**Supplementary Appendix for**

**Nationalism, Status and Conspiracy Theories: Evidence from Pakistan**

**Table of Contents**

[**A1.** **Sampling Protocol** 2](#_Toc153801852)

[**A2. Balance Table** 3](#_Toc153801853)

[**A3. Descriptive Statistics** 4](#_Toc153801854)

[**A4. Pre-Analysis Plan and Other Outcomes** 5](#_Toc153801855)

[**A5. Difference in Means between Pooled Treatments and Control** 6](#_Toc153801856)

[**A6. Means of Belief in Conspiracy Theory by Treatment** 6](#_Toc153801857)

[**A7. Dichotomized Outcome Measure** 7](#_Toc153801858)

[**A8. Analysis Controlling for Demographic Variables** 9](#_Toc153801859)

[**A9. Ordered Logit Robustness Check** 10](#_Toc153801860)

[**A10. Attrition and Non-Response** 11](#_Toc153801861)

[**A11. Baseline Belief in Conspiracy Theory by Ethnic Group** 14](#_Toc153801862)

[**A12. Treatment Effect Across Ethnic Groups** 15](#_Toc153801863)

[**A13. Effect of Treatments on Pride** 16](#_Toc153801864)

[**A14. Effect of Treatments on Anger** 17](#_Toc153801865)

[**A15. Effect of Nationalism on Conspiracy Belief by Whether Pakistan’s International Contributions are Perceived as Sufficiently Recognized** 18](#_Toc153801866)

[**A16. PTM Conspiracy Belief by Respondents Who Think Pakistan’s Contributions Well-recognized** 19](#_Toc153801867)

[**A17. Pakistani Nationalism Compared to Other Countries** 20](#_Toc153801868)

# **A1.** **Sampling Protocol**

The survey was conducted in Urdu by the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion (an affiliate of Gallup International in Pakistan, hereafter Gallup Pakistan) over the phone using Random Digit Dialing (RDD). Enumerators were trained by the authors and Gallup team leaders. Pre-tests were conducted in the Gallup offices to ensure that the wording being used was effectively conveying the intended meaning. A pilot of 100 respondents was then conducted prior to fielding. Enumerators collected the answers on tablets using ODK software. Treatments and control were randomized, so everyone had an equal probability of being assigned to one of the four conditions. As A2 shows, respondents across the four conditions were balanced across observed covariates.

In the RDD approach, all mobile phone users in Pakistan (130 million active sims) have an equal probability of being selected. Because landlines in Pakistan are almost non-existent, only mobile users were interviewed. According to the latest Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) survey of 2019, only 3% of households have a landline and Gallup research suggests that these households also have a person owning a mobile phone. Moreover, landline numbers frequently do not work and they are non-representative, with richer households more likely to still maintain a landline.

As of 2020, there are 4 mobile operators in Pakistan and they have varying shares of the active mobile

market. Mobilink is the largest with about a third of the total market. Gallup assigns the mobile numbers to the operators based on their market share. Using these shares, they created an RDD sample frame. After a trained enumerator dialed a randomly chosen cell phone number, they would survey the person who answered the call as long as that individual was above the age of 18. If a phone number that was selected randomly did not result in a person answering, Gallup moved on to the next randomly selected number. While non-response for this type of survey is greater than face-to-face, it is generally lower than the percentages of non-response reported in U.S. phone surveys.

# **A2. Balance Table**

**Table A2: Difference in Means (with T-test P-values) between**

**Covariate Mean for Respondents in Control and \_\_\_\_\_\_\_.**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Covariates** | **Min, Max** | **Chauvinistic Treatment** | **Cohesive Treatment** | **Legitimacy Treatment** | **Pooled Treatments** |
| **Female** | (1, 2) | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.01 |
| **Age** | (18, 80) | 0.14 | -0.39 | -0.44 | -0.24 |
| **Rural**  | (1, 2) | -0.02 | -0.05+ | -0.02 | -0.03 |
| **Shia** | (0, 1) | 0.01 | 0.02+ | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| **Punjab** | (0, 1) | 0.014 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.02 |
| **Social Media Consumer** | (0, 1) | -0.004 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| **Education** | (1, 8) | 0.22+ | -0.12 | 0.18 | 0.09 |
| **Political knowledge** | (0, 1) | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| **Tolerance towards religious minorities** | (1, 4) | -0.00 | -0.03 | -0.08 | -0.04 |
| **PTI Supporter** | (0, 1) | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
| **Pashtun** | (0, 1) | -0.01 | -0.00 | -0.02 | -0.01 |

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1.

In 44 t-tests, we find 3 variables where the difference in means exceeds the p<0.10 level, which is consistent with expectations. Given that this is what we would expect by chance, we can be confident that the randomization succeeded in achieving balance on demographic and partisan covariates.

Given the presence of multiple treatment conditions, we fit a multinomial logistic regression model to the following equation:

$$Version=α+β\_{1}Female+β\_{2}Age+β\_{3}Rural+β\_{4}Shia+β\_{5}Punjab+β\_{6}SocialMediaConsumer+β\_{7}Education+β\_{8}PoliticalKnowledge+β\_{9}TolerantReligion+β\_{10}PTI+ β\_{11}Pashtun+ε$$

The test for joint orthogonality for the model as a whole fails to reject the null (p=0.86). This further contributes to our confidence that randomization succeeded in achieving balance on covariates.

# **A3. Descriptive Statistics**

|  |
| --- |
| **Table A3. Descriptive Statistics of Sample** |
| Age | 18-29 years old 44.9%29-49 years old 42.6%49 and above 12.5% |
| Province | Punjab 54%Sindh 22%KPK 17%Balochistan 4% |
| Gender | Male 83.6%Female 16.4% |
| Religion | Islam 96% |
| Household income (monthly in Pakistani Rupees) | Less than 15,000 rupees 20%15-45,000 rupees 41%More than 45,000 rupees 15% |
| Education  | No formal schooling 15%Primary 9%Middle 14%Matriculation 24%Intermediate 14%College/University 14%Masters/Professional degree 7% |
| Where do you get the majority of your news? | TV news stations 46%Internet (blog, websites) 22%Social media (Facebook, Twitter) 11% Major newspapers 5%  |
| Consumes at least one form of social media (WhatsApp, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, or Facebook) | 68% |
| Consumes all forms of social media | 11.7% |
| Attitudes towards India | Treat as friend 45%Treat as enemy 30%Neither friend nor enemy 19% |

# **A4. Pre-Analysis Plan and Other Outcomes**

We pre-registered our study with EGAP in November 2020 prior to fielding the experiment. In the pre-analysis plan (PAP), we include discussion of our theory and potential mechanisms. We also describe our experimental treatment and hypotheses. We included in our survey a number of different outcome measures related to domestic minority group, state prowess, and international reputation. These included a mix of true, false, and unverified statements. Hypotheses related to each of these are included in the PAP; however, we do not include a hypothesis for the pooled treatments which is a test we conduct in this manuscript.

In this paper, we focus on only two outcomes related to ethnic minorities, both of which would be classified as “conspiracy theories” because they are unverifiable. We made the decision to analyze these outcomes in this paper, rather than all of them together, in order to be concise and thematically consistent on issues related to domestic minority groups and fifth column allegations. Descriptive data from our survey is available in Mir & Siddiqui 2022.

The relationship of the other outcome measures to the treatments provides some evidence that social desirability was unlikely at play. For example, an outcome measure asking respondents if they believed a false statement, “Pakistan is consistently ranked one of the most peaceful countries according to an annual global index of peacefulness” was not affected by the treatments, though we would expect belief in this statement to increase if social desirability was playing a role. The OLS regression showing this test between the pooled treatments and control is below.

**Table A4. Effect of Pooled Treatment on Other Outcome**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
|  | **Pakistan****Peaceful** |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| Pooled Treatment | 0.025 |
|  | (0.052) |
| Constant | 1.667\*\*\* |
|  | (0.046) |
|  |  |
| Observations | 1,936 |
| R-squared | 0.000 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

OLS regression with robust standard errors. The outcome measure is measured on a scale of 1-4, with greater numbers indicating greater belief in the statement.

# **A5. Difference in Means between Pooled Treatments and Control**

|  |
| --- |
| **Table A5****Belief in Accuracy of Conspiracy Theory Related to \_\_\_**Difference-in-Means (Control vs. Pooled Treatments) |
|  | **Pooled Treatment** | **Control** | **Diff-in-Means** |
| **PTM** | 2.46 (0.04) | 2.23 (0.07) | 0.22 (0.76)\*\* |
|  | N=1155 | N=349 |  |
| **Baloch** | 2.78 (0.03) | 2.64 (0.06) | 0.15 (0.07)\* |
|  | N=1331 | N=396 |  |

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, +p<0.1

# **A6. Means of Belief in Conspiracy Theory by Treatment**

|  |
| --- |
| **Table A11** **Means of Belief in Conspiracy Theory, by Treatment** **(1-4 scale, with higher numbers indicating greater belief in misinformation)** |
|  | **Chauvinistic Prime** | **Legitimacy Prime** | **Cohesive Prime** | **Control** |
| **PTM** | 2.45N=381 | 2.46N=376 | 2.46N= 398 | 2.23N=349 |
| **Baloch** | 2.72N=430 | 2.91N= 441 | 2.73N = 460 | 2.64N= 396 |

# **A7. Dichotomized Outcome Measure**

Our results are robust to recoding the outcome (measured on a 1-4 scale) as a dichotomous (0-1) variable. Table A7 shows OLS regressions using this dichotomized outcome variable for the pooled treatment vs. the control, while Table A7b shows the same results for each of the three treatments separately.

**Table A7.**

**OLS Regressions Using Dichotomized Outcome Variable for Pooled Treatment**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |
|  | PTM Subversivedichotomized | Baloch Subversivedichotomized |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment | 0.085\*\* | 0.062\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.028) |
| Constant | 0.447\*\*\* | 0.593\*\*\* |
|  | (0.027) | (0.025) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,504 | 1,727 |
| R-squared | 0.005 | 0.003 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

The table shows ordinary least square regressions for a dichotomized outcome variable, in which 1 includes anyone who somewhat or strongly believed in the accuracy of the conspiracy theory and 0 includes anyone who somewhat or strongly disbelieved the accuracy of the conspiracy theory.

**Table A7b.**

**OLS Regressions Using Dichotomized Outcome Variable for Each Treatment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | PTM Subversive | PTM Subversive | PTM Subversive | Baloch  | Baloch | Baloch |
|  | Dichotomized | Dichotomized | Dichotomized | Dichotomized | Dichotomized | Dichotomized |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Chauvinist Nationalism | 0.075\*(0.037) |  |  | 0.041(0.034) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cohesive Nationalism |  | 0.081\*(0.037) |  |  | 0.037(0.033) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LegitimacyNationalism |  |  | 0.101\*\*(0.037) |  |  | 0.110\*\*\*(0.033) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.447\*\*\* | 0.447\*\*\* | 0.447\*\*\* | 0.593\*\*\* | 0.593\*\*\* | 0.593\*\*\* |
|  | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.025) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 730 | 747 | 725 | 826 | 856 | 837 |
| R-squared | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.010 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.013 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

The table shows ordinary least square regressions for a dichotomized outcome variable, in which 1 includes anyone who somewhat or strongly believed in the accuracy of the conspiracy theory and 0 includes anyone who somewhat or strongly disbelieved the accuracy of the conspiracy theory.

# **A8. Analysis Controlling for Demographic Variables**

**Table A8. OLS Regressions with Controls**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |
|  | PTMSubversive | BalochSubversive |
| Treatment | 0.183\* | 0.136+ |
|  | (0.085) | (0.079) |
| Education | 0.024 | 0.024 |
|  | (0.018) | (0.017) |
| Income | 0.034 | 0.012 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.028) |
| Shia | 0.261 | 0.027 |
|  | (0.173) | (0.158) |
| Pol. KnowledgePunjab | 0.271\*\*\*(0.076)0.059(0.071) | 0.436\*\*\*(0.071)-0.019(0.066) |
|  |  |  |
| Constant | 1.858\*\*\* | 2.318\*\*\* |
|  | (0.149) | (0.139) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,201 | 1,380 |
| R-squared | 0.027 | 0.042 |

The table shows ordinary least square regressions with robust standard errors, with controls for education, income, a dummy variable for whether the respondent belonged to the minority Shia sect, a dummy variable for whether the respondent was in Punjab province, and a measure of political knowledge. We measure political knowledge by asking respondents the name of the President of Pakistan (Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy with the President holding largely ceremonial responsibilities). 44% answered this question correctly. The results show that more politically knowledgeable respondents were more likely to believe conspiracy theories about minority groups as subversives. This result is consistent with other findings from Pakistan (see, for example, Siddiqui 2020) but raises important questions about the nature of the education system in the country (see also Mir & Siddiqui 2022).

# **A9. Ordered Logit Robustness Check**

**Table A9. Ordered Logit Regression**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |
|  | PTM Subversive | Baloch Subversive |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| Pooled Treatment | 0.332\*\* | 0.205+ |
|  | (0.115) | (0.105) |
| Observations | 1,504 | 1,727 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Outcome measures are measured on a 1-4 scale, with greater numbers indicating greater belief in the conspiracy.

# **A10. Attrition and Non-Response**

We analyze whether respondents chose to respond or not respond to the outcome measures differentially based on the treatment group to which they were assigned. Table A10 shows the percentage of respondents who did not respond (coded by enumerators either as “don’t know” or “choose not to answer”) across treatments and control for each of the two outcome measures. Table A10b depicts the results from an OLS regression, showing that attrition was not significantly determined by assignment to treatment. Table A10c demonstrates the results of a Lee Bounds test as a robustness check, which show both the smallest and largest effect of treatment on outcomes. Table A10d shows ordinary least square regressions with robust standard errors for a recoded outcome measure, in which we code the non-responses as a 3 on a new 1-5 scale.

|  |
| --- |
| **Table A10. Non-Response Percentage by Treatment** |
|  | Chauvinist | Cohesive | Legitimacy | Control |
| PTM Percentage Non-Response | 34% | 36% | 38.4% | 38.1% |
| Baloch Percentage Non-Response | 25.5% | 26% | 27.7% | 29.8% |

**Table A10b. OLS Regression of Non-Response by Treatment (vs. Control)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |
|  | PTM Non-Response | Baloch Non-Response |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| Chauvinistic Nationalism | -0.042(0.028) | -0.043(0.026) |
|  |  |  |
| Cohesive Nationalism | -0.021(0.028) | -0.037(0.026) |
|  |  |  |
| Legitimacy Nationalism | 0.002(0.028) | -0.021(0.026) |
|  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.381\*\*\* | 0.298\*\*\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.019) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,373 | 2,373 |
| R-squared | 0.001 | 0.001 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

The table shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression where the dependent variable is a dummy variable coding whether respondents responded to the question. 1 indicates non-response, while 0 indicates response. As the table shows, non-response did not vary significantly across the treatments.

|  |
| --- |
| **Table A10c. Lee (2009) Treatment Effect Bounds, For Pooled Treatment**  |
|  | **Coefficient** | **Standard Error** | **z** | **P>|z|** |
| **PTM** |  |  |  |  |
| Lower | 0.18 | 0.10 | 1.80 | 0.072 |
|  Upper | 0.27 | 0.09 | 2.84 | 0.005 |
| **Baloch** |  |  |  |  |
|  Lower  | 0.09 | 0.08 | 1.08 | 0.282 |
|  Upper | 0.23 | 0.10 | 2.50 | 0.013 |

The table shows how the results could change under the extreme bounds’ assumptions about the patterns of attrition. The upper bounds are positive and significant for both dependent variables, while the lower bound remains positive but is significant only for the PTM measure. For the PTM, the coefficient lies between 0.18 (p<0.1) and 0.27 (p<0.05), indicating that the intervention is still effective even under less favorable patterns of attrition. For the Baloch measure, the coefficient lies between 0.09 (p>0.1) and 0.223 (p<0.05). Overall, the results suggest that differential attrition could only be a threat to the observed treatment effects under quite conservative assumptions used by the extreme bounds analysis.

**Table A10d. OLS Regressions for Pooled Treatment with Re-Coded Non-Response**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |
|  | PTM Subversive | Baloch Subversive |
|  | Five Point Scale  | Five Point Scale |
|  |  |  |
| Treatment | 0.191\*\* | 0.162\* |
|  | (0.066) | (0.071) |
| Constant | 2.801\*\*\* | 3.165\*\*\* |
|  | (0.057) | (0.062) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,373 | 2,373 |
| R-squared | 0.004 | 0.002 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

The table shows ordinary least square regressions with robust standard errors for a recoded outcome measure, in which we code the non-responses as a 3 on a new 1-5 scale.

# **A11. Baseline Belief in Conspiracy Theory by Ethnic Group**

|  |
| --- |
| **Table A11****Means of Belief in Conspiracy Theory by Ethnic Group** |
|  | **Punjabis** | **Baloch** | **Pashtun** |
| **PTM** | 2.49 (0.05)N = 523 | 2.40 (0.19)N = 47 | 2.25 (0.08)N= 255 |
| **Baloch** | 2.77 (0.05)N = 618  | 2.12 (0.18)N = 50 | 2.68 (0.08)N.= 265 |

Baloch were significantly less likely (p=0.0006) than other ethnic groups to believe the conspiracy theory about fellow Baloch, across all conditions, and Pashtun were significantly less likely than other ethnic groups to believe the conspiracy about the PTM (p=0.034).

# **A12. Treatment Effect Across Ethnic Groups**

|  |
| --- |
| **Table A12****Difference-in-Means of Belief in Conspiracy Theory, by Ethnic Group** |
|  |  |  | **Pooled Treatment** | **Control** | **Diff-in-Means** |
| **Punjabis** | **PTM** | Mean | 2.54 (0.06) | 2.28 (0.12) | 0.25 (0.13)+ |
| N | 421 | 102 |  |
| **Baloch** | Mean | 2.81 (0.05) | 2.59 (0.11) | 0.23 (0.12)+ |
| N | 490 | 128 |  |
| **Baloch** | **PTM** | Mean | 2.4 (0.21) | 2.42 (0.38) | 0.02 (0.43) |
| N | 35 | 12 |  |
| **Baloch** | Mean | 2.13 (0.20) | 2.08 (0.37) | 0.06 (0.42) |
| N | 37 | 13 |  |
| **Pashtun** | **PTM** | Mean | 2.33 (0.09) | 2.01 (0.15) | 0.32 (0.18) + |
| N | 190 | 65 |  |
| **Baloch** | Mean | 2.76 (0.09) | 2.44 (0.16) | 0.32 (0.18) + |
| N | 201 | 64 |  |

T-test with unequal variances. 1-4 scale, with high numbers indicating greater belief in conspiracies. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

# **A13. Effect of Treatments on Pride**

**Table A13 Effect of Treatments on Pride**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  |  Pride | Pride | Pride |
|  |  |  |  |
| Chauvinistic Nationalism | 0.117\* |  |  |
|  | (0.051) |  |  |
| Cohesive Nationalism |  | 0.036 |  |
|  |  | (0.056) |  |
| Legitimacy Nationalism |  |  | -0.151\* |
|  |  |  | (0.065) |
| Constant | 9.729\*\*\* | 9.753\*\*\* | 9.816\*\*\* |
|  | (0.037) | (0.035) | (0.029) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,775 | 1,775 | 1,775 |
| R-squared | 0.002 | 0.000 | 0.004 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

OLS regression, with robust standard errors, of the stated treatment group compared to the pooled other two treatment groups. Pride was measured on a scale of 1-10, with greater numbers indicating more pride, following the treatment. Respondents in the control group were not asked this question. That our three nationalism treatments evoked different levels of pride in being Pakistani allow us to rule out one possible research design flaw—that the treatments were perceived as identical by respondents and hence had similar effects on the outcome measures.

# **A14. Effect of Treatments on Anger**

**Table A14. Effect of Nationalism Treatments on Anger Towards Pakistan’s Enemies**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Anger | Anger | Anger | Anger |
| Pooled Treatment | 0.086 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.106) |  |  |  |
| Chauvinistic Nationalism |  | 0.001 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.105) |  |  |
| Cohesive Nationalism |  |  | 0.208\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.102) |  |
| Legitimacy Nationalism |  |  |  | -0.132 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.103) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 9.059\*\*\* | 9.124\*\*\* | 9.069\*\*\* | 9.158\*\*\* |
|  | (0.092) | (0.052) | (0.052) | (0.052) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,304 | 2,304 | 2,304 | 2,304 |
| R-squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.001 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

OLS regression, with robust standard errors. Anger was measured on a scale of 1-10, with greater numbers indicating more pride.

# **A15. Effect of Nationalism on Conspiracy Belief by Whether Pakistan’s International Contributions are Perceived as Sufficiently Recognized**



Coefficient plot showing the effect of nationalism primes on belief in conspiracy theories among those who saw Pakistan’s contributions to international peace were well received on the world stage relative to those who did not believe they were.

# **A16. PTM Conspiracy Belief by Respondents Who Think Pakistan’s Contributions Well-recognized**

****

Bar graph showing belief in accuracy of conspiracy theory about the PTM by low and high international esteem groups. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

# **A17. Pakistani Nationalism Compared to Other Countries**

The World Values Survey, Wave 7, included several questions related to nationalism. The survey inquired about confidence in a country’s armed forces, the United Nations, and the IMF. It also delved into trust in people of other nationalities and religions. Lastly, participants were asked about their sense of pride in their nation.

The survey covered individuals across 64 countries in different years, including Pakistan in 2018. Overall results indicate that Pakistanis tend to be more nationalistic than the Wave average across multiple dimensions as shown in the tables below. For instance, nearly 80% of Pakistanis expressed “a lot of” confidence in the armed forces, in contrast to the Wave average of 28%. Additionally, almost 85% of Pakistanis stated that they were “very proud” of their country, compared to the Wave average of around 56%. Nearly 49% of Pakistanis reported not trusting people of another nationality, compared to the Wave average of 24%. Around 46% mentioned not trusting people of another religion, whereas the Wave average was 20%.

However, Pakistanis indicated similar levels of confidence in international institutions such as the United Nations and IMF when compared to the Wave average. Approximately 40% and 36% expressed “a great deal” and “quite a lot” of confidence in the United Nations and IMF, respectively, in contrast to the Wave average of 43% and 34%.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Table A18. Pakistan Attitudes, World Values Survey (Wave 7)** |
| **Confidence in … (%)** | **A great deal** | **Quite a lot** | **Not very much** | **None at all** | **Don't know** | **No answer** |
| Armed Forces | 79.8 | 13.4 | 3.9 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 0.1 |
| UN | 14.2 | 25.4 | 14.1 | 23 | 22 | 1.4 |
| IMF | 12.3 | 24 | 13.1 | 26.3 | 23.1 | 1.3 |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|  **Trust in … (%)** | **Trust completely** | **Trust somewhat** | **Do not trust very much** | **Do not trust at all** | **Don't know** | **No answer** |
| People of another nationality | 6.9 | 20.8 | 17.9 | 48.6 | 5.2 | 0.6 |
| People of another religion | 7.2 | 24.2 | 19.8 | 45.8 | 2.6 | 0.5 |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|  **Pride in … (%)** | **Very proud** | **Quite proud** | **Not very proud** | **Not at all proud** | **I am not** | **don't know** |
| Nation | 85.3 | 9.8 | 2.9 | 1 | - | - |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Table A18b. Wave Average, World Values Survey (Wave 7)** |
|  Confidence in … (%) | **A great deal** | **Quite a lot** | **Not very much** | **None at all** | **Don't know** | **No answer** |
| Armed Forces | 27.7 | 38.7 | 22.2 | 9.1 | 1.8 | 0.3 |
| UN | 10.9 | 32.2 | 28.9 | 17.2 | 9.7 | 0.8 |
| IMF | 7.5 | 26.9 | 31.1 | 18.4 | 14.6 | 0.9 |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| **Trust in ... (%)** | **Trust completely** | **Trust somewhat** | **Do not trust very much** | **Do not trust at all** | **Don't know** | **No answer** |
| People of another nationality | 4.9 | 33.9 | 33.5 | 23.7 | 3.2 | 0.6 |
| People of another religion | 5.9 | 37.4 | 32.9 | 19.6 | 3.2 | 0.7 |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|  Pride in … (%) | **Very proud** | **Quite proud** | **Not very proud** | **Not at all proud** | **I am not** | **Don't know** |
| Nation | 56 | 30.2 | 8.3 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 0.5 |

**References**

Mir, Asfandyar and Niloufer Siddiqui. 2022. “Losing Facts to Fiction: Nationalism, Misinformation, and Conspiracy Theories in Pakistan.” *United States Institute of Peace* Special Report. Available at: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/losing-facts-fiction-nationalism-misinformation-and-conspiracy-theories>