

# Supplementary materials for “Legislative Cooptation in Authoritarian Regimes: Policy Cooperation in the Kuwait National Assembly”

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## S.1 Data Collection

Figure A.1: Sample transcript

( ١٣١٧ / خاصة أ )	- ٨٤ -	( ١٣١٧ / خاصة أ )	- ٨٣ -
<p>السيد العضو سيف مطلق العازمي السيد العضو عادل مساعيد الجارالله السيد عبدالعزيز عبد الطيف الابراهيم السيد العضو عدنان سيد عبد الصمد السيد د. علي صالح العمير السيد العضو فيصل فهد الشاربع السيد الشيخ محمد عبدالله الصباح السيد ياسر حسن أبـل السيد العضو د. يوسف سيد حسن الزلزلة</p>	<p>السيد الشيخ صباح خالد الصبـاح السيد العضو د. عبدالرحمن صالح الجبران السيد العضو عبدالله إبراهيم التميمي السيد د. علي سعد العبيدي السيد العضو فارس سعد العتيبي السيد العضو كامل محمود العوضي السيد العضو محمد ناصر الجبري السيد العضو يعقوب عبد المحسن الصالح السيد مرزوق علي الفخـم</p>	<p>السيد الرئيس : موافقة ، اقرأ المادة بعد التعديل .</p> <p>السيد فيصل الشاربع : عن ( المقـرر ) دون الإخلال بالفقرة ( الأولى ) و ( الثانية ) من المادة السابعة من هذا القانون للجنة العليا بناء على اقتراح مسبق من الهيئة أن تستبعد من نطاق هذا القانون عقود حق الانتفاع بأرض الدولة والإجراءات التي أبرمت قبل سريان القانون رقم ( ٢٠٠٨ / ٧ ) ، وتم تجديدها باعتبارها عقود بناء ، وتشغيل ، وتحويل بحيث أخضعت لأحكامها ، متى تبين لها افتقاد هذه العقود لخصائص نظام الشراكة وعلى اللجنة أن تبين في قرارها النظام القانوني المناسب الذي سينطبق على العقد عند نهاية مدته والباقي كما هي .</p>	<p>السيد الرئيس : موافقة ؟</p> <p>( موافقة عامة )</p> <p>السيد الرئيس : موافقة ، حسب المادة ( ١٠٤ ) من اللائحة الداخلية للمجلس تم مناقشة التعديلات المقترحة على المشروع الذي أقره المجلس في المداولة الأولى والآن يجري التصويت نداء بالإسم لإنهاء للمداولة الثانية ، تفضل الأمين العام .</p> <p>( جرى التصويت بالتداء بالإسم على النحو التالي :</p>
<p>السيد العضو جمال حسين العمير السيد العضو حمد سيف الهريشاتي السيد العضو سعود نشمي الحرجي السيد العضو د. عبدالله محمد الطريجي السيد العضو د. عوده عوده الرويعي السيد العضو ماجد موسى المطيري السيد العضو مبارك بنيسه الخرينج السيد العضو محمد طـا السيد العضو د. محمد هادي الحويـلة</p>	<p>السيد العضو د. أحمد مطيع العازمي السيد العضو حمدان سالم العازمي السيد العضو سعد علي الرشيد السيد العضو سلطان جدعان الشمري السيد العضو عسكر عويد الغنـري السيد العضو فيصل سعود الدويـان السيد العضو ماضي محمد الهاجري السيد العضو مبارك سالم الحريص السيد العضو محمد مروي الهديـة</p>	<p>السيد الرئيس : موافقة ؟</p> <p>( موافقة عامة )</p> <p>السيد الرئيس : موافقة ، حسب المادة ( ١٠٤ ) من اللائحة الداخلية للمجلس تم مناقشة التعديلات المقترحة على المشروع الذي أقره المجلس في المداولة الأولى والآن يجري التصويت نداء بالإسم لإنهاء للمداولة الثانية ، تفضل الأمين العام .</p> <p>( جرى التصويت بالتداء بالإسم على النحو التالي :</p>	<p>السيد الرئيس : موافقة ؟</p> <p>( موافقة عامة )</p> <p>السيد الرئيس : موافقة ، حسب المادة ( ١٠٤ ) من اللائحة الداخلية للمجلس تم مناقشة التعديلات المقترحة على المشروع الذي أقره المجلس في المداولة الأولى والآن يجري التصويت نداء بالإسم لإنهاء للمداولة الثانية ، تفضل الأمين العام .</p> <p>( جرى التصويت بالتداء بالإسم على النحو التالي :</p>
<p>السيد الرئيس : الحضور ( ٤٨ ) ، موافقة ( ٢٩ ) ، عدم موافقة ( ١٧ ) ، امتناع ( ٢ ) إذن موافقة على المشروع ويحال إلى الحكومة ، الفقرة التالية .</p>	<p>السيد الرئيس : الحضور ( ٤٨ ) ، موافقة ( ٢٩ ) ، عدم موافقة ( ١٧ ) ، امتناع ( ٢ ) إذن موافقة على المشروع ويحال إلى الحكومة ، الفقرة التالية .</p>	<p>السيد الرئيس : موافقة ؟</p> <p>( موافقة عامة )</p> <p>السيد الرئيس : موافقة ، حسب المادة ( ١٠٤ ) من اللائحة الداخلية للمجلس تم مناقشة التعديلات المقترحة على المشروع الذي أقره المجلس في المداولة الأولى والآن يجري التصويت نداء بالإسم لإنهاء للمداولة الثانية ، تفضل الأمين العام .</p> <p>( جرى التصويت بالتداء بالإسم على النحو التالي :</p>	<p>السيد الرئيس : موافقة ؟</p> <p>( موافقة عامة )</p> <p>السيد الرئيس : موافقة ، حسب المادة ( ١٠٤ ) من اللائحة الداخلية للمجلس تم مناقشة التعديلات المقترحة على المشروع الذي أقره المجلس في المداولة الأولى والآن يجري التصويت نداء بالإسم لإنهاء للمداولة الثانية ، تفضل الأمين العام .</p> <p>( جرى التصويت بالتداء بالإسم على النحو التالي :</p>

Note: The above transcript includes the roll call votes recorded on June 30, 2014, for Law No. 116 of 2014 on Public-Private Partnerships (*Qānūn Raqm 116 li-Sana 2014 fi sha'n Al-Shirāka bayn Al-Qaṭa'ain Al-ʿām w-l-Khāṣ*). Source: *Kuwait National Assembly Archive*.

Figure A.2: Qualtrics screenshot

**Legislative transcript**

Please enter the alphanumeric code used to name the .pdf document. For example, if the filename is 1299-a.pdf, please enter 1299-a.

**Law code**

Please enter the unique code used to identify this law. Please note that in some cases, the KNA votes on two or more laws (as a group) at the same time. Before continuing, please review the transcript pages and see if this is the case. If more than one law is recorded at the same time, please indicate so with a semicolon (i.e., 2008052901; 2008052902; 2008052902).

Before continuing, please make sure the filename and the first page of the transcript .pdf match. For example: (١٢٩٩) on the first page of the transcript .pdf should correspond with the filename 1299-a.pdf.

Please also make sure that there are no pages missing from the "table of contents," which begin on the second page of each transcript.

If there are pages missing AND you cannot find the recorded vote in the table of contents, please contact the administrator.

**Date of Vote (yyyy/mm/dd)**

Please enter the date in the correct format (year/month/day). Entering the day and month incorrectly may cause problems.

**Page Start**

This is the first page where the vote you are recording can be found. Please use the number found at the top of the page, in Arabic (i.e., not the page number of the .pdf file).

**Page End**

This is the last page where the vote you are recording can be found. Please use the number found at the top of the page, in Arabic (i.e., not the page number of the .pdf file).

**Issue Description**

Please indicate, in 4-5 sentences, what this vote is about. Please be clear and specific, and enter as much information as possible.

**Votes**

When you reach the .pdf page in the transcript where the roll call votes are listed, please read the names listed on the .pdf first. The process will take longer if you read the form first, and then try to find the names on the .pdf. As you see each name on the .pdf, find them listed (in alphabetical order) on the form below and click "yes," "no," or "abstain."

Generally, names are listed in both the .pdf and the form in alphabetical order by first name. This may not always be the case.

If, for some reason, you come across a name in the .pdf that is not listed in this form, please enter that name in the Notes section, as well as the individual's vote (i.e., "yes," "no," "abstain").

Ministers have been highlighted in gray. MPs selected as Ministers have not been highlighted.

If for some reason the names of individual MPs and Ministers were not recorded for this vote, please mention this in the Notes section.

Please also describe exactly how many individuals voted "yes," "no," or "abstain." This will usually appear immediately after the votes are recorded. All proposals to be considered as laws are recorded by roll call, meaning that every law in the laws spreadsheet should have a corresponding roll call vote.

	yes	no	abstain
الشيخ أحمد الحمود الجابر -- و	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
أحمد خالد الكتيب -- 10/و	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
د. أحمد عبدالله الرعي -- 8/و	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
د. أحمد محمد الخطيب -- 9	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
أحمد محمد صالح العسائي -- و	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
أحمد محمد النصار -- 3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
أحمد ناصر التريمان -- 19	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
أحمد يعقوب باقر -- 5	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
د. اسماعيل خضر الشطي -- 8	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
نزيكي محمد العازمي -- 24	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
جاسم حمد الصقر -- 3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
جاسم محمد النون -- 7/و	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
جمال أحمد الكندي -- 13	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
جمعان قاتح العازمي -- 23/و	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
حبيب جعفر حبات -- و	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
حمد عبدالله الجوعان -- 2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
حمود ناصر الجبري -- 14	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
خالد سالم ندوه -- 21	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
خلف دميثير العززي -- 18	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
رائد سلمان الهبيدة -- 18	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
سالم عبدالله الحماد -- 12	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
سمو الشيخ سعد العبدالله سالم الصباح -- و	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
سعد بلقي العازمي -- 25	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
الشيخ سعود ناصر الصباح -- و	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
شارع ناصر المعجمي -- 21	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
صالح يوسف الفضالة -- 10	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
الشيخ صباح الأحمد الجابر -- و	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ضاري عبدالله العثمان -- و	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>


*Note:* The above Qualtrics screenshot is a partial depiction of the platform used by coders to record roll call votes in the seventh legislative term (1992-1996).

Table A.1: Data collection and coding summary

Term	Years	Votes	Laws	Missing	Transcripts	Start	End
1	1963-1966	10,213	195	16 (0.08)	228	2019-11-04	2020-01-20
2	1967-1970	8,663	170	26 (0.15)	203	2019-12-30	2020-01-16
3	1971-1975	7,011	132	18 (0.14)	237	2020-01-20	2020-02-04
4	1975-1976	5,760	98	7 (0.07)	107	2020-02-06	2020-02-23
5	1981-1985	36,908	703	83 (0.12)	219	2019-09-09	2019-10-14
6	1985-1986	6,052	103	7 (0.07)	92	2019-02-13	2019-03-13
7	1992-1996	43,295	820	59 (0.07)	243	2019-07-01	2019-09-10
8	1996-1999	8,001	128	0 (0.00)	181	2019-04-03	2019-05-08
9	1999-2003	14,461	335	1 (0.00)	218	2019-05-28	2019-07-01
10	2003-2006	6,925	166	16 (0.10)	158	2019-06-09	2019-06-19
11	2006-2008	3,753	97	8 (0.08)	69	2019-04-23	2019-05-13
12	2008-2009	516	20	1 (0.05)	35	2019-10-17	2019-10-17
13	2009-2011	4,013	105	7 (0.07)	118	2019-04-08	2019-05-17
2012_1	2012-2012	260	4	0 (0.00)	29	2019-10-16	2019-10-16
2012_2	2012-2013	2,532	129	0 (0.00)	35	2019-03-18	2019-03-21
14	2013-2016	10,113	390	9 (0.02)	122	2019-01-22	2019-02-21
<b>Total</b>	1963-2016	168,476	3,595	258 (0.07)	2,294	2019-01-22	2020-02-23

*Note:* Table displays the total number of laws passed by the KNA in each legislative term. *Missing* denotes the number of laws (and the percent of the total) that were not found in the transcripts in each term. *Transcripts* denotes the number of legislative transcripts (.pdf files) archived by the Kuwait National Assembly Online Archive in each legislative term. *Start* and *End* refer to the start and end dates of the coding process for each term, respectively. Source: *Kuwait National Assembly Roll Call Votes (KNA-RCV)* dataset.

Figure A.3: Legislative activity in the Kuwait National Assembly, 1963-2016



*Note:* Laws passed ( $N = 3,337$ ) and unique “second deliberation” votes ( $N = 2,693$ ) in the Kuwait National Assembly (KNA). Gray lines count unique laws; black lines count unique “second deliberation” votes. Dashed vertical lines signify elections and the start of a new term. In the post-liberation period, the KNA began voting on multiple laws concurrently with greater frequency. Source: *Kuwait National Assembly Roll Call Votes (KNA-RCV)* dataset.

## S.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.2: Legislator and Minister Characteristics, 1963-2016

	Elected Legislators	Ministers
<i>Age (mean)</i>	46.8	49.5
<i>Female</i>	0.01	0.03
<i>Education: Known</i>	0.72	0.82
<i>Secondary</i>	0.26	0.19
<i>Bachelor</i>	0.46	0.47
<i>Post-graduate</i>	0.28	0.34
<i>Occupational Background</i>		
<i>Public Sector</i>	0.40	0.60
<i>Private Sector</i>	0.21	0.13
<i>Other</i>	0.38	0.27
<i>Ideological Affiliation</i>		
<i>None</i>	0.59	0.77
<i>National-Liberal</i>	0.14	0.08
<i>Left-Populist</i>	0.03	0.00
<i>Muslim Brotherhood</i>	0.06	0.08
<i>Salafi</i>	0.06	0.03
<i>Ind. Islamist</i>	0.07	0.02
<i>Shia Islamist</i>	0.06	0.02
<i>Tribal Affiliation</i>	0.47	0.13
<i>Shia</i>	0.13	0.08
<i>Al-Sabah</i>	0	0.32
<b>Observations</b>	<b>829</b>	<b>316</b>

*Note:* Table compares demographic attributes of legislators and ministers represented in the KNA through 2016. The unit of analysis is the individual-term level (meaning legislators elected to multiple terms appear multiple times in the dataset). Age is represented as a numeric mean based on the individual's age at the time he took office; all other attributes are represented in proportional terms. Other employment includes academia, certain technical fields, and nationalized corporations. Ideological affiliation refers to alignment with one of six proto-parties. Al-Sabah indicates a member of the ruling family. Source: *KNA-RCV* dataset.

Table A.3: Laws Passed Against Minister Opposition

Term	Date	Pre-Diss.	# Min Against	MP Margin	Type	Law Subject
1963	1965-07-03	No	7	28	Budget	Budget for the General Authority Shoaiba Industrial Area 1965/1966
1967	1968-06-04	No	9	14	General	Preventing pollution of navigable waters with oil
1967	1970-01-10	No	4	30	General	Extending the deadline for elections and appointment procedures for the new municipal council
1981	1982-04-06	No	10	34	General	Amending the Real Estate Registration Law
1981	1982-11-02	No	1	36	General	Amending a law establishing a department in the High Court for the consideration of administrative disputes
1981	1983-01-25	No	1	32	General	Amending law regarding local leaders ( <i>mukhtar</i> )
1981	1985-01-08	No	11	31	General	Concerning the appointment of university students and institutes affiliated with the Public Authority for Applied Education and Training in various government agencies
1985	1985-07-09	No	5	36	General	Amending 1982 law concerning military and civilian staff salaries, pensions for retirees, and civil service law
1985	1985-07-09	No	5	32	General	Regarding crimes involving explosives
1985	1986-01-28	No	13	21	General	Amending 1979 law regarding the civil service
1992	1995-05-23	No	1	6	General	Raising the maximum amount of public loan
1992	1995-08-01	No	6	32	General	Amending 1976 degree law regarding social insurance
1992	1995-12-05	No	10	40	General	Amending 1976 degree law regarding social insurance
1992	1996-06-25	No	6	23	General	Increasing the capacity of the National Guard
1992	1996-09-10	No	4	34	General	Amending 1984 law concerning personal status
1996	1998-11-24	No	8	32	General	Amending 1963 law regarding internal regulations of the National Assembly
1999	1999-12-14	No	11	38	General	Concerning the procedures applied to ships violating a UN Security Council resolution
1999	2001-05-22	No	9	41	General	Amending 1995 law concerning minister trials
2003	2006-03-20	Yes	6	41	General	Amending 1995 law regarding private sector contribution to the reconstruction of state-owned land for the purposes of residential care
2006	2007-02-20	No	2	41	General	Concerning support for sports clubs
2006	2007-04-02	No	16	45	General	Concerning compensations for students at University of Kuwait and the General Authority for Applied Education and Training
2006	2007-12-04	No	15	46	General	Concerning the establishment of a joint stock company engaged in banking in compliance with Islamic Sharia
2009	2011-03-22	No	1	38	General	Amending 2008 law regarding disbursement of monthly financial support in the amount of fifty dinars
2009	2011-11-14	Yes	4	43	General	Granting bonuses to members of the faculty, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs
2009	2011-11-14	Yes	4	42	General	Amending 1995 law regarding compensation for students at the University of Kuwait and the General Authority for Applied Education and Training
2013	2015-02-12	No	11	34	General	Amending 1979 law concerning the civil service

*Note:* Table lists information for laws that passed despite ministers voting against them. Pre-dissolution indicates whether the law was passed within the three-month period preceding a legislative dissolution. The table also lists the number of ministers present and voting against the laws, as well as the legislator vote margin (yes - no votes).

## **S.3 Policy Concessions**

Much of the existing literature on cooptation has shown that the incorporation of political parties in autocratic legislatures makes the exchange of concessions more credible, reducing incentives to rebel and extending the survival of incumbent autocrats (Gandhi & Przeworski 2006; Gandhi 2008; Frantz & Kendall-Taylor 2014). Though formal political parties do not exist in the Kuwait context, since 1963, elected legislators have tended to affiliate with one of six political factions, or “proto-parties”: the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis, independent Islamists, National-liberals, Shia Islamists, and left-populists. In this section, we briefly describe each of these groups and provide several examples of the types of concessions these groups advocate for.

### **S.3.1 Muslim Brotherhood**

Kuwait is home to the oldest and most organized Muslim Brotherhood branch among the Arab Gulf states. The Kuwait branch emerged in 1951, a full decade before independence. Like its counterpart in Egypt, the Brotherhood initially sought the “Islamization” of society and focused its work on reforming the education sector and expanding its charitable activities. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Brotherhood members served as ministers of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, Justice, and Oil. Throughout this period, the ruling family provided limited concessions to the Muslim Brotherhood in an effort to weaken the appeal of Arab Nationalists in the National Assembly. The Brotherhood used its influence to pressure the ruling family to implement sharia, or Islamic, law with varying degrees of success. Specifically, the Brotherhood unsuccessfully argued for an amendment to Article 2 of the Constitution that would proclaim sharia “the” rather than “a” primary source of legislation (Freer 2018, pp. 53).

In the 1980s, the Brotherhood sought to ban Christmas celebrations and succeeded in limiting nationality to Muslims and banning the consumption or sale of alcohol in embassies. During this period, the Brotherhood consolidated control over several government financial



institutions: the World Islamic Charity Body, Zakat House, and Kuwait Finance House (Freer 2018, pp. 75). After the liberation of Kuwait, the Muslim Brotherhood announced the creation of a political organization, the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), that continued to advocate for shariah. When women were granted the right to vote in 2005 (against the wishes of ICM-affiliated elected legislators), the organization pushed to ensure the measure complied with the principles of shariah by creating separate polling locations for women.<sup>3</sup>

### **S.3.2 Salafis**

Salafism emerged in Kuwait in the 1960s with the arrival of several Saudi-trained preachers who began working with the Muslim Brotherhood. By the 1970s, Salafis left the Brotherhood and began forming their own, smaller organizations due to ideological and doctrinal disagreements (Pall 2020). The ruling family capitalized on this rift and provided Salafis with financial support to create a charity similar to the Muslim Brotherhood. Salafis used their growing support in the National Assembly to advocate for a variety of Islamist-inspired policies. Following the 1992 election, for example, several elected legislators unsuccessfully sought to establish an “authority to direct the public to do good and refrain from evil,” which would effectively function as an Islamic religious police (Al-Shayegi 1994; Ghabra 1997). When a reformed press law was passed in 2006, Salafis forced the inclusion of a prohibition on directly insulting God, the prophets, and Islam (Freer 2018, pp. 110).

Though Salafis were not as cohesively organized as the Brotherhood, their political organization—the Popular Islamic Gathering—sought to challenge the Brotherhood’s control over the Islamic sector. This was particularly the case as Salafis sought greater control over the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, especially after the events of the Arab Spring. In 2014, a prominent Salafi elected legislator was given ministerial control over the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Oil. For example, during this period,

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<sup>3</sup>See: <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/21635>.

Salafi influence over the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs allowed it to channel funds to Cambodian and Indonesian Salafis with ties to Kuwaiti Salafis (Pall 2020, pp. 23).

### **S.3.3 Independent Islamists**

The rise of Islamism in the 1980s resulted in the emergence of a new class of Islamist actors unaffiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafis. In the Kuwait context, these Islamists are referred to as “independent Islamists.” These Islamists do not operate under the direction of or with support from a political or party-like organization. Electorally, these Islamists do at times coordinate with both Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi competitors in an effort to limit vote-splitting. In the National Assembly, however, these Islamist legislators do coordinate and have in the past joined broader Islamist voting blocs in the legislature. These elected legislators also support efforts to implement shariah-compliant legislation. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, independent Islamists periodically controlled the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs.

### **S.3.4 National-liberal**

National-liberals trace their origins to the Kuwait branch of the Movement of Arab Nationalists, led by Dr. Ahmad Khatib: the leader of Kuwait’s first “opposition.” Much of the success of Arab Nationalism can be attributed to the rise of Nasserism and anti-colonial sentiment in Kuwait before independence (Takriti 2018). When the National Assembly first convened in 1963, Arab Nationalists were most interested in using the National Assembly to vocalize support for transnational causes important to the larger movement. But they also used the National Assembly to limit the ruling family’s absolute control over the newly independent state bureaucracy. In 1964, Arab Nationalists successfully objected to the appointment of six prominent merchants to the Council of Ministers, on the grounds that merchant inclusion in the cabinet constituted a conflict of interest. In 1965, the Council of Ministers introduced

restrictive laws allowing the Minister of Information to close publications and monitor civil associations and clubs. In response, eight elected legislators close to the movement resigned (Crystal 1995, pp. 87-88). From 1973 to 1975, the movement was critical to the successful nationalization of Kuwait’s oil industry (Baaklini & Abdul-Wahab 1979).

With waning support for Arab Nationalism across the region, the movement reconstituted itself in the 1980s and 1990s under the auspices of a broader liberal agenda. This agenda centered on the expansion and protection of civil and political rights (Al-Ghazali 2007). These efforts included support for women’s rights, particularly the right to vote and run in National Assembly elections. In 2006, liberals (as well as Islamists) successfully advocated for a reform to Kuwait’s longstanding electoral law, resulting in a change from 25 electoral districts to five.

### **S.3.5 Leftist-populist**

In 1999, a left-leaning coalition of several liberal, tribal, and Shia elected legislators announced the creation of the Popular Action Bloc. Broadly, leftist-populists in the Kuwait context have advocated for policies and legislation focused on social justice, economic equality, and national independence (Kraetzschmar 2018). Though the group emerged from within the National Assembly as a distinct voting bloc, it participated in subsequent elections as an electoral front with a diverse following. Because the Popular Action Bloc cast itself as “true” parliamentary opposition, from 1999 to 2008, its members refused to join the Council of Ministers. The group introduced and advocated for legislation that resonated with traditional liberal causes, such as the protection of press freedoms and the expansion of laws protecting the right to assemble (Al-Ghazali 2007). In 2001, for example, the group advocated for a “freedoms session” in the National Assembly. Fearing the session would be used to create a formal political parties law, the government boycotted the session.<sup>4</sup> On other occasions, these legislators have also advocated for various populist causes, such as the cancelation of

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<sup>4</sup>See: <https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/2001-04-09-1.1172346>.

interest on bank loans.<sup>5</sup>

### S.3.6 Shia Islamists

Shia comprise roughly 25% of the citizen population of Kuwait. Historically, Kuwaiti Shia have been divided along ethnic lines: Arab Shia are those whose ancestors migrated from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and, to a lesser extent, southern Iraq. Iranian Shia are those who migrated to Kuwait in the nineteenth century from Southern Iran (Jamal 2005; al Mdaires 2010; Louër 2011). Since the 1980s, various Shia Islamist groups have participated in National Assembly elections. Though not explicitly ethno-sectarian, these groups have run under associational labels that signal their connection to various Shia clerics in Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran. These groups have occasionally allied with Sunni Islamist groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salaf) on issues related to sharia law (Al-Madares 1999). But, more broadly, their advocacy has focused more directly on expanding protections for Kuwait's Shia minority. Since their rise in the 1980s, these groups have used the National Assembly to institutionalize these protections in legislation and through legislative advocacy. These include recognition of independent personal status courts, an expansion of the number of Shia places of worship (such as *hussainiyat*, or congregation halls for Shia religious ceremonies), permits for Shia newspapers, recognition of Ashura as a national holiday, and the naming of schools and other public buildings with the names of Shia leaders (Al-Ghazali 2007).

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<sup>5</sup>See: [https://riskandforecast.com/post/kuwait/drama-in-kuwaiti-parliament\\_532.html](https://riskandforecast.com/post/kuwait/drama-in-kuwaiti-parliament_532.html).

## S.4 Additional Analyses

### S.4.1 Full models

	Voting with regime			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WTI Price	0.028*** (0.002)	0.029*** (0.002)		
Oil Revenues			0.023*** (0.002)	0.025*** (0.002)
Ideology Dummy	-0.042*** (0.003)	-0.060*** (0.008)	-0.040*** (0.003)	-0.059*** (0.010)
Cabinet Affiliate	0.016*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)
Age	-0.0004*** (0.0001)		-0.001*** (0.0001)	
Female	0.115*** (0.014)		0.117*** (0.014)	
Edu - Post-graduate	-0.025*** (0.003)		-0.025*** (0.003)	
Edu - Missing	-0.010*** (0.003)		-0.014*** (0.003)	
Edu - Secondary	-0.007** (0.003)		0.001 (0.003)	
Occ - Other	0.005 (0.003)		0.007 (0.003)	
Occ - Private	0.005* (0.003)		0.007* (0.003)	
Occ - Public	0.007* (0.003)		0.008** (0.003)	
Shia	-0.007* (0.003)		-0.010** (0.003)	
Tribe Dummy	-0.014*** (0.002)		-0.016*** (0.002)	
Log Swiss Vote	-0.009*** (0.002)		-0.013*** (0.002)	
By-election	0.019*** (0.005)		0.016* (0.006)	
Inflation	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.001)
Law Type - Budget	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)
Law Type - Treaty	0.019*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)
Law Type - General	-0.036*** (0.003)	-0.035*** (0.003)	-0.038*** (0.003)	-0.039*** (0.003)
New Law	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.009** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)
Constant	1.098*** (0.013)	1.063*** (0.021)	1.123*** (0.018)	1.023*** (0.028)
Term FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
MP FEs		✓		✓
Observations	82,386	82,386	70,472	70,472
R <sup>2</sup>	0.039	0.101	0.044	0.117

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A.4: Table reports coefficients from OLS models of voting consistent with the minister bloc at the legislator-vote level. Models include term fixed effects and controls as indicated.

	Voting with regime	
	(1)	(2)
WTI Price	0.029*** (0.002)	
Oil Revenues		0.027*** (0.003)
Ideology Dummy	-0.029*** (0.002)	-0.030*** (0.002)
Age	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0005*** (0.0001)
Female	0.118*** (0.014)	0.120*** (0.014)
Edu - Post-graduate	-0.022*** (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.003)
Edu - Missing	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)
Edu - Secondary	-0.008*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Occ - Other	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Occ - Private	0.007*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)
Occ - Public	0.007** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)
Shia	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.003)
Tribe Dummy	-0.015*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.002)
Log Swiss Vote	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)
By-election	0.018*** (0.005)	0.015** (0.006)
Inflation	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.001)
Law Type - Budget	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)
Law Type - Treaty	0.019*** (0.003)	0.020*** (0.003)
Law Type - General	-0.036*** (0.003)	-0.039*** (0.003)
New Law	-0.005** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.003)
WTI x Ideo	-0.003* (0.002)	
Oil x Ideo		-0.010*** (0.002)
Constant	1.099*** (0.013)	1.129*** (0.018)
Term FEs	✓	✓
Observations	82,386	70,472
R <sup>2</sup>	0.038	0.044
<i>Note:</i> * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01		

Table A.5: Table reports coefficients from OLS models of voting consistent with the minister bloc at the legislator-vote level. Models include fixed effects and controls as indicated.

### S.4.2 Probit Specifications

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Voting with regime			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WTI Price	0.220*** (0.020)	0.256*** (0.021)		
Oil Revenues			0.172*** (0.020)	0.209*** (0.022)
Ideology Dummy	-0.343*** (0.022)	-0.292*** (0.065)	-0.322*** (0.023)	-0.259** (0.093)
Cabinet Affiliate	0.118*** (0.015)	0.088*** (0.020)	0.116*** (0.016)	0.071*** (0.021)
Inflation	-0.081*** (0.006)	-0.094*** (0.007)	-0.079*** (0.007)	-0.093*** (0.008)
Term FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
MP FEs		✓		✓
MP controls	✓		✓	
Law controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	82,386	82,386	70,472	70,472
Log Likelihood	-17,376.540	-15,458.830	-14,646.290	-12,918.190
Akaike Inf. Crit.	34,827.090	31,677.660	29,362.580	26,504.380
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Table A.6: Cooptation strategy and voting with the regime. Table reports coefficients from probit models of voting consistent with the minister bloc at the legislator-vote level. All models include term fixed effects and controls for type of law. Models alternately include controls for legislator attributes (age, gender, education, sect, occupation, tribal affiliation, and electoral performance) or legislator fixed effects. WTI price and oil revenues are standardized continuous variables.

### S.4.3 Robustness to Abstention Coding

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Voting with regime - Abstention coded as Anti-Regime		Voting with regime - Abstention coded as Pro-Regime	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WTI Price	0.028*** (0.002)	0.030*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)
Ideology Dummy	-0.039*** (0.002)	-0.050*** (0.007)	-0.059*** (0.003)	-0.099*** (0.010)
Cabinet Affiliate	0.015*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.003)
Inflation	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)
Term FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
MP FEs		✓		✓
MP controls	✓		✓	
Law controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	86,524	86,524	86,524	86,524
R <sup>2</sup>	0.038	0.093	0.033	0.116

*Note:*

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A.7: Cooptation strategy and voting with the regime – Robustness to abstention. Table reports coefficients from OLS models of voting consistent with the minister bloc at the legislator-vote level. DV is voting with the regime; legislator abstention is alternately coded as anti-regime (models 1 and 2) or pro-regime (models 3 and 4) in the period preceding April 2007 (when the rules were changed to require a majority of votes cast to pass legislation).



#### S.4.4 Robustness to Absence Coding

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Voting with regime - Absence coded as Anti-Regime	Voting with regime - Absence coded as Pro-Regime
	(1)	(2)
WTI Price	0.027*** (0.004)	0.021*** (0.002)
Ideology Dummy	-0.052*** (0.013)	-0.028*** (0.005)
Cabinet Affiliate	0.026*** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.001)
Inflation	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.0004)
Term FEs	✓	✓
MP FEs	✓	✓
Law controls	✓	✓
Observations	124,916	124,916
R <sup>2</sup>	0.147	0.071


*Note:*

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A.8: Cooptation strategy and voting with the regime – Robustness to absences. Table reports coefficients from OLS models of voting consistent with the minister bloc at the legislator-vote level. DV is voting with the regime; legislator absence (failure to be present for a second deliberation vote) is alternately coded as anti-regime (model 1) or pro-regime (model 2). Models include term and legislator fixed effects and law controls.

### S.4.5 Cooperation by Law Category

Figure A.4: Cooperation by law type



*Note:* Figure plots the proportion of legislators voting with ministers by law type. Topics are listed in descending order of average cooperation. The unit of analysis is the second deliberation vote.

#### S.4.6 Robustness to Lag Timing

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Voting with regime			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WTI Price	0.028*** (0.002)	0.029*** (0.002)		
Oil Revenues			0.022*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.002)
Ideology Dummy	-0.043*** (0.003)	-0.060*** (0.008)	-0.041*** (0.003)	-0.059*** (0.010)
Cabinet Affiliate - 3 month lag	0.017*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)
Inflation	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.001)
Term FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
MP FEs		✓		✓
MP controls	✓		✓	
Law controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	82,386	82,386	70,472	70,472
R <sup>2</sup>	0.039	0.102	0.045	0.117

*Note:*

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A.9: Cooptation strategy and voting with the regime – Cabinet appointment lag (3 months). Table reports coefficients from OLS models of voting consistent with the minister bloc at the legislator-vote level. DV is voting with the regime; cabinet affiliate is coded based on whether a legislator had an ideological affiliate on the cabinet three months prior to the vote. Models include term and legislator fixed effects and law controls.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Voting with regime			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WTI Price	0.029*** (0.002)	0.030*** (0.002)		
Oil Revenues			0.022*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.002)
Ideology Dummy	-0.041*** (0.002)	-0.059*** (0.008)	-0.038*** (0.003)	-0.057*** (0.010)
Cabinet Affiliate - 5 month lag	0.018*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)
Inflation	-0.010*** (0.001)	-0.010*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.001)
Term FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
MP FEs		✓		✓
MP controls	✓		✓	
Law controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	82,386	82,386	70,472	70,472
R <sup>2</sup>	0.039	0.102	0.045	0.117

*Note:*

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A.10: Cooptation strategy and voting with the regime – Cabinet appointment lag (5 months).. Table reports coefficients from OLS models of voting consistent with the minister bloc at the legislator-vote level. DV is voting with the regime; cabinet affiliate is coded based on whether a legislator had an ideological affiliate on the cabinet five months prior to the vote. Models include term and legislator fixed effects and law controls.