Online Appendix

A Additional details on the survey

The following images depict the pictures that respondents were shown before answering their questions.

Figure A1 shows the picture of an individual with a radical-right t-shirt (of party VOX). Figure A2 shows the picture of an individual with the t-shirt of the mainstream party (PSOE). Figure A3 shows the picture of an individual with a radical-left t-shirt (of party Podemos). As mentioned in the main text, we also show respondents an isolated image of the t-shirt alone, to make sure they notice it and can easily identify the party it refers to. The image of the t-shirt alone was prefaced with the sentence "Notice the t-shirt the person in the picture was wearing".

Figure A1: Images depicting individual with radical-right t-shirt (of party VOX).

To check how representative our sample is, we compare it to the sample of the 9th wave of the European Social Survey (ESS). We start with merging the two datasets, and add a dummy coded 1 for observations from ESS and 0 for observations from our original survey. Then, we use this dummy to conduct a series of t-tests where we check for differences in the two samples. We check for differences in respondent's left-right self-placement (0-10 scale), age, political interest (1-4 scale), gender, and region (by looking into dummies for each Spanish autonomous region).

The results are shown in Table A1. As the table shows, respondents in our sample are, on average, more interested in politics, younger, more likely to be from Madrid and less likely

Figure A2: Images depicting individual with t-shirt of mainstream party (of party PSOE).

Figure A3: Images depicting individual with radical-left t-shirt (of party Podemos).

to be from Castilla-La Mancha.

B   Additional analyses

We now report some additional analyses of the survey data. We start with addressing a potential concern in our design. As discussed in the main text, we do not compare our survey items against what respondents say they would do about a non-political behavior. Readers might worry that this can bias our estimates. If PSOE and Podemos are also somewhat stigmatized in Spain, our estimates would be underestimating the true likelihood that individuals engage in sanctioning.

To address this concern, we look for evidence of whether these parties are, indeed, stig-

Left-right self placement	-0.0225	(-0.23)
Age (calculated)	-6.384***	(-9.93)
Political interest	0.216***	(6.13)
Female (dummy)	0.00526	(0.28)
Canarias	-0.0122	(-1.75)
Murcia	-0.00258	(-0.45)
Andalucia	-0.0241	(-1.66)
Balears	-0.000219	(-0.04)
Valencia	0.00405	(0.35)
Catalunya	0.00671	(0.52)
Extremadura	-0.00932	(-1.57)
Castilla La Mancha	-0.0172*	(-2.08)
Castilla y Leon	-0.00281	(-0.32)
Madrid	0.0881***	(6.23)
Aragon	-0.00467	(-0.68)
Rioja	-0.00152	(-0.52)
Navarra	-0.00498	(-1.28)
Basque country	-0.0111	(-1.41)
Cantabria	-0.00254	(-0.58)
Asturias	0.00623	(1.03)
Galicia	-0.0118	(-1.18)
N	2850	

t statistics in parentheses

Entries represent results of t-tests.

Positive values mean that the variable has a higher value in our sample than in the ESS one.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A1: Comparing our sample to that of the European Social Survey Wave 9.

matized. We do so by looking into reported vote—an observational measure of political stigmatization proposed by Valentim 2021; 2023. This measure compares how individuals vote in election day to how they report to have voted (in post-electoral surveys). The rationale is that, if a given party platform is stigmatized, even individuals who vote for it have an incentive to say they did not when a survey interviewer asks. As such, stigmatized party platforms should be under-reported in surveys when compared to their official vote share. Following this reasoning, reported vote is calculated by taking the vote share for each party as reported in post-electoral surveys and dividing it by the official vote share for that same party.

To test whether this is the case for PSOE and Podemos, we collect all available post-electoral surveys run by survey company CIS. We then compare the vote shares for the two parties as reported in those surveys to their official vote share.

The results are shown in Figure B1. The upper facet reports the results for Podemos, while the lower facet reports them for PSOE. In both cases, we show two bars. The left-hand side bar reports the official vote share for each party; the right-hand side bar reports the vote share for each party as reported in the CIS post-electoral surveys. If there was evidence of stigmatization, we should see that the left-side bar is taller than the right-side bar. What

Figure B1: PSOE and Podemos are not under-reported in post-electoral surveys, which suggests that they are not stigmatized in Spain.

we find, however, is the opposite. This means that there is no evidence that either party we use as a control is also stigmatized.

We now provide some additional information to the question of whether there is a norm against showing radical-right preferences. In Figure 1 we simply plot the descriptives of how harmful, socially appropriate and morally appropriate individuals deem the expression of each political preference.

We now add to these findings in two ways. First, by running these analyses within individuals. To that end, we reshape the dataset to long format, so that each observation is one outcome*party*individual. Then, we regress each outcome on the party that was shown to the individual, adding individual fixed effects. These analyses are thus analogous to the ones we show in Table 1, except with a different set of outcomes.

The results of this exercise are shown in Table B1. Each model represents a different

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Socially appr (self)	Morally appr (self)	Harmful (self)	Socially appr (others)	Morally appr (others)	Harmful (others)
Podemos	0.685***	0.728***	0.515***	0.614***	0.643***	0.582***
	(0.105)	(0.113)	(0.0784)	(0.0963)	(0.0972)	(0.0712)
PSOE	0.428***	0.510***	0.522***	0.612***	0.674***	0.553***
	(0.0994)	(0.106)	(0.0779)	(0.0936)	(0.0935)	(0.0699)
Constant	2.158***	2.136***	2.242***	2.193***	2.178***	2.209***
	(0.0525)	(0.0567)	(0.0392)	(0.0482)	(0.0486)	(0.0356)
N	2362	2362	2362	2359	2359	2342

Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors are clustered by respondent

All models include respondent-level fixed effects

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B1: Replication of the analyses in Figure 1 adding individual-level fixed effects. **Notes**: All models include individual fixed effects. Perceptions of harmfulness are measured in a 1-4 scale; perceptions of appropriateness (social and moral) are measured on a 1-6 scale. Standard errors are clustered by respondent.

outcome reported in Figure 1. Coefficients report the difference in each outcome as reported for Vox and for each of the other two parties, within individual. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level (which is possible because each respondent answers questions about two different parties).

As the Table shows, even within individuals there is a clear difference in perceptions of harmfulness, social and moral appropriateness of showing support for Vox. Whatever outcome we look into, we find a significant difference between Vox (the reference category) and the two remaining parties. The magnitude of the differences is also sizeable. Perceptions of harmfulness are measured in a 1-4 scale; while perceptions of appropriateness (social and moral) are measured on a 1-6 scale. Since most coefficients are above 0.5, this means they are very large in substantive terms. This suggests that the difference between the perceived appropriateness of showing support for Vox and for other parties can found even when we analyse differences *within respondents*.

We now provide some additional details for the analyses shown in Table 1. In that table, we find that respondents always deem sanctioning radical-right views as more appropriate than other political views, except when it comes to physical sanctions. As mentioned in the main text, one possibility is that this is driven by concerns for one's safety. Individuals may fear that physical sanctions lead to retaliation, and thus find them less appropriate. If that were the case, we should find that respondents who feel fear upon seeing the individual with the radical-right t-shirt find physical sanctions less appropriate. This effect should be stronger for individuals who belong to vulnerable groups, such as women, older respondents, and respondents who belong to national minorities.

In Table B2 we test for this expectation. We regress perceptions of appropriateness of physical sanctions on self-reported feelings of fear and a number of sociodemographic characteristics of respondents. We also interact fear with a dummy for respondents identifying as female, age, and a dummy for Spanish nationals. In Model 2, we also add region fixed

effects.

Overall, we find no evidence that perceptions of appropriateness of physical sanctions are driven by concerns for one's safety. In both models, there is no significant correlation between fear and perceptions of appropriateness of this type of sanctions. We also find no evidence of an interaction with membership in any vulnerable group.

Afterwards, we replicate the analyses shown in Table 2 using different independent variables. Instead of perceptions of social appropriateness, we focus on perceived moral appropriateness (Table B3) and harmfulness of showing a radical-right preference (Table B4). The latter variable is inverted, so that the interpretation of the sign of coefficients remains the same. Higher values in this variable mean that respondents deem it less harmful to display a radical-right preference. Like with the remaining variables, we expect a negative coefficient, suggesting that the more harmful respondents deem the expression of radical-right preferences, the more appropriate they deem sanctions to be. In both tables, the results are very similar to those shown in Table 2. Regardless of the measure we draw upon, perceptions of appropriateness and harmfulness of showing a radical-right preference are predictive of willingness to engage in all types of sanctions.

We now add to the findings shown in Figure 1 by directly comparing the share of respondents who deem it socially and morally acceptable and not harmful to display each preference to those who deem it socially and morally unacceptable and harmful.

To that end, we split each scale into two. We take the bottom half of the scale to mean disagreement with the question, and the upper half to mean agreement. All questions are answered in an even-numbered scale, which means that they do not have mid-points. Then, for each party, we report the share of respondents who deem it socially appropriate, morally appropriate, and harmful to display that preference, as well as their expectations of others views.

The results are shown in Figures B2 through B4. These plots highlight one point already made clear in Figure 1: individuals tend to overestimate the share of others who deem the public display of all political preferences as unacceptable. When it comes to PSOE (Figure B2) and Podemos (Figure B3), more individuals think it is socially and morally appropriate than inappropriate to display that preference in public. However, they think that most others will deem it inappropriate.

This pattern, however, is not found when we look into perceptions of harmfulness. Respondents overwhelmingly find it not harmful to display a preferences for either PSOE or Podemos public. Moreover, unlike what had happened with perceptions of appropriateness, their second order expectations of harmfulness are accurate. As with many findings

6

	(1)	(2)
Fear	0.0159	0.0543
	(0.227)	(0.225)
Fear x Age	0.00358	0.00317
	(0.00251)	(0.00251)
Fear x Female	-0.0110	-0.0174
	(0.0621)	(0.0620)
Fear x Spanish	0.00703	-0.00695
	(0.190)	(0.189)
Female (dummy)	-0.0663	-0.0444
	(0.131)	(0.132)
Age	-0.00226	-0.00101
	(0.00508)	(0.00504)
College	-0.199**	-0.189**
	(0.0710)	(0.0708)
Spanish	0.0466	0.103
	(0.379)	(0.363)
Canarias		-0.0592
		(0.218)
Murcia		-0.134
		(0.269)
Andalucia		0.0165
		(0.118)
Balears		0.0570
		(0.293)
Valencia		-0.0655
		(0.126)
Catalunya		-0.0107
		(0.119)
Extremadura		0.0166
		(0.294)
Castilla La Mancha		0.0742
		(0.204)
Castilla y Leon		0.244
		(0.190)
Aragon		0.0311
		(0.232)
Rioja		0.608
		(0.413)
Navarra		0.268
		(0.445)
Basque country		-0.288
		(0.150)
Cantabria		0.586
		(0.477)
Asturias		0.0531
		(0.222)
Galicia		-0.248
		(0.127)
Constant	1.617***	1.492***
	(0.447)	(0.437)
N	1160	1160

Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors are robust

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B2: Fear and membership in vulnerable groups as predictors of perceived appropriateness of physical sanctions to radical-right views.

	Physical	Verbal	Insult	Gossip	Deny help	Avoid interact
Beliefs about moral appropriateness	-0.00721	-0.154***	-0.0943***	-0.376***	-0.153***	-0.245***
	(0.0246)	(0.0257)	(0.0213)	(0.0324)	(0.0240)	(0.0269)
Constant	1.698***	2.706***	1.981***	4.069***	2.465***	3.225***
	(0.222)	(0.247)	(0.202)	(0.322)	(0.239)	(0.272)
N	1160	1160	1160	1160	1160	1160

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B3: The more morally inappropriate respondents think it is to show radical-right preferences, the more appropriate they think it is to sanction those preferences.
Notes: All models include the following set of controls: age, a dummy for respondents who attended college, a dummy for respondents who identify as female, a dummy for Spanish nationals, and fixed effects for each region of residence. All outcomes are measured on a 1-10 scale. Standard errors are robust.

	Physical	Verbal	Insult	Gossip	Deny help	Avoid interact
Beliefs about harmfulness (inverted)	-0.0493	-0.290***	-0.207***	-0.668***	-0.316***	-0.406***
	(0.0341)	(0.0395)	(0.0323)	(0.0475)	(0.0370)	(0.0399)
Constant	1.801***	3.019***	2.245***	4.734***	2.844***	3.586***
	(0.232)	(0.256)	(0.212)	(0.322)	(0.251)	(0.279)
N	1160	1160	1160	1160	1160	1160

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B4: The more harmful respondents think it is to show radical-right preferences, the more appropriate they think it is to sanction those preferences.
Notes: All models include the following set of controls: age, a dummy for respondents who attended college, a dummy for respondents who identify as female, a dummy for Spanish nationals, and fixed effects for each region of residence. All outcomes are measured on a 1-10 scale. Standard errors are robust.

throughout the paper, the results for the two parties are strikingly similar.

The situation changes when we look into the radical-right party Vox (in Figure B4). When it comes to this party, respondents still overestimate the proportion of others who will deem it morally and socially inappropriate to display this preference in public. However, unlike what happens with PSOE and Podemos, most respondents themselves deem it inappropriate. The same is true of how harmful it is to display this preference in public. Unlike with PSOE and Podemos, most respondents deem the public expression of support for Vox as harmful.

We also look at whether perceptions of appropriateness depend on which image respondents see first. As we discuss in the text, all respondents see the individual wearing a Vox t-shirt and one of the other two images, at random. One might wonder to what extent there are some order effects. To check for such effects, we regress perceptions of appropriateness on a dummy coded 1 for respondents who see the Vox image first.

The results are shown in Table B5. While all coefficients are positive, they are also all far from statistical significance. As such, there is no clear evidence that perceptions of appropriateness depend on whether respondents see the Vox t-shirt first or a different one.

Then, we replicate Figure 2, which looks into what sanctions are deemed most appropriate, in the form of a regression with respondent-fixed effects. To that end, we reshape the dataset to long format, so that each row is one respondent*sanction type. Then, we regress the respondent's own perception of acceptability, and their perception of others' perceptions,

Figure B2: Share of respondents who perceive it appropriate and harmful to display a preference for PSOE, and their guess of others' views.


Figure B3: Share of respondents who perceive it appropriate and harmful to display a preference for Podemos, and their guess of others' views.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Socially appropriate	Morally appropriate	Harmful (inverted)
Vox shown first	0.0506	0.0121	0.0736
	(0.0986)	(0.0989)	(0.0661)
Constant	3.371***	3.351***	2.837***
	(0.0711)	(0.0708)	(0.0455)
N	1182	1182	1182

Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors are clustered by respondent

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B5: Perceptions of appropriateness do not depend on which image respondents see first.

Notes: Standard errors are clustered by respondent.

Figure B4: Share of respondents who perceive it appropriate and harmful to display a preference for Vox, and their guess of others' views.

on a dummy for each sanction type. Doing so allows us to check which types of sanctions are deemed most acceptable, and are perceived as being deemed most acceptable by others, while leaving all individual-level variables (be they observable or unobservable) constant. As the reference category, we use physical sanctions.

The results are shown in Table B6. As the Table shows, the findings are very similar to the ones shown in Figure 2. In the case of both own beliefs and perceptions of others' beliefs, insulting is the social sanction that is perceived as least acceptable. This is followed by physical reactions (the reference category, omitted) and denial of help, among which we cannot find a statistically significant difference (as denoted by the fact that the coefficient for denial of help, which compares this sanction to physical sanctions, the reference category, fails to reach statistical significance). These are followed, in growing order of acceptability, by verbal sanctions, gossip, and no reaction.

We also replicate Figure 2 focusing on the two other parties included in our survey that were not radical-right. Figure B5 shows the perceived acceptability of sanctions against individuals showing a preference for PSOE (center-left). Figure B5 shows the perceived acceptability of sanctions against individuals showing a preference for Podemos (radical-left). Finally, Figure B7 shows all three parties together. In this Figure we remove the dots identifying respondents to avoid over-plotting.

The analyses of the Figures highlights three main points. First, the patterns in which sanctions are deemed most acceptable are strikingly similar across the three parties. Second, all sanctions are perceived as less acceptable when imposed upon individuals who show a preference for PSOE and Podemos than when imposed upon individuals who show a

10

	(1)	(2)
	Acceptability of each sanction (own)	Acceptability of each sanction (others)
Do nothing	2.662***	2.037***
	(0.0678)	(0.0670)
Gossip	0.527***	0.751***
	(0.0479)	(0.0455)
Deny help	0.00254	0.0662
	(0.0405)	(0.0409)
Avoid interaction	1.281***	1.254***
	(0.0629)	(0.0554)
Insult	-0.196***	-0.0603*
	(0.0334)	(0.0322)
Verbal	0.186***	0.289***
	(0.0371)	(0.0346)
Constant	2.363***	2.523***
	(0.0317)	(0.0289)
N	8254	8246

Standard errors in parentheses

The reference category is the acceptability of physical sanctions

Standard errors are clustered by respondent

All models include respondent-level fixed effects

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B6: Replication of the analyses in Figure 1 adding individual-level fixed effects.
Notes: All models include individual fixed effects. Perceptions of appropriateness of each sanction type are measured on a 1-6 scale. Standard errors are clustered by respondent.

Figure B5: Perception of acceptability of different types of sanctions on individuals displaying a preference for center-left party PSOE.
Notes: Each dot represents a respondent. All variables are measured in a 1-6 scale. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

preference for Vox. The only exception is when it comes to physical sanctions. These sanctions are not perceived as more appropriate when it comes to Vox than when it comes to the remaining parties. This highlights the point made above in Table 1, where we found no difference when it comes to physical sanctions. However, it should be noted that individuals still think others deem physical sanctions on Vox supporters as more appropriate than it is to impose those sanctions on individuals with other political preferences. Third, the perceived appropriateness of sanctions to either PSOE and Podemos is very similar. This is also in line with the findings shown in Figure 1, which show that the perceived acceptability of showing support for these parties is identical. Since it is equally acceptable to display support for the two parties, it makes sense that sanctions on individuals who display such support are deemed identically acceptable.

We now report the same additional analyses that we showed for Figure 2, but for Figure 3, which looks into self-reported propensity to sanction radical-right preferences. As we did above, we start with replicating these analyses in the form of a regression with respondent-

Figure B6: Perception of acceptability of different types of sanctions on individuals displaying a preference for radical-left party Podemos.
Notes: Each dot represents a respondent. All variables are measured in a 1-6 scale. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B7: Perception of acceptability of different types of sanctions on individuals displaying a preference for different political parties.
Notes: All variables are measured in a 1-6 scale. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

	(1)
	Willigness to engage in each sanction (own)
Do nothing	6.096***
	(0.143)
Gossip	1.620***
	(0.0972)
Deny help	0.638***
	(0.0774)
Avoid interaction	3.136***
	(0.132)
Insult	-0.00343
	(0.0431)
Verbal	0.248***
	(0.0496)
Constant	3.324***
	(0.0521)
N	8198

Standard errors in parentheses

The reference category is the acceptability of physical sanctions

Standard errors are clustered by respondent

All models include respondent-level fixed effects

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B7: Replication of the analyses in Figure 1 adding individual-level fixed effects. **Notes**: All models include individual fixed effects. Perceptions of appropriateness of each sanction type are measured on a 1-6 scale.

fixed effects. As discussed above, the advantage of these analyses is that we get to look into within-individual differences, thus keeping all characteristics of respondents constant.

The results are shown in Table B7. The table supports the results from Figure 2. Insult and physical reactions are the reactions that individuals would be least likely to engage in. Their likelihood of engaging in these two types of sanctions is statistically indistinguishable. These are followed, in growing order of willingness to engage, by verbal sanctions, denial of help, gossip, avoidance of interaction, and non-reaction. With the exception of the differences between physical sanctions and insult, all other differences are statistically significant.

Then we replicate Figure 3 focusing on the two other parties included in our survey. Figure B8 shows the self-reported propensity to engage in each type of sanctions over an individual showing a preference for PSOE (center-left). Figure B9 shows the self-reported propensity to engage in each type of sanctions over an individual showing a preference for Podemos (radical-left). Figure B10 shows all three parties together. As done above, we remove dots to avoid over-plotting.

The conclusions we can draw from comparing these Figures to Figure 3 are very similar to the ones we drew from the previous Figures. When we compare sanctions against one

Figure B8: Self-reported willingngess to engage in different types of sanctions on individuals displaying a preference for center-left party PSOE.
Notes: Each dot represents a respondent. All variables are measured in a 1-6 scale. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

another, the patterns are very similar across the two parties, and very similar to the patterns for Vox. However, individuals are less likely to sanction a preference for PSOE or Podemos than one for Vox. This further reinforces the point that there is a social norm against showing support for Vox, specifically. Additionally, it should be noted that the types of sanctions that individuals report they would be more willing to use to punish radical-right views (like avoidance of interaction and gossip) are also those where the gap between willingness to sanction radical-right and other views is wider.

Afterwards, we replicate the analyses of Table 3 adding dummies for region of residence. This is done to check whether respondents from some regions are particularly willing to sanction radical-right views. We focus only on the models that include sociodemographic variables as predictors, to which we add region of residence. We drop the variable for the vote share for Vox in each region, because that would be collinear with the region dummies.

As shown in Table B8, the inclusion of these dummies in the models does not substantially change the correlation between the remaining variables. When it comes to the correlation between these dummies themselves and sanctioning behavior, we find no clear evidence that individuals from some regions are more willing to engage in sanctioning.

This is an important point especially when it comes to Catalonia and the Basque Country.

Figure B9: Self-reported willingness to engage in different types of sanctions on individuals displaying a preference for center-left party Podemos.
Notes: Each dot represents a respondent. All variables are measured in a 1-6 scale. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

As discussed in the text, in our main analyses we use a dummy for Spanish nationals as a proxy for ingroupism. We find no correlation between this variable and willingness to sanction. However, it might be argued that this is not a good proxy, and that a better one would be whether individuals are from regions with strong peripheral nationalism—chiefly among which Catalonia and the Basque Country. However, looking into the dummies for these regions, we again find little evidence of a correlation. It does seem that respondents from Catalonia are more likely to insult individuals wearing a Vox t-shirt, but we find no evidence of a correlation with any other sanction (even if all coefficients are positive). When it comes to individuals living in the Basque Country, we also find that, despite all coefficients being positive, there is no significant correlation with any of the sanctions we look into.

We also replicate Table 3 including ideology as a fully factorized variable. The reason for this is that the absence of an effect in Table 3 could be masking non-linearities. We address this concern by adding a dummy for each position along the left-right continuum. The reference category is 0 (far left). Since the only change happens in the models that include left-right ideology as an independent variable, we focus on those models alone. In other words, we do not report the models using sociodemographic characteristics of respondents as predictors of willingness to sanction, because these models do not include ideology and

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Figure B10: Self-reported willingness to engage in different types of sanctions on individuals displaying a preference for different parties, and perceptions of the willingness of others.
Notes: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Personal willingness to sanction is measured on a 0-10 scale; perceptions of others' willingness to sanction is measured on a 1-5 scale.

	Physical	Physical	Verbal	Verbal	Insult	Insult	Dir sanct (PCA)	Dir sanct (PCA)	Gossip
Female (dummy)	-0.328**	-0.299*	-0.219	-0.248**	-0.218	-0.367*	0.579*	-0.0350	-0.249*
	(0.111)	(0.130)	(0.114)	(0.0954)	(0.188)	(0.162)	(0.238)	(0.0832)	(0.113)
Age	-0.00507	-0.0157**	-0.0165***	-0.0111**	-0.0364***	-0.00961	-0.0357***	-0.0138***	-0.0169***
	(0.00440)	(0.00479)	(0.00426)	(0.00360)	(0.00663)	(0.00600)	(0.00836)	(0.00295)	(0.00417)
College	-0.320**	-0.256*	-0.186	-0.234*	0.0919	-0.203	0.204	0.0113	-0.186
	(0.110)	(0.127)	(0.112)	(0.0935)	(0.187)	(0.160)	(0.237)	(0.0822)	(0.111)
Spanish	-0.128	-0.105	0.131	-0.0335	0.572	0.119	0.248	0.184	0.0853
	(0.262)	(0.299)	(0.221)	(0.213)	(0.397)	(0.359)	(0.579)	(0.174)	(0.242)
Canarias	-0.430*	-0.135	-0.369	-0.275	0.254	-0.286	0.597	0.103	-0.180
	(0.185)	(0.417)	(0.199)	(0.191)	(0.518)	(0.392)	(0.794)	(0.245)	(0.257)
Murcia	0.395	0.506	0.211	0.344	-0.388	0.370	-0.776	-0.117	0.241
	(0.515)	(0.599)	(0.482)	(0.446)	(0.579)	(0.592)	(0.789)	(0.283)	(0.499)
Andalucia	0.156	0.0448	0.258	0.142	-0.305	0.250	-0.589	-0.0944	0.0704
	(0.177)	(0.204)	(0.192)	(0.158)	(0.291)	(0.264)	(0.375)	(0.133)	(0.187)
Balears	0.105	-0.388	-0.439*	-0.200	-0.796	-0.541	-2.180**	-0.608**	-0.570*
	(0.489)	(0.293)	(0.182)	(0.210)	(0.622)	(0.518)	(0.770)	(0.229)	(0.257)
Valencia	0.0142	-0.0684	-0.132	-0.0614	0.540	-0.210	0.0808	0.0670	-0.0195
	(0.192)	(0.240)	(0.179)	(0.164)	(0.354)	(0.271)	(0.455)	(0.146)	(0.187)
Catalunya	0.173	0.125	0.204	0.153	0.419	0.566*	0.669	0.273	0.272
	(0.178)	(0.206)	(0.181)	(0.152)	(0.322)	(0.285)	(0.420)	(0.145)	(0.182)
Extremadura	0.367	0.517	0.657	0.446	0.841	0.375	-0.334	0.183	0.472
	(0.425)	(0.619)	(0.581)	(0.438)	(0.679)	(0.626)	(0.802)	(0.319)	(0.495)
Castilla La Mancha	0.321	-0.0585	-0.0325	0.0629	-0.0626	-0.452	-0.949	-0.249	-0.108
	(0.339)	(0.329)	(0.290)	(0.256)	(0.472)	(0.335)	(0.579)	(0.199)	(0.295)
Castilla y Leon	0.326	-0.197	-0.0138	0.0381	0.119	-0.103	-0.433	-0.0756	-0.00522
	(0.310)	(0.320)	(0.293)	(0.262)	(0.414)	(0.388)	(0.540)	(0.188)	(0.300)
Aragon	0.0634	-0.0207	0.227	0.00545	0.749	-0.00116	0.446	0.195	0.0695
	(0.284)	(0.356)	(0.328)	(0.259)	(0.635)	(0.411)	(0.727)	(0.232)	(0.299)
Rioja	1.084	1.122	1.379	1.046	-0.683	1.530	0.489	0.246	0.999
	(0.769)	(0.965)	(0.946)	(0.768)	(0.917)	(1.016)	(1.380)	(0.477)	(0.831)
Navarra	1.078	0.0130	0.286	0.408	1.747	-0.200	1.840	0.539	0.593
	(1.101)	(0.960)	(0.960)	(0.860)	(1.422)	(1.059)	(1.379)	(0.559)	(0.967)
Basque country	0.270	0.159	0.151	0.165	1.027	0.792	0.0627	0.383	0.389
	(0.358)	(0.358)	(0.269)	(0.219)	(0.580)	(0.525)	(0.648)	(0.255)	(0.289)
Cantabria	-0.105	-0.191	0.227	0.0134	0.632	-0.118	-0.201	0.0659	0.107
	(0.437)	(0.504)	(0.521)	(0.428)	(0.891)	(0.769)	(1.121)	(0.411)	(0.607)
Asturias	0.229	0.0634	0.144	0.122	0.487	0.407	0.190	0.217	0.236
	(0.364)	(0.409)	(0.335)	(0.299)	(0.645)	(0.592)	(0.776)	(0.322)	(0.393)
Galicia	-0.105	-0.165	-0.0921	-0.109	0.0311	-0.320	0.172	-0.0373	-0.130
	(0.178)	(0.230)	(0.221)	(0.170)	(0.403)	(0.293)	(0.516)	(0.164)	(0.209)
Constant	1.314***	2.052***	1.487***	0.669*	3.299***	1.914***	4.875***	0.378	0.770*
	(0.335)	(0.378)	(0.312)	(0.277)	(0.544)	(0.508)	(0.750)	(0.243)	(0.325)
N	1153	1156	1152	1143	1151	1153	1153	1140	1127

Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors are robust

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B8: Replication of Table 3 adding dummies for each region of residence.

	Physical	Verbal	Insult	Dir sanct (PCA)	Gossip	Deny help	Avoid interact	Ind sanct (PCA)	All sanctions (PCA)
Left-right self placement: 1	0.363	0.0992	0.157	0.181	0.282	0.544	0.923	0.271	0.304
	(0.369)	(0.412)	(0.357)	(0.312)	(0.598)	(0.557)	(0.643)	(0.216)	(0.335)
Left-right self placement: 2	-0.255	-0.353	-0.122	-0.207	0.310	0.00658	0.0138	0.0382	-0.129
	(0.224)	(0.321)	(0.277)	(0.215)	(0.472)	(0.369)	(0.512)	(0.175)	(0.244)
Left-right self placement: 3	0.213	0.0667	0.0705	0.101	0.0938	0.436	-0.153	0.0699	0.152
	(0.258)	(0.313)	(0.272)	(0.226)	(0.417)	(0.369)	(0.479)	(0.171)	(0.256)
Left-right self placement: 4	-0.0928	-0.366	-0.406	-0.239	-0.274	-0.251	-0.168	-0.166	-0.315
	(0.246)	(0.297)	(0.229)	(0.204)	(0.442)	(0.359)	(0.516)	(0.175)	(0.237)
Left-right self placement: 5	0.267	0.0273	0.0410	0.0983	-0.428	0.261	-1.275**	-0.234	-0.0327
	(0.236)	(0.289)	(0.247)	(0.210)	(0.398)	(0.339)	(0.462)	(0.167)	(0.241)
Left-right self placement: 6	0.548*	0.347	0.145	0.300	0.294	0.420	-0.0784	0.111	0.308
	(0.274)	(0.339)	(0.277)	(0.240)	(0.449)	(0.376)	(0.530)	(0.183)	(0.271)
Left-right self placement: 7	0.314	0.00336	0.104	0.125	-0.175	0.123	-1.077*	-0.189	0.00115
	(0.274)	(0.307)	(0.264)	(0.221)	(0.440)	(0.346)	(0.502)	(0.175)	(0.255)
Left-right self placement: 8	0.325	0.268	0.0239	0.178	0.452	0.245	-0.751	0.000220	0.148
	(0.294)	(0.372)	(0.328)	(0.254)	(0.511)	(0.410)	(0.576)	(0.198)	(0.296)
Left-right self placement: 9	0.319	-0.0778	0.0342	0.0945	-0.834	0.923	-1.405	-0.182	0.0185
	(0.531)	(0.571)	(0.529)	(0.483)	(0.626)	(0.803)	(0.939)	(0.288)	(0.487)
Left-right self placement: 10	0.407	-0.125	-0.108	0.0513	-0.721	0.128	-0.818	-0.259	-0.0906
	(0.325)	(0.310)	(0.257)	(0.228)	(0.451)	(0.389)	(0.595)	(0.196)	(0.269)
Political interest	-0.0545	0.0376	0.00287	-0.00437	-0.00228	-0.0627	-0.121	-0.0263	-0.0161
	(0.0678)	(0.0764)	(0.0675)	(0.0567)	(0.111)	(0.0977)	(0.134)	(0.0466)	(0.0653)
Anger	0.273***	0.356***	0.380***	0.295***	0.302**	0.589***	0.139	0.198***	0.362***
	(0.0730)	(0.0792)	(0.0682)	(0.0545)	(0.113)	(0.100)	(0.130)	(0.0464)	(0.0623)
Disgust	0.0109	0.224**	0.0578	0.0834	0.768***	0.181	0.903***	0.309***	0.247***
	(0.0778)	(0.0773)	(0.0638)	(0.0536)	(0.125)	(0.118)	(0.160)	(0.0538)	(0.0623)
Fear	0.249***	0.105	0.256***	0.180**	-0.137	0.0570	-0.309**	-0.0541	0.115
	(0.0678)	(0.0826)	(0.0672)	(0.0564)	(0.111)	(0.0990)	(0.117)	(0.0452)	(0.0637)
Sadness	-0.106	-0.0979	-0.134*	-0.0995	0.0182	0.0122	0.437**	0.0652	-0.0453
	(0.0669)	(0.0722)	(0.0622)	(0.0520)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.135)	(0.0462)	(0.0595)
Constant	-0.135	-0.402	-0.370	-1.031***	0.0391	-0.522	1.531*	-1.180***	-1.554***
	(0.308)	(0.365)	(0.324)	(0.268)	(0.536)	(0.453)	(0.631)	(0.223)	(0.312)
N	1068	1068	1064	1057	1063	1066	1066	1052	1040

Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B9: Replication of Table 3 with self-reported ideology as a fully-factorized variable.

would thus remain unchanged.

As shown in Table B9, the conclusion remains very similar: there is no clear correlation between one's left-right self-placement and their willingness to engage in any type of sanctioning, with the exception of avoidance of interaction. The only other significant correlation is between individuals who identify as a 5 or 7 in the left-right scale and avoidance of interaction; and between those who self identify as a 6 and physical sanctions.

One concern with these analyses is that individuals who feel that their ideology is stigmatized may misreport it. It should be noted that our survey is conducted online, which means that social norms are less likely to affect the responses individuals provide (Valentim, 2021). However, this may not completely do away with this concern. For that reason, we try to alleviate it by running an additional set of analyses. Concretely, we also Table 3 using a dummy for left-wing individuals (those who report an ideology above 5 in a 0-10 scale) instead of the continuous variable.

The rationale for these analyses is the following. In Spain, stigmatized political preferences are mostly found at the right of the political spectrum. They correspond to the radical-right party Vox, the focus of this study, and the center-right party PP (Valentim, 2022). As such, if some individuals have an incentive to misrepresent their ideology because

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	Physical	Verbal	Insult	Dir sanct (PCA)	Gossip	Deny help	Avoid interact	Ind sanct (PCA)	All sanctions (PCA)
Left-wing respondent (dummy)	0.245*	0.203	0.0608	0.149	-0.0403	-0.275	0.00414	-0.0493	0.0894
	(0.124)	(0.134)	(0.117)	(0.0989)	(0.152)	(0.224)	(0.176)	(0.0764)	(0.113)
Political interest	-0.0790	0.0121	0.00961	-0.0190	-0.0287	-0.0132	0.0257	0.00187	-0.0150
	(0.0625)	(0.0717)	(0.0627)	(0.0530)	(0.0876)	(0.121)	(0.0986)	(0.0422)	(0.0606)
Anger	0.260***	0.344***	0.365***	0.284***	0.586***	0.143	0.287**	0.196***	0.353***
	(0.0720)	(0.0792)	(0.0685)	(0.0550)	(0.0983)	(0.126)	(0.111)	(0.0453)	(0.0624)
Disgust	0.0284	0.256***	0.0962	0.108	0.189	0.982***	0.846***	0.338***	0.282***
	(0.0795)	(0.0776)	(0.0672)	(0.0567)	(0.114)	(0.154)	(0.123)	(0.0523)	(0.0652)
Fear	0.248***	0.0954	0.241***	0.174**	0.0482	-0.346**	-0.173	-0.0688	0.104
	(0.0680)	(0.0819)	(0.0672)	(0.0567)	(0.0968)	(0.116)	(0.108)	(0.0445)	(0.0640)
Sadness	-0.128	-0.111	-0.150*	-0.114*	-0.0120	0.493***	0.0284	0.0705	-0.0555
	(0.0685)	(0.0718)	(0.0643)	(0.0538)	(0.100)	(0.130)	(0.102)	(0.0446)	(0.0605)
Constant	0.0768	-0.413	-0.417	-0.982***	-0.361	0.548	-0.270	-1.373***	-1.602***
	(0.199)	(0.234)	(0.214)	(0.174)	(0.278)	(0.398)	(0.328)	(0.138)	(0.199)
N	1159	1161	1157	1148	1159	1159	1156	1145	1131

Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B10: Replication of Table 3 with a dummy for left-wing individuals instead of self-reported ideology.

of existing social norms, these should be right-wing individuals. They may either present themselves as less rightist than they are, choose the middle category (5), or prefer not to answer the question. Given how costly it is for someone who is right-wing to say that they are left-wing (Bølstad and Dinas, 2017), we think that this possibility is quite unlikely. Our dummy should thus be able to compare left-wing individuals to all others: those who report to be right-wing, those who report to be centrist, and those who do not respond. As such, we hope it can somewhat do away with concerns about self-reported ideology being affected by social norms.

The results are shown in Table B10. We find little evidence of a correlation between the dummy for left-wing individuals and sanctioning behavior. If anything, they are more likely to engage in physical sanctions. However, this finding is in tension with those of previous tables, where we found no evidence of a correlation with this type of sanction. Overall, the table does not provide clear evidence of a correlation between being left-wing and being willing to engage in sanctions.

Tables B11 and B12 replicate Table 3 drawing upon PSOE and Podemos, respectivelly, instead of Vox.

Finally, we look into two questions raised by our findings. First, the possibility that willingness to sanction may be shaped by concerns for one's safety. The radical right are often associated with intolerance and violence in many societies. For this reason, respondents may shy away from direct sanctions which may come with risks of a violent reaction. This should be particularly so for respondents from more vulnerable groups, like women, minorities, and older people. The use of a young man as the experimental stimulus could increase this concern, given that threatening and violent behaviour is more common among young men.

If this is the case, we should see it reflected in the variable that asks respondents whether

	Physical	Physical	Verbal	Verbal	Insult	Insult	Dir sanct (PCA)	Dir sanct (PCA)	Gossip	Gossip	Deny help	Deny help	Avoid interact	Avoid interact	Ind sanct (PCA)	Ind sanct (PCA)	All sanctions (PCA)	All sanctions (PCA)
Female (dummy)	-0.234 (0.152)		-0.383* (0.163)		-0.290* (0.140)		-0.271* (0.129)		-0.566** (0.211)		-0.213 (0.190)		-0.440 (0.276)		-0.168 (0.118)		-0.313 (0.160)	
Age	0.00765 (0.00561)		-0.000272 (0.00611)		0.00593 (0.00542)		0.00435 (0.00497)		-0.0169* (0.00811)		0.0107 (0.00731)		0.00795 (0.0102)		0.000549 (0.00431)		0.00393 (0.00609)	
College	-0.495*** (0.147)		-0.382* (0.162)		-0.285* (0.136)		-0.355** (0.128)		-0.225 (0.215)		-0.243 (0.188)		0.323 (0.274)		-0.0457 (0.116)		-0.308 (0.158)	
Spanish	-0.223 (0.305)		-0.0849 (0.291)		-0.174 (0.278)		-0.138 (0.246)		-0.200 (0.850)		-0.0133 (0.337)		-0.750 (0.646)		-0.113 (0.230)		-0.161 (0.311)	
PSOE vote in Region	0.0105 (0.0156)		0.00625 (0.0157)		0.0126 (0.012)		0.00944 (0.0119)		-0.0119 (0.0221)		0.00714 (0.0179)		0.0330 (0.0273)		0.00257 (0.0113)		0.00797 (0.0146)	
Left-right self placement		0.0244 (0.0273)		0.0284 (0.0331)		0.0340 (0.0232)		0.0258 (0.0230)		-0.0132 (0.0368)		0.0778* (0.0311)		0.0201 (0.0515)		0.0195 (0.0198)		0.0337 (0.0277)
Political interest		-0.0420 (0.0866)		0.0636 (0.0977)		0.0124 (0.0789)		0.00785 (0.0743)		-0.00958 (0.129)		0.0247 (0.105)		0.168 (0.170)		0.0320 (0.0659)		0.0292 (0.0894)
Anger		0.472*** (0.137)		0.343* (0.135)		0.289* (0.116)		0.354*** (0.106)		0.00531 (0.179)		0.0642 (0.152)		0.148 (0.204)		0.0504 (0.0929)		0.314** (0.119)
Disgust		-0.226* (0.0966)		0.0894 (0.119)		-0.00185 (0.0851)		-0.0482 (0.0777)		0.685*** (0.197)		0.287 (0.158)		0.530* (0.235)		0.318** (0.106)		0.150 (0.107)
Fear		0.622*** (0.143)		0.374* (0.174)		0.533*** (0.134)		0.470*** (0.122)		-0.0316 (0.206)		0.586** (0.195)		-0.591* (0.232)		0.0361 (0.108)		0.407** (0.141)
Sadness		-0.0227 (0.0696)		0.00125 (0.0751)		-0.0563 (0.0705)		-0.0259 (0.0620)		0.167 (0.138)		0.0723 (0.0983)		0.757*** (0.185)		0.188** (0.0661)		0.0935 (0.0756)
Constant	0.718 (0.585)	-0.528 (0.309)	1.180 (0.601)	-0.760* (0.356)	0.484 (0.482)	-0.744* (0.292)	-0.0240 (0.460)	-1.345*** (0.275)	3.119* (1.217)	0.0841 (0.444)	0.562 (0.637)	-1.173*** (0.394)	1.925 (1.126)	0.0339 (0.543)	0.113 (0.431)	-1.325*** (0.233)	0.0547 (0.564)	-1.900*** (0.328)
N	581	537	578	534	578	536	567	525	570	535	579	535	582	538	574	530	563	521

Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors are robust

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B11: Replication of Table 3 drawing upon PSOE instead of Vox.

	Physical	Physical	Verbal	Verbal	Insult	Insult	Dir sanct (PCA)	Dir sanct (PCA)	Gossip	Gossip	Deny help	Deny help	Avoid interact	Avoid interact	Ind sanct (PCA)	Ind sanct (PCA)	All sanctions (PCA)	All sanctions (PCA)
Female (dummy)	-0.232 (0.156)		-0.357* (0.158)		-0.220 (0.149)		-0.272 (0.140)		-0.540* (0.210)		-0.433* (0.203)		-0.396 (0.301)		-0.296* (0.119)		-0.399* (0.171)	
Age	-0.00436 (0.00610)		-0.0101 (0.00588)		-0.0133* (0.00560)		-0.00965 (0.00522)		-0.0164* (0.00812)		-0.00404 (0.00808)		0.00422 (0.0112)		-0.00470 (0.00470)		-0.0106 (0.00644)	
College	-0.294 (0.156)		-0.193 (0.158)		-0.223 (0.151)		-0.216 (0.141)		-0.219 (0.213)		-0.423* (0.203)		-0.191 (0.305)		-0.196 (0.121)		-0.314 (0.172)	
Spanish	0.490** (0.170)		0.0781 (0.382)		0.345 (0.199)		0.293 (0.183)		-0.239 (0.834)		-1.317 (0.968)		0.128 (0.756)		-0.413 (0.401)		-0.0827 (0.377)	
Podemos vote in Region	-0.00168 (0.0489)		-0.0530 (0.0450)		-0.0642 (0.0487)		-0.0415 (0.0425)		-0.0791 (0.0631)		-0.0688 (0.0560)		-0.134 (0.0773)		-0.0597 (0.0343)		-0.0740 (0.0531)	
Left-right self placement		-0.0329 (0.0288)		-0.0360 (0.0297)		-0.0422 (0.0292)		-0.0343 (0.0265)		0.0152 (0.0400)		-0.0420 (0.0392)		0.144* (0.0604)		0.0149 (0.0220)		-0.0234 (0.0321)
Political interest		-0.000863 (0.0781)		0.0273 (0.0911)		-0.0344 (0.0798)		0.00596 (0.0734)		0.0347 (0.133)		0.0984 (0.123)		-0.154 (0.174)		0.0156 (0.0697)		0.0268 (0.0916)
Anger		0.426** (0.150)		0.369** (0.140)		0.335* (0.130)		0.363** (0.114)		0.230 (0.173)		0.360 (0.190)		-0.280 (0.283)		0.104 (0.0957)		0.365** (0.139)
Disgust		-0.0661 (0.108)		0.0946 (0.129)		0.0851 (0.0910)		0.0319 (0.0842)		0.434* (0.169)		0.269 (0.174)		1.168*** (0.285)		0.348*** (0.0894)		0.220* (0.105)
Fear		0.566*** (0.150)		0.605*** (0.155)		0.608*** (0.143)		0.555*** (0.136)		0.262 (0.176)		0.498** (0.178)		-0.385 (0.226)		0.123 (0.0983)		0.532*** (0.158)
Sadness		-0.0402 (0.0816)		-0.0529 (0.122)		-0.0977 (0.0937)		-0.0645 (0.0824)		0.0700 (0.145)		-0.0183 (0.144)		0.568* (0.226)		0.0992 (0.0777)		0.00210 (0.101)
Constant	0.669 (0.703)	-0.576* (0.283)	2.048** (0.750)	-0.775** (0.295)	1.888** (0.712)	-0.583* (0.278)	0.880 (0.630)	-1.284*** (0.258)	3.807** (1.371)	-0.365 (0.421)	3.823** (1.184)	-0.851* (0.390)	4.364** (1.387)	0.234 (0.557)	1.607* (0.656)	-1.304*** (0.225)	1.818* (0.848)	-1.836*** (0.312)
N	573	530	572	529	572	529	567	524	570	529	569	526	570	527	562	521	556	515

Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors are robust

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B12: Replication of Table 3 drawing upon Podemos instead of Vox.

they felt fear upon seeing the individual in the picture—since fear is very closely related to concerns about one's safety. It is important to note that, as shown in Table 3, fear increases direct sanctions, not indirect ones. With that being said, we believe it is still important to check to what extent this effect may differ for respondents from vulnerable groups.

To assess this possibility, we check replicate Table 3 adding interactions between fear and sociodemographics that make respondents more vulnerable. Concretely, we focus on whether respondents identify as female, their age, and whether they are a national minority—the only variable indicating minority status in our survey. The latter is coded as a dummy for Spanish individuals to make it easier to compare against Table 3. A value of 0 in this variable means that a respondent is a member of a national minority. It should be noted that adding this interaction may raise concerns of post-treatment bias, since emotional reactions may themselves be influenced by respondents' sociodemographic characteristics. However, we believe that this is an important point that should be checked empirically.

The results are shown in Table B13. We find mixed support for the expectation that sanctioning patterns are driven by safety concerns. First, we find no evidence that the effect of fear on sanctioning depends on respondent's age. The interaction between the two variables has very small coefficients, which have contradictory signs and are far from significant. Fear does seem to make women more unlikely to engage in direct sanctioning and denial of help, and more likely to avoid interaction and gossip, However, none of these interaction coefficients is close to statistical significance.

Where we do find significant interactions is in the case of national minorities. Fear makes respondents who belong to a national minority less likely unlikely to engage in all types of sanctions, when compared to Spanish nationals. This is shown by the significant interaction coefficient for the PCA for all sanction types. That this coefficient is positive means that fear makes Spanish nationals more likely to engage in all types of sanctions—and, conversely, fear impels respondents of other nationalities less to engage in them. When we look into specific sanctions in isolation, we see that this interaction coefficient is significant when it comes to insult, denial of help, and gossip. Avoidance of interaction is also very close to significance at the 0.05 level ($p = 0.068$).

All in all, this evidence suggests that fear for one's safety may affect the willingness to sanction of respondents from national minorities. However, we find no clear cut evidence that the same happens with respondents from other vulnerable groups, such as those who identify as female or those who are older.

Second, we look into the possibility that the willingness to sanction may depend on the ideological outlook of a society. As mentioned in the main text, in societies where the right

	Physical	Verbal	Insult	Dir sanct (PCA)	Gossip	Deny help	Avoid interact	Ind sanct (PCA)	All sanctions (PCA)
Fear	0.273	0.0806	0.138	0.164	-0.179	0.139	-0.253	-0.0746	0.0677
	(0.269)	(0.289)	(0.238)	(0.221)	(0.341)	(0.514)	(0.365)	(0.167)	(0.253)
Fear x Age	0.000496	0.000420	-0.00104	-0.000484	0.00484	-0.00435	0.000904	0.000686	0.000307
	(0.00423)	(0.00458)	(0.00436)	(0.00364)	(0.00565)	(0.00677)	(0.00595)	(0.00263)	(0.00409)
Fear x Female	-0.187	-0.0562	-0.111	-0.110	-0.0860	0.216	0.166	0.0516	-0.0560
	(0.107)	(0.118)	(0.108)	(0.0910)	(0.142)	(0.185)	(0.157)	(0.0696)	(0.104)
Fear x Spanish	0.127	0.350	0.391*	0.256	0.598*	0.735	0.784**	0.378**	0.442*
	(0.204)	(0.221)	(0.153)	(0.159)	(0.238)	(0.430)	(0.263)	(0.125)	(0.184)
Female (dummy)	0.0274	-0.215	-0.0315	-0.0483	-0.228	0.0727	-0.619	-0.170	-0.174
	(0.186)	(0.219)	(0.182)	(0.155)	(0.274)	(0.422)	(0.326)	(0.143)	(0.187)
Age	-0.00395	-0.0127	-0.0114	-0.00759	-0.0145	-0.0164	-0.0306*	-0.0111*	-0.0131
	(0.00750)	(0.00856)	(0.00753)	(0.00627)	(0.0106)	(0.0154)	(0.0122)	(0.00532)	(0.00736)
College	-0.316**	-0.267*	-0.204	-0.243**	-0.230	0.172	0.0639	-0.00783	-0.204
	(0.107)	(0.122)	(0.107)	(0.0897)	(0.155)	(0.229)	(0.179)	(0.0780)	(0.104)
Spanish	-0.302	-0.785	-0.627*	-0.509	-1.072	-1.279	-0.976	-0.577*	-0.771*
	(0.335)	(0.420)	(0.307)	(0.277)	(0.566)	(0.979)	(0.677)	(0.280)	(0.348)
Vox vote in Region	0.00397	0.00511	0.00409	0.00406	-0.0154	-0.0483*	-0.0292	-0.0153*	-0.00480
	(0.00974)	(0.0108)	(0.00911)	(0.00769)	(0.0136)	(0.0193)	(0.0155)	(0.00675)	(0.00902)
Constant	0.663	1.666**	1.097*	0.210	2.441**	4.936***	4.129***	0.662	0.595
	(0.515)	(0.612)	(0.504)	(0.437)	(0.810)	(1.227)	(0.933)	(0.393)	(0.525)
N	1153	1156	1152	1143	1153	1153	1151	1140	1127

Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B13: Replication of Table 3 adding interactions between fear and sociodemographics.

has more electoral support, willingness to sanction radical-right views may decrease and willingness to sanction radical-left views may increase. As also mentioned in the text, the absence of comparative data does not allow us to make provide authoritative answers to this question. Still, we can see to what extent willingness to sanction depends on the ideological outlook of different regions in Spain.

To that end, we collect data on party vote shares at the regional level, in the last election before our fieldwork (November 2019). In Spain, there are many regional parties that do not run in the whole country. To enable comparisons across regions, we focus on the five main national parties: Vox, PP, PSOE, Podemos, and Ciudadanos. Then, we compute the difference between the vote shares of right-wing parties (PP, Vox, and Ciudadanos) and left-wing parties (PSOE and Podemos). Positive values in this variable mean that the three right-wing parties had more votes than the two left-wing parties in a given region. Negative values mean that the right-wing parties had less votes than the left-wing parties.

Then, we regress willingness to engage in each type of sanctions on this variable. As control variables, we add the same sociodemographic variables used in Table 3: a dummy for respondents identifying as female, age, a dummy for respondents with college education, and a dummy for respondents of Spanish nationality.

We do this exercise twice. Once for willingness to sanction a preference for Vox; once for willingness to sanction a preference for Podemos—the radical-left party. The goal is thus to check whether the former decreases and the latter increases as right-wing parties win more votes vis-a-vis left-wing parties.

Table B14 shows the results for Vox. We find some evidence that, as the difference

	Physical	Verbal	Insult	Direct sanctions (PCA)	Deny help	Avoid interaction	Gossip	Indirect sanctions (PCA)
Difference between right and left vote share in region	-0.00180	-0.00286	-0.00513	-0.00298	-0.0182*	-0.0204*	-0.0121	-0.00889*
	(0.00490)	(0.00544)	(0.00449)	(0.00385)	(0.00715)	(0.0100)	(0.00800)	(0.00358)
Female (dummy)	-0.323**	-0.291*	-0.222*	-0.245**	-0.358*	0.621**	-0.206	-0.0256
	(0.109)	(0.127)	(0.111)	(0.0929)	(0.160)	(0.237)	(0.187)	(0.0823)
Age	-0.00626	-0.0162***	-0.0178***	-0.0120***	-0.0108	-0.0333***	-0.0356***	-0.0135***
	(0.00434)	(0.00472)	(0.00424)	(0.00356)	(0.00597)	(0.00837)	(0.00658)	(0.00293)
College	-0.317**	-0.258*	-0.194	-0.236*	-0.211	0.199	0.0840	0.00612
	(0.109)	(0.126)	(0.111)	(0.0931)	(0.160)	(0.237)	(0.186)	(0.0822)
Spanish	-0.0641	-0.0951	0.145	-0.00924	0.132	0.234	0.611	0.192
	(0.261)	(0.292)	(0.217)	(0.210)	(0.351)	(0.573)	(0.392)	(0.171)
Constant	1.418***	2.089***	1.634***	0.756**	2.126***	4.804***	3.444***	0.433
	(0.327)	(0.365)	(0.303)	(0.272)	(0.465)	(0.703)	(0.514)	(0.226)
N	1153	1156	1152	1143	1153	1153	1151	1140

Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B14: Difference between right and left vote shares and willingness to sanction radical-right views.

	Physical	Verbal	Insult	Direct sanctions (PCA)	Deny help	Avoid interaction	Gossip	Indirect sanctions (PCA)
Difference between right and left vote share in region	-0.0151*	-0.00694	-0.00555	-0.00844	-0.000790	0.0302*	0.00463	0.00567
	(0.00756)	(0.00677)	(0.00657)	(0.00638)	(0.00889)	(0.0123)	(0.00851)	(0.00506)
Female (dummy)	-0.261	-0.383*	-0.244	-0.297*	-0.452*	-0.371	-0.551**	-0.302*
	(0.155)	(0.159)	(0.151)	(0.141)	(0.203)	(0.300)	(0.210)	(0.119)
Age	-0.00426	-0.0102	-0.0134*	-0.00963	-0.00426	0.00361	-0.0166*	-0.00492
	(0.00601)	(0.00583)	(0.00556)	(0.00516)	(0.00804)	(0.0112)	(0.00808)	(0.00467)
College	-0.290	-0.195	-0.225	-0.217	-0.424*	-0.202	-0.222	-0.196
	(0.155)	(0.158)	(0.151)	(0.141)	(0.203)	(0.305)	(0.214)	(0.121)
Spanish	0.510**	0.116	0.386	0.326	-1.285	0.163	-0.202	-0.389
	(0.178)	(0.400)	(0.218)	(0.201)	(0.977)	(0.752)	(0.849)	(0.407)
Constant	0.706*	1.376**	1.063**	0.364	2.928**	2.481**	2.745**	0.800
	(0.333)	(0.461)	(0.356)	(0.322)	(0.963)	(0.919)	(0.966)	(0.472)
N	573	572	572	567	569	570	570	562

Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B15: Difference between right and left vote shares and willingness to sanction radical-left views.

between the vote share of right and left parties increases, the willingness to sanction radical-right preferences decreases. This variable has a negative effect for all sanction types. However, these effects are small and, for the most part, not statistically significant. Vote shares seem to affect mostly willingness to engage in indirect sanctions. We find a significant correlation with denial of help and avoidance of interaction, as well as witht eh summary measure for indirect sanctions.

Table B15 shows the results for Podemos. The evidence is less clear cut when it comes to this party. If anything, the right winning more votes vis-a-vis the left *reduces* the willingness to sanction radical-left views in direct forms. When it comes to indirect sanctions, however, we do find the expected positive effect. As the right becomes stronger, willingness to sanction radical-left views also becomes stronger. However, it should be noted that these effects are, again, small and only significant in the case of avoidance of interaction.

Finally, we replicate the analyses controlling for the willingness to sanction the other party preference that individuals see in the survey. Due to concerns about post-treatment bias, we can only replicate the models that draw upon attitudes and emotional reactions. This is what we do in Table B16. We find that, in the case of most sanctions, willingness to sanction one party preference correlates with willingness to sanction another. This suggests that some individuals may have a stronger intrinsic preference to sanction than others. However, even

after controlling for this variable, we still find evidence of emotions predicting sanctioning behavior.

	Physical	Physical	Verbal	Verbal	Insult	Insult	Dir sanct (PCA)	Dir sanct (PCA)	Gossip	Gossip	Deny help	Deny help	Avoid interact	Avoid interact	Ind sanct (PCA)	Ind sanct (PCA)	All sanctions (PCA)	All sanctions (PCA)
Left-right self placement	-0.0110	-0.00178	-0.0651	-0.0300	-0.0773*	-0.0327	-0.0469	-0.0170	-0.0969	-0.120*	-0.0569	-0.0432	-0.112	-0.210**	-0.0481*	-0.0619**	-0.0685*	-0.0447
	(0.0357)	(0.0366)	(0.0378)	(0.0378)	(0.0303)	(0.0331)	(0.0269)	(0.0276)	(0.0550)	(0.0543)	(0.0477)	(0.0414)	(0.0704)	(0.0673)	(0.0230)	(0.0222)	(0.0320)	(0.0309)
Political interest	-0.0539	-0.103	0.0233	0.0409	-0.0102	-0.0223	-0.00932	-0.0333	-0.207	0.234	-0.130	-0.0348	-0.356	0.221	-0.109	0.0728	-0.0740	0.0170
	(0.0847)	(0.0852)	(0.103)	(0.0958)	(0.0868)	(0.0847)	(0.0716)	(0.0697)	(0.148)	(0.151)	(0.138)	(0.126)	(0.183)	(0.194)	(0.0609)	(0.0641)	(0.0827)	(0.0791)
Anger	0.0990	0.203*	0.338**	0.172	0.397***	0.171	0.243**	0.158*	0.655***	-0.0867	0.789***	0.241	0.143	0.0819	0.309***	0.0450	0.398***	0.153*
	(0.107)	(0.0997)	(0.115)	(0.101)	(0.0935)	(0.0881)	(0.0822)	(0.0652)	(0.159)	(0.148)	(0.130)	(0.142)	(0.189)	(0.182)	(0.0585)	(0.0650)	(0.0896)	(0.0737)
Disgust	0.0549	-0.0172	0.170	0.260**	-0.0506	0.166*	0.0437	0.126*	0.415*	0.985***	-0.111	0.428**	0.861***	0.866***	0.174**	0.401***	0.126	0.347***
	(0.102)	(0.0909)	(0.107)	(0.0963)	(0.0855)	(0.0809)	(0.0710)	(0.0613)	(0.166)	(0.172)	(0.149)	(0.157)	(0.244)	(0.219)	(0.0668)	(0.0742)	(0.0779)	(0.0706)
Fear	0.315**	0.0791	0.0648	-0.00439	0.262**	0.122	0.197*	0.0513	-0.227	-0.124	0.107	-0.121	-0.315*	-0.343	-0.0576	-0.0983	0.130	-0.0217
	(0.101)	(0.0808)	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.0951)	(0.0923)	(0.0807)	(0.0699)	(0.145)	(0.171)	(0.134)	(0.148)	(0.159)	(0.187)	(0.0590)	(0.0698)	(0.0897)	(0.0809)
Sadness	-0.0830	-0.0283	-0.0627	-0.0291	-0.0759	-0.105	-0.0646	-0.0524	0.163	-0.00188	0.108	0.0315	0.609**	0.417*	0.136*	0.0622	0.0218	-0.00891
	(0.0816)	(0.0727)	(0.0956)	(0.0794)	(0.0770)	(0.0681)	(0.0607)	(0.0531)	(0.150)	(0.142)	(0.136)	(0.130)	(0.213)	(0.177)	(0.0604)	(0.0604)	(0.0680)	(0.0601)
PCA all sanctions UP	0.410***		0.346***		0.359***		0.326***		0.241**		0.416***		0.130		0.147***		0.355***	
	(0.0728)		(0.0725)		(0.0752)		(0.0617)		(0.0815)		(0.0847)		(0.0831)		(0.0411)		(0.0727)	
PCA all sanctions PSOE		0.417***		0.505***		0.460***		0.404***		0.466***		0.476***		0.263***		0.224***		0.462***
		(0.0698)		(0.0770)		(0.0706)		(0.0615)		(0.0744)		(0.0723)		(0.0753)		(0.0360)		(0.0679)
Constant	0.246	0.546	0.148	0.0244	0.119	0.205	-0.613*	-0.519	0.859	0.215	0.155	0.235	1.891*	1.362	-0.864***	-1.038***	-0.995**	-1.068***
	(0.384)	(0.306)	(0.424)	(0.358)	(0.364)	(0.342)	(0.311)	(0.265)	(0.626)	(0.575)	(0.507)	(0.478)	(0.738)	(0.760)	(0.254)	(0.245)	(0.363)	(0.301)
N	513	519	513	518	511	517	508	514	510	516	513	516	514	517	508	509	502	505

Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B16: Replication of Table 3 adding controls for willingness to sanction the other party respondents saw in the survey.