

Supplementary material for: ‘Misconduct by voters’ own
representatives does not affect voters’ generalized political
trust’

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Appendix A: The UK parliamentary expenses scandal

In this appendix we provide a brief overview of the expenses scandal and explain both our choice of dataset and why we expect spillovers in this case. Our dataset on MP expenses is based on the Graffin et al. (2013) data due to its large sample size compared to other similar datasets. Graffin et al. (*ibid.*) cover 644 MPs; Vivyan, Wagner, and Tarlov (2012) cover 587; Eggers and Fisher (2011) cover 467; and Larcinese and Sircar (2017) cover 359.

The expenses scandal broke with the 8th May 2009 publication in The Daily Telegraph of leaked documents demonstrating the systematic abuse of expense allowances by MPs. British parliamentarians may claim reimbursement for reasonable expenses; such as the upkeep of a second home in London for non-central London MPs. It turned out that many MPs had interpreted ‘reasonable expenses’ in an unreasonable way. While aggregated data had been released in 2004, the 2009 leak included every itemized claim between 2005 and 2009 (Besley and Larcinese 2011). Although many MPs had not abused the system, over half had done so and some heavily implicated MPs resigned or were de-selected before the 2010 election. Some of the abuses were frivolous (including the infamous £1,645 duck house); others were deceptive (for example, ‘flipping’ second home claims between London and constituency homes); and a small minority involved criminal offences (claiming for a mortgage which had already been paid). A government commissioned report, the Legg repayments report, itemized the claims which parliamentarians were instructed to repay. In the end, 392 of 646 MPs were instructed to make repayments, the total value of which came to £1.1 million (Curtis and Laville 2010).

Several aspects of this scandal render it a strong test in which we should expect spillover. First, the scandal was nonpartisan. Unusually, and unlike the ‘sleaze’ scandals afflicting the Conservative Party in late 1990s, the expenses scandal implicated a large number of MPs from all parties. Indeed, Allen and Birch (2014) found that voters perceived the scandal to have implicated all parties equally, and Heerde-Hudson (2011) found that MPs from all parties abused the expenses system to a similar extent. Voters thus knew that the scandal had happened, but also thought that it was not partisan. This was also reflected in media coverage which was intense, but rarely framed the scandal in a partisan context (Larcinese and Sircar 2014).

Second, the response from parliamentarians was defensive and roundly criticized in the media. For example, Sir Anthony Steen, when asked about his gardening expenses, accused constituents of ‘jealousy’ (Watt 2009). Maier (2011) differentiates between functional and dysfunctional responses to scandal. In the former, those implicated explain their actions and are held accountable through deselection or electoral defeats. If this is perceived by voters, this generates a positive spillover effect: voters perceive the system to be functioning. By contrast, denial and limited electoral accountability provides a cognitive shortcut between representative misconduct and wider institutional malpractice. The response to the expenses scandal was largely dysfunctional.

Third, financial scandals are perceived more negatively than those concerning private life (Sarmiento-

Mirwaldt, Allen, and Birch 2014), especially if involving abuses of power (Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2014) and in times of economic hardship (Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallardo 2015). Given the expenses scandal was obviously financial in nature and immediately followed the 2008 economic crisis, we should expect large scandal effects.

The nature of the scandal also means that we are able to overcome common problems in the empirical literature by using a non-experimental, multi-politician scandal in which both scandal implication and spillover can be precisely measured. First, the type and timing of this multi-politician scandal is held constant across the country: only the degree of scandal implication varies by constituency. MPs' abuses of the expenses system were also uncorrelated with their political or sociodemographic background (Heerde-Hudson 2011). We can therefore use this quasi-experimental variation in scandal intensity to measure precisely its impact on political trust, using a real scandal instead of an artificial experimental context. Second, the Legg repayments Report provides data on expenses claims, giving objective measures of implication which can be compared to media and public perceptions. Only the US House banking scandal has similar properties (Dimock and Jacobson 1995). This avoids relying on constituents' perceptions or news consumption to operationalise MPs' scandal implication and allows us to track media and public perceptions over time.

Given this, there is surprisingly little research that examines the effect of the expenses scandal on diffuse political trust. While there appeared to be a short-term drop in aggregate political trust at the time, this was in a context of low and declining trust and the national average rapidly reverted to its long-run trend (Heath 2011; Heerde-Hudson 2011; Curtice and Park 2010). On one hand, the immediate impact of the scandal on the 2010 general election also appears limited and moderated by voters' partisan biases (Pattie and Johnston 2012; Vivyan, Wagner, and Tarlov 2012; Vivyan, Wagner, and Tarlov 2014). On the other hand, some have argued that the scandal's long-run attitudinal impact was substantial, redefining cultural reference points and bolstering 'anti-politics' (Flinders and Anderson 2022). Nonetheless there is little work that directly examines how voters assimilated specific judgments about their own MP into more diffuse support. And this evidence is itself not always comprehensive. While Larcinese and Sircar (2017) demonstrate a correlation between voters' perceptions of their own MP's specific corruption and the belief that 'most MPs are corrupt', this seems likely to be endogenous to constituents' underlying prior diffuse support. Equally, Allen and Birch (2014) argue that constituents of scandal-implicated MPs exhibited less favourable beliefs about standards in public life, but their study does not directly measure spillovers onto trust in politicians, institutions or democracy.

Appendix B: Variables for main analysis.

In this appendix we describe the variables we use in our main analyses in more detail.

Dependent variables

Our dependent variable for Hypothesis 1 is constituents' scandal attributions. Constituents were asked whether their MP had claimed expenses 'to which they were not entitled'. If they responded positively, they were asked to quantify the inappropriate claims on a 0-10 scale.

Our dependent variable for Hypothesis 2 is constituents' approval of their MP. Here we use a measure of MP approval on a five point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Respondents were asked: 'please tell me how far you agree or disagree with the following statement: my member of parliament tries hard to look after the interests of people who live in my constituency'. While constituents' approval of their local MP is of course an imperfect proxy for their specific trust in their local MP, we believe that the proxy is reasonable in this case because voter approval tends to be very highly correlated with specific political trust. Using the 2014 to 2023 British Election Study panel data, which includes both our approval variable and a direct measure: 'How much trust do you have in the MP in your local constituency?' on a 1 to 7 scale, we found that the correlation between these two measures is 0.78.

Our dependent variable for Hypothesis 3 is constituents' diffuse political trust. We measure this in three different ways and also directly measure constituents' perceptions of scandal spillover to test the spillover mechanism.

First, we look at voters' trust in politicians as a group. We use a standard 0-10 scale which asks: 'how much do you trust British politicians generally?'. Second, we look at voters' trust in institutions, namely the UK parliament. Again, this is measured using a 0-10 scale which asks: 'how much do you trust the parliament at Westminster?'. Third, we look at voters' satisfaction with democracy to test the depth of spillover effects: spillovers onto satisfaction with democracy are closely associated with normative concerns about declining diffuse support. Satisfaction with democracy is measured using a four-point ordinal scale which asks: 'on the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, a little dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way that democracy works in this country?' Finally, we directly measure spillover by using a question which asks respondents whether 'the reports on MPs' expense claims prove that most MPs are corrupt' with response options on a five point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

For all of our dependent variables, we re-coded them onto 0-1 scales for ease of interpretation.

Independent variables

Our independent variables measure each MP's implication in the expenses scandal. We differentiate between financial and media implication for reasons discussed in the main text. We standardized all of our independent variables in terms of standard deviation changes.

In terms of financial implication, we use three measures: Legg repayments Report repayments; second

home claims; other expense claims. The first measures illegitimate claims using the repayments demanded by the Legg repayments Report. Vivyan, Wagner, and Tarlov (2012) define an MP as implicated if asked to pay back any expenses, but we follow Graffin et al. (2013) and Eggers and Fisher (2011) and use the total each MP was asked to repay. Second, we measure second home claims. Most substantial claims related to this (rather than travel expenses, for example) and the practice of ‘flipping’ second home claims were a key source of public anger. Finally, there are the residual claims made in the previous two parliamentary sittings. Eggers and Fisher (*ibid.*) argue that voters may have been angered by the sheer cost of the system and so using these three measures allows us to compare illegitimate, technically legitimate, and legitimate claims. Following Graffin et al. (2013), we use the natural logarithm of the financial implication measures to account for their left-skewed distributions.

We measure media implication using the formula for coverage intensity developed by Eggers (2014). This counts the number of articles mentioning the MP, their constituency, and ‘expenses’ between May 1 2009 and May 5 2010 (the day before the general election). We use LexisNexis to collate articles and, unlike Larcinese and Sircar (2017), do not restrict our analysis to national news since local news may be significant for constituency-level attitudes. We then normalise the measure by the count of articles mentioning the MP and their constituency to adjust for prior coverage. Including the constituency limits the coding of articles in which an MP only comments on the scandal as implicating them. The 10 in the denominator ensures the variable is always defined, and that MPs with limited coverage are not given inflated scores:

$$\text{Media Score} = \frac{\text{Articles Mentioning MP Name, Constituency, and ‘Expenses’}}{\text{Articles Mentioning MP Name and Constituency} + 10}$$

Using coverage intensity in this manner avoids the problem that more prominent MPs get more media coverage, limits the implication of MPs who are merely commenting on the scandal and provides a more nuanced measure than simply counting those who were mentioned in The Daily Telegraph (Vivyan, Wagner, and Tarlov 2012) or were on The Daily Telegraph’s list of ‘most notorious claims’ (Pattie and Johnston 2012).

Control variables

We include controls at the MP and voter levels. At the MP level, we control for factors which might influence an MP’s implication or voters’ trust in that MP. These are: gender, prior electoral margin (using redistricting-corrected margins from Rallings and Thrasher 2007), distance from constituency office to Westminster (to proxy for expense requirements and for lower trust in peripheries), Central London constituencies (these 25 MPs were not granted second home allowances), resignation, redistricting (the sum of constituents ‘leaving’ and ‘joining’ the constituency as a percentage of the ‘old’ electorate) and proxies for local media density and socioeconomic grievances (population density, proportion of managers and professionals, and unemployment rate). Studies on the expenses scandal (Larcinese and Sircar 2017)

find that although the relationship between financial implication and media coverage is not affected by party affiliation, it is affected by gender. To reflect disproportionate media coverage, we also control for prestige using three binary variables to measure whether an MP received a pre-nominal honour, a post-nominal honour, or was a ‘frontbench’ MP (Graffin et al. 2013).

At the voter level, we control for co-partisanship and knowledge. Co-partisanship is straightforwardly whether the person’s own partisanship¹ matches their local MP’s party affiliation. General political knowledge is measured using reported political attentiveness and scandal knowledge with whether the respondent reads a newspaper and whether they read *The Daily Telegraph* (in which the scandal was first reported). We also control for voter-level determinants of political trust that are known to be important. These are age (Schoon and Cheng 2011), social class (McKay, Jennings, and Stoker 2021), social trust (Newton and Zmerli 2011), education (Schoon et al. 2010) and perceived economic performance (Choi and Woo 2012). Online Appendix C has a full list of controls with basic descriptive statistics.

¹We measure partisanship using the standard question which asks: ‘generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, or what?’

Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics

In this appendix, we report basic descriptive statistics for all variables, after standardization if applicable, used in the main analyses. We also report correlations among the main independent variables and with some other measures of expenses scandal implication used in related work. All tables were created with the stargazer R package (Hlavac 2022).

Our final dataset covers 16,429 people living in 608 constituencies. We have excluded Northern Irish MPs, because the British Election Study surveys that we use were not fielded in Northern Ireland. Following Eggers (2014), we have also excluded a small number of constituencies for which boundary changes between the 2005 and 2010 general elections made it difficult to identify the appropriate 2010 constituency for the MP in question. In Appendix F, we present some additional robustness tests which also demonstrate that our results are not affected by boundary changes affecting the remaining constituencies that we use.

Table C1: Descriptive statistics for main analysis

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Median	Pctl(75)	Max
<i>Dependent variables</i>								
Inclusion attributions (binary)	15,597	0.248	0.432	0	0	0	0	1
Inclusion attributions (scale)	15,387	0.118	0.255	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Specific support	14,056	0.505	0.284	0.000	0.250	0.500	0.750	1.000
Trust in politicians	16,174	0.297	0.227	0.000	0.100	0.300	0.500	1.000
Trust in parliament	15,971	0.333	0.242	0.000	0.100	0.300	0.500	1.000
Satisfaction with democracy	15,634	0.427	0.280	0.000	0.330	0.330	0.660	1.000
Spillover perceptions	15,469	0.600	0.295	0.000	0.250	0.750	0.750	1.000
<i>Independent variables</i>								
Media score (standardized)	16,429	0.000	1.000	-1.633	-0.691	-0.216	0.462	3.659
Legg repayments (standardized)	16,372	0.000	1.000	-1.016	-1.016	0.352	0.916	1.912
Second home claims (standardized)	16,372	0.000	1.000	-2.914	0.270	0.372	0.407	0.442
Other claims (standardized)	16,372	0.000	1.000	-10.485	0.058	0.116	0.156	0.311
<i>MP level controls</i>								
Incumbent stood again	16,429	0.764	0.424	0	1	1	1	1
Inner London MP	16,372	0.049	0.216	0	0	0	0	1
Distance from London	16,372	1.450	1.194	0.000	0.523	1.230	2.020	7.520
Female MP	16,372	0.199	0.399	0	0	0	0	1
Local unemployment rate	16,372	0.051	0.022	0.020	0.034	0.047	0.062	0.183
Local proportion managerial class	16,372	0.270	0.071	0.130	0.217	0.259	0.319	0.504
Local population density	16,372	0.188	0.224	0.001	0.026	0.098	0.295	1.310
Proportionate boundary change	16,372	0.158	0.226	0.000	0.007	0.062	0.196	1.146
Previous election margin	16,372	0.185	0.121	-0.019	0.092	0.174	0.260	0.584
MP prestige	16,372	0.411	0.649	0	0	0	1	3
<i>Voter level controls</i>								
Co-partisan	16,429	0.332	0.471	0	0	0	1	1
Age	16,386	0.612	0.147	0.010	0.490	0.600	0.730	0.930
Education scale	16,159	0.540	0.343	0.000	0.300	0.600	0.900	1.000
Political attentiveness	16,227	0.626	0.247	0.000	0.500	0.700	0.800	1.000
Newspaper reader	16,429	0.405	0.491	0	0	0	1	1
Telegraph reader	16,429	0.059	0.236	0	0	0	0	1
Occupation scale	16,220	0.706	0.337	0.000	0.500	0.833	1.000	1.000
Social trust	15,954	0.554	0.228	0.000	0.400	0.600	0.700	1.000
Retrospective economic evaluation	16,020	0.217	0.412	0	0	0	0	1

Table C2: Correlations between measures of expenses scandal implication

	Media Score	Media Score 2009	Legg repayments	Second Home Claims	Other Claims	Subjective (Curtice and Park 2010)	Subjective (Eggers and Fisher 2011)	Raw scandal article count
Media score 2010	1	0.480	0.302	0.173	-0.023	0.283	0.509	0.181
Media score 2009	0.480	1	0.130	0.181	0.026	0.316	0.462	0.246
Legg repayments	0.302	0.130	1	0.127	0.005	0.078	0.371	0.093
Second home claims	0.173	0.181	0.127	1	0.255	0.098	0.126	-0.008
Other claims	-0.023	0.026	0.005	0.255	1	0.023	-0.026	-0.023
Subjective (Curtice and Park)	0.283	0.316	0.078	0.098	0.023	1	0.625	0.138
Subjective (Eggers)	0.509	0.462	0.371	0.126	-0.026	0.625	1	0.180
Raw scandal article count	0.181	0.246	0.093	-0.008	-0.023	0.138	0.180	1

Appendix D: Tables for main analyses

To account for the left-skewed distribution of scandal attributions, we also used a binary implication measure (models 4-6). In these models, a one standard deviation increase in media implication is associated with an 8 per cent increase in the probability of an average constituent implicating their MP. For Legg repayments and second home claims the effects are 5 per cent and 4 per cent respectively.

Attributions

Table D1: Inclusion Attributions Reflect Financial and Media Implication in 2010

	<i>Inclusion Attributions (0-1 scale)</i>					
	Multilevel Linear			Multilevel Logit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Media score (sd)	0.067** (0.004)	0.065** (0.005)	0.065** (0.005)	0.434** (0.039)	0.412** (0.041)	0.432** (0.042)
Legg repayments (sd)	0.021** (0.004)	0.022** (0.005)	0.021** (0.004)	0.301** (0.041)	0.307** (0.040)	0.310** (0.042)
Second home claims (sd)	0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.256** (0.051)	0.205** (0.070)	0.227** (0.072)
Other claims (sd)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.048 (0.041)	-0.035 (0.043)	-0.041 (0.044)
<i>Controls</i>						
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.121** (0.004)	0.214** (0.041)	0.194** (0.042)	-1.330** (0.039)	-0.529 (0.373)	-0.881* (0.404)
Observations	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606
Marginal R-Sq.	0.091	0.095	0.120	0.118	0.124	0.178
Conditional R-Sq.	0.220	0.221	0.245	0.248	0.247	0.301

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales. Marginal R-squared estimates the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable explained by the fixed effects. Conditional R-squared estimates that explained jointly by the fixed and random effects.

Specific Support

Table D2: Scandal Implication Influenced Voters' Specific Support in 2010

	<i>Specific Support:</i>					
	Multilevel Linear (0-1 scale)			Multilevel Ordered Logit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Media Score (sd)	-0.020** (0.004)	-0.018** (0.004)	-0.018** (0.004)	-0.133** (0.028)	-0.112** (0.028)	-0.132** (0.029)
Legg repayments (sd)	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.068* (0.028)	-0.073** (0.027)	-0.066* (0.028)
Second Home Claims (sd)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.011 (0.006)	0.043 (0.030)	-0.083* (0.041)	-0.090* (0.043)
Other Claims (sd)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.026)	0.014 (0.028)
<i>Controls</i>						
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.504** (0.004)	0.488** (0.037)	0.444** (0.038)	NA NA	NA NA	NA NA
Observations	13,308	13,308	13,308	13,308	13,308	13,308
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606
Marginal R-Sq.	0.009	0.023	0.146	0.009	0.024	0.152
Conditional R-Sq.	0.080	0.081	0.205	0.082	0.082	0.212

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales. Marginal R-squared estimates the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable explained by the fixed effects. Conditional R-squared estimates that explained jointly by the fixed and random effects.

Diffuse Trust

Table D3: Scandal Implication did not Influence Voters' Diffuse Support in 2010

<i>Multilevel Linear:</i>												
	Trust in Politicians (0-1)			Trust in Parliament (0-1)			Satisfaction with Democracy (0-1)			Spillover Perceptions (0-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Media score (sd)	0.004 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.0005 (0.003)
Legg repayments (sd)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.006* (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.005 (0.002)
Second home claims (sd)	-0.011** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.012** (0.002)	0.006 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.014** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Other claims (sd)	0.003 (0.002)	0.0004 (0.002)	-0.0001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.00005 (0.002)
<i>Controls</i>												
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.298** (0.002)	0.244** (0.019)	-0.024 (0.020)	0.335** (0.002)	0.243** (0.020)	-0.029 (0.021)	0.428** (0.002)	0.337** (0.024)	0.129** (0.026)	0.598** (0.003)	0.742** (0.025)	1.009** (0.025)
Observations	15,170	15,170	15,170	15,018	15,018	15,018	14,784	14,784	14,784	14,622	14,622	14,622
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606
Marginal R-Sq.	0.003	0.005	0.165	0.003	0.008	0.158	0.001	0.003	0.105	0.003	0.011	0.187
Conditional R-Sq.	0.010	0.010	0.169	0.010	0.011	0.159	0.004	0.005	0.108	0.013	0.014	0.187

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01. Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales. Marginal R-squared estimates the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable explained by the fixed effects. Conditional R-squared estimates that explained jointly by the fixed and random effects.

Appendix E: Differences by Co-Partisanship

In this appendix we test whether the effect of MP scandal implication on our dependent variables differed for those who share their party identity with their MP.

Attributions

The below table is a replication of the linear models from Table D1, including interactions between the three significant implication measures and the ‘party match’ variable. Some of the interactions are significant, suggesting that there is an interaction between partisanship and implication influencing voters’ perceptions of their representative’s implication. Co-partisanship decreases the media effect on implication by about a quarter and decreases the Legg repayment effect by about half. This is similar to Vivyan, Wagner, and Tarlov (2012, p. 757) who find that the probability of a co-partisan implicating their MP is 20 per cent lower, although this interaction between co-partisanship and MP implication was not statistically significant. Larcinese and Sircar (2017, p. 86) find a significant interaction between Legg repayments and ‘partisan match’, but this is only when the Legg repayment variable is not included.

Table E1: Attribution and Co-Partisanship

	<i>Inclusion Attributions</i>		
	Multilevel Linear		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Media score	0.071** (0.005)	0.068** (0.005)	0.068** (0.005)
Legg repayments	0.026** (0.005)	0.027** (0.005)	0.026** (0.005)
Second home claims	0.006 (0.005)	0.006 (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)
Other claims	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Co-partisan	-0.043** (0.004)	-0.043** (0.004)	-0.046** (0.004)
Media score:Co-partisan	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)
Legg repayments:Co-partisan	-0.015** (0.004)	-0.015** (0.004)	-0.015** (0.004)
Second home claims:Co-partisan	-0.008 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.004)
<i>Controls</i>			
MP-Level	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y
Constant	0.136** (0.004)	0.226** (0.041)	0.195** (0.042)
Observations	14,526	14,526	14,526
Constituencies	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	506.048	485.735	629.767
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-990.096	-929.470	-1,201.535
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-906.676	-770.213	-981.608
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.05; **p<0.01	

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Specific Support

The below table is a replication of the linear models from Table D2, including interactions between the three significant measures of implication and the ‘party match’ variable. Only the Legg repayment: co-partisan interaction is significant.

Table E2: Specific Support and Co-Partisanship

	<i>Specific Support</i>		
	Multilevel Linear		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Media score	−0.021** (0.005)	−0.017** (0.005)	−0.017** (0.004)
Legg repayments	−0.013** (0.005)	−0.013** (0.004)	−0.013** (0.004)
Second home claims	−0.004 (0.004)	−0.011 (0.004)	−0.012 (0.004)
Other claims	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
Co-partisan	0.171** (0.005)	0.173** (0.005)	0.162** (0.005)
Media score:Co-partisan	−0.003 (0.005)	−0.004 (0.005)	−0.003 (0.005)
Legg repayments:Co-partisan	0.013* (0.005)	0.012* (0.005)	0.011* (0.005)
Second home claims:Co-partisan	−0.002 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
Constant	0.443** (0.004)	0.445** (0.037)	0.444** (0.038)
<i>Controls</i>			
MP-Level	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y
Observations	13,308	13,308	13,308
Constituencies	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	1,348.453	1,326.096	1,030.262
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,718.906	2,694.192	2,118.525
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	2,801.363	2,851.610	2,335.912

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Diffuse Trust

The below table replicates Table D3 for the sub-sample of those who share their party identity with their MP. In the full models, none of the measures of implication are significant at conventional levels. We therefore find no evidence of partisan blame shifting onto diffuse political trust.

Table E3: Diffuse Trust and Co-Partisanship

	<i>Multilevel Linear</i>											
	Trust in Politicians			Trust in Parliament			Satisfaction with Democracy			Spillover Perceptions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Media score	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.0003 (0.005)	0.0004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.0003 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)
Legg repayments	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)
Second home claims	-0.015** (0.004)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.011* (0.004)	0.001 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.0001 (0.005)	0.005 (0.007)	0.006 (0.006)	0.018** (0.005)	0.006 (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)
Other claims	0.005 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.0003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.0004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)
<i>Controls</i>												
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.351** (0.004)	0.345** (0.035)	0.064 (0.036)	0.389** (0.004)	0.321** (0.038)	0.051 (0.039)	0.492** (0.004)	0.429** (0.041)	0.218** (0.045)	0.558** (0.004)	0.625** (0.043)	0.918** (0.044)
Observations	5,163	5,163	5,163	5,130	5,130	5,130	5,075	5,075	5,075	4,996	4,996	4,996
Constituencies	596	596	596	596	596	596	596	596	596	595	595	595
Log Likelihood	292.715	280.716	635.706	21.407	22.144	338.610	-568.933	-549.896	-375.630	-1,000.712	-1,008.770	-561.043
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-571.430	-527.431	-1,221.412	-28.814	-10.288	-627.220	1,151.867	1,133.791	801.260	2,015.423	2,051.539	1,172.087
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-525.585	-416.094	-1,057.680	16.986	100.941	-463.648	1,197.591	1,244.837	964.562	2,061.038	2,162.318	1,334.997

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01. Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Appendix F: Robustness

In this appendix we demonstrate the robustness of our results in several ways. We demonstrate robustness to:

- Excluding ‘don’t know’ responses when considering scandal attributions.
- Using an ordered logit model for satisfaction with democracy and spillover perceptions.
- Considering different effects for those with high political knowledge.
- Using longitudinal panel data to control for prior attitudes.
- Using longitudinal panel data to rule out that ‘scandal fatigue’ could be driving our null finding.
- Accounting for constituency boundary changes.
- Re-running all models with each implication measure included separately.

Operationalisation of Implication

The below table is a replication of Table D1 in which we have excluded those who responded ‘don’t know’ when asked whether their MP was implicated in the scandal. While the coefficient estimates vary slightly, the results from Table D1 are robust to this alternative operationalisation of scandal implication.

Table F1: Operationalisation of Implication

	<i>Inclusion Attributions</i>					
	Multilevel Logit			Multilevel Linear		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Media score	0.487** (0.047)	0.454** (0.049)	0.466** (0.050)	0.085** (0.006)	0.080** (0.006)	0.080** (0.006)
Legg repayments	0.381** (0.047)	0.386** (0.047)	0.397** (0.048)	0.032** (0.006)	0.033** (0.006)	0.033** (0.006)
Second home claims	0.268** (0.055)	0.303** (0.078)	0.316** (0.080)	0.011 (0.006)	0.018 (0.009)	0.016 (0.009)
Other claims	-0.051 (0.046)	-0.057 (0.049)	-0.067 (0.050)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)
<i>Controls</i>						
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	-0.316** (0.045)	0.251 (0.433)	0.636 (0.474)	0.207** (0.006)	0.300** (0.056)	0.324** (0.058)
Observations	8,563	8,563	8,246	8,353	8,353	8,057
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	-5,029.716	-5,020.214	-4,673.818	-1,078.377	-1,093.243	-878.837
Akaike Inf. Crit.	10,071.430	10,072.430	9,397.637	2,170.754	2,220.487	1,809.673
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	10,071.430	10,072.430	9,573.074	2,219.967	2,340.003	1,991.525

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Ordered logit replication for Table D3

In this section we replicate the models from Table D3 with satisfaction with democracy and spillover perceptions as the dependent variables using ordered logit specifications. For satisfaction with democracy, none of the four independent variables are statistically significant. For spillover perceptions, the effect of media implication is essentially zero and statistically insignificant. In the full model, Legg repayments are statistically significant but the coefficient is not substantively meaningful. A one standard deviation increase in Legg repayments is associated with a less than 1% increase in the probability of strongly agreeing that: ‘the reports on MPs’ expense claims prove that most MPs are corrupt’.

Table F2: Ordered Logit Replications for Table D3

	<i>Multilevel Ordered Logit</i>					
	Satisfaction with Democracy			Spillover Perceptions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Media Score	-0.004 (0.017)	0.000 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.027 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.017)	0.001 (0.017)
Legg repayments	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.017)	0.008 (0.017)	0.038* (0.018)	0.036* (0.017)	0.035* (0.017)
Second Home Claims	-0.033 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.026)	0.087** (0.019)	-0.015 (0.025)	-0.014 (0.025)
Other Claims	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.017 (0.017)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.036* (0.017)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.017)
<i>Controls</i>						
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	NA NA	NA NA	NA NA	NA NA	NA NA	NA NA
Observations	14,784	14,784	14,784	14,622	14,622	14,622
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606
Marginal R-Sq.	0.001	0.003	0.114	0.003	0.012	0.199
Conditional R-Sq.	0.004	0.004	0.115	0.013	0.013	0.199

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Differences by political knowledge

Régner and Floch (2005) find spillovers only among those with high knowledge, while Sikorski, Heiss, and Matthes (2020) argue that spillovers are concentrated among people who are more knowledgeable. We find little evidence of an interaction between political knowledge² and implication affecting diffuse support for politicians, institutions or democracy.

We replicate Table D2 with interactions between the significant independent variables and measures of general political knowledge and scandal knowledge, finding that those who report more political attentiveness and those who read the Telegraph were more responsive to media implication. However, we find no evidence of any spillovers onto diffuse political trust among those with the highest political knowledge. We then replicate Table D3 twice, first for the sub-sample with above mean general political knowledge, and then for the sub-sample of newspaper readers, to test whether spillovers among those with high knowledge are obscured in the main tables. None of the measures of scandal implication reaches significance in the full models, so we reject the hypothesis that spillovers are concentrated among those with high knowledge.

²Whether this is measured as general political knowledge (proxied by political attentiveness) or knowledge of the scandal (proxied by whether the respondent reads a newspaper and whether they read The Daily Telegraph).

Table F4: Political Knowledge and Specific Support

	<i>Specific Support</i>		
	Multilevel Linear		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Media score	−0.005 (0.008)	−0.001 (0.008)	−0.001 (0.008)
Legg repayments	−0.008 (0.008)	−0.009 (0.008)	−0.007 (0.008)
Second home claims	−0.004 (0.004)	−0.010 (0.006)	−0.011 (0.006)
Other claims	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
Attention	0.090** (0.011)	0.089** (0.011)	0.024* (0.010)
Newspaper	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	−0.009 (0.005)
Telegraph	0.017 (0.010)	0.014 (0.010)	0.007 (0.009)
Media score:Attention	−0.027* (0.011)	−0.028* (0.011)	−0.027** (0.010)
Legg repayments:Attention	−0.001 (0.011)	−0.001 (0.011)	−0.0005 (0.010)
Media score:Newspaper	0.008 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)
Legg repayments:Newspaper	−0.003 (0.005)	−0.002 (0.005)	−0.003 (0.005)
Media score:Telegraph	−0.016 (0.010)	−0.016 (0.010)	−0.022* (0.010)
Legg repayments:Telegraph	0.005 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)	−0.002 (0.010)
Constant	0.442** (0.006)	0.436** (0.030)	0.447** (0.030)
Observations	13,308	13,308	13,308
Constituencies	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	−1,907.221	−1,897.567	−1,036.271
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,846.442	3,847.133	2,136.542
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	3,966.380	4,042.032	2,376.418

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F5: Political Knowledge and Diffuse Support

	<i>Multilevel Linear</i>											
	Trust in Politicians			Trust in Parliament			Satisfaction with Democracy			Spillover Perceptions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Media score	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.0001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Legg repayments	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.0001 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.008* (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)
Second home claims	-0.012** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.014** (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.015** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.005)
Other claims	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
<i>Controls</i>												
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.328** (0.003)	0.281** (0.027)	0.051 (0.033)	0.356** (0.003)	0.260** (0.028)	0.054 (0.035)	0.418** (0.003)	0.351** (0.033)	0.314** (0.042)	0.554** (0.004)	0.688** (0.034)	1.007** (0.042)
Observations	8,323	8,323	8,323	8,306	8,306	8,306	8,265	8,265	8,265	8,184	8,184	8,184
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	237.085	213.000	841.393	-341.204	-350.573	299.288	-1,583.024	-1,602.491	-1,133.322	-1,884.759	-1,890.548	-1,240.092
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-460.171	-391.999	-1,630.786	696.407	735.145	-546.576	3,180.048	3,238.982	2,318.643	3,783.518	3,815.097	2,532.185
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-410.983	-272.544	-1,448.089	745.581	854.566	-363.933	3,229.187	3,358.318	2,501.158	3,832.588	3,934.266	2,714.443

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F6: Political Knowledge and Diffuse Support

	<i>Multilevel Linear</i>											
	Trust in Politicians			Trust in Parliament			Satisfaction with Democracy			Spillover Perceptions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Media score	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.0001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)
Legg repayments	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.009* (0.005)	0.007 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)
Second home claims	-0.013** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.016** (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.010* (0.005)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.006)
Other claims	0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.0002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
<i>Controls</i>												
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.301** (0.003)	0.252** (0.029)	0.002 (0.030)	0.328** (0.003)	0.219** (0.031)	-0.053 (0.033)	0.419** (0.004)	0.308** (0.038)	0.130** (0.040)	0.598** (0.004)	0.718** (0.040)	1.002** (0.040)
Observations	6,295	6,295	6,295	6,272	6,272	6,272	6,194	6,194	6,194	6,151	6,151	6,151
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	343.440	322.283	795.500	-117.189	-128.897	345.806	-1,108.659	-1,126.788	-774.060	-1,306.149	-1,309.134	-762.379
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-672.880	-610.567	-1,541.001	248.378	291.795	-641.611	2,231.318	2,287.575	1,598.120	2,626.297	2,652.267	1,574.757
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-625.648	-495.859	-1,372.313	295.585	406.440	-473.015	2,278.438	2,402.008	1,766.403	2,673.368	2,766.582	1,742.866

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Endogenous controls

In our survey data, the voter-level attitudinal controls are measured in 2010, after the scandal broke. They are endogenous to the scandal, and this could bias the multilevel estimators. The 2005-2010 BES panel contains annual waves between 2005 and 2009 and three 2010 general election waves. Three waves predate the scandal (the 2009 wave is post-scandal). The sample is representative and clustered by constituency. We replicate all our analyses using the 2010 pre-campaign wave, controlling for pre-2009 attitudes. All our results are robust to controlling for pre-2009 attitudes.

The below tables replicate Appendix D using the 2005-2010 BES panel, with attitudinal controls measured prior to the scandal. The dependent variables are recorded in 2010. To ensure convergence with the smaller sample size, we dropped some controls. Specifically, we dropped voter-level attitudinal controls which were measured more than a year prior to the scandal. We also dropped those which are measured after the scandal, because they could be endogenous to the scandal. Due to sample size restricting the convergence of the models, we do not replicate the multilevel ordered logits.

Table F7: Endogenous Controls

	<i>Inclusion Attributions</i>					
	Multilevel Linear			Multilevel Logit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Media score	0.047** (0.005)	0.045** (0.006)	0.045** (0.006)	0.385** (0.069)	0.373** (0.072)	0.377** (0.073)
Legg repayments	0.022** (0.005)	0.022** (0.005)	0.022** (0.005)	0.406** (0.074)	0.412** (0.074)	0.414** (0.075)
Second home claims	0.007 (0.006)	0.007 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	0.245* (0.108)	0.160 (0.137)	0.169 (0.139)
Other claims	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.045 (0.078)	-0.023 (0.083)	-0.027 (0.085)
<i>Controls</i>						
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.097** (0.005)	0.150** (0.050)	0.126* (0.054)	-1.474** (0.071)	-0.683 (0.684)	-1.101 (0.764)
Observations	2,432	2,432	2,432	2,432	2,432	2,432
Constituencies	575	575	575	575	575	575
Log Likelihood	419.963	400.628	412.035	-1,160.179	-1,148.563	-1,120.889
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-825.927	-767.257	-784.069	2,332.358	2,329.125	2,279.777
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-785.352	-668.717	-668.140	2,367.137	2,421.869	2,389.910

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01. Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F8: Endogenous Controls

	<i>Specific Support</i>		
	<i>Multilevel Linear</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Media score	-0.019* (0.008)	-0.017* (0.008)	-0.017* (0.008)
Legg repayments	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.008)
Second home claims	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.011)
Other claims	0.015* (0.007)	0.013 (0.008)	0.013 (0.007)
<i>Controls</i>			
MP-Level	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y
Constant	0.509** (0.007)	0.430** (0.072)	0.507** (0.076)
Observations	2,331	2,331	2,331
Constituencies	567	567	567
Log Likelihood	-385.467	-395.350	-357.745
Akaike Inf. Crit.	784.934	824.700	755.490
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	825.212	922.519	870.571
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.05; **p<0.01	

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F9: Endogenous Controls

	<i>Multilevel Linear</i>											
	Trust in Politicians			Trust in Parliament			Satisfaction with Democracy			Spillover Perceptions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Media score	0.002 (0.005)	0.0001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.0004 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.0003 (0.006)	-0.0003 (0.006)	0.00002 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.006)
Legg repayments	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.006)
Second home claims	-0.001 (0.005)	0.016* (0.008)	0.019** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.018* (0.008)	0.021** (0.008)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.003 (0.010)	0.002 (0.009)	0.012 (0.007)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.009)
Other claims	0.005 (0.005)	-0.0005 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.004 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.019** (0.006)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.006)
<i>Controls</i>												
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.293** (0.005)	0.249** (0.047)	0.067 (0.052)	0.321** (0.005)	0.288** (0.051)	0.118* (0.054)	0.402** (0.006)	0.286** (0.058)	0.327** (0.064)	0.626** (0.006)	0.830** (0.061)	1.008** (0.066)
Observations	2,506	2,506	2,506	2,506	2,506	2,506	2,506	2,506	2,506	2,506	2,506	2,506
Constituencies	478	478	478	478	478	478	478	478	478	478	478	478
Log Likelihood	69.426	48.833	205.926	-116.972	-133.801	27.853	-455.371	-472.046	-408.231	-566.228	-574.908	-467.697
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-124.853	-63.666	-371.852	247.943	301.602	-15.706	924.742	978.092	856.463	1,146.457	1,183.816	975.394
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-84.068	35.383	-255.323	288.728	400.651	100.823	965.527	1,077.142	972.991	1,187.242	1,282.865	1,091.923

Note:

p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Scandal fatigue

A concern with 2010 data (regardless of when attitudinal covariates are measured) is the time which has elapsed since the scandal, because voters can exhibit scandal fatigue (Kumlin and Esaiasson 2012). One could argue that the effect of MP implication on vote choice in 2010 was overshadowed by the financial crisis and electoral partisanship (Eggers 2014) and the null finding for diffuse trust is consistent with an immediate effect which dissipated rapidly. Nonetheless, the diffuse trust models are robust to using the 2009 wave of the 2005-2010 panel, controlling for pre-2009 attitudes and adjusting the media score to include only articles published between May and July 2009.

The below table replicates Table D3 using the 2005-2010 BES panel, with attitudinal controls measured prior to the scandal, and the dependent variables measured in 2009. The spillover perceptions dependent variable is excluded due to its only being recorded in 2010. Due to the smaller sample size, we do not replicate the multilevel ordered logits. None of the measures of implication are significant in the full models. The exception is that second home payments are associated with an increase in trust in parliament in the full model. However, the coefficient is very small.

Table F10: Scandal Fatigue

	<i>Multilevel Linear</i>								
	Trust in Politicians			Trust in Parliament			Satisfaction with Democracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Media score09	-0.0002 (0.004)	0.0005 (0.005)	-0.0003 (0.004)	-0.0001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)
Legg repayments	0.001 (0.005)	0.0005 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.0002 (0.006)	0.0005 (0.006)
Second home claims	-0.005 (0.005)	0.012 (0.007)	0.015* (0.007)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.015 (0.008)	0.017* (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.007 (0.010)	0.007 (0.009)
Other claims	0.009* (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.014** (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.012* (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)	0.009 (0.006)
<i>Controls</i>									
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.256** (0.004)	0.194** (0.045)	-0.021 (0.048)	0.283** (0.005)	0.199** (0.049)	-0.018 (0.052)	0.354** (0.006)	0.281** (0.059)	0.256** (0.065)
Observations	2,466	2,466	2,466	2,466	2,466	2,466	2,466	2,466	2,466
Constituencies	478	478	478	478	478	478	478	478	478
Log Likelihood	203.830	183.245	327.294	4.658	-10.871	140.819	-466.050	-486.539	-389.849
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-393.659	-332.491	-614.588	4.685	55.741	-241.637	946.099	1,007.078	819.699
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-352.987	-233.715	-498.381	45.357	154.517	-125.430	986.772	1,105.854	935.906

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01. Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Constituency boundary changes

If boundary changes to constituencies are uncorrelated with trust or implication, then random error leads to attenuation bias and the true coefficients are underestimated. We took two measures to minimise this. First, we included boundary changes as an MP-level control in all of our models. Second, in the table below, we re-ran the diffuse trust models excluding constituencies in which large changes occurred (as coded over 50 per cent change by Rallings and Thrasher 2007). Our results are robust to boundary changes.

To ensure the non-findings for diffuse trust and spillover perceptions are not affected by attenuation bias due to boundary changes before the 2010 general election, we re-ran the models in Table D3 excluding constituencies in which large boundary changes occurred. We define ‘large’ boundary changes as those coded an over 50 per cent change by Rallings and Thrasher 2009). Again, none of the implication measures attain significance in the models with full controls.

Table F11: Boundary Changes

<i>Multilevel Linear</i>												
	Trust in Politicians			Trust in Parliament			Satisfaction with Democracy			Spillover Perceptions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Media score	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Legg repayments	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.00002 (0.003)	0.00003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.007* (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)
Second home claims	-0.011** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.011** (0.003)	0.007 (0.004)	0.006 (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.013** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)
Other claims	0.004* (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.0001 (0.003)
<i>Controls</i>												
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.298** (0.002)	0.236** (0.021)	-0.034 (0.022)	0.333** (0.002)	0.238** (0.023)	-0.034 (0.023)	0.425** (0.003)	0.339** (0.026)	0.139** (0.028)	0.595** (0.003)	0.750** (0.027)	1.022** (0.028)
Observations	12,763	12,763	12,763	12,763	12,763	12,763	12,763	12,763	12,763	12,763	12,763	12,763
Constituencies	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549
Log Likelihood	847.188	826.187	1,944.629	-32.911	-35.890	1,015.137	-1,931.199	-1,946.371	-1,284.455	-2,584.921	-2,568.859	-1,359.758
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-1,680.375	-1,618.374	-3,837.259	79.822	105.781	-1,978.275	3,876.398	3,926.742	2,620.910	5,183.843	5,171.719	2,771.515
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-1,628.195	-1,491.650	-3,643.447	132.002	232.504	-1,784.463	3,928.578	4,053.465	2,814.722	5,236.023	5,298.442	2,965.327

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Individual implication measures

In this appendix we replicate the analyses in appendix D using each measure of scandal implication separately. Our results do not substantially change.

Table F12: Inclusion Attributions with Media Only

	<i>Inclusion Attributions</i>					
	Multilevel Linear			Multilevel Logit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Media score	0.074** (0.004)	0.071** (0.005)	0.071** (0.004)	0.555** (0.041)	0.517** (0.042)	0.540** (0.043)
<i>Controls</i>						
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.122** (0.004)	0.211** (0.040)	0.193** (0.042)	-1.303** (0.042)	-0.392 (0.389)	-0.719 (0.420)
Observations	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	451.295	430.868	625.984	-7,239.189	-7,214.799	-6,943.224
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-894.591	-833.736	-1,205.968	14,484.380	14,455.600	13,930.450
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-864.256	-727.564	-1,031.543	14,507.130	14,554.190	14,097.290

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F13: Inclusion Attributions with Legg repayments Only

	<i>Inclusion Attributions</i>					
	Multilevel Linear			Multilevel Logit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Legg repayments	0.039** (0.005)	0.038** (0.005)	0.037** (0.005)	0.481** (0.044)	0.441** (0.043)	0.452** (0.045)
<i>Controls</i>						
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.121** (0.005)	0.235** (0.046)	0.217** (0.047)	-1.322** (0.044)	-0.256 (0.408)	-0.576 (0.441)
Observations	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	361.912	357.266	549.838	-7,266.352	-7,235.369	-6,966.165
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-715.825	-686.531	-1,053.675	14,538.700	14,496.740	13,976.330
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-685.489	-580.359	-879.249	14,561.450	14,595.330	14,143.170

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F14: Inclusion Attributions with Second Home Claims Only

	<i>Inclusion Attributions</i>					
	Multilevel Linear			Multilevel Logit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Second home claims	0.024** (0.005)	0.026** (0.007)	0.027** (0.007)	0.443** (0.053)	0.395** (0.070)	0.417** (0.071)
<i>Controls</i>						
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.121** (0.005)	0.181** (0.049)	0.162** (0.049)	-1.335** (0.046)	-0.836 (0.441)	-1.186* (0.472)
Observations	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	344.076	337.516	531.103	-7,285.106	-7,268.032	-6,997.175
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-680.152	-647.031	-1,016.206	14,576.210	14,562.060	14,038.350
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-649.817	-540.859	-841.781	14,598.960	14,660.650	14,205.190

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F15: Inclusion Attributions with Other Claims Only

	<i>Inclusion Attributions</i>					
	Multilevel Linear			Multilevel Logit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Other claims	0.005 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.062 (0.047)	0.064 (0.045)	0.066 (0.047)
<i>Controls</i>						
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.122** (0.005)	0.219** (0.048)	0.202** (0.049)	-1.308** (0.049)	-0.414 (0.446)	-0.734 (0.477)
Observations	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	333.060	330.401	523.325	-7,323.792	-7,284.784	-7,015.057
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-658.121	-632.802	-1,000.650	14,653.580	14,595.570	14,074.110
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-627.786	-526.630	-826.225	14,676.330	14,694.160	14,240.950

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F15: Eroding with Media Only

	<i>Specific Support</i>		
	Multilevel Linear		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Media score	-0.024** (0.004)	-0.022** (0.004)	-0.022** (0.004)
<i>Controls</i>			
MP-Level	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y
Constant	0.503** (0.004)	0.477** (0.036)	0.432** (0.037)
Observations	13,308	13,308	13,308
Constituencies	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	-1,912.902	-1,903.340	-1,011.854
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,833.803	3,834.681	2,069.707
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	3,863.788	3,939.626	2,242.118
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.05; **p<0.01	

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F16: Eroding with Legg repayments only

	<i>Specific Support</i>		
	Multilevel Linear		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Legg repayments	-0.017** (0.004)	-0.017** (0.004)	-0.015** (0.004)
<i>Controls</i>			
MP-Level	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y
Constant	0.504** (0.003)	0.473** (0.029)	0.428** (0.030)
Observations	13,308	13,308	13,308
Constituencies	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	-1,921.961	-1,908.957	-1,019.509
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,851.922	3,85.914	2,085.018
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	3,881.906	3,950.860	2,257.428
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01		

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F17: Eroding with Second Home Claims Only

	<i>Specific Support</i>		
	Multilevel Linear		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Second home claims	-0.013** (0.004)	-0.017** (0.005)	-0.018** (0.005)
<i>Controls</i>			
MP-Level	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y
Constant	0.504** (0.004)	0.500** (0.038)	0.455** (0.039)
Observations	13,308	13,308	13,308
Constituencies	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	-1,926.130	-1,912.794	-1,021.586
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,860.260	3,853.588	2,089.173
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	3,890.244	3,958.534	2,261.584
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.05; **p<0.01	

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F18: Eroding with Other Claims Only

	<i>Specific Support</i>		
	Multilevel Linear		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Other claims	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)
<i>Controls</i>			
MP-Level	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y
Constant	0.503** (0.004)	0.478** (0.037)	0.433** (0.039)
Observations	13,308	13,308	13,308
Constituencies	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	-1,930.955	-1,918.105	-1,027.228
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,869.910	3,864.210	2,100.456
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	3,899.894	3,969.156	2,272.866
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.05; **p<0.01	

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F19: Spillovers with Media Only

<i>Multilevel Linear</i>												
	Trust in Politicians			Trust in Parliament			Satisfaction with Democracy			Spillover Perceptions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Media score	-0.00002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.0004 (0.003)	0.0005 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
<i>Controls</i>												
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Constant	0.298** (0.002)	0.243** (0.019)	-0.027 (0.020)	0.334** (0.002)	0.249** (0.020)	-0.026 (0.021)	0.428** (0.002)	0.334** (0.023)	0.123** (0.025)	0.598** (0.003)	0.737** (0.025)	1.007** (0.025)
Observations	15,170	15,170	15,170	15,018	15,018	15,018	14,784	14,784	14,784	14,622	14,622	14,622
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	1,012.548	1,006.164	2,302.135	-1.747	11.011	1,205.261	-2,191.739	-2,206.146	-1,443.858	-2,890.996	-2,856.776	-1,460.137
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-2,017.095	-1,984.329	-4,558.270	11.494	5.977	-2,364.522	4,391.479	4,440.292	2,933.716	5,789.991	5,741.551	2,966.275
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-1,986.587	-1,877.550	-4,382.847	41.962	112.615	-2,189.330	4,421.884	4,546.710	3,108.545	5,820.353	5,847.815	3,140.851

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F20: Spillovers with Legg repayments Only

<i>Multilevel Linear</i>												
	Trust in Politicians			Trust in Parliament			Satisfaction with Democracy			Spillover Perceptions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Legg repayments	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.008** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)	0.009** (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.004 (0.002)
<i>Controls</i>												
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.298** (0.002)	0.243** (0.019)	-0.027 (0.020)	0.334** (0.002)	0.249** (0.020)	-0.026 (0.021)	0.428** (0.002)	0.334** (0.023)	0.122** (0.025)	0.598** (0.003)	0.738** (0.025)	1.008** (0.025)
Observations	15,170	15,170	15,170	15,018	15,018	15,018	14,784	14,784	14,784	14,622	14,622	14,622
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	1,017.827	1,007.275	2,302.214	4.004	12.258	1,205.628	-2,191.630	-2,206.113	-1,444.052	-2,885.337	-2,854.755	-1,458.382
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-2,027.654	-1,986.550	-4,558.428	-0.008	3.485	-2,365.255	4,391.261	4,440.226	2,934.105	5,778.675	5,737.510	2,962.764
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-1,997.146	-1,879.771	-4,383.006	30.460	110.123	-2,190.064	4,421.666	4,546.644	3,108.935	5,809.036	5,843.774	3,137.341

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F21: Spillovers with Second Home Claims Only

	<i>Multilevel Linear</i>											
	Trust in Politicians			Trust in Parliament			Satisfaction with Democracy			Spillover Perceptions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Second home claims	-0.011** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.012** (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	0.014** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.0003 (0.003)
<i>Controls</i>												
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.298** (0.002)	0.245** (0.019)	-0.024 (0.020)	0.335** (0.002)	0.245** (0.020)	-0.028 (0.021)	0.428** (0.002)	0.338** (0.023)	0.129** (0.026)	0.598** (0.003)	0.739** (0.025)	1.007** (0.025)
Observations	15,170	15,170	15,170	15,018	15,018	15,018	14,784	14,784	14,784	14,622	14,622	14,622
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	1,026.181	1,006.301	2,302.423	12.942	11.766	1,205.667	-2,189.092	-2,205.575	-1,442.680	-2,879.346	-2,856.441	-1,459.886
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-2,044.361	-1,984.603	-4,558.847	-17.884	4.468	-2,365.333	4,386.184	4,439.149	2,931.360	5,766.692	5,740.882	2,965.772
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-2,013.853	-1,877.823	-4,383.424	12.584	111.106	-2,190.142	4,416.589	4,545.568	3,106.189	5,797.053	5,847.146	3,140.348

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

Table F22: Spillovers with Other Claims Only

<i>Multilevel Linear</i>												
	Trust in Politicians			Trust in Parliament			Satisfaction with Democracy			Spillover Perceptions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Other claims	0.0005 (0.002)	-0.00004 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.0002 (0.002)
<i>Controls</i>												
MP-Level	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual-Level	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	0.298** (0.002)	0.243** (0.019)	-0.026 (0.020)	0.334** (0.002)	0.250** (0.020)	-0.025 (0.021)	0.428** (0.002)	0.337** (0.023)	0.125** (0.025)	0.598** (0.003)	0.739** (0.025)	1.008** (0.025)
Observations	15,170	15,170	15,170	15,018	15,018	15,018	14,784	14,784	14,784	14,622	14,622	14,622
Constituencies	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606
Log Likelihood	1,012.546	1,005.752	2,301.652	-1.803	11.189	1,205.938	-2,191.142	-2,205.318	-1,442.851	-2,890.711	-2,856.636	-1,460.234
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-2,017.092	-1,983.504	-4,557.304	11.606	5.622	-2,365.876	4,390.285	4,438.636	2,931.703	5,789.423	5,741.271	2,966.468
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-1,986.584	-1,876.725	-4,381.881	42.074	112.260	-2,190.685	4,420.690	4,545.054	3,106.533	5,819.784	5,847.535	3,141.045

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are population average fixed effects. Random effects in the MP-level intercepts only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been standardized in terms of standard deviation changes, and all dependent variables are on 0-1 scales.

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