
| Intercept: CON | −1.473*** (0.295) | −1.508*** (0.448) | −2.761*** (0.730) | −1.045 (0.538) | −2.949*** (0.769) | −1.029** (0.364) |
| Intercept: NAT | 1.046** (0.326) | 1.321* (0.540) | −0.286 (0.801) | 0.624 (0.515) | 0.341 (0.739) | 0.533 (0.442) |
| Observations | 4,143 | 1,238 | 873 | 2,167 | 1,297 | 3,755 |
| $R^2$ | 0.310 | 0.297 | 0.307 | 0.261 | 0.256 | 0.290 |
| Log Likelihood | −4,838.867 | −1,545.279 | −1,018.828 | −2,928.939 | −1,686.333 | −4,776.062 |
| LR Test (df = 39) | 4,349.712*** | 1,306.854*** | 902.391*** | 2,066.966*** | 1,161.968*** | 3,906.305*** |

*Note: Data from CSES* *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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