

Supplementary Appendix to “The Expertise Paradox: How Policy Expertise Can Hinder Responsiveness”

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Appendix A: Versions of the policy appeal

The vignette used to test the expertise paradox hypothesis varied both the issue domain of the policy appeal (to manipulate expertise), and the position of the group of voters sending the message (to hold issue disagreement constant). In total, the study included ten different versions of the hypothetical message: 5 policy issues \times support/opposition. Below we present the English translation of all ten versions.

Health care

In favor: Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to **support** a proposal to ban companies for running hospitals. They believe that health care is facing major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that a ban on companies for operating hospitals makes it **easier** for vulnerable patients to choose the health care they need.

Against: Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to **oppose** a proposal to ban companies for running hospitals. They believe that health care is facing major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that a ban on companies for operating hospitals makes it **more difficult** for vulnerable patients to choose the health care they need.

Education

In favor: Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to **support** a proposal to provide more resources to charter schools. They believe that the school faces major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that more resources for charter schools make it **easier** for vulnerable children to get a place in a school that takes care of their needs.

Against: Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to **oppose** a proposal to provide more resources to charter schools. They believe that the school faces major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that more resources for charter schools make it **more difficult** for vulnerable children to get a place in a school that takes care of their needs.

Immigration

In favor: Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to **support** a proposal to receive fewer refugees. They believe that integration policies face major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that **receiving fewer refugees** allows Sweden to take care of the most vulnerable groups in society.

Against: Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to **oppose** a proposal to receive fewer refugees. They believe that integration policies face major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that **accepting refugees** allows Sweden to take care of the most vulnerable groups in society.

Social Welfare

In favor: Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to **support** a proposal to ban panhandling. They believe that the issue of social security faces major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that a ban on panhandling would **help** protecting vulnerable groups in society.

Against: Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to **oppose** a proposal to ban panhandling. They believe that the issue of social security faces major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that a ban on panhandling would **not help** protecting vulnerable groups in society.

Housing

In favor: Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to **support** a proposal for reduced interest deductions for home loans. They believe that the housing market faces major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that lowered interest deductions for home mortgages would **reduce** the risk that vulnerable groups end up subsidizing the houses of more affluent people.

Against: Imagine the following. A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to **oppose** a proposal for reduced interest deductions for home loans. They believe that the housing market faces major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that lowered interest deductions for home mortgages would **increase** the risk that vulnerable groups end up subsidizing the houses of more affluent people.

Appendix B: Descriptive statistics

Table B1 summarizes the political and demographic characteristics of the sample of elected officials that took part in the study. The sample is part of the Panel of Politicians and includes a diverse group of representatives from all main parties and levels of government. Table B2 presents the distribution of issue areas identified by study participants as the domains of higher or lower expertise.

Table B1: Demographic characteristics of the Panel of Politicians: waves 13 and 14

	Wave 13	Wave 14
Age (years)	61.9	63.1
Female (%)	34.5	33.2
College degree or higher (%)	50.1	49.7
Social Democrats (%)	27.8	27.2
Moderate Party (%)	18.7	19.8
Centre Party	11.1	11.2
Left Party	10.7	11.3
Liberals (%)	10.3	10.6
Green Party (%)	8.2	7.9
Christian Democrats (%)	5.2	4.7
Sweden Democrats (%)	3.7	3.4
Local government	73.0	72.3
Regional government	16.8	16.2
National government	3.8	4.0
N	1,861	1,348

Note: Entries are percentages or average values for the public officials who completed waves 13 and 14 of the Panel of Politicians, respectively.

Table B2: Distribution of issue areas by high/low policy expertise

Issue Area	% High Expertise	% Low Expertise
Healthcare	16.1	30.7
Education	31.6	11.1
Immigration	11.0	14.2
Social Welfare	19.7	12.6
Housing	21.6	31.3

Appendix C: Full results

Table C1 provides the model results used to produce Figure 1 in the main text, and includes a set of baseline models without covariate adjustment (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7). Tables C2 and C3 complement Figure 3 in the main text with the full models estimated to test how formal education and experience in office moderate the expertise paradox. Finally, Table C4 reports the main findings from study 2.

Table C1: The effects of expertise on legislators' ability to incorporate contrasting views. Complement to Figure 1 and Figure D1.

	Understand Complexity		Opinion based on facts		Hold position strongly		Represents majority opinion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Expertise	-0.24** (0.09)	-0.28** (0.09)	-0.34** (0.08)	-0.35** (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.13 ⁺ (0.08)	-0.17* (0.08)
Educational Level		-0.05 ⁺ (0.03)		-0.03 (0.03)		0.09** (0.03)		-0.01 (0.03)
Age		0.002 (0.003)		0.002 (0.003)		-0.01** (0.003)		0.01* (0.003)
Social Democrats		0.23 (0.16)		0.02 (0.15)		-0.23 (0.15)		-0.06 (0.15)
Centre Party		0.14 (0.19)		0.12 (0.18)		-0.01 (0.18)		-0.19 (0.17)
Liberals		0.15 (0.19)		-0.03 (0.18)		-0.13 (0.18)		-0.04 (0.17)
Moderate Party		0.06 (0.17)		-0.25 (0.16)		-0.22 (0.16)		-0.31* (0.16)
Christian Democrats		0.23 (0.24)		0.13 (0.22)		-0.10 (0.22)		-0.08 (0.22)
Green Party		0.24 (0.21)		0.29 (0.19)		0.07 (0.19)		0.05 (0.19)
Sweden Democrats		0.02 (0.27)		-0.21 (0.25)		-0.26 (0.25)		-0.48* (0.25)
Feminist Initiative		0.55 (0.43)		-0.16 (0.39)		0.16 (0.40)		-0.07 (0.39)
Other Party		0.15 (0.31)		0.44 (0.28)		-0.34 (0.29)		-0.01 (0.28)
Constant	2.96** (0.06)	3.01** (0.32)	2.96** (0.06)	2.97** (0.29)	5.36** (0.06)	5.87** (0.30)	2.96** (0.06)	2.74** (0.29)
Observations	1,669	1,511	1,667	1,509	1,668	1,511	1,667	1,510
R ²	0.005	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.0002	0.03	0.002	0.01

Note: Entries are coefficients of linear models (SEs in parenthesis) with legislators' responses to the policy appeal as the outcome variable. For each outcome (described in the column headers), we estimated a bivariate regression (Models 1, 3, 5, and 7) and a multivariate regression with covariate adjustment (Models 2, 4, 6, and 8). *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C2: The effects of expertise on legislators' ability to incorporate contrasting views, by levels of formal education. Complement to Figure 3 (panel a).

	Understand Complexity	Opinion based on facts	Hold position strongly	Represents majority opinion
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expertise	-0.17 (0.15)	-0.22 (0.14)	0.14 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.14)
College Degree	0.11 (0.16)	0.13 (0.14)	0.36** (0.15)	0.35** (0.14)
Expertise × College Degree	-0.28 (0.22)	-0.25 (0.19)	-0.09 (0.20)	-0.43** (0.19)
Social Democrats	0.38** (0.19)	0.14 (0.17)	-0.22 (0.17)	0.10 (0.17)
Centre Party	0.20 (0.23)	0.12 (0.21)	0.03 (0.21)	-0.19 (0.21)
Liberals	0.17 (0.22)	0.01 (0.20)	-0.25 (0.21)	-0.02 (0.20)
Moderate Party	0.13 (0.20)	-0.11 (0.18)	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.25 (0.18)
Christian Democrats	0.33 (0.27)	0.15 (0.25)	-0.09 (0.25)	-0.03 (0.24)
Green Party	0.26 (0.24)	0.33 (0.22)	-0.05 (0.22)	0.18 (0.22)
Sweden Democrats	0.03 (0.32)	-0.09 (0.29)	-0.24 (0.29)	-0.55* (0.29)
Feminist Initiative	0.98* (0.58)	0.04 (0.52)	0.45 (0.53)	-0.11 (0.52)
Other Party	0.28 (0.37)	0.54 (0.34)	-0.35 (0.34)	0.33 (0.33)
Age	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.01*** (0.004)	0.01** (0.004)
Above-Median Experience	0.16 (0.11)	0.14 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	0.12 (0.10)
Constant	2.50*** (0.30)	2.52*** (0.27)	5.93*** (0.28)	2.28*** (0.27)
Observations	1,066	1,065	1,066	1,065
R ²	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03

Note: Entries are coefficients of linear models (SEs in parenthesis) with legislators' responses to the policy appeal as the outcome variable (described in the column headers). *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C3: The effects of expertise on legislators' ability to incorporate contrasting views, by experience in office. Complement to Figure 3 (panel b).

	Understand Complexity	Opinion based on facts	Hold position strongly	Represents majority opinion
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expertise	-0.26 (0.16)	-0.20 (0.15)	0.19 (0.15)	-0.37** (0.15)
Experience in Office	0.20 (0.16)	0.27* (0.14)	0.18 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.14)
Expertise × Experience	-0.09 (0.22)	-0.25 (0.20)	-0.17 (0.20)	0.24 (0.20)
Social Democrats	0.37* (0.19)	0.12 (0.17)	-0.23 (0.17)	0.09 (0.17)
Centre Party	0.19 (0.23)	0.11 (0.21)	0.02 (0.21)	-0.19 (0.21)
Liberals	0.15 (0.22)	-0.01 (0.20)	-0.25 (0.20)	-0.05 (0.20)
Moderate Party	0.12 (0.20)	-0.12 (0.18)	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.26 (0.18)
Christian Democrats	0.34 (0.27)	0.16 (0.25)	-0.09 (0.25)	-0.01 (0.24)
Green Party	0.25 (0.24)	0.31 (0.22)	-0.06 (0.22)	0.17 (0.22)
Sweden Democrats	0.01 (0.32)	-0.12 (0.29)	-0.25 (0.29)	-0.58** (0.29)
Feminist Initiative	0.93 (0.58)	-0.04 (0.52)	0.41 (0.53)	-0.12 (0.52)
Other Party	0.27 (0.37)	0.52 (0.34)	-0.36 (0.34)	0.32 (0.34)
Age	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.01*** (0.004)	0.01** (0.004)
College Degree	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.003 (0.10)	0.31*** (0.10)	0.12 (0.10)
Constant	2.56*** (0.30)	2.53*** (0.27)	5.91*** (0.28)	2.50*** (0.27)
Observations	1,066	1,065	1,066	1,065
R ²	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03

Note: Entries are coefficients of linear models (SEs in parenthesis) with legislators' responses to the policy appeal as the outcome variable (described in the column headers). *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C4: The effects of perceptions of expertise on self-confidence and close-minded cognition. Complement to Figure 4.


	Doubts about my own decisions	Waste of time to pay attention to certain ideas
	(1)	(2)
Expertise Prime	-0.13 (0.08)	0.05 (0.11)
Social Democrats	0.23 (0.15)	-0.30 (0.20)
Centre Party	0.11 (0.17)	-0.13 (0.23)
Liberals	-0.07 (0.17)	0.0004 (0.23)
Moderate Party	0.01 (0.15)	0.19 (0.21)
Christian Democrats	0.04 (0.23)	0.46 (0.31)
Green Party	0.47** (0.18)	0.31 (0.25)
Sweden Democrats	-0.29 (0.25)	0.79** (0.34)
Feminist Initiative	0.23 (0.36)	0.17 (0.49)
Other Party	0.66** (0.27)	0.67* (0.37)
Educational Level	0.11*** (0.03)	0.004 (0.04)
Age	-0.01** (0.003)	-0.01** (0.004)
Constant	2.35*** (0.30)	3.90*** (0.40)
Observations	1,145	1,143
R ²	0.04	0.03

Note: Entries are coefficients of linear models (SEs in parenthesis) with legislators' agreement with the each of the statements described in the column headers. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix D: Sensitivity Analyses


Figure D1 replicates the main analyses without covariate adjustment. Figure D2 explores the sensitivity of the findings to individual issues accounting for whether the policy appeal was in line with the opinion of the majority, according to the 2019 National SOM survey. Figures D3 and D4, in turn, account for heterogeneity across domains by including fixed effects by selected issue and pairing of high/low expertise issues, respectively. Figure D5 replicates the main models accounting for issue salience. Issue salience is measured by how strongly respondents hold their particular position on the issue included in the vignette. The variable take the value of 1 if respondents answered “Very good/bad proposal”, and 0 if the answer was “Fairly positive/bad proposal.” As expected, issue salience is negatively associated with all four outcome variables, but the effects of expertise remain substantively unchanged. Figures D6 and D7 replicate the main analyses accounting for respondents’ level of government. The result show that the results do not vary substantively between local-level officials and regional- or national-level officials. The main findings are also substantively the same when analyzing men and women legislators separately (Figure D8). Table D2 compares the share of supporters among legislators in the high- and low-expertise conditions, for each policy domain. The table shows that policy experts do not tend to have preferences more closely aligned with the electorate, relative to officials with lower expertise in the same domain. In Figure D9 we reestimated the main models restricting the analysis to officials who identified the same domain of expertise in a more extensive list of 14 issue areas. The results suggest that the main findings in study 1 are not driven by the limited choice set provided. Finally, Figure D10 replicates the same models reported in Figure 3 (panel b) with a continuous measure of experience in office. Although the direction of the conditional effects suggests that more years in office is associated with a higher propensity to discount contrasting views in their areas of expertise, the confidence envelopes are wide and inconclusive.

Figure D1: The effects of expertise on legislators' ability to incorporate contrasting views, without covariate adjustment




Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators' assessment of voters' opinion. Horizontal narrow/wide bars are 95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on the y -axis corresponds to a distinct outcome variable. Estimates and standard errors derived from bivariate linear models.

Figure D2: The effects of expertise on legislators' ability to incorporate contrasting views, controlling for alignment between policy appeal and majority opinion




Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators' assessment of voters' opinion. Horizontal narrow/wide bars are 95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on the y -axis corresponds to a distinct outcome variable. Estimates and standard errors derived from linear models with covariate adjustment for party, age, and education, and whether the policy appeal is in line with majority opinion. Public opinion estimates from the National SOM Survey.

Figure D3: The effects of expertise on legislators' ability to incorporate contrasting views, with fixed effects by selected policy issue




Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators' assessment of voters' opinion. Horizontal narrow/wide bars are 95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on the y -axis corresponds to a distinct outcome variable. Estimates and clustered standard errors derived from linear models with fixed effects by issue and covariate adjustment for party, age, and education.

Figure D4: The effects of expertise on legislators' ability to incorporate contrasting views, with fixed effects by pairing of higher/lower expertise domain




Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators' assessment of voters' opinion. Horizontal narrow/wide bars are 95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on the y -axis corresponds to a distinct outcome variable. Estimates and clustered standard errors derived from linear models with fixed effects by pairing of higher/lower expertise domain and covariate adjustment for party, age, and education.

Figure D5: The effects of expertise on legislators' ability to incorporate contrasting views, accounting for issue salience




Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators' assessment of voters' opinion. Horizontal narrow/wide bars are 95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on the *y*-axis corresponds to a distinct outcome variable. Estimates and standard errors derived from linear models with covariate adjustment for party, age, education, and issue salience.

Figure D6: The effects of expertise on legislators' ability to incorporate contrasting views, accounting for level of government



Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators' assessment of voters' opinion. Horizontal narrow/wide bars are 95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on the *y*-axis corresponds to a distinct outcome variable. Estimates and standard errors derived from linear models with covariate adjustment for party, age, education, and respondent's highest level of government.

Figure D7: The effects of expertise on legislators' ability to incorporate contrasting views, conditional on level of government




Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators' assessment of voters' opinion among local-level officials and upper-level officials. Horizontal narrow/wide bars are 95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on the y -axis corresponds to a distinct outcome variable. Estimates and standard errors derived from linear models with covariate adjustment for party, age, and education.

Table D1: The effects of expertise on legislators' ability to incorporate contrasting views, by level of government.

	Understand Complexity	Opinion based on facts	Hold position strongly	Represents majority opinion
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expertise	-0.42*** (0.13)	-0.11 (0.13)	-0.34*** (0.12)	-0.20* (0.12)
Local Rep.	0.02 (0.13)	0.04 (0.12)	0.15 (0.12)	0.04 (0.12)
Expertise × Local Rep.	0.25 (0.18)	0.20 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.16)	0.06 (0.16)
Education	-0.05* (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Age	0.002 (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.01** (0.003)
Social Democrats	0.21 (0.16)	-0.24 (0.15)	0.01 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.15)
Centre Party	0.12 (0.19)	-0.03 (0.18)	0.10 (0.18)	-0.19 (0.17)
Liberals	0.12 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.18)	-0.04 (0.18)	-0.04 (0.18)
Moderate Party	0.04 (0.17)	-0.24 (0.16)	-0.26 (0.16)	-0.32** (0.16)
Christian Democrats	0.20 (0.24)	-0.12 (0.22)	0.13 (0.22)	-0.09 (0.22)
Green Party	0.21 (0.21)	0.05 (0.19)	0.27 (0.19)	0.04 (0.19)
Sweden Democrats	-0.001 (0.27)	-0.28 (0.25)	-0.22 (0.25)	-0.49** (0.25)
Feminist Initiative	0.53 (0.43)	0.14 (0.40)	-0.19 (0.39)	-0.08 (0.39)
Other Party	0.11 (0.31)	-0.37 (0.29)	0.42 (0.28)	-0.03 (0.28)
Constant	2.99*** (0.33)	5.84*** (0.31)	2.89*** (0.30)	2.72*** (0.30)
Observations	1,511	1,511	1,509	1,510
R ²	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.01

Note: Entries are coefficients of linear models (SEs in parenthesis) with legislators' responses to the policy appeal as the outcome variable (described in the column headers), conditional on the level of government.
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure D8: The effects of expertise on legislators’ ability to incorporate contrasting views, conditional on officials’ gender




Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators’ assessment of voters’ opinion among women and men. Horizontal narrow/wide bars are 95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on the y -axis corresponds to a distinct outcome variable. Estimates and standard errors derived from linear models with covariate adjustment for party, age, and education.

Table D2: Share of legislators supporting each policy initiative, by expertise condition and policy appeal evaluated, along with the share of policy supporters among the mass public.

Policy	% of supporters			N	% of supporters in the mass public
	High Expertise	Low Expertise	p -value		
Healthcare	40.8	45.8	0.34	449	69.3
Education	39.5	36.8	0.64	391	35.4
Immigration	61.4	47.2	0.04	209	71.2
Social welfare	29.4	42.2	0.03	279	56.5
Housing	56.0	50.0	0.18	446	50.0


Note: The first two columns are the share of respondents in the Panel of Politicians supporting each policy, by treatment condition (described in the columns). The p -values for the difference in means are reported in column 3 (sample size in column 4). The final column presents the share of voters supporting each policy according to the SOM institute survey (2019).

Figure D9: The effects of expertise on legislators' ability to incorporate contrasting views, among officials who identified same area of expertise in both waves




Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators' assessment of voters' opinion, among public officials with (black) and without (gray) a college degree. Horizontal narrow/wide bars are 95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on the *y*-axis corresponds to a distinct outcome variable. Estimates and standard errors derived from linear models with fixed effects by issue and covariate adjustment for party, age, and education.


Figure D10: The effects of expertise on legislators' ability to incorporate contrasting views, by the number of years in office




(a) Voters understand complexity



(b) Opinions based on facts



(c) Voters hold position strongly



(d) Opinion aligned with majority

Note: The gray lines depict the estimated marginal effects of expertise on agreement with each of the statements described in the labels below each panel. Shaded polygons represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates and confidence intervals derived from linear models with covariate adjustment for party, age, and education.

Appendix E: Validating self-reports of expertise

In study 1, we asked officials to identify an issue where they had (1) more and (2) less expertise, from a list of five salient issue areas: education, health care, social welfare, housing, and integration. This measure is meant to capture issue areas where legislators have relatively more/less expertise. However, since the measure is based on self-reports, it is possible that subjects' choices were based not on actual specialized knowledge and experience but on some other motivation.

To evaluate the extent to which this measure is rooted in actual expertise, we leveraged the panel component of the study.¹ In study 2, fielded eight months later, we randomly assigned half the sample to an expertise prime where subjects were asked to describe one instance when their “policy expertise was important to solve an issue or push legislation forward.” The prompt did not reference any specific policy issue. We content analyzed responses to this open question to identify the issue area, or areas, that the officials mentioned, and compared it with the self-reports from study 1. The content analysis was conducted in three steps: first, we created a list of keywords associated with each of the five issues included in study 1; second, we coded any reference to the keywords in officials' responses as a mention to that issue area; third, an RA reviewed the output for disambiguation. Finally, we merged the data from the content analysis with the self-reported areas of expertise from study 1.

Table E1 lists a series of examples of responses to the open question in study 2 along with the self-reported areas of higher expertise in study 1. As the examples show, officials often describe their professional experience (e.g., as doctors, teachers, or engineers) to explain the source of their expertise. In other instances, officials mention specific experiences in office that allowed them to gain expertise on a given issue (e.g., “as a member of the Aliens Appeals Board”).

To better summarize the data, Table E2 describes how often respondents unpromptly mentioned the higher/lower expertise domains in study 2. This analysis is based on the subset of officials who participated in both studies and was randomly assigned to the expertise prime in study 2. We find that nearly 40% of officials provided specific examples about their expertise in the same area identified as higher expertise in study 1. Less than 1% of officials mentioned their lower expertise domain. Importantly, not mentioning an issue that was selected in study 1 as higher expertise does not mean self-reports are invalid. By design, subjects were forced to choose between a small list of five issue areas. If someone was an expert on environmental issues or infrastructure, she was not able to self-report that issue.

¹We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

For this reason, we describe the measure in study 1 as a measure of relative expertise.² To provide a more direct test of the measure, we replicated the analysis among respondents who mentioned any of the five issues included in study 1 (column 2). Only among this subset should we expect a perfect correspondence between self-reports in study 1 and their response to the expertise prime. For this subset, 80.4% of officials provided an example in their area of higher expertise.

While the expertise prime in study 2 was designed with a different goal in mind, we believe these analyses illustrate how the measure of expertise in study 1 are not simply capturing beliefs, but also specialized knowledge and idiosyncratic experiences that can influence how legislators interact with voters.

²As Figure D9 shows, restricting study 1 to five issues did not systematically bias the results.

Table E1: Examples of answers to the expertise prime (study 2) and self-selected higher expertise domains (study 1)

Quote (study 2)	Higher expertise (study 1)
<p>1. I am a doctor and a politician at the regional level. My medical skills are often of great use. For example, by pointing out that we as a politician at regional levels should NOT decide who should and should not get insulin pump in diabetes (has thus happened).</p>	Health care
<p>2. The transition from a focus on specialized health care to proximity health care, emphasizing primary care, preventive measures, and collaboration between the state and municipalities. This shift is slowly taking place and I have been working throughout all my adult life towards this goal.</p>	Health care
<p>3. I am an educated teacher and have been able to contribute with perspective from the ground when working with the operation plan for the local school board. It is an ongoing advocay work, for example, on how important preschool is to strengthen the opportunities for children with a mother tongue other than Swedish to take advantage of teaching when they start school. Offering extended length of stay in preschool for children with linguistic needs and working actively with them is something that favors this. Now the administration is looking into the possibility of offering extended lenght of stay for these children to a greater extent.</p>	Education
<p>4. As a committed teacher, I am quite familiar with how the school works and this has enabled me to influence how we in opposition should push forward school policies. In concrete terms, I have been involved to push for more schools to be built and question the governing Alliance’s decision to build a combined hotel and high-stadium school instead of a larger school - which we really need.</p>	Education

5. As a cultural politician with a background in a cultural school and as a performing musician, I would say that it was crucial for an inquiry into the cultural school in Sweden. It later resulted in a series of reforms for the cultural schools and also the importance of cultural schools in the municipalities. I sat on the Green Party's board when the government was formed in 2014 and pushed hard for it to be included in the government agreement. Without my experience and contacts in the cultural school world, the issue would not have been a 1) election question for MP 2) question for the government negotiations.

6. I often get questions about private schools and I can often contribute knowledge partly from my own research but also from my professional experience as a teacher, among other things.

7. As a PhD in biology, I have had great opportunities to influence issues regarding biology and the environment.

8. When I was a member of the Aliens Appeals Board and had to deal with deportation cases, the knowledge i had about the situation in the countries in question was of great importance. A special case that comes up is the deportation of a Turkish citizen who was an opposition supporter. Thanks to my insights, the decision reached was different from what the lawyers originally suggested.

9. In the decision that [anonymized] municipality would become a sanctuary municipality.

10. I worked as an educator in an elementary school. Other members of my family are also educators but at other levels. Once, I raised the question of the size of classes in our preschools. Our majority pushed us to follow the the National Agency for Education's recommendations. Another issue concerned the location of the school for students with learning disabilities.

- | | |
|--|-----------------------|
| <p>11. By having good insights into the tenants' situation and experiences, as well as good contacts with various players in the tenancy movement, I have been able to push forward good and timely proposals and have good conversations to improve the situation for the municipality's many tenants.</p> | <p>Housing</p> |
| <hr/> | |
| <p>12. My professional experience in construction, either as worker as in different functions on the service man side of a construction company has come in handy both in the Building Committee and the election committee as member of the municipal council. This background has also been a helpful in my work in the board of a local public energy company.</p> | <p>Housing</p> |
| <hr/> | |
| <p>13. About five years ago, we (myself and a few others) made the decision to allow a local elderly care unit to switch from a private provider to public management. The decision was not popular with some but the quality of the service has improved as well as the working conditions for staff.</p> | <p>Social welfare</p> |
| <hr/> | |
| <p>14. For a long time, my knowledge of pesticides in various constellations has influenced decisions on increasing the proportion of organic and Swedish in municipal and county-run kitchens.</p> | <p>Social welfare</p> |
| <hr/> | |
| <p>15. Since I am active in the field of functional rights - that is, rights for people with disabilities - I often become an expert on such issues. In my home municipality, I fought for 15 years to introduce activities with personal representatives for people with mental disabilities. This activity is central to the municipality being able to have a well-functioning social psychiatry, but without my drive it would never have been introduced.</p> | <p>Social welfare</p> |

Note: Entries are quotes from the expertise prime in study 2 (column 1) and the self-selected higher expertise issue selected from the list of 5 issues in study 1 (column 2).

Table E2: Share of respondents in the recollection experiment (study 2) who mentioned unprompted examples of expertise in the areas of higher/lower expertise, as measured in study 1

Issue area reported in study 1	Mentions in study 2	
	Full sample	Any of 5 issues
Higher expertise	36.2%	80.4%
Lower expertise	0.1%	1.9%

Note: Entries are the share of respondents in the recollection experiment who provided unprompted examples of expertise in the same issue area self-reported as higher/lower expertise in the previous wave. Column 1 includes subjects who participated in both waves and were randomly assigned to the expertise treatment. Column 2 restricts the sample to subjects who mentioned at least one of the 5 issue areas included in study 1.