Supplementary Information (SI) for:

Germann, Micha (2024). "Mini-Publics, (Lack of) Representativeness, and Legitimacy Beliefs." Forthcoming in the *British Journal of Political Science.*

Online Appendix

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1   Departures from the Pre-Analysis Plan

Below I provide the full list of departures from the pre-analysis plan ([AsPredicted #111066](#)):

- As foreseen in the pre-registration, I requested 1,200 survey responses from the pollster (Ireland Thinks). However, I ended up receiving 1,308 responses. I am reporting the results including all 1,308 responses received as the main analysis in the paper. As a robustness check, I also provide the results for the first 1,200 responses received based on survey time stamps (see SI Appendix §7). The results are similar.
- The pre-registration foresees dropping speeders as a robustness check. However, the pre-registered definition of a speeder (a total survey duration of less than *one third* of the *mean* duration) turned out to be problematic because there happened to be a small number of respondents with very long survey durations of up to 60 hours. The likely reason is that some respondents interrupted the survey and then revisited it several days later. As a result, 63% of respondents qualify as speeders in terms of the pre-registered definition. I still report the results using the pre-registered definition of a speeder (see SI Appendix §7). However, in addition, I also report the results when relying on an alternative, less restrictive definition of a speeder: respondents who took less than *half* the *median* survey duration to complete the survey. According to this alternative definition, approximately 8% of respondents qualify as speeders. The results are similar with both definitions of a speeder.
- I re-run the analysis while retaining only respondents who correctly recalled the exact experimental condition they were assigned to, the policy recommendation made by the mini-public, and the final decision on the policy proposal after the experimental treatments. The results are similar to the main analysis (see SI Appendix §7).
- In response to reviewer comments, I added the following two types of analysis: (1) seemingly unrelated regression to compare the size of regression coefficients in the procedural fairness and decision acceptance models; (2) sub-group analyses comparing the effects of experimental treatments between experimental subjects with vs without a university degree and experimental subjects who do vs do not support the introduction of the UBI scheme. The results of the seemingly unrelated regression suggest that coefficient sizes are statistically indistinguishable between models except in one case: the mini-public with a small demographic bias (see SI Appendix §6). The results of the sub-group analysis suggest that supporters of the basic income scheme are significantly more appreciative if a mini-public is held, but that results are otherwise comparable between supporters and opponents. Finally, I find no evidence for effect heterogeneity due to educational attainment (see SI Appendix §8).

2   Survey Materials

2.1   Policy Issue

We are now going to describe a scenario to you about a political decision-making process in Ireland. Please read the scenario carefully and then tell us your beliefs about the process we are describing.

The policy matter at stake is whether or not Ireland should introduce a **basic income scheme**.

Under the proposed scheme, the Irish government would pay every adult €200 per week to cover essential living costs. Children would receive a smaller amount (€30).

The basic income would replace most other welfare benefits, including unemployment and child benefits. Top-up payments would remain in place for those with special needs and for pensioners. People could keep the money they earn from work or other sources.

The basic income scheme would be paid for by increasing income tax and the introduction of a property tax.

In your opinion, should Ireland introduce the basic income scheme we just described to you?
Possible answers: Completely disagree – Tend to disagree – Tend to agree – Completely agree - Don't know
[Force response]

[Filter: only if no opinion on issue] You indicated that you do not have an opinion on the introduction of the basic income scheme. If you had to choose, would you agree that the basic income scheme we described to you should be introduced?
Possible answers: Completely disagree – Tend to disagree – Tend to agree – Completely agree [Force response]

2.2   Procedural Saliency Prime

Next, consider that the decision whether or not Ireland should introduce the basic income scheme can be made in different ways.

Specifically, some people argue that the issue should be referred to a **citizens' assembly** before a final decision is made.

A citizens' assembly is a body comprised of citizens who are randomly selected to mirror the Irish electorate.

The idea is that the citizens' assembly would meet for several days to hear from experts and debate the issue between themselves.

After this, the citizens' assembly would make a recommendation on whether to introduce the basic income scheme.

This recommendation would then be considered by elected representatives in the Irish parliament (Dáil) before they make the final decision.

2.3   Experimental Conditions

Version 1: No mini-public

Now imagine that a decision on the basic income scheme is made.

The question whether the basic income scheme should be introduced **is *not*** referred to a citizens' assembly before the final decision.

Parliament makes the final decision and decides *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Version 2: Fully representative mini-public

Now imagine that a decision on the basic income scheme is made.

The question whether the basic income scheme should be introduced **is** referred to a citizens' assembly before the final decision.

There were **no** problems with recruitment.

As a result, the citizens' assembly closely mirrored the Irish adult population on aspects such as **educational attainment** and **initial viewpoints on the basic income scheme**.

After debating the issue, the citizens' assembly recommends *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Parliament makes the final decision and decides *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Version 3: Mini-public with small demographic bias

Now imagine that a decision on the basic income scheme is made.

The question whether the basic income scheme should be introduced **is** referred to a citizens' assembly before the final decision.

However, there were problems with recruitment that led to a **small** over-representation of **highly educated citizens.**

Specifically, **28%** of citizen assembly members had a university degree compared to **23%** of the Irish adult population.

After debating the issue, the citizens' assembly recommends *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Parliament makes the final decision and decides *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Version 4: Mini-public with large demographic bias

Now imagine that a decision on the basic income scheme is made.

The question whether the basic income scheme should be introduced **is** referred to a citizens' assembly before the final decision.

However, there were problems with recruitment that led to a **large** over-representation of **highly educated citizens.**

Specifically, **43%** of citizen assembly members had a university degree compared to **23%** of the Irish adult population.

After debating the issue, the citizens' assembly recommends *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Parliament makes the final decision and decides *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Version 5: Mini-public with small attitudinal bias

Now imagine that a decision on the basic income scheme is made.

The question whether the basic income scheme should be introduced **is** referred to a citizens' assembly before the final decision.

However, there were problems with recruitment that led to a **small** over-representation of **supporters (opponents) of the basic income scheme.**

Specifically, **60%** of citizen assembly members supported the basic income scheme prior to their participation compared to **55%** of the Irish adult population.

(Specifically, **50%** of citizen assembly members opposed the basic income scheme prior to their participation compared to **45%** of the Irish adult population.)

After debating the issue, the citizens' assembly recommends *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Parliament makes the final decision and decides *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Version 6: Mini-public with large attitudinal bias

Now imagine that a decision on the basic income scheme is made.

The question whether the basic income scheme should be introduced **is** referred to a citizens' assembly before the final decision.

However, there were problems with recruitment that led to a **large** over-representation of **supporters (opponents) of the basic income scheme.**

Specifically, **75%** of citizen assembly members supported the basic income scheme prior to their participation compared to **55%** of the Irish adult population.

(Specifically, **65%** of citizen assembly members opposed the basic income scheme prior to their participation compared to **45%** of the Irish adult population.)

After debating the issue, the citizens' assembly recommends *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Parliament makes the final decision and decides *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

2.4   Reminders of Experimental Condition

Now we would like to ask about your perceptions of the way in which the decision to introduce the basic income scheme was made.

Recall that:

Version 1: No mini-public

- The policy matter **was *not*** debated by a citizens' assembly prior to the final decision.
- Parliament decided *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Version 2: Fully representative mini-public

- The policy matter **was** debated by a citizens' assembly prior to the final decision.
- The citizens' assembly **closely mirrored** the Irish adult population.
- The citizens' assembly recommended *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.
- Parliament decided *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Version 3: Mini-public with small demographic bias

- The policy matter **was** debated by a citizens' assembly prior to the final decision.
- The citizens' assembly had a **small** overrepresentation of **highly educated citizens**.
- The citizens' assembly recommended *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.
- Parliament decided *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Version 4: Mini-public with large demographic bias

- The policy matter **was** debated by a citizens' assembly prior to the final decision.
- The citizens' assembly had a **large** overrepresentation of **highly educated citizens**.
- The citizens' assembly recommended *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.
- Parliament decided *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Version 5: Mini-public with small attitudinal bias

- The policy matter **was** debated by a citizens' assembly prior to the final decision.
- The citizens' assembly had a **small** overrepresentation of **supporters (opponents) of the basic income scheme**.
- The citizens' assembly recommended *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.
- Parliament decided *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

Version 6: Mini-public with large attitudinal bias

- The policy matter **was** debated by a citizens' assembly prior to the final decision.
- The citizens' assembly had a **large** overrepresentation of **supporters (opponents) of the basic income scheme**.
- The citizens' assembly recommended *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.
- Parliament decided *(not)* **to introduce** the basic income scheme.

2.5   Outcome Questions

Note: Outcome questions were asked immediately after the experimental manipulation.

How fair do you think matters were when the decision was taken?
Possible answers: 0 (not fair at all) – 10 (very fair)

How just do you think that the decision-making process was?
Possible answers: 0 (not just at all) – 10 (very just)

How appropriate do you think that the decision-making process was?
Possible answers: 0 (not appropriate at all) – 10 (very appropriate)

How willing are you to accept the decision?
Possible answers: 0 (not at all willing) – 10 (very willing)

How important do you think it is to accept the decision?
Possible answers: 0 (not important at all) – 10 (very important)

2.6   Factual Manipulation Checks

Note: Manipulation and memory check questions were asked immediately after the outcome questions.

Next, we are wondering about your recollection of the decision-making process. Please make sure that you read all of the different answering possibilities before you provide your answer as it is important that you get these questions right.

According to your memory, which of the following statements best reflects the decision-making process we described to you?
- The issue was not debated by a citizens' assembly.
- A citizens' assembly debated the issue. There were no recruitment problems.
- A citizens' assembly debated the issue. There were problems with recruitment that led to a small overrepresentation of highly educated citizens.
- A citizens' assembly debated the issue. There were problems with recruitment that led to a large overrepresentation of highly educated citizens.
- A citizens' assembly debated the issue. There were problems with recruitment that led to a small overrepresentation of supporters (opponents) of the basic income scheme.
- A citizens' assembly debated the issue. There were problems with recruitment that led to a large overrepresentation of supporters (opponents) of the basic income scheme.

Do you remember the citizens' assembly's policy recommendation?
- The citizens' assembly recommended to introduce the basic income scheme.
- The citizens' assembly recommended not to introduce the basic income scheme.
- The issue was not debated by a citizens' assembly.

Do you remember the final decision?
- Parliament decided to introduce the basic income scheme.
- Parliament decided not to introduce the basic income scheme.

3 Power Analysis

I relied on information on effect sizes and variability from similar prior studies to decide on the sample size. To my knowledge, four existing manuscripts have studied the effects of mini-public involvement on the legitimacy perceptions of non-participants. In combination, those four manuscripts include six independent studies and eight effect estimates (Germann et al. 2024; Jacobs & Kaufmann 2022; van Dijk & Lefevere 2023; Werner & Marien 2022). Similar to the current study, all prior studies took the form of a scenario experiment. No prior study stated explicitly to what extent the mini-publics were representative of the populations they were meant to represent. Yet, all prior studies framed the mini-publics as randomly selected and, therefore, as representative in aspiration.

Table S1 summarizes the findings of those previous studies. All reported results refer to the difference between a political process that does and does not involve a mini-public. The final decision is always made by parliament and the policy recommendations made by mini-publics are always followed. Some studies also report results for scenarios in which mini-public recommendations are not, or only partially, implemented, and where final decisions are not made by parliament (Germann et al. 2024; van Dijk & Lefevere 2023). The latter are not considered here because the final decision is always made by parliament in the present study and mini-public recommendations are always fully implemented. To maximize consistency with the present study, the reported results also consider only "decision losers" where that is possible. All reported effects refer to citizens' perceptions of the fairness of political decision-making or their willingness to accept the decision. As becomes evident, all six prior studies found evidence that mini-publics increase legitimacy perceptions, with an average effect size of 0.14 on a 0-1 scale. At the same time, the variability in legitimacy ratings between different respondents was significant in all studies, with an average standard deviation of 0.24.

Table S1: Effects of mini-public involvement on legitimacy perceptions in prior studies

Manuscript	Outcome	N_{Group}	$M_{Control}$	$M_{Treated}$	Δ	$SD_{Control}$	$SD_{Treated}$
Germann et al. (2024)[1]	Fairness	220	0.48	0.60	0.12	0.30	0.26
Germann et al. (2024)[1]	Decision acceptance	220	0.56	0.63	0.08	0.27	0.26
Jacobs & Kaufmann (2021)[2]	Fairness	150	0.24	0.55	0.31	0.20	0.15
van Dijk & Lefevere (2023)[3]	Fairness	610	0.54	0.64	0.11	0.18	0.21
van Dijk & Lefevere (2023)[3]	Decision acceptance	620	0.59	0.67	0.08	0.25	0.24
Werner & Marien (2022) – Study 1[4]	Fairness	200	0.47	0.56	0.09	0.25	0.24
Werner & Marien (2022) – Study 2[4]	Fairness	200	0.35	0.58	0.24	0.30	0.27
Werner & Marien (2022) – Study 3[4]	Fairness	230	0.50	0.59	0.09	0.23	0.21

Note: Outcome variables were re-scaled so that they range from 0 to 1.

[1] Germann et al. (2024) study the effects of mini-public involvement on legitimacy perceptions depending on whether the final decision is made by parliament or by referendum; and whether or not the mini-public recommendation is honored or not in the final decision. The effect sizes and standard deviations reported here refer to decision losers and the effect of mini-public involvement if the final decision is made by parliament and the mini-public recommendation is followed.

[2] Jacobs & Kaufmann (2021) study the effects of the involvement of either a self-selected citizen panel or a randomly selected mini-public on legitimacy perceptions. The effect sizes and standard deviations reported refer to the effect of a randomly selected mini-public involvement; however, it should be noted that Jacobs & Kaufmann do not distinguish between the effects on decision winners and losers. Therefore, the effect sizes and standard deviations refer to the average effect on decision winners and losers. As in the current experiment, the final decision is always made by parliament in this study and the mini-public recommendation is always followed.

[4] van Dijk & Lefevere (2023) study the effects of mini-public involvement on legitimacy perceptions on both decision winners and losers. As in the current experiment, the final decision is always made by parliament in their experimental set-up. van Dijk & Lefevere vary to what extent the recommendations made by the mini-public are subsequently implemented; the reported effects refer to a scenario whereby all recommendations are fully implemented. There is no clear definition of a decision loser in this study since participants can "win", "lose", and experience several different combinations of winning and losing. Therefore, the reported effects refer to decision losers, decision winners, and those in-between.

[4] Werner & Marien (2022) study the effects of mini-public involvement on legitimacy perceptions on both decision winners and losers. The effect sizes and standard deviations reported here refer to the effect of mini-public involvement on decision losers, which is the focus in the current experiment. As

The pre-registered hypotheses state that the beneficial effects of mini-publics on legitimacy perceptions decrease in size if there are deviations from full representativeness. Therefore, it was important that I select a sample size which allows me to detect effects that are smaller compared to prior studies. In an average scenario wherein the standard deviations in the experimental groups are equal to the average standard deviation in prior studies (0.24 on a 0-1 scale), the sample size I requested from the pollster – 1,200 responses or an expected 200 responses per experimental group – is sufficient to confidently detect changes of 0.07 on a 0-1 scale in a two-group comparison (power = 0.80; alpha = 0.05). In other words, the requested sample size should be sufficient to detect effects that are about half the size of those reported in the average prior study (0.14). In a more pessimistic scenario wherein variability is equal to the largest standard deviation detected in any prior study (0.30), the minimum detectable effect size in a two-group comparison is 0.08 with the requested sample size. Even in the latter case I should therefore be able to confidently detect effects which are substantially smaller than the average effect reported in prior studies (0.14).

As noted in the paper, I chose to study only a single type of demographic bias: an over-representation of people with high educational attainment. While it would have been interesting to study additional types of demographic bias (e.g., gender, age, or class), this would have required a larger sample size than the 1,200 I was able to afford. For example, adding just one additional form of demographic bias would have increased the minimum detectable effect in a sample of $N = 1,200$ to 0.08 in the average scenario and to 0.10 in the more pessimistic scenario; adding two more types of demographic bias would have increased them to 0.09 in the average scenario and to 0.11 in the more pessimistic scenario; and adding three more to 0.10 and 0.12, respectively. Especially in the more pessimistic scenario, I would therefore no longer have been able to confidently detect effects that are significantly smaller compared to the average effect measured in prior studies (0.14). Therefore, I chose to prioritize statistical power and focus on a single type of demographic bias.

Two more things are worth noting. First, I ended up receiving slightly more than the 1,200 responses I had requested from the pollster (1,308). Second, the standard deviations in my experimental groups are similar to those observed in prior studies (0.22 to 0.31 on a 0-1 scale). The effects of involving a representative mini-public on fairness perceptions (+0.17 on a 0-1 scale) and decision acceptance (+0.17 on a 0-1 scale) are also similar in this study compared to prior studies.

4 Descriptive Statistics

Table S2: Sample descriptives and population reference figures

	Sample	Population
Gender[*]		
Female	50%	51%
Male	50%	49%
Age[*]		
18-34	20%	29%
35-64	61%	53%
65+	19%	18%
Region of residence[*]		
Northern & Western	24%	18%
Southern	30%	34%
Eastern and Midland	46%	49%
Educational attainment		
Did not finish 3rd level education	40%	58%
Finished 3rd level education	60%	42%
2020 general election		
Fianna Fáil (center-right)	17%	14%
Fine Gael (center-right)	26%	13%
Sinn Féin (left)	21%	18%
Green Party (left)	7%	4%
Labour (leftist)	4%	3%
Other party	20%	11%
Did not vote	5%	37%

Note: The target population were people resident in the Republic of Ireland aged 18 years or older. Population figures for gender, age, region of residence, and education are based on the 2016 census. Party left-right classifications are based on the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2019). Some of the figures do not add up to 100 due to rounding.
[*] Sampling quota in place.

5   Scaling Analysis

This section assesses the outcome variables' unidimensionality (Gerbing & Anderson 1988) and reliability (Lord & Novick 1968). For the unidimensionality assessment, I rely on Mokken scale analysis (MSA). A set of items can be considered a unidimensional Mokken scale if: (1) the overall H-coefficient is ≥ 0.30; (2) all item-specific H_i-coefficients are ≥ 0.30; and (3) all *crit*-values are < 80 (van Schuur 2003). Mokken scales with overall H-scores ≥ 0.30 are considered weak, ≥ 0.40 moderate and ≥ 0.50 strong. For the reliability assessment, I draw on Cronbach's α. $\alpha \geq 0.60$ is generally seen as indicating a minimally acceptable level of reliability, though $\alpha \geq 0.70$ is preferable.

Tables S3 and S4 show the results. As becomes evident, both the procedural fairness and the decision acceptance scale meet the criteria of a strong Mokken scale. At the same time, both the procedural fairness and the decision acceptance scales have high scale reliability ($\alpha = 0.95$ and 0.87, respectively).

Table S3: Procedural fairness perceptions

#	Question text	H_i	crit
1	How fair do you think matters were when the decision was taken?	0.89	0
2	How just do you think that the decision process was?	0.89	0
3	How appropriate do you think that the decision process was?	0.87	0
H		0.88	
α		0.95	
N		1308	

Table S4: Decision acceptance

#	Question text	H_i	crit
1	How willing are you to accept the decision?	0.77	-12
2	How important do you think it is to accept the decision?	0.77	-11
H		0.77	
α		0.87	
N		1308	

6 Main Results

Table S5: Numerical regression results

	Procedural fairness	Decision acceptance
	(1)	(2)
Representative mini-public	0.17***	0.17***
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Small demographic bias	0.09***	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Small attitudinal bias	0.08***	0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Large demographic bias	0.07**	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Large attitudinal bias	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	0.35***	0.38***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	1308	1308

Note: This table shows linear regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The reference category is a political process that does not involve a mini-public. $^{*}\, p < 0.05$, $^{**}\, p < 0.01$, $^{***}\, p < 0.001$.

Table S6: Wald tests of the equality of coefficients

	Procedural fairness	Decision acceptance
	(1)	(2)
Representative mini-public vs small demographic bias	$F = 11.95; p < 0.001$	$F = 17.09; p < 0.001$
Representative mini-public vs small attitudinal bias	$F = 16.11; p < 0.001$	$F = 10.78; p = 0.001$
Small demographic bias vs small attitudinal bias	$F = 0.16; p = 0.689$	$F = 1.04; p = 0.309$
Representative mini-public vs large demographic bias	$F = 18.59; p < 0.001$	$F = 17.49; p < 0.001$
Representative mini-public vs large attitudinal bias	$F = 63.16; p < 0.001$	$F = 40.53; p < 0.001$
Large demographic bias vs large attitudinal bias	$F = 11.67; p < 0.001$	$F = 3.99; p = 0.046$
Small demographic bias vs large demographic bias	$F = 0.76; p = 0.384$	$F = 0.01; p = 0.937$
Small attitudinal bias vs large attitudinal bias	$F = 17.03; p < 0.001$	$F = 10.47; p = 0.001$
Small attitudinal bias vs large demographic bias	$F = 0.26; p = 0.610$	$F = 1.19; p = 0.275$
Small demographic bias vs large attitudinal bias	$F = 18.87; p < 0.001$	$F = 4.39; p = 0.036$

Note: This table shows the results of Wald tests of the equality of coefficients reported in Table S5.

Table S7: Seemingly unrelated regression

	Procedural fairness (1)	Decision acceptance (2)	Difference
Representative mini-public	0.17***	0.17***	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	
Small demographic bias	0.09***	0.05	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	
Small attitudinal bias	0.08***	0.08**	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	
Large demographic bias	0.07**	0.05	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	
Large attitudinal bias	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	
Constant	0.35***	0.38***	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Observations	1308	1308	

Note: This table shows the results of a seemingly unrelated regression combining the two regression models reported in Table S5 in a single model. Seemingly unrelated regression relaxes the assumption that errors are independent between the procedural fairness and decision acceptance models and therefore allows direct comparisons of regression coefficients from models with different dependent variables. The first two columns show regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The final column shows the difference in coefficient size including information on statistical significance. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

7   Robustness Checks

Figure S1: Robustness checks

Main results: The results reported in the paper (Figure 2).

Covariates: Measures of the following covariates are included in the specification: subjects' age (measured in years), gender (female vs male), educational attainment (university degree vs no degree), vote choice in the 2020 Irish general election (Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Green Party, Labour, Sinn Féin, Other, I did not vote, and I did not remember), political trust (0-10 scale), and satisfaction with democracy (0-10 scale).

Heard of citizens' assembly: Only subjects are retained who stated that they had heard of the term "citizens' assembly" (the term most commonly used for the concept of a mini-public in Ireland) before the survey experiment. This question was included on the first page of the survey and, therefore, before any information on mini-publics was shown to experimental subjects.

No speeders: Speeders, defined as subjects who rushed through the questionnaire in less than one third of the average duration, are dropped.

No speeders (alt): Speeders, alternatively defined as subjects who rushed through the questionnaire in less than half of the median survey duration, are dropped (see SI Appendix §1 for further explanation).

N = 1,200: The samples are restricted to the first 1,200 respondents (see SI Appendix §1 for further explanation).

Correct recall: The samples are restricted to subjects who correctly recalled the exact experimental condition they were assigned to, the policy recommendation made by the mini-public (if applicable), and the final decision on the policy proposal. Factual manipulation check questions were asked after the outcome questions.

Note: The figure shows linear regression coefficients. The spikes represent 95% confidence intervals.

8 Sub-Group Analysis

Table S8: Multiplicative interactions between experimental treatments and educational attainment

	Procedural fairness	**Decision acceptance**
	(1)	(2)
Representative mini-public	0.22***	0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Small demographic bias	0.11**	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Small attitudinal bias	0.11**	0.11*
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Large demographic bias	0.08*	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Large attitudinal bias	0.04	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Degree	0.09*	0.10*
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Representative mini-public * degree	-0.08	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Small demographic bias * degree	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Large demographic bias * degree	-0.03	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Small attitudinal bias * degree	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Large attitudinal bias * degree	-0.10*	-0.10
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Constant	0.30***	0.32***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1297	1297

Note: This table shows the results when the experimental treatments are interacted with a binary measure of whether or not a respondent holds a university degree. Standard errors are in parentheses. The baseline category is a political process which does not involve a mini-public. According to Wald tests, the multiplicative interaction terms are not jointly statistically significant ($p = 0.36$ and $p = 0.53$, respectively). $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.

Table S9: Multiplicative interaction between experimental treatments and issue position

	Procedural fairness	Decision acceptance
	(1)	(2)
Representative mini-public	0.08*	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Small demographic bias	0.07*	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Small attitudinal bias	0.05	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Large demographic bias	0.04	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Large attitudinal bias	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Pro UBI	0.01	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Representative mini-public * pro UBI	0.17***	0.23***
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Small demographic bias * pro UBI	0.04	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Large demographic bias * pro UBI	0.05	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Small attitudinal bias * pro UBI	0.07	0.11*
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Large attitudinal bias * pro UBI	0.04	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Constant	0.34***	0.36***
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations	1308	1308

Note: This table shows the results when the experimental treatments are interacted with a binary measure of whether or not a respondent supports the introduction of a universal basic income scheme (i.e., the policy at stake in the experiment). Standard errors are in parentheses. The baseline category is a political process which does not involve a mini-public. According to Wald tests, the multiplicative interaction terms are jointly statistically significant ($p = 0.01$ and $p < 0.01$, respectively). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure S2: Treatment effects depending on educational attainment (based on models reported in Table S8)


Figure S3: Treatment effects depending on issue position (based on models reported in Table S9)

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